On The Theory of the Aggregate Image

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Key Determinations:

1) Any object's 'identity' are those notions which exist in the space between objects, ultimately serving to be some sort of gravity bounding them together, whose product is naturally intersubjective and oftentimes of either sight or sound, for which such objects attach themselves and, consequently, lives in, and are molded by, language, family, culture, religion, common interest, or any which other way two or more objects can identify any semblance of *similarity*.

2) The 'reflectivity principle' is the notion that, wherein all things together exist, we observe degrees of *familiarity* in the external image of that all else which, inevitably, catches our eye, like beams of light splintering off of a knight's armor off in the distance, serving to trigger our excursion from that immediate circumstance wherein we, then, find ourselves scouring amongst our personal catalogue of experience to re-collect those distant and, now, disfigured historical memories in order to supplant the essence of such things in the immediate with our own conceptions, as if to obscure the size of the army marching behind toward the field of battle.

3) No state can possess sovereignty as, not only can a state not will itself (thus, being not innate), its whole existence definitively depends on the consent of individuals which comes only by way of one's judgement (is not universal) and not of one's sovereign propensities (are universal) – following natural rights theory.

Introduction:

The objective and agenda for this piece is to outline, briefly, how a philosophical conception of the relation of artifacts (primarily, at the unit level of analysis), and the concomitant structure which integrates any and all artifacts, can be leveraged to critique and better understand larger-level (otherwise, the systemic level of analysis) phenomena of international structure, dynamics, and trajectories. This theoretical 'construction' is a corollary of critical theory and political constructivism - more closely attuned to the solidarist view in the English School - and derives its relevance from what Barry Buzan remarks in that "social systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones. When units are sentient, how they perceive each other is a major determinant of how they interact" (Buzan, pg. 6). The remainder of this piece is as follows: I will first introduce a few historical political-philosophic quotations for the purpose of providing context in which to place the discussion of my model; then, I will introduce the philosophy of my model where I touch upon the importance of perception in politics and what other professions international relations (IR) theorists should begin to explore (mainly being epistemology, phenomenology, and metaphysics); lasty, I will discuss how my model is relevant to the field of IR wherein I will expound upon my conception of sovereignty, power, freedom and consent, and free will. With that said, below are the few quotations for which I would like to briefly remark upon.

(1) *"men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands...everyone sees how you appear, few touch what you are"* – Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (pg. 71)

(2) *"so that our free will not be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that fortune is arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the other half, or close to it, for us to govern"* - Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (pg. 98)

(3) *"[in] an international system: all events, wherever they occur, react upon each other"* – Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (pg. 373)

(4) *"constructivism is interested in how ideational structures actually shape the way actors define themselves and relate to others"* - Mark Kauppi & Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory (pg. 154)

The first quotation from the above illustrates two distinct attributes of my ideational, and for now highly conjectural, aggregate image: 1) that people's (or, one's own) manifestations (or, actions / choices / decisions) are greatly attributed (or, connected) to, and to some degree causally determined by, the external dimension of another object's projected image; and, therefore, 2) that there exists a separation of the internal and external dimension to every projected image of every object which, consequently, leads it to be such that it is nearly impossible for any one object to know intimately the internal dimension of any other object's image – hence, the latter part of Machiavelli's determination. It is this phenomenological distinction between that which we observe and that which we, possibly, can never know intimately which lends insight and function to the principle of reflection regarding any one objects external image. Even more precisely, Machiavelli means to convey that one acts given what one observes of those things around them - being the external dimension of all things' projected image – and, in observing the external image, one is likely to observe a quite different, and in fact separate, image than what any given thing sees of their own image - being the internal dimension of all things' projected image. Otherwise stated, what you see of me as you

look upon is, likely, very different than what I see of myself. Thus, there exists throughout our existence, in perpetuity, a dynamic of relations and decision-making which operates off of incomplete information. Specifically, that one cannot make decisions which automatically incorporates the internal dimension of another's image - which, in a matter of fact, I would argue, illustrates or matches one's intentions. The significance of this realization becomes important later when delve into the legal theory regarding the principle of consent – specifically, the normative instance by which one intentionally renders proper consent. Nevertheless, for the moment, what's ever the more important to note about the dynamics of the separation between the internal and external dimension of any object's projected image is the notion that one's insecurity derives specifically from the fact that we, ourselves, cannot observe the external dimension of our own image – it is only through a high or extensive degree of reflectivity in another's image which enables us to observe parts of our own. The reason this nuance is a critical facet of the model is that it lends insight regarding those moments when brash or baneful decisions are made – ironically, being more so a consequence of feeling insecure about ourselves rather than about anything else. Quincy Wright, in his extensive two-volume study of war, while alluding to this nuance, goes further to discuss some of its consequences by saying "leaders whose energy derives from the continual push of a feeling of physical or psychic inferiority frequently overcompensate by aggressiveness. They appear more likely to accept violence as a solution [for] problems" (Wright, pg. 1206). In conjunction with such a determination, I would encourage the reader to refer to my other writing *On Policy* where I discuss Dean Rusk's retrospection on how the U.S. misperceived the situation in Japan in 1945 and how else we could have ended the war.

With that said, however, there are two nuances to note as it relates to how objects inter-act: 1) through communication (physical or verbal) we can learn about the composition of the internal dimension of another's image by way of merely inquiring about what a counter-part sees of their own image - granted that such particular means of inquisition is limited to certain objects (i.e., only human to human); and, 2) one's judgement and, consequently, manifestations (or, actions) can be modified given the degree of 'reflectivity' in another's image. Furthermore, as has already been introduced, there exists a degree of reflectivity in every image projected by every artifact across our existence which, ultimately, effects our own ability to make judgements, by way of mere observation, regarding 'truth'. More precisely speaking, an image has 1) parts that are reflective (it may not be wholesomely reflective); and, of those parts which are reflective, 2) degrees of reflectivity (highly, moderately, minimally, or even, possibly, though not likely, none). Overall, this ideational conjecture is seemingly quite similar to that of Immanuel Kant's phenomenological writings in that "the objects we observe are *phenomena*, which Kant distinguishes from what he calls *noumena* - the unknowable essence of objects as things in themselves, quite apart from how we may see them or how they may appear" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 145).

The second quotation allows us to dig deeper into the notion of the separation between the dimensions of an object's image - specifically, between that which is "of the internal", for which free-will *may* reside thereby giving prevalence to a more voluntaristic belief of things and their relations, and that which is "of the external", where then, in following with the third quotation, one's belief of things is more deterministic. Even more, in acknowledging such dichotomy, we begin to seriously contemplate much further the underpinnings and implications of one's 'self' versus that all else. More precisely, where does the 'internal' end and the 'external' begin? And, what is the internal comprised of? Well, though beyond the

scope of this piece, I will remark that the one's internal is comprised of two components: 1) sovereign propensities; and, 2) judgement. Each category, too, comprises of several underlying institutions which, ultimately, coalesce to form the aggregate of each. For instance, within one's propensities are instincts, emotions, feelings, and a few other items. Alternatively, one's judgement is comprised of experience, culture, morals, and, as well, a few other items. With that said, and to not allow the reader to confuse such sovereignty with that of the political sort, it is very important to clarify what I mean by 'sovereign'; specifically, that propensities are *innately* engrained in the faculty of *all humans* – otherwise being, *universal*. It is in this determinate fashion which make propensities sovereign. To corroborate such a determination, in his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Jeremy Bentham remarks "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" (Bentham, pg. 1). What's everthemore interesting, too, as it pertains to one's propensities, is Bentham purports a unique condition which stipulates that any one individual's pursuit of self-interest is strictly measured by the return (perceived or material) of either 'pleasure' or 'pain' from any particular activity. More precisely, he pronounces "a thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his *pleasures*: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his *pains*" whereby, then, "the interest of the community then is…the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it" (Bentham, pg. 3). Aside from detailing the nature of one's propensities, and to offer insight into how one's propensities can simultaneously operate and enmesh with one's judgement, Margaret MacDonald states that "value judgements…are expressions of feeling" (ed. Laslett, pg. 49). Nevertheless, and to wrap this introduction, it is such that both sovereign propensities and judgement operate, as they often do, together.

On the Philosophy of the Aggregate Image:
Overview:
It is a task within the field of phenomenology to investigate the hidden essence behind the mere projected images of artifacts within the world for which we exist. Hence, the illustration below (Figure 1) attempts to do exactly that – to portray how one should understand the relation of artifacts but, more importantly, what image is seen by either and how the projected images can influence and drive one's decision-making. The application of this theory can transmute the discussion of international relations (IR) and political theory as it can serve to modify one's understanding of the structure, perception and engagement of artifacts (or collectivities) at any level of analysis. More pointedly, this theory is meant to add to the underpinnings of the constructivist image of international relations where it is understood that "our knowledge - or what we think we 'know' - flows from our subjectivity, imposing our mental framework not just on nature, but also on the social world" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 146). Furthermore, it is a task within the field of "epistemology [to shed] light on the relevant distinction between genuine knowledge (or, recognition) and merely apparent knowledge" (Moser, Mulder, Trout, pg. 38-39).

Such professions, though on their surface may appear to not be related or helpful to the field of international politics, can actually truly enable IR theorists to discover new approaches and realities which could steer the profession, even politics at large, in a better direction and keep us from falling into those classic traps. In fact, James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, in their book *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, remark "if a comprehensive theory is ever to be developed, it will probably require inputs from biology, psychology, social psychology, anthropology…philosophy, theology, and religion" (Dougherty

& Pfaltzgraff, pg. 189). That said, and to only temporarily discourse, as it pertains to the profession of biology, it is commonly understood that organisms, much like social systems, are quite adaptable, which lends significance to the sub-field of biology which studies the evolution of organisms. Specifically, sociobiology, having emerged in the 1970's, is concerned with studying how the evolution of certain organisms leads to ultimately sculpting, and even optimizing, their social behavior for the purpose of survival (Sapolsky, pg. 331). Nevertheless, in conjunction with this assertion for the need to wonder a bit off the trodden path, recently James de Derian and Alexander Wendt have professed a quantum-physical approach to IR by way of their book *Quantum International Relations: A Human Science for World Politics*. To introduce the reader, here, to such a profession, "quantum concepts imply that the world acts more like a single indivisible unit, in which even the 'intrinsic' nature of each part depends to some degree on its relationship to its surroundings" (David Bohm in Stenger, pg. 127). Though such an approach is appropriate and maybe necessary, I believe an exodus into phenomenology, epistemology, and metaphysics to be more necessary as it will help IR theorists, even if merely those of the constructivist type, better contemplate and critique relations by looking at 'what is knowledge', 'how is knowledge formed and transferred', 'what are the implications of one's knowledge as it relates to a socially constructed world', and 'what is the reality of the interconnectedness of the world given its social relations'?

Perception in IR:
Before presenting my model, I believe it would be wise to first remark why the perception of things – the study of phenomenology and metaphysics – is relevant and quite important to the field of IR. Robert Jervis, in his book *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, begins by very clearly stating that "most international relations scholars have ignored the general question of how states perceived each other and…when and why threats are perceived" (Jervis, pg. xv). In ignoring the question of how entities perceive one another, most IR scholars, particularly those of the realist type, jump right to when threats are perceived, wherein they, then, are quick to resort to such trivial particulars as 'relative distribution', or the 'changes' in such a distribution, as a means for providing logic and making determinations. However, in doing so, they ultimately gloss over what's probably most important and, as of now, least understood. Therefore, I attempt to provide logic in addressing the how. Furthermore, I will discuss what one *can* see versus what one *cannot* see and how, given what one *can* see, one could, at moments, be merely seeing themselves.

The reason this is so critical to remark upon upfront is because "perception is a source of beliefs" (Moser, Mulder, Trout, pg. 89), where, given our beliefs, we immediately judge their compatibility to our individual experience wherein, given some internal criterion of support or reliability, we then come to justify such beliefs. From a historical sense, Kauppi and Viotti remark that "there are three types of faulty perceptions discernable in the narrative of 'History of the Peloponnesian War'… [wherein] all three contribute to flawed assessments of rivals, undercut a rational decision-making process, and increase the possibility of war" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 264). Specifically, they are:

(1) "decision makers *perceive* the enemy to be more centralized and coordinated in its decision-making process than it actually is" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 264)
(2) "those in authority experience 'cognitive closure' as evidenced by a *belief* that few, if any, alternatives are open to them" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 264)
(3) "leaders *engage* in 'wishful thinking'" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 264)

Today, even as much, if not possibly more than then, perception plays a vital role in policymaking as it necessarily serves to determine not only how we perceive one another but also what we deem threatening. To provide a brief discourse on a particular policy perspective – containment - wherein (mis)perception was critical, Richard Kugler remarks "earlier in the Cold War the U.S. embraced the nuclear-oriented strategy of Massive Retaliation as its vehicle for pursuing containment, deterrence, and collective security" (Kugler, pg. 20). It should be mentioned, however, given that the Cold War spanned close five decades, that such a policy was acknowledged and utilized across many administrations. However, two particular administrations – Truman and Eisenhower – where the most influential in establishing the initial scope, intention and meaning of containment, which would subsequently serve to be the historical narrative for which following administrations would re-collect upon to justify their current beliefs, wherein, specifically, the nuclear-oriented strategy was more earnestly adopted by Eisenhower given his desire to reduce the military budget while retaining the lethality and flexibility. In effect, under the Eisenhower administration the U.S. substituted between means given their relative costs – otherwise, less Soldiers and more nuclear weapons. What's tragic, though, is that before Eisenhower took office "there was no theory in support of these new policies" (Morgenthau in Derian, pg. 48); rather, Washington's approach to policy was such that diplomats "played it by ear…[and] did what they thought they needed to do under the circumstance" (Morgenthau in Derian, pg. 48). In fact, Hans Morgenthau, who at the time was serving as an international relations theoretician under the Turman-Acheson administration, remarks "the policy of containment was never officially formulated…[but] grew as an almost instinctive reaction to the threat of Russian imperialism" (Morgenthau in Derian, pg. 48). In conjunction with, and possibly being as result of, this haphazardly constructed policy, under the Eisenhower administration it, paradoxically, was perceived by U.S. diplomats that such demobilization was to be a Soviet opportunity to expand their dominion over Eastern Europe (Kissinger, 115) wherein, because such diplomats "saw power in military terms" (Kissinger, pg. 115), their "perception of the global challenge…tempted us into distant enterprises and prevented us from meeting them conclusively (Kissinger, pg. 64).

To provide greater context to such a consequence, Richard Kugler remarks that there are 5 major categories of interests for which policy must consider: national survival, vital interests, major interests, peripheral interests, and insubstantial interests (Kugler, pg. 60-62). David Finkelstein remarks that President Truman and George Marshall, in 1947, determined the containment of Communism (both Russian and Chinese), through military and economic assistance to Europe and the Middle East, to be a *vital interest*, ultimately for U.S. security. However, Henry Kissinger, in his memoirs, retrospectively argues that the containment policy ultimately failed for a multitude of reasons, the most critical being "containment could never be an adequate response to the modern impact of Communist ideology" (Kissinger, pg. 62). Another reason, however, for the failure of the containment policy, one which deals with a particular strategy at a state's disposal as it pertains to its pursuit for survival, was its dependency on allies – or, what John Mearsheimer regards as buck-passing. However, as noted by A. J. P. Taylor, it is known that "alliances are flimsy things whose duration depends upon the good will of [others]" (Taylor, pg. 215). In light of such dependency on others for an alliance to be of any degree of success, George F. Kennan "complain[ed] that American policy-makers – mainly after 1950 – overemphasized the military thrust of containment, thereby erecting an enormous edifice of military alliances that pitted the so-called Free World against the threat of worldwide Communist revolution" (Patterson, pg. 115). A final failure of the policy comes

by way of Gen. Omar Bradley where, in his memoir, he recounts the predominate issue to have been, in light of a significantly reduced defense budget, "no one had fully thought through its long-term military implications" (Bradley, pg. 473). Otherwise said, we didn't take time to judge that which we *couldn't* readily observe to either support or refute those things for which we *could* observe. Ultimately, however, as one re-collects on such a policy and considers some of its implications, maybe even for the purpose future application, one should understand how faulty perceptions "produced a self-fulfilling prophecy: the United States misperceived the Soviet Union as aggressive and, by acting on this belief, led the Soviets in turn to view the United States as a grave threat" (Jervis, pg. xiii).

Nevertheless, over the decades since the Cold War, with the widening and deepening of world networks (cultural, economic, financial, etc.) and growth of economies, policy strategists have become increasingly aware of the proportionally greater costs of pursuing such policies as, now, to contain is to forego. More precisely, Stephen Flanagan & James Schear, in judging the feasibility and effectiveness of a containment policy, remark "containment's greatest benefits are that it can be a responsive first step, a natural complement to more ambitious steps...[however,] there is also the risk that containment will result in open-ended commitments and political stalemates" (Flanagan & Schear, pg. 125). The authors conclude, however, by saying "containment would not only require the U.S. to forgo the benefits of cooperation with China, but [would] also have a destabilizing impact in Asia" (Flanagan & Schear, pg. 167).

To conclude such discourse on perception in politics, every political determination ultimately sends a signal to other actors wherein the usual perceptive dynamic is such that "conceptions of self and interest tend to 'mirror' the practices of significant others over time" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 140-141). However, the usual pitfall of such a dynamic between actors, being a consequence of the fact that each actor cannot observe the internal dimension of the others' image, is what is known as the 'inherent bad faith model' (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 266) – the notion that any given action by an actor is frequently interpreted in the worst way by other actors or, as otherwise noted, "that each *should* act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other's intentions" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 141) – which merely leads each actor to having increased suspicion and distrust of the other. However, to circumvent such a spiraling snare the profession of diplomacy can, and should, serve to illuminate one's intentions (or, to create a less reflective external image thereby illuminating the internal image) where, then, one isn't left with interpreting another's actions in terms of what might actually be themselves as it could be that what one perceives of another, and consequently judges, is merely a reflection of themselves resulting from another's highly reflective external image. Ultimately, Wendt continues on to say that "society would be impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 141). Nevertheless, and unfortunately, there seems to be an inherent pattern in policy-making wherein it becomes "the tendency of decision makers to assume a high degree of coherence and ascribe a consistency to events that, in fact, lack these qualities. The greater the fear and suspicion one has of the adversary, the more likely this cognitive distortion will occur" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 264). In sum, and before presenting my model, I find it very fitting that Barbara Tuchman says "history is the unfolding of miscalculations" (Tuchman, pg. 163).

Figure 1: Two objects and their images.

In discussing the normative determination by which one should construe any sense of identity, Martin Heidegger, in his book *Identity and Difference*, attempts to distinguish between an object's characteristics, usually being the reduced construct by which man readily applies its thinking toward and, necessarily, draws meaning from, versus its appropriation – being the relation of an artifact to that of itself or another in some structure or 'framework' where "the framework concerns us everywhere, immediately" (Heidegger, pg. 35). Given this, it, then, is important to briefly contemplate the nature of appropriation wherein "the essence of identity is a property of the event of appropriation" (Heidegger, pg. 39) as well as to consider those mechanics which might be important in determining such a framework, which I shall discus in a bit. However, thus far we have three items: objects, a framework, and appropriation. In regards to the latter, let's say, for instance, P and K are related – otherwise, that they exist in some relation to each other. We should, then, think of three sorts of appropriation: either P → K, or K → P, or P←→K. Heidegger makes the determination that any two or more artifacts are naturally, by way of their observance of, and presence among, each other, "mutually appropriated" (Heidegger, pg. 33) and that, consequently, there is no hierarchical order of objects in existence. Otherwise stated, it is of such appropriation (P←→K) that is the essence of any and all identity within the totality of existence (or 'Being'). Analogously, Michael Oakeshott, in speaking from a more philosophically political perspective, remarks "everything figures by comparison, not with what stands next to it, but with the whole" (pg. 17).

In taking this as the foundation and normative way of understanding relations, Heidegger goes on to remark that "every analysis...falls in its thinking short of the mark, in that the above-mentioned totality of the world...is interpreted in advance in terms of man" (Heidegger, pg. 34). Otherwise, man's conception of his own identity and, thereby too, others' identity, each manifesting without due discovery (thus being 'in advance'), is often construed as such that appropriation is not 'mutual' but, rather, individually-directional (P→K or K→P). In this regard, man's understanding of identity is pre-suppositional and self-oriented, where such a conception is the epitome of the consuming interest with one's self. Alternatively said, if P is human and K is animal, humans, in their constructed understandings of those things for which they observe and inter-act with, usually think in the sort of appropriation that is non-bilateral

– it is, naturally, unilateral. To give clarity to the reason why the sort of appropriation is important is because the "appropriation determines and defines the experience of thought" (Heidegger, pg. 33). It sets the conditions for how we perceive ourselves and each other in the world (or aggregate) whose consequence can be quite paradoxical – specifically, it is in this non-mutually appropriated state wherein we see what we believe and believe what we see. Heidegger ends his discussion of the principle of identity by saying "caught up in this [unilateral] conception, we confirm our own opinion" (Heidegger, pg. 34) with the result being "we reduce everything down to man" (Heidegger, pg. 34) wherein he subsequently advocates that we "stop conceiving [of things] as something purely technical, that is, in terms of man and his machines" (Heidegger, pg. 34).

Overall, Heidegger's understanding of identity is quite akin to that of a subfield of quantum mechanics – specifically, one which deals with the non-locality of objects and their engagement across space and in time. Within such a theory, more commonly known as quantum entanglement, is the postulate that objects need not, and, in fact, do not, necessarily abide by the principle of locality set down by physicists – specifically, "that you can directly affect *only* things that are next to you" (Greene, pg. 80). Rather, the theory of quantum entanglement stipulates "that the universe admits interconnections that are *not local*" (Greene, pg. 80) wherein any one objects' behavior can, then, directly depend on another's objects behavior given an infinite horizon of space between them. Thus, one of the predominate differences between the two schools of thought comes by way of each's conception of space. Physicists ascribe to the notion that "if there is space between two objects...we can and do consider the two objects to be independent" (Greene, pg. 79), wherein, then, such objects are understood to be "separate and distinct" (Greene, pg. 79). It is in this way that space then serves to be "the medium that separates and distinguishes one object from another" (Greene, pg. 79). However, quantum entanglement theorists stipulate that "intervening space, regardless of how much there is, does not ensure that two objects are separate" (Greene, pg. 80). Therefore, and being the crux of my theory of the aggregate image, while Heidegger remarks that artifacts *exist together* as they share in each other's space, quantum entanglement goes even further to stipulate that artifacts can have a sort of non-independence (otherwise, dependence) as they *together exist*. I say 'dependence' in that most objects and events, and in fact most attributes of human existence, are not independent – either in their existence or sustenance. A farmer depends on rain for good crop yields. Roads and bridges depend on people or animals to traverse it. Supply depends on demand – vice versa.

With that said, and though I admit in my model that K and P are distinct entities, K's and P's existence, determinations, and survival is anything but, which brings us in proximity to the theory of anarchy in international politics. In his article *The Social Construction of International Politics*, Alexander Wendt, in challenging the critical neorealist assumption regarding the structure of the international system, argues "that self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 132). To this – I agree. Even more, I think the current logic of anarchy is the consequence of a quite reduced logic. More precisely, the current logic is such that since no *higher* authority exists above that of the state there is no ultimate body to govern the actions or relations of states. It is in such a state of non-governance by way of an absent superior entity which predominately lends significance to the belief that the international system is anarchic – or, otherwise, disordered. However, as I will in time explicitly determine, the reality of the world, being that it is naturally social, is

anything but disorderly – to include states. Though, and in an attempt to persuade, I must render proper insight into my methodology. Therefore, first, it must be understood, and this being the critical criterion for the following determination, governance demands two things: 1) consent; and, 2) dependence. For any entity to govern, either itself or another, it must have the consent (or, approval or agreeance) from that which it aims to govern and there must exist some degree of dependence (or, reliance) among such entities. Otherwise stated, not only must I approve of you to obligate me but, a priori, I must have a sort of dependence as it pertains to your ability to create appropriate obligation that is in accordance with my intended well-being and, concomitantly, you must depend on my consent and, even more, render such equal consent as it pertains to my criterion for well-being – this is, so to speak, the contract. Thus, it is such *dependence* which *establishes the nature* of the relation of one entity to that of another. And, it is such *consent* which ultimately *brings to fruition* such relation wherein, then, one entity is of the authority to obligate the other – otherwise, to be its author in certain matters. David Hume remarks "in all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between authority and liberty" (Hume, pg. 40). Thus, and in fact, consent is that principle which serves to bridge liberty and authority. Nevertheless, in light of this criterion, and this being my determination, it is a fallacy to believe the international system to be anarchic merely by way of the absence of some sort of *higher* governing entity. The epitome of such fallacy derives from the misconception regarding the *extent of dependence* between all entities (states and individuals) which exist. Economics, and the decades long trend of globalization, is of but one profession which emphasizes the reality of such extreme inter-dependence. Thus, and conclusively, the degree of anarchy is not necessarily determined by the degree of consent – even though, as could be argued, within the international system, consent is quite profuse – as much as it is by the extent of dependence of that all else which *together exist*.

Nevertheless, Wendt agrees with the notion that an objects' identity is highly intersubjective – that they are, at least partially if not fully, derived from others' perception. More precisely, he remarks "identities are inherently relational" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 135) wherein they "are constituted by both internal and external structures" (Wendt, pg. 224). Overall, and to expound upon what has been discussed thus far, I propose 1) that the identity of anything is strictly defined by that all else which exists beside itself – not by or of itself; and, 2) that the external of everything, by way of such mutual appropriation and entanglement, is actually extremely ordered wherein it merely, however, appears to the eye of mankind as being un-ordered as man cannot observe, much less, if we could, even understand, the entirety of the external. Summarily, it should be noted in reference to the first proposition that my conception of identity operates quite contrarily to the common metaphysical understanding of identity which stipulates that the identity of anything "is the relation that each thing has to itself and to nothing else" (Hawthorne, pg. 99).

Finally, and before moving onto the reflective principle of the aggregate image, I'd like to expound even further upon my conception of identity for the purpose of providing greater clarity, while also bringing into reference Heidegger's emphasis on the importance of language (or, more wholesomely 'communication') as the means by which objects across space and in time adhere to one another – otherwise, that which facilitates objects to *together exist*. Though, I think it necessary, before presenting my final determination on identity, to prelude such by way of the latter. Specifically, Heidegger remarks "language is the most delicate and thus the most susceptible vibration holding everything within the suspended structure of the appropriation" (Heidegger, pg. 38). Though I agree with his notion, I believe it to be a bit

limited. The reason being language is but one element of communication, where, I believe, even among humans, non-verbal elements of communication are more influential, while being delicate and susceptible all the same. With that said, here is my ultimate determination on identity: *throughout the history of humanity (even if only modern) people, being one of their sovereign propensities, have continuously sought to construct and codify, to whatever degree they can, a notion (or notions), which ultimately serve to be some sort of gravity bounding people together, whose product is naturally intersubjective and whose materialization is oftentimes in either sight or sound, for which they subsequently attach themselves to, which then lives in, and is (or are) molded by, language, family, culture, religion, common interest, or any which other way two or more people can identify any semblance of similarity that exists in the space between them.* It is in this way that the natural essence of any entity's identity are those notions which mends the space between them such that they then *together exist.* This, to me, is a more wholesome conception of identity as it readily acknowledges the interconnectedness – otherwise, dependence – of 'Being' (of all that which exists and how such exists). Even more, Alexander Wendt points to such separation between one's self and their identity in remarking that "actors *acquire* identities" (Wendt in Derian, pg. 135) rather than themselves *create* such. Lastly, the image below is meant to illustrate the above-mentioned determinations – specifically, that all images inter-connect and that it is the space between entities which defines their identity (otherwise, "n-1").


Figure 2: The Aggregate Image.

On the Reflective Principle:
They say insanity is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting (or believing) the outcome to change. I say that it is more insane to do the same thing repeatedly and expect the outcome

not to change (otherwise, to be the same) – for instance, that the satisfaction (or return) from pursuing those things which we desire (or fear, believe, hope) will not alter or diminish through our repeated engagement. Nothing in life is still. Change is a pervasive characteristic of living whereby, then, every sort of 'doing' or 'engagement' necessarily, by the very essence of Being and Identity, produces a new outcome (no matter how *familiar* it's presence may appear). The crux, then, of the association and subsequent determination between repetition and insanity is by way of what may seem familiar as a result of our doing which, if strictly observed (whereby in observing such familiarity in objects or events we naturally forego observing that all else which may not be familiar), leads one to construe things in a limited sense wherein, then, the degree of insanity is self-imposed – we see what we believe and believe what we see. Familiarity is a self-regarded perception stimulated through the observation of images of the external which can, possibly, lead to obscuring any underlying truth (or, intention) regarding such things themselves. In short, if one expects (or believes) things not to change, then their focus will be toward those things that don't - in search for what appears familiar and, thereby, neglecting that all else which is not. Overall, one's constructed belief, which usually, then, is justified through personal re-collection (in other words, to reach behind and collect items with the aim of applying such items to the current circumstance) and subsequent application of such particulars within one's individual experience, can manifest as tragedy if it derives quite dependently on that which appears to be familiar in the context of their immediate circumstance.

The question, then, naturally becomes one of: what motivates one's search for (and attachment to) that which appears familiar? I would argue that such a pursuit, bypassing for the moment the reason for attachment, derives from the desire for 'conformity'. "Conformity with what?", you might ask. I would say, conformity with one's own experience. To elucidate such a determination, we can recall the U.S.'s perception and subsequent handling of the Vietnam War whereby Sir Max Hastings, in his book *Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy (1945 – 1975)*, remarks "memories of the World War II *experience* hung heavy over strategy making" (Hastings, 137). However, it is not at all unknown, nor unnatural, that we leverage our individual experience for the purpose of constructing and fitting meaning to those events currently unfolding before our very eyes. More precisely, Lisa Barrett remarks "your past experiences give meaning to your present sensations" (Barrett, pg. 26). Alternatively said, and in raising concern regarding the causal relation between sensation and meaning, Williams James remarks "sensational and reproductive brain-processes combined, then, are what gives us the content of our perceptions" (James, pg. 78). Nevertheless, in preluding the way in which humans ultimately makes decisions, Lisa Barrett goes on to discuss two fundamental mannerisms of the brain: 1) concepts; and, 2) simulations. In regards to the former, "using concepts, your brain groups some things together and separates others...[like] cookie cutters that carve boundaries" (Barrett, pg. 28), while in regards the latter "simulations are your brain's *guesses* of what's happening in the world...[wherein] your brain impose[s] meaning...[by] selecting what's relevant and ignoring the rest" (Barrett, pg. 27). William James makes somewhat of a similar determination as it relates to Lisa Barrett's 'cookie-cutter' concepts in remarking that "every perception is an acquired perception" (James, pg. 78). Nonetheless, in drawing such two mannerisms together, Lisa Barrett remarks "in every waking moment, your brain uses past experiences, organized as concepts, to guide your actions" (Barrett, 31). In light of such psychology, Sir Hastings, in briefly discussing the dissimilar conceptions between various military and political figures regarding the war effort and the implication of such difference on formulating a unified strategy, concludes "[Gen. Maxwell] Taylor viewed the conflict as a

military problem" (pg. 137). This, however, was not Dean Rusk's or Robert McNamara's conception of the conflict – thus giving way to such tragic decision-making.

Given such a brief attempt to illuminate the process by which one constructs notions or beliefs, I'd like to, next, expound upon how one goes about justifying such beliefs by way of an epistemological discourse. Specifically, in their book *The Theory of Knowledge*, the authors, in discussing belief and theoretical ideas, remark "the pragmatic, or context-sensitive, feature of knowledge manifests a lesson about the theory dependence of justification: our theoretical purposes, or goals, determine what degree of support or reliability is required for a belief to be justified" (Moser, Mulder, Trout, pg. 51). Even more, I would argue, however, is our beliefs about objects or events seem to us more justifiable when they *conform to our own experience*. In discussing the theoretical implications of justification, being a second condition of knowledge, the authors purport that "typically we can trace the specific reasons for our beliefs only through a short line of justifying beliefs, or *inferential* justifications [wherein] we quickly arrive at rather general beliefs deeply entrenched in our basic view of the world - a view that seems to be justified largely by the way its constituent beliefs 'hang together' as a coherent comprehensive portrait of the world" (Moser, Mulder, Trout, pg. 82-83). I would be remised, too, if I did not address the degree of similarity between these authors' notation of 'inferential' and that of Barrett's 'guesses' as it pertains to bridging beliefs and decision-making.

Now that we discussed the logical nature of the pursuit for conformity, I should like to turn toward the reason for which one attaches themselves to that which appears familiar. Specifically, being of familiar degree, one, as a result, feels a sense of security (or, non-vulnerability) as it pertains to their propensities (moderating possibly fear or anxiety) and content in their judgement (giving reason to cut-off further investigation and, thereby, effort into searching for what might be a 'more proper' determination). This, no matter, is quite a natural consequence as, through recognizing that which appears familiar, we can sustain our survival by reorienting our focus toward those things for which we may not yet have fully deemed non-threatening (or, just don't know completely). However, and this being a sort of tragedy in-of-itself, we never reach such a point of further investigation. Rather, in light the many circumstances we impose on ourselves, taking for instance that of war, we constrain ourselves to operating in a manner which leads one to never reaching the stage of such methodical inquisition. In his other book *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Martin Heidegger, in corroborating the notion that reflectivity in the external dimension of one's image obscures the essence of the object or event itself, remarks "to know means to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the openness of beings. To know is accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings...[but] merely to have information, however wide-ranging it may be, is not to know. Even is this information is focused on what is practically more important...it is not knowledge" (Heidegger, pg. 24). However, to intimately 'know' requires significant time and effort – where most don't care to expend it, maybe because they can't observe its return.

Nevertheless, I think it is commonly understood that we are often too quick to attach pre-formulated conceptions to those objects and events for which we observe. This phenomenon, however, serves to be the underpinning of the reflectivity principle – being a characteristic of *only* the external dimension of any object's image - whereby, given the inter-connectedness of things, that which we observe responds (however accordingly) quite immediately to our own manifestations. In this way, Raymond Aron is very correct – "all events, wherever they occur, react upon each other" (Aron, pg. 373). Again, though, this is not without negative consequence

in the realm of, at least, international politics. Though, for now, it is most important to recognize the very real nature of how things inter-act. Specifically, of those things for which we perceive, we immediately formulate a belief akin to our pre-conceptions for which, fitting with our individual experience, we then justify said belief wherein, subsequently, we make determinations which are quite representative of such beliefs. As we act, however, all those things for which we observe inter-actively make determinations given their own propensities and judgement. It is such inter-dependence which lends the significance of the 'reflectivity principle': *it is the notion that, wherein all things together exist, we observe degrees of familiarity in the external of that all else which catches our eye, like beams of light splintering off of a knight's armor off in the distance, thus triggering one's excursion from their immediate circumstance, wherein they, then, find themselves scouring amongst their personal catalogue to re-collect those distant and, now, disfigured memories to supplant the essence of such things with their own conceptions, as if to obscure the size of the army marching behind toward the field of battle.* However, I think the most appropriate summation of what has been discussed thus far comes from Douglass North wherein he remarks "what is 'reality' is relative to people's historically derived rationalizations of the world around them and is fundamentally colored by their views of rightness or wrongness of the existing customs, rules, and institutions" (North, pg. 13). Finally, the reason for such discourse on epistemology and psychology – specifically, how beliefs are constructed and subsequently justified – is it becomes a critical and necessary notion when discussing certain political conceptions. For instance, and as we shall discuss in greater detail in the next section, F. H. Hinsley stipulates "it is the concept of sovereignty which authorizes and *justifies*" (Hinsley, pg. 223) wherein, ironically, "sovereignty has been considered a major cause of modern war" (Wright, pg. 895). It is such a concept, having been left un-refuted for centuries, which continues live in our human history (or, societal experience) that enables anyone to-day to readily justify current determinations through such easy re-collection and application.

On The Relevance and Importance of the Aggregate Image

In following with the sort of presentation of concepts in the introduction, I should like to present a couple more quotations which shall serve us well in the following discussion – specifically, the normative view an such inter-connected state of existence.

(1) *"constructivists view international structure in terms of a social structure infused with ideational factors to include norms, rules, and law. This structure can influence the identities and interests of agents, as well as international outcomes"* - Mark Kauppi & Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory (pg. 145).

(2) *"the moral point of view requires us to regard the world from the persepctive of one person among many rather than from that of a particular self with particular interests"* – Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (pg. 58).

On Power:
Paul Starr, in his book *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*, remarks "power…originates in dependence" (Starr, pg. 4). Though I believe this to be somewhat correct, there is more to this determination than merely by what's been so simply said. The essence of the identity of 'power' is it can only exist when 'difference' also exists, where the product of such is hierarchy. In fact, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff remark that "whatever hierarchy exists in the international system is the result of differentiation among states in their capabilities" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, pg. 64). Ever further, in his book *Behave: The Biology of Humans at*

our Best and Worst, Robert Sapolsky corroborates such a corollary by remaking "a hierarchy is a ranking system that...establish[es] a status quo by ritualizing inequalities" (Sapolsky, pg. 426). He pronounces that the logic for the establishment and ritualization of such hierarchy is that it is through hierarchical systems that some semblance of stability is created within a social order wherein "everyone knows their place" (Sapolsky, pg. 426). It is, then, by way of such hierarchy which introduces the mechanic of power within the framework of the *dependence between things* – merely altering *how* such objects depend and not removing dependence altogether. Though, and more importantly, we mustn't neglect the role of consent pertaining to the *governance of things* - specifically, such consent, existing within the same framework, serves to constrain power. Nevertheless, throughout his exploration of the tendency for humans and animals to construct such a dichotomous "us versus them" mentality, he remarks that a particular consequence of such social behavior is "grouping people activates parochial biases, no matter the basis of the grouping" (Sapolsky, pg. 390). Such social bias can, thus, be found wherever states exist.

Nonetheless, it is because of such hierarchy – being codified in the status of a 'state' - that great attention is paid by IR scholars toward the relativeness (or, structure) of power, particularly those of the realist type who hold that "the concept of power is always a relative one" (Morgenthau, pg. 174). However, such a conception of power is metaphorically akin to that of playing a game of seesaw. It is presupposed of the entities who occupy the opposing seats that their identities, being defined by some characteristic rather than by the nature of mutual appropriation or entanglement, are solely derived from their respective 'weight' (or, size), wherein what merely matters, then, is which of the two is of slightly greater proportion (or, "power"). Under this conception, the objective of such entities then becomes one of who can gain more weight in order to tip the scale in their direction. In light of this metaphor, and to introduce a bit of realist logic regarding the international structure of power and a state's pursuit of relative advantage, Hans Morgenthau goes on to stipulate "nations...have 3 choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions" (Morgenthau, pg. 201). They can, in keeping such discourse aligned with the metaphor, elect for any of the following: 1) the entities themselves can become fatter; 2) the entities can ask a bystander to come push down on their own seat; or, 3) they need merely convince the bystander to not push down on the other entity's seat. Such strategies are categorized by John Mearsheimer, in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, as 'balancing' and 'buck-passing', wherein "with balancing, a great power assumes direct responsibility for preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance" (Mearsheimer, pg. 156) while buck-passing "attempts to get another state to bear the burden of deterring or possibly fighting an aggressor" (Mearsheimer, pg. 157-158). It is in this regard which lends such IR scholars to understand power as being of a state's possession – otherwise, the weight of the entity which occupies the seat. And, the game, being a classic social trap with the underpinnings of adolescence and arrogance, necessarily becomes one of where the two fattest kids attempt to assert their dominance through such simplistic and readily available means of measurement (a seesaw) wherein they, nevertheless, depend on those other kids who happen to be in the park that day to come help them realize their bit of self-worth. Henry Kissinger elucidates the realism of such a 'game' most appropriately in his memoirs by saying "the management of a balance of power is a permanent undertaking, not an exertion that has a foreseeable end. To a great extent it is a psychological phenomenon: if an equality of power is perceived it will not be tested" (Kissinger, pg. 115).

The main flaw of such a conception, however, is that it inordinately relies on one's own perception of things to define the aggregate structure – specifically, of only those things which one can readily observe wherein, naturally, most things are left unobserved. However, being regarded as more sovereignly propense, we make determinations only by what we observe – we never, though we should more frequently, make determinations given what we may not, or even need not, observe (this is where one's judgement becomes significant). The trouble, however, in relying on one's propensities – specifically, taking that of emotion – is that, in following Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of emotions, they are "a more primitive state of consciousness or way of seeing the world" (Williams, pg. 39). Nevertheless, to illuminate the relevance and downfall of such determinations regarding the aggregate structure as it pertains to power, Mearsheimer remarks that a states' conception of "the structure of the international system...causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony" (Mearsheimer, pg. 53). However, it should be noted, in conjunction with such a tragic mis-conception, that one's observance of anything and everything is so statistically remote, and thus being insignificant and even indeterminate, that, I would argue, it does not even add up to .001% of the aggregate – hence reason for the moral pronouncement by Beitz above. The lesson to be learned, therefore, which is sometimes heeded by realists, is that "the balance of power has never, in the long run, prevented wars" (Aron, pg. 647). Rather, the consequence of merely perceiving that which is relative, and thereby obscuring the aggregate, is that it, in fact, sets one on the path to war. Alternatively said, war is merely a product of such mis-perception whose object, then, is to forcibly codify some degree of hierarchy.

In fact, it is *only* through war which hierarchy materializes at the level of the state. War does what law does not (and cannot). Law cannot destroy – it is not its nature nor intent. Its intent, true, is to prevent and penalize whereby the difference between destruction and penalty becomes that of pre-emption – otherwise, the nature of the timing regarding when one can exercise a right. It is such pre-emptive behavior, being an authentic policy of states to-day, which actually serves to demarcate between the true nature of the state from that of an individual, where it is too often believed their respective lives and nature are equal – this is another fallacy in modern political thought. This determination comes by way of Baron Montesquieu wherein he declares "the life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defence: the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation" (Montesquieu, pg. 133). While a state can act pre-emptively, as it normally does, to preserve its own well-being, a man cannot.

Nevertheless, to put such discourse into more of a historical grounding, realist theorists emphasize the corollary between changes in its relative distribution within the international system and increased likelihood of war – more commonly known as 'Thucydides Trap'. In his book *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides - who "is usually credited with being the first writer in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of the IR discipline" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 25) - in describing the trajectory of the conflict between Athens, who at around 479 BCE was "the chief maritime power of Greece and the center of a maritime empire" (Ryan, pg. 14), and Sparta, whose policy of the period "was to install friendly oligarchs in other Greek city-states" (Ryan, pg. 9), remarks "the real reason for the war is, in my opinion, most likely...the *growth* of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." (Thucydides, pg. 49). However, W. A. Dunning illuminates quite a different stimulus of conflict between the two city-states by saying "the Athenian state presented in every respect the sharpest *contrast* to the Spartan" (Dunning, pg. 11). The argument can then become one of where it was

not necessarily the *change* in Athens with respect to Spart so much it was that merely some degree of *difference* existed between the two city-states. Nevertheless, the crux of the realist interpretation of Thucydides' text is such that "the explanatory emphasis is on how the overall changing distribution or balance of power in the Greek system of city-states generated suspicion and distrust" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 253) which served to be the predominant cause of war. However, as it should mentioned as well, relating more to the translation of Thucydides' text, Arthur Eckstein remarks "important realist conclusions drawn from Thucydides rest on the habitual use of careless translations. They leave the impression that he explains the outbreak of the war in terms of a system-level process whose outcome is inevitable" (Eckstein, pg. 1). The implication of such potential misunderstanding lies in the fact that Thucydides' "approach influenced three of the most famous Greek philosophers who wrote after him - Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius" (Kauppi & Viotti, pg. 276). We here, too, find in the re-collections of human history an opportunity in which beliefs can be readily, though possibly inaccurately, justified.

However, and to provide a final means for contemplating how such a conception of power is wrong, I'd like to talk more philosophically and leverage what has already been outlined in my model. Like anything else which exists, an object or entity cannot be so readily defined by way of itself but, rather, only as it exists to that of all else. A road is not a road if there is no one to travel it – otherwise said, it has no purpose by way its singular existence. This is not to say, however, that such an object, or any entity for that matter, is void of will or authority; rather, only that the identity of its existence is necessarily determined solely by that of all else. To use another plain example, the letter 's' is not a word in-of-itself but, again, only properly exists among the company of other letters. Thus, anything and everything becomes what it is only by way of *what* other things exist and, more specifically, *how* such other things exist among that all else existent. It is in this determination, which correlates quite closely with certain principles in statistics, that I observe the identity of anything to be that of all else beside itself – or, as illustrated in statistics, "n-1" – wherein the concept of power is no different. To elucidate even further such logic, it is typical that "when we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men" (Morgenthau, pg. 32). Herein lies the downfall of the realist school, whereby they concentrate their attention, falling for the classical magic trick of misdirection to create an illusion, on *man's control* and not on *other men*. However, it becomes not a matter of what one man 'possesses' – his propensities or judgement – but, rather, of the existence of the sorts of other men in regards to that one man – of others' propensities and judgement. If men were set equal, there would be no difference and, consequently, no hierarchy - power would be nonexistent. Said in a different way, a man which exists in nothing but himself has no power because there is nothing for him to influence. In such nothingness, no means exist; thus, then, not even a man can influence himself.

Overall, given the notions illustrated above, it is my belief that power is not a possession; rather, power is a consequence of the relativeness of that all else in the external structure (or aggregate image). Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, in presenting some of the major assumptions of the postmodernist body of thought of IR, remark "knowledge is always conditioned by a particular time and place" (pg. 182). I believe the concept of power follows a similar line of logic – mainly, that power cannot truly be of an agent's possession; rather, it is defined by, and a product of, the external of any particular time and place. More concisely put, it is the consequence of that all else in the external which, in either the absence or presence of certain

other systemic attributes (being either accommodating or abrogating), affords one the opportunity to capitalize on one's propensities and judgement.

On Voluntarism and Determinism:
I believe the best way in which I can present my conception and, thereby, understanding of the issue of voluntarism and determinism is by way of a personal experience with nature. In a journal entry of mine I wrote "a pine needle that fell from the tree never had the worry of it one day falling or about where else it may end up. It never, in its natural state, surmised about anything which has not yet happened – it exists simply in and by its own existence". Putting aside for the moment the philosophical contemplation, I immediately wondered to myself, after having personally gone outside and observed with own eyes the pine trees, "has anyone else ever thought this thought?". I bring this up because I believe that this contemplation directly relates to the voluntarism-determinism discussion.

One could make the argument that I held within me a certain sovereign propensity (either by way of my individual nature or encounters with every-thing up until my walk outside) whereby, given everything I have observed, I was on a *trajectory* to that very particular point to walk outside where, then, upon being outside, I was able to *see* what I saw and *contemplate* what I saw. Naturally, this gets quite complex very fast; however, for the sake of not taking more time and space elaborating on such alternative perspectives, I believe there is a duality in one's existence that is both voluntary and determined. The walk from inside to outside was voluntary – no matter how habitual the matter might be. Furthermore, once outside, the trajectory of the contemplation (how my mind wandered), whose space may have undoubtedly derived from my observation of the will of nature (the needle falling from the tree), was nevertheless of my own coalescence of all that else I had seen or contemplated prior to. Thus, and this being my determination, I believe there to be a *separation of wills* – the will of that all else (in this instance, nature) and that of my own (cognition). Margaret Macdonald, in her article *Natural Rights*, articulates somewhat of the same notion in saying "intelligent choices are not random" (ed. Laslett, pg. 52). Being not random, cognition, then, by way of being of some degree of order – for instance, my coalescence – can be considered as being voluntary where, alternatively, nature, and almost all that else which surrounds us, at least in how we relate to such, for the most part, or at least to a quite separate degree, does not present itself in such similar fashion – there appears to be no order to nature. This determination follows closely to that of Macdonald's wherein she says "nature provides no standards" (ed. Laslett, pg. 45).

Naturally, too, voluntarism and the principle of consent are inextricably linked as we typically understand consent to be a product of one's willful determinations or intentions (or, the internal dimension of one's image). Being such, we rarely, if ever, ascribe to the notion of free will that of 'obedience' or 'submission'. However, John Austin, in the first volume of his lectures on jurisprudence, stipulates "all *obedience* is voluntary or free, or every party who obeys consent to obey. In other words, every party who obeys wills the obedience which he renders, or is determined to render it by some motive or another. That acquiescence which is purely involuntary, or which is purely the consequence of physical compulsion or restraint, is not obedience or submission" (Austin, pg. 272). Given this, it should be briefly mentioned, if nothing else but to provide context for the reader, that John Austin's book – more so his conception of law - was held by many other jurists of the time to be quite strict, though not necessarily incorrect. E. C. Clark, in his book *Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on Austin*, after

outlining the strictness of Austin's conception of law proper, goes on in chapter XIV to present a few his own objections wherein he, nonetheless, in his summation of what the state consists of, and in accordance with Austin's use of language, articulates "that a state consists of a body or bodies, of human beings dwelling together but not members of the same family, in the habit of paying *obedience* to a person or assemblage of persons who are not in the habit of paying obedience to any other" (Clark, pg. 165).

The reason for articulating this nuance of language is for the purpose of providing clarity and distinction to that which is of one's individual will versus the will of that all else – which, I tend to associate more with that of 'obedience' than toward the essence of 'consent'. More precisely, it is the undertone of the word obedience which raises concern regarding the principle of consent and its voluntaristic connotation. For instance, I could very well imagine being submitted to circumstance wherein I necessarily 'obey' or 'follow' but, yet, do not 'approve' or 'condone'. In utilizing Austin's criterion of that which can be categorized as being involuntary (or, not willful) – being the consequence of compulsion – it could easily be the case where mere circumstance compels me, wherein, then, and of being of such acquiescence, I do not consent but merely obey. To resolve this dichotomous and convoluted conception of consent, Frederick Pollock articulates the criterion of consent as that of *mutual intention* between two or more parties (Pollock, pg. 153). It is such intention, which is derived only from one's judgement, that is no longer random or a matter of mere circumstance. Even more, and to conclude this discussion, Pollock remarks "consent ought to be full and free" (Pollock, pg. 153).

On Sovereignty:

Franz Oppenheimer remarks that "it is self-evident, that in any group of human beings, be it ever small, there must exist an authority which determines conflicts and, in extraordinary situations, assumes the leadership" (Oppenheimer, pg. iii). To this, I agree – it is a quite usual occurance in any society or state that authority of some (or any) kind is existent. My critical argument, however, derives from how the formulated belief of authority is justified in terms of sovereignty – especially given the current era wherein we no longer ascribe to the monarchical political system for which sovereignty was designed for.

To provide a historical context, however, in which to place the following discussion, from around the seventh century leading up to, and indeed a past, the sixteenth century there existed a constant struggle for dominance between the Church (Pope) and Imperial System (Emperor). In the mid- to late-sixth century, the structure of societies was such that "[many] kingdoms in the eastern half of what we can now call England...were themselves built out of much smaller building-blocks, sometimes called *regiones*" (Wickham, pg. 156-157). It wasn't until the beginning of the seventh century that "these small units, which had doubtless been expanding in the meantime, began to crystalize into kingdoms the size of one or two countries" (Wickham, pg. 157-158). Over the next few centuries, leading up to the early sixteenth century, such societies and economies all throughout Europe would soon become even more expanded, integrated, and politically complex which would ultimately serve to widen certain "circles of influence" (Greengrass, pg. 69). The political ramification of such growth and integration was that it put everthemore pressure on both the Church and Emperor to hasten their respective pursuits and, subsequent, discovery of that which would enable them to claim ultimate dominion over all the, at the time, still highly fragmented European entities. I say 'entities' as,

still, in the sixteenth century "nowhere was there a 'nation state'" (Greengrass, pg. 266). In fact, in the onset of the sixteenth century the reality was "the European landmass was a political kaleidoscope" (Greengrass, pg. 259) where "in 1520, there were some 500 more or less independent entities" (Greengrass, pg. 262). It wasn't until around the early seventeenth century that "something of a state-like structure" (Greengrass, pg. 262) began to form where those 500 or more entities eventually dwindled down to close 350 "separate states" around 1650 (Greengrass, pg. 262). Others argue that it was not actually until "the decline of the European colonial empires in the mid-twentieth century [that] the *state* became the only form of polity" (Philpott, pg. 9).

Nevertheless, and to back-track a bit to the early sixteenth century, it was in such an environment of political fragmentation and civil war, in conjunction with increasing economic growth and social inter-dependence, that both the Church and Emperor held a motivation for a last-ditch effort to assert their superiority over the other. It would soon be, however, that King Henry VIII would ultimately declare "this realm of England is an empire...governed by one supreme head and king" (Tanner, pg. 41) by way of his Act in Restraint of Appeals in 1533. The significance of this declaration was that the Emperor would soon encompass the full realm of the Church under its dominion and thereby, thus, granting itself a new sort of ultimate authority and dignity. More precisely stated, "he [the King] being also institute and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole, and entire power, pre-eminence, authority, prerogative, and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final to all manner of folk resiants or subjects within this his realm...without restraint or provocation to any foreign princes or potentates of the world" (Tanner, pg. 41). To this, Harold Laski remarks "he mistakes the popular basis of the Tudor throne" (Laski, pg. 2). Nonetheless, though this is not meant to debate the theoretical propositions between ruler sovereignty and popular sovereignty or limited sovereignty (Kant in Ebenstein, pg. 540), it is not coincidental that the nature and extent of his self-prophesized authority would soon envelope and, subsequently, embody that very same notion of 'divinity' which had been profusely professed by the Church throughout its centuries-long struggle. Nevertheless, it was by way of King Henry's declaration that "the Crown indeed insisted that the kingdom was independent, henceforth, of the Papacy...[wherein] Henry VIII was trying also to express that idea of sovereignty within the body politic for which the technical language did not yet exist" (Hinsley, pg. 119). Such a deficiency, however, would soon be remedied.

Jean Bodin, a French jurist and philosopher, by way of his *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, formally introduced in literature a codified notion of sovereignty which was "based on the *sovereign will* of states" (Hinsley, pg. 186). Specifically, Bodin defined sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of the state, that is, the greatest power to command" (Ebenstein, pg. 389). He further proposed "that sovereignty was indivisible and could not be shared either with groups or individuals within a country or those outside it" (Wilson, pg. 171). It should be noted, too, that it is in this particular regard where one can readily observe how remarkably akin Bodin's conception of sovereignty was to that of King Henry VIII's. However, this is not too surprising as, much like Machiavelli, Jean Bodin's "political thinking [was] developed under pressure of personal experience" (Tooley, pg. i) wherein his "book was a direct outcome of the confusion brought about by civil and religious wars" (Hinsley, pg. 120). Otherwise, he was living amongst, and writing about, all the changes which were underway across all of Europe wherein, necessarily, to provide a remedy to fit his immediate circumstance, he, along with many other jurists and philosophers, reached back re-collecting several Aristotelian ideas.

The consequence, however, was that such "older doctrines, which had hitherto been unargued statements of simple beliefs, were now erected into learned arguments...and that [these] new ideas were themselves turned by diverse temperaments and conflicting interests to different ends" (Hinsley, 76). Nevertheless, the consequence of Bodin's particular pattern of observation, construction, justification, and purportion was that his principle of sovereignty was precisely created to be the means for providing a more adhesive mold to the current hierarchical structure of the monarchical system – the political system of the time - by giving it legal legitimacy and, subsequently, *legal authority*. To corroborate such a determination, William Ebenstein remarks "Bodin prefer[ed] monarchy to aristocracy and democracy because the unity and indivisibility of authority seem best safeguarded in one man" (Ebenstein, pg. 387). Even more, F. H. Hinsley remarks that "the concept of sovereignty, being *made to serve* the state or the nation regarded as an absolute end, was interpreted as justifying the use of absolute power or symbolizing the actual possession of it" (Hinsley, pg. 217). Unfortunately, however, the ultimate ramification of Bodin's work was "everyone writing after Bodin, by direct or indirect influence, repeats what he has to say in whole or in part on these subjects. Hobbes, the royalist writers, and Locke all assume that the essence of sovereignty is the authority to make law" (Tooley, pg. xxxi). It wouldn't be long, too, until Bodin's conception of the *sovereign will of the state* would itself be re-interpreted and transformed to fit the more contemporary circumstance in which states would find themselves – it would soon be refitted and defined as the *sovereign state*.

In light of such historical context, I feel now to be the perfect time in which to disprove not only the historical conception of sovereignty but also its contemporary counterpart. This proof is rather simple and relies quite wholesomely on everything which has been professed thus far – more specifically, my argument is meant to align with my above model. Restated, there are only two items which any individual "possesses": 1) sovereign propensities; and, 2) judgement. You may be asking yourself why I say propensities are 'sovereign' rather than judgement. The reason comes by way of a principle called 'universality', which resides at the crux of the theory of natural rights. Nevertheless, for now, the easiest way in which to illustrate how propensities are more sovereign in nature, given all humans, than judgement is by way of a simple example:

> Let us both *touch* a hot stove. We both will feel the heat - almost in the exact same way, I would imagine. Now, let us both *witness* an event. We both, given our own experiences and concepts of things, may come to quite different conclusions. In this regard, judgement, then, is not sovereign - otherwise, being universal.

Furthermore, it is only by way of one's judgement, and not their sovereign propensities, that one can *intentionally* render such consent, following Pollock's 'mutual intention' and not that of Austin's 'obedience'. Thus, when we transition from the level individual to that of the aggregate (or, state), sovereignty does not sail in the channel which exists between the two entities. Therefore, and being my final determination, no state can ever possess any degree of sovereignty as, not only can a state not will itself, it definitively depends on the consent of the individual which can only come from one's judgement.

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Annex:

1) A Proof of Inter-dependence (or, to Together Exist):

When I'm inside, I can see the birds playing outside; but when I go outside, they disappear from my view – probably off to play outside another person's window. So, what then of the inter-dependence between me and that other individual?

How does that which we do (or that which we do not) affect those (anyone, really) around us, even if we do not know or cannot see them? By this example, my actions of going outside *would* produce an outcome wherein that other individual shares in observing the birds playing. What's everthemore fascinating, however, at least to me, is that had I elected to not go outside, whereby, then, the birds playing outside my window likely would have remained in my purview, I, by way of my abstinence, nevertheless would still be directly connected to that same individual's being - the alternative merely being they *would not* have been able to enjoy watching the birds playing outside their own window. So, and this being the critical determination, no matter the notion which exists in the space between object, which subsequently serves to define each objects' identity (as it is the notion which each object has identified), there nevertheless will always exists such inter-dependence between objects across all space and of any time.

Thus, to *together exist* is not merely to *exist together*. The former supposes *how* objects exist, whereas the latter stipulates *where* objects exist.

Normative Concept

Legitimacy = $f($ "acceptability" / "justification" $)$

Correlating Concepts

in reference to "power" or "authority" of some entity

more so "condoning" than you are "obeying"

"Consent", "recognition" & "obligation"

what distinguishes between the two is

where, "Justification" → "Obligation"
(means) (creates) (product)

"approval"

↓
"legislates"

↳ I could be submitted to circumstance and, thus, "follow" but, nonetheless, not "agree". The normative proposition is such that we follow because we approve.

I would say it is more of "consent" as this is closer to "obeying" than "recognition"

"intention"

• is what is of authority derived from "rec." or "consent"?
majority ↳ quantitative ~~factor~~ determining factor

A ··· Z̶
     ↓
    ↗
B →
(rec.) (Authority)

C

D ··· E

→ by "existing" it has authority over itself → it is the "↓".

• the question becomes one of: when does '↗' have authority over something other than itself?

• Observation alone cannot Create obligation.
↳ what is the difference between "observation" & "recognition"?

(recognize)

○ 3

Perception   Fits into one's Experience