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U.S. Military Strategy & Force Posture for the 21st Century: Capabilities & Requirements

by Richard Kugler

  1. People / Organizations:

  2. Quotes:

    • "Multipolarity has a long track record of instability" - Author (pg. xix)

    • "the harsh reality is that economic reform can normally be achieved only amidst political and social stability, and political reform normally can succeed only amidst economic and social tranquility" - Author (pg. 98)

    • "the U.S. is a maritime nation that depends on overseas commerce" - Author (pg. 195)

    • "the margin of victory in warfare is often narrow, and it normally turns on the capacity to  execute a coherent scheme of operational maneuver with high coordination, speed, and synchronization" - Author (pg. 201)

  3. Data Resources:

  4. General Notes:

    • "Designing a new strategy is especially difficult because major domestic and international changes are simultaneously at work, thereby denying planners the luxury of fixed assumptions about the future" (pg. xiii)

    • "the U.S. needs to relearn the lost art of strategy analysis, which investigates how complex military means can best be used to achieve complicated political ends" (pg. xiv)

      • "the static bipolar international system [during the later years of the Cold War] encouraged not only strategy continuity but also a lowering of our intellectual horizons" (pg. xiv)

    • "the U.S. changed its military strategy 4 times between 1947 and 1967" (pg. xiv)

    • Bush's Regional Strategy & Base Force (pg. xiv)

      • "was crafted during the tumultuous months in which the Soviet Union was collapsing and the Persian Gulf War was being fought…[it] postulated a future international system of broadly cooperative relations among the major powers but continued local tensions in key regions around the world…[it] called for continuing international engagement and activism [and] called upon the U.S. to maintain alliance commitments and a balance of power through forward presence…[which] called for a Base Force: a posture offering reduced reliance on nuclear forces and a continued conventional strength at a level about 25% less than the Cold War posture" (pg. xiv-xv, 30)

      • "the Bush administration…argued that the Base Force was needed not only to fight specific regional contingencies, but also to provide a flexible and diverse stable of military assets capable of meeting uncertain challenges" (pg. xv)

    • 5 Revolutionary Transformations (pg. xv)

      • "the nation-state system, while remaining fundamentally anarchic, is changing. Despite the spread of democracy, nondemocratic governments still rule in many places, including major parts of Eurasia and the Middle East" (pg. xv)

      • "not only in Europe, but elsewhere, bipolarity is giving way to multipolarity. With old constraints breaking down, many nations have greater freedom of action and fewer reassurances than before" (pg. xviii)

      • "new ideologies are emerging worldwide to rival democracy: ethno-nationalism, conservative authoritarianism, and Islamic fundamentalism" (pg. xviii)

      • "new economic powers are appearing" (pg. xviii)

      • Modern technology is spreading" (pg. xix)

    • "U.S. defense planning should not be anchored on the assumption that the current international system will remain in place for the coming two decades" (pg. xix)

    • 3 Core Security Objectives (pg. xxii)

      • Deterring regional threats.

      • Discouraging the emergence of any hegemon.

      • Preventing any slide in multipolarity rivalry.

    • Bush's Proposed New Security Principles (pg. xxiii, 28-29)

      • Regional Strategy Foundations:

        • Strategic deterrence

        • Forward presence

        • Crises response

        • Reconstitution

      • Regional Strategy Principles:

        • Readiness

        • Collective security

        • Arms control

        • Maritime and aerospace superiority

        • Decisive force

      • Proposed Strategic Foundations:

        • Protection of national interests

        • Partnership, cooperation, and community-building

        • Dissuasion through a stable balance of power

        • Threat-specific regional deterrence

        • Stalwart defense, crisis resolution, escalation control

        • Nuclear reassurance at low levels and nonproliferation

        • Industrial preparedness

      • Military Principles for 'Base Force':

        • Readiness

        • Capable balanced forces

        • Joint and combined operations

        • Full-spectrum contingency response

        • Proportional and decisive force

        • Sea-controlled and littoral projection

        • Responsive mobilization

        • Deliberate rearmament

    • "in Asia, U.S. strategy would aim to defend Japan and South Korea, deter North Korean aggression, dissuade China and Russia from malevolent conduct, and reassure friends in Southeast Asia and South Asia. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, U.S. strategy would aim to defend key friends and allies while deterring radical Arab aggression" (pg. xxiv)

    • "continued emphasis on NATO and other alliances is essential" (pg. xxv)

    • "U.S. military strategy should be anchored on the capability to respond flexibly" (pg. xxvi)

      • "the U.S. will need to retain sufficient flexibility to react to one Major Regional Contingency (MRC) in an atmosphere of international tensions elsewhere" (pg. xxvi)

    • Chapter 1: Introduction (pg. 1)

      • "the U.S. abandoned concern for its military strategy and suffered the consequences of inadequate preparedness when the Cold War broke out" (pg. 3)

      • "military strategy is best viewed as a component of national security policy. It is a vehicle by which a nation employs military forces to pursue its international political and economic goals" (pg. 4)

        • "it should derive from an integrated set of judgements about U.S. national interests and objectives, military missions and doctrine, international dangers, enemy threats, and the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces." (pg. 4)

      • "throughout the Cold War, the national economy remained strong in absolute and relative terms" (pg. 6)

      • "the West won the Cold War because it subordinated national priorities to the larger cause of building security coalitions in Europe and Asia" (pg. 8)

      • "NSC 68 established the conceptual underpinnings for U.S. military strategy during the Cold War…[it] established containment, deterrence, collective security, and continental defense as core U.S. strategy concepts." (pg. 10) [116191.pdf (wilsoncenter.org)]

      • "in 1957, the U.S. and NATO adopted the strategy of Massive Retaliation (MC 14/2), which upgraded the importance of nuclear deterrence" (pg. 11) [a570523a.pdf (nato.int)]

      • "the goal of spreading democracy and partnership will remain a basic purpose of U.S. foreign policy" (pg. 7)

    • Chapter 2: The Regional Strategy (pg. 15)

      • "the 'Curve of Diminishing Return' postulates that there is a nonlinear between investment and security…that major security returns are experienced in the early stages of force building" (pg. 18)

      • "earlier in the Cold War the U.S. embraced the nuclear-oriented strategy of Massive Retaliation as its vehicle for pursuing containment, deterrence, and collective security. But by the early 1960's Massive Retaliation had become outmoded by the USSR's acquisition of a credible capability for nuclear retaliation…[when suddenly] Flexible Response provided the necessary spectrum of option. Like MR it was anchored in containment…but it took into account additional objectives [such as] forward defense, escalation control, and alliance cohesion. [FR also] struck a new balance between nuclear and conventional forces." (pg. 20)

      • "FR's adoption by NATO in 1967 was a controversial event" (pg. 21) [a670511a.pdf (nato.int)]

      • "by the mid-1980's, the U.S. was investing large fund into research and development on a new Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)" (pg. 22)

      • "President Bush first revealed the Regional Strategy in a speech at Aspen, Colorado on the day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait" (pg. 27) [Public Papers - George Bush Library and Museum (tamu.edu)] [a344614.tiff (defense.gov)]

      • "the foreign policy assumptions underpinning the Regional Strategy reflected the optimism of late 1990. The key military feature of the Regional Strategy is that the U.S. no longer would base its defense preparations on the need to fight a global war [but] would focus on preparing for Major Regional Conflicts (MRC's)." (pg. 28)

      • "Cheney called for a strategy aimed at shaping the international system by guiding it in the direction of stability, democracy, and cooperation" (pg. 34)

    • Chapter 3: Domestic Determinants (pg. 41)

      • "Clinton portrayed economic renewal as a means not only to restore domestic prosperity, but also to underwrite an assertive American role in world affairs." (pg. 42)

      • "the threats envisioned by Clinton included regional aggression, new belligerency from former Soviet republics, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, and local conflicts that might spill across borders. The missions endorsed by Clinton were to maintain nuclear deterrence, reassure allies and discourage potential adversaries, promote collective security, preserve freedom from the seas, protect U.S. economic interests, and provide U.S. technological superiority" (pg. 43)

      • "Clinton displayed an apparent greater willingness to employ U.S. forces in crises abroad" (pg. 45)

      • "1992 witnessed sharp debates over [Bush's] Regional Military Strategy & Base Force, culminating in the election of a new President committed to changes that amounted to a refinement of the current approach" (pg. 47)

      • "the Regional Strategy and Base Force [assumes] that [the] relationships among the major powers will be stable" (pg. 48)

    • Chapter 4: U.S. Interests in the Coming Era (pg. 57)

      • "U.S. security policy and military strategy should be anchored on our 'national interests'. The rationale is that interests transcend the disappearance of specific enemies and carry over from one era to the next regardless of how international and domestic conditions might change" (pg. 57)

      • "defense planning must begin with a careful definition of exactly what constitutes our national interests" (pg. 57)

      • "some interests are shaped by national values and visions" (pg. 58)

      • The Nature of U.S. Interests (pg. 59)

        • "the term 'interest' can be an asset or state of affairs…interests can be legitimate or illegitimate. Legitimacy is based on an inherent right deriving from sovereignty, physical circumstance, history, legal titles, and respect for other nations. Under international law and common diplomatic practice, legitimacy bequeaths the right to use military power to protect interests that are threatened by nations with illegitimate designs" (pg. 59)

        • "in his National Security Strategy of the United States, President Bush identified 4 interests and associated objectives as drivers for U.S. policy for the coming era" (pg. 59)

        • "these 4 interests are described in terms so abstract that they lack the specificity needed to develop usable guidelines for planning…also not provided is a sense of [relative] importance and priority" (pg. 60)

        • "for the military planner, the following question immediately arises: which interests justify the use of military force?" (pg. 60)

        • 5 Major Categories of Interests: (pg. 60-62)

          • National Survival - "mandates the use of all necessary forms of military power to ensure its protection" (pg. 60)

          • Vital Interests - "their loss might not immediately threaten national survival, but eventually might" (pg. 61)

            • "current trends suggest that future military threats to these interests will be far less severe than was the case during the Cold War" (pg. 64)

          • Major Interests - "their loss would cause serious damage, but would not transparently pose a major threat to national survival and prosperity" (pg. 61)

            • "the decline in threats to vital U.S. interests will be accompanied by an expansion of the role played by major interests" (pg. 64)

            • "Ukraine is of special importance…[it] is equivalent to France in size and potential strength. A democratic Ukraine secure from external threats and able to exert a restraining hand on neighbors could contribute heavily to the quest for stability." (pg. 65)

          • Peripheral Interests - "their loss might hurt, but would not inflict serious damage" (pg. 61)

          • Insubstantial Interests - "their loss would not harm the nation as a whole" (pg. 62)

        • "continuity [in U.S. defense planning] will come from 2 sources: 1) national survival will remain the bedrock goal of U.S. defense policy, and 2) America's vital interests, which are dictated heavily by geostrategic considerations, will retain their traditional character" (pg. 62)

        • "during the 19th century, the U.S. primarily embraced a policy of isolationism [which was] anchored on the assumption that it did not have vital interests beyond its borders worth defending" (pg. 63)

    • Chapter 5: The Future International System (pg. 75)

      • "an international equation previously anchored on a few constraints is being replaced by a far more complex equation, composed of many variables and unclear relationships, with unknown coefficients and exponents" (pg. 75)

      • "the Regional Strategy expects a more peaceful world achieved through a combination of undiminished partnership with current allies and growing collaboration with former global adversaries" (pg. 78)

      • "these three geographic areas are not the Regional Strategy's sole focus. Nonetheless, the MRC's stemming from these areas pose the greatest military threats to the U.S." (pg. 78, 114)

        • Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Southwest Asia & the Persian Gulf, Korean Peninsula (pg. 78)

      • "stability means an absence of major violence and serious threats to legitimate U.S. national interests" (pg. 79)

      • "an issue for debate is whether democracy brings about pacific foreign policies, or whether an already tranquil regional setting makes democracy possible" (pg. 81)

      • "in 1920, there were only 64 nation-states. By the early 1960's, the number had grown to 110, and today stands at 145.this explosive growth owes to the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian, Turkish, and Soviet empires in Europe, and to the independence movements that swept over Africa and Asia as imperialism receded after WWI and WWII…the result has been to greatly increase the number of actors on the world stage, all of them pursuing foreign policies and interacting with each other." (pg. 82-83)

      • "the great issue is whether this development - the appearance of more nation-states - will translate into growing order or anarchy" (pg. 83)

      • "the emergence of multinational corporations and complex trade patterns has created a web of interlocking economic relationships that cut across national borders and limit national soveriegnty" (pg. 83)

      • "political pluralism" (pg. 83)

      • "to the extent that multilateralism prevails, it will be because nation-states pursue this course as a policy instrument, not because collective institutions are strong enough to prevent them from doing otherwise" (pg. 84)

      • "interdependence brings many nations into greater contact with each other, thereby making them more vulnerable to the behavior of their neighbors" (pg. 85)

      • "Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a product of radical Arab nationalism, not Islamic fundamentalism" (pg. 96)

      • "the principle threat to international stability posed by nationalism is that democracy and benign external conduct will fail to take hold in Russia and China" (pg. 98)

    • Chapter 6: A Spectrum of Alternative Futures (pg. 111)

      • "a Russian invasion that doesn’t threaten NATO's borders would fall short of activating Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Any Western response therefore would fall into the category of an ad hoc operation under Article 4" (pg. 116)

      • "the growing importance of economics and maritime commerce suggests that sea battles might make a comeback" (pg. 119)

      • Worlds of the Future International System (pg. 120)

        • Global Harmony

        • Reduced Regional Tension

        • Enhanced Regional Tension

        • Renewed Rivalry with Russia

        • Unstable Multipolar Rivalry

    • Chapter 7: Refining U.S. Strategy (pg. 127)

      • "a military strategy is only as good as the strategic concept that brings it to life. Typically, a strategic concept is composed of assertions that: 1) illuminate the chief international problem, 2) forge linkages between security policy and defense strategy, 3) provide a credible theory regarding how military power can support national policy and strategy, and 4) establish a sense of priorities" (pg. 128)

        • "it must articulate clear relationships between ends and means, and it must strike an acceptable balance between idealism and realism, optimism and conservatism, and capability and affordability" (pg. 128)

      • "just as isolationism and protectionism were inappropriate in the past, they are unlikely to work in the future" (pg. 135)

      • "whereas the Regional Strategy places the dominant emphasis on forward presence, the new approach emphasizes the need to blend forward presence and power projection from the U.S." (pg. 139)

      • "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons means that conventional forces will become the centerpiece of future U.S. military strategy" (pg. 143)

      • "U.S. doctrine should be anchored on the decisive and proportional use of force" (pg. 149)

        • "this approach implies a flexible stance toward the development of military plans" (pg. 150)

      • "the concept of battlefield synergy through joint [operations] provides a guiding criterion for shaping the doctrines of the individual services" (pg. 152)

    • Chapter 9: Force Capabilities (pg. 181)

      • "two methodologies [for determining conventional force size] have dominated public literature: threat-based contingency analysis & resource-based capability analysis" (pg. 185)

      • Threat-Based Contingency Analysis (pg. 186)

        • "determines U.S. military requirements on the basis of an in-depth examination of postulated wartime situations" (pg. 186)

        • "the strength of this methodology lies in its ability to be explicit and quantitative" (pg. 186)

        • "Korea, Vietnam, and Kuwait…have led to a central argument against contingency analysis - it produces tunnel visions and too often calls the shots wrong" (pg. 187)

      • Resource-Based Capability Analysis (pg. 193)

        • "anchored on the premise that the future is too uncertain to permit confident forecasts or wars [so] it focuses on building a force posture that will be strong and flexible" (pg. 193)

      • Mission-Based Capability Analysis (pg. 194)

        • "rather than asking 'what kind of posture do we seek?' it asks 'what kind of military missions do we want to be able to perform in peace, crisis, and war?'" (pg. 195)

        • "its chief postulate is that the U.S. will need a conventional posture capable of handling general problems that will manifest themselves in different ways" (pg. 195)

        • "is anchored on the premise that defense policy and strategy must be crafted in the face of great uncertainty and international ambiguity" (pg. 195)

    • Chapter 10: Maximizing Effectiveness in Forces (pg. 209)

      • "this analysis examines options that reduce the Base Force by an overall amount of 10-15%" (pg. 209)

      • 6 Force Reduction Options (pg. 211)

        • Reduced Base Force

          • "this option would cause the least disruption [as] it imposes and equal across-the-board reduction" (pg. 213)

        • Ground-Oriented

          • "this option preserves ground forces…[and] reduced the Air Force and Navy" (pg. 214)

        • Maritime-Oriented

          • "in exchange for a larger Navy, it provides a marginally smaller Army and Air Force" (pg. 214)

        • Air-Oriented

        • Enhanced Reserve Component Forces

        • New Roles and Missions

          • "anchored on the assumption that the current practice of overlapping role and missions promotes jointness, and avoids any streamlining that would unduly sacrifice this attribute" (pg. 217)

  5. Further Readings:

War: Ends & Means: Text
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