

# The Theory of Knowledge: A Thematic Introduction, by Paul Moser & Dwayne Mulder & J. D. Trout

## a. People / Organizations:

- Plato - Philosopher (pg. 4) [[Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus \(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\)](#)]
- Rene Descartes - Philosopher (pg. 7)
- Socrates - Philosopher (pg. 9)
- Bertrand Russell - Philosopher / Mathematician (pg. 29)
- W. V. Quine - Philosopher (pg. 29)
- Richard Rorty - Philosopher (pg. 29)
- Rudolf Carnap - Philosopher (pg. 32)
- Philip Kitcher - Philosopher (pg. 34)
- Roderick Chisholm - Philosopher (pg. 36)
- William Alston - Philosopher (pg. 37)
- Brand Blanshard - Philosopher (pg. 69)
- Charles Peirce - Philosopher (pg. 81)
- Edmund Gettier - Philosopher (pg. 96)
- Moritz Schlick - Philosopher (pg. 108)
- William Beaumont - U.S. Army Surgeon (pg. 109)
- G. E. Moore - Philosopher (pg. 157)
- Thomas Reid - Philosopher (pg. 157)

## b. Quotes:

- "everyone has some stake in distinguishing truth from error, wisdom from ignorance, and the path to knowledge from the path to ignorance" - Authors (pg. 4)
- "if the truth is relative, say, to your own beliefs, then your prospects for acquiring knowledge are much better than if truth is objective and thus difficult to acquire" - Authors (pg. 12)
- "believing is a logically necessary condition for knowing...[however,] belief is not sufficient" - Authors (pg. 15)
- "for a true belief to be knowledge, it must have what philosophers call justification, warrant, or evidence" - Authors (pg. 15)
- "as long as we have some goal in life, epistemology will have value for us" - Authors (pg. 38)
- "epistemology sheds light on the relevant distinction between genuine knowledge (or, recognition) and merely apparent knowledge" - Authors (pg. 38-39)
- "in any discipline in which knowledge is valuable, epistemology will contribute by way of elucidating the conditions, sources, and limits for genuine knowledge...[where] such disciplines as physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and theology will benefit from epistemology" - Authors (pg. 39)
- "perception is a source of beliefs" - Authors (pg. 89)
- "intuition...is a special faculty of perception" (pg. 112)
- "rationalism states that nonempirical reason is the source of all knowledge, whereas empiricism states that sensory experience is the source of all knowledge" - Authors (pg. 101)
- "rationality is often determined only relative to some basic worldview, or ontology. Specification of rational or justified belief often presupposes a basic metaphysical framework" - Authors (pg. 179)

## c. General Notes:

- Chapter 1 - Epistemology: A First Look (pg. 1)
  - "skepticism challenges familiar assumptions about knowledge" (pg. 1)
  - Why Study Knowledge (pg. 2)
    - "we believe, and perhaps even know, many things on the basis of authority" (pg. 2)
    - "whether knowledge is picked up from someone else or acquired more directly, we recognize value in 'possessing' knowledge" (pg. 2)
    - "philosophers typically look at the nature of knowledge generally, asking what is required for a person genuinely to know that something is true rather than false" (pg. 3)
      - ◆ "to pursue truth judiciously...we need principles indicating when we ought to accept something as true" (pg. 3)
    - "philosophers call the theory of knowledge 'epistemology'" (pg. 3)
      - ◆ "characterized broadly, epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge" (pg. 4)
    - "Indian (Hindu) philosophy...deals extensively with questions in epistemology and logic similar to many of the topics in classical and contemporary European and American philosophy" (pg. 4)
  - Some Doubt about Knowledge (pg. 5)
    - "what is commonplace knowledge to us was...incomprehensible to our ancestors. They made confident claims to know some of the things we now know to be wrong" (pg. 6)
    - "Descartes...ended up requiring something akin to what we call 'certainty' as a condition for philosophical knowledge: in particular, certainty as indubitability, the absence of possible doubt about correctness. Another kind of certainty requires infallibility, the absence of any real possibility or error" (pg. 7)
    - "most contemporary epistemologists have rejected the demand for certainty as a prerequisite of knowledge" (pg. 7)
      - ◆ "setting the prerequisites of knowledge very high can lead to the view that we have no knowledge" (pg. 7)
    - "the philosophical position that people cannot or at least do not have knowledge is skepticism" (pg. 8)
      - ◆ "total skepticism denies the existence of any human knowledge" (pg. 8)
      - ◆ "partial skepticism denies that existence of only some particular type or types of knowledge" (pg. 8)
    - "Pyrrhonian skepticism emphasizes suspension of judgement on most matters" (pg. 9)
    - "skeptical challenges to knowledge are instructive, because they raise difficulties at least for our initial, naïve explanations of how knowledge arises" (pg. 10)
    - "a relativist concerning truth asserts that the truth of a claim can hold only relative to some knower or perhaps to some group of knowers. The relativist about truth denies that there is 'absolute' truth (that is, truth that does not vary from person to person)" (pg. 11)
      - ◆ "relativism makes truth very easy to get and, correspondingly, it makes knowledge easy to get" (pg. 12)
    - "skepticism flourishes with a view of truth as entirely objective" (pg. 13)
      - ◆ "a skeptic might say that all we ever have to go on, in our quest for objectivity, is our limited experience and that the truth, the objective fact of the matter, always stands beyond that experience" (pg. 13)

- ◆ "philosophers commonly distinguish two kinds of skepticism: knowledge skepticism and justification skepticism" (pg. 13)
      - ◇ "knowledge skepticism asserts that no one knows anything" (pg. 13)
      - ◇ "justification skepticism asserts that no one is ever justified in believing anything" (pg. 13)
- Traditional Definition of Knowledge (pg. 14)
  - "Epistemology in the Western philosophical tradition has until recently offered a prominent definition of knowledge that analyzes knowledge into three essential components: justification, truth, and belief" (pg. 14)
    - ◆ "this definition is called the 'tripartite analysis of knowledge'" (pg. 14)
    - ◆ "the traditional analysis of propositional knowledge implies that knowledge is a species of belief" (pg. 14)
      - ◇ "[thus,] believing is a logically necessary condition for knowing...[however,] belief is not sufficient" (pg. 15)
  - "to know something, to have genuine knowledge, we must be correct in what we believe" (pg. 15)
    - ◆ "[thus,] the second essential condition for knowledge...is truth" (pg. 15)
  - "[lastly,] for a true belief to be knowledge, it must have what philosophers call justification, warrant, or evidence" (pg. 15)
- Knowledge and Experience (pg.17)
  - "knowledge depending on experience is called 'a posteriori' knowledge" (pg. 17)
  - "knowledge that does not depend on experience is called 'a priori' knowledge" (pg. 17)
  - "a central philosophical question is how sensation leads to perception of our surrounding environment" (pg. 21)
    - ◆ "many philosophical topics fit under the heading of problems of perception. Another important source of knowledge is memory...[and] testimony from other people is also an important source of knowledge" (pg. 21)
- Intuitions and Theory (pg. 21)
  - "we should not be causal in our reliance on our intuitions" (pg. 21)
  - "the main point is that our common-sense intuitions about the nature of knowledge can themselves be adjusted, corrected, or even rejected in light of our acceptance of more general, theoretical claims about the nature of knowledge" (pg. 22)
- Chapter 2 - Explaining Knowledge (pg. 23)
  - "a theory of knowledge should, at a minimum, clarify the difference between genuine knowledge and merely apparent knowledge" (pg. 23)
- The Scope of Epistemology (pg. 24)
  - "an epistemology will explain what unites the various potential domains of knowledge" (pg. 25)
  - "the scope, or breadth, of an epistemology is determined by the range of potential domains of knowledge it explains" (pg. 25)
- Epistemology, Naturalism, and Pragmatism (pg. 29)
  - "replacement pragmatism affirms the pointless and hence dispensability of philosophical concerns about how the world really is and recommends the central philosophical importance of what is profitable, advantageous, or useful" (pg. 30)
    - ◆ "replacement pragmatism implies that a proposition is acceptable to us if and only if it is useful to use" (pg. 30)
  - "many reductive naturalists hold that the only real things in the world are the lower-level constituents (for example, electrons and protons) of higher-level phenomena (for example, individual humans and social groups)" (pg. 34)
    - ◆ "on their view, such terms as 'belief' and 'justification' involve just common-sense, practical ways of relating to a reality better characterized by the physical sciences" (pg. 34)
- Value in Epistemology (pg. 36)
  - "the deontological approach...does not, however, require that beliefs be under our direct control...[rather,] it requires only that belief formation be, in some way, indirectly controllable by us, perhaps in the way that many habits are under our indirect control" (pg. 36)
    - ◆ "such an approach must not confuse epistemically justified belief with excusable belief [where] a belief might be excusable even if it lacks supporting evidence" (pg. 37)
  - "[William] Alston links epistemic goodness to a belief's being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons to the contrary" (pg. 37)
    - ◆ "the key notion of adequate grounds guarantees that the resulting epistemology will be evaluative and hence normative" (pg. 38)
- Chapter 3 - Belief (pg. 41)
  - "beyond ordinary perceptual beliefs, we have scientific, moral, political, and theological beliefs" (pg. 41)
- Belief and Representational States (pg. 42)
  - "a belief...is about some state of affairs" (pg. 42)
  - "one prominent view in the philosophy of mind...[is] each of the 'propositional attitudes', [which] philosophers call such psychological states as belief, desire, hope, and fear, is fully specified by two features: psychological relation and propositional content" (pg. 42)
    - ◆ "the difference between such propositional attitudes are reflected in the ways you think...and act" (pg. 42)
    - ◆ "it is not the propositional attitude that would make such mental states different; it is rather the relevant propositional content, the propositions to which the attitude is related" (pg. 42-43)
  - "there can be as many particular beliefs as there are possible objects of belief" (pg. 43)
  - "philosophers and psychologists have studied belief in its various cognitive roles: in attitude formation, induction, contribution to bias, and a host of other psychological processes" pg. 43)
  - "the kind of information beliefs bear depends, at least in part, on the way they represent the world" (pg. 43)
  - "not all mental states are beliefs. We [also] have desires, hopes, fears, and other propositional states" (pg. 44)
    - ◆ "all such states are representational in that they supply a kind of map, or scenario, of some part of the world" (pg. 44)
  - "beliefs are inherently propositional" (pg. 44)
    - ◆ "they are representational psychological states that may or may not be manifested in overt behavior" (pg. 44)
    - ◆ "beliefs seem akin to some habits we have in that they involve tendencies to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances" (pg. 44)
- Belief and Belief Ascription (pg. 45)
  - "we should distinguish between belief and its attribution, that is, between belief and belief ascription" (pg. 45)
    - ◆ "we thus should not conclude simply from a useful tendency to attribute beliefs 'as if' they were held by certain people that they are actually held by those people" (pg. 46)
  - "the attribution of beliefs and preferences to others, including others from a radically different culture, challenges us to translate the utterances of others into language we can understand" (pg. 46)
- Are Beliefs Transparent? (pg. 47)
  - "sometimes the best explanation of our behavior requires the attribution of an attitude to us that is not immediately introspectable by us" (pg. 48)
    - ◆ "some philosophers have proposed that our mental states are immediately introspectable - a view sometimes called 'the transparency thesis'...[which says] we can know what we believe simply by looking inward" (pg. 48)

- Belief and Theoretical Ideals (pg. 50)
  - "it would be epistemologically irresponsible to claim that an 'approximately' true assertion is not 'really' true" (pg. 51)
    - ◆ "accuracy is typically achieved at the expense of greater time" (pg. 51)
  - "the pragmatic, or context-sensitive, feature of knowledge manifests a lesson about the theory dependence of justification: our theoretical purposes, or goals, determine what degree of support or reliability is required for a belief to be justified" (pg. 51)
  - "the important point is twofold: beliefs are dispositional and representational, and we appear to have cognitive states with representational contents not transparent to us" (pg. 54)
- Eliminativism and Prediction (pg. 54)
  - "eliminativist philosophers hold that our beliefs are brain states and that we shall someday discover that there is nothing even like belief as we currently conceive it" (pg. 54)
  - "in sum, then, we have seen that beliefs are inherently representational and that they should not be confused with mere ascription of beliefs. As dispositional states, our beliefs are not always immediately accessible to us, but this lack of transparency does not challenge the reality of beliefs" (pg. 57)
- Chapter 4 - Truth (pg. 59)
  - "belief is a prerequisite for knowledge" (pg. 59)
  - Relativism (pg. 61)
    - "two people in different situations can use the same standards, or methods, for discerning the truth and get different results" (pg. 63)
      - ◆ "their different determinations can be accounted for in terms of their different situations. If the standards that these two people used in identifying what is true also serve as conditions definitive of what is true, then we reach the relativist's conclusion" (pg. 63)
      - ◆ "[if] the truth-defining and truth-identifying criteria are the same for [each person]...[then] we should admit the possibility of differences between people in their determinations of what is true" (pg. 63)
    - "the remainder of this chapter is concerned with finding the defining criteria for truth" (pg. 64-65)
  - Truth and Correspondence (pg. 65)
    - "according to a longstanding tradition about what it is for a statement to be true, there must be some appropriate correspondence between true statements and actual features of the world" (pg. 65)
      - ◆ "[remember,] a statement may be 'approximately' true, and a correspondence definition of truth must have the resources to accommodate this fact" (pg. 65)
    - "the correspondence definition of truth has its roots in Aristotle's...Book IV of the Metaphysics" (pg. 65)
    - "despite its intuitive appeal, the correspondence definition of truth faces some difficulties" (pg. 66)
      - ◆ "the first problem is that it is difficult to spell out exactly what the relation of correspondence between a statement (or belief) and the world amounts to" (pg. 66)
  - Truth and Coherence (pg. 69)
    - "[some philosophers] have defined truth in terms of a relation between statements" (pg. 69)
    - "the coherence definition of truth claims that a statement is true if and only if it stands in an appropriate relation to some system of other statements" (pg. 69)
      - ◆ "the appropriate relation is called coherence" (pg. 69)
      - ◆ "a statement coheres with a system of other statements if and only if it follows logically from that system of statements or logically implies some subset of that system" (pg. 69)
      - ◆ "the trademark of coherentism about truth is that it does not define 'truth' in terms of a special relation between statements and the nonpropositional world, but rather in terms of systematic interconnectedness of statements" (pg. 70)
        - ◇ "[thus,] the main problem, however, concerns what system of statements a statement must cohere with to be true" (pg. 70)
        - ◇ "if the relevant system comes from some individual's set of beliefs, then truth will be relevant to individuals" (pg. 70)
    - "any version of the coherence definition of truth must specify the defining conditions for the truth-making coherent system of statements" (pg. 71)
  - Truth and Pragmatic Value (pg. 72)
    - "the pragmatic definition of truth asserts that a statement is true if and only if it is useful in a certain way" (pg. 72)
      - ◆ "pragmatists emphasize that truth is a certain kind of validation or verification that ideas receive when they are put to use in our interacting with the world" (pg. 72)
      - ◆ "the pragmatic definition of truth is relativist because the relevant kind of usefulness definitive of truth can vary from person to person and from culture to culture" (pg. 72)
- Chapter 5 - Justification and Beyond (pg. 77)
  - Justification, Truth, and Defeat (pg. 77)
    - "genuine knowledge requires not only truth and belief, but also that the satisfaction of the belief condition be appropriately related to the satisfaction of truth condition" (pg. 77)
      - ◆ "that is, on the traditional approach, genuine knowledge requires that a knower have an 'adequate indication' that a believed proposition is true" (pg. 77)
      - ◆ "[it] is evidence indicating that a proposition is true" (pg. 77)
    - "we may distinguish between deductive and inductive justification" (pg. 78)
    - "justification differs from truth, which does not change with changes in evidence. Your beliefs about what is true may change with changing evidence, but it does not follow that the truth concerning what you believe itself changes too" (pg. 79)
  - Inferential Justification and the Regress Problem (pg. 79)
    - The Regress Problem (pg. 80)
      - ◆ "some skeptics have used a regress argument to contend that we are not justified in believing any proposition implying the existence of the external world" (pg. 80)
      - ◆ "the fundamental skeptical worry underlying the regress argument is this: if one's belief that external objects exist is supposedly justified on the basis of another belief, how is the latter allegedly justifying belief itself justified?" (pg. 80)
        - ◇ "we [thus] seem threatened by endless regress of required justifying beliefs" (pg. 80)
      - ◆ "contemporary epistemologists have offered four general replies to the regress problem" (pg. 81)
    - Epistemic Infinitism (pg. 81)
      - ◆ "states that regresses of inferential justification are infinite, but that this does not undermine genuine justification" (pg. 81)
      - ◆ "no matter how far back we go in an endless regress of inferential justification, we find beliefs that are only conditionally justified: that is, justified if, and only if, their supporting beliefs are justified" (pg. 81-82)
        - ◇ "at every moment in the endless chain, according to skeptics, we find a belief that is merely conditionally justified, and not actually justified" (pg. 82)

- Epistemic Coherentism (pg. 82)
  - ◆ "the view that all justification is a system dependent in virtue of 'coherence relations' among beliefs" (pg. 82)
  - ◆ "[coherentists] claim that all justification of beliefs depend on coherence within a system of beliefs" (pg. 82)
  - ◆ "typically we can trace the specific reasons for our beliefs only through a short line of justifying beliefs, or inferential justifications. We quickly arrive at rather general beliefs deeply entrenched in our basic view of the world, a view that seems to be justified largely by the way its constituent beliefs 'hang together' as a coherent comprehensive portrait of the world" (pg. 82-83)
    - ◇ "such beliefs lead rather to a network of beliefs" (pg. 83)
    - ◇ "we evidently rely on broad portraits of how things generally are in order to support claims about specific situations" (pg. 83)
  - ◆ "[whereas] a coherence theory of truth...aims to specify the meaning of 'truth' or the essential nature of truth...a coherence theory of justification, in contrast, aims to explain the...kind of justification essential to knowledge" (pg. 83)
    - ◇ "the nature of logical entailment [is when] one belief logically entails another if the truth of the first guarantees the truth of the second" (pg. 84)
    - ◇ "explanatory coherence relations obtain when some of our beliefs effectively explain why some other of our beliefs are true" (pg. 84)
  - ◆ "epistemic coherentism implies that the justification of any belief depends on that belief's coherence relations with other beliefs" (pg. 85)
    - ◇ "such coherentism is thus system oriented, emphasizing the role of interconnectedness of beliefs" (pg. 85)
- Epistemic Foundationalism and Reliabilism (pg. 86)
  - ◆ "foundationalism about epistemic justification states that such justification has two tiers:" (pg. 86)
    - ◇ "some instances of justification are non-inferential, or foundational" (pg. 86)
      - ▶ "a non-inferential...belief is justified...[not] by means of inference from or dependence on other beliefs...[but] in virtue of its special relation to one's perceptual experience, which is not itself a belief" (pg. 86)
    - ◇ "other instances of justification are inferential, or non-foundational" (pg. 86)
  - ◆ "foundationalists typically characterize a non-inferentially justified, foundational belief as a belief whose epistemic justification does not derive from other beliefs" (pg. 88)
    - ◇ "we thus should avoid a confusion of (a) what a belief's justification derives from and (b) what the causal basis of a belief's existence is" (pg. 88)
  - ◆ "proponents of foundational justification by reliable origins hold that non-inferential justification depends on belief-forming sources...[which] is called epistemic reliabilism" (pg. 89)
    - ◇ "reliabilism...invokes the reliability, or truth conduciveness, of a belief's source" (pg. 89)
      - ▶ "many reliabilists divide over what exact 'kind' and 'degree' of truth conduciveness confers epistemic justification" (pg. 89)
    - ◇ "[the] nonreliabilist view invokes the particular perceptual experience that underlie a foundational belief" (pg. 89)
      - ▶ "the nonreliabilist, in sharp contrast with reliabilism, allows that perceptual experience could justify a belief even if perception turned out to be unreliable" (pg. 89)
  - ◆ "a longstanding problem confronts versions of foundationalism [which] restrict non-inferential, or foundational, justification to subjective beliefs about what one 'seems' to see, hear, feel smell, or taste" (pg. 93)
    - ◇ "such subjective beliefs do not logically entail beliefs about physical objects...[as it is] always possible that one's subjective beliefs are true while the relevant beliefs about physical objects are false" (pg. 93)
- Epistemic Contextualism (pg. 94)
  - ◆ "according to contextualism, in any context of inquiry, the people involved simply assume some propositions as starting points for their inquiry" (pg. 94)
  - ◆ "contextualists emphasize that contextually basic propositions can vary from social group to social group and from context to context" (pg. 94)
    - ◇ "a key problem for contextualism come from the view that 'unjustified' beliefs can yield epistemic justification for other beliefs" (pg. 94)
    - ◇ "if any unjustified proposition can serve as a justifier, we shall be able to justify anything we want" (pg. 94)
  - ◆ "in sum...infinism, coherentism, foundationalism, or contextualism may offer a viable solution to the [regress] problem" (pg. 95)
- Supplementing Justification: The Gettier Problem (pg. 95)
  - "[some] recommend...that we construe the justification condition as a causal condition" (pg. 95)
  - "in sum...we have seen that justification is subject to defeat, or undermining, in a way that truth is not" (pg. 99)
- Chapter 6 - Sources of Knowledge (pg. 101)
  - Rationalism, Empiricism, and Innatism (pg. 101)
    - "rationalism states that nonempirical reason is the source of all knowledge, whereas empiricism states that sensory experience is the source of all knowledge" (pg. 101)
      - ◆ "basic empiricism states that we do not have knowledge of reality through the nonempirical use of reason" (pg. 102)
        - ◇ "knowledge of reality, according to basic empiricism, derives from sensory experience and from the empirical use of reason" (pg. 102)
      - ◆ "basic rationalism...affirms that such knowledge is available to us" (pg. 102)
    - "the issue is whether we can know synthetic propositions independently of sensory experience" (pg. 103)
    - "rationalists emphasize the role of reason, and empiricists emphasize the role of sensory experience" (pg. 103)
      - ◆ "let's characterize the empirical use of reason as either (a) processes of thinking about the objects of sensory experience or (b) processes of deductive or inductive reasoning from premises deriving from the former processes of thinking" (pg. 103)
  - Empiricism, Positivism, and Underdetermination (pg. 106)
    - "logical positivists who formed the Vienna Circle...[use] various analytical techniques to restrict philosophical pursuits to the advancement of 'scientific' knowledge, thereby banishing metaphysical concerns from philosophy" (pg. 107)
      - ◆ "the logical positivists' doctrines have had a lasting influence on empiricist epistemology" (pg. 107)
      - ◆ "if there is no way of telling when a proposition is true, then the proposition has no sense whatever; for the sense of a proposition is its methods of verification" - Friedrich Waismann (pg. 107)
        - ◇ "if metaphysical claims about gods, souls, essences, values, and the like lack a methods of verification, one can use the verification principle to dispense with those claims as meaningless" (pg. 107)
      - ◆ "the Vienna Circle...construed the needed method of verification as a method of justification, or confirmation, in terms of observable events" (pg. 107-108)
  - Intuitions and First-Person Reports (pg. 111)

- "epistemological arguments often begin with what philosophers call 'intuitions' about the nature of knowledge" (pg. 111)
  - "intuition...is a special faculty of perception" (pg. 112)
- Memory (pg. 112)
  - "memory seems to have a feature of first-person privilege" (pg. 113)
  - "contribution of memory to knowledge must take account of such complex theoretical issues in the nature of memory: particularly, the reliability of memory, its vulnerability to suggestion, and the damage that can result from Misleading Post-event Information (MPI)" (pg. 114)
- Theoretical Unification (pg. 114)
  - "the theoretical preference widely shown for explanations that unify otherwise disparate data is favorable" (pg. 116)
- Testimony and Social Dependence (pg. 117)
  - "sometimes we must rely on others if we are to be epistemically responsible" (pg. 117)
  - "a noteworthy means of justification and knowledge is called triangulation" (pg. 118)
    - ◆ "it suggests that if we come to the same conclusion by diverse methods then the probability that this convergence is a coincidence may be correspondingly lower and perhaps even rationally negligible" (pg. 118)
  - "the social dependence of knowledge helps us greatly in acquiring significant truths, and methods such as triangulation protect us from having too many false beliefs" (pg. 122)
- Chapter 7 - Rationality (pg. 123)
  - Preliminary Distinctions (pg. 123)
    - "portrayed broadly, rationality is reasonableness" (pg. 123)
    - "we can illuminate relations between epistemology and the theory of rationality by examining...deduction, induction, normative and descriptive assessment, bias, and sensitivity to cultural and social context" (pg. 126)
  - Rational Inference: Normative and Descriptive (pg. 127)
    - "all inductive arguments are deductively invalid" (pg. 130)
    - Principle of Instrumental Rationality - "if you intend that a situation, X, occur and you believe, in agreement with your evidence, that another situation, Y, is the most effective means to X, then you rationally should aim to have Y occur" (pg. 130)
  - Consistency and Wayward Beliefs (pg. 132)
    - "our mental states have contents, and those contents represent the world in a certain way. To explain someone else's behavior, thereby identifying a rationale for it, we must characterize the contents of that person's mental states" (pg. 132)
    - "philosophers widely agree that we should hold beliefs that are at least consistent, particularly that we should not embrace contradictory views" (pg. 133)
    - "the attribution of beliefs and preferences to others challenges us to translate their language into language we can understand" (pg. 133)
  - Rationality and Decision Under Uncertainty (pg. 135)
    - ◆ "Herbert Simon has faulted modern decision theory on the grounds that humans rarely have available the facts, consistent preferences, and reasoning power required by standard decision theory. He contends that human rationality is 'bounded' in that it [often] does not require utility maximization or even consistency" (pg. 136)
  - Base-Rate Fallacy (pg. 138)
    - ◆ "for the support of a causal claim...we need to compare the relative frequency of [a] property in the population to the frequency of that property in the general population. The latter measure is called the base rate" (pg. 138)
    - ◆ "we might find that 14 percent of commercial pilots suffer heart disease and conclude that commercial piloting and heart disease are causally related...but [find that] the heart disease of the general population is 12 percent, [thus,] our conclusion would be the result of what is called the base-rate fallacy" (pg. 138)
  - Availability Bias (pg. 139)
    - ◆ "when reasoning causally, we typically draw from a body of experiences that has not been organized with accurate statistical representation" (pg. 139)
    - ◆ "memory allows only certain experiences to be retained, most often because they are especially memorable or available" (pg. 139)
    - ◆ "one of the most powerful influences prompting an availability bias is the phenomenon of framing" (pg. 140)
      - ◇ "framing is the process whereby a problem is presented to an audience, preparing them to see a certain range of possible options, solutions, evidential bearing, and so on" (pg. 140)
  - Confirmation Bias (pg. 140)
    - ◆ "researchers who expected to see a certain phenomenon tended to overestimate the frequency of confirming instances of their hypothesis" (pg. 141)
  - Judgement Under Uncertainty and Task Demands (pg. 141)
    - ◆ "our rationality consists in our having [such] rules, [but] not in our always performing in ways that display rational judgement" (pg. 146)
- Chapter 8 - Skepticism (pg. 149)
  - Some Species of Skepticism (pg. 149)
    - "the more restricted we take the scope to be, the more skeptical we are. So, if we restrict knowledge to claims about our subjective experiences...we are very skeptical" (pg.149)
      - ◆ Knowledge Skepticism
        - ◇ "unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no one knows anything" (pg. 149)
      - ◆ Justification Skepticism
        - ◇ "no one is even justified in believing anything" (pg. 150)
    - "more moderately, a knowledge skeptic might hold that we simply do not know anything with certainty, where certainty is either indubitability, infallibility, or irreversibility" (pg. 150)
  - Some Skeptical Arguments (pg. 151)
    - "how can we specify what we know without having specified how we know" (pg. 152)
      - ◆ "it seems that an identification of a particular case of knowledge requires your having general standards for when a belief counts as knowledge. In addition, your having general standards for when a belief counts as knowledge apparently depends on your having already identified and examined particular cases of knowledge" (pg. 153)
    - "particularism begins with particular cases of knowledge that we can identify, and uses these to infer answers to general questions of how we know" (pg. 153)
    - "an view opposing particularism is called methodism" (pg. 154)
      - ◆ "it begins with an answer to the general question of how we know, by specifying the general methods by which we acquire

