A *Phenomenology of "That!"*

An Introduction to the Dialectic of Subjectivity

Dennis Binseel

1. "What do we mean here by 'existence precedes essence'? We mean that man first exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only afterward defines himself. If man as existentialists conceive of him cannot be defined, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature since there is no God to conceive of it. Man is not only that which he conceives himself to be, but that which he wills himself to be, and since he conceives of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after being thrown into existence, man is nothing other than what he makes of himself. This is the first principle of existentialism." - J. Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, pg. 22

2. "Philosophy cannot arise from scientific ways of thinking and scientific knowledge alone. Philosophy demands a *different thinking*, a thinking that, in knowing, reminds me, awakens me, brings me to myself, transforms me" - K. Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*, pg. 12

3. "A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something *begins its essential unfolding*" - M. Heidegger, 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' (in ed. D. F. Krell, *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, pg. 356)

4. There is no god - only how great the human can be. And, to be sure, there are two meanings to this: 1) that humans need no god to be good; and, 2) that god, as an idea, is made to represent the good which humans are not.

This lecture has two agendas: 1) to introduce the structure of Sartre's 'for-itself' (i.e., consciousness) and highlight such's dialectical nature (i.e., transcended-transcending); and, 2) to open-up the threefold structure of Sartre's 'The Look' to show how he loses the dialectical method when discussing interpersonal relations. Throughout this lecture, I continually reference Heidegger, drawing mostly upon his notion of 'Dasein' (i.e., human existence) as a way in to give an alternative understanding to some of the concepts Sartre presents in his Being and Nothingness. As will be shown, I believe Sartre's highly neurotic personality – as reflected by a few entries in his War Diaries, but particularly his own analysis of his childhood experience as presented in his Words - failed him in his early philosophical years. And, more importantly, seeing as he all but repurposed most of Heidegger's concepts, Heidegger continues to offer a healthier approach to 'Being' and how to construe human relationships. Now, as I do admit, while this lecture begins slow, it quickly gains speed. Therefore, I've provided below a way by which to conceptualize what's soon to be discussed, hoping such enables your understanding. With that said, there is nothing in this lecture which anyone cannot understand if they really want to. There are difficulties, but they are not insurmountable – they only require a bit of thinking. It is not my intent to but readily furnish anyone with "answers". Doing so, in fact, only disables you – it takes away from you the opportunity to explore and see for yourself.

There

"That!" Open Realm

(Between – 'where' here and there meet)

Here | There

Let's just begin. And, where we begin is with our title – "*that!*" is where we begin. What is distinctive about this "that" is its nature of *pointing* - it is pointing "that-*there*" out. As an example, we say, "look at *that* over there!". And, it is this which brings us in closer to what is often silent in this movement of *pointing out* "that there". In this movement of *pointing* (i.e., to-which) there is also a *referring* (i.e., from-which). *This to-which and from-which is the very structure of "that!"*. We have now opened-up a realm of Being for us to wander about and explore.

What we should now address is precisely this *realm of Being*. What we wonder in *where we wander* is how expansive this place for which we stand is?. We ask, "how distant is 'there' from 'here'?". "How far must I venture before I find myself 'there'?", we continue. With respect to our first question, I do not exactly know. But, in light of this shortfall, how we can proceed, in hopes that we *might* discover an answer to our question, is draw upon what *might* be between 'here' and 'there', thus marking the distance between each. So, let us ask, "what lies between 'here' and 'there' ?". Now, as one can readily notice, this at first glance (i.e., prima facie) *appears* to be quite a difficult question to answer. It is difficult because the answer *we seek*, at the moment, is uncertain. It is in the face of this uncertainty that we find ourselves dealing with Nothing (or, no-thing). In fact, if we are to proceed further, deepening in our thinking, we will quickly discover *Nothing is between 'here' and 'there'*. We know No-thing *stands* to figure between each as, if Some-thing were in fact between, we *would* (that is, not might) notice an obstacle which need be overcome before we could find ourself on the other side of what's 'here'. So, what we can thus far conclude is that *between 'here' and 'there' is Nothing*.

Yet, this Nothingness which pervades, filling the space between does not mean that 'here' and 'there' are the same – only that 'here' and 'there' stand near-enough to one another that they, *together*, standing on common ground, *share in Being*. But, you might ask, "how can we assure ourselves that 'here' and 'there', as much as they share in Being, share, too, in Being different *from* one another?". For this, let's take from our daily lives a casual encounter – sitting in the park.

[Here I sit, on this bench, *gazing out* upon the grass, bushes, trees and water. I 'here' birds and crickets chirping, squirrels scurrying up trees, and leaves rustling in the wind, with the wind gently brushing over, and sun settling upon, my skin. *All this 'there'*, there, escaping itself for a moment, to pass over at a zero-distance (i.e., traversing the Nothingness which is between), *meets* me here, where I in turn reach out and lean (in) to wrap myself around what meets me]

It is precisely this *meeting* which indicates, *announcing* a separation - a difference - therein *opening-up* (i.e., revealing, disclosing, uncovering) 'a-way' between 'here' and 'there' in which *to* wander away. Though, seeing as this 'way' between

is filled to the brim, utterly and totally seeping, with Nothing, we discover, *in* our way away, Nothing. *Nothing stands in the way between our being* 'here' and "*that!*" over 'there', so that *away is our way.* Do we not say, "off and away we go!"? And so, what we discover is "*that!*" our way is uncertain, where this uncertainty is Nothing, so "*that!*" certainly Nothing is certain. Here, we find the glory *hidden away (in) Nothing* – we are free! *Free to-be.* We learn *Nothing is the ground upon we stand* so "that!" we can go "off and away!". Even more wonderous, it is Nothing "*that!*" allows, giving way, for meeting. *We are free to meet.* So, then, what stands 'there', *beyond* me 'here' – and, so, *is in away*, apart from me, where, *as apart from me*, is *not* me - has no obstacle standing before itself to overcome in order "*that!*" 'there' might come forth *to be present* before me 'here'. And so, as soon as what's 'there' escapes itself, sooner is it 'here' *with* me – 'there' *leaps!* out, startling, rushing towards me, passing ever-so-quickly through our ever-expansive zero-distant Nothingness. What's more, it is in this very *movement* of rushing towards me wherein I discover "*that!*" *I am a Being which is* 'here'. No sooner do I step forward (i.e., "off and away we go"), leaning in *to assume myself as one* "*that!*" is – a *Being* which is *both* 'here' and 'there'. Making our way to here, and for all which has thus been discussed, Martin Buber, in *I and Thou*, most appropriately remarks "all real living is meeting" (pg. 11). Now, though this is all which has been uncovered thus far, we will in due course return to Martin Buber, aiming to open-up for-ourself his distinction between the *I-It* and *I-Thou* relation in a discussion on how the dialectic of consciousness figures (or, takes shape) in social relations. But, for the moment, we must proceed with summarizing what's so far been disclosed so that we may place all which has been in the place of consciousness (i.e., for-itself).

So, in our exploration thus far – viz., in our traversing and wandering about – we have come to discover "*that!*" has the structure of *to*-which (i.e., 'there') and *from*-which (i.e., 'here'), where between each is Nothing; so, too, "*that!*" as near as 'here' and 'there' are *to* one another they are precisely "*that!*" distant *from* each other. Nearness, constantly yearning *to-be near*, desperately strives to close-up, seal, extinguish the Nothingness between which is only *further* opened (e.g., "up and *away*") by the ceaseless flight of Distantness's insatiable desire *to-be distant*. And, to be sure, it is this simultaneous *movement* which *is* dialectic – viz., the *circularity* and *inter-connection* (or, integration, pairing, *standing on common ground*) of seemingly opposite positions (or, regions of Being), where, upon second glance (e.g., first glance reconsidered), therein moving, *leaping!* toward a *higher* and *clearer* vantage, we find *all is with(in) one* 'framework'. And, to this, Martin Heidegger, in *Identity and Difference* (hereon denoted as ID), says "the framework concerns us everywhere, immediately" (ID, pg. 35). *Dialectic is the continual tension in Being* between 'here' (i.e., *in*ward-to-be-by-itself) and 'there' (i.e., *for*ward-to-be-of-itself), where Nothing, as valuable a freedom it is in that it presents no obstacle at all, is as equally absent (e.g., *away*) as 'a-way' for which way to wander. And so, finally, having incidentally come this way, we now stand on the doorstep of the "for-itself", where '*That!*" which is for-itself is consciousness.

However, having since arrived at consciousness, no sooner do we find before ourself two doors, where to the right is Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (hereon denoted as BN), wherein 'Being' is defined as a combination of "two absolutely distinct regions" (BN, pg. 25) – viz., the in-itself and for-itself - and where to the left is Heidegger's *Being and Time* (hereon denoted as BT), wherein he says the "entity which each of us is...we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'" (BT, pg. 27). Now, to an extent, as can been seen by the title of each's philosophical work, no matter which way or where we go we will eventually find ourself standing in the same place because what both Sartre and Heidegger discuss is, for the most, the same matter (e.g., Being). The only real difference between each's exposition of Being – granted, one which is surely quite significant in any advanced discussion of philosophical ontology, but which is here well beyond the scope of a simple introduction to the dialectic of consciousness – derives from how Being is interpreted, and so defined, by each. To this, Herbert Spiegelberg, in volume 2 of *The Phenomenological Movement* (hereon denoted TPM), says that where "Heidegger's phenomenology was pointedly a phenomenology of *Dasein*, of Human Being, as contrasted to Husserl's consciousness...Sartre conceives of this Dasein again as consciousness" (TPM, pg. 479).

Now, the reason for Sartre's conceiving of Being in terms of consciousness comes from having discovered a particular detail following his close reading of Husserl's philosophy. As Spiegelberg notes, it's without a doubt that "Husserl was for Sartre the most important philosophical stimulus" (TPM, pg. 452) during his early philosophic years. In fact, Sartre says himself, in his *War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phony War, 1939-1940* (hereon denoted as WD), that "I was saturated in Husserl...Husserl had gripped me. I saw everything through the perspective of his philosophy..." (WD, pg. 183). And, to be sure, what had "gripped" Sartre was Husserl's postulate "all consciousness is consciousness (of) something" (BN, pg. 21), where, as James Edie points out in his article 'Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoanalyst' (in ed. E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum, *Phenomenology and Existentialism* – hereon denoted as EP-PE), "Sartre emphasizes the transitive value of the (of)" (EP-PE, pg. 147). What this (of) means to Sartre is that consciousness has a structure which is 'intending', where, as intentional, "consciousness is directed outside" (BN, pg. 10) to that which stands *beyond* itself. To this, Spiegelberg says "for Sartre, a consciousness-of means in the first place a reference *from* the intending act *to* the intended object beyond as a distinct entity..." (TPM, pg. 488). It, in fact, is precisely this (of) which leads Sartre to conclude that "transcendence is a constitutive structure of consciousness, which is to say that consciousness is born *bearing on* a being that it is not" (BN, pg. 23). Now, it is at this pivotal juncture, tying together the (of) which consciousness *is*, wherein this (of) is transitive – and, therefore, transcended - with the being that consciousness is *not*, as what *is not* are those objects which stand in-the-world *beyond* consciousness, *bearing, impressing, appearing* upon it, that Sartre formally defines consciousness as "being what it is not and not being what it is" (BN, pg. 27) –

otherwise, that consciousness is *transcended-transcending*. It's this which leads such to be inherently dialectical. It's a letting-activity (or, actively letting).

Now, as Maurice Natanson, in *A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology* (hereon denoted as CSO), aptly remarks, to those who are not accustom to "the involved and often tangled line of Sartre's argument and the horrifying quality of the prose which is intended to convey the author's ideas" (CSO, pg. 19), this might seem a difficult pill to swallow. However, what we can do to enable ourself in being able to better understand what's meant by Sartre's definition is to deconstruct it into two parts. As so, the first part we have is consciousness as a "being what it *is not*". Now, what this means is that consciousness discloses for-itself that which *appears*-in-the-world beyond itself - otherwise, what appears 'there', passing over a zero-distance, bears upon 'here'. But, if you were to ask Sartre "how can consciousness *actively let* what *is not* itself appear to, falling upon, bearing on, itself?", he'd respond by saying "the for-itself precisely *is nothing*" (WD, pg. 233). Meaning, consciousness is no-"*thing*" (i.e., some *already made*, prefabricated *object* or *entity*, sitting just 'behind' the film of consciousness, 'working' consciousness, much in the way of Husserl's transcendental ego), as, again, if in fact consciousness were some-*thing*, it would only be something which stood in the way of meeting what's '*there*'-in-the-world. Taken from a different perspective, if there were a transcendental ego, serving as the essence to human consciousness, playing consciousness like a puppet from 'behind' (or, from the deep and silent interiority of consciousness), then how things would work, in terms of our being-in- and meeting-the-world, is that the world, in its appearing 'there' before us, would pass immediately through, almost as if entirely leaping over, surpassing the empty expansive realm that is our consciousness to, first, communicate with our essential ego, where all the while this inter-action would be silent (i.e., unannounced) and, therefore, unbeknownst, before, second, the ego *determined*, committing itself to produce, consciousness *as an object itself* based upon what met *it* (i.e., indicating 'thing'-hood or 'thing'-ness), upon which we would subsequently experience what the ego "told" us to experience. Now, what this all speaks is a life *pre-determined* (e.g., where a *pre*-fabricated ego *determined* conscious experience), wherein freedom is totally non-existent. But, seeing as freedom is an essential value to Sartre, figuring largely, in fact, in his humanistic existential philosophy (cf. his *Existentialism is a Humanism*), he adhors this perspective (e.g., absolute idealism). To this, Sartre says, in 'Existentialism: A Clarification' (in ed. R. Aronson & A. Van Den Hoven, *We Have Only This Life To Life* - hereon denoted as LTL), "Existentialism...maintains that in man - and in man alone - existence precedes essence. This simply means that man first is, and only subsequently is this or that. In a word, man must create his own essence: it is in throwing himself into the world, suffering there, struggling there, that he gradually defines say what this man *is*..." (LTL, pg. 88), concluding with "existentialism defines man by action..." (LTL, pg. 88). And so, it is Sartre's "existence precedes essence" (*cf. J. Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, pg. 22*) - viz., that who and what we are is only who we care and choose *to-be*, wherein so doing *we make*

ourself to care-to-be-in-the-world - which is meant, not only to refute Husserl's ego but, testify to *the ground* (i.e., the nothingness of consciousness) "*that!*" is human freedom and action. To this, Dermot Moran notes that to Sartre "freedom is a stance of consciousness, in fact the fundamental stance" (IP, pg. 359).

Now, summarizing what's thus far been discussed, for Sartre there is no 'transcendental' ego. Consciousness is essentially Nothingness (i.e., no-thing-ness). And, it's important to note the difference between these two positions – that is, between saying there is no *essential ego* and '*that!*' consciousness is *essentially nothingness*. To say the essence of consciousness is nothing is not the same as saying there is no essence at all. Rather, it's *for* this nothingness which consciousness essentially *is* "*that!*" leads us to be free – and, too, free to *meet*, as nothing stands between me 'here' and the world 'there'. This nothingness is letting. And, not only does nothingness afford consciousness *the ground* by which to stand *for*-itself (in) its own *place* but, consciousness in-turn takes up this nothingness in its standing to face what's 'there'-in-the-world *beyond* itself 'here'. Now, to briefly focus in on something just introduced, with regard to the use of the word 'place', it's very important to note Andrew Benjamin's remark, in *Towards a Relational Ontology* (hereon denoted as TRO), "*that!*" "place is that in which relations occur" (TRO, pg. 30), whereby "being-in-relation is equally being-in-place" (TRO, pg. 30). So, nothingness is "*that!*" place which *is* consciousness, where consciousness *is* freedom and actively letting. Thus, as we have since disclosed 1) what appears, *appears 'there'*; and, 2) *where* 'there' appears is *in-the-world*. '*There' is appearance*, and it's for our consciousness being nothing (or, gratuitous), as well as being "*that!*" place were relations take place, that *we stand free to meet*, therein being-in-relation *with*, the world. And, it's in light of all of this that Sartre concludes "subjectivity lacks any power to constitute the objective" (BN, pg. 23), saying similarly in his *War Diaries*, "that which the for-itself lacks is *there*, before it" (WD, pg. 233). Granted, this all is not to say Sartre does not believe the ego at all exists – in fact, he does, but only as 'transcendent' and not as 'transcendental'. Meaning, as Frederick Copleston says, in *A History of Philosophy: Maine de Biran to Sartre* (heron denoted as HOP), "the ego *is posited* as the point of unity and the source of all one's experiences" (HOP, pg. 348) by consciousness through consciousness's turning, reflecting, falling upon itself. So, if the ego is taken to represent the notion of 'self' (which is the basis of ego-psychology), Sartre, not denying that the 'self' exists, holds that the self is only a derivative of a relation consciousness has with the world. Otherwise, consciousness being related *to* the world as in-the-world, the notion of 'self' derives precisely *from* our being-in-the world – specifically, in how we meet the world through our caring-to-be-in-the-world.

Now, trekking a bit deeper, and keeping in mind "*that!*" consciousness is 'here' and the world 'there', where the notion of 'self' springs from is "*that!*" 'here' bursting forth, *extending out-ward, to turn in-ward* and, thus, fall un-*to* itself (i.e., *in-to* face itself) to "find" (or, locate, position, place) itself 'here'-in-the-

world. Otherwise said, seeing as 'here' cannot stand *to-be* absent any 'there', as 'here' itself would too be absent (i.e., 'there' *must* be in order "*that!*" 'here' *can* be), it is *through* the world 'appearing-there', falling upon our being 'here', that our 'appearing-here' can at all be discovered by our being 'here'. What's more, as it should be noted, it is in this very same movement of consciousness turning *in-'to' face itself* that it is necessarily and simultaneously turning *away 'from'* the world (remember that there is no 'to'-which without there also being a 'from'-which, as "*that!*" is the structure of dialectic). This *fleeing in face of the world* 'there' to find oneself 'here' is, to Sartre, what gives way to humans becoming 'lost' – specifically, *lost in their own pursuit to 'find' themself*. And, as we'll in time discuss, the reason for their inevitably becoming 'lost' derives from the fact that the for-itself is in *continual flight 'from' itself 'to'ward the possibilities it has for-itself*. What this means, then, is as soon as the for-itself *turns in-'to'* itself in order to 'find' itself, no sooner has the for-itself already escaped, surpassed, transcended itself 'from' "*that!*" place in which it first sought itself. To this, David Detmer, in *Sartre Explained: From Bad Faith to Authenticity* (hereon denoted as SE), says "as a consciousness, I am always on the way. I never arrive" (SE, pg. 103). Likewise, as Hazel Barnes remarks in *An Existentialist Ethics* (hereon denoted as AEE), "Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* emphasizes that the Self, like Being, is that which is always pursued but never attained. In this respect it is like the Future; it is always present...but we never coincide with it" (AEE, pg. 67). As a result, what we ultimately risk, in our pursuit (of) 'self', therein *keeping 'to'* (and so, not *letting 'from'*) "*that!*" place we've all but past, is devolving into 'inauthenticity' (and so, not *evolving authentically*). Otherwise said, inauthenticity is the flight of consciousness to "place itself" anew (i.e., aiming to be its own ground in-and-for-itself) *apart from* (or, at a distance to) the world at the expense of *already* being-in-place-*with*(in)-the-world, where, too, it was originally *through* the world 'appearing-there' which gave place to our being-'here'. Even more, it was *by* the world, being before originally, which *threw* our being to-be, and in so doing, be-in-this-place. It's here, in fact, to which Heidegger says, "'Being-in' is...the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (BT, pg. 80). And, with regard to our being-*thrown*, Heidegger continues saying, "the expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the facticity of [Dasein's] being delivered over" (BT, pg. 174), where "whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's 'facticity'" (BT, pg. 82; cf. WD, pg. 109). Sartre, keeping quite close to Heidegger, says "the for-itself *is*" (BN, pg. 129) and "it *is*, insofar as it is thrown into the world" (BN, pg. 129). And so, in short, being inauthentic, in part, equates to consciousness *falsely construing*, *through* its reflecting, *falling* upon itself as reflection, therein thus *believing*, it was "*that!*" which "placed itself" – and so, finding place only in-itself, losing itself. Otherwise said, consciousness, fleeing the world, therein denying its facticity (i.e., its factual existence as being-in-the-world), takes up for-itself *playing* the part of the world, where, as so, according to Sartre, consciousness stands (in) Bad Faith.

Travelling, traversing, wondering and wandering all this way, we now find ourselves standing at a juncture where *behind* us is the world 'appearing-there', falling, bearing upon, "*that!*" 'here', where the nothingness "*that!*" is consciousness actively lets (in) the being (of) 'there' *to stand on common ground* with our being 'here'. Nonetheless, the world, *leaping out!*, escaping, throwing itself, appears startlingly – we are startled to find our 'self' *as* a being which *is*; a being "*that!*" has been thrown to-be. Our facticity is most startling. Though, soon as we discover our 'existence precedes essence' no sooner are we free 'to'-be "this or that". So, "*Away* 'from' here *is our way*", we say. And, "off and away we *go*!", moving hastily hence, bursting forth, projecting, transcending toward who we are free to-be. And, it's precisely "*that!*" which stands ahead of us 'here' now. For all "*that!*" we have wandered, wondering all the while about "*that!*", we discover we have all but returned to our starting point. (cf. J. Sartre, *Saint Genet*, pg. 69), as what lays *before* us is the second part of Sartre's definition of consciousness. No where we go, we always go nowhere.

Remembering "*that!*" (i.e., 'to'-which and 'from'-which represents the continual tension (in) being *'between', which* is the structure of dialectic) Sartre formally defines consciousness as "being what it is *not* and *not being* what it is" (BN, pg. 27), the second part is what we will now begin to explore and open-up – specifically, consciousness as "*not being* what it is". Now, in our discussion of facticity, we noted Sartre saying "the for-itself *is*" (BN, pg. 129). Thus, here having ready-to-hand (cf. M. Heidegger, BT) these two 'definitions', how we should first proceed is substitute in the former the language of the latter. Doing so, the second part of Sartre's definition of consciousness becomes "*not being* what it ["the for-itself *is*"]". What this all means is "*that!*" consciousness is (in) *continual flight* 'from'-itself, therein escaping, nihilating, transcending itself as a for-itself, therein never coinciding with itself. It's homeless. And, consciousness does all this because it is continually pro-jecting itself 'to'-be ahead (of) itself, at a distance 'to'-itself. What's more, with regard 'to'-*where* consciousness is pro-jecting, launching, making itself *to-be* is "*that!*" *very same 'open'-place* which is its own possibility. Meaning, what consciousness has for-itself, 'there' present before and *with*(in) "*that!*" place which *is* itself (e.g., standing on common ground 'to' itself), *is* Nothing and its own freedom *to-be* for-itself. To this, Sartre says "the law of being of the for-itself as the ontological foundation of consciousness is to be itself in the form of self-presence" (BN, pg. 126). Sartre continues, "the being of consciousness, as consciousness, is to exist at a distance from itself, as self-presence, and this zero distance that being bears within its being is Nothingness" (BN, pg. 128; WD, pg. 110). Thus, taken together, what we can say of the for-itself, and thereby the structure of consciousness, is it is "*that!*" which is (for)ward-(of)-itself (e.g., 'there'), laying off (in) the distance *to*, facing, itself (e.g. 'here'), where, as (to)-itself, it, too, is (from)-itself, there all being (to)-, (from)- and (for)-itself. Simply said, consciousness is the arriving to meet itself in the mode of departing from itself (i.e., moving away *in-to*). And, to be sure, it's this which makes consciousness inherently dialectical.

Now, as Hazel Barnes notes in her 1992 article in the *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy* (Vol. 4, No. 2-3, pg. 93-111) entitled 'Sartre's War Diaries: Prelude and Postscript' (hereon denoted as SWD), "the concept of Nothingness as a lack in the very being of consciousness Sartre held to be the decisive cleavage between himself and his predecessors as well as the unifying foundation of his own philosophy" (SWD, pg. 95). Yet, though, to Sartre, "freedom is the appearing of Nothingness" (WD, pg. 132), and it's this freedom which in turn "obliges human-reality *to make itself*" (BN, pg. 579) through choosing to be 'this' or 'that', therein creating human values (CSO, pg. 10), his concept of the structure of the for-itself is truly not all that original as compared to Heidegger. In fact, Herbert Marcuse says in his 1948 article in the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (Vol. 8, No. 3, pg. 309-336) entitled 'Existentialism' (hereon denotes as E) "Sartre's book is in large parts a restatement of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* and Heidegger's *Sein and Zeit* [*Being and Time*]" (E, pg. 311). And, the reason this is so comes from Sartre's having eventually distanced himself from Husserl. As Sartre notes in his *War Diaries*, "gradually...the difficulties were piling up and a deeper and deeper gulf was separating me from Husserl. His philosophy evolved ultimately towards idealism, which I could not accept" (WD, pg. 184). "It was certainly to escape from this Husserlian impasse that I turned towards Heidegger" (WD, pg. 184), Sartre concludes. It's this, in fact, why Spiegelberg correctly notes "it seems plain enough that Sartre's ontological enterprise leads him closer to Heidegger than to any other philosopher before him" (TPM, pg. 454 – *cf. pg. 468-469 for a more complete articulation regarding "both the similarities and differences between Sartre's and Heidegger's respective ontologies"*).

So, focusing here a bit on Heidegger, we find "Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being" (BT, pg. 75), where "'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity" (BT, pg. 23); rather, "Being is always the Being of an entity" (BT, pg. 29), where, much in the same way as Husserl and Sartre, this (of) is referring (*cf. BT, §The Concept of the Phenomenon, pg. 51-55*). To this, Heidegger says "every reference is a relation..." (BT, pg. 108). And so, seeing as Life *leaps!* out, calling, continually and simultaneously falling upon us on all fronts, we are called (in)-*to* Being – *a Being "that!" is*; and, one related everywhere at once. Heidegger goes on to say, "this entity which each of us is himself...we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'" (BT, pg. 27; pg. 36), wherein "we are ourselves the entities to be analyzed" (BT, pg. 67) as any "understanding of Being belong[s] to Dasein..." (BT, pg. 37). Thus, in proceeding to analyze Dasein (i.e., Human existence), Heidegger says "the fundamental structure [of] Dasein [is] 'Being-in-the-world'" (BT, pg. 65), where what's meant by the term 'world' is the "totality of involvements" (BT, pg. 415) of entities and "the interconnection of these relationships" (BT, pg. 415), specifically saying "their unity makes up what we call the 'world'" (BT, pg. 415). Said otherwise, as K. Reinhardt remarks, in *The Existentialist Revolt* (hereon denoted as TER), "Man, as existing, is actively related to the objects and beings which surround him..." (TER, pg. 134). And, it's for this total immersion *with*(in) the surrounding world that Heidegger

conclusively says, "'Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (pg. 80). Now, with respect to this "Being of Dasein", Heidegger remarks, "Dasein exists" (BT, pg. 78), where, "the 'essence' of this entity [Dasein] lies in its 'to be'" (BT, pg. 67). What this means is "Dasein is…primarily Being-possible. Dasein is in every case what it can be…The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein…pertains to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being towards itself, for the sake of itself" (BT, pg. 183). More precisely, "in each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility" (BT, pg. 68). And, *where* it 'has' this possibility is 'there', in-"*that!*"-place, ahead-of-itself (i.e., "towards itself"). To this, Heidegger says, "Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its Being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself', not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not, but as Being towards the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being…we shall denote as Dasein's 'Being-ahead-of-itself'" (BT, pg. 236; *cf. §41. Dasein's Being as Care, pg. 235-241*). Meaning, what every human being 'has' (for)ward-(of)-themself (e.g., 'there'), laying off (in) the distance *to*, facing, themself (e.g. 'here'), *where, (in) "that!" place*, as (to)-themself, it, too, is (from)-themself, is their own possibility 'to be' – and, be someone for themselves and for all those with whom they stand in relation. And so, to Heidegger, it's "that kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence'" (BT, pg. 32), where Dasein's "existential meaning is care" (BT, pg. 65). Meaning, it's who we care-to-be which is the essence to human being. Heidegger further says, "care is that which forms the totality of Dasein's structural whole" (BT, pg. 279). Thus, all we are to ourselves and anyone is only "*that!*" who we care-to-be. Now, to give clarity and summarize Heidegger's conception of the 'essence' and 'structure' of Dasein and the significance of human possibility, Heidegger says "Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch 'of life' - one which is somehow present-at-hand - with the phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along. The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein…Factical Dasein exists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 'ends' and their 'between' are, and they are in the way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care. Thrownness and that Being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are 'connected' in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein (is) the 'between'" (BT, pg. 426-427). Now, taking together all that which has since been disclosed, J. Collins astutely remarks, in *The Existentialists: A Critical Study* (hereon denoted as TE), "It was a widespread opinion that, for Heidegger, human existence, or Dasein, is a brief moment of light shining between two abysses of utter nothingness. Man is thrown from whence he knows not and advances whither he knows not" (TE, pg. 198).

It should be said that this Light of Life is seen everywhere - to a child's laughter which fervidly erupts only to as quickly return whence it came; to ideas which burst, suddenly *appearing*, in our mind like shooting stars in the night sky, *where*(in), upon *meeting*, they immediately proceed with escaping toward "*that!*" nothingness to *again* be in-itself (e.g., *Sartre, in his War Diaries, says "the for-itself flees the in-itself through the in-itself towards the in-itself" (WD, pg. 214), where the "for-itself and in-itself are separated by nothing" (pg. 233) and that "the for-itself exists only as nihilation of the in-itself", (WD, pg. 205); in Being and Nothingness, Sartre says "the for-itself is at the same time a flight and a pursuit; at the same time it flees the in-itself and it pursues it; the for-itself is pursuing-pursued" (BN, pg. 480)*); and, to each and every choice we make which can never 'there'-*after* be annulled, as, upon our passing through "*that!*" open-realm of Being, 'there'-(in) choosing to-be 'this' or 'that', such immediately collapses, forever ceasing to anymore Be – it *is Been* (cf. CSO, pg. 24). To this last part, Henry Kissing, in *The Meaning of History* (hereon denoted as MOH), in fact, says "necessity is an attribute of the past" (MOH, pg. 1). Such is well said and quite appropriately aligns with Heidegger's and Sartre's ontology (even existentialism as a whole). Now, it should be noticed, too, that the past haunts us, so that *necessity follows* us no where we go. And, it's precisely because of this necessary haunting that, though no ethic can be grounded upon 'necessity' itself (i.e., *our past offers no right* dictate for who we are to-be), morality is very much silently alive and necessarily a part of the Light of Life. Morality is a *call* 'to'-care (cf. BT, *§ Conscience as the call of care, pg. 319-324*), where, our Being-'here', in-place-*with*(in)-the-'world', ought heed morality's call (as) necessary, since surely, upon passing 'between', it will be so (i.e., no matter who we choose to be, "*that!*" will be, 'there' haunting us 'here'). And, it's to our exploring - wondering and wandering about - *the ground between* these ends (e.g., 'from'-which and 'to'-which) that Seneca says "there is no more difficult art than living" (in E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, pg. xiv; *cf. E. Fromm, The Art of Being*). And so, seeing as "Man is thrown from whence he knows not and advances whither he knows not", all we are is merely a passing (in) 'between', simultaneously departing who we once were and entering who we are yet to-be.

Having uncovered all that we've more recently discussed, therein illuminating the path travelled, we here and now find ourselves standing, yet again, at another juncture, where what's *been* brought forth *to stand in the light* are a few of the commonalities between Sartre and Heidegger. We *learned* Sartre's consciousness – from facticity (e.g., "being what it is *not*") and transcendence (e.g., "*not being* what it is"); to "*that!*" 'place' which (is) nothingness and such's value for being-free; to (be)*ing* a being which is 'between'; to thrownness and being-in-the-world; to the significance of our involvement *with*(in) the 'world' through acting or comporting or making ourselves 'to-be'; and, to the importance our actions have on the values borne which in turn define our society (or, more appropriately, Human Existence) - has many roots in Heidegger's Dasein. But, remembering that as close as 'here' and 'there' are 'to' each other (e.g., Nearness), they stand precisely that far

'from' one another (e.g., Distantness). Thus, we should re-*turn* our attention *to*ward exploring "the decisive cleavage between [Sartre] and his predecessors" (i.e., how far Sartre went to distance himself from Heidegger).

Facing once more our two doors, to our left is Heidegger's concept of 'care', where "Being-in-the-world is essentially care" (BT, pg. 237). What's more, he says, "in its very structure, care is ahead of itself - Being already in the world - as Being alongside entities within-the-world" (BT, pg. 263). At base, "care is always concern and solicitude" (BT, pg. 238). Thus, it's quite apparent that care, according to Heidegger, represents community, mutuality and reciprocity, and consideration (even responsibility) for the livelihood of those who share in Being (cf. BN, pg. 338-339). To this, Frederick Copleston, in volume 11 of *A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism* (hereon denoted as LPE), says "Being-in-the-world is being-with (*Mitsein*)" (LPE, pg. 180). However, as Soren Overgaard notes in his article 'The Look' (in ed. S. Churchill and J. Reynolds, *Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts* – hereon denoted as KC), if we turn our glance to the right, we discover that "for Sartre mutual recognition is not in the cards" (KC, pg. 114). Sartre, in fact, contends "The essence of relations between consciousnesses is not *Mitsein*; it is conflict" (BN, pg. 564), where "conflict is the original meaning of being-for-the-Other" (BN, pg. 483). Otherwise said, that the original condition of human relations is one where each stands in conflict with every other – something, in fact, quite akin to Hobbes's 'state of nature' (*cf. D. Binseel, A Very General Introduction to the Trajectory of Jurisprudence, pg. 10*). "But, why conflict?", we ask ourself. "Why did Sartre, 'restating' most of what Heidegger detailed in *Being and Time*, therein quite literally re-purposing and re-labeling many of his concepts under the title *Being and Nothingness*, diverge so far in the other direction when it came to human relations?", we continue. Now, pausing for a moment, it's important to note that, though these questions flow from one another, they, nonetheless, are two distinct questions. Therefore, we find ourself in pursuit of two distinct answers (or, what amounts to the same, one answer comprised of two parts). Thus, the only real matter to be decided here and now is which question to first address. To this, seeing as we've all but returned to exactly where we initially headed "off and away!", detailing the congruities in '*Being*' between Heidegger's Dasein and Sartre's For-Itself, it's only fitting we re-*turn* whence we came, wandering and wondering in new light. Doing so will serve us well in the end as we'll establish the proper foundation by which to place our discussion of what Sartre means by 'conflict' and how 'the look' figures heavily into such.

Thus, the first part of the answer we seek centers around the latter half of each's titled work, where in Sartre's we find Nothingness stands readily near Being. The reason for this is Sartre was a philosopher of negativity (e.g., nothing, not-being, negation, nihilation). Consequently, as F. H. Heinemann remarks in *Existentialism and the Modern Predicament* (hereon denoted as EMP), "Sartre's world is a world in which the affirmative is transformed into the negative, the normal into the abnormal, good faith into bad faith, and truth into

falsehood" (EMP, pg. 125). Heinemann continues, "this negativity...leads not only to an inversion, but to a perversion of the natural world of human relationships" (EMP, pg. 125). Likewise, Herbert Marcuse says Sartre's "negativity originates with and constantly accompanies the human being" (E, pg. 313), specifically noting "the pervasive role of negation" (E, pg. 324) in Sartre's philosophy (*cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration to (O)bjectivity for an economic example of 'negation'*). Now, at first glance (i.e., *prima facie*), Heinemann's and Marcuse's statements might appear the same; but, they each, in fact, though starting in the same pace, point in different directions. Therefore, we need to be quite careful in how we understand Sartre's negativity. Thus, focusing our attention on the language of each's remarks, where Heinemann says 'transforms' and 'inversion' and 'perversion', Marcuse says 'originates' and 'accompanies' and 'pervasive'. Considering the tonality of each's language, and such's implications, I think Marcuse's statement points in the more appropriate direction of what's meant by Sartre's negativity. So, then, what does Marcuse mean by "negativity *originates with* and constantly *accompanies* the human being"? To this, Sartre reminds us, when thinking about the origin of nothingness and its place among being, "what we need to remember is that being *is* and that nothingness *is not*" (pg. 49). "But, if nothingness *is not*, how, then, can we even grasp nothingness in the first instance?", we proceedingly ask. Sartre replies, "[nothingness] can be seen to originate in negative judgements" (BN, pg. 37), where what's meant by 'negative judgement' is a determination about the being of something which involves the making, positing, pairing of a 'not-being' *to stand alongside*, on common ground, said 'some'-thing, therein *founding* a 'not-being'-'some'-thing (i.e., no-thing). As example, sitting on this bench, gazing out upon the grass, bushes, trees and water, I can quite easily "imagine" (*cf. J. Sartre, The Imaginary, pg. 187 – "nothingness can be given only as an infrastructure of something"*) these bushes burned, trees fallen, grass dead, and water dried-up. In a sense, then, I *project* the nothingness which my being [e.g., for-itself] *is* to-be 'there' beyond me, almost as if "*that!*" nothingness were seeping, escaping through some "hole in being" (BN, pg. 129; cf. WD, pg. 214). And, in fact, it's for this which leads Sartre to ultimately declare "man [e.g., for-itself] is the being through whom nothingness comes into the world" (BN, pg. 60); or, what amounts to the same, "there is non-being only on the surface of being" (BN, pg. 50), since "being is antecedent to nothingness and founds it" (BN, pg. 50). Thus, taking collectively what Sartre says here with what Heidegger said earlier, what we soon discover is, where Heidegger positioned Being between two poles of Nothing (BT, pg. 426-427; TE, pg. 189), Sartre reverses (or, "inverts") this structure such that *Nothing is between Being*. This here is best represented by his statement "what separates the subject from himself...*is nothing*" (BN, pg. 127). And, as we've already seen, it's precisely this no-thing-ness which we *are, make, and confront* which leads us to be free beings – and, so, free to use our being to choose, make, engage ourself in-the-world and, thereby, determine our essence.

Now, though this all brings us back to the significance of choice (i.e., having ahead-of-ourself to choose between 'this' or 'that') and human relations (i.e., the values which *take 'place'* in-the-world through all that we choose to-be), if, before proceeding hastily forth, we were curious enough to trek a bit deeper in *Being and Nothingness* to more fully elucidate Sartre's "stepping-stones", we'd find him saying "the for-itself is the foundation of all negativity and all relation: *it is the relation*" (BN, pg. 480; cf. TRO, pg. 30), wherein "nothingness...is the foundation of negation" (BN, pg. 65) and "from negation, we [are] led to freedom..." (BN, pg. 121). What this all means to say, then, is "man does not exist first in order to be free later; rather, there is no difference between man's being and his being-free" (BN, pg. 61). Said otherwise, "human freedom precedes man's essence and makes it possible" (BN, pg. 61). And, it's precisely this human freedom – viz. that *Nothing stands in the way* - which makes man ultimately responsible for all that *he chooses to-be* and the values which spring forth from his choices, therein living, pervading, infecting all human relations. However, this human responsibility which has its *ground in freedom* (e.g., in "*that!*" 'place' which is free (cf. WD, pg. 109)), 'there'-(in) pertaining to human possibility, is not confined to merely the positive side of choice. Humans are equally as responsible, through their *judgement*, for all which is negated, surpassed, left silent to-be elsewhere (BN, pg. 128 – "*nothingness is always an elsewhere*") – viz. "otherwise than being" (cf. E. Levinas) – *through* all which they judge to do. In this way, *human choice is dialectical* as, not only are we continually torn between having to choose among our possibilities (e.g., 'this' or 'that') but, every choice, in as much as it's (posit)ive, is equally as much and simultaneously negative (e.g., a negation), where, as so, who we are *not* dances on the surface of who we *are*, haunting us 'til death do us part. What's more, as it too ought be said, in light of our human possibilities, our *character* springs from what we *do* (i.e., how we *move* between 'here' and 'there' in "*that!*" open-realm which is Being); how we're *defined*, though, falls from all which we do *not*. What this means, then, is, assuming more than two possibilites, most of who we truly are at any moment is all we chose not-to-be. And, how this all ties back with what we said earlier about morality as a 'call'-to-care (e.g., caring for our human possibilities), how we should *move* is *judge* which of all our possibilites we ought-be. Simply because the Realm of Ought is, at times, revealed to us 'here' only upon reflection (i.e., turning to face our past, noticing who we, then, could have better been) doesn't mean one cannot then, (in) the very same moment of passing between, turn consciousness, harnessing what's been disclosed, toward what is ahead-of-ourself so as to better-be for-ourself, and in that way better for all who share in Being. I only have a past to learn 'from', where my future is where I can apply my learning 'to', and in that way *lean in-to Being*.

Therefore, and to conclude a somewhat long-winded excursion, what Sartre is trying to emphasize through the "stepping-stones" of his negativity is the "tremendous responsibility [which] rests upon a man's shoulders in the exercise of choice..." (LPE, pg. 194), and what all such means for the values which take place and persist in the world we make for ourself. Sartre, in fact,

goes so far as to even say "the other and I are co-responsible for each other's existence" (BN, pg. 391) through who we each choose to be, where, as in-the-world, we are both for-ourself and for-each-other. Thus, at least for the moment, in regards to Heinemann's remarks about Sartre's negativity, it's not so much 'transforming' or 'transposing' the positive to-be a negative so much it is *making the negative to stand alongside, therein giving meaning to, the positive*, as if reaching out to clasp that which is silent, surpassed, appearing for the most part as 'secondary', to draw forth and *stand on common ground* with its opposite, thereby more fully illuminating human being and its situation (*cf. E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, pg. 3 – "Being and not-being illuminate one another, and unfold in a speculative dialectic"*). To this, Kurt Reinhardt appropriately remarks, in *The Existentialist Revolt* (hereon denoted as TER), "This existence includes both positive and negative elements...And it is precisely the perpetual presence of the negative, the contingent, the finite that opens the individual's eyes to the reality of the positive, the necessary, the infinite" (TER, pg. 45).

Now, having wandered all this way, what's important to draw forth from all that's been discussed, so that we can address the second part of our question (e.g., why does Sartre construe human relations in terms of conflict?), are two fundamental notions: 1) consciousness is no-*thing*-ness (WD, pg. 233); and, 2) consciousness is relation (BN, pg. 480). It's with these two notions in hand that we begin to locate the problem (or, point of friction) of how this *no-thing-relation* "entity which each of us is himself" (BT, pg. 27; pg. 36) becomes conflicted upon meeting an Other like entity. To this, David Detmer summarizes and puts the matter well by saying "the problem [in our relations with others] is that as a consciousness (that is, as a for-itself, a no-thing), I am not an object. Recall that, on Sartre's view, consciousness is a relation, rather than a thing." (SE, pg. 103). Now, in light of all this, we're still missing a key component to our foundation which we must here and now introduce so that we may continue in our discussion. Therefore, the third notion we should keep in mind as we move ahead is that this entity which each of us are is embedded within a concrete body (which, in fact, is the starting point for the mind-body problem in philosophy, wherein we ask "what is "*that!*" dynamic between the physicalness of the body and the non-physicality or immateriality that is mind-consciousness?"; and, "does one *lead* the other?"). And, it's for this 'concreteness' (i.e., thing-ness) – that our body is 'what' initially *affords us*, and, just as much and at the same time, *gives away to others*, our *appearance* in-the-world (BN, pg. 479) - which gets us the rest of the way toward dealing with Sartre's 'Concrete Relations with the Other' (BN, pg. 479), wherein we come upon his novel notion of 'The Look' (cf. BN, pg. 347-366 for Sartre's description). In short, 'The Look' is Sartre's own way of dealing with the philosophical problem of 'how can I *know* other consciousnesses *truly* exist 'outside' of merely my own?'. More precisely, it is meant to be the *means* through which we dis-cover - or, uncover; reveal; disclose; *wander in wonder* through our own darkened, shadowed, elusive, contoured cave of unknowingness, hoping 'to'-arrive at its clearing to then stand in the Light of knowingness, thereupon reaching out through our newfound understanding to-

be-*with* the world which *meets* us (*cf. BT, §36. Curiosity, pg. 215 – "the care for seeing is essential to man's Being"*) - *Others as subjects*, with their own subjectivity, as opposed to mere objects (i.e., bodies absent any mind), in the world.

Now, and in order to provide context for those who may be unfamiliar with how Sartre's philosophical career unfolded after *Being and Nothingness*, it's without a doubt that, upon its publication in 1943, 'The Look' has long since achieved widespread attention in philosophy and social theory. But, and quite ironically, as Thomas Flynn notes in *Sartre: A Philosophical Biography* (hereon denoted as SPB), "This [e.g., 'Concrete Relations with the Other'] is the portion of BN with which Sartre was least pleased" (SPB, pg. 212). The reason for this is found in the fact that, as Thomas Anderson notes in *Sartre's Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity* (hereon denoted at STE), "in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre dwells on the negative side of human relationships. In great detail he describes a number of human interactions and shows that in every case, even that of love, they involve attempts at domination and subjugation of one party by another" (STE, pg. 27), where 'The Look' ultimately serves as the vehicle of such attempts. What's more, as Anderson continues, "Besides their negative character, the other thing that is striking about Sartre's treatment of human relations in *Being and Nothingness* is how abstract it is. Not only does he continually refers to such relations as relations between consciousnesses or for-itselfs, rather than between human beings; these relations occur almost exclusively on a psychological plane" (STE, pg. 30). And to this, as Betty Cannon notes in her 1999 article in *The Humanistic Psychologist* (Vol. 27, No. 1, pg. 23-50) entitled 'Sartre and Existential Psychoanalysis' (hereon denoted as SEP), Sartre acknowledged in an interview saying "my early work was a rationalist philosophy of consciousness...[BN] is a monument of rationality. But in the end it becomes an irrationalism..." (SEP, pg. 41-42; *cf. IP, pg. 385 – "as we have seen, Being and Nothingness is more accurately understood as offering a purely speculative metaphysics of a very traditional kind, the very kind repudiated by Husserl, Heidegger, and the phenomenological tradition generally"*). What we find as a result, as Thomas Anderson further notes in his article 'Sartre's Second or Dialectical Ethics' (in ed. S. Churchill and J. Reynolds, *Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts*), is "Sartre moved very quickly beyond this negative position...In [his] *Notebooks*, which were written in the late 1940s, he stresses the importance of intersubjective relations of 'authentic' love, friendship and generosity and makes it clear that the conflictual relations presented in *Being and Nothingness* were never meant to be taken as the only possible human relationships" (KC, pg. 202-203; *cf. SPB, §The Mediating Third, pg. 342*). Thus said, in the few years between 1943 and the late 1940's, we find Sartre's whole philosophical attitude flip (and, more will be said as to why in a bit). This all is to say that, as we detail the notion of 'The Look', it should *not* be taken seriously. The only true value it adds is to challenge our thinking. 'The Look', therefore, simply lends us another way by which the world *could* be seen, leaving it, then, to ourself to determine how the world *ought* be seen. And so, in an effort to gain a better sense of how we *ought* construe Others and the world we live in, it's important we, first, position

Sartre's 'The Look' against what Heidegger says as to how we arrive at "*that!*"-*place* 'where' we understand the Other's existence.

So, briefly re-turning our attention back to Heidegger, we recall "The Being of Dasein is care" (BT, pg. 465), where care is the primordial (i.e., original) ontological structural whole (i.e., the relational nature/basis/ground) of Dasein's existence. In his formal definition of 'Care', Heidegger says "the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)...Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as *concern*, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as *solicitude*. Being-alongside something is concern, because it is defined as a way of Being-in by its basic structure – care" (BT, pg. 237). Now, what this all means is 1) human existence *already is* (*cf. BT, pg. 120 – "Dasein as such already is"*); 2) as *already*, humans are already *with*, (in), and encounter (or, engage) a world; 3) as already engaging *with* a world, each, therefore, already stands *in* relation with every Other who shares in being-*with*(in)-the-world; and 4) the nature of this relation shows itself originally through our concernful encounter with Others and the 'world'. Now, this said, and in an attempt to uncover what's meant by 'concernful encounter', we move ahead to find Heidegger saying "Dasein, in so far as it *is*, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this *submission* belongs essentially to its Being" (BT, pg. 120-121). Now, since having somewhat addressed the "...already to a world which it encounters" component – viz., the 'encounter' piece of 'concernful encounter' – through our prior discussion of thrownness and facticity, what we are still in search of is what's meant by 'concernful'. And so, seeing as the most appropriate way by which to open-up a clearing for ourself to then wander about in wonder is through asking a question, what we shall ask ourself is: "what does Heidegger mean by 'has always submitted itself'?". Now, as it should be noted, there are few ways in which we can *move about in our thinking*, so that we may hopefully uncover an answer to our question. The easiest, perhaps, is to draw forth something we've already mentioned, but likely forgotten, which, once returned to the fore our mind, will serve as light to guide us in our wandering. Thus, what we should keep in mind is the notion of 'actively letting', which, as we've discussed, Sartre connotes through the terms 'Nothingness' and 'gratuitous' – viz., the transitive nature of the (of) of consciousness, where the world 'there' *bears, impresses, appears* upon us 'here'. Consequently, what we're able to discern, now, with this bit of light which has brought with it fore-sight, is 'letting' has a significant role in understanding what's meant by 'concernful' and, to a much greater extent, the Being of Dasein. What we also discover is Sartre's 'gratuitous' closely resembles Heidegger's 'submission', therein lending the impression that 'submission' might embody more the character of 'giving way' – i.e., of 'letting' – than 'servitude' (or, any other similar notion which involves some underlying hierarchy; cf. Nicolas Berdyaev, *Slavery and Freedom*, pg. 65-66).

"So does Heidegger say anything about 'letting'?", we ask. Absolutely! And, in fact, he speaks about the significance of 'letting' in a number of places. Beginning with his essay entitled 'On the Essence of Truth' (hereon denoted as OET) he says "To let be - that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are - means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself" (OET, pg. 6). "Freedom...lets beings be the beings they are" (OET, pg. 6), he continues. Though, with this said, we're still in search of how such applies to Dasein as Being-in-the-world and alongside Others. To this, we make headway in turning next to his essay 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' (trans. by A. Hofstadter), in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (hereon denoted as PLT), wherein we discover "The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is *Buan*, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word *bauen*, which says that man *is* insofar as he *dwells*, this word *bauen* however *also* means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for..." (PLT, pg. 145). Put simply, "human being consists in dwelling" (PLT, pg. 147), where "the basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve" (PLT, pg. 148). "But, what does it mean to-spare and to-preserve?", we ask. Sparing, Heidegger says, "consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something *positive* and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we 'free' it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace" (PLT, pg. 147), where "preserving and nurturing is not making anything" (PLT, pg. 145). Human dwelling, then, in the real sense (PLT, pg. 146), means "to be at peace, to be brought to peace, and to remain in peace" (PLT, pg. 147), wherein we make Nothing (e.g., not anything) stand in the way between ourself and that which we *meet*, thereby letting ourself engage completely with "*that!*" "open region [i.e., *meeting*-'place'] and its openness into which every being comes to stand". Grant Farred, in fact, in his 2017 article in the *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy* (Vol. 25, No. 1, pg. 10-26) entitled 'Letting-Be: Dwelling, Peace, and Violence in Ngugi wa Thiong'o's *Petals of Blood*' (hereon denoted as LB), perfectly puts what we've been discussing by saying "To let-be is a mode of being in which everything, every aspect of life, is manifestly present. To let-be presupposes a radical openness...to the world - so that dwelling is best recognized as an intense understanding of how to be in the world, of what it means to be. In its radical openness, to let-be admits of everything in the world" (LB, pg. 11). And so, preserving what we've thus far opened-up, we see the clearing ahead, "off and away!" in the distance, just shy of our reach. And, to reach 'there' we re-*turn* to what Heidegger remarks in *Being and Time*, where "letting something 'be' does not mean that we must first bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered...and that we must thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered. This 'a priori' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything..." (BT, pg. 117). Now, standing at the clearing, we finally see '*letting* something *be*' is what's meant by 'concernful', 'where'(in) –

i.e., *in-"that!"-place* - we dwell peace-fully, letting ourself engage with, thereby submitting to, our openness which *is* (Be)ing. This all, hopefully, serves to broaden and deepen our understanding of what Heidegger means when he says "The Being of Dasein is care" (BT, pg. 465), and that "Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentially concern" (BT, pg. 84).

But, if, for some reason, we're still a bit lost in our understanding, therein unable to find our way away, let's summarize what's been explored between our introducing Sartre's 'The Look' to standing 'here' at the clearing which is Being (cf. *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, §Letter on Humanism (hereon denoted at MH-LH), pg. 240 – "Being [is] essentially broader than all beings, because it is the clearing itself"). What all we've discussed is 'letting' represents the-way-we-*are* and are-*with* "that!" which is *beyond* ourself but, nonetheless, shares in being-in-the-world. 'Care' stands for the openness to Being peacefully in-"that!"-place, 'where'(in) we exercise the freeness which *is* our Being to make Nothing stand in the way between: 1) ourself and our own possibilities which we, *in the same movement*, pro-ject 'to-be' ahead-of-ourself, 'there'(in) stretching ourself "along in such a way that [our] own Being is constituted in advance" (BT, pg. 426); and 2) the world which "we are free to-meet" 'there', 'here'(in) letting such fall upon us with absolute ease. All in all, then, letting is caring to-let; meeting, caring to-meet; seeing, caring to-see; loving, caring to-love; and, Being, caring to-Be. And, all this *is* (in) "that!" place we *are*, dwelling peacefully, 'where'(in) need, *through* "that!" same movement of making Nothing, is made to be at an impossible distance – completely out of reach – and is, therefore, no-where near. As so, Care has lost any need. Since need is needy – that is, needing to-have; needing to-keep; needing to-feel; needing to-think; needing to-be - it all but suffocates Care, immediately collapsing its openness (*cf. Simone de Beauvoir, Letters to Sartre, pg. 324 – "my love, I don't know if you can feel the need that I have for you. I've borne it with all the patience I could muster, but now that I'm relaxed...it utterly suffocates me"*). As suffocating, need dis-stances any love of letting (be)*ing* Be free. And so, where Care of Being lost (**this has two meanings – the ulterior and primary: of never keeping to one 'place', as we are continually venturing "off and away!"; cf. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 9 – "Wherever such a venture takes place, there is philosophy"*), Human Being reduces to no more than the objects of human needs - e.g., a need for recognition and identity; a need for technology; a need for money; a need for freedom. Being, then, is lost *behind* impersonal objects, awaiting to be *dis-covered* through the clearing away of need to thereby stand in the Light of Life. It's only when we lose any need to-have being that we finally first arrive *at being*, where *love is letting ourself step-in to meet and lean into Being* (*cf. E. Fromm, To Have or To Be?, pg. 75; cf. E. Fromm, The Art of Loving; cf. BT, § Conscience as the call of care, pg. 319*). Finally, and to all this, Heidegger reminds us "the essence of man consists in his being more than merely human...[as] Man is the shepherd of Being" (MH-LH, pg. 245).

Now that we've discussed Heidegger's position regarding the existence and experience of Others who share in being-in-the-world, we're ready to proceed with opening-up and discussing the threefold structure of Sartre's 'The Look'. The best way I see to do so is to, first, re-imagine ourself back at that park where we first began, sitting on the bench, gazing out upon the water, listening to the score of sounds which surround and seeing the Life scurrying about before our eyes. Here, in this place, I see squirrels leaping from branch to branch; I see the leaves steadily descending, twirling, stumbling into each other, almost as if they were playing like dancing children; and, far off in the distance from me, at the park's entrance, I see a man walking, with his head down and phone in hand. At first glance, this man appears to me much in the way as *everything else which surrounds me* in this park does – he, *for me*, is merely an Other-object; lost in the 'there' of it all; blended, washed into the background. With the wind whistling, leaves rustling, and birds chirping, his footsteps are soft and distant - near mute - against all that 'there' which meets me. What's more, having since returned my gaze to fall back up the water's glimmer, I've quite forgotten even what color shirt he was wearing. Though, and all the while curiously reminiscing about how fast he slipped from my concernless attention, I soon notice my ear being drawn to the heightening sound of his nearing footsteps. He's becoming a larger presence. And so, a bit bothered by his sudden intrusion into my being in this park, where this park is 'here' *for me*, I re-turn to *looking-at* him – albeit begrudgingly. "Pathetic", I think myself. "He's still on his phone", I even murmur. I soon feel myself largely irritated at the fact that, not only has he disrupted my world, as if stealing from me my infatuation with the Life in this park, but he, too, seems oblivious to the beauty which fills this place, contributing only his heavy-healed clonking. In this unappeased mood, my looking at him intensifies, drawing in to focus upon each detail of his being. And so, like binoculars displacing the background upon zooming in on an object, this park and all its life and beauty soon collapses, falling from my field of view, to where all I now see is this man walking towards me. Concentrating on his movement, I first notice his pompous strut, watching his baggy pantlegs whip to-and-fro. Subtly shifting my look, I notice his brown briefcase, furnished with gold-plated edges and papers disorderly seeping out the top. Making my way past his silver cufflinks and yellow and blue striped tie, I see his clean-shaven face and square black-framed glasses. With the full weight of my look bearing upon him, almost as if aiming to discern the very color and life behind his eyes, he looks up from his phone and catches me staring intently at him. "Ah, shit", I think startlingly. "He sees me!". What's more, in this split second of his look *leaping!* out at me, with him standing out against the background as a subject, I feel part of my being immediately rush out from within, seeping through its hole, like air abruptly escaping a balloon. All my insecurities rush to the surface, as now I realize there is a new dimension of me I cannot control anymore than he can of what I made and attributed to him. My world sliced in half by his look, I learn, much in the same way this man was an object-for-me turned into a subject-looking-out, I, too, can just as easily, and without any forewarning, be transformed from a subject-looking-out into such a pathetic, pompous object-

looked-at. And, knowing I exist in a world filled to the brim with being, I realize, too, that there is no place I can turn 'to' for shelter 'from' piercing, tearing, dis-placing looks.

Now that we have mental picture to work from, let's proceed with tying together what we've now just disclosed with how Sartre describes 'The Look'. So, starting from the beginning, we recall the Other *appeared*, at first glance, as merely another object (i.e., an other-object) lost (in)ward (i.e., interior) (of) the 'there' of it all, thus failing to stand (out) as anything noticeable 'to' us 'here' as a subject (*cf. HOP, pg. 350 – "all differentiating within being is due to consciousness, which makes something to appear by differentiating it from its background"*). Now, without going any further, right off the bat, we notice how the structure of the park tracks with how Sartre first set up his philosophy in BN, wherein he "sharply divided all reality into just two realms. This culminated in his distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself" (KC, pg. 196; *cf. EP-PE, pg. 168 – "the two realms are utterly distinct"*; *cf. IP, pg. 357 – "Sartre constantly claims that there is no relation possible between in-itself and for-itself – these two regions do not communicate*; *cf. BN, pg.137 – "nihilation, as the nihilation of being, represents the original connection between the for-itself's being and the in-itself's being…the origin of transcendence, conceived as the for-itself's original connection with the in-itself, is precisely nihilation"*; *cf. BN, pg. 183 – "the for-itself's being is born to itself in an original connection with being…[where] this internal connection is negative"*). This park (i.e., world), therefore, has embedded in it *already* (i.e., a priori) a sharp bifurcation, leading there to be two modes of being-(in) – one (in) which being is 'subject' and the second (in) which being is 'object'. What this means, then, is this park is already torn apart, existing as *unreconciled* (much in the same way, in fact, as in-itself and for-itself). And, how all such is represented is through a subject-object structure. Now, if we were to ask why we at all need to begin our thinking about ourself and others who share in being-(in) this park with 'separateness', Sartre would draw our attention to what he holds is a 'fundamental presupposition'. Specifically saying, "at the origin of the problem of the Other's existence there is a fundamental presupposition: that the Other is indeed the *other*, which is to say the me that *is not* me; here, therefore, we are apprehending a negation as a constitutive structure of Other-being…The Other is the one who is not me, and who I am not. This *not* indicates a nothingness as a *given* element of separation between the Other and myself. Between the Other and myself, *there* is a nothingness of separation. The origin of this nothingness derives neither from me, nor from the Other, nor from a reciprocal relation between the Other and myself; rather, on the contrary, it is in its origin the foundation of any relation between the Other and myself" (BN, pg. 319). O.k. So, let's tackle what Sartre says piece-by-piece. First, what Sartre means by "the Other is indeed the *other*" is simply that 'there' is a being which our consciousness *is not*, which feeds directly into the first part of his formal definition of consciousness, where "the for-itself is defined…as being what it is not and not being what it is" (BN, pg. 27). Second, we discover what ultimately partitions our world from the world of the Other is an 'original nothingness', which derives not from us or our

other. But, now, we run up against a contradiction, as earlier we noticed Sartre say "man is the being through whom nothingness comes into the world" (BN, pg. 60). The reason this is so critical to note is because either 1) man, in fact, does not *wholly* bring nothingness into the world - where, if this is the case, Sartre's whole philosophical set-up stands in question - or, and I don't know which alternative is more significant, 2) "man *is* the being through whom nothingness comes into the world", in which case either we bring this nothingness to the world or the Other brings nothingness into the world. "But, if the Other is responsible for bringing this nothingness into the world, then is not this Other a consciousness as well?", we ask. "And, if that is the case, then wouldn't there be only a subject-subject relation between ourself and the Other?", we continue to think to ourself. Unfortunately, as we're already noticing, there are a lot of questions which can be raised about Sartre's 'fundamental presupposition' and its implications for what he details later in BN.

Nonetheless, let's take another step forward in our analysis of the situation of being-in-the-park. The second matter we recall was our being a *subject*-in-the-park. And, as so, we were the *center* of all Life (i.e., every-other-thing was *organized around us*); and so, it *appeared* as though the 'there' of it all stood 'there' *for me* – otherwise, this park seemed *mine*. Underneath such an image, what's conferred upon ourself - *through* ourself - is the notion that we sit on top of the world, enthroned as its only conscious being. Now, without proceeding further, we already notice how neurotic and fanatical such an image of the world is (*WD, pg. 283 - "what I've always passionately desired - and what I still desire, although by now there's no hope of it - is to be at the centre of a beautiful event. An event: that's to say, a temporal flow that happened to me - that wasn't in front of me, like a picture or piece of music, my life and in my life, with my time. An event in which I was the main actor..."*). Surely no human being is truly so *ignorant* to never once realize that other beings in the world are conscious, nor are they likely so *blinded* by their own idealized image of themself that they see nothing else as possible but their only being conscious. "But, then, why did Sartre position his philosophy upon an extreme?", we ask. To this, Sartre says, in *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (hereon denoted as BEM), "Today I think that philosophy is dramatic in nature...If literature is not everything, it is worth nothing" (BEM, pg. 11-14). And, dramatic he was, where we are left with having to locate the truth in his *Words* (*cf. pg. 157 – "for about ten years I have been a man who is waking up, cured of a long, bitter-sweet madness...you can get rid of a neurosis but you are never cured of yourself"; cf. pg. 69-71*). Nonetheless, proceeding from such an extreme position of being the center *of all Life* (*cf. Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (NHG), Chapter 6 – Alienation of Self, pg. 155 – "the real self...is the alive, unique, personal center of ourselves"; cf. Karen Horney, Our Inner Conflicts (OIC), Chapter 7 - Externalization*) – though, such is not to say the *creator* of all Life (which, again, is shown by the first part of Sartre's definition of consciousness; cf. BN, pg. 23) – one can quite easy imagine what accompanies this *mineness* is the *feeling* of being fully free, as we feel ourself somehow

protected in our *own* universe (BN, pg. 350). And, it's important to note that feelings (or, attitudes) play a defining role in our concrete relations with others. Sartre says, in fact, "the origin of my concrete relations with the Other [is] they are governed entirely by the attitudes that I take up…" (BN, pg. 481). Therefore, tying together Sartre's subject-object structure with the concomitant quality of being (i.e., freeness), we get the impression that being-*subject* means being-*free* and being-*object* means being-*not-free*. Thus, and in summation, it is *appearing* to be the *center* of Life which gives us the idea that the world is in some way *mine* which, then, ignites within us the feeling of freedom. Now, as we're about to discuss, this feeling of freedom (or, peace, bliss, tranquility) is torn away from us *through* the Other's Look – or, at least, supposedly *appears* that way.

Having up to this point articulated some of the suppositions of Sartre's 'The Look', we now stand at a juncture where we can address more fully such's threefold structure. So, beginning from the moment immediately prior to the Other's look grasping me, holding me as its object, we are in this park as a *subject* who feels completely free – and, for that matter, on top of the world. But, all this suddenly changes once the Other looks up from his phone to see me sitting 'here' on this bench in-the-park. In that split second, I experience a "sudden jolt that shakes me when I grasp the Other's look…" (BN, pg. 362). With this, and without going any further, we have the first moment of our threefold structure: an *original meeting* – or, what Sartre identifies as 'a jolt' (which gives the impression of some 'awakening' or 'opening-up'). In this fleeting moment, before our consciousness *turns* away 'from' the world 'to' *find itself* (as) some-*thing seen* (recall our discussion on Sartre's concept of 'self' and Bad Faith), it stands, in such momentary openness, *on common ground* as an open-relation with that which it *meets*. And, to this, Robert Wood, in *Martin Buber's Ontology: An Analysis of I and Thou* (hereon denoted as MBO), keenly remarks "as we *reflect*…we see ourselves 'here', facing objects 'there'…What *escapes* such acts of attentiveness is presence: *the original bond between* subject and objects. Presence is the mutual givenness of subject and object, the primary togetherness which antedate their *separation through reflection*" (MBO, pg. 55-56; **italics added*; ID, pg. 33 – "mutually appropriated"; *cf. D. Binseel, On The Theory of the Aggregate Image, §A Proof of Inter-dependence (or, to Together Exist)*). In clarifying what's entailed in this process of separating 'from' meeting 'to' isolation, Wood continues with saying "through reflection we come to mediate our relation with the Other by *linking* it to similar things in the past or by *fitting* it into our future projects…" (MBO, pg. 54; **italics added*). And, to be sure, this act of 'mediation' often takes the form of anticipation or calculation (*cf. Harvey Jackson, Contemplative Thinking: The Approach of Jiddu Krishnamurti & Martin Heidegger, pg. 2 – "Heidegger describes the most dangerous quality of our secular age as the obsession with the surface of thinking that distracts us from deep thinking. Heidegger terms this surface calculative thinking, not disparaging its ability to organize our world but warning against its power to absorb completely our energy and attention. Calculative thinking is not merely a euphemism for the approach of empirical science but characterizes any thinking process that plans to dominate and manipulate situations"*). It's (in) such a

movement of mediation (or, reconciliation) – that is, of taking-up a separate effort to give any *happening*-experience significance (or, meaning) by relating such 'to', or making it figure against, something other - that we often pro-ject (or, conceptually overlay) a pseudo-architecture (i.e., schemata; *cf. Hannah Arendt, Thinking Without a Banister, pg. 390 – "without a 'schema' one can never recognize anything"*) unto an 'original' experience. It's for all this, which happens instantaneously, which refers us to one of the two predominant questions philosophy asks, which is "what *is* reality?" (Metaphysics) – the other being, "how can I *know* reality?" (Epistemology). This aside, and turning back to what Wood says with respect to how our experience of Others and reality becomes objectified, we find him saying "anticipation *reduces* the Other to an object of use" (MBO, pg. 54; **italics added*), and so "the Other is considered in terms of schemata" (MBO, pg. 54). "All this is objectification", he concludes, while insisting "real meeting involves a transcendence of all such subjective mediation to arrive at authentic immediacy" (MBO, pg. 54). Now, the only matter here left to note is that Sartre's 'jolt' is an 'original' meeting per his 'fundamental presupposition' – specifically, that the nothingness which is situated "*between the Other and myself*" is "in its *origin* the foundation of any relation between the Other and myself". And, since *Nothing originally stands in the way*, each is free to meet. With all this said, we now move ahead with detailing the second and third moments of 'The Look'. And, to open-up the way ahead for us wander, we ask, "how do things unfold once the boundary between me and the Other is discovered through my grasping of the Other's look?".

To our question, Sartre first says "the Other's look, to the extent that I grasp it, comes to give my time a new dimension" (BN, pg. 365; *cf. D. Binseel, On The Theory of the Aggregate Image, §The Model*). Upon this 'jolt' of meeting, "The Other's look confers spatiality on me" (BN, pg. 364), wherein, all-of-a-sudden, there is a part of me which is *for* the Other. And, it is this *being-for* which suddenly dis-places, abruptly dislodges, separates me 'from' being-'here' – and, 'here' (as) subject - 'to' being-'there' – *an object for the Other* which stands against the 'there' of it all, lost in the background. Thus, to Sartre, the Other's looking-at me tosses me over an impossible distance of nothing. To say all this in a different way, what Sartre means by "confers spatiality on me" is, where *before* meeting the Other's look when all we were was a 'here' facing the world 'there' (i.e., relations were, in a sense, binary), immediately *following* the jolt, we *realize* (which is the second moment of our threefold structure of 'The Look') that every-*thing* in this park, to include ourself, has been *reorganized* to, *in turn*, be centered around, now, the Other-*subject* – thus meaning, whichever of us is subject, that is where the world faces and falls upon, wherein every-thing else, then, is all but lost in the fall. And so, what we discover, *through our reflection* (i.e., our *turning*-in-'to' ourself 'here', thereupon creating our 'self' 'there', and so, all the while, turning-*away*-'from' the 'here', the presence, of it all; **the bad faith entailing making our 'original'-here fall into a pseudo-'there'*), is my being-'here', through the look of the Other (cf. *OIC, §Chapter 7 – Externalization, pg. 115 – "projection means the shifting of blame and responsibility to someone else"*), has been

made to fit "alongside the world's objects" (BN, pg. 362), all of which are 'there' in the eyes of the Other. Thus, it's in this moment of reorganization that our being-subject (and so, being-free) *turns, slipping, falling into* being-object (and so, being-not-free). To this, Betty Cannon, in *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory* (hereon denoted as SAP), says "The Other's Look is a dethronement - an *original fall* which degrades me as a...subject and makes me a mere object in the Other's world" (SAP, pg. 83; *italics added*). But, to Cannon's point, it's only we who degrade ourself – and, that's all it ever can be. And so, re-iterating our main point differently, it's our reflection which creates us (as) a thing (i.e., object) (almost like a psychological mirror) – and, surely, not a thing only for ourself; but, one which is also *for the other*, which serves as the evidence for ourself to blame others for acts we perpetrate (i.e., flight from responsibility, which is the essence of bad faith). Now, trailing a bit further along this line of argument, and though I've since just illuded to an underlying fallacy inherent in Sartre's 'The Look' (i.e., a neurotic trend), we should briefly return to the language we used in our above narrative, focusing on the moment immediately following our being 'startled' by meeting the Other's look. Doing so, we recall our saying "He sees me!" – this being the whole of our reflection (i.e., we realize we are *seen*). Now, though these words few, they speak a great deal about what we've just discussed in terms of our making ourself into an object through reflection. In this momentarily reflection, we notice ourself as the object of the other's look; meaning, we've already done some work in our mind to equate ourself with being an object, therein already conferring upon ourself objecthood. Implicit in all of this is the understanding that we are *what's* looked-at. It's here, in fact, we find Sartre say "to grasp a look is...to become conscious of being-looked-at" (BN, pg. 355). "If someone looks at me, then, I am conscious of being an object" (BN, pg. 370), he continues. And, remembering we said earlier feelings (or, attitudes) play a defining role in our concrete relations with others, we should proceed to ask ourself, "what feeling does this being an object produce?". To this, Sartre says, "I feel myself to be over *there*, for the Other.." (BN, pg. 362), almost as if over 'there', in the eyes of the Other, were a "phantom-outline of my being" (BN, pg. 362). And, it's this outline which "is given to me as a burden that I carry, without ever being able to turn back toward it in order to know it, without even being able to sense its weight...And yet it really is a question of *my* being, and not my being's image. It is a question of my being as it is inscribed in and through the Other's freedom. It is as though I had a dimension of being from which I was separated by a radical nothingness, and this nothingness is the Other's freedom..." (BN, pg. 359). And so, my "world flows away...and I flow away out of myself; the Other's look makes me be, beyond my being in the world, in the midst of a world that is this one and, at the same time, beyond this world" (BN, pg. 358). As a result, "suddenly I see a subtle alienation of all my possibilities" (BN, pg. 362). "In this way, being seen constitutes me as a defenseless being for a freedom that is not my freedom. It is in this sense that we may regard ourselves as 'slaves', insofar as we appear to the Other" (BN, pg. 365). Thus, "if there is an other, however or whoever he may be, and whatever relations he has with me, and even if he does

not act on me in any way other than through the pure arising of his being, I have an outside, and I have a *nature*. My original fall is the Other's existence, and shame - like pride - is my apprehension of myself as a nature, even though this nature itself escapes me and is unknowable as such. Strictly speaking, I do not feel myself losing my freedom, in order to become a thing; instead, my freedom is over there, outside the freedom that I live, like a given attribute of this being that I am for the other. I apprehend the other's look at the very center of my act, as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities" (BN, pg. 360). In brief, "each look makes us concretely experience...that we exist for all living men" (BN, pg. 382).

   O.k., now that I'm sure you can see how this all is quite rhetorical (devoid of any care or hope, which, to be sure, is a neurotic trait; *cf. OIC, pg. 18 – "He finally becomes hopeless and may try to find a kind of restitution in sadistic pursuits, which in turn have the effect of increasing his hopelessness and creating new conflicts"*), let's take a moment to look through some of these contradictions and the implications of some of Sartre's remarks. First, Sartre says what stands at issue in the other's look is "my *being*, and not my being's image", only to then go on and say "we may regard ourselves as 'slaves', insofar as we *appear* to the Other". Though, he also talks of a "phantom-outline of my being", "an outside", and "a nature", which all speak more of our being's *appearance* in-the-world (i.e., the body) than being itself. So, which is it? Does the Other, at any point in their looking at me, truly acquire and then "have" (or, possess) my *being* – or, is it that they come to constitute an *image* of my being, based on how I *appear* to them, which, then, has for it its own nature (or, character, way about itself)? No doubt, it's not the former – reality is likely the latter. And, as so, Sartre, then, is still correct in pointing out that the image the Other makes of me is beyond my control and ability to fully know. But, does that mean my possibilities all-of-a-sudden wash away? Absolutely not. In fact, if that truly were the case, then the whole notion of Sartre's for-itself would collapse, since a loss of the for-itself's possibilities would imply a loss of transcendence, which would then imply a for-itself which is not at all free (*cf. BN, §The For-Itself and the Being of Possibles, pg. 150 – "freedom and the for-itself's being are just one and the same"*), which would entirely destroy his ultimate existentialist claim "existence precedes essence". Nonetheless, we're already beginning to see exactly how far Sartre went to distance himself from Heidegger, for some reason believing "The essence of relations between consciousnesses is not *Mitsein*; it is conflict" (BN, pg. 564). "But, how does such conflict manifest in our relations with Other's?", we ask. "How do we respond to an Other who tosses us over an impossible distance, making us to figure against a phantom-outline of ourself over *there*, wherein we *feel* ourself losing control of our possibilities?", we continue. What a great question! And, it's this question, in fact, which leads us into what Sartre posits as the two predominant (and, *only*) attitudes we take-up in our relation towards (i.e., not-*with*) the Other.

So, remembering ourself to be at the moment where our world was suddenly tossed from being-'here' to being-'there' (passing from subject to object; and, likewise, the Other from object to subject), Sartre reminds us of the supposition that "to *perceive* is to be looking, and to *grasp* a look is...to become conscious of being-looked-at" (BN, pg. 355; *italics added*), where "we cannot perceive the world and apprehend at the same time a look that is directed at me" (BN, pg. 355). Meaning, we can only ever occupy one stance at a time – either we are 'here' as a subject looking or 'there' as an object looked-at. It's this, in fact, which illustrates "his denial that people can enter into any relationships other than subject to object, and vice versa" (STE, pg. 32). Instead, Sartre holds "that to apprehend the Other as both a free subject and an object is an 'impossible ideal'..." (STE, pg. 32), saying himself "we can never concretely take up a position of equality, i.e., a position in which the recognition of the Other's freedom [as subject] might lead to the Other's recognition of our freedom" (BN, pg. 538). Therefore, when the we *realize* the Other's looking-at us as an object-in-the-world, wherein we *feel* our freedom slip away, our natural response to feeling such a way is to, understandably, *fight* back against what we feel is our freedom escaping through some "hole in being" (BN, pg. 129; cf. WD, pg. 214) to regain control over our possibilities. And, the manner by which we fight (or, close ourself off to prevent our freedom escaping) is, according to Sartre, to make the Other into an object *again* (remember, before we grapsed the Other's look, the Other *was* an object). Only then, Sartre believes, can we expect to regain the freedom we never lost in the first instance (again, looking back to the implication we noted above, if we truly did lose any freedom over our possibilities at all, we would no longer exist as a for-itself - at least, as defined by Sartre). And so, supposition in one hand and emotional turmoil in the other, Sartre proceeds with saying "the two basic attitudes that I take up in relation to the Other [are]: transcending the Other's transcendence or, on the contrary, swallowing up this transcendence within me without taking away its character of transcendence" (BN, pg. 481-482; cf. STE, pg. 32-33). What this means is our only two options in relating to the Other are 1) make the Other into an object, and in so doing take away from him his freedom as a subject (i.e., Sadism); or, 2) roll over and let the Other do such to us (i.e., Masochism). Now, as we can easily see, not only is this a rather miserable outlook on human relations – and, one which is grossly neurotic and whose implications not in the least bit thought out (which is puzzling considering the importance Sartre places on human essence being defined by how we harness our freedom to choose who we are to be) - but Sartre paints a world which leaves no room for ethics – i.e., how we ought responsibly conduct ourself and be-*with* Others. In this "realist" world he's concocted, genuine human connection is impossible – lost in the elsewhere which is nothing (BN, pg. 128 – "nothingness is always an elsewhere"); and, as so, it's no where near.

Nonetheless, with having since opened-up Sartre's subject-object structure and the three moments of 'The Look', what we must now ask ourselves is: is 'The Look' dialectical? To this, I would say yes; however, saying so is a bit

of a trap, as there are two radically different versions of 'dialectic'. One is Kantian and the other Hegelian. The Kantian dialectic retains unreconciled dualisms or oppositions (e.g., phenomena and noumena, appearance and reality, sensibility and understanding), whereas the Hegelian dialectic aims to do away with the Kantian dualism through synthesizing 'thesis' (e.g., positive) with 'anti-thesis' (i.e., negation). In more advanced terms, the synthesis represents the negation of the negation toward a new positive. Thus, taking together Sartre's 'for-itself' and 'The Look', what we find is the former figures more along the lines of the Hegelian dialectic (e.g., transcended-transcending) and the latter with the Kantian dialectic (e.g., subject-object structure). Seeing this is the case, we're forced to wonder why Sartre included both in his philosophical system. Even more confusing is why Sartre at all – intentionally or otherwise – leverages the Kantian dialectic, given that he opens up *Being and Nothingness* (literally the first sentence of the book) with saying "by reducing the existent to the series of appearances that manifest it, modern thought has made considerable progress" (BN, pg. 1). He continues, "we have certainly got rid of the dualism that opposes an existent's inside to its outside. The existent no longer has an 'outside', if by that we mean some skin at its surface that conceals the object's true nature from view" (BN, pg. 1). Now, in saying this, Sartre is taking a stand against Kant and his system of thought. But, yet, in our discussion of 'The Look', Sartre also held that we as individuals have an outside which is given to us by the Other – and, in fact, it's likely this 'outside', which we make to sit between ourself and Others, which hides from our view the fact that each Other is *not* merely some object-in-the-world but a free subject. Taking this bit a step further, I'd say it's precisely our creating such phantom-objects to figure between ourself 'here' and the world 'there' which infect the relations we have in our lives as we figure 'there' to be conflict. And, we don't realize this as we're too involved in our efforts to "figure out" who the Other is as opposed to letting the Other present themself as they are.

All this said differently, though Sartre admits a relation exists between ourself and the Other, saying, too, "a relation is a synthesis" (BN, pg. 33) - and so, trying to tell us he's following in Hegel's footsteps - the reason 'The Look' is a frustrated, confused dialectic is because Sartre has merged the Hegelian with the Kantian. Though subject and object stand as opposites underneath some synthetic framework, there is no *passing forth* (i.e., transcending, developing) 'to' any *new* relation – otherwise said, there is no leap toward higher ground. And, the reason transcending is such a significant aspect to include is because that's how Sartre defines the for-itself (i.e., consciousness) – "being what it is not and not being what it is" (BN, pg. 27). And, recalling Thomas Anderson's remark that Sartre "continually refers to such relations as relations between consciousnesses or for-itselfs, rather than between human beings…" (STE, pg. 30), transcendence should be a factor in any relation between ourself and the Other. To all this, Robert Cumming says, in *Starting Point: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Existence* (hereon denoted as SP-DE), though "reliance on contradiction is the most familiar trait of dialectic" (SP-DE, pg. 186), "a

dialectical method cannot function simply by separating, contradicting, and indulging in interplay...[it] must expand into a process of development" (SP-DE, pg. 255; *cf. SP-DE, pg. 257 – "the relation between levels involves interplay in the vertical dimension, a stage involves interconnected development, including interplay..."; cf. pg. 187; cf. pg. 216*). Now, in light of this, it's important to recognize, too, that Cumming affirms the movement of 'The Look' includes most other traits of dialectical method - referring specifically to the continual rotation between "looking-being to being-looked-at" (BN, pg. 535). Nonetheless, we find a number of other authors taking aim at Sartre's dialectical method in BN. Specifically, George Kline says, in his article 'The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Mark' (in ed. E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum, *Phenomenology and Existentialism* – hereon denoted as TER-PE), says "for Sartre self and other stand permanently hostile and unreconciled. His doctrine...is certainly not a doctrine of dialectical reconciliation. The result is a distorted Hegelianism: it retains the harsh action of contradiction without the soothing balm of synthesis" (TER-PE, pg. 126). Adding to this, Herbert Marcuse says "Sartre's concepts are, in spite of his dialectical style...decidedly undialectical" (E, pg. 324). Now, again, these authors are surely holding in their hand the Hegelian dialectic as the tool for drawing such assertions.

Nonetheless, I keep to the main argument that, since Sartre admits no other structure than subject-object/object-subject, there is no room for a leap toward any *higher level* of relation – and, therefore, *new* synthesis. Whereas consciousness is continually arriving anew 'to'-be (as) departing from itself, Sartre's 'Concrete Relations with Others' seems to be stuck at an impasse. And so, in light of all which we've covered in this impossibly short amount of space, I would argue 1) consciousness is inherently dialectical (*cf. E. Levinas, Time and the Other, pg. 39 – "I do believe in the existence of ontological problems and structures...It is a matter of affirming that 'being' is not an empty notion, that it has its own dialectic..."*); 2) Sartre loses the dialectical method in his system of interpersonal relations (or, inter-subjectivity); and, 3) where Sartre falls, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber are there to guide our way away toward *"that!"* place where we can thrive as human beings, meeting each other on common ground.

Forthcoming Lectures (as part of a series entitled 'On the Road to Alienation')

    Lecture II – Psychoanalysis and Dialectic: How We Wander in *"That!"* Place Which Is Consciousness.

    Lecture III - A Psychoanalytical Reconsideration of the Concept of Alienation in Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology (with reference to the psychopathology of self in social media)

    Lecture IV – Social Relations & Society: An Existentialist Critique

A Note to the Reader (And, Prelude to Lecture II):

I've wanted to write this for a while now – at least since first reading BN in April 2023. But, I decided to sit and think about all that I read for a year. In that time between first picking up Sartre and exploring existentialism and psychoanalysis, I found myself increasingly, not only disagreeing with Sartre's whole philosophical system but, wondering what truly compelled him to write such a laborious, redundant, and extreme work. I don't know if that answer exists – and, I surely don't have any inkling of such at this juncture of my studies. But, he seemed, to me, to repurpose most of what other philosophers said. Where he was "original", he was all but extreme. And, where he was neither of these, he was inconsistent. So, I'm a bit befuddled why he's perceived as admirably as he is in academic circles. Nonetheless, what I have also surmised thus far in my studies is that Heidegger absolutely deserves much more attention by philosophers and critical social theorists. Sartre may have first shown me the movement of thought; but, at the same time, he showed how not to think about humans and their relations with one another. It was Heidegger who showed me the bounds of Being.

But, to elaborate a bit more upon why Sartre's conception of human relations ought be dismissed, we begin with the idea Karen Horney identifies as 'The Neurotic Personality of Our Time'. In regards to this notion, we need to first turn our attention to what Irene McMullin, in Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations, in her discussion of Heidegger's view of human relations, says "Initially, Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so" (BT 129/121)" (pg. 34). Now, what Heidegger means by "Initially, Dasein is the they" (or, 'the crowd') is we begin our lives lost inward (of) society and its common, average, everyday understanding of life, where to be otherwise is to stand apart – at a dis-stance to the crowd - as an authentic individual. And, we reach our authentic selves only when we step outside of the sheer abundance, density, and juvenility of 'the crowd', distancing ourself from such's expectations and average beliefs. Though, to Heidegger, most people, throughout their life, never arrive to meet themselves - i.e., they forever live a life lost in das Man, being perpetually tossed at once in every which direction the current of the crowd, at any given moment, happens to sway.

This being torn between each and every direction at once is the confounding principle of neurosis. And, it is this neurosis that impacts "most people" which renders our society incapable (i.e., psychologically inept) of reconciling the difference which pervades - filling to the brim - this existence. Thus, where initially 'difference' is precisely that which fills life, affording such its vast beauty (i.e., that all is not the same), it's never seen as such. Rather, 'difference' falls victim to the lost man's neurosis, appearing as perpetrator of dis-harmony and dissemblance. And, seeing as this 'difference' towers over man, continually assailing him on all fronts, man becomes proportionally fearful (i.e., as heavy and intrusive such difference 'appears', as equally fearful he becomes in face of it).

Now, the predominant reason man sees difference as threatening stems from what he's already made to figure against such - an idealized image. This is where we find Karen Horney, in chapter 6 of her book Our Inner Conflicts, say included in every neurosis is an idealized image for which the individual has, not only gone to great lengths to inflate themself but, subsequently attached themself. And, it's through such an attachment to the unrealistic expectations which the idealized image necessitates that 'there' (i.e., the world and all its beauty) falls victim to being misconstrued, neglected to be seen for what it is. Instead, the 'there' is turned into an enemy, an intruder - one which attempts to steal from me my possibilities.

In fear of difference, man retaliates through destructive practices, aiming to diminish the stature of that which appears so grand and threatening (i.e., fear turns, boiling over into expressed anger, which is the opposite of acceptance / "letting"), and thereby keep intact his own ideal. However, this all but creates more conflict, as 'difference' man can never extinguish. And so, soon discovering his futile efforts to destroy the very aspect of life which affords vibrance and opportunity, he quickly seeks to identify a victim - one who can be blamed for what he cannot himself accomplish; and, cannot accomplish precisely because of his neurosis. Remember, it's his neurosis which is dis-abling. As disabling, neurosis inhibits, standing in the way of, progression. Otherwise said, the Nothing which was "originally" between ourself and the world 'there' turns, boiling over into something which, then, stands in the way of meeting what's beyond ourself. What this all means is man is the being through whom conflict comes into the world, dwelling in the between, therein infecting all relations.

Pairing all this with what we said earlier regarding Sartre's 'The Look', we discover a very similar trend. We find Sartre's idealized image is his being the center of 'the universe", and expecting (or, desiring) to remain as such. We discovered it was this expectation which sat at the center of his neurosis, therein disturbing any authentic meeting of the Other. Even in our narrative, we recall how we felt disturbed by the Other's growing presence. We saw how this disturbance grew, eventually towering over ourself. It was at this point of the Other looming so large in 'our own world' that Sartre described is possibilities escape through some hole in being to sit over there, beyond him, underneath some "phantom-outline". He proceeded to describe feeling alienated from himself, sliding into a "defenseless being" (and, to be sure, hopelessness is another trait of neurosis). And, it was this dis-placement of his possibilities which set the scene for conflict, where he accordingly responded with aiming to deny the Other's freedom through turning him into an object. All in all, we discovered Sartre's underlying neurosis set him "On The Road To Alienation", whose consequent environment was filled to the brim with conflict (i.e., destruction). Thus, it was his neurosis which was the cause of conflict in his 'concrete relations with the Other'. This is why I say it was his neurotic personality which failed him greatly in his early philosophic years. As so, he ought be dismissed in any discussion of human relations.

This all aside, I understand I may have lost much of my audience over the course of this lecture. There are two reasons which account for my frustrated writing style. First, I know all too well the lack of values our society promulgates - pursuit of absolute individuality and trivial material pleasures have utterly dislodged from the human the call to understand and, therefore, find reasons to exert effort toward reaching genuine human connections - those grounded upon respect, humility, and love. Processes have long since outstripped the worth of those for whom they were meant to serve; porn and podcasts are more revered than the combined thought of the deepest thinkers who have ever lived; and, politics has all but become the common man's party, where each a pathologically drunkin' activist with their own uncompromising agenda in hand (i.e., "if I can't get all that I want, then each will get nothing"). But, more importantly, society, seeing no reason in its wrong (which is not to say it cannot point-out 'wrong', but that it lacks the knowingness of 'how' best to properly rectify such), continues to demonstrate its lack of care to recenter its values. Thus, the situation each academic faces is one in which those who are in most dire need of learning what's there to be learned have already set themselves on a path which coddles their understanding, therein pre-emptively avoiding anything which might challenge their juvenile judgements, where the result is intellectuals preaching to themselves and to an imagined audience (i.e., one each wishes were there, but in reality is far from here). It's knowledge of this which leaves me quite reserved in my writing. I see no reason to speak to an audience who is not there to listen. The other aspect of my frustration derives from what I believe

is 'teaching'. To me, teaching is not telling – it's not simply telling you what to believe. Though, it must tell the way (or, at least, 'a-way' away from here in which to wander and, thereby, discover for yourself). It's this which leads teaching to be a quite difficult art to practice. I believe I've given in this lecture enough food for thought, including other readings to pursue; but, I will not so easily disclose that hidden, surpassed, silent realm which exists in all of you. You each are who you choose to be. I will not force any of you to be more than who you see fit to be for yourself and others. However, what I would like to leave you all with is this: why is it, when we learn, therein being awakened to something new, we say, "oh, I had no idea"? What is "that!" place where ideas take their stand in the light of our awakened awareness? And, how do we face these ideas? Once here, is that all they're ever to be? Or, can ideas be changed? But, then, how we do we engage ourself with our ideas? How do our ideas move as we move in "that!" place? Where do we put those ideas (or, parts of) we don't particularly like to confront? Is it that we simply turn away from facing certain ideas? Do we re-construct them? Or, do we displace them? But, if the latter, where do these ideas go once dis-placed? These are question I should hope to answer in the next lecture. It was only important I, in this one, disclose the structure of "that!" place.

<u>Further Readings:</u>

1. *Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relation*, by Irene McMullin
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/24960/pdf

2. *Sartre and Adorno: The Dialectics of Subjectivity*, by David Sherman
https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/163/monograph/book/5203

3. *I and Thou*, by Martin Buber
https://ia801301.us.archive.org/35/items/IAndThou_572/BuberMartin-i-and-thou_text.pdf

4. *Dialectical Logic*, by Evald Ilyenkov
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/dialectical-logic.pdf

5. *Dialectic*, by Mortimer Adler
https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46365/2015.46365.Dialectic_text.pdf

6. *Collected Philosophical Papers*, by Emmanuel Levinas
https://monoskop.org/images/0/08/Levinas_Emmanuel_Collected_Philosophical_Papers_1987.pdf

7. *Totality and Infinity*, by Emmanuel Levinas https://lust-for-life.org/Lust-For-Life/TotalityAndInfinity/TotalityAndInfinity.pdf

8. *The Levinas Reader*, by Emmanuel Levinas
https://monoskop.org/images/f/f9/The_Levinas_Reader_1989.pdf

9. *Critical Theory and Society: A Reader*, (ed.) by S. Bronner & D. Kellner
https://files.libcom.org/files/critical_theory_and_society_reader.pdf

10. *Critical Theory: Essential Readings*, (ed.) by D. Ingram & J. Ingram
https://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Critical-Theory-The-Essential-Readings.html

11. *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, by Max Horkheimer
https://monoskop.org/images/7/74/Horkheimer_Max_Critical_Theory_Selected_Essays_2002.pdf

12. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno
https://monoskop.org/images/2/27/Horkheimer_Max_Adorno_Theodor_W_Dialectic_of_Enlightenment_Philosophical_Fragments.pdf

13. *Eclipse of Reason*, by Max Horkheimer
https://rbb85.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/maxhorkheimer-theeclipseofreason.pdf

14. *One Dimensional Man*, by Herbert Marcuse
https://files.libcom.org/files/Marcuse,%20H%20-%20One-Dimensional%20Man,%202nd%20edn.%20(Routledge,%202002).pdf

15. (Article) Sartre, Intersubjectivity, and German Idealism, by Sebastian Gardner
https://www.sartreonline.com/GardnerSartre.pdf

1. "true community does not arise through peoples having feelings for one another...but through, first, their taking their stand in living in mutual relation with a living Center, and, second, their being in living mutual relation with one another" – Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, pg. 45

2. "all reality is an activity in which I share without being able to appropriate for myself. Where there is no sharing there is no reality" – Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, pg. 63

3. "love itself cannot persist in the immediacy of relation; love endures, but in the interchange of actual and potential being" - Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, pg. 99

4. "relation is mutual" – Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, pg. 8

5. "everything in [the world] penetrates everything else" - Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, pg. 32

There

Here   **Here**   There

"That!" Open Realm

(Between – 'where' here and there meet)

Here   There

Here | There

1. "*I and Thou* constitutes a revolution by opening up the sphere of the Between beyond the impasse of subjectivism and objectivism with which modern thought has been so mightily struggling" – R. E. Wood, MBO, pg. 3

1. "meeting occurs in the depth which is the Between" – R. E. Wood, MBO, pg. 71

2. "modern culture is a human world filled with objects" - R. E. Wood, MBO, pg. 75

3. "The externalized individuals are herded together and treated as means to be utilized in the achievement of productivity and power...Genuine freedom and equality are possible only through genuine fraternity, where men stand in openness to the Other" - R. E. Wood, MBO, pg. 77

P. Mullahy, in *Oedipus*, says "the key problem of psychology for Fromm is the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards the world and to himself. This relatedness is acquired in the process of human learning, human acculturation." (pg. 241). Mullahy notes Fromm saying, "It is not as if we had on the one hand an individual equipped by nature with certain drives and on the other, society as something apart from him, either satisfying or frustrating these innate propensities. Although there are certain needs, such as hunger, thirst, sex, which are common to man, those drives which make for the differences in men's characters, like love and hatred, the lust for power and the yearning for sub-mission, the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure and the fear of it, are all products of the social process. The most beautiful as well as the most ugly inclinations of man are not a part of a fixed and biologically given human nature, but result from the social process which creates man [and which he creates]. In other words, society has not only a suppressing function although it has that too but it has also a creative function. **Man's nature, his passions, and anxieties are a cultural product** [*cf. K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, pg. 19 – "feelings and attitudes are to an amazingly high degree molded by the conditions under which we live, both cultural and individual, inseparably interwoven"*]; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history." (pg. 242-242). Mullahy concludes, "the conditions of human life - being a part of nature, yet transcending the rest of it, 'homeless', yet chained to this natural world, longing for immortality, yet condemned to death, possessing a rational mind which tells him of his brief hour and a body that makes him want to be alive, a craving for oneness with the world and a self-awareness which sets him apart - such conditions constitute incompatibilities which Fromm calls existential dichotomies because they spring from the nature of human existence. These conditions cannot be eradicated but man must face them. He cannot return to the prehuman state of animal existence in which reason, self-awareness, and imagination do not exist to remind him of his powerlessness, aloneness, and mortality. Thus, the human situation impels man everlastingly to strive for a solution to these incompatible conditions of life. Reason, which is his blessing, is also his curse. Human history is a record of the struggle to overcome, or at least to come to satisfying terms with, the incompatible conditions of human existence" (pg. 243).

The (from)-which and (to)-which are important for the nihilating moment.

Now, what is important to distinguish here is that the for-itself is *both*, in the same movement, reaching-out and drawing-in (otherwise, *calling forth*) (i.e., extending out-ward and coming in-ward, collapsing in and on itself). It is this that is the *dialectical tension*.

Consciousness flickers; but, does so quick enough that is seems it's "always on".

The for-itself bursting forth toward itself (i.e., moving outward unto itself), passing through it's realm of possibility. More is open the more we become open - we must be beside ourself, seeking, and therein letting, out our own openness. The more closed-off we are, the greater is the price for being so, which we may never ourselves know (i.e., meet) precisely due to our disposition of being-closed.

Martin Heidegger, in Introduction to Metaphysics, says "to know means to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the openness of beings. To know is accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings, to stand up to it. Merely to have information, however wide-ranging it may be, is not to know...one who carries such information around with him and has added a few practical tricks to it will be at a loss and will necessarily bungle in the face of real reality...to know means to be able to learn" (pg. 24)

June 30, 2023

We all *move* in different directions; but, where we *go* is nowhere.

It's the same place: *We - that's Me!*

Our ending is just beginning - or, beginning ending.

To end is to begin, and to begin toward an end.

No where we go, we always go nowhere.

///

What's 'We' as opposed to 'Me'?

What am (I) without (You)?

What are (You) without (Me)?

What are (We)?

///

The same place? What place? What is that place which is ending? Beginning? Does to-end mean to-begin? If so, they're co-located - thus, in the same place.

Yet, they are not the same 'thing'. An end is an-old, whereas beginning a-new. So, there's some difference - a 'distance' (or, gulf, void, absence, nothingness) between the two. In this difference, we move. But where do we go in this place that is absent and nothing? Well, no-where.

///

We, in this place, where we move, and move differently - but differently together - are the same. A single. A life.

A Remark on Truth & 'Separate Subjectivities':

I can mark space with any object I choose; but, whichever I choose, though that space may have a different *appearance* (e.g., a house, a road, a plane, a ball), 'space' is still disclosed to me *all the same.* This is to say the *means*, not that they're stripped of any significance in their own right, still refer - where, as Heidegger says in *Being and Time*, "every reference is a relation" (pg. 108) - to the same 'truth'. Death is an end – it's a truth we *each* can and do know; and, to be sure, it's not only known by each in nearly the exact same way but lived by all.

We incorrectly think about 'truth'. We face it with an attitude of *needing* to qualify such, fitting it through subjective terms (i.e., conditions), as if thinking in terms of trillions of microscopic droplets running through a hose, each passing through it's own invisible outline, *separate from every other*, all the while forgetting each is water to the same pedal, bathing underneath the same sun which dries-up the pool just yonder from which the hose draws.

Truth begins in abstraction, where the *means* to such is subjectivity.

Do we mark our consciousness with different objects (i.e., pieces of knowledge)? Sure. But, does that knowledge, at its end, point-out anything truly *different* (remembering that difference itself is a truth – e.g., that there *is* difference in the world)? No.

January 26, 2024

Sartre was a liar. He was exceedingly skilled in the use of rhetoric which, undoubtedly, any successful playwright or novelist must be. And, to be clear, rhetoric is the *extension* of truth to *meet* a narrative - in the political setting, ideology is the overarching narrative and propaganda its rhetorical *tool*. *As an extension* (i.e., a movement *beyond* itself), truth no longer stands for-itself on its own *ground* (i.e., such is not its own foundation) - rather, it soon becomes <u>lost</u> *between* "fact" and fiction, **each <u>tugging</u> at the other**.

January 1, 2024

The art of thinking is much like that of calligraphy. Standing off at a distance (i.e., removed and thus not truly residing on common ground), seeing another demonstrate the brilliance of their ability, therein grasping intimately the swiftness, fluidity, and 'perfection' of vocation, one is likely, *in light of the very art of another's doing*, to become convinced - rather, deluded - that they as well, in an instant, can so readily do for-themself what took another years to refine through practice. It is only upon doing for-themself that they soon realize the incredible distance which marks the difference between the one who practices versus the one who casually meanders about in life watching others.

Logic can be heard by all who will let themselves hear such; however, to turn around and spurt out logic demands a skill which is not inclusive in the art of listening, for which many have neglected to learn and practice.

Meaning, the art of thinking is not wholly equivalent to the art of listening. But, thinking demands one, in first instance, listen.

What this essentially amounts to is: one cannot declare they truly understand something if, all the while, they remain incapable of fully articulating that which they believe to understand. If one cannot outlay the various perspectives of an argument, they likely don't "know" such - only 'believe' to know.

January 1, 2024

I'm not sure we can say our society values knowledge when most, in the first instance, never find in it enough value to pursue it. Yet, how could they 'know', without pursuing it, what knowledge is really worth?

January 14, 2024

There are really only 3 great mysteries 'here': 1) how do children see the world?; 2) what are black holes & the bounds of the universe; and, 3) why have humans not learned to live *with* each other?

January 13, 2024

Philosophy needs to die before its significance (it's imperative as an institution) realized.

For too long the human has believed themself to be without its *call*, doing 'just fine' underneath the absence of its urgencies (i.e., gravity; *cf. Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, pg. 46 - "philosophy is grounding"*). They reach, jump and leap, parading trivialities with inflated ego's. As such, not a cliff could contain them, they're convinced.

So, "let them *run!*". Let them charge ahead, ignoring the *call for care* (i.e., vigilance and compassion). "Step aside!". They'll soon enough notice what was keeping as soon as it's missing.

Philosophy is grounding. They need good reminding of this.

○ a note on 'space' & 'time':
you can define the moment of the movement, but you cannot define the space through which said movement takes place. Such is why we can only detail the '<u>structure</u>' of immanence & the 'essence' <u>to transcendence</u>.

"neither the 'this' or the 'background'"

Primary realm of the dialectic of transcendence (i.e., arriving as departing)

"space (or)"
"Breakage" (or, moment of movement between infinite & finite, i.e., concrete, negation)

Being

[(in-itself)
(for-itself)

"isolated by external negation" (Salvan, pg. 51)

(Be)ing

'this'

undifferentiated Totality (i.e., the Background)

↳ its activity is to (play) & pull back to-be (in) its own totality, only escaping for a moment.

"Consciousness, as absolute nothingness, becomes a particular nothingness as it makes itself present to a particular object, and brings it existence as 'being there', i.e., as a presence" (Salvan, pg. 48)

"Consciousness is Consciousness (of) Something," where the (of) is 'this' object.

"the being which I am not Presently, inasmuch as it appears on [that is, over and against] the background of the totality of being, is the (this)" - Sartre

○ the 'object' is something present to Consciousness. As present, Consciousness cannot be that which stands before it → thus, it <u>is not</u> it.

i.e., the being which it itself is not.

Diagram labels (highlighted):
"levels"
"relation"
"reflexive"
"movement"
"leap"
"Contradiction"

Diagram annotations:
(A)
(Z)
'moving away'
(x) & (y) where each has its own "definition"
or, "the inflection (of) reflection"
'into itself'
(y)
(B)

Key Relations : (A) → (B)
(A) → (Z)
(A) → (y) } all Subsumed
(x) → (y)

(the Structure of Dialectic)

• "a dialectical method cannot operate on isolated facts or impressions but only by correlating relations " (R.D. Cumming, Starting Point, pg. 209.)

• "reliance on contradiction is the most familiar trait of dialectic " (pg. 136)

• "an attempt to "locate" ... is dialectically implicit in the experience of dislocation – that is, implicit as the "opposite", the "Contradiction" " (pg. 143)

↳ thus, the 'movement' of (A), moving away to unto itself, would be the "structure" of (A)'s location.

◦ "the essence of 'being located there' lies (in) 'being (dis) located outside itself' " (pg. 165)

◦ "contradiction impels the movement of thought that is the fourth trait of an existential dialectic " (pg. 209)

◦ "a dialectical method cannot function simply by separating, contradicting, & indulging in 'interplay'. The 'dynamic' process of definition... must expand into a process of development " (pg. 255)

◦ "in the case of verbal irony, one does not say what one means or mean what one say; there is a discrepancy or contradiction between the 'external' statement and the 'inner' meaning " (pg. 240)