

# Philosophy and Sociology, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations: <https://platypus1917.org/wp-content/uploads/Adorno-Theodor-W.-Philosophy-and-Sociology.pdf>

b. Quotes:

- "I believe that what distinguishes the positivistic spirit from the spirit of philosophy is this notion that the subject must effectively eliminate itself in order to attain the truth, whereas philosophy holds that the object only reveals itself at all through its exposure to the power and freedom of the subject. This is one of the most crucial distinctions here" - Author (pg. 27-28)
- **"...we must first earn a living for ourselves before we can start thinking at all..."** - Author (pg. 30)
  - "...we are compelled to do certain things that allow us to earn a living, in other words, to function within the existing order; and this remains the case even if we do not restrict our thinking to the immanent demands of the system in which we find ourselves but reflect critically upon that system as philosophy enjoins us to do. On the other hand, we thereby find that our soul is deprived of 'its God-given right', as Hölderlin puts it, that the innermost dynamic of thought is somehow stifled or cut off." - Author (pg. 30)
    - **"...the contradiction that I pointed out for you is not one that is produced by thinking, by the discipline of sociology, but is actually the contradiction inherent in society – a society whose understanding of reason, of ratio, has been shaped by the concept of a binding and comprehensive idea of truth, but one where reason is also always tied and limited in a particularistic way to merely instrumental rationality"** - Author (pg. 30-31)
- "I like to cite the remark of Helvétius that the truth never hurt anyone except the one who told it" - Author (pg. 31)
- **"...philosophy is ultimately nothing but rigorous self-conscious reflection upon the actual world, upon what you encounter in the experience of your own field of research or investigation"** - Author (pg. 35)
- **"A human being who is truly free, who is not fettered in a positivistic sense, does take joy in thinking, can experience happiness whenever something is revealed that cannot just be read off from the facts that are presented to us."** - Author (pg. 43)
  - "since it remains easier not to learn anything in the world rather than to come to learn something in the world, this latter danger seems in the general intellectual condition of the age, in this present moment, to be more pressing than the danger of vanity or hubris which thinkers such as Comte have emphasized" (pg. 43)
- "...a deployment of statistics which has forgotten the process of abstraction inevitably involved really runs the danger of becoming a fetish and leading to the sort of assertions which crop up all too often in empirical social research under the name of 'spurious correlations', i.e. statistical correlations, which in reality are quite devoid of meaning" - Author (pg. 73)
- **"it is only critical reflection that can reveal that this relation of equivalent exchange cannot possibly be equivalent, can show in other words that the labour time the worker provides is greater than the labour time that is required for the reproduction of his own life. Thus the worker necessarily gives more than he or she receives,** and the entire gigantic process of capitalism, of the accumulation of capital, actually rests on this 'more' which has thus specifically been defined as surplus value" - Author (pg. 101)
  - "...the congealed labour which already enters into the productive process and is always more than the immediate expenditure of the worker's labour, together with the so-called natural resources...involve[s] more than merely individual achievements. For these are categories which actually spring from the whole process of society, from the totality of the productive process. And this totality of the productive process thus appears to the particular individual employer as if it were naturally given, as something over which he has no power, so that he cannot genuinely and in all honesty imagine that he gives less than he receives in this transaction. But the illusion lies precisely in the way that this natural given is a socially mediated given; in other words, what the employer offers the worker and what the latter claims as remuneration already expresses the underlying class relationship and the entire developed form of exchange society or developed market society." - Author (pg. 101-102)
  - "I want to really emphasize this point because it is here – and I believe this is decisive for understanding the relationship between philosophy and sociology – that you discover a central social reality which cannot be grasped at all in the usual common and garden sociologies. And this is that **the social totality, in other words, the interconnection of all the subjects that engage in exchange here, is prior to the economic behaviour of the individual subject.** The forms of behaviour of the individual employer and the individual worker can really be derived only from this totality, yet the usual positivistic form of sociology attempts to reach some more or less objective social insights only by abstracting from the forms of behaviour of individual human beings, whether this be individual employers, individual workers or some third party. But then the question of ideology – and this is a quite decisive point – becomes a question of theory" - Author (pg. 102)
- "...the heritage of the great tradition of philosophy is preserved in the critical theory of society" - Author (pg. 106)
  - "...what this means, I believe, is essentially this: that the aforementioned problems of constitution have become problems internal to society. In other words, the theory of ideology is not interested in showing how particular interests lead us to misrepresent certain situations or circumstances which unfold in the context of some already existing relation between people and things...On the contrary, the essential thing here, and the thing you really need to understand if you are to grasp the concept of ideology in its full import and thereby avoid a merely subjectivistic interpretation of ideology, is that **the categories of cognition themselves are intrinsically pre-formed by society as a whole, and also in particular by the relations of social production which are actualized at the expense of truth.** According to this theory, **truth is to be found in the social forces of production, there where human life actually produces and reproduces itself, whereas this realm of social production is obscured or concealed by the forms within which it takes place. But these forms effectively precede all individual consciousness, all individual intention, all subjectivity in such a way that ideology inevitably arises by virtue of the social totality.** In other words, every actual ideology in the strong sense inevitably emerges because in a sense we are unable to think outside the context of this a priori framework – and I deliberately use this expression from the great modern tradition of philosophy – outside the context of the a priori categories of bourgeois society. And it is only because these a priori categories lead to internal contradictions – which is where Hegel comes in – such as the contradiction I presented to you earlier regarding the positions of the worker and the employer in the process of production; it is only by recognizing these contradictions that it is possible for us to break through this universal context of delusion which surrounds us" - Author (pg. 107)
- "...contemporary sociology of knowledge in the positivist sense...is essentially subjectivistic in character" - Author (pg. 108)
  - "I would argue that positivism as a whole is subjectivistic in orientation. Here I am using the expression 'subjectivistic' in the sense in which Hegel speaks about the mere 'philosophy of reflection'" - Author (pg. 108)
    - "For the positivist will typically say something like this: 'It is you speculative thinkers, you who like to talk about a totality that you never really have a firm handle on, that basically think in a purely subjective fashion; it is you who simply see the world in your own terms. It is we, on the other hand, who concern ourselves with the facts as they are given, the facts that can be observed and verified in accordance with the method of the natural sciences.' In other words, the positivist will try and turn the tables here and claim: 'You are the true subjectivists, namely those who have no rigorous notion of truth at all.' Now this conception on the part of positivism seems to me quite false" - Author (pg. 108)
  - "I would say, therefore, that even with these recent forms of positivism we are still talking about a rather shameless subjectivism, and that one could

- show that these ultimate criteria are criteria of mere subjectivity where the further question regarding the objective connections in which such criteria stand is basically avoided" - Author (pg. 110)
- "...**positivism as a whole, in concentrating on such fixed immediacies in this way, is in reality a reified or thing-like form of thinking**, in spite of Hume's critique of the concept of thing" - Author (pg. 110)
    - "the positivistic approach to the facts of consciousness and the forms of consciousness, to the prevailing ideologies insofar as they can be identified, to the behaviour, the attitudes, and on occasion even the practical motivations of human beings, is essentially focused on individual subjects, while at the same time it neglects the relationship of these individual subjects to one another and the factors which govern this relationship" - Author (pg. 111)
      - "the resulting universal propositions or regularities are abstracted from the individual subjects without its being acknowledged whether or to what extent these individual subjects are already pre-formed by the overall context or relationship in which they stand to one another; in other words, if I may use this expression once again, to what extent they are pre-formed by the relations of social production" - Author (pg. 111)
  - "public opinion...to a considerable extent is nothing more than a reflex of the existing relations of power, does not have much directly to say about truth" - Author (pg. 112)
    - "On the other hand, we must also add – which brings me back to Hegel's point that public opinion must be respected too – that the subjective consciousness of human beings also contains a certain truth content. Thus a theory which simply ignores or overrides the consciousness that human beings have with regard to themselves is just as deluded as the opposite approach is obtuse – the approach which simply takes human beings à la lettre, just as they rate or assess themselves, as people like to put it" - Author (pg. 113)
  - "If the intellectual and cultural things in our experience assume any life at all for us, this life actually consists in their relation to the social world" - Author (pg. 117)
  - **"I believe you cannot do better than take the expressions of mind and culture seriously in themselves and try to explore their truth and their untruth, their inner coherence or their incoherence. The path which offers insight with regard to ideology is not that of abstract classification but the path of determinate critique"** - Author (pg. 119)
    - *\*Adorno approaches this through dialectics* [https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063\\_e154ae09aa164fbf867f05236b7a3de0.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_e154ae09aa164fbf867f05236b7a3de0.pdf)
    - "The only appropriate approach to the things of mind or spirit is one that tries to explore their immanent truth content, their immanent substance" - Author (pg. 119)
  - "I would specifically like to warn you about the danger of apologetic thinking. In other words, I would like to warn you against regarding thought as a means or instrument that is meant to provide you with something or other, that you can firmly hold on to, that will basically reconfirm for you something that is already in force, something which has already been confirmed by the tradition. For **it is an essential and distinctive character of thought that it remains open**. And **to think in accordance with premises which already effectively sanction the result of thought...even before it has abandoned itself to its own movement**, to think in this way is to engage in pseudo-activity, to indulge in a spurious kind of thinking altogether." - Author (pg. 121)
    - **"...you must summon the intellectual courage to avoid letting your thought simply be dictated to or regulated in advance by everything one is already supposed to endorse or believe..."** -Author (pg. 121)
      - "in all of the judgements you make you should beware of this ominous 'as' which invariably belongs to the sphere of heteronomy – the heteronomy which you have effectively relinquished as soon as you seriously undertake to study something, in other words, as soon as you seriously attempt to understand something on the basis of your own reason and your own knowledge, although we are constantly in danger of falling back into such heteronomy under the overwhelming pressure of the world in which we live. That the power of thinking may destroy something, whatever it may be, is no argument against this thinking if such destruction appears compelling – that is, if the thing itself calls for destruction. For destruction of this kind, if we are talking about genuine thinking here rather than a merely sophistical exercise of ingenuity, is not an unmotivated play of thought that is simply intent on tearing something down, as people like to say. Rather, it is motivated by the thing itself, which is all that justifies such thinking. And if a thing is bad, it also deserves to be recognized in thought as the bad and inadequate thing that it is. When we try and avoid this, when we fail to confront it, and even regard such avoidance as a higher kind of ethos, we are acting more pharisaically rather than more ethically. And **if you learn anything at all in these lectures, it should be a fundamental self-criticism with regard to this attitude which threatens to reassert itself on all sides today to a quite disturbing degree**. The concept of 'the positive' which people love to employ in this connection has itself already assumed a rigid, ossified and reified form. Thus as soon as we start looking round for so-called values, we see that things which once enjoyed a substantial living presence within a culture have already become alienated from us, have already ceased to be binding on us, and are now abstractly fixed and retained as 'values'. I would almost say that, as soon as we explicitly start asking about values, we find that the values in question for that very reason no longer actually exist, that such things are only falsified when they are grasped in terms of the category of value, one which specifically derives from the sphere of political economy and, not by accident, reflects the mere relation of exchange. That we should have something solid to hold on to, that we want to bind ourselves to something reliable, cannot possibly be a criterion for anything" - Author (pg. 122)
    - **"science in the emphatic sense** – namely the kind of knowledge which is not limited simply to the acquisition of expertise or information – **really begins only when we move out into the open space of thought, when we completely relinquish the illusory notion that thought must yield or produce something wholly determinate** – like the profit we secure through haggling. Anyone who would measure thinking by this yardstick soon falls back into dogmatism, and I would just remind you that, with very good reason, Kant actually treated dogmatism and scepticism as equivalent to each other. The reason for this is simply that what I happen to accept dogmatically – when I take or believe something to be true without being involved in this truth myself, or without spontaneously recognizing this truth on my own part – can just as easily be replaced, according to the pragmatic considerations of the moment, by something else that is accepted in an equally blind and heteronomous way. Thus objectively speaking – once reason has abdicated its task of distinguishing between truth and untruth – we see how the dogmatic approach and the sceptical approach immediately pass over into each other. **A thinker who halts the process of thinking in order to preserve something or other – and today this has already shrunk to something as thin and meagre as being as such – has thereby merely abandoned thought to arbitrariness**. The thinker thus works against just what he had hoped to hold on to precisely by undermining its claim to truth. Thus he no longer even raises a claim to truth, but rather, for the sake of that reified possession of something he could not contemplate losing, he now just posits and manipulates it. **What is truly relativistic, ladies and gentlemen, is not the exercise of trenchant critical insight but the blind acceptance of a truth that could be just as easily exchanged for another one. Such a need actually reflects what I would describe as a reified consciousness, that is, a consciousness which no longer really achieves a living experience of objects. This consciousness is at once both rigid and changeable**; in other words, it operates with hard and fast categories yet is also intrinsically capable of arbitrarily exchanging certain aspects or moments for a whole range of different ones" - Author (pg. 122-123)
      - **"the reified consciousness** takes the object in advance as something rigid and alien to the subject, and typically as something conventional or externally approved; while, on the side of the subject, the reified consciousness actually comes to resemble a thing – in other words, increasingly adapts to the prevailing world of things, to the preponderant power of the existing order. In accommodating itself to what is as it now is, without any apparent alternative, such consciousness imagines that it can actually secure and acquire, in an external way, those normative features which have already been lost to it precisely because it cannot distinguish between true and false, because it no longer has access to

living experience" - Author (pg. 123)

- "...you must take care, and take care above everything else, to recognize the dangers of this reified consciousness, one which nowadays has developed an entire vocabulary for itself..." - Author (pg. 124)
- "...do everything you possibly can to resist this reification of consciousness, which has probably infected all of us in one form or another." - Author (pg. 124)

- "One has only to think, for example, of the division or separation of knowledge into a sphere of facts, which belong in sociology, and one of ideas, which belong in philosophy, or, again, of the separation between the question of genesis, which belongs in sociology, and the question of validity, which belongs in philosophy, or whatever other rigid dichotomies you care to mention. These **habitual modes of thinking**, which fundamentally underlie the controversy between sociology and philosophy, **are themselves actually nothing other than an expression of such reified consciousness**. And the most important task for the theory of knowledge today, with regard to human cultural and intellectual life generally, is surely to show that these rigid pairs of concepts which are effectively presented to us as if they had nothing to do with each other, in truth only represent the rupture between consciousness and objectivity. They merely mirror or reflect that state of alienation which the need for values, for being, for rootedness, for a sustaining centre, or whatever it may be, hopes to escape. This I believe is the central thought which should enable you to address the fundamental problem of philosophy and sociology with which you will surely continue to be confronted" - Author (pg. 124)

- **"This reified consciousness – this consciousness which seeks something it can rely on externally and hardens itself in the process, is simply the correlate of the administered world.** Thus what is relativistic here, if I may repeat the point, is certainly not the realm of living experience that resists such consciousness. On the contrary, we find that **there is actually a profound affinity between the blindness of a reified consciousness which simply accepts things without immanently engaging with them and a relativistic habit of thinking for which any truth can arbitrarily be replaced by another one.** And this holds for our attitude or position in relation to any theory. Today any theory can be snapped up and abused by reified consciousness." - Author (pg. 124-125)

- "The apologetic need that I have described as the real enemy of living consciousness is actually the expression of a weakened consciousness, an expression of anxiety, which nonetheless points back to an entire social order which we still have every conceivable reason to fear, just as we had before. It might initially be possible to repress this anxiety by looking for the sort of value system we mentioned and trying to take our bearings from that system. But such repression works no better than any other kind, as psychology teaches us: **the sense of security that we gain by finding something we can rely on, as we say, is paid for by an even greater sense of insecurity and anxiety when we realize that we do not really believe in what we are clinging to and have merely produced it because we need it. What is intellectually demanded of us, therefore, before we can even engage with the concept of ideology, is to open ourselves to the living experience of the thing itself instead of prejudging the matter by imposing external correlations upon it**" - Author (pg. 125)

- **"At various points in the course of these lectures I have claimed that society is antagonistic in the sense that, while ratio is constantly at work here as a means for controlling inner and outer nature, nothing has really changed in terms of the irrationality of society itself insofar as there is still no really transparent general social consciousness that would be capable of directing the social processes themselves"** - Author (pg. 137)

- "the more the rationality of the means, the more the particularistic rationality in society, as I would call it, continues to grow while society as a whole remains basically irrational, then the greater the contradictions become, and the greater the danger that this particularistic rationality will only produce more suffering for human beings and will eventually even destroy the whole interconnected system. One might also express this by saying that the particularistic forms of rationality within the prevailing irrationality of the whole mean that this irrationality becomes stronger rather than weaker. The situation today, when we can ourselves annihilate millions of human beings at a stroke, is more irrational than that of the past when some plague was also certainly capable of wreaking enormous destruction. This is because the contradiction between our potential for limiting or resisting death and the reality in which we could actually produce and organize it in countless ways has become more flagrant than ever. So we might say – to repeat the point – that, while the appearance of rationality constantly increases in our society through the particular way in which it functions, this society actually becomes ever more irrational at the same time through the growing contradiction between what is actual and what is possible" - Author (pg. 137)

- **"But if society itself today, in its objective form, can no longer really be measured or assessed in terms of its classical bourgeois concept of rationality, namely in terms of the rational calculation of exchange, then society to an increasing degree also eludes a real theory of society, for theory is the question concerning the immanent rationality of this society"** - Author (pg. 138)

- "it is almost impossible for a theory of society to express this society in rational terms if the society no longer has any such rationality about it. Thus in a certain sense we might say that contemporary society eludes theory because that which effectively provides the substrate of theory – namely the relationship between the rational theoretical claim of the whole and its actual reality – no longer exists in the same way as before. **Theory is the question concerning immanent rationality, and where this rationality has essentially been reduced to issues of immediate economic management on the one hand and a very complicated and opaque system of social security on the other, then this rational substrate is no longer present at all**" - Author (pg. 138)

- "it is quite true, heaven knows, that I have often criticized Edmund Husserl, but in a certain sense he also deserves the greatest credit. For although, as you will all know, he began by defending the idea of pure validity in contrast to issues of genesis in the most emphatic possible way, he still found himself compelled, through the immanent demands of his own thought, to concede that there are, as Husserl puts it, genetic meaning-implications involved in acts of judgement, implications which he nonetheless interpreted in a traditional Kantian manner as problems of constitution. In other words, he later retreated from his famous thesis regarding the validity of propositions in themselves independently of their origin and now claimed that it was part of their meaning that we can follow them back to their origin. But then he looked for this origin in universal reason, in other words, in the transcendental structure of the mind itself, which he attempted in turn to distinguish and split off from anything that factually exists" - Author (pg. 194)

#### c. General Notes:

- Lecture 1 (pg. 1)

- "what I should like to unfold for you here is something about the conflict, the problematic, that has historically prevailed in the relation between the two fields of philosophy and sociology, and which is becoming even stronger at the present time, and indeed from both of the sides involved" (pg. 1)

- "I would like, from a quite specific, critical, and decisive point of view, to shed some light on these two fields; and this, so I believe, will bring us right to a problem, a central one, that is of considerable relevance both philosophically and sociologically speaking, a problem that neither of these disciplines is able to evade. **I am talking about the problem of the idea of truth, on the one hand, and the idea that knowledge is essentially determined by social factors, on the other.** And I believe that, by starting from this single and central problem, it then becomes possible to shed some further light on the particular fields of philosophy and sociology..." (pg. 2)

- **"...with philosophy and sociology, we are essentially dealing with two at least disparate, if not downright irreconcilable, spheres of thought"** (pg. 2)

- "The idea of being 'right' that is at work here is generally taken over without further ado from a very specific and, I have to say right away, limited notion or conception of philosophy; what is understood specifically by philosophy here is the realm of that which immutably persists, of the purely intellectual or spiritual, of the truth that is detached from all human factors or conditions..." (pg. 2)

- "in thinking of sociology as a professionalized discipline in this way, many sociologists are tempted to regard philosophical reflection or investigation as some sort of disturbance or obstruction, like sand that has got into the machinery; so we start racking our brains about how it is possible to know social reality, or about the very concept of society, or about the relationship of static and dynamic factors in society,<sup>4</sup> or however we may choose to describe these problems..." (pg. 3)
  - "...in the context of the following lectures I shall be able to show you that **sociology must actually call upon philosophy if it wishes to retain any genuinely scientific character for itself, if it really wishes to be anything more than a mere technique...**" (pg. 3)
    - "...what is distinctive about this sort of critique of philosophy, if I can put it this way, is that it regards philosophy itself as not scientific at all, but as a field which only introduces something alien, arbitrary, and ultimately insusceptible of proof into the proper questions of social science..." (pg. 3)
      - ◆ "...I believe this kind of exaggerated claim to scientific status, when it is specifically contrasted with the philosophical approach to things, is essentially reactive in character. In other words, this claim to scientific status, inasmuch as it refuses to go beyond the identifiably given, and repudiates the idea of doing so as essentially 'unscientific', thereby reveals an inner tendency to regress to a pre-scientific level, and thus to retreat to what we could basically call the social practice of a reporter; and while there is of course nothing contemptible whatsoever about the task of gathering information and recording facts in the field of the social sciences, this process both presupposes certain theoretical elements and requires, if it is to enjoy any scientific dignity at all, further theoretical interpretation. And in this context, as you will see, the concept of philosophy actually signifies nothing other than precisely that" (pg. 3-4)
- "What I hope to do, in the second part of this series of lectures, later in the semester, is to address this complex, or indeed this conflict, between sociology and philosophy specifically as it presents itself from the side of sociology..." (pg. 4)
- "in Germany there is a philosophical tradition which – understandably or not so understandably – starts from Kant and which, remarkably enough, has continued specifically within those philosophical schools that originally found themselves in a certain opposition to capitalism, in other words within phenomenology and the existential ontology that developed out of it. This whole intellectual tradition...ends up in the following situation" (pg. 4)
  - "**the principal task of philosophy, according to Kant, is not to tell us anything directly about the essence of things as such, but to exhibit the possibility of knowledge and to determine the limits of human knowledge.** But if philosophy is to exhibit the possibility of knowledge, or, to put this in more precise and specifically Kantian terms, to exhibit the possibility of experience in general, then according to Kant's argument it cannot presuppose any kind of material content which, for its part, derives from experience but must remain 'pure', as Kant puts it. 'Pure' in this sense effectively amounts to reflection on the cognitive function as such – in other words, on something purely intellectual that excludes any reference to real or material factors that might be reflected in this purely intellectual realm, or even form the presupposition of such a purely intellectual realm. In Kant's philosophy, specifically in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this issue takes shape as the problem of what is called 'constitution'. The Critique of Pure Reason is a work that investigates how knowledge is constituted or, in other words, if I can express this once again in a rather abbreviated form, tries to identify the factors or functions through which something like an objective world becomes possible in the first place, and thereby allows insight into the essential connections governing this objective world, whatever it may involve or contain. In the context of this method, however, the objective world itself is regarded as secondary or, in Kant's terms, as the constituted in relation to the constitutive, as that which has been generated or produced over against the purely intellectual and productive principles which make something such as experience in general possible in the first place." (pg. 4-5)
    - "it does not require that much acumen if we consider, for example, the most popular philosophy to have spread within the German universities, namely the so-called existential ontology of Heidegger, to rediscover such lines of thought still at work – albeit through recourse to a much older tradition – under **the problematic name of the relationship between 'being' and particular 'beings', where the latter are supposed to be merely derivative in relation to the former**" (pg. 6)
      - ◆ "**In the context of Heidegger's philosophy, 'being' is not, heaven forbid, supposed itself to be anything, is not at any cost supposed to be remotely tangible, to be connected with experience or with anything material whatsoever. On the contrary, it is supposed to be that which makes experience in a higher sense possible;** or, as Heidegger's teacher Husserl put it, it is supposed to be available to categorial intuition rather than to discursive or scientific concepts of any kind. And over against this so-called knowledge of being, any substantive social knowledge, and especially any attempt at social self-reflection, can appear only as a kind of Fall, as a recourse to something secondary, whereas the task is precisely to return to what is first, namely to the concept of being" (pg. 6)
        - ◇ "I may note in passing that I have just drawn your attention, with reference to one small specific model only, to a relationship between idealism and modern existential ontology which I nonetheless believe is of far greater relevance and significance than might initially appear. I believe that it is possible, and indeed even obligatory, to offer a detailed critique of **contemporary existential ontology** that will show how it is actually an idealism *malgré lui-même*, or, in other words, **an unwittingly covert and thus, if I may put it in this way, miscarried form of idealism**" (pg. 6)
  - "When you read Kant you will constantly encounter a vigorous repudiation of psychology, and there is a specific reason for this. For **Kant's philosophy is essentially an analysis of the faculty of knowledge** – in other words, of the faculty of human consciousness itself. Now human consciousness, as it presents itself to Kant, is bound up with actual, living human beings, and in a certain sense is also itself a part of the empirical world. The empirical subjects or empirical human beings, as psychology deals with them, form just as much an object of our experience as, for example, are things in space or anything else. But Kant is seeking to identify the constitutive factors of experience in general, and in his analysis of consciousness he cannot properly therefore assume this consciousness insofar as it is itself an empirical fact to which I stand in relation" (pg. 8)
    - "[Kant] specifically wanted to salvage eternal truth. But he wanted to salvage this precisely through an analysis of human consciousness. That, of course, is why he was particularly allergic to any conception of consciousness or the mind which would have turned this consciousness into something merely factual, simply into a piece of empirical reality; and that is why – in accordance with Freud's famous thesis concerning the pathos of the smallest differences – he always strove with a quite particular passion to distinguish his own analyses of the mind, of consciousness, or of whatever else it might be, from psychology in the most emphatic possible way" (pg. 8)
- "...his analysis of consciousness has nothing to do with an analysis of the actually given empirical human mind or empirical human soul..." (pg. 9)
  - "he is nonetheless constantly forced to make use of particular expressions and particular considerations that are undeniably derived from the real actual life of particular individuals, from the psychological life of particular individuals. Thus **the famous unity of consciousness, the synthetic unity of apperception, which is ultimately the most important concept in Kant's whole philosophy, essentially derives simply from observing that what is called the 'I' is a unity only because it is aware of itself as something identical in the horizon of time** – in other words, through the process of recollection, presentation and anticipation. Thus Kant's principle of identity itself is, if you like, actually drawn from psychology, which is why it also already involves the dimension of time; and, precisely because it is temporal in character, consciousness is determined in the first place as an empirical consciousness" (pg. 9)
    - ◆ "...I just wanted to show you that the dividing line between pure Kantian philosophy and the realm of psychology is not nearly as

- clear, as sharp, or as unambiguous as Kant himself intended" (pg. 9)
- "if Kant so strongly repudiated the real individual human subject in contrast to the pure 'I think' that accompanies all my representations, 29 i.e. in contrast to consciousness as a pure formal unity of experience, then he would also clearly have to reject any reflection on society, namely sociology, as having any grounding or constitutive force as far as philosophy is concerned. For **society, after all, is in fact something like a functional connection, a functional connection that obtains between individual empirical human beings, which would then indeed also appear as factors within a constituted field of knowledge**" (pg. 10)
  - "...the idea of sociology itself is actually earlier and derives from Comte's extremely insightful and important teacher, Count Saint-Simon" (pg. 7)
    - "The creation of sociology as a specific discipline is a relatively late phenomenon. We can say that this discipline comes to reflect upon itself as a kind of science only very late in the day, and there are very particular reasons why this is so..." (pg. 7)
  - "The precise point of time at which a science becomes independent, expressly reflects upon itself, or sticks a label on itself and the point at which such a science arises are two things which we can distinguish, though not in such a way as to conclude that a science really exists only once it has given itself its own name. And we can indeed say that, in this broader sense, sociology as a discipline is as old as philosophy, and that especially among the greatest representatives of ancient philosophy that separation between sociology and philosophy which will perhaps seem self-evident to many of you is not yet present at all" (pg. 8)
    - "what we find today is that philosophy is now hardly inclined to allow sociology any room at all, and that both fields have parted from each other in mutual acrimony." (pg. 11)
      - "The result is that philosophy guards even more jealously the position that it has now at least managed to establish for itself as just one branch among other branches of enquiry, which is why it not only refuses to tolerate any invasions of its own territory on the part of sociology or psychology but even attempts wherever possible to attack these disciplines even in areas where they perhaps seem to be most appropriate." (pg. 11)
    - "you might think of the fashion for so-called *Daseinsanalyse* or 'existential analysis', a trend which is very pronounced today, in contrast to the psychoanalysis that explores psychical life as a field of concrete experience. Thus we can say that **modern philosophers in general, if they are philosophers in an emphatic sense and not simply methodologists like the logical positivists for example, are anti-sociological in outlook** – with the exception, I would add, of a very few individuals, some of whom you will find here in Frankfurt. Thus the anti-empirical tendency of philosophy is now extended to fields that have been removed from the realm of philosophy. Where there is still something such as philosophy to be found, it tends to treat sociology negatively and refuses to let it be even in its native territory, so to speak" (pg. 12)
  - Lecture 2 (pg. 13)
    - "I should now like to...introduce you to the kind of resistance to philosophy that one typically encounters in the field of sociology. And here you may be surprised by two things in particular. The first is that such resistance has by no means always characterized our two disciplines – for we shall soon be exploring certain theoretical positions for which the distinction between philosophy and sociology did not yet exist at all. But secondly you will also see that **the rejection of philosophy on the part of sociology goes back a very long way**, and that ever since 'sociology' has expressly existed as such...the anti-philosophical impulse has remained alive in the field of sociology. I shall shortly illustrate this with reference to Auguste Comte" (pg. 13)
      - "What I mean is that sociology has not simply proved to be the more progressive or more enlightened discipline in comparison with the less enlightened or reactionary discipline of traditional philosophy; on the contrary, we shall see that **sociology, at least in its specific Comtean sense, arose in a polemical reaction to philosophy which was seen as a destructive expression of Enlightenment**." (pg. 13-14)
    - "**there is no theoretical position, of whatever kind, whose function within society is entirely independent of the social and historical situation at the time**. There is no truth that cannot be abused and turned into ideology, no theoretical position that cannot be brought to serve the opposite of what it undertakes to claim. And this alone should already suffice to make you sceptical in the face of the all too hasty identification of theory and praxis that is popular today" (pg. 14)
    - "to return to Comte and his struggle against philosophy, I should just like to remind you in brief that **the concept of 'progress', which along with that of 'order' is one of the highest concepts in Comte's sociology, found exemplary expression in his famous theory of stages**. He assumes three stages in human historical development: firstly, the theological-dogmatic stage; secondly, the metaphysical stage; and, thirdly, the stage which he calls the positive or scientific stage, the stage which in Comte's eyes culminates in sociology" (pg. 14)
      - "The first stage is the theological-dogmatic stage, the second is the metaphysical stage – where concepts take the place of dogmatically posited essential beings or agencies – and the third is the positive stage. This is the stage where our thought turns directly to society, operates by means of observation and classification, and basically models itself on the natural sciences – an approach which is now widely accepted as a matter of course in empirical sociology today. Thus the idea that the natural sciences should provide the model for empirical social thought, and that society itself represents a kind of nature, is something you already find here in Comte" (pg. 41)
      - "...in his own time Comte was concerned principally with speculative philosophy as a specifically critical force" (pg. 14)
        - "**Throughout Comte we detect the fear that philosophical concepts, especially those of freedom, equality and fraternity – in other words, the Enlightenment ideas that in a certain sense lay behind the French Revolution – threaten to undermine every kind of social order and thus lead to anarchy. It is this position which motivates Comte's general attack on philosophy**, and this is very similar to a passage in Hegel...where he says that speculative philosophy actually finds itself allied with religious faith in opposition to a merely rationalistic or merely reflective form of thinking" (pg. 14-15)
      - "What Comte calls the metaphysical stage, the second stage of human development, is characterized by the way in which it supposedly objectifies or ascribes independent existence to various intellectual essences or entities, as Comte puts it, over against the facts which are subsumed by means of them. This argument is simply that of a rigorous nominalism that rejects the objectification of any concept as mere dogma, and Comte regards such objectification of concepts over against the facts as nothing but a kind of semi-secularized theology. **He tells us again and again that metaphysical concepts are actually nothing but theological notions that have been half-heartedly filtered through reason**" (pg. 15)
      - "you must remember that **the entire Comtean system is based on the idea of an equilibrium between the two principles of order and progress, where Comte defends the principle of progress** precisely insofar as he speaks for the bourgeois society that has become emancipated from the structures of feudal and absolutist authority but also on behalf of order, insofar as, just like Hegel, he not only sees the horrors of the French Revolution but also sees that the ruthless realization of bourgeois equality, i.e. of the exchange principle as the sole criterion of society, tends to deform and unhinge the structure of society itself; in other words, he sees that this naked exchange relation is ultimately all that remains, and that this deformation of society threatens to expose it to what might typically be described today as 'atomization' or 'massification' – to use popular expressions which in Comte's time were just as superficial and inadequate for capturing the real historical dynamics involved as they are today" (pg. 17)
        - "here I simply want to bring out one Comtean thought which will show you precisely how the bourgeois principles of progress and rationality are combined with the principle of order in Comte" (pg. 17)
          - ◆ "this is the thought that the task of ruling society essentially falls to a kind of science, indeed specifically to sociology. For **Comte envisages sociology as a scientific discipline, as a neutral and entirely objective authority that stands above the play of social**

forces and is capable both of directing human progress...and also of somehow containing and neutralizing the disorganizing, destructive and anarchic forces that arise and develop within society itself, and this idea, once again, strongly recalls the role of the state in Hegel. On this Comtean conception, therefore, sociology represents a kind of classless authority hovering above the play of social forces" (pg. 17-18)

- ◇ "He criticizes the principle regarding the freedom of conscience – namely the principle expressed with particular force by Fichte but already affirmed by Kant – which claims that every single human being is responsible only to his own conscience, a principle which, as Comte quite rightly sees, embodies one of the most fundamental impulses of the bourgeois metaphysics of freedom. (pg. 18)
- ◇ "He then goes on to speak, rather perceptively, about the anarchy which increasingly afflicts the relations between peoples and countries with the emergence of the modern nation state. This anarchy only encourages the possibility of utterly devastating wars..." (pg. 19)
- ◆ "You can see that **Comte here accuses philosophy, critical thinking itself, because it would tend, through its abstract reasoning as Hegel would say, to dissolve actually existing institutions.** And from this he concludes without further ado, without providing any real justification for this view, that this critical effect would be synonymous with anarchy – in other words, that it would prove entirely destructive and ultimately undermine the self-preservation of society itself. The notion that a society of self-responsible individuals enjoying civic equality might lead to a more meaningful arrangement of things by virtue of its own internal dynamics and its own objective character, namely because all individuals share an interest in their own self-preservation – as Kant could still suggest in his *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent* – this notion is something that has really already fallen away in Comte; instead we find him bestowing a right to exist on institutions as such, an idea that can be traced back to the older tradition of the French Enlightenment, and particularly to Montesquieu. The process of critique and the resulting dissolution of institutions is basically identified with anarchy" (pg. 19)
  - ◇ "The idea of the self-preservation of society in spite of these antagonisms or through these increasingly evident antagonisms was first really developed by the early socialists in opposition to the great bourgeois philosophers of the same period whose thought already betrayed a certain apologetic character; and insofar as Comte came to speak for a bourgeois class that already felt threatened by the emerging power of 'third estate', we find in his work that the concept of social institutions retrospectively assumes the very lustre that it had forfeited in the French Revolution" (pg. 19-20)
  - "you can actually detect a dialectical element which is certainly quite alien to Comte the arch-nominalist, and it is this: **the same rational principles which once represented truth, insofar as they hastened the dissolution of an old social order that had become an unacceptable fetter on human development, may drive society towards destruction when we cling to them in a completely unreflective way, at the point, in other words, when society has become nothing but an unfettered exchange society**" (pg. 20)
    - ◆ "I want to show you how thinkers such as dear old Comte, who would never be suspected of harbouring such inclinations, nonetheless find themselves driven to dialectical conceptions simply by the force of the subject matter they engage with" (pg. 21)
  - "we find that Comte – and this is really a point where this positivist philosophy crucially differs from philosophy in the emphatic sense – sets social organization in dogmatic opposition to the idea of freedom of conscience on account of a hidden premise that is not really examined at all. This is the premise that it is better that something such as organized society should exist than that it should not exist" (pg. 21)
    - ◆ "But this effectively ignores the fundamental question which preoccupied many schools of thought in the ancient Greek Enlightenment, such as the Cynics, that wondered whether organized society was not deeply problematic, and hardly something to be endorsed, in comparison with the state of nature" (pg. 21)
- "[Comte] **literally makes a cult of the facts;** looked at more closely, this essentially involves the idea that those who administer the facts as facts, namely the representatives of organized science, also claim to be able to direct and control social reality completely. To put this another way: the decisive turn which this sociology adopts in contrast to the concept of critical philosophy, a concept which Comte expressly opposes, is that his own thought is one that moves in advance within the parameters of the rules, of the facts of society as it actually exists. Thus **the laws and principles in accordance with which civil society is organized, such as the principle of exchange, are not themselves grasped as things that have a history, that have come to be, that are problematic in any way; on the contrary, all this is taken positively in the sense that we must hold to what is actually there** – or, as I prefer to put it, that we must proceed in a purely system-immanent fashion. Instead of critically exploring the contradictions and internal problems of the system in which we move and find ourselves, instead of ultimately grasping the system itself as something historical and conditioned, as something that possibly may not be simply binding for all time" (pg. 21-22)
- "[to Comte,] **theology and speculative metaphysics are essentially the same. They both spring from an excess of imagination over observation, and their content derives from a desire to discover absolute concepts**" (pg. 23)
  - "As for the element that Comte here calls fantasy, the features of spontaneity and independence – in other words, the element that allows us to envisage something that ought to be, something beyond the mere enactment of what already is – we find that this whole sphere of possible conceptualization must be relegated, in the best case, to the realm of auxiliary hypotheses formation. But Comte's ideal is precisely this: as long as science functions in an orderly fashion, as long as we have a sufficient number of observations, there is no longer any need whatsoever for fantasy" (pg. 23)
- "the element of speculation, or, rather, anti-speculation, that you find here clearly sprang from the politics of the time. Napoleon had once issued certain edicts against the school of the Ideologists, a philosophical school of the late Enlightenment that attempted to provide a kind of sociology of the 'facts of consciousness' and thus trace these facts back to their real functions" (pg. 24)
  - "the kind of authoritarian argumentation which Napoleon mobilizes against unfettered or free-floating reason is precisely what you find in Comte here. We already glimpse here that the same social consciousness which once unfolded under the sign of the liberation of the subject would now once more restrict the freedom of the subject, and in essentially arbitrary ways, through the power of institutions – a tendency which eventually culminated and found its most consistent realization in the heteronomous politics of Fascism, in the total state" (pg. 24)
- Lecture 3 (pg. 25)
  - "we talked about the way in which the concept of observation and therefore of what is factual gets played off in Comte against the realm of the imagination. I would also remind you that **Comte believes that the neglect of the facts is encouraged by the untamed exercise of the imagination,** a neglect that he identifies with a failed or inadequate adaptation to the actual given circumstances of society. In Comte, therefore, you already find, in rudimentary form, something like the theory of adaptation that later played such an important role in Spencer, and indeed has continued to dominate the field in American sociology to this day" (pg. 25)
    - "you find such theories, or at least this general idea, in Comte even before the development of Darwin's theory of adaptation, which surely shows that the spirit of positivism in sociology unfolded in an immanent way and certainly has no need to be traced back to influences from biology" (pg. 25)
      - "...the Darwinian conception itself was influenced by social ideas that actually derived from the competitive mechanisms of modern

- society, from the question of survival or otherwise in the specific context of economic struggle" (pg. 26)**
- "Now the downgrading of imagination in comparison with observation...gives a distinctive twist to the concept of the subject, and this is actually what defines the relationship of philosophy and sociology" (pg. 26)
    - "...what you know about the great idealist systems of the post-Kantian period, especially those of Fichte, Hegel and Schelling, you will certainly be aware that a remarkably elevated and emphatic concept of subjectivity stands at the heart of all these philosophical doctrines." (pg. 26)
      - "...in Hegel too the entire world can ultimately be regarded as the product of subjectivity, and the exemplary demand which this lays upon knowledge, upon philosophy as science, is precisely this: **thought must exert itself to move beyond the mere facts, to penetrate the facts in a really thoughtful way, and, to express this task in traditional philosophical language, to bring out the very essence of the matter**" (pg. 26)
        - ◆ "[however,] even the most extreme speculative idealism would not have claimed that any individual, if I may put this rather crudely, could just think away wildly in their own way and simply construe a world of their own making. Rather, each thinking individual serves as a representative of this higher, universal, transcendental or objective subject, must try and live up to the full and undiminished significance of what can be found and observed, and thereby correct the limited and arbitrary aspects of a merely individual subjectivity. Hegel's philosophy already follows this through to the very end when he calls, with a seemingly paradoxical expression, for freedom towards the object. This refers to **the capacity on the part of the subject to abandon oneself to the object, to immerse oneself as thinking subject in the matter itself, instead of simply spinning this out of oneself, turning it into a mere product of oneself, as it were.** Nonetheless, the thought of the thinking subject as a spontaneous and productive subject is crucial for German Idealism, and indeed for the entire philosophical tradition" (pg. 27)
          - "Kant accords a central place to the concept of the imagination, and specifically to the original and productive power of the imagination which gives unity to the things of experience. In other words, **what you find in sociology, to put this rather crudely here, is a kind of anti-subjective tendency:** on this view the subject is not supposed to inform or shape reality in any way through its own intellectual processes or through its own activity, but simply keep to what reality provides" (pg. 27)
            - ◆ "...this has produced a requirement that anyone who is engaged with empirical sociology today can readily experience for themselves; and this, if I may exaggerate somewhat just so you understand what I am talking about here, is the requirement for the self-liquidation of the thinking subject" (pg. 27)
              - ◇ "...in short, if this suppression of your imagination, this restriction of your own freedom, appears to you here as the natural requirement of scientific research, this is ultimately connected with the attitude that early sociology already adopted in relation to the spirit of philosophy" (pg. 28)
                - "it will be our task here to reflect expressly upon the question whether this ascetic approach which science constantly expects of us actually represents a freedom towards the object, whether it gives us more of the object, or whether under certain circumstances it even gives us less of the object..." (pg. 28)
    - "this Comtean demand at the expense of the free subject has a certain implication for sociological thought which I would like to draw to your attention even at this preliminary stage, and that is the way this demand essentially directs the process of thinking. By encouraging you to avoid speculation and orient yourselves to the given, you find your thought is already referred to the categorial forms and the givens that you happen to encounter as they are. This tacitly presupposes the existing order, the particular arrangement of things that you find before you, although this presupposition is never actually made explicit, and the existing order is not only turned into the criterion of truth but is thereby elevated to the norm that is supposed to govern thinking as such. And this specific concept of adaptation has had these two sides to it right from the start: in the first place, we must unreservedly register the facts as faithfully as possible, while taking care to deduct all costs incurred by the process of subjectivity, so that the remainder, what you are finally left with, is the truth; in the second place, there is already something normative or prescriptive about this adaptation or accommodation on the part of knowledge to what is currently the case; thus knowledge itself is supposed to take its measure from the existing order of things as they are, though it may perhaps improve things in a gradual way. In other words, the conception of sociology which we have started with already contained the demand for the kind of immanently systematized thought..." (pg. 28-29)
      - "[such] would be to ignore or forget something essential – that **our consciousness is ultimately only a rather inadequate and tentative way of dealing with reality itself** and that nothing simply guarantees or assures us that reality is not itself contradictory. What I am trying to say is this: you yourselves as knowing subjects, all of us as knowing subjects, always already oriented in some way towards the whole, the absolute, the truth – in other words, **every thought, however unassuming it may be, simply by presenting itself as a claim, even an unassuming claim, to be right already harbours a kind of internal dynamic, already bears something like a concept of objective truth or objective rightness within itself.** And thought feels itself somehow stalled or cheated if its claim is not honoured – in other words, if it is not actually given what it believes it may rightly expect from reality. On the other hand, the way the world is arranged means that we actually risk ruin if we fail to adapt sufficiently to it" (pg. 29-30)
    - "**My own view**, if I may introduce this here, **is that you will actually get further in your knowledge of facts, of the relations and connections involved in society, if you take on board these uncomfortable theoretical reflections than you will by just focusing relentlessly on the functional connections of society.** For it is a rather remarkable paradox that when we simply try and perform our functional roles within society, when we reduce our own knowledge to this merely functional level, we generally find we actually no longer know or understand anything at all, or that our knowledge is extraordinarily impoverished as a result. In other words, to put this in logical terms, if you completely reduce the practice of thought to the mechanisms of social adaptation, if you allow thought no other possibility beyond that of unreserved accommodation, then thought ends up as nothing but tautology. It ends up with what empirical research likes to call 'the preparation of the facts', where you basically have no more than what you have already. Any judgements you come up with are all really nothing more than 'analytical judgements', mere repetitions or classifications of what is already there anyway" (pg. 31)
      - "Now the objection against imagination in favour of observation, which I talked about earlier, naturally has a certain plausibility. **There is no doubt that the notion that mysterious forces are at work in society, things beyond the world of observable fact,** can easily lead to all kinds of wild speculations and mythological explanations" (pg. 32)
        - "...it has to be said that it is only the imagination, only the element in sociology which goes beyond the recording and collation of connections, that is able to bring such facts into any meaningful connection with one another..." (pg. 32)
          - ◆ "Comte's line of argument...supposes and essentially starts from the idea that all connections between social facts are fictive in character, or, as we might put this today in slightly more polite, friendly and elegant terms, are simply scientific models, while the only thing that is true, by comparison, are the facts themselves. The problem that I am trying to draw to your attention here is this: this assumption, in which you are unreflectively raised as sociologists, already downplays the possibility that social relations and connections precede and pre-form the individual data." (pg. 32)
      - "it is surely impossible to avoid recognizing that we actually live in an all-encompassing social system, that the facts we find and the things we encounter within this system are already significantly pre-formed through this system. All the individual social acts that we perform as social beings are interrelated, and not in some merely arbitrary way but in accordance with certain rules within a quite specifically organized

- context.** Even in our immediate experience we find that we encounter individual social facts within the context of a system that cannot be pinned down as readily as facts themselves may be, and this is the justification for continuing to hold on to the idea of society, of critical reflection, of an interconnected whole, of a predetermining structure, of a system, in short, for continuing to hold on to the social categories which sociology originally took over from philosophy" (pg. 32-33)
- "...we experience the social pre-formation in question whenever in our own social behaviour we try to act in a way other than that which the pre-existing social system essentially requires of us" (pg. 33-34)
    - ◆ "Durkheim effectively put it like this: 'If you want to know what society is, just ask where it hurts; it's where you come up against something that is so much stronger than your own action and your own behaviour that you cannot really do anything about it or even resist it without provoking the most tangible and specific consequences'" (pg. 34)
      - ◇ "In these facts and things the individual human being encounters resistance, comes up against a solid mass, which he can do nothing about and which is stronger than the will or understanding of the individual subject. Thus, for Durkheim, as you should clearly bear in mind right from the start, the criterion for what he calls the social as such is precisely this distinctive character of impenetrability, of something set over against us: it is this which manifests what we should really regard as the object of sociology, as distinct from the field of psychology in particular" (pg. 48)
      - ◇ "This Durkheimian thesis of unintelligibility, as we might call it, arises from the experience that society is really to be found precisely there where I do not understand it, where it hurts, where I encounter it as compulsion. I believe that there is a profoundly true moment to Durkheim's theory at this particular point, and I believe that you would be depriving yourselves of a crucial aspect of social knowledge if you failed to recognize for yourselves the significance of this moment in Durkheim's theory" (pg. 66)
        - ▶ "...society does indeed exhibit a truly reified and congealed character. **Society is not something that can be understood immediately or in every respect**, and it repeatedly confronts us as this enigmatic reality, this reality we cannot understand, of which Durkheim speaks with such enormous pathos" (pg. 66-67)
          - "In a way this experience is rightly and legitimately reflected in Durkheim's conception of society" (pg. 67)
      - ◆ "According to him, the genuinely social domain, the genuine object of sociology, actually begins, we might paradoxically say, precisely where understanding fails or is lacking" (pg. 88-89)
  - "this fundamental aspect of social compulsion – in other words, the way you have to conform to the regular norms of the organized already existing whole – is something you can directly experience for yourselves from the resistance you meet as soon as you try to act otherwise" (pg. 34)
- "Let me just close for today by saying that philosophical concepts, if they are worth anything at all, are not concepts that dwell in some other separate world, in ill-famed higher spheres that lie far beyond the particular sciences or disciplines. On the contrary, **philosophy is ultimately nothing but rigorous self-conscious reflection upon the actual world, upon what you encounter in the experience of your own field of research or investigation.** This should already suggest that, while we have indeed begun by exploring the difference between the spheres of philosophy and sociology, these disciplines are not merely antithetical but also constitute a functional or dynamic unity" (pg. 35)
- Lecture 4 (pg. 36)
- "[Comte] thought that the so-called metaphysical ideas were really secularizations of theological concepts, concepts which reappear here in a much paler or more diluted form, but which allegedly share the same theological nature and origin as those concepts..." (pg. 36)
    - "Now in one sense this observation is quite right. For, as it turns out, the sublimated propositions of metaphysics and speculative philosophy, propositions which no longer actually seem to apply to solid reality, are infinitely less suited to the task of shaping or integrating the masses, and thus perform a much weaker function in reality, than the old theological dogmas" (pg. 37)
  - "for Comte, philosophy comes off worse than theology, in spite of his own theory of progress, in spite of the fact that he thinks philosophy involves a more rational approach than any theology, precisely because it does not retain as much integrating social power as the latter" (pg. 37)
    - "this represents a tremendous turning point, one which has become famous in American philosophy and sociology in particular under the name of pragmatism, the roots of which you can ultimately trace back to this earliest form of sociology. It involves the idea that the truth of a theory can be defined in terms of how it holds up or finds itself confirmed in reality. In later forms of pragmatism, especially in the work of John Dewey, this doctrine has been developed in a very subtle and sophisticated way. Here in Comte it is expressed in a rather crude and primitive form, and this very crudeness allows us to look behind the scenes at what we could perhaps call the primal history of pragmatism. The underlying thought here is just the notion that a philosophy or theoretical position is to be measured in terms of its power to promote society or to encourage the 'social community', as we recently used to say. We should thus ascribe positive value to those theories which have the power to maintain society and enhance social cohesion and a negative value to those which lack this power. When people talk about the destructive character of intellectual reflection and philosophy, the cheapest and most pathetic charge that we may regularly expect to hear in the intellectually enfeebled climate of today, you will recognize this attitude in its ultimate consequences and its basest shape..." (pg. 37)
      - "To put it quite bluntly, because it takes society and the process of socialization as its specific object, sociology concludes that whatever helps to strengthen this process, to promote the cohesion of society, is itself also something positive – like society as the true object of sociology – and that whatever weakens this cohesion is thereby something negative" (pg. 38)
  - "Comte basically says that the principle of causality, or the question concerning the genuine ground of things, in the end no longer requires us to seek further back to find the source of things in a creative God; on the contrary, the principle simply traces efficient causes, becomes paler and paler, and finally turns into nothing but a general name for the particular phenomena which it subsumes – so that such a universal concept ends up losing its meaning. We might almost say that Comte maliciously blames metaphysics for the fate that he himself brings down on it through his own kind of thinking. Comte effectively says: if you no longer have anything solid, no real entities to show us, if these entities have finally turned into nothing but general concepts, nothing but abstractions, then they no longer possess any explanatory force – they are just abbreviated expressions for the particular facts they subsume, mere tautologies that no longer say anything new about what they describe. They can no longer withstand the critique that positivism raises against them and must therefore be cast aside" (pg. 40)
    - "...when he says that philosophical concepts have simply become names for the processes they refer to, this can only mean that they really just become abstractions from what they want to grasp. As nothing but abstractions that are drawn from the latter, they cannot serve in turn to explain it. Hence Comte concludes, to use his words, that they are absurd" (pg. 40-41)
  - "There are two things worth noting here. **One is the charge of vanity, which positive thinking always likes to level against speculative thinking.** Thus it is said that, if we take our own concepts, something that we have created, as the warrant or essence of truth, instead of humbly keeping to what reality offers us, we simply puff ourselves up immeasurably and take an illusory pleasure in what Nietzsche expressed positively when he claimed at the beginning of Zarathustra that he enjoyed his own spirit. **A human being who is truly free, who is not fettered in a positivistic sense, does take joy in thinking, can experience happiness whenever something is revealed that cannot just be read off from the facts that are presented to us.** But here this is all reduced to a vain and selfish pleasure on the part of an individual who deems himself superior to every demand for solid and reliable insight" (pg. 42-43)



- "the denunciation of the supposed vanity of philosophical thought can also become an ideology, an excuse for glorifying that which renounces thought and even presents its own obtuseness and intellectual inadequacy as the ultimate expression of the highest sense of responsibility where genuine knowledge is concerned. And since it remains easier not to learn anything in the world rather than to come to learn something in the world, this latter danger seems in the general intellectual condition of the age, in this present moment, to be more pressing than the danger of vanity or hubris which thinkers such as Comte have emphasized" (pg. 43)
- Lecture 5 (pg. 48)
  - "...Comte's concept of social facts...includes laws such as the dynamic law of progress or the static law of order..." (pg. 48-49)
  - "...part of the constant baying between philosophy and sociology can basically be traced back to this misunderstanding" (pg. 49)
  - "Durkheim treats Comte as if he were really a kind of cultural and intellectual historian, as if he were specifically concerned with the history of ideas, such as the idea of progress, whereas this kind of interest – which was certainly characteristic of Dilthey – was really quite foreign to Comte" (pg. 50)
    - "I believe it would hardly be going too far to say that the real pathos of Comte's thought, the ultimate interest behind it, derives more from his concern with social order than from the idea of progress" (pg. 50)
  - "...no linguistic expression whatsoever, let alone a scientific discipline that involves processes of classification and progressive generalization, is conceivable if it dispenses with concepts altogether" (pg. 53)
  - "Bergson employed a metaphysical concept of intuition in order to criticize that concept of fixed and rigid fact which is presupposed by the natural sciences, and therefore he also insisted on a quite different aspect of human knowledge. Durkheim, on the other hand, brought the whole weight of the tradition of the natural sciences in particular to bear against Bergson himself – a fact, incidentally, that is not without a certain irony, since it was actually Bergson who came out of this very tradition and in reality enjoyed a closer relationship to the natural sciences than Durkheim himself. But we might say that in Bergson the sphere of the mind – and indeed of the mind conceived as independent of the entire causal-mechanical structure based upon the classification of facts – is itself hypostasized in a way that is very similar to the manner in which the facts are hypostasized in Durkheim" (pg. 54)
    - "And we can probably only understand the one-sidedness, let us call it, or a certain narrowness, that characterizes the two great theoretical minds in France around this time, and that both exhibit in their own way, if we see each thinker as a corrective to the other" (pg. 54)
  - "as we usually find in such cases, in thinkers to whom we must concede considerable intellectual powers, and who, like Durkheim, possessed an astonishing wealth of material knowledge, the genuine problems are actually hidden in conceptual errors and false inferences of various kinds" (pg. 55)
- Lecture 6 (pg. 58)
  - "...the principal objection raised by Durkheim, from the perspective of the intermediate phase of positivism he represents, against Comte and the older form of positivism associated with him can be expressed as follows. He complained that the concepts employed by Comte were not strictly derived from the field of observation but were developed rather freely as conceptual anticipations that cannot really be justified in scientific terms." (pg. 58)
    - "...there is no form of thinking whatsoever that cannot somehow be accused of indulging in metaphysics..." (pg. 58)
      - "It is just the point that **thinking without concepts, and thus also that thinking without anticipations, a thinking that does not move beyond experience, beyond the merely observed, beyond the domain of 'protocol sentences', cannot in principle be avoided.** Without concepts there cannot even be order in a positivist sense, although no concept is ever wholly fulfilled by that which it subsumes. And that difference between conceptual theses and the claim which concepts possess within a positivist intellectual framework, one which has characterized sociology for the last hundred and fifty years, will give rise again and again to the process we have indicated, where one thinker will berate the preceding thinker as a theologian in disguise" (pg. 58-59)
  - "...the concept of a social or collective mind which plays a central role in Durkheim's mature theory of society..." (pg. 59)
  - "**sociology is quite right to challenge any metaphysical construction and ask what right it possibly has to ascribe such meaning to history with all its sufferings and its meaninglessness. On the other hand, philosophy can of course equally challenge sociology and point out that, if it lacks the relevant concepts, if it lacks the thought of a possibility against which existing reality needs to be measured, then it is also incapable of grasping the real world itself.** In this case sociology does not comprehend a thing but sits motionless before this reality like a surly counter clerk who simply registers all the details" (pg. 62)
    - "...positivism ends up literally not seeing the wood for the trees, in other words, not seeing society for the social facts. And this, in turn, tends to prove extremely detrimental as far as the character of society as currently constituted is concerned" (pg. 63)
  - "What motivated [Durkheim]...was simply the problem of projection: wherever we believe that we understand something, we achieve this understanding by translating what is to be understood in terms of our own categories and our own experiences; in other words, we turn the object we encounter into ourselves, into the subject. Thus we are always in danger of putting our own image of ourselves, whether this is a wish-fulfilling image or whatever image it may be, in the place of that object which it is our task as scientific investigators precisely to cognize purely as such" (pg. 64)
  - "...you may now be able to grasp the real significance of this concept of rationality in Weber. For on the one hand rationality is something we are able to understand: something I can find in myself, something we can all find in each one of us, insofar as we are all members of bourgeois society, because rationality itself is nothing but that unity of bourgeois reason which is more or less effectively embodied in every single bourgeois individual. At the same time, however, rationality is calibrated in advance to the demands of reality and has already been purified of the merely psychological determining features of the individual precisely in order to facilitate the self-preservation of the individual, so that rationality has become that indwelling authority within us which is furthest away and most objectively detached from the contingent aspect of the singular individual" (pg. 65)
- Lecture 7 (pg. 69)
  - "I have already pointed out to you that all of these sociologists from the period we have been discussing here shared a certain interest in securing the independence of sociology vis-à-vis other neighbouring disciplines. This was connected with the specific situation in which sociology, as a young science, found itself competing with the old and long-established world of the *universitas litterarum*" (pg. 69)
  - "while this sociology seems entirely nominalist in character, always seems to start from the individual case and from the individual observation, to foreground individual observation rather than general laws and concepts, it then proceeds in such a way that the dialectic (and I do not mean the dialectic in a specifically technical sense here), the polarity, the tension – in other words, the interaction between the individual and society – essentially disappears from view, and it simply subsumes the individual without further ado under purely social concepts. One might say that a social science which has forfeited its own concept, and thus consists in nothing beyond the registration and classification of facts, is typically in danger of splitting apart into two unconnected domains, neither of which can properly claim truth for itself. Thus, on the one hand, you get a sociology in the narrow sense which now actually believes that it can justifiably downgrade the individual into a function of society, which is what happens in the sociological school we have just been discussing; on the other hand, you get a kind of psychology which has long since also found its way into sociology under the name of social psychology and in countless other theoretical forms; and this approach, in contrast to the former, believes it can infer the social realm directly from norms and regularities revealed in the behaviour of individuals, as the great psychologist Freud himself believed, rather naively from a theoretical-scientific point of view it has to be said, when he said that on his view sociology is really just applied psychology. Thus both of these very one-sided approaches, if we may put it that way, derive from a reified opposition between the domain of society and that of the

- individual, between the 'domain of the many' and the 'domain of the individual', as it has occasionally been described. These approaches fail to realize that both these so-called domains need to be recognized as internally bound up with each other if the analysis of either is to yield any rigorous meaning. Not the least of the tasks that fall to a philosophical reflection on sociology, it seems to me, is precisely to think through the relationship between these domains in a new and much more fundamental manner than has hitherto been the case" (pg. 72-73)
- "In the past people have tried either to explain the whole simply on the basis of one or the other of these two domains, or to present both domains as entirely independent of one another. But in the latter case they failed to see that, if we are dealing with the same facts explained from the perspective of two quite different spheres, there must ultimately be some sort of mediation which actually lends unity to both of these different forms of explanation" (pg. 73)
  - "I would say that what we can learn from Durkheim, at least in contrast to Max Weber, is that **our understanding of society cannot be reduced to the meaningful and purposive-rational action of individual subjects**, as Weber puts it. On the other hand, these emphatically social facts – such as social solidarity, the phenomenon of suicide, the essence of primitive religion – are not simply to be accepted as an unchangeable given but should be derived from the regular objective processes of a specific society. Thus the thing-like character which Durkheim talks about does indeed accurately reflect the fact that **the regular processes to which we are subjected as social beings actually unfold over and beyond our own consciousness, and the fact that these processes are incommensurable with our own inner life and to that extent are not something we can actually understand**. Nonetheless, they are potentially understandable if we are capable of revealing the principle which governs the society in question" (pg. 73-74)
    - "...Durkheim's theory also has a specific substantive side to it. I am talking about his critique of Comte where he rejects the notion of progress..." (pg. 74)
  - "I really ought to say a little more here about this question of progress, simply because, if you are attending a series of lectures about the problem concerning the relationship between philosophy and sociology, you would surely expect to hear at least something about the concept of progress. For on the one hand this is really a concept that has sprung from philosophy, and it goes back to the thought that humanity is in some sense moving towards the Kingdom of God, an idea which is clearly outlined in Augustine's work *De civitate Dei*. And through various stages of secularization, the most important phase of which is represented by Bossuet, the great French theologian of the baroque era, this idea eventually came to expression in the later Enlightenment. Thus Condorcet, in his *Esquisse*, was the first to present the idea of 'progress' as the fundamental principle of history. And then, finally, in Hegel's doctrine of history as 'the progress of the consciousness of freedom', the idea of progress becomes the very content of philosophy itself. Thus we are dealing here with an unquestionably philosophical theme, albeit one that, as you will remember, also plays an enormous role in the sociology of Comte, as indeed Durkheim specifically complained." (pg. 74)
    - **"...there is unquestionably progress in the sense that human beings are increasingly capable of subjecting nature to themselves** – that is, both the external nature with which they must come to terms and, to an ever greater degree, the inner nature which they shape through social and psychological means. They are therefore capable, if I may put like this, of bringing more and more of the world of objects under their control, and this brings about a whole range of things which can really be described in terms of progress." (pg. 76)
      - "I think that to deny this aspect of progress would be just as obtuse as the way in which the hollow and superficially declaimed optimism all around us today also deceives us about the dark and threatening character of the world in which we live. Thus rationality has certainly increased in the sense of our domination of nature; the means which human beings have at their disposal in their constant interchange with nature have been refined and developed to an ever greater degree, and, however partial or restricted this process may have been, it still also harbours the potential of progress for the world as a whole. In other words, it is perfectly feasible today to envisage a social condition of humanity in which the natural catastrophes of society – famine, wars, dictatorships and such-like things – no longer exist, whereas it was not even possible to think of such potential in earlier phases of society, just as the conception of a humane and rationally organized society that would be worthy of human beings was never actually framed as such in earlier historical stages of society" (pg. 76)
    - "On the other hand, **we also have to concede that this progress has unfolded only in a blind kind of way, that it has unfolded, as I would like to say, at every step by reacting to problems that humanity has constantly had to confront** in the realm of technology, or in the attempt to master acute and recurrent crises" (pg. 76)
  - "..the macro-economic doctrines of John Maynard Keynes and his school...was an example of blind progress insofar as it sprang simply from the desire to preserve the existing social order without really grasping one essential thing, namely the question of how to establish a form of society itself in which the possibility of such catastrophes would be excluded – and such a conception of humanity, one which would be capable of averting such catastrophes, one which could really be described as progressive in the most fundamental sense, has not existed to this day. This is not because there have never been human beings who were capable of thinking the thoughts which I am expressing to you here, thoughts which are so simple that, God knows, you certainly don't need me to express them for you. But they are thoughts which the whole course of your earlier education and the current state of the world itself have almost driven out of you..." (pg. 77)
    - **"the only reason such thoughts have not been developed, or at least why they have not given rise to genuine progress, why they have remained powerless in social terms, is because the society in which we live, in spite of all its tendencies towards integration, has continued to be a society of mutually hostile and conflicting interests**. There is really no actual and effective site, no third position, as it were, over and above this society which would be capable of thinking through these contradictory interests. In other words, the blind way in which progress has unfolded up until now is itself nothing but the consequence of the fact that **we continue to live in a fundamentally divided society**, that, in spite of an ever-advancing rationality in specific parts of society, in spite of this particularistic rationality, **the whole has remained irrational to this day"** (pg. 77)
      - "Now this has certain quite decisive consequences for the structure of progress itself. The most striking consequence – to go straight to what is essential here – is that **the element of violence which is required to dominate nature if human beings are to meet their needs and master the chaotic conditions of social existence has only been maintained and perpetuated within human beings themselves and the social arrangements in which they live. Thus society and the forms in which it is organized continue to exert a certain almost unbearable pressure on individuals, a pressure which, in turn, provokes a kind of resistance**, since there is no substantial correspondence between the interests of human beings and the prevailing social order without which these human beings cannot actually survive. In other words, to put this in psychological terms, **society encourages those destructive tendencies which Freud explored and identified in his important late text on *Civilization and its Discontents***. These tendencies are always liable to explode and to destroy the whole social order..." (pg. 77-78)
        - ◆ **"This element of violence in progress qua domination of nature generates a kind of context of guilt, is continually reproduced in the relations between human beings, and itself gives rise to the forces which turn against progress. The greater the productive forces involved in this advancing process have become, the greater and more terrifying too are the forces which are ready to inhibit this progress**. We are no longer simply talking here about some mere relation between humanity and a stage which has in reality already been superseded, or a situation in which humanity is merely holding on to such a superseded stage of development. In other words, we are not just talking about the phenomenon of historical stagnation, as this is described, for example, in the sociology of Simmel. **What we are actually taking about here is a regression to barbarism"** (pg. 78)
    - "We must also point out that **this rationality, this constantly advancing rationality, is embedded in an irrational whole, that it remains caught**

- up in something irrational, and that the function of rationality is thereby actually intensified in this irrationality. Thus today, for example, the rationality that is invested in technological progress remains embedded in the continuing irrational division of the world into two completely irreconcilable and mutually threatening power blocs, with the result that every specific advance in the application of rationality assumes a double face. We might say that, within the prevailing irrationality of the whole, every advance, every example of progress, in any concrete particular case, also immediately takes on a threatening or terrifying character. We might say that every particular expression of rationality that does not correspond to any rationality on the part of the whole thus actually emphasizes the aspect, and only that aspect, which threatens to destroy anything worthy of human beings that still remains in the world. In other words, the price of progress becomes higher and higher, without our ever actually being able to reap what this progress really promises" (pg. 78)
- "You will all have recognized something like this from the simple fact that, although the process of automation and mechanization, the progressive rationalization of the labour process, reduces the amount of work time that is required, we do not actually appear to be any better off as a result. For we see that all human beings, and I mean all human beings without distinction, find themselves even more thoroughly caught up in the social system, even less capable of autonomy and self-determination, than they have probably been in any other phase of history. The merely particular rationality which is not reflected in terms of the ultimate concern of humanity as a whole now really leads towards the kind of devastated life which the irrationalists of every school have observed, and in this they can for their part lay claim to a particular truth. In other words, **the world is indeed increasingly disfigured through a rationality that essentially consists in a constant increase in industrial output and the productive forces of society, where there is no higher perspective from which we might legitimately recognize the interests of nature itself, and where the latter is regarded solely in terms of domination**" (pg. 78-79)
    - ◆ "you must also be able to acknowledge the significance of the irrationalist critique of progress without simply rejecting it through some over-romanticized attachment to the idea of progress. Instead you should understand that critique itself as an aspect or moment of this progress; you must understand, in other words, that it is because the world is actually not yet rational enough, not yet properly transparent to itself, not yet genuinely self-determined, that it does indeed repeatedly manifest the horrific features which are then lamented from certain romantic perspectives that have been given an essentially reactionary and retrospective twist" (pg. 79)
      - ◇ "we must be able to acknowledge the truth moments in that critique of the rationalized and technologized world and take them up into the way we attempt to construe progress and rationality. In particular, **we shall have to reflect upon the core of irrationality within the rational itself as it exists today, namely upon the fetishization of instrumental means in a society of universal exchange, a society which forgets that these means are simply means rather than ends in themselves.** In other words, we must reflect upon the fetishization of production and the productive apparatus at the expense of living subjects themselves. What this means today is that the quantity of goods and commodities is fetishized at the expense of any genuine self-determination on the part of human beings. I believe that I have at least provided you here with the outlines of an answer to the question concerning progress or the absence of progress" (pg. 79-80)
  - "we can properly understand the question concerning the mediation between philosophy and sociology only once we have elucidated the distinctions which really are involved here. **A mediated unity is a unity-in-difference, not merely some fusion or conflation of things which are actually different from one another**" (pg. 80)
- Lecture 8 (pg. 81)
    - "...up until this point I have essentially been talking about the mediation between sociology and philosophy, about the basic problem involved in their sometimes very complex relations to each other – and especially about the way this was expressed in the critique of philosophy or of conceptual-metaphysical thinking that was mounted by two thinkers who belong, methodologically speaking, among the most important figures from the field of sociology. I am talking about the thought of Comte and specifically about Emile Durkheim's *Règles de la méthode sociologique*" (pg. 81)
      - "I would rather start by discussing what in fact is traditionally thought to be involved in the concepts of 'sociology' and 'philosophy' respectively" (pg. 82)
    - "First, it must be acknowledged that **sociology is an individual science** which takes a quite specific field as its object and addresses this field in a direct or immediate way, i.e. addresses this field with *intentione recta*, to use the terminology of philosophy, rather than primarily in the context of self-reflection. In other words, **it tries to apprehend and grasp the objects with which it is concerned in a direct or immediate way**, in much the same way that you expect any other so-called positive science to proceed. **Sociology is a positive science** and, indeed – if I deliberately put this as comprehensively and as cautiously as I can in order to reduce at least a little the possibilities for misunderstanding – is the individual science of the social realm. Thus **sociology is concerned both with social facts and the social relations within society, and equally with the concept of society itself.** In other words, just to make this element of complicity clear to you from the start, it is capable both of presenting society and its facts precisely as they are, of clearly identifying particular groups of relations or groups of facts within this given and existing society, and, on the other hand, of taking the interconnections of society itself, or the social totality, or whatever you wish to call it, as its specific object. This is 'the social' in the broadest possible sense, something that can range – we might say – all the way from the structure of an exchange society or the structure of socialization itself to such highly specific phenomena, let us say, as the relations internal to some particular business or enterprise. In the first instance **sociology simply confronts the social as its object, without necessarily raising the question about how this object itself is constituted**" (pg. 83)
      - "you will find that sociology – and I have to admit that it is remarkably similar to philosophy in this regard – cannot simply be studied in the way that one studies the natural sciences, or even, in my view, in the way one studies a discipline such as geography or history. For here you never quite clearly know how you should begin, never really know what the first step is, or how to proceed to the next..." (pg. 84)
        - "...d I would suggest that the reasons which have expressly led sociology towards a constant symbiosis with philosophy, or, to put this more modestly, which still lead us to look towards philosophy to save us, as if it were really able to offer assistance here, are connected in part with the fact that, **with sociology, there is no firmly prescribed order in the object, and thus no firmly prescribed order for how to study it either**" (pg. 84)
      - "...sociology certainly does not yet occupy an established place in the system of the sciences. And there is a real social reason for this. For a society which is truly and completely interconnected, a society which – to put this more formally – constitutes a totality where every process is a function of all the other processes or is a function of the whole, is something which did not previously exist" (pg. 85)
        - "...all sorts of things have actually come together to produce the concept of sociology" (pg. 85)
      - "**Sociology has also absorbed the theory of institutions and social arrangements** generally, which play such an important role in Durkheim's thought but also in what is described in America as 'institutional analysis'. In addition, sociology has incorporated the analysis of individual political forms and structures insofar as these can also be understood in terms of the general life process of society, and it has finally also absorbed the whole field of what we now describe as 'empirical social research'..." (pg. 86)
        - "...if you want to reach any level of scientific insight at all, you will have to embed them within some meaningful theoretical context of one sort or another. It is only then that you can discover their specific significance" (pg. 87)
      - "sociology is a discipline which in a way has been rather thrown together, like those abbeys or monasteries that only came together over

- centuries as they absorbed the entire complex of earlier structures and outhouses and hardly represent a single unified whole. And this is why sociology does not lend itself to ready definition" (pg. 89)
- "Philosophy is certainly not concerned with the factual in the same way as sociology or the other special sciences are" (pg. 90)
    - "Thus it used to be said that philosophy was concerned not with the phenomena but with the essence, not with the facts but with the essence" (pg. 90)
      - "at least it is clear that philosophy does not concern itself directly or immediately with the facts, and that society does not principally provide the object of philosophy" (pg. 90)
    - "...questions about the nature of being or what is truly real, about the relation between being and beings, between matter and form, between possibility and actuality, or about the relationship between the Good, the True, and the Beautiful; or again about concepts such as God, freedom and immortality, or finally about the possibility of knowledge, of binding and objectively valid forms of knowledge as such, and all that this implies. These, at any rate, are the traditional themes of philosophy, and the attention of philosophy is drawn to specifically social aspects and elements only when we thoroughly try and work through these themes, only when we develop a critical consciousness of this philosophical thematic, only when we realize that these themes cannot be addressed or resolved directly at a single stroke" (pg. 90)
      - "the intention of philosophy, at least since the beginning of the early modern age, and to some extent implicitly in antiquity, must be described as *intentio obliqua* rather than as *intentio recta*. In other words, in this context we do not just enquire directly into these things, these essences or these concepts. For when philosophy enquires into these matters, it thereby also enquires into the possibility of the question itself and into the constitution of these objects, since essences and concepts themselves are not facts and cannot therefore simply appear before our eyes with the kind of immediacy which, according to sociology, the 'faits sociaux' are actually or allegedly supposed to possess. **It is therefore an essential feature of every philosophy...that it never simply makes immediate claims or assertions about things**" (pg. 90-91)
    - "This is part of the reason why philosophy has no immediate object as such, and why it does not immediately know or refer to society either. It is only through this element of reflection that philosophy acquires a relationship to society, whether it believes that it is able in its own right to prescribe norms to society, or whether it mounts a critique of society which measures the latter against its own claims and standards, or whether it recognizes itself and its own subject as a social subject, and thus reflects upon itself as something essentially social in character. In short, the relationship between sociology and philosophy is not something that can be laid down right at the start. On the contrary, it is something that is really produced only through self-reflection on the part of both disciplines as they are unfolded and developed" (pg. 91)
      - "insofar as **philosophy is nothing but the theory of science**, which is effectively what the proponents of analytic philosophy have tried to turn it into these days, there is also a sense in which it can actually be called pre-scientific – that is, pre-philosophical. For it accepts a certain concept or intellectual form, namely that of science, which it is essentially the task of philosophy to criticize and to grasp in terms of its inner possibility and basic problematic" (pg. 91)
    - "...Germany philosophy did not emancipate itself from theology as thoroughly as it did in other Western countries, and has remained markedly apologetic in character" (pg. 92)
  - Lecture 9 (pg. 93)
    - "In the last session Professor Horkheimer offered you a brief introduction to the theory of ideology and laid particular emphasis upon the element of necessary social illusion that is involved here. For at the end of the session, if I am correctly informed, he explained to you that the exchange relation, as far as labour is concerned, inevitably appears to both sides, to both the employer and the worker, in a quite different way. In other words, the employer has the feeling – and inevitably has the feeling – that the worker has received full recompense for his labour, while the worker has the feeling of being somehow short-changed in the process" (pg. 93)
      - "Horkheimer pointed out to you that matters inevitably appear one way to the employer and a different way to the worker" (pg. 101)
        - ◆ "**it is only critical reflection that can reveal that this relation of equivalent exchange cannot possibly be equivalent, can show in other words that the labour time the worker provides is greater than the labour time that is required for the reproduction of his own life. Thus the worker necessarily gives more than he or she receives**, and the entire gigantic process of capitalism, of the accumulation of capital, actually rests on this 'more' which has thus specifically been defined as surplus value" (pg. 101)
      - "...the theory of ideology...is generally regarded as a special field within sociology, as a specific branch of sociology that has received the rather problematic title of the sociology of knowledge..." (pg. 93)
    - "...in my last lecture I attempted, in a somewhat drastic fashion, to clarify the difference between sociology and philosophy. At the same time I also tried to develop for you certain themes and motifs that might help you to understand that both of these disciplines, **for all the genuine differences between them, are nonetheless intrinsically dependent upon each other**" (pg. 93)
      - "if we now try to say at least something about the concept of ideology, the reason for this is quite simply that **the theory of ideology or the sociology of knowledge is the area where**, to put this very straightforwardly, **these two disciplines, in spite of the separation imposed by the division of intellectual labour, clearly intersect with each other**. This is an area where philosophy and sociology are both equally involved, since sociology here clearly finds itself confronted with philosophical questions, while at the same time it makes certain demands on the understanding and sometimes even the explanation of philosophical questions" (pg. 93-94)
    - "sociology is tempted to believe that it is capable, on its own, of explaining anything and everything without really reflecting upon its own epistemological conditions. So you can already see from this that, precisely where sociology makes an extremely radical claim to provide the quintessential conditions of knowledge itself, it is inexorably led back to fundamental epistemological questions, so that sociology here ends up passing over into philosophy." (pg. 95)
    - "...mind or spirit itself is an aspect or moment which is bound up in all kinds of ways with the overall life-process of humanity" (pg. 97)
      - "On the one hand, I think it is quite evident that the process of social labour, and ultimately the preservation of the human species itself, is utterly inconceivable without this aspect or moment that we describe in terms of mind or spirit; on the other hand, it is also clear that mind or spirit itself springs from the need for the self-preservation of the species and also from the specific social forms or institutions that are bound up with this – and the most essential of these developments, it seems to me, is the historical process in which physical labour, by means of which human life is directly secured and sustained, became separated or divorced from mental or spiritual labour" (pg. 97)
        - "**the world of the mind is dependent in the sense that it can only exist in the context of the material process of life which it presupposes and effectively relies upon; at the same time, its claim to be independent, to produce something internally coherent and consistent, is also legitimate rather than simply illegitimate**" (pg. 98)
          - ◆ "The element of untruth here begins to appear only when this independence on the part of the mind is itself made into an absolute, when it forgets the moment of its own dependency or its own relation to the real process of society – in other words, when mind or spirit comes to fetishize or worship itself, as we might put it in a rather emphatic way that goes far beyond the particular context of our present discussion. Now this idea of the independence of the mind is ideological in the quite specific sense that the class character of society itself is here ignored or repressed, so that the actually existing relations of domination are legitimated through the intrinsic and unconditional right of the mind to control or subjugate all that is" (pg. 98)

- "Now this is where the theories diverge – over the question whether the sphere of the mind functions as a distinct social sphere or whether it is absolutely conditioned by, or is absolutely dependent upon, social factors" (pg. 99)
    - "What you find in Hegel, therefore, is not so much an attempt to derive the social realm from 'spirit' as an attempt to decipher society itself – precisely by identifying and bringing out the spirit of society, in other words, the constitutive social forms of a specific epoch. And the so-called spirit of a historical epoch is not something that can possibly be detached from the forms in which society produces itself. In fact Hegel never conceived of the life of spirit as something that is somehow independent of the life of the social forms through which it finds expression. On the contrary, the life of spirit for Hegel is nothing other than the self-unfolding of the productive forces of society itself" (pg. 99)
      - "...you will also discover that Marx endorses a concept which eludes any simple sociological reduction to social relations and is actually the necessary condition of his version of the theory of ideology. I am simply talking about the concept of truth in Marx. Now I do not believe that anyone has ever really undertaken a thorough investigation of Marx's concept of truth." (pg. 100)
        - "If you take the concept of socially necessary illusion as seriously as I have indicated you should, and in the form in which I have presupposed it up until now, it is evident that we can properly speak of illusion only if there is also something true or non-illusory in contrast to such illusion. And this concept of truth, for its part, naturally presupposes that, in analysing the illusory itself, we encounter something other than illusion...For this very distinction, as a distinction of true and false, already presupposes a concept of truth which is not exhausted in this distinction. You can say that the base is true, the superstructure is false, only if you possess a concept of truth here, or, better, if you develop a concept of truth here, which enables you to distinguish what is indeed true and what is indeed false." (pg. 100)
          - ◆ "The socially necessary illusion needs to be derived from the exchange relation, namely the exchange relation as you have now come to understand it. **Marxian theory analyses the way that exchange, which is actually a relation between human beings, necessarily appears to us as a quality of things, as their value, and derives this from the fact that the comparable element between the goods which are exchanged, namely their value, is something abstract, i.e. the socially necessary labour time. It claims that this abstract equivalent of exchange can no longer easily be recognized in terms of its actual relationship to living human beings and living labour. Thus once it has been abstracted and become independent in this way, it ceases to appear as a direct relation between human beings and therefore becomes reified**" (pg. 100)
            - ◇ "I would just like to point out in passing how you can clearly see here that Marxian theory already involves a decisive element that cannot be captured by a vulgar or primitive concept of materialism. And that is the insight, where the decisive issue of exchange as the principle of reproduction of life is concerned, that social reality itself already contains a conceptual moment, namely this moment of abstraction. We have to distinguish between the illusion produced by this abstraction and that which lies behind it – the actual living labour that is made up of human labour power and the contribution of material nature, two aspects that need to be distinguished but can never wholly be divorced from each other. In mounting this critical analysis of illusion, of the fetishized exchange relation, of **the abstraction that marks our concepts and ultimately the mind itself**, you already discover something that represents the truth moment in contrast to the ideology in question" (pg. 100-101)
    - "If we want to use the term 'ideology' seriously, if it is to be more than a mere *façon de parler*, then it needs a specific theory of the totality of society behind it, and only when it has such a developed theory to back it up can we legitimately speak of 'ideology'. Where this is not the case, the concept of ideology is just so much blather. And it is no accident that it has become blather, for the concept is thereby robbed of its force, is converted into something that can be used for any purpose and thus can no longer meaningfully be used at all. Nor can it be decided in some immediate and isolated fashion whether something is ideology or not ideology..." (pg. 102)
      - "...as soon as you try to determine, for example, whether something such as public opinion is constituted through the consciousness of singular individuals, or is a pure reflection of social institutions themselves, you discover that no such simple decision about truth is possible. For what is required in this regard is a fully articulated theory that is intrinsically bound up with concrete, critical and corrective individual investigations." (pg. 102-103)
      - "Here you see how a motif which Hegel introduced into philosophy also reappears in the theory of ideology, namely the claim that truth does not amount to a declaration, that truth is not something which is merely particular or restricted in character. For the **truth is the whole – and here the whole must mean critical insight into the construction of society as a whole, critical insight into the totality of society and into the relationship between this totality and its individual aspects or moments**" (pg. 103)
        - "But such a critique may well result in the recognition that the whole in question does not live up to its own concept, namely the concept of a justly organized and meaningfully self-reproducing whole, and thus conclude that it has itself become 'dysfunctional', as this is so felicitously put today. In other words, the social whole no longer accomplishes precisely what it was supposed to accomplish, for the human beings who are exposed and subjected to this interconnected whole are also mortally and fatefully threatened by the very society to which they owe their life. Now **this category of the totality – namely the interconnected character of society as a whole through the fundamental structures within which social action transpires** – cannot be derived from the facts in a simply immediate way. The category of totality is not itself a pure fact and cannot be established purely by inference from the facts. And to that extent we might say, if you will forgive me the paradox, that the very doctrine which people love to reproach for being opposed to philosophy, indeed for being alien or downright hostile to philosophy – namely the theory of ideology in its most rigorous form, when it goes beyond the merely factual, grants conceptual thought a moment of independence and resists its dissolution into facticity – must itself inevitably be recognized as a philosophical theory rather than as a merely sociological one" (g. 103)
  - Lecture 10 (pg. 104)
    - "In our last session we considered a range of issues regarding the concept of ideology and the basic problem surrounding the theory of ideology as such. And I might just remind you that the most essential thing which emerged here is that the theory of ideology in its classical form – if I may use that expression for once – does not imply the adoption of some kind of universal relativism or general scepticism with regard to the idea of truth itself. For the concept of ideology in its telling form actually presupposes a very emphatic concept of truth. But this concept implies that **truth cannot be presented as a single isolated thesis, for it is formed and articulated by reference to the whole.** Sociologically speaking, this means that both the origin and the function of ideologies, along with their truth content or lack of truth content, can be revealed only in terms of their relation to the social totality rather than, for example, by reducing them to certain isolated social factors, or by fishing out certain singular claims or theses as identifiably ideological. This brings me to a distinction which may perhaps have become rather blurred in philosophy today, but which is nonetheless of considerable significance with regard both to the relationship between philosophy and sociology and to the theory of ideology. This is the distinction between the objectivity of truth and mere subjectivity" (pg. 104)
      - "when I talk about the objectivity involved in the concept of ideology I am trying to bring out the following: that the strict or classical form of the theory of ideology derives consciousness and its forms from objective social processes and, indeed, wherever possible from the sphere of production, and in this sphere of production from the relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production" (pg. 105)
        - "By the 'forces of production' you are to understand all those forces through which human beings essentially engage with nature, and especially to the extent that this engagement with nature takes the form of social labour rather than the more or less contingent practices of gathering or hunting or other such archaic activities. To put it rather crudely, to understand the concept of the force of production here

you should simply think of human labour power, along with the available technical forces of production, namely the entirety of those technological means which allow human beings to engage with nature" (pg. 105)

- ◆ "the productive forces which unfold in the cultural and intellectual sphere are actually none other than those which unfold in the process of society as a whole. And the task of revealing the mediations which are involved here in a genuinely concrete manner is one that has barely been addressed as yet" (pg. 118)
- "By 'relations of production', on the other hand, you should understand the entirety of social relations, but especially those relations which involve control over the means of production and prevail up to some particular time within some specific form of production as a whole" (pg. 105-106)
- "Now the balance or equilibrium between these two categories – the forces of production on the one side and the relations of production on the other – is only ever temporary in character, and they generally tend to diverge from one another. Thus the relations of production, to the extent that they continue to represent relations of exploitation and domination to this day, have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, to become independent, to carry on existing in an irrational manner. In this way they tend to act as a fetter on the rational forces of society, namely the forces of production, or, in extreme cases, in the catastrophes that repeatedly afflict society in times of crisis and war, even in large part to destroy those forces" (pg. 106)
  - "the essential thing here, and the thing you really need to understand if you are to grasp the concept of ideology in its full import and thereby avoid a merely subjectivistic interpretation of ideology, is that **the categories of cognition themselves are intrinsically pre-formed by society as a whole, and also in particular by the relations of social production which are actualized at the expense of truth.** According to this theory, **truth is to be found in the social forces of production, there where human life actually produces and reproduces itself, whereas this realm of social production is obscured or concealed by the forms within which it takes place. But these forms effectively precede all individual consciousness, all individual intention, all subjectivity in such a way that ideology inevitably arises by virtue of the social totality.** In other words, every actual ideology in the strong sense inevitably emerges because in a sense we are unable to think outside the context of this a priori framework – and I deliberately use this expression from the great modern tradition of philosophy – outside the context of the a priori categories of bourgeois society. And it is only because these a priori categories lead to internal contradictions – which is where Hegel comes in – such as the contradiction I presented to you earlier regarding the positions of the worker and the employer in the process of production; **it is only by recognizing these contradictions that it is possible for us to break through this universal context of delusion which surrounds us**" (pg. 107)
    - ◆ *\*where Adorno's approach is employing dialectical thinking.*
  - "Kant is not really concerned with the correctness or otherwise of particular judgements about particular objects, and the Kantian theory of knowledge does not therefore deal with instances of knowledge in the context of certain already established relations of subject and object. Rather, it addresses the question as to how something like a knowledge of objects, how something like organized, internally coherent, and meaningful experience, is actually possible at all. The Kantian theory of knowledge is not a theory which relates specifically to the truth or otherwise of particular cognitive acts in the context of an already established world of objects. Rather, it investigates how this world of objects, and how our own thinking relationship to this world, comes about in the first place." (pg. 106-107)
    - "**For Kant the sphere of the transcendental, which is also a subjective sphere, is essentially the object of philosophical analysis,** although the direction of his interest is an expressly objective one. In other words, **Kant takes the objectivity of knowledge as his starting point and then seeks to ground this objectivity by showing how the claim to objectively valid knowledge and the subjective constitution of experience are reciprocally dependent on each other.** The fundamental intention of Kantian philosophy, in contrast to positivist philosophy, was an objective one, and there are formulations in the *Critique of Pure Reason* which make this unambiguously clear" (pg. 109)
      - "Kant's insight here, his fundamental point, is that objectivity is supposed to be confirmed or explicated through subjective analysis in his sense, whereas in Hume, by contrast, the concept of objectivity itself is criticized through subjectivity and thereby deliberately eliminated" (pg. 109)
      - "**Hegel went on to take this very moment of objectivity as mediated through subjectivity as the cornerstone of his entire philosophy...**" (pg. 109)
- Lecture 11 (pg. 116)
  - "...the theory of ideology constitutes the real stumbling block where the controversy between philosophy and sociology is concerned. The fundamental argument is that the claim to the objectivity of truth, as this is upheld by philosophy, is essentially undermined by sociology, since the latter, instead of actually addressing questions of truth, already subjects every idea of objective truth to doubt by suspecting it of ideology. Sociology allegedly tries to replace insight into any kind of binding truth or validity by exposing the source of the thesis in question" (pg. 116)
  - "...the theory of ideology in its strict form...is precisely not one that relativizes the concept of truth. On the contrary, as I pointed out in the last few lectures, it actually holds fast to an objective concept of truth" (pg. 118)
    - "I am talking here of what we might call the totalized concept of ideology, an approach which seems to intensify the concept of ideology to the greatest possible degree and extend it way beyond its merely particular classical formulation, although it actually ends up by fundamentally weakening and eventually destroying the concept of ideology" (pg. 118)
      - *\*cf. J. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason for remarks on 'totalization'.*
      - *\*cf. D. Binseel, A Phenomenology of "That!", pg. 38 - "Sartre was a liar. He was exceedingly skilled in the use of rhetoric which, undoubtedly, any successful playwright or novelist must be. And, to be clear, rhetoric is the extension of truth to meet a narrative - in the political setting, ideology is the overarching narrative and propaganda its rhetorical tool. As an extension (i.e., a movement beyond itself), truth no longer stands for-itself on its own ground (i.e., such is not its own foundation) - rather, it soon becomes lost between "fact" and fiction, each tugging at the other"*
  - "...we are all more or less victims of the mythological idea that what is true and exists intrinsically as something eternal and immutable cannot have arisen or come to be. This is the idea that there must be something absolutely first in the order of being, as prima philosophia has always claimed to show, and that something is already disqualified if it comes from somewhere. On the one hand, of course, everything comes from somewhere, but this completely abstract way of relating something valid to its genesis is by no means equivalent to making an appropriate judgement with regard to the matter in question, for it actually tends in general to avoid such judgements" (pg. 120)
    - "Now it is characteristic of the whole period of the theory of ideology in its declining phase, as I would describe it...that it does not really get beyond this abstract theory of dependence, or at best simply produces certain correlations between ideology and society without actually being able to establish any relation to what is 'true' or 'false' in the matter in question" (pg. 120)
    - "...it is not actually the critique of ideology that is relativistic; rather, **it is the kind of absolutism that is so popular these days, namely the belief in those celebrated absolutely binding values that we try so hard to maintain because we think that we cannot possibly manage without them. It does not occur to us that the very rigidity of these values which we want to endorse is itself simply a reflection of the rigid and reified consciousness that searches for such values without even reflecting that this need itself, this need for a supposedly firm foundation, as yet says nothing about what is really at stake**" (pg. 121)
      - "...I would say that there is actually precious little difference between the painful need for so-called eternal values, which we see around

- us today and is so anxious to defame any critical reflection on things..." (pg. 121)
- "...nominalism simply becomes a means of refusing any conception of the social whole that attempts to go beyond the façade of the immediately given, a means of defaming any such approach as arbitrary, as nothing but an airy and ungrounded construction. Nominalism thus becomes a way of denigrating theory qua theory – as we would say today – or making us suspicious of theoretical thought right from the start for the sake of a world which cannot intrinsically be justified in the light of the concept or any theoretical reflection. In this sense **the whole positivist movement is to a large extent intrinsically ideological because it effectively prevents reflection on the hypokeimenon (ὑποκείμενον), the underlying substance or hidden essence of society, and promotes the cult of strictly observable facts instead**" (pg. 126-127)
  - Lecture 12 (pg. 128)
    - "I pointed out that, although individual ideologies originally emerged in specific social contexts, and thus also received their original significance from these same contexts, this does not mean that these ideologies, in terms of their material content or their truth content, are simply exhausted by the function they assumed in those contexts, or that they constantly exercise the same function over time. I also attempted to show that a specific intellectual approach, namely that of nominalist scepticism, from the beginning constituted one element of the bourgeois ideology..." (pg. 128)
      - "This has also been expressed in terms of a sociological law which is all the more remarkable for being one of very few principles which is actually shared by Marxist and so-called bourgeois sociologists alike. This is the law, which I would like at least to mention here, that in its Marxist form asserts that the 'superstructure' of society changes more slowly than the 'base'. In the context of American non-Marxist sociology this notion was first expressed I believe by Ogburn – although I may actually be mistaken about this – when he introduced the concept of 'cultural lag' to indicate that consciousness and the existing forms of culture, as they put it in the anglophone world, are not seamlessly or immediately congruent with the base and the conditions of material production, and not even with the relations of production. For the ideologies and the superstructure exhibit a certain life of their own, a certain tenacity or tardiness as it were, in relation to the base" (pg. 129)
        - *\*this gets us in proximity to the theory of the state*
    - "It is the intellectual categories we have at our disposal...that allow us in the first place to stand back from the particular rigid and confining relations which surround us and to envisage other contrasting possibilities which may well appear to us in the context of reflection, even though they do not immediately appear that way in the context of reality." (pg. 129)
      - "it is actually a rather remarkable fact that the realm of mind should change more slowly than the material basis of society" (pg. 130)
    - **"we have to recognize that the social movements and developments that unfold in connection with class conflicts, for as long as society itself remains essentially arbitrary and irrational, will continue to render certain social groups superfluous, to weaken or disempower them, to destroy them in a literal or metaphorical sense, while under this prevailing irrationality the explicit progress of ratio, which develops in the grip of this irrationality, is incapable of bringing happiness or fulfilment to anyone"** (pg. 130)
    - **"It is certainly one of the most significant insights that we owe to modern psychology** – and by modern psychology here I am thinking simply and exclusively of psychoanalysis in its strict Freudian form – **that the unconscious is timeless**, as Freud himself put it in a rather extreme and sweeping way, or possesses a certain kind of rigidity. Thus although the libidinous energies of the unconscious, as he puts it, are plastic in character, i.e. can assume different forms under different circumstances, the unconscious nonetheless constantly reveals a tendency to fall back to the archaic form that once belonged to it" (pg. 131)
      - "whenever there are acute disturbances in the relationship between the personality and reality, they would say, there is also always an immediate tendency for the overwhelming mass of primitive, undifferentiated and archaic elements to reassert their power over us. Now whatever conclusion we come to about this controversy, these regressive and backward-looking forces of the unconscious and human psychology tend to produce a certain affective structure which binds human beings to what are really superseded forms of consciousness, even when in conscious terms they should be quite capable of recognizing these connections between the social process and the objective obsolescence of ideology which I have tried to point out for you. I believe that it is really only in this context that the fact of 'cultural lag' or the slower transformation of the superstructure in relation to the social base can properly be understood." (pg. 132)
    - "...in Hegel it is quite clearly and unambiguously expressed that society also produces poverty precisely with its wealth" (pg. 132)
    - **"this apologetic tendency on the part of modern bourgeois or civil society springs from the fact that it is already felt deep down, at the heart of this society, that something is not actually in order, that this society, in its own innermost principle, harbours something that tends to drive it apart and dissolve it.** Thus the most suitable apologetic means of neutralizing any fundamental critical reflection on society is to argue or insist that fundamental critical thought of this kind, this inheritance of the great tradition of bourgeois rationalism – which confronts society with its own claim to rationality – is something essentially unscientific in character, something windy and speculative that no one can possibly rely on any more. And here the other wing of bourgeois consciousness comes into play – a consciousness that was divided from the first into a rationalist wing and an empiricist wing – namely **the empiricist tradition which implies from the start that there can be no such thing as an objectively valid theory of the whole and no such thing as social objectivity. It also contests the idea that society is built up according to certain principles and specific structural relations, that society is really a system, and insists instead that scientific knowledge merely consists in the identification of individual facts.**" (pg. 133)
      - "This is how it comes about that the same nominalistic theory, when maintained in a rigid and undialectical manner, accomplishes the very opposite of what was intended when the theory was initially conceived. The simple fact, which always immediately diverges from the totality, since the totality is never completely captured in any individual fact, thus sabotages the concept of totality, which is then easily charged with being something unverifiable, i.e. something that cannot be possessed wholly in terms of any individual fact or even any intermediate field of observable facts" (pg. 133)
        - **"positivism is also a necessary expression of consciousness insofar as the decline of our society itself is reflected in the pluralism, in the indifferent and disintegrating multiplicity, that characterizes particular insights that can no longer be unified in any convincing way"** (pg. 138-139)
    - **"In contemporary sociology – and this is perhaps the decisive distinction in contrast to philosophy – we are no longer dealing with genuine theory at all"** (pg. 134)
      - "when, finally, it is even claimed that sociology should free itself from the concept of society, since it can now rely simply on the compelling results of all these particular investigations, this is just the royal road, as it were, for dispensing with critical theory altogether. For if there is no such thing as society, then there is naturally no such thing as a critique of society, and this certainly smooths the way for a sociology that will actually perform what today is called 'socially useful labour'. This ideological dimension can hardly be denied, and I do not think I have to say much more about this here. But **it is clear that this is all an expression of a weakened and merely adaptive consciousness**, whether this is because human beings no longer have the power or even the will to rouse themselves to develop an understanding of society as a system, or whether this is because – and I regard this second point as the more decisive one – under the pressure of currently organized forms of science and knowledge, human beings constantly have to ask permission for every thought they express and are constantly required to show how far the thought in question is verifiable and acceptable within our system of culture and education" (pg. 136)
        - **"this effectively undermines their readiness and capacity for exercising any really independent thought"** (pg. 136)
    - "we must really ask ourselves about how things stand with regard to the possibility of theory today, and especially the possibility of a theory of contemporary society, when we complain that no such theory currently exists" (pg. 136-137)

- "We could perhaps express this in economic terms and say that, the more our society passes over from one based on exchange relations towards one that is based on the direct control over production, and thus over consumption on one side and blindly persisting market relations on the other, the less this society can be measured in terms of a concept of rationality that was effectively modelled upon the notion of equivalence, of like for like, of fair exchange. There is actually ever less exchange in society. The market as it survives today is what economists call a pseudo-market, and rationality has become a merely technical rationality for calculating or predicting the processes of this essentially controlled market. We are no longer talking about the rationality of 'the invisible hand' through which the social whole was said to reproduce itself of its own accord, albeit in a somewhat painful and laborious way" (pg. 138)
  - "You must not forget that the system, the negative system, of capitalism which Marx outlined is a system in the dialectical sense that it derived the concept of rationality from civil society itself, precisely as this concept was presented in the classical doctrines of political economy and the associated theories of surplus value. Marx then proceeded to ask how far the society in question corresponds to the rationality to which it lays claim in accordance with its own ideology or theory with regard to itself." (pg. 138)
- Lecture 13 (pg. 140)
  - "we were wondering how an originally progressive bourgeois social theory – namely the nominalist critique of dogmatically given universal concepts – was eventually transformed into an apologetic social theory, although the nominalism itself remained basically unchanged. And you may also remember that I insisted upon this observation in emphatic contrast to the rather crude and unsophisticated thesis that was endorsed by Max Scheler in his sociology of knowledge. For he attempts to establish a fundamental equivalence between nominalism and progressive social tendencies on the one hand, and between realism – in the sense of Platonism and conceptual realism – and apologetic social tendencies on the other" (pg. 140)
    - "Let me now just try and show you, at least in summary terms, in what way **nominalism is actually incompatible with the development of theory**" (pg. 141)
      - "Now one of the essential aspects of nominalism – and this is the aspect which really facilitated the rapid growth of the modern mathematical natural sciences – is the claim that we cannot know the inner being or so-called essence of things, whether this is because, as in the most extreme form of nominalism, the very idea of the essence of things is repudiated – and the independent character of the concept is just the thesis that something like an intrinsic essence or substantial concept belongs to things – or whether because, in a more mediated form of nominalism such as that represented by the Kantian philosophy, it is claimed that, while things may indeed have an inner essence, any real insight or knowledge concerning the latter is closed off to us on account of the laws which govern the limits of human experience" (pg. 141)
        - ◆ "Here I shall ignore the rather paradoxical character of the claim that we have no insight into the essence of things, something which is itself presented as an essential insight and thus appears to presuppose what it denies, namely that anything such as an essential insight is even possible" (pg. 141)
    - "I have already drawn your attention to certain social tendencies of our own time and thereby raised the question as to how far an adequate form of theory is now at all possible; and I finally suggested to you that the positivism that prevails today does represent an adequate consciousness of our situation insofar as the decline into embracing mere facticity on the one hand and vacuous formalism on the other actually corresponds to the incipient decline of bourgeois society itself" (pg. 142)
    - "...the thing itself, namely society, has been abandoned by ratio, i.e. where the unreason in the relation between the social forms of production and the actual level of the productive forces has become manifest, we find that theory has also forfeited its rights with regard to society – and this is because theory always really means confronting a thing with the rationality which is internal to it or, rather, confronting something with its own claim to embody rationality" (pg. 142-143)
      - "...contemporary society in particular is indeed accessible to theoretical insight to an especially high degree. This is because all of the complicated processes of mediation which prevailed in liberal society in its heyday have now fallen away. Society has become all the more transparent as a result, just as the process of distribution in relation to any social product has become directly transparent to us, namely the movement of the product from the producers through to the various points of distribution, where the latter now play the role once performed by independent agents in the circulation of the market. The theory of society was basically what was then called political economy, and this political economy essentially involved the insight that, for all its structural regularity at the level of the whole, this society also always displayed an irrational aspect or moment at the level of the social and economic vicissitudes affecting individuals" (pg. 143)
        - "Adam Smith's famous remarks concerning 'the invisible hand' that governs the fate of society also has its negative side. For this 'hand' cannot actually be perceived at the level of the particular or in the fate of the individual economically productive and socialized subject. It can be perceived only in relation to the totality of such individuals" (pg. 143)
          - ◆ "In other words, **this idea of the objectivity and the rationality of an overarching process that is realized over the heads of individuals was expressly bound up, in this classical version of the theory of society, with the irrationality of social actions on the part of individuals, and this moment of irrationality thus continued to be evident**" (pg. 143-144)
            - ◇ "...in a certain way, the social whole has now actually become much more transparent than before. One might almost say that the irrationality in society has shifted to the extremes. Thus, on the one hand, the irrationality has moved in a direction where the highest agencies which carry out these economic plans can hardly be said to plan the whole outcome in a fully conscious way, for they do not get beyond their own particular interests and take only general interests into consideration in an indirect fashion – only when this is required if they themselves are to keep going, or if they wish to avoid being caught up in the catastrophe that, deep within society, still threatens to emerge at any moment. On the other hand, the irrationality is still present in the sense that it is possible in totalitarian states for particular groups of the population to be expressly singled out at any moment as people who should be excluded or destroyed – precisely because, under the existing conditions of production, this society is no longer capable of reproducing itself in an unimpeded way" (pg. 144)
      - "the impossibility of developing a theory, which I demonstrated to you last time when I demonstrated the loss of rationality on the part of society itself, and the superfluous character of theory once the essence of society has become manifest can now be recognized as two dialectical sides of the same state of affairs" (pg. 145)
        - "...a dialectical theory, which is essentially nothing but the movement of its own concept, cannot be fixed or tied down, cannot be statically reduced to some immutable doctrine about society, one which is constituted precisely as it is once and for all" (pg. 146)
          - "as soon as such a theory is simply enthroned as a state religion it does not merely succumb to the usual phenomena of ossification, something to which, according to Georg Simmel, every intellectual and cultural product in the world is eventually exposed. What happens is that the theory thereby enters into direct contradiction with its own intellectual content" (pg. 146)
            - ◆ "It is quite impossible to criticize the concept of reification, the concept of reified consciousness, the concept of the rigid separation and opposition of subject and object – and such critique is unconditionally implied in the essence of a dialectical theory – while simultaneously endorsing an utterly reified conception of the relationship between knowledge and thing, between subject and object, a conception which turns subjective consciousness into a mere copy or reflection of the object and thus already effaces that dialectical relation between subject and object which it is the vital and essential task of dialectical theory to grasp" (pg. 146-147)



- "people there have effectively fallen back into the very subjectivism which, as I said before, is the latent essential principle of a nominalism that nonetheless likes to present itself as eminently objective. In other words, the merely subjective declarations of those in power are deceptively elevated to the status of intrinsic and independent truth" (pg. 147-148)
- "since I am specifically attempting in these lectures to develop something akin to the elements of a dialectical theory for you, I should like to take this opportunity to say more about what is actually meant by the term 'dialectic' here. For I believe **it would be a complete misunderstanding of the concept of dialectic if you tried to think of it as a kind of method**, as something which you just need to apply to reality in the same rigid and reified way that is usually encountered in the Eastern bloc, and which will then serve as a nutcracker with which you can now disclose the meaning of all phenomena" (pg. 148)
  - "I would almost say that **the meaning of dialectic as I am trying to present it to you here is the exact opposite...is, rather, to immerse yourselves in the phenomena themselves with all the experience and intellectual energy that you are able to draw upon, and to approach these phenomena by making full use of all that you know and have theoretically reflected upon; thus you must allow yourselves just as much to be guided by the phenomena as you must also measure the phenomena in terms of the theoretical material that is already available to you.** And both these aspects or moments, that of your own experience and that of theoretical reflection, must be able to modify each other and interact with each other in an open and flexible way so that neither moment is simply reified or rendered independent in relation to the other. In this sense, therefore, dialectic is not a method waiting to be applied in order to crack open the truth of everything, and it is certainly not a world view" (pg. 148)
    - "...dialectic is not a claim or proclamation, not some fixed reproducible thing to which everything can be subjected" (pg. 148)
  - "But I should perhaps at least attempt to characterize for you, at least indirectly, what is at stake here. This is the attempt to expose ourselves to our experience, and to articulate the contours of this experience – without rigidity, without appeal to anything fixed and immutable, to any self-identical framework, as Herr Heidegger so eloquently likes to put it – but without simply falling into relativism as a result" (pg. 148-149)
    - **"the task is to hold on to a concept of binding and objective truth precisely in the constant movement of the concept and the constant relativization of partial or individual insights.** If I were to express this negatively...I would say the central task is this: to renounce all forms of reified and ossified consciousness and think in a way that nonetheless upholds the concept of objectively binding truth and objectively binding insight" (pg. 149)
      - ◆ "it does involve a demand which in the age of reified consciousness people find it enormously difficult to fulfil, and this is the demand for intellectual freedom. This requires that you give yourselves over to the phenomena in a sovereign, independent and flexible kind of way" (pg. 149)
        - ◇ "One aspect or moment of such cognition is fidelity to the facts, a readiness to immerse yourselves in the particulars of real existence, a mistrust of abstract and questionable concepts that are simply foisted on things in advance. At the same time, we also have to acknowledge the equal necessity for the complementary movement provided by our own intellectual powers. In other words, it is not enough to point your finger at appearances...For you must also have the capacity to move from one system of relations, from one 'frame of reference', to another. You must have the capacity – like the shifting camera angle in a film – to look at things not only in really close proximity but from a considerable distance as well. In short, **you must try and cultivate what Hegel refers to as freedom towards the object, but to an extent that goes far beyond what he was describing in these terms.** And it actually seems to me that what can perhaps be called the objectivity of cognition – when something truly essential is revealed to you which is certainly not a matter of some rigid and conceptually static 'essence' – is closely bound up with that capacity for flexibility on the part of the subject, that ability to immerse oneself in the object and to step back from it, to engage with the object in an experimental spirit" (pg. 149-150)
    - **"The ability to distance yourselves** from the business of science as it is currently practised, and thus to maintain an inner freedom in the face of the well-worn categories that it continues to employ, **is probably the most essential thing here if you are really to comprehend** – at least in a way that goes beyond the mere acquisition of information – **what I have attempted to describe for you as the basic intention of dialectic**" (pg. 150)
  - Lecture 14 (pg. 151)
    - "Now of course there has always been talk of something like false consciousness, and indeed of supposedly widespread false consciousness. One only has to think of Heraclitus and his talk of the foolish and deluded 'many'" (pg. 151)
      - *\*Quite similar to Heidegger's 'They' (or, 'the many')*
      - "This was a common enough topos in ancient thought, and it might be rather grandiose to interpret this simply as a justificatory or defensive ideology on the part of an old aristocratic order which found itself threatened by emergent democratic movements in Greece during the sixth and seventh centuries bc. For it seems to me more likely that the claim to authority, or perhaps also to the market value, which the more or less unattached or wandering philosophers of the time cultivated was naturally bound up with the fact that they presented themselves as initiates in possession of true insight, whereas others were in thrall to mere 'opinion'. And of course **this notion is reproduced in Plato's fundamental distinction between truth and appearance, where appearance is generally identified with immediate sense perception, while truth is identified with reason**" (pg. 151-152)
        - **"...this thought already involves something which has been decisive for the entire history of the modern concept of ideology – namely that the essential task, in contrast to all ideology, is precisely to break through immediate appearances, through some semblance or façade, and penetrate to some more or less concealed core"** (pg. 152)
    - "in today's lecture I should like to encourage you, with specific reference to this intellectual model, to maintain a free and open mind with respect to such hackneyed and well-worn notions. For it is of course the case that nominalist movements take sensuous knowledge, the immediately given, i.e. that which is mere semblance or appearance for the other philosophical approach, to be the only real source of knowledge, while what is concealed by appearances, truth in the sense of alētheia (ἀλήθεια), is scorned as a purely metaphysical construction by Enlightenment thought in the broadest sense. Yet this very distinction between essence and appearance, between the underlying structural laws and the outer façade, expresses precisely what is central where the recognition of ideology is concerned. For **the task is to see through the phenomena of the façade** – the surface phenomena which serve to conceal what effectively holds the whole process together – and thus allows us to recognize the essential laws or principles which are at work. And to that extent **the theory of ideology in its classical form is also the heir to philosophy insofar as it opposes a concept of essence or structure to the merely ephemeral and deceptive phenomena of the façade**" (pg. 152)
    - "In the early bourgeois phase of social development in Elizabethan England, Bacon was the first person who seriously attempted to identify those more or less constant intrusions or disturbing factors which made scientific knowledge, or knowledge properly based upon experience, effectively impossible" (pg. 152)
      - **"Bacon's doctrine of idols, if I may say a few words about this here, offers us a partly anthropological and partly psychological doctrine of the illusions or disturbances to which our consciousness is exposed merely from the side of the subject, as it were, in its relation to objects,** which are taken as things that are just there in themselves in the sense of naive realism. On this conception, therefore, the task of knowledge is simply to experience these objects in the most adequate and least distorted way, but thereby also in an essentially passive way" (pg. 153)



- social-economic base...**" (pg. 157)
- **"...bourgeois society has always been internally divided** and the identity between the universal and the particular which it affirmed has never actually been realized..." (pg. 157)
    - "In this sense there is no such thing as one bourgeois ideology precisely because there is no one bourgeois society; or, to put this more exactly, because the one **bourgeois society is defined precisely by the internal fracture**, by the class relationship, which it involves. And **the lack of identity, the unreconciled character of the relationship between universal and particular, is decisively reflected in the form assumed by the ideologies in question**" (pg. 157)
      - ◆ "Thus in a rather striking way we can distinguish between those theoretical positions which effectively uphold the side of the universal – in the history of modern thought these are the rationalistic positions – and those which uphold the side of the particular – which are the empiricist positions" (pg. 157)
    - "...it belongs to the essence of ideology that, although the various conditions, insights, forms of behaviour, whatever it is, have been historically produced and have come to be what they are, all of this – in the context of ideology – is almost always presented as something that exists in itself or possesses some intrinsic being as such. One might say that **the fetishization of the historical – in other words, the absolutizing of what has become what it is and the forgetting of how it came to be what it is – is a necessary characteristic of ideology**. And one can even show that forgetting as such is a constitutive category for the overall form that modern epistemology has assumed" (pg. 159)
      - "Thus we might say that something like the 'consciousness of things' in the context of philosophy is only possible when the undiminished actuality of the phenomena to be synthesized is no longer present to us, and we thus forget or neglect certain aspects of these phenomena. And it is only through what is no longer present in the phenomena, in other words through a kind of *sterēsis* (στέρησις) or deprivation, that they first become susceptible to what metaphysical and epistemological theories have so lauded under the name of 'synthesis'. **The cognitive achievement involved in such theories of knowledge is an achievement of forgetting, for something which has become what it is here appears as an absolute**. This alone helps you to understand the relationship of ideology to history itself: while ideology is constitutively dependent on history, it must nonetheless deny the latter precisely in order to uphold the absolute truth content it claims. History is the scar, the critical point, of ideology as such. **Once we can expose the historical origin of a particular ideology, it forfeits that illusory appearance of absoluteness which is essential to its existence**" (pg. 159-160)
    - "Now when you recognize that ideologies are intrinsically entwined with history, this seems to open up an extremely important aspect that points in another direction as well. For **it is not just that ideologies themselves change; the essence of ideology also changes**, if I can put it that way. In other words, the contents of consciousness are not equally ideological at all times – there is a more or a less where ideology is concerned. In the course of our earlier reflections on the theory of ideology I have already spoken at various points about the way that ideology has become more tenuous and more fragmented today. It is either merely a duplication of what already exists or nothing but the kind of naked lie currently propagated by dictatorships. I have thereby already indicated that one cannot just take over the concept of ideology as if it were a constant that is equally valid for all epochs. Now there is a subjective and an objective side to this." (pg. 160)
      - "On the objective side, it seems that ideology in an emphatic sense presupposes a highly developed society. An ideology as such can really emerge only where the base is articulated enough to provide a closed motivational context to which the superstructure then corresponds." (pg. 160)
        - "...the concept of ideology presupposes a certain kind of social objectification, a kind of alienation on the part of socialized subjects. It is only where society has taken on a certain weight or power of its own in relation to socialized subjects, only where society is no longer immediately identical with socialized human beings themselves but has already become extended and objectified, that something like the formation and development of an ideology is really possible" (pg. 160)
      - "And on the other side, namely the subjective side, I would say that ideology presupposes a relatively highly developed level of rationality. Ideology in an emphatic sense can arise only where the claim to the rational, legitimate or justifiable character of society has already in some sense become universal" (pg. 160)
    - "**Now I would say that, today, in a world where bourgeois society is trembling or already broken in so many ways, there can no longer be ideologies in the sense of attempts to show the coherent rational character of society**" (pg. 161)
      - "...the concept of 'ideology' is not an abstract universal concept but one that strictly applies only to bourgeois society. Thus there are no feudal ideologies but only feudalistic ones..." (pg. 161)
        - "what is common to all these great restorationist thinkers is that they are all confronted with the genuinely paradoxical task of justifying the irrational itself, the irrational character of those societies themselves, precisely by appeal to rationality – in other words, there is really only something such as feudal ideology under the form of romanticism." (pg. 161)
  - Lecture 15 (pg. 162)
    - "Now allow me to come to the central issue, and let me try today, if at all possible, to bring together our hitherto fragmentary reflections on **the problem of ideology as the principal site where sociology and philosophy essentially intersect with each other**. In our last session I pointed out that it is not just that ideologies and the functions of these ideologies undergo change over time, but also that ideologies can be said to exist to a different extent in different historical periods. Thus one cannot simply take all forms of consciousness – even insofar as they could be described as false consciousness – and subsume them all to the same extent under the classical concept of ideology" (pg. 162)
      - "...the concept of 'ideology', in the specific sense of a necessary kind of false consciousness, is really beginning to dissolve today" (pg. 162)
        - "On one side we are confronted with something that can no longer properly be described as ideology precisely because it no longer harbours any claim to objective truth..." (pg. 162-163)
    - "**...what we see more and more these days is that the existing order itself, in other words the totality of productive relations and productive forces as they are given today, is now taking over the function of ideology. The existing order is thus accepted as such, and that which exists is experienced as so inescapable that it is effectively raised into a justification of itself in its mere factual existence**" (pg. 165)
      - "I believe that the veil beneath which human beings exist today, beneath which consciousness exists today, is – to put this in an extreme way – the veil of complete unveiledness. It is the veil that consists in the way that human beings certainly experience in themselves the power of the reality that confronts them, without this power being particularly dressed up in any way, although the power in question, through its sheer disproportion to the power and to a considerable extent even the insight of any individual, appears as if it were not itself something that has become what it is, as if it were not itself mediated in and through human beings themselves, as if it were not society itself that ultimately lay behind this power. For this power appears as if it had literally become what Hegel had already said it was at a much earlier stage of the development of bourgeois society as an emerging system of complete socialization, namely a kind of 'second nature'" (pg. 165)
    - "behind the increasing loss of intellectual vigour, the increasing loss of interest for theoretical issues more generally, that we see today there are further reasons beyond those I have already discussed with you, namely reasons on the subjective side of things. **That no one any longer takes any real pleasure in thinking actually reflects something objective – namely the pressure which weighs upon every individual, and the danger to which every individual is exposed simply by trying to exercise independent thought, and, above all, that feeling of hopelessness and powerlessness which every thought now tends to assume**" (pg. 165-166)

- "I believe that in a sense all this is an illusion. In other words, I believe that, just as 'second nature' is in reality nothing but society in a bewitched form, so too **the powerlessness of human beings themselves, who ultimately constitute this very society, is only an illusion**" (pg. 166)
          - "I also believe that we cannot resolve this simply by invoking the idea of humanity and appealing to human spontaneity in an empty and declamatory fashion or just by exhorting people to all imaginable kinds of wonderful things, thoughts and deeds. For we need first of all to go back and consider the conditions of that weakening and that kind of resignation under which we suffer so much today. It is not by denying our current state but only by comprehending it as such, by seeing through it precisely as a piece of ideology, that there is any possibility of moving beyond it" (pg. 166)
  - "...**ideology today rests upon the way that the social order and, above all, the technological apparatus under which we live, together with the technical means and productive forces on which that order depends, have themselves acquired a kind of halo and suggestive power of their own, where the very powerlessness of the individual in relation to these media is in truth reflected**" (pg. 167)
    - "In other words, ideology is polarized between an idolization of technology and of institutions on the one hand and sheer deception on the other. I would say there is an essential conclusion to be drawn from this: **the critique of ideology today**, if it is to avoid focusing on what is actually inessential, **must concern itself less with the intellectual and cultural products of the mind** – and with confronting ideological products with the cui bono question as we used to do in the good old days – **but should attempt instead to recognize ideology precisely in the realism seemingly devoid of ideology and the practice of naked deception to which human beings have subjected themselves**" (pg. 167-168)
  - "class consciousness is not – and in the classical theory of ideology itself was never conceived as – something that would just accrue to human beings by nature as it were, simply in accordance with their class position" (pg. 169)
    - "For you must not forget that, even on the classical conception, which sees the proletariat as essentially an object of social processes, the proletariat itself does not somehow stand beyond society. For the proletariat too, insofar as it sells its labour power and keeps the bourgeois process of production in motion, is already incorporated into bourgeois society from a relatively early point of time. It would therefore be quite absurd to suppose that the consciousness of this class, which in terms of its own interests is certainly opposed to the prevailing order but still lives in and from this order and is shaped down to its innermost impulses by the totality of this order, would a priori possess an expressly oppositional and entirely distinctive class consciousness of its own" (pg. 169)
  - "it is not really a question of whether human beings, where their own subjective consciousness is concerned, actually doubt whether they possess or recognize certain values or fail to possess or recognize any values at all. For if **ideology is really a necessary form of false consciousness, as I think we ought to interpret the concept of ideology** if it is not to become vague and flabby, then what truly decides whether a given consciousness is ideological or not is not the subjective attitude of the relevant subject but the structure of the categories in terms of which a human being actually thinks" (pg. 170)
    - "I would actually be tempted to argue that this particular kind of scepticism [e.g., subjectivism] is itself a form of ideology, precisely because it tends to be closely associated with a narrow-minded attachment to one's own merely individual interests" (pg. 170)
    - "I would like to show you that **this consciousness of the so-called sceptical generation, insofar as there really is such a thing, is an ideological or false consciousness** – in other words, a consciousness which mistakes a series of surface phenomena which directly claim our attention – above all the immediacy of our own particular interests – for what is essential here, namely the structure of society itself. **Once we realize that the immediacy of the individual and of particular interests is itself mediated by society as a whole, we can no longer really endorse the standpoint that the individual is always what is closest to itself, simply because this is not actually true. For the whole is present in every individual person**, even in what strikes us as the most naive and self-evident human need. Thus the truly sceptical approach should actually be aimed at this very tendency to absolutize the standpoint of immediacy." (pg. 170)
      - "...the obsession with merely immediate consciousness serves only to conceal the objective social structures on which this individual consciousness depends." (pg. 172)
  - "...we should also point out that technology itself also functions as a kind of veil in the sense that we are no longer capable of perceiving the human productive forces behind the technology which they have created" (pg. 170)
- Lecture 16 (pg. 173)
  - "**...a consciousness which is sceptical in terms of subjective attitude certainly cannot be accounted free of ideology** simply for that reason. For it is actually the dogged immediacy with which one's ends are pursued, without any theoretical reflection or any thought that goes beyond what currently exists, that itself constitutes a certain ideology and weaves a kind of veil." (pg. 173)
  - "I believe that what is all too often neglected in discussions of the concept of ideology is precisely that **ideologies in the strict or emphatic sense are mediated by the totality of society**. In other words, ideological categories are those which appear in an a priori way as essential forms of our consciousness yet are basically defined or determined by the entire structure of our society – and thus do not represent merely interests or views which are characteristic of particular groups and would be specific to some particular social class" (pg. 173-174)
    - "When we discussed the concept of class consciousness I took the opportunity of distinguishing the concept of ideology from the kind of psychology of interests to which it has often been reduced, and I believe that we can properly understand this point only once we are quite clear that **ideology is not a sort of thinking**, or is not necessarily a sort of thinking, **that is imposed on some individual within the overall social structure essentially by the group to which the individual in question happens to belong**. For the veil which I spoke about arises through the way that the entire social structure within which we are bound does not merely appear to us as a kind of second nature but also actually produces us, as you might say, as a kind of second nature out of itself, and provides us with the means, forms and categories in terms of which we think and act. Hence it is also extraordinarily difficult to reduce ideologies today to the special interests of particular groups. I do not want you to misunderstand me here" (pg. 174)
  - "**the mechanisms of reification, or the mechanisms of reifying consciousness – the hypostatization of immediate private interest as the only relevant criterion**, the nationalistic ideologies that have spread to so many countries in the world, and other things of this kind – are mediated by the totality of society itself, and in this sense they reach down below the specific forms of social differentiation and constitute a kind of fundamental stratum which human beings basically have in common today" (pg. 174-175)
    - "People themselves are also far less conscious of these mechanisms, for they function at a preconscious level and are much more difficult to resist and challenge precisely because they have taken on the character of a second nature" (pg. 175)
    - "...the attempt to reduce ideologies to the needs of particular groups obviously becomes more difficult the further removed the cultural and intellectual spheres are from the immediate interests of the material base of society" (pg. 175)
  - "when you hear people say today that the human being as such is what counts, that the sole end or goal is man himself, and that specific social relations are irrelevant to this notion of man, we can certainly say that such an ideology only helps to maintain the current order and thus ultimately works to the advantage of those who benefit from this order." (pg. 175)
    - *\*this is an attack on humanism (and, possibly existentialism).*
      - "But these people cannot specifically be said to represent this ideology in contrast to other social groups, for it is also expressly shared by the less advantaged members of society and various other groups which certainly have no special interest in propagating it. Nor can we say that this ideology, in terms of its content, is specifically designed to justify any particular identifiable differences within society. For in terms of actual

- content it does not serve class differences in a direct or immediate way. It does so only indirectly in the sense that, by presenting society as it exists as a truly human society, this approach assumes an ideological character precisely as a whole" (pg. 175)
- "I would contrast legitimizing ideologies of this kind with what I call complementary ideologies, namely ideologies which really experience some aspect of things in their negative character. Instead of trying to justify or legitimate the prevailing order of things itself directly, ideologies of this sort attempt to supplement the latter by recourse to some kind of cultural or intellectual argument, some form of consciousness, which that order itself does not possess." (pg. 176)
    - "One might say that 'the human being' is just the complementary ideology to ubiquitous dehumanization. And I suspect we encounter something very similar – if you will allow me to pursue a somewhat speculative thought here – with those metaphysical explorations of temporality which flourish so much today, in other words, with all those attempts to turn time into the metaphysically crucial and essential thing as such. It is very interesting to observe how this metaphysical elevation or glorification of time has emerged precisely in an epoch when something such as the consciousness of temporal continuity, of a continuous, coherent and meaningful course of life, can no longer really be found" (pg. 177)
      - "we also find that all of the philosophies which, in a certain sense, were reacting against a rationalistic approach espoused the idea of the stream of consciousness – that is, of the essentially temporal character of subjectivity as something immediately lived – until the metaphysical construction of time itself finally arose out of this specific aspect of experience" (pg. 177-178)
  - Lecture 17 (pg. 185)
    - "In truth, however, concepts must be developed in such a way that they organize, from a central theoretical perspective, the mass of phenomena which are subsumed under them. Thus within the continuum that, in a sense, any actual thing really represents, it can never be the task of a concept to include every possible detail in a totally clear and unambiguous way. For that only sabotages thinking by expecting or demanding too much of the concept of a concept" (pg. 187)
      - "...ideologies themselves are becoming ever more abstract, i.e. that the dominant ideologies of today involve infinitely less specific positive content than was formerly the case. Thus the concept of 'man' – which has become one of the most decisive theoretical vehicles of this development today – is already infinitely thinner and more abstract than the principal ideological concept deployed by the National Socialists..." (pg. 187)
    - "In [the] looser and broader sense, ideological thinking is a kind of thinking that in the case of a particular concept ignores the conditions of its production and turns the congealed product of a dynamic process into something that simply exists in itself, and thus fetishizes it in the process. In this sense ideology and fetishism are identical with each other" (pg. 189)
    - "Now I claim that validity is not something pure which is conceivable independently of questions of genesis; on the other hand, the sociological position that genesis is just validity, the idea behind what we called the total concept of ideology, is not defensible either. Thus everything comes down to mediation. But when I say 'mediation' here I must also warn you about a misunderstanding that it is always easy to fall into, and perhaps especially easy to fall into here since we have not really been able to unfold the philosophical problematic of the problem of mediation here on account of the specific thematic focus of these lectures. When I speak of 'mediation', I am not talking about a middle way, about an approach that would acknowledge the right that is due to genesis and validity in each case" (pg. 191)
      - "To a certain extent we might say that the sociology of knowledge which was developed by Max Scheler did represent a theory of mediation somewhat along those lines, although, as you will all know, he still basically came down rather one-sidedly on behalf of the theory of validity. He argued that the issue of genesis, or the genetic perspective, prevails within the order of being, so to speak, which is also where we deal with ideologies, with the psychology of interests, with everything like that. And here he even provided entire lists which correlated particular cultural and intellectual forms with particular social factors and conditions." (pg. 191-192)
      - "the answer is not the kind of mediation which just accepts there is genesis on the one hand and validity on the other, and then seeks to balance out or accommodate both perspectives. For where the philosophical concept of mediation is concerned – and I believe this is fundamental for any genuine understanding of dialectical method, and something one must really already learn from Hegel if one wants to understand the whole approach that is adopted here – we need to see that the problem of mediation lies in the concept itself, which has to be conceived as essentially mediating in character" (pg. 192)
        - "We are not talking about a general relationship between concepts that is external to individual concepts, about something intermediate that somehow balances out these concepts. **We are talking about the recognition that the moments which intrinsically belong to and are presupposed by the individual concepts also appear to be excluded or indeed specifically excluded by these same concepts. You can see here just how closely the idea of dialectic as a process in which extremes pass over into one another is connected with the thought of mediation.** This means that, if you just question the concepts thoroughly enough in terms of their own intrinsic meaning, you will actually stumble on the very moments which they appear to exclude and see that the mediation involved here cannot be understood as a kind of connecting link between concepts" (pg. 192-193)
          - ◆ *\*this is the start to his theory of negative dialectics. Cf. Ontology and Dialectics, Lecture 23*  
<https://sublimalsensibility.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/theodor-w-adorno-ontology-and-dialectics.pdf>
    - "Now I believe that the easiest and clearest way to show you what I mean by this inner mediation of the two opposed concepts of genesis and validity is the following" (pg. 193)
      - "the really important thing is for you to get beyond this rigid antithesis altogether" (pg. 193)
      - "the concept of ideology itself, if it is to possess any meaning, actually presupposes the concept of truth; that it is intrinsically contradictory, and an utterly meaningless undertaking, to speak about ideology in an emphatic sense, and thus about what is supposedly the simply conditioned character of knowledge, unless we possess a concept of truth itself in this regard. For if I say that a thought or idea is simply conditioned, or can be understood only in terms of its simply conditioned character, and thus lacks any truth moment whatsoever, I thereby deny that the concept in question has truth, or I relativize the truth claim that it raises. But that is only possible if one possesses a concept of truth that is not exhausted in the process, i.e. a concept of truth against which a notion such as 'simply conditioned' or 'absolute' can be measured. In other words, without a concept of validity it is quite impossible to grasp the concept of any conditioned truth. I am basically just repeating this from an earlier lecture and importing it into this one" (pg. 194)
        - "both of these moments...are mediated through each other. One cannot be thought without the other, and any attempt to isolate one of these moments alone inevitably discovers that I am thereby arbitrarily hypostasizing or absolutizing that aspect or moment. Or it discovers that, if I think thoroughly consistently enough about one aspect or moment, I end up thinking about the other as well. **But the great difficulty which arises here – and this is the difficulty of all dialectical thinking – is that although both of these moments are reciprocally related to one another, and neither can exist without the other, they are by no means simply the same.**" (pg. 196)
          - ◇ *\*there' cannot exist absent a 'here' - each, in part, defines the other. To be apart-(from) is to be a-part-(of).*
          - ◆ "there is a synthesis of subjective and objective aspects or moments which cannot be separated from one another but which nonetheless cannot be collapsed into a simple identity with one another" (pg. 196)
  - Lecture 18 (pg. 197)

- "What I want to argue is that the opposition between the relativist position, which regards everything as merely ephemeral precisely because it is something that has come into being, and the position usually described as absolutism, which makes an absolute and objective truth claim – that this antithesis itself cannot be sustained. In other words, neither of these aspects or moments, the genetic moment and the moment of objective truth, can be thought without the other." (pg. 197)
- **"After all we have heard so far about reified consciousness, it will probably come as no surprise to you if I say that this way of thinking – the idea that nothing which has become is really capable of truth – is the primal phenomenon, the very prototype, of reifying thought, for which truth must be always tied to what remains or persists.** Perhaps this is because human beings originally, and rightly, saw the concept of truth as the antithesis to the phenomenon of death and their own ephemeral existence, as an end to all that untruth and illusion to which our life is exposed by virtue of its transience. Perhaps they believed that this conception of truth offered them a remedy for all this, without actually recognizing that this moment of emergence or becoming is already contained in the idea of truth. It is one of the most curious aspects of philosophy that those philosophers, like the great German idealists after Kant, who placed the idea of spontaneity, function, activity and becoming at the centre of philosophy – all of them concepts in which time is implicated as a necessary moment – still clung to this thing-like concept of truth" (pg. 200)
  - "...they continued to hold on to a rigid and static concept of truth in spite of this insight into the essential relationship between truth and process or becoming; in other words, they still held on to the idea that, while truth is something produced or brought about, it is nonetheless supposed to be entirely independent of time" (pg. 201)
    - **"...you must relinquish the belief that the truth cannot have 'become'"** (pg. 201)
      - ◆ **"...the true can in fact have 'become', that the idea of truth itself is something which has arisen, something which has been laboriously achieved. And I believe that the power of truth, that which compels us to hold on to the idea of truth, lies in this element of emergence, this process of becoming, in which it seeks to find expression** – in stark contrast to any conception of truth which looks upon it as simply rigid, fixed and given. So if you really want to get beyond this antithesis between genesis and validity – which is crucial not only for understanding the true relationship between the disciplines of sociology and philosophy but for the tasks which any really productive consciousness has to confront – **the decisive thing is to try and free yourself as resolutely as possible from the idea that truth cannot be something that has become; from the idea that truth stands motionless on one side, while the realm of factual existence, of change, of becoming, stands on the other, and the task is somehow to bring them both together.** Only once you have seen through this notion – the antithesis between objectivity qua truth and mere subjectivity qua becoming – as illusory, or as simply provisional, will you be able to escape the spell of ideology. For ideology always basically consists in denying any truth-character to what has become; and it is only another way of saying the same thing when that which has become is absolutized, and something longer in the process of becoming is regarded as if it enjoyed a simply objective kind of being in itself. The critique of ideology has rightly and repeatedly recognized the fixated and reified forms of what exists as something that has emerged and come to be. I could also point out – though only in passing for reasons of time – that it is not a question of either accepting or rejecting the absolutist position, which our own ideal notion of culture has usually defended against the allegedly corrosive effects of relativism. For the task is to recognize this antithesis itself, this opposition between the absolute and the relative, as a kind of deceptive appearance. The problem here is that some partial, particular and objectified truth takes itself to be absolute, where of course it is not, whereas the totality of interconnected moments, once they are grasped precisely as such, does indeed go beyond the merely contingent appearance and relativity of particular instances of knowledge." (pg. 202-203)
- "neither should we reify intellectual problems by imagining that the solutions we are trying to find for them are already simply and immediately inscribed in those problems. For if we really want to resolve these problems, we discover that we are thrown back on our own spontaneity and subjectivity. In a sense the problem lies waiting in the matter itself, but it also lies waiting for us, and without the requisite intellectual activity on our part it cannot be picked up in the first place. But insofar as subjects are inevitably required to resolve the hidden or implicit problem – and therewith actual living social human beings – it is clear that society in turn also leaves its mark on these problems. For the human beings which these problems intrinsically require if they are to be resolved are the same human beings who belong in turn to a social totality, who are pre-formed through the categories of this social totality which they bring to the problems. Thus **human beings impress something of the shape of the society to which they themselves belong upon the problems with which they are involved.** In this way I believe you can get some sense of the overall relationship I am talking about without appealing to some third term" (pg. 206)
  - "Thus, to conclude, **the mediation between philosophical thought or intellectual products as such and society lies in the totality** – in the totality of society, in the whole that is actually implied by every cultural or intellectual product, rather than in any single, particular or interacting interests. To put this another way: the unfolding rationality which prevails within the products of the mind, which distinguishes what is right and what is false, which drives one intellectual structure, one philosophy, one principle on towards the next, is itself identical with the unfolding principle of the society which – as a thoroughly interconnected society bound together by the principle of exchange – obeys this moment of rationality to the point where it might finally drive beyond the form of exchange society altogether" (pg. 206)
    - "Thus we might say that the history of mind and culture is a self-contained and internally motivated and coherent history to the extent that the interconnected character of society is internally motivated and coherent; on the other hand, it is just as fractured, arbitrary and afflicted in itself as society, for all its systematic unity, has remained fragmented, afflicted and destructive to this day" (pg. 206)
- "society appears in a 'windowless' way in the so-called cultural and intellectual problems. Mind or spirit is the shape of society, is society as appearance, rather than something motivated by or dependent on society. And validity or justification would ultimately be nothing but the appearing necessity of genesis" (pg. 207)

d. Further Readings:

- Introduction to Sociology, by T. Adorno [http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Sociology%20\(Stanford,%202000\).pdf](http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Sociology%20(Stanford,%202000).pdf)
- Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by T. Adorno [http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Kant%27s%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason%20\(Stanford,%202001\).pdf](http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Kant%27s%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason%20(Stanford,%202001).pdf)
- Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, by T. Adorno [http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Metaphysics%20\(Stanford,%202000\).pdf](http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Metaphysics%20(Stanford,%202000).pdf)
- The Problems of Moral Philosophy, by T. Adorno [http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Problems%20of%20Moral%20Philosophy%20\(Stanford,%202000\).pdf](http://www.edarcelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Problems%20of%20Moral%20Philosophy%20(Stanford,%202000).pdf)
- Course of Positive Philosophy (3 vols.), by A. Comte
  - Volume 1 - <https://historyofeconomicthought.mcmaster.ca/comte/Philosophy1.pdf>
  - Volume 2 - <https://historyofeconomicthought.mcmaster.ca/comte/Philosophy2.pdf>
  - Volume 3 - <https://historyofeconomicthought.mcmaster.ca/comte/Philosophy3.pdf>
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