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Political Theory and International Relations (Part 1)

by Charles Beitz

  1. People / Organizations:

  2. Quotes:

    • "states have common interests" - Author (pg. 49)

    • "it is wrong to conceptualize international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature" - Author (pg. 49)

    • "states are more than aggregations of persons" - Author (pg. 52)

    • "the national interest is often invoked to justify disregard of moral principles that would otherwise constrain choices among the alternative foreign policies" - Author (pg. 54)

    • "the invocation of the national interest does not necessarily justify disregard of other moral standards" - Author (pg. 55)

    • "states qua states do not think or will or act in pursuit of ends; only people, alone or in groups, do these things" - Author (pg. 76)

    • "political autonomy is not a sufficient condition of a regime's legitimacy" - Author (pg. 120)

    • "it is wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social justice to the nation-state; instead, these principles ought to apply globally" - Author (pg. 128)

  3. Data Resources:

  4. General Notes:

    • Introduction (pg. 3)

      • "the only problem in international relations to have gained significant theoretical attention is the justification and prevention of war - the main form of social intercourse in the global state of nature" pg. 3)

      • "political theory arises from a perception of the possibility of choice in political affairs" (pg. 4-5)

      • "an important function of the political theorist is to formulate and examine alternative principles and to illuminate the reasons why some [choices] are more persuasive than others" (pg. 5)

      • "this book is intended to help lay the groundwork for a more satisfactory normative political theory of international relations" (pg. 6)

    • Chapter 1 - International Relations as a State of Nature (pg. 11)

      • "the state, like other institutions that can affect people's well-being and their rights, must satisfy certain moral requirements if we are to consider it legitimate" (pg. 13)

        • "the normative component of political theory is the search for such standards and for the reasoning that forms their justification" (pg. 13)

      • "skepticism about international morality derives from a variety of sources, such as cultural relativism, apprehension about the effects of 'moralism' on foreign policy, the view that rulers have an overriding obligation to follow the national interest, and the idea that there can be no moral principles of universal application in a world order of sovereign states" (pg. 13)

      • "the Hobbesian argument for international skepticism combines two premises:" (pg. 14)

        • "the first is the empirical claim that the international state of nature is a state of war [or competition], in which no state has an overriding interest [or incentive] in following moral rules that restrain the pursuit of more immediate interests" (pg. 14)

        • "the second is the theoretical claim that moral principles must be justified by showing that following them promotes the long-range interests of each agent to whom they apply" (pg. 14)

      • "I shall argue that each premise is wrong" (pg. 14)

      • The Skepticism of the Realists (pg. 15)

        • "moral judgements have no place in discussions of international affairs or foreign policy" (pg. 15)

          • "this claim is one of the foundations of the so-called realist approach to international studies and foreign policy" (pg. 15)

        • "a [moral] theory must distinguish morality from egoism and explain how it can be rational to act on reasons that are (or might be) inconsistent with considerations of prudence or self-interest" (pg. 16)

          • "I shall proceed on the assumption that we share some basic ideas about the nature and requirements of morality (which I refer to as moral institutions)" (pg. 16-17)

        • "[cultural] differences are reflected in the structures of various legal systems and in the attitudes customarily taken by different cultures toward social rules, collective ideals, and the value of individual autonomy" (pg. 17)

          • "different cultures [thus] might have radically different conceptions of what morality is" (pg. 18)

        • "one need not embrace cultural relativism to maintain that moral judgements are inappropriate in international relations" (pg. 19)

        • "some realists begin with the assertion that it is unrealistic to expect nations to behave morally in an anarchic world" (pg. 19)

          • "[Hans] Morgenthau argues that international morality is largely a thing of the past and that competing national interests are now the main motives in world politics" (pg. 19)

        • "Machiavelli holds that princes are justified in breaking the moral rules that apply to ordinary citizens when they do so for reasons of state" (pg. 22)

          • "the private virtues - liberality, kindness, charity - are vices in the public realm because their observance is inconsistent with the promotion of the well-being of the state" (pg. 22)

          • "Machiavelli's view and its contemporary variants are not forms of international skepticism [as] they do not deny that moral judgements are appropriate in international relations; instead, they maintain that moral evaluations of a state's actions must be cast in terms of the relation between the state's actions and its own interests" (pg. 22)

        • "what is distinctively moral about a system of rules is the possibility that the rules might require people to act in ways that do not promote their individual self-interest" (pg. 23)

          • "what is needed to vindicate the national interest view is an argument to show that following the national interest always does produce morally right action in international relations" (pg. 23)

        • "it seems that what leaders may rightfully do for their people, international of domestically, is limited by what the people may rightfully do for themselves" (pg. 24)

          • "what the skeptic wants to maintain is that the definition and pursuit of the national interest is not subject to any moral conditions" (pg. 25)

          • "a consistent skepticism about international ethics must maintain that there are no moral restrictions on a state's definition of its own interests, that is, that a state is always morally justified in acting to promote its perceived interests" (pg. 25)

            • "the international skeptic might claim that certain peculiar features of the international order make moral judgements inappropriate" (pg. 25)

            • "national sovereignty is often claimed to be such a feature" (pg. 25)

          • "it is difficult to see why the fact of competing national sovereignties should entail there being no sense at all in moral evaluation of international action" (pg. 27)

      • The Hobbesian Situation (pg. 27)

        • "according to Hobbes, the state of nature is defined by the absence of a political authority sufficiently powerful to assure people security and the means to live a felicitous life" (pg. 28)

        • "morality is a system of rules that promote each person's overriding interests, and hence to which each person has reason to adhere, only when everyone complies with them" (pg. 29)

          • "a condition of the rationality of acting on moral rules is that one have adequate assurance of the compliance of others" (pg. 29)

          • "such [moral] principles are not effective when there are no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance" (pg. 33)

        • "the moral problem posed by Hobbes's theory is how to create conditions in which the laws of nature would be effective" (pg. 33)

      • International Relations as a State of Nature (pg. 35)

        • "if these conditions are not met by international relations, then the analogy between international relations and the state of nature does not hold, and the prediction that international relations is a state of war does not necessarily follow" (pg. 36)

          • 4 Conditions:

            • "the actors in international relations are states" (pg. 36)

            • "states have relatively equal power" (pg. 36)

            • "states are independent of each other in the sense that they can order their internal affairs independently of the internal policies of other actors" (pg. 36)

            • "there are no reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance by the actors with rules of cooperation in absence of a superior power capable of enforcing these rules" (pg. 36)

        • "I shall argue that contemporary international relations does not meet any of these conditions" (pg. 36)

          • "the first [condition] establishes the analogy between the state of nature and international relations by identifying the states as the actors in international relations just as individuals are the actors in the interpersonal state of nature" (pg. 36-37)

          • "transnational political activity is unlikely to promote international cooperation in the absence of perceptions by national decision makers of significant shared interests that would justify such cooperation" (pg. 40)

          • "[however,] the nation-states can no longer be regarded as the only, or as the ultimate, actors in international relations, since their actions may be influenced significantly by pressures from groups that represent transnational interests" (pg. 40)

          • "it is increasingly true that the security and prosperity of any one state depends to a greater or lesser extent on that of some or all other states" (pg. 42)

            • "the interdependence of state interests has recently been illustrated in the broad area of economic and welfare concerns" (pg. 43)

          • “power may be defined, very roughly, as an actor’s capacity to cause other actors to act (or not to act) in ways in which they would not have acted (or would have acted) otherwise” (pg. 44)

          • "the actors in international politics, their forms of interaction and competition, their power, and the goals the system can promote have all changed" (pg. 48)

            • "this new complexity, which has both analytical and normative importance, is likely to be obscured if one accepts the model of international relations as a state of nature in which the only major problem is war" (pg. 49)

      • The Basis of International Morality (pg. 50)

        • "the difficulty is that it is not clear what such a [national] right involves or how it can be justified" (pg. 52)

          • "at a minimum, [states] are characterized by territorial boundaries and a structure of political and economic institutions" (pg. 52)

        • "the national interest is often invoked to justify disregard of moral principles that would otherwise constrain choices among the alternative foreign policies" (pg. 54)

        • "the ambiguity concerns the scope of 'national survival'" (pg. 55)

          • "when [national survival] means 'the survival of the state's citizens', the view seems prima facie acceptable" (pg. 55)

          • "when 'national survival' extends further the view's prima facie acceptability dissipates precisely because the survival of persons is no longer at issue" (pg. 55)

        • "the invocation of the national interest does not necessarily justify disregard of other moral standards" (pg. 55)

          • "what is required is a balancing of the rights and interests" (pg. 55)

          • "it would seem preferable to dispense with the idea of the national interest altogether and instead appeal directly to the rights and interests of all persons affected by the choice" (pg. 55)

        • "nothing is gained, and considerable clarity is lost, by attempting to justify principles of international conduct with reference to their effects on the interests of states. It is the rights and interests of persons that are of fundamental importance from the moral point of view, and it is to these considerations that the justification of principles for international relations should appeal" (pg. 55)

        • "the moral point of view requires us to regard the world from the persepctive of one person among many rather than from that of a particular self with particular interests" (pg. 58)

        • "from the point of view of self-interest, one chooses that action or policy that best serves one's own interests…from the moral point of view, on the other hand, one views one's interests as one set of interest among many and weighs the entire range of interests according to some impartial scheme. Both points of view are normative in the sense that they may impose requirements on action - for example, by requiring [one] to subordinate some immediate desire to some other consideration" (pg. 58)

          • "there is a gap between the structure of moral choice and the content of the rules…that should be chosen to govern various realms of action" (pg. 59)

      • From International Skepticism to the Morality of States (pg. 63)

        • "moral requirements on action can have justifications other than the rational self-interest of the agent" (pg. 64)

        • "two basic features of the morality of states are:" (pg. 65)

          • "the principle of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in international society are to be treated as autonomous sources of ends, morally immune from external interference, and morally free to arrange their internal affairs as their governments see fit" (pg. 65-66)

          • "the absence of any principle of international distributive justice: in the morality of states, each state is assumed to have a rights to the wealth of its territory, and there are no moral rules regarding the structure and conduct of economic relations between states" (pg. 66)

Political Theory and International Relations (Part 2)

  1. General Notes:

    • Chapter 2 - The Autonomy of States (pg. 67)

      • "[there is] the idea that states, like persons, have a right to be respected as autonomous entities" (pg. 69)

      • "while the idea of state autonomy is widely held to be a fundamental constitutive elements of international relations, I shall argue that it brings a spurious order to complex and conflicting moral considerations" (pg. 69)

        • "intervention, colonialism, imperialism, and dependence are not morally objectionable because they offend a right of autonomy, but rather because they are unjust" (pg. 69)

        • "state autonomy…is a derivative of more basic principles of justice" (pg. 69)

      • State Autonomy and Individual Liberty (pg. 71)

        • "I propose a criticism and reconstruction of the idea of state autonomy by exploring the moral foundations of the principle of nonintervention" (pg. 71)

          • "this principle is the most important embodiment of the modern idea that states should be treated as autonomous entities; it is also the main structural principle of a conception of the world" (pg. 71)

        • "bilateral economic aid has been claimed to constitute an instrument of intervention because political conditions are often attached" (pg. 73)

        • "perhaps intervention could aim at inducing a government to change a particular policy against its will, at altering the balance of power between competing groups or classes, or at producing a change in the structure of economic activity within a state" (pg. 73)

        • "this approach attempts to define intervention so that any and all actions and policies that constitute impermissible interference in a state's internal affairs count as intervention" (pg. 74)

        • "we are likely to think that a person's liberty to pursue his own ends without interference is an important good…and that there is no moral warrant for interfering with a person's liberty" (pg. 75-76)

        • "states qua states do not think or will or act in pursuit of ends; only people, alone or in groups, do these things" (pg. 76)

        • "it is the consent of the individual citizens that provides the underpinnings of the state's autonomy and secures the analogy with individual liberty" (pg. 77)

          • "it is natural to think that a state's autonomy might be defended in terms of the liberties of [those] persons [that comprise to make up the state]" (pg. 77)

          • "the liberty of states is a consequence of the liberty of persons to [which it] associate[s]" (pg. 77)

        • "institutions themselves stand in need of justification, but such a justification cannot be provided in terms of consent" (pg. 79)

          • "few, if any governments can be shown to be morally legitimate by appeal to considerations of actual or tacti consent" (pg. 79)

          • "the weakness of the argument from [individual] consent to [state] legitimacy also undermines the argument from [individual] consent to [state] autonomy" (pg. 79)

        • "violation of a state's autonomy by an external agent cannot be criticized simply because it involves the exercise of coercion against persons without their consent…[because] domestic government would be subject to a similar criticism" (pg. 79)

          • "if legitimate domestic governments exercise coercive power over their own citizens without their consent, and if illegitimate violations of autonomy by external agents might be described in precisely the same way, how can one form of coercion be distinguished from the other?" (pg. 80)

        • "a government is legitimate if it would be consented to by rational persons subject to its rule" (pg. 80)

          • "it is because all persons should be respected as sources of ends that we should not allow all states to claim a right of autonomy" (pg. 81)

        • "if one keeps in mind that states, unlike persons, lack the unity of consciousness and the rational will that constitute the identity of persons…it should come as no surprise that this lack of analogy leads to a lack of analogy on the matter of autonomy" (pg. 81)

      • Nonintervention, Paternalism, and Neutrality (pg. 83)

        • "there are three main arguments for a general prohibition of intervention in international relations" (pg. 83)

          • "the first…draws on the idea that states, like persons, have a right to be respected as autonomous sources of ends" (pg. 83)

            • "however, as I have suggested, a state's claim to autonomy in this sense rests on the conformity of its institutions with appropriate principles of justice" (pg. 83)

          • "Mill claims that [a] government is not justified in interfering with a person's self-regarding behavior…[as] the individual is in a better position than anyone else, and certainly than any government, to determine his own interests." (pg. 84)

            • "[thus,] intervention in a state's internal affairs cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds because the intervening state is unlikely to be impartial and because, in any event, a state is more likely to know its own best interests than any other state" (pg. 84)

            • "in a world characterized by high levels of political and economic interdependence, one wonders whether there can be any pure cases of domestic political change, untouched by significant external influence" (pg. 87)

          • "we might say that the virtue of a generalized nonintervention principle is its impartiality between competing conceptions of the good in international relations" (pg. 87)

            • "an exceptionless nonintervention principle cannot be supported by arguments analogous to those usually given for the principle of equal liberty in domestic society" (pg. 89-90)

        • "if the target state is neither just nor likely to become just if left to its own devices, the situation is more complicated. Interference would be permissible on three conditions:" (pg. 92)

          • "first, it must meet the standards noted above (i.e., promote justice and be carried out with adequate information and assurances against self-serving actions by the intervening agent)" (pg. 92)

          • "second, it must not run afoul of other relevant moral restraints on political action" (pg. 92)

          • "third, it must not be too costly in terms of the other goals of international politics" (pg. 92)

      • Self-Determination (pg. 92)

        • "concepts of liberty are sometimes divided into 'negative' and 'positive' varieties" (pg. 92)

          • "the negative aspect of state autonomy is expressed by the principle of nonintervention" (pg. 92)

          • "the positive aspect of state autonomy is expressed by the principle of self-determination" (pg. 92)

        • "while nonintervention takes the political order as it is, self-determination looks behind the political order to the order of social groups and supports efforts to bring political boundaries into alignment with boundaries between groups" (pg. 93)

        • "in summary, claims of a right of self-determination, when pressed by or on behalf of residents of a colony, are properly understood as assertions that the granting of independence would help reduce social injustice in the colony" (pg. 104)

      • Eligibility, Boundaries, and Nationality (pg. 105)

        • "voluntary associations are not territorial groups: they do not normally have to live together on a separate territory or to deprive others of the territory they inhabited" (pg. 109)

        • "typically cases of self-determination, on the other hand, have an essential territorial component" (pg. 109)

          • "a group's claim to be recognized as an independent political entity is accompanied by a claim that boundaries be redrawn to afford a separate territory to the independent group" (pg. 109)

        • "the common characteristics approach to the eligibility problem may fit better with the history of self-determination but it does not avoid the problems associated with territoriality" (pg. 111)

          • "[however,] the fact that people have in common some important characteristic does not imply anything about their political preferences" (pg. 111)

        • "[another] issue raised…is whether diversity of nationality threatens the possibility of maintaining representative institutions sufficiently to warrant extending the principle of self-determination to national groups regardless of whether they occupy well-defined areas" (pg. 114)

      • Economic Dependence (pg. 116)

        • "the effects of foreign investment and multinational corporate activity…interfere with 'the ability of a nation-state as a collectivity to make decisions which shape its political and economic future'" (pg. 116)

          • "states that are not autonomous in this respect are termed 'dependent': such a state 'is one which does not have control over the major decisions affecting its economy'" (pg. 116)

        • "[regarding] the right of self-determination…it is not obvious what such a right requires, who is eligible to claim it, or why we should object to offenses against it" (pg. 119)

        • "it is necessary to judge regimes…by more substantive criteria than the simple criterion of political autonomy…these criteria are supplied by the principle of justice appropriate to the society involved" (pg. 119)

        • "political autonomy is not a sufficient condition of a regime's legitimacy" (pg. 120)

      • State Autonomy and Domestic Social Justice (pg. 121)

        • "I have argued that the principle of state autonomy - the central element of the morality of states - lacks a coherent moral foundation" (pg. 121)

        • "unjust institutions do not enjoy the same prima facie protection against external interference as do just institutions" (pg. 121)

          • "the nonintervention principle cannot be interpreted properly without considering the justice of the institutions of the states" (pg. 121)

        • "other concepts related to the ideal of state autonomy - self-determination and economic dependence - also require reference to principles of justice" (pg. 121)

          • "the strongest moral argument for self-determination is that political independence is necessary for the elimination of social injustice and for the development of just institutions" (pg. 121)

          • "the strongest moral argument against economic dependence is that the associated forms of international economic relations produce or support unjust domestic institutions" (pg. 121-122)

        • "the analogue of individual autonomy, at the level of states, is conformity of their basic institutions with appropriate principles of justice" (pg. 122)

    • Chapter 3 - International Distributive Justice (pg. 125)

      • "it is no part of the morality of states that residents of relatively affluent societies have obligations founded on justice to promote economic development elsewhere" (pg. 127)

      • "I shall argue…that persons of diverse citizenship have distributive obligations to one another analogous to those citizens of the same state" (pg. 128)

        • "international relations is coming more and more to resemble domestic society in several respects relevant to the justification of principles of (domestic) social justice" (pg. 128)

      • "it is wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social justice to the nation-state; instead, these principles ought to apply globally" (pg. 128)

      • Social Cooperation, Boundaries, and the Basis of Justice (pg. 129)

        • "society is typically marked by both an identity and a conflict of interest" (pg. 130)

        • "principles of justice determine a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens produced by 'social cooperation'" (pg. 131)

      • Entitlements to Natural Resources (pg. 136)

        • "[John] Rawls's objection is that those who are less advantaged for reasons beyond their control cannot be asked to suffer the pains of inequality" (pg. 137)

        • "resource endowments are arbitrary in the sense that they are not deserved" (pg. 139)

          • "the fact that national societies are assumed to be self-sufficient does not make the distribution of natural resources any less arbitrary" (pg. 140)

      • Interdependence and Global Distributive Justice (pg. 143)

        • "interdependence in trade and investment produces substantial aggregate economic benefits in the form of a higher global rate of economic growth" (pg. 145)

        • "direct foreign investment in the guise of multinational corporate expansion appears in some instances to exacerbate international inequality" (pg. 146)

      • Contrasts Between International and Domestic Society (pg. 154)

        • "there is an array of processes and institutions through which states and other political actors attempt to influence one another and which, directly or indirectly, affect the prospects of the persons who live within their scope" (pg. 154)

          • "these processes and institutions range from war and coercive diplomacy to ad hoc bargaining and transnational organizations" (pg. 154)

        • "some function must be fulfilled to make possible the implementation of global principles, but these functions need not be fulfilled through mechanisms like those familiar in domestic society" (pg. 157)

      • The Rights of States (pg. 161)

        • "the difference principle itself recognizes the probability that differential rates of reward may be needed as incentives for contribution; it requires only that the distributive inequalities that arise in such a system be to the greatest benefit of the world's least advantaged group" (pg. 162)

        • "citizens of a society cannot base their claims to a larger distributive share than that warranted by the difference principle on morally arbitrary factors" (pg. 163)

          • "[however,] one might point out that the sentiment of nationality is stronger than that of humanity and argue that the difference principle therefore applies in full force only inside national societies" (pg. 164)

          • "one might say that an international difference principle can only command redistribution of the benefits derived from international social cooperation or economic interaction. It cannot touch the benefits of domestic cooperation" (pg. 165)

            • "[however,] the amount of social and economic interaction in a cooperative scheme does not provide a straightforward index of the strength of the distributive principle" (pg. 166)

      • Applications to the Nonideal World (pg. 169)

        • "thus far, we have reached two main conclusions:" (pg. 169)

          • "first…Rawls's derivation of the principles of justice for the law of nations is incomplete" (pg. 169)

            • "he neglects resource redistribution" (pg. 169)

          • "second, the self-sufficiency assumption, upon which Rawls's entire consideration of the law of nations rests, is not justified by the facts of contemporary international relations" (pg. 170)

        • "the state-centered image of the world has lost its normative relevance because of the rise of global economic interdependence" (pg. 170)

        • "for the purpose of moral choice, we must, instead, regard the world from the perspective of an original position from which matters of national citizenship are excluded by an extended veil of ignorance" (pg. 176)

    • Conclusion (pg. 177)

      • "I have argued that prevailing theoretical conceptions of international relations are inadequate and lead to incorrect normative principles of international practice. A more satisfactory normative theory of international politics should include a notion of state autonomy explicitly connected with considerations of domestic social justice, and principles of international distributive justice that establish a fair division of natural resources, income, and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies" (pg. 179)

      • "I argued that the idea that all states have a right of autonomy is incorrect because the analogy of states and persons is imperfect. States are not sources of ends in the same sense as are persons. Instead, states are systems of shared practices and institutions within which communities of persons establish and advance their ends" (pg. 180)

  2. Further Readings:

    • Leviathan, by T. Hobbes

    • Perpetual Peace, by I. Kant

    • On Liberty, by J. S. Mill

    • A Theory of Justice, by J. Rawls

    • A Few Words on Non-Intervention, by J. S. Mill [The Collected Works Of (oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com)] (pg. 194)

    • Power and the Pursuit of Peace, by F. H. Wolfers

    • The Legal Community of Mankind, by W. Schiffer

    • The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations, by E. B. F. Midgley

    • The Philosophy of International Relations, by F. Parkinson

    • International Law, by W. E. Hall

    • The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, by I. Kant

    • The History of Peace, by A. C. F. Beales

    • Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by R. Nozick

    • The Liberal Theory of Justice, by B. Barry

    • The Elements of Politics, by H. Sedgwick

    • Power and International Relations, by I. L. Claude

    • The Growth of International Thought, by F. M. Stawell

    • Just and Unjust Wars, by M. Walzer

    • Philosophers of Peace and War, by W. B. Gallie

    • War and Morality, ed. By R. Wasserstrom

    • War and Moral Responsibility, ed. By M. Cohen & T. Nagel & T. Scanlon

    • Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs, ed. By V. Held & S. Morgenbesser & T. Nagel

    • Realities of American Foreign Policy, by G. F. Kennan

    • The Philosophy of Altruism, by T. Nagel

    • Ethical Theory, by R. B. Brandt

    • The Twilight of International Morality, by H. Morgenthau [Morgenthau_The Twilight Of International Morality.pdf (american.edu)]

    • The Necessary Amorality of Foreign Affairs, by A. Schlesinger, Jr.

    • Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes, by J. Kertzer & K. Powers & B. Rathbun & R. Iyer [IBD-13-0683 1..12 (usc.edu)]

    • Politics Among Nations, by H. Morgenthau

    • Power and Interdependence, by J. Nye

    • Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy, by C. Frankel

    • In Defense of the National Interest, by H. Morgenthau

    • The Prince, by N. Machiavelli

    • Ethics, by W. K. Frankena

    • Transnational Relations and World Politics, ed. By R. O. Keohane & J. S. Nye

    • Beyond the Nation-State, by E. B. Haas

    • Working Peace System, by D. Mitrany

    • The Philosophical Philosophy of Hobbes, by H. Warrender

    • The Logic of Leviathan, by D. Gauthier

    • New Forces in World Politics, by S. Brown

    • The Nation State and National Self-determination, by A. Cobban

    • The Moral Point of View, by K. Baier

    • The Changing Structure of International Law, by W. Friedmann

    • The Law of Nations, by J. L. Brierly

    • The Concept of Law, by H. L. A. Hart

    • Moral Beliefs, by P. Foot

    • Are There Any Natural Rights?, by H. L. A. Hart

    • Two Treatises of Government, by J. Locke

    • Natural Law and the Theory of Society, by O. Gierke

    • Of the Law of Nature and Nations, by S. Pufendorf [Of the Law of Nature and Nations - Google Books]

    • Neoclassical Realist Theory and the Limits of Structural Realism, by N. M. Ripsman & J. W. Taliaferro & S. E. Lobell

    • Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, by N. M. Ripsman & J. W. Taliaferro & S. E. Lobell

    • Structural Realism [Structural Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]

    • Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism, by S. E. Lobell [Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism | Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies]

    • The Morality and Politics of Intervention, by M. Halpern

    • Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, by C. Wolff

    • The Principles of Political Thought, by S. I. Benn & R. S. Peters

    • The Philosophical History of the State, by B. Bosanquet

    • Philosophy of Right, by F. Hegel [Hegel's Philosophy of Right - Google Books]

    • National Character and the Factors in its Formation, by E. Baker

    • Nationalism and Social Communication, by K. W. Deutsch

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