

# Critique on the Couch: Why Critical Theory Needs Psychoanalysis,

by A. Allen

## a. People / Organizations:

## b. Quotes:

- "any interpretation of psychoanalysis that understands the drives in reductively biologic terms, posits a fundamentally asocial or antisocial core to the self" - Author (pg. 8)
- "a return to psychoanalysis not only provides critical theory with a realistic conception of the person; it can also help critical theory to rethink its commitment to developmentalist, evolutionary, stage models of self and society" - Author (pg. 10)
- "psychoanalysis enables individual transformation through the power of critical insight: analogously, critical theory enables social transformation through the power of critical insight" - Author (pg. 23)
- "contemporary critical theory needs psychoanalysis for (at least) three reasons: to temper its tendencies toward normative idealism, to rethink its developmental models of self and society, and to theorize the aims and methods of critique beyond utopianism and rationalism" - Author (pg. 23-24)
  - **"my primary thesis** is that psychoanalytic drive theory, particularly the version developed by Melanie Klein, offers critical theory a realistic conception of the person that tempers its tendencies toward normative idealization and disrupts its developmental schemas" - Author (pg. 24)
- "all emotions, phantasies, anxieties and defenses involve internal and external objects; thus, object relations are at the center of our psychic life" - Author (pg. 38)
- "philosophy is like the work of art; both are capable of crystalizing an infinite truth within a finite form" - Author (pg. 82)
- **"the recent resurgence of authoritarian politics around the globe, but especially in the Unites States and Europe, has left critical theorists scrambling for explanations"** - Author (pg. 187)
  - \*cf. R. Samuels, *The Psychopathology of Political Ideologies*  
[https://www.binseelsnotes.com/\\_files/ugd/d7b063\\_643988b3484b45aca18a1b02b3c89545.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_643988b3484b45aca18a1b02b3c89545.pdf)
  - \*cf. Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?*
    - She notes, "populists are antipluralists. They claim that they and they alone represent the people", therein believing populists to be "a real danger to democracy".

## c. General Notes:

- Introduction: Why Critical Theory Needs Psychoanalysis (pg. 1)
  - "Theodor Adorno's famous claim that 'in psycho-analysis nothing is true except the exaggerations' is, to be sure, itself a exaggeration" (pg. 1)
    - "it captures something important about the first generation of the Frankfurt School's approach to psychoanalysis, an approach that has been decisively rejected by at least the most prominent members of the second and third generations. Indeed, perhaps more than anything else the early Frankfurt School was defined both theoretically and institutionally by its attempt to bring Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis together in the service of a critical theory of advanced capitalist societies" (pg. 1)
  - "perhaps the greatest exaggeration of Freudian psychoanalysis...is the theory of drives, particularly Freud's late conception of the fundamental antagonism between life and death drives, Eros and Thanatos" (pg. 1)
    - "Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse...understood the death drives as an articulation of the depth of modern humanity's destructiveness and turned to libidinal drives to identify a potential source of resistance to a totally reified and administered society" (pg. 1-2)
  - "by rejecting drive theory, the revisionists [e.g., Henry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, and Erich Fromm] sociologized psychoanalysis, positing the seamless integration of individual and society as the goal of analytic work" (pg. 2)
    - "this turned psychoanalysis into a mechanism of conformism and social normalization rather than resistance to the social order" (pg. 2)
  - "Jurgen Habermas...famously dropped psychoanalysis from his research program in the early 1970's, in the wake of the critical reception of his 1968 book *Knowledge and Human Interests*..." (pg. 2)
  - "Alex Honneth also seem[ed] uncomfortable with drive theory's speculative exaggerations" (pg. 2)
    - "his interpretations of psychoanalysis focuses on the object-relations theory of D. W. Winnicott..." (pg. 3)
      - ◆ "this interpretation specifically rejects the death drive, arguing instead that aggression is the result of the pain, confusion, and anxiety that are generated by the breakup of primary fusion. At issue for Honneth is not only the speculative, exaggerated nature of drive theory in general, but also the presumed asocial and even antisocial implications of the death drive in particular" (pg. 3)
    - "Honneth contends that the mere fact of a historical relationship between critical social theory and psychoanalysis is not sufficient to justify an ongoing theoretical alliance between the two intellectual projects" (pg. 3)
      - ◆ "each generation of critical theorists must pose the question of the potential relevance of psychoanalysis...anew" (pg. 3)
  - Psychoanalytic Realism (pg. 3)
    - "in his own response to the question of why contemporary critical theory needs psychoanalysis, Honneth contends...that the latter supplies the former with a 'realistic' conception of the person or philosophical anthropology" (pg. 3)
      - "I think it is safe to say that [Honneth] does not refer to scientific naturalism or metaphysical realism" (pg. 3)
    - "Honneth contrasts realism with a 'moralistic idealism' that presumes that individuals are capable of having and acting upon excessively high degrees of rational reflection or insight. By highlighting the irrational and unconscious forces that motivate us to act in ways that we do not fully understand and that remain stubbornly resistant to rational reflection, psychoanalysis serves as a realistic check on the tendencies toward excessive rationalism and idealism that might tempt the critical theorist qua normative theorist" (pg. 4)
      - "however, Honneth's own psychoanalytically informed philosophical anthropology, derived from his reading of Winnicott, remains, or so it seems to me, not quite realistic enough" (pg. 4)
    - "Honneth's original turn to Winnicott's object-relations theory, in his important early work *The Struggle for Recognition*, was motivated by his suspicion of psychoanalytic drive theory. Drive theory, in Honneth's view, entails a problematic philosophical anthropology in which intersubjectivity takes a back seat to the 'intrapsychic conflict between unconscious instinctual demands and gradually emerging ego-controls'. Honneth turns to Winnicott to develop a thoroughly intersubjective philosophical anthropology, one that foregrounds the infant's affective relationship with their primary caregiver as an enabling condition for developing the sense of self-confidence that is the precondition for more complex and differentiated relations of recognition. Central to this account is the psychoanalytic concept of symbiosis or symbiotic fusion, which Honneth initially characterized as a prolonged state of mutual dependence and undifferentiated unity between 'mother' and infant. On Honneth's early reading of Winnicott, the job of the 'good-enough mother' is to frustrate the infant's desires just enough so that they will gradually come to realize that the caregiver is a separate person with their own needs and desires while at the same time offering the continuous emotional support that the infant needs to develop a secure and stable self-relation. Through this ongoing **process of reality testing and mutual attunement**, the early stage of 'mother' infant fusion gradually gives way to a relationship

- between a caregiver and a child who experience each other as distinct entities while remaining dependent on one another's love and recognition for their basic self-confidence" (pg. 4)
- "[Daniel] Stern contends that even very young infants have a primary sense of self-awareness - that is, an awareness of themselves as distinct from their caregivers - and that the relationship between infant and caregiver is best understood not as one of fusion but rather as one of reciprocal interaction" (pg. 5)
  - "in his more recent work, Honneth acknowledges the challenge that Stern's research poses for his interpretation of symbiotic fusion, and he reformulates his theory of recognition accordingly" (pg. 5)
    - ◆ "however, even [Honneth's] modified conception of primary fusion has been sharply criticized, perhaps most trenchantly by Joel Whitebook" (pg. 5)
      - ◇ "As Whitebook sees it, Honneth fails to take seriously enough the infantile omnipotence that goes hand in hand with primary fusion. Insofar as infants perceive themselves to be fused with their caregiver, they do not perceive there to be any distinction between their own needs and desires and the actions of the caregiver. Whatever the caregiver does is experienced as the unmediated extension of the infant's own desires and strivings. In other words, primary fusion and infantile omnipotence are two sides of the same coin" (pg. 5)
  - "for Honneth, the infant's process of individuation begins not from state of phantasied omnipotence but from a relationship with 'beloved objects occasionally experienced as fused with their own experience'" (pg. 6)
    - ◆ "I take this to mean that fusion gives us a completely unmediated [i.e., wholly immersed] experience of being together with another person" (pg. 6)
      - ◇ *\*meaning, there is nothing 'between' which stands to 'connect' each to one another - rather, those who stand in relation are (in) complete relatedness with one another.*
        - ▶ *\*this is quite similar Buber's I-Thou relation.*
      - ◇ "in such an experience, a relation of recognition [i.e., 'that' you stand 'there' before me 'here'] may be impossible, given that recognition presupposes two differentiated subjects who recognize each other, but it is also unnecessary, for **it is precisely the blissfulness of this unmediated being together with another person that relations of recognition strive to recapture**" (pg. 6)
  - "the requirement that the child recognize the caregiver's independence...generates a profound anxiety that is, according to Honneth, the source of aggression" (pg. 7)
    - ◆ "thus, Honneth understands aggression in dynamic and relational terms, as the unavoidable result of an interactive socialization process..." (pg. 7)
  - "However, the reference to drives in the plural here is a bit misleading. Honneth claims to reject drive theory on account of its excessive focus on the intrapsychic and thus its asocial implications, but in point of fact all of his arguments against drive theory are directed against the death drive or primary aggression. Moreover, Honneth seems to presuppose something like a primary erotic drive, in precisely the sense that Freud uses that term in his later work, as a drive for building up greater and greater unities. What else is the notion of symbiotic fusion that stands at the center of his theory of recognition if not the perfect embodiment of this erotic drive? It is, after all, not only the zero point of all relations of recognition but also the paradigm case of love. Thus, the target of Honneth's critique is less drive theory per se than the duality or ambivalence of the drives, and the positing of aggression or destructiveness as a fundamental drive of equal force and similar provenance to Eros" (pg. 7)
    - "In sum, **Honneth makes two key moves in his interpretation of psycho-analysis, both of which lead him away from a fully realistic conception of the person:** first, he transforms the fundamentally ambivalent psychoanalytic conception of primary fusion—with narcissism and omnipotence as its other face—into a state of blissful, unmediated being together with another person that serves as the paradigm case of his conception of recognition; second, he conflates the aggressive or death drive with drive theory per se, then rejects 'drive theory' while tacitly presupposing the existence of a prosocial, erotic drive for unification through symbiosis. Taken together, these moves have the effect of displacing human drives for destruction, mastery, aggression, and omnipotence (in short, for power, at least in some of its most recognizable forms) from the centerpiece of his philosophical anthropology and thus from his conception of social life. The result is an account of the person that is unrealistic in a specifically Geussian sense, insofar as it obscures the fundamental role that power plays in human psychic and social life" (pg. 7)
  - "Melanie Klein's conception of the drives emphasizes the fundamental antagonism between life and death drives while understanding the death drive in psychological (rather than reductively biologicistic) and social...terms" (pg. 8)
    - "Unlike Freud, Klein equates the death drive with primary aggression; as a result, her account does not depend on the appeal to speculative biology that underpins the Freudian version. Given her distinctive understanding of the relationship between drive and object, **the Kleinian death drive is a distinctive mode of social relatedness, one that entails relating to others aggressively and destructively.** Klein's work thus offers critical theory the possibility of a realistic psychoanalytic account of the person that is at the same time thoroughly psychological and social" (pg. 8)
    - "drive theory can be defended without making strong claims about indestructible features or innate constituents of human nature and instead on the basis of more modest claims about the implications of **certain inescapable preconditions for human existence**" (pg. 8)
      - ◆ "from the psychoanalytic point of view, perhaps the most important of these preconditions is the fact that human beings, unlike many other animals, are born into a protracted state of helpless dependence upon their caregivers" (pg. 8)
      - ◆ "To say this is not necessarily to commit oneself to strong claims about a timeless and immutable human nature; it is to make a more modest claim about what we might call, following Hannah Arendt, the human condition, a condition that places constraints on what kinds of creatures we can become and what that process of becoming is like" (pg. 9)
  - "If the drives are understood as rooted in certain...inescapable facts about the human condition, and if their structure and content is taken to be historically and socially constituted and therefore malleable and plastic, then drive theory need not be incompatible with critical theory's commitment to historicization. Moreover, even this rather modest conception of drives has important and far-reaching consequences. Whitebook argues that **the fact that we are born helpless and dependent on the care of others means that socialization is necessary for us to become subjects**" (pg. 9)
    - "On this view, the fact that our initial human condition is one of helpless dependence on our caregivers gives rise not only to drives for love and connection with others, but also to drives for aggression, destructiveness, and domination. Once formed, **these drives become a permanent part of all of our relationships with others,** including (perhaps especially) our love relationships" (pg. 9)
      - ◆ "this is precisely where Klein's conception of drive theory starts: with the infant in a relationship of love and attachment to their primary caregiver that is at the same time a relationship of complete helplessness and dependence, with all of the frustration and aggression such a relationship elicits. In other words: a relationship structured around a fundamental and intractable ambivalence" (pg. 9)
  - Rethinking Developmentalism (pg. 10)
    - "a return to psychoanalysis not only provides critical theory with a realistic conception of the person; it can also help critical theory to

- rethink its commitment to developmentalist, evolutionary, stage models of self and society" (pg. 10)
- "Habermas constructs a developmental account of individuation through socialization that marks the self's progression from pre-conventional to conventional to post-conventional modes of ego identity. From the point of view of cognitive development, this progression is marked by greater and greater degrees of abstraction, generalization, and reflexivity. Through the process of individuation through socialization, individuals develop a progressively decentered understanding of the world..." (pg. 10)
    - *\*cf. D. Winnicott, The Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment, pg. 75 - "the infant is beginning to relate himself to objects that are less and less subjective phenomena, and more and more objectively perceived 'not-me' elements. He has begun to establish a self..."*. This represents 'separation (as) integration'
    - <https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Winnicott-D.W.-1965.-The-maturation-processes-and-the-facilitating-environment.pdf>
  - "from the point of view of [Habermas'] moral development, ontogenesis consists in a transformation from an initial dependence on an external (usually parental) authority for judgments of right and wrong (the pre-conventional stage) through an internalization of that authority relation that results in feelings of guilt and shame (the conventional stage) to an ability to reflect autonomously on social norms and consider whether such norms are genuinely valid..." (pg. 10-11)
    - "Social evolution is, for Habermas, a cumulative, progressive, directed process of increasing rationalization in both technological and moral practical domains. The latter consists in a progressive decentration of worldviews; differentiation of objective, intersubjective, and subjective worlds and corresponding validity claims; and a heightening of reflexivity. This conception of social evolution is central to Habermas's distinction between mythical and modern worldviews. According to Habermas, modern worldviews represent an advance over mythical worldviews in that, first, they enable the differentiation between objective, intersubjective, and subjective worlds and their corresponding validity claims and, second, they understand themselves as worldviews. Their openness to critical assessment supports their claim to superior rationality and reflexivity" (pg. 11)
  - "the problem with the Habermasian model...is its rationalism, and its accompanying understanding of self as founded upon the mastery or suppression of the drives" (pg. 12)
  - "Horkheimer and Adorno contended that bourgeois society rests on the introversion of sacrifice: the internalized renunciation of instinctual drives in the service of pursuing economic gain. For them, **the rational ego itself is a structure of domination whose function is to gain mastery over the unruly forces of the id**" (pg. 12-13)
    - "on this view, the bourgeois self is held together by a structure of internalized domination that mirrors the ego's dominating relationship to external nature and to other subjects" (pg. 13)
      - ◆ *\*otherwise, the structure of the internal relationship between the bourgeois ego and id (i.e., that the ego is aiming to 'suppress' or 'dominate' the id) resembles quite closely the sadistic structure of capitalism (i.e., labor relations and flow of money).*
  - "for Lacan, the ego is an imaginary, alienated, narcissistic, defensive structure, formed through a process of misrecognition in which the infant substitutes their unified image in the mirror for their incoherent, fragmented experience of themselves. The ego thus presents an obstacle to psychoanalysis, which targets the discourse and subject of the unconscious" (pg. 13)
    - "Lacanian analysis thus aims to break down the conscious, rational ego that is propped up by the Kantian notions of autonomy" (pg. 13)
  - "Habermas's account of individuation through socialization can be understood as an attempt to find a way out of the problem of the ego - and thus should also be assessed from this perspective. Unlike Marcuse, who accepted the basic Adornian premise that the rational ego is repressive and violent and argued for the generation of an alternative, utopian sensibility via a regression to embodied, polymorphous, narcissistic pleasure, Habermas attempts to resolve the problem of the ego via his turn to communicative intersubjectivity. According to Habermas and several of his most prominent defenders, the turn away from the philosophy of consciousness and to linguistic intersubjectivity allows him to offer a nonrepressive account of rationality and ego identity that overcomes the reifying logic of identity thinking" (pg. 14)
    - "however, it is far from clear that the turn to communicative intersubjectivity, as important and groundbreaking as it is, actually addresses the problem of the repressive coerciveness implicit in the Kantian model of rationality and autonomy. However much the theory of communicative action may improve our understanding of intersubjective relations, it does not thereby resolve the problems that arise in the relationship between subject and object" (pg. 14)
      - ◆ "the latter was Adorno's main focus insofar as his critique of the ego as a structure of internalized domination concerns the relationship between rational ego (subject) and material nature (object), including the bodily drives and impulses that must be brought to heel through the process of individuation" (pg. 14)
  - "Confronting the problem of the ego without remaining, as Adorno arguably does, mired in paradox requires developing a nonviolent, nonrepressive model of ego or psychic integration, one that associates maturity not with the coercive mastery of inner nature but rather with the ego's expansion and enrichment through the ongoing incorporation of more and more unconscious content. At the same time, confronting the problem of the ego without explaining it away, as Habermas could be said to do, requires retaining a robust conception of the unconscious, one that takes seriously precisely its foreignness-that is, its inability to be translated into rational, communicative thought without remainder" (pg. 15)
    - "in chapter 2, I shall argue that Klein's conception of the ego offers a promising model for addressing these problems. **For Klein, ego integration is not a process of dominating inner nature but an ongoing, open-ended process of enrichment and expansion**" (pg. 15)
      - ◆ "Klein account of the subject is intersubjective from the ground up, though hers is rich and ambivalent conception of intersubjectivity that emphasizes the affective, phantasmatic aspects of our relations with others" (pg. 15-16)
        - ◇ "in this way, Klein's account combines an intersubjective perspective with a robust account of unconscious, intrapsychic experience" (pg. 16)
      - ◆ "The key innovation here is Klein's positional model of the psyche, which emerges in her late metapsychology. This model distinguishes between the paranoid, schizoid and depressive positions, where these are understood not as stages of development but as configurations of object relations or ways of organizing psychic experience. Although the depressive position is understood as an achievement of sorts, Klein also maintains that individuals oscillate between both positions throughout their lives..." (pg. 16)
        - ◇ "because her positional model of the self is based on an account of pre-Oedipal infantile experience and concerns the psychic processes and transformations undergone during the first year of life, it does not depend on Freudian models of psychosexual development" (pg. 16)
    - "Klein's metapsychology offers powerful resources for working through the residual Eurocentric racism that pervades Freudian developmental schemas, evident in the deeply problematic psychoanalytic conception of 'the primitive'" (pg. 17)
  - Psychoanalysis as Critique (pg. 17)
    - "In addition to offering critical theory a more realistic conception of the person and helping it to think through its commitment to developmental schemas at the individual and social levels, psychoanalysis also provides a compelling model for the aims and methods of critique. An engagement with psychoanalysis can prompt critical theory to rethink its understandings of emancipation and progress beyond

abstract utopianism and transformative praxis beyond narrow rationalism" (pg. 17)

- "Starting with utopianism, recall that the early Frankfurt School turned to psychoanalysis not only for a compelling diagnosis of the problems of bourgeois capitalist societies but also for an account of the unconscious as a stratum of human experience that is stubbornly resistant to existing social norms. As Whitebook has argued, the Frankfurt School thereby connected the psychoanalytic unconscious to the problem of utopia. For at least some members of the early Frankfurt School, the unconscious marks out a space of radical alterity from which critique can be launched, or what Whitebook calls 'the good Other' of the 'repressive ego and the logic of domination'" (pg. 17)
- "the key to Marcuse's escape from the paradox of the ego lies in his distinction between socially necessary and surplus repression. Although Marcuse acknowledges that some degree of repression of instinctual nature is necessary for the formation of society, much of the repression that we experience as members of late industrial capitalist societies is no longer necessary and in fact serves only to uphold capitalist domination. Thus, true progress for Marcuse consists in undoing the work of surplus repression, ending the reign of the repressive rational ego, and unleashing the forces of Eros so that they may infuse society with a new sensibility emphasizing imagination, artistic creativity, and embodied pleasure" (pg. 18)
- "only by retaining a robust notion of the unconscious can critical theory provide itself with the resources needed to nourish its utopian imaginary. Obviously, a critical theory that leaves psychoanalysis behind altogether is cut off from resources, but so too is a critical theory that interprets psychoanalysis without the ambivalence of the drives that gives the theory of the unconscious its vitality" (pg. 18-19)
- "Psychoanalysis, too, stands in a complicated relationship to utopia. While it may be true that the psychoanalytic unconscious marks out a stratum or mode of human experience that lies stubbornly outside of social control - and so can inspire utopian imaginaries - it is also the case, as Whitebook has claimed elsewhere, that **psychoanalysis is opposed to the idea of utopia in principle**. The thought here is that positive images of utopian societies rest on a denial of human aggression and destructiveness and a disavowal of the inevitability of human finitude, loss, and lack. As such, utopianism represents an expression of infantile omnipotence and grandiosity" (pg. 19)
  - "Adorno is equally suspicious of the seductions of utopian speculation that rest on false promises of reconciliation. Indeed, the refusal of such false promises is the very core of dialectical thinking for Adorno. Dialectical thinking is, as he puts it, 'the refusal to accept the denial or elimination of contradictions... Instead it makes contradictions into an object or theme of philosophical reflection itself'" (pg. 20)
- "critical theory needs psychoanalysis in order to articulate a meaningful conception of resistance to social norms and the prospects for emancipation without falling into problematic forms of utopian thinking or false models of reconciliation. **Psychoanalysis thereby offers critical theory a way of rethinking the aims of critique. Relatedly, psychoanalysis prompts critical theorists to reconsider our understanding of critical method**" (pg. 22)
  - "This idea that psychoanalysis serves as a model for the methodology of critical theory is developed most systematically in Habermas's early work *Knowledge and Human Interests*. There, Habermas interprets psychoanalysis as a form of knowledge and practice that incorporates methodological self-reflection" (pg. 22-23)
    - ◆ \*J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*  
<https://hugoribeiro.com.br/area-restrita/Habermas-knowledge-and-human-interests.pdf>
  - "on this view, psychoanalysis enables individual transformation through the power of critical insight: analogously, critical theory enables social transformation through the power of critical insight" (pg. 23)
    - ◆ "Habermas, Honneth, and Celikates tend to favor a rationalistic understanding of psychoanalysis, such that their account of how analysis works rests primarily on the role of rational insight and reflexivity. This is, however, a highly selective and partial understanding of psychoanalytic method" (pg. 23)
      - ◇ "even for Freud, and certainly for Klein and Lacan, analysis does not work primarily through the mode of rational insight; indeed, the latter is quite often understood to be a mode of defense that all too easily becomes an impediment to genuine transformation" (pg. 23)
      - ◇ "Because none of these thinkers pay sufficient attention to the role of the transference in psychoanalytic method, they also fail to pose the question of what this might mean for the analogy to critical method" (pg. 23)
- "**contemporary critical theory needs psychoanalysis for (at least) three reasons**: to temper its tendencies toward normative idealism, to rethink its developmental models of self and society, and to theorize the aims and methods of critique beyond utopianism and rationalism" (pg. 23-24)
  - "my primary thesis is that psychoanalytic drive theory, particularly the version developed by Melanie Klein, offers critical theory a realistic conception of the person that tempers its tendencies toward normative idealization and disrupts its developmental schemas" (pg. 24)
    - ◆ "this realistic conception of the person also serves as the foundation for creativity, reparation, and productive individual and social transformation" (pg. 24)
- Chapter 2 - Kleinian Realism: Between the Intrapsychic and the Intersubjective (pg. 27)
  - "critical theory needs psychoanalysis first and foremost for its realistic philosophical anthropology or theory of subjectivity, in order to correct for the tendency... toward normative idealism" (pg. 27)
    - "however, Honneth's interpretation of psychoanalysis does not, in my view, provide the realistic conception of the person that he argues is needed" (pg. 27)
      - ◆ "engaging psychoanalysis through a thoroughly intersubjectivist reading of D. W. Winnicott, Honneth dispenses with the death drive... [and] screens power, ambivalence, and omnipotence out of his philosophical anthropology. The result is a conception of subjectivity that is more compatible with his normative theory of recognition, but also decidedly less realistic" (pg. 27)
  - "to be sure, for anyone who is familiar with Klein's work, it might seem outrageous to describe her account of subjectivity as realistic. After all, she is often criticized for the widely speculative nature of her work, the overly sophisticated mental states she attributes to very young children and even infants, and her deeply pessimistic conception of human nature" (pg. 27)
    - "her metapsychology is consistent with the core methodological commitments of critical theory, particularly its understanding of the self as socially or intersubjectively constituted" (pg. 28)
    - "the main point is rather simple: because she views subjects as object-related from the start, **Klein understands the self in fundamentally relational terms**; but, because she emphasizes the duality of the drives and the role of unconscious phantasy, her account of subjectivity is richer, more complicated, and more ambivalent - in short, more realistic - than Honneth's" (pg. 28)
    - "Klein departs from Freudian drive theory in two key ways - by reconceiving the relationship between drive theory and object, and by rearticulating the death drive as primary aggression..." (pg. 28)
- Kleinian Metapsychology (pg. 29)
  - "Klein's work underwent significant development and transformation over the course of her life" (pg. 29)
  - "Klein was an early pioneer of analytic work with very young children, and because her metapsychology emerged out of - indeed was her way of systematizing and making sense of - her clinical experience, it differs from the classical Freudian model insofar as it centers on the pre-Oedipal phases of psychic development." (pg. 29)

- "thus...her mature metapsychology neither recapitulates nor in any way depends upon [Freudian] theories" (pg. 29)
- "At the core of Klein's metapsychology, and crucial for understanding her distinction between paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, is her claim that **object relations are in place from the very beginning of life**. The first object - or, more precisely, part-object - is the breast, and the infant relates to this object from birth" (pg. 29)
  - "for Klein, the infant is object-related from birth, meaning that they are related both to external objects and to the psychic representatives of those other people, which Klein calls 'internal objects'" (pg. 29-30)
  - "The claim that object relations are present from the beginning of life goes hand in hand with Klein's claim that there exists a rudimentary, not fully coherent, and relatively unintegrated ego - but an ego all the same - in place from the beginning of life" (pg. 30)
- "in is mature work, Freud contended that infants begin life in a state of undifferentiated merger or fusion not only the primary caregiver but with the external world as a whole" (pg. 30)
  - "on this view, the infant's sense of themselves as an entity separate from others and the rest of the world is developed over time through a painful process of reality testing that undermines the feeling of infantile omnipotence that does hand in hand with primary narcissism" (pg. 30)
  - "Klein rejects the idea that the early infant is merged or fused either with their environment or with their caregiver in favor of a conception of the infant as having a rudimentary, not fully coherent ego that relates to fragmented part-objects" (pg. 30)
    - ◆ "intrapsychic fantasy plays a crucially important role in Klein's account, [as] when the infant is overwhelmed by fantasy, their experience has an omnipotent character" (pg. 30)
- "**the paranoid-schizoid is the starting point for Klein's metapsychology**" (pg. 31)
  - "[Klein's] term 'position' refers to 'a specific configuration of object relations, anxieties and defenses which persist throughout life'" (pg. 31)
  - "In the paranoid-schizoid position, the subject relates to part-objects; experiences a high degree of persecutory anxiety; relies on splitting, idealization, and demonization as defenses against such anxiety; and is easily overwhelmed by phantasy. In the depressive position, by contrast, the subject experiences depressive anxiety and guilt, but also develops the capacity for integration that enables it to relate to objects as whole objects; to withstand the ambivalence that inevitably results from the realization that the loved (idealized) and hated (demonized) part-objects are one and the same; and to narrow without ever fully closing the gap between phantasy and reality" (pg. 31)
  - "Because the early ego is relatively incoherent and unintegrated, the infant starts out in a state of extreme anxiety that Klein relates to psychosis. This is not to say that all infants are psychotic (a view that was occasionally mistakenly attributed to Klein), but rather that she believes that the psyche has a psychotic core. For Klein, this means that **primordial psychic experience consists of a rudimentary ego terrified by the relative lack of coherence or integration of itself and its objects**. The hallmark of the paranoid-schizoid position is, for Klein, the ego's experience of itself as 'in bits'. Thus, the infant in the paranoid-schizoid position experiences their primary object as a part-object (as the breast, rather than as the mother or primary caregiver) and, as a defense against anxiety, they split that part-object into a good, gratifying breast that nourishes, loves, and protects them, and a bad, frustrating, persecutory breast that withholds nourishment and care" (pg. 31)
    - ◆ "this splitting of the breast, according to Klein, 'results in a severance of love and hate'" (pg. 31)
      - ◇ "the infant loves and is attached to the good breast...and hates and feels persecuted by the bad breast, which is experienced as persecutory and destructive" (pg. 31-32)
      - ◇ "By splitting the breast into an idealized good breast that is the source of all that is good and nourishing and a demonized, persecutory bad breast that withholds care and nourishment, the infant splits love from hate, while continuing to relate to the primary object in both ways" (pg. 42)
    - ◆ "But the story is still more complicated than this, because, even in the early stages of infancy, the psyche's relation to its primary object is shaped not only by splitting but also by complex dynamics of projection and introjection involving both the good and the bad breast. Indeed, the infant's phantasy of the good breast in some sense is the result of the projection of their love and libidinal impulses outward, into the breast, and the parallel phantasy of the bad breast results from the projection of their hatred, aggression, and destructiveness. At the same time, the infant introjects both the bad breast and the good breast, taking them back into the rudimentary ego, transforming them into internal objects. Although the infant introjects the bad breast in order to attempt to control it, this move also heightens the experience of danger and anxiety, because now the persecutory object is both outside and inside the ego. By contrast, the introjection of the good breast creates an internal protector that enables the infant to defend against anxiety and comes to form the core of the developing ego" (pg. 32)
      - ◇ As Klein writes, 'this first internal good object acts as a focal point for the ego. It counteracts the processes of splitting and dispersal, makes for cohesiveness and integration, and is instrumental in building up the ego'" (pg. 32)
  - "**successful navigation of the paranoid-schizoid position consists in achieving an optimal balance between projection and introjection** - splitting off and projecting the bad parts of the self and introjecting the good parts of the object" (pg. 32)
- "this brings us to the depressive position, which, for Klein, represents a developmental achievement marked by greater integration of both the ego and its objects" (pg. 32)
  - "the key moment in the transition to the depressive position occurs when the infant first recognizes the mother or primary caregiver as a whole object..." (pg. 32)
  - "when this transition takes place, the infant realizes that the object that they have been attacking and destroying in their phantasies (the bad breast) is the very same object that they also love and depend on (the good breast) - **a realization that gives rise to depressive anxiety**" (pg. 32-33)
    - ◆ "whereas persecutory anxiety results from the fear of the ego's annihilation and complete disintegration, depressive anxiety is caused by the fear of the loss and destruction of the love object" (pg. 33)
      - ◇ "in this way, Klein's depressive position is closely bound up with the drive for reparation, which is the urge to repair the damage that was done, whether in phantasy or in reality, to the object" (pg. 33)
  - "Klein presents the depressive position as something to be *worked through* or *overcome*. [Though,] Klein never describes what might lie beyond the depressive position very precisely..." (pg. 33)
    - ◆ "for now will simply note that, for Klein, 'overcoming' consists not in achieving some radically distinct position, but rather in continually working through the initially overwhelming and destabilizing experience of depressive anxiety, thereby enhancing one's ability to manage ambivalence without resorting to splitting, bring one's internal and external objects into closer alignment, and engage in acts of reparation" (pg. 33)
  - "the depressive position not only entails a relation to the object as a whole object...[but] it also gives rise to a corresponding integration of the ego" (pg. 33)
    - ◆ "the infant in the depressive position experiences themselves as less fragmented and incoherent and that their relationship to their internal objects begins to correspond more closely with the actually existing external objects..." (pg. 33-34)
      - ◇ "Klein regards complete integration of the ego and synthesis of internal and external situations to be impossible in

- principle, and yet she takes increased integration to be an important developmental and analytic goal" (pg. 34)
- "at the core of the depressive position is the infant's acknowledgement and acceptance of the fundamentally ambivalent nature of their relationship to their primary object" (pg. 34)
  - ◆ "thus, the acceptance of ambivalence goes together with a better understanding of the relationship between one's internal and external objects, between psychic reality and external reality" (pg. 34)
- Drives as Relational Passions (pg. 34)
  - "Klein...found that Freud's late account of the duality of life and death drives resonated powerfully with her pioneering analytic work with children" (pg. 34)
    - "psychoanalysis [had] tended to underestimate the role of aggression in human psyche and emotional life" (pg. 35)
  - "two key features...distinguish Klein's conception of drive from Freud's: first, the relation between drive and object; and, second, the relationship between the theory of the drives and the speculative biology that underpins the Freudian account" (pg. 35)
    - "I argue that Kleinian drive theory offers a compelling alternative to the Freudian account, one that constitutes a uniquely productive resource for a critical theory inasmuch as it preserves the emphasis on primary aggression without running afoul of the basic methodological commitments of critical theory" (pg. 35)
      - ◆ "Freud's drive theory is notoriously contested, with critics accusing him of a crude biological reductionism and defenders insisting in response on the distinction between *Instinkt* and *Trieb*" (pg. 35)
        - ◇ "the implication is that drives are rooted in stimuli that arise internally, from within the organism, that exert a force or pressure to which the organism must respond" (pg. 35-36)
          - ▶ "On the mechanism model, drives are somatic in origin, internally rooted stimuli that impinge on the psyche from within. According to this model, the psyche is a stimulus processing machine, and the drives represent an internal disturbance, upsetting the psyche's attempts to maintain stability and achieve quietude" (pg. 36)
          - ▶ "[a contradiction] leads Freud to formulate a radically new version of drive theory and, relatedly, a new model of the psyche as organ-ism. On this view, drives are no longer understood as internally emerging forces that disrupt the psyche's efforts to maintain stability and quietude; rather, 'the drives themselves seek the quietude that was previously the aim of the psyche'. This leads Freud to claim that the drives are fundamentally conservative in that they seek quiescence, understood as a return to an earlier state of inanimacy" (pg. 37)
            - "Freud's late organism model of the drives provides the basis for a compelling response to a standard objection to psychoanalytic drive theory - namely, that **it is guilty of a crude biological reductionism at odds with the broadly social constructivist commitments of much contemporary theory**" (pg. 37)
              - ◆ "Freud's late version of drive theory starts from the presumption that drives are fundamentally conservative. As he describes, '*an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces*'" (pg. 39)
        - ◆ "Freud...retain[ed] an antisocial conception of the drives long after he [had] abandoned the mechanism model of the psyche" (pg. 39)
          - ◇ "this assumption lies at the core of his argument in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, where the central human struggle is between the push to gratify libidinal and aggressive drives, on the one hand, and the need to keep those drives in check in order to make social order possible, on the other" (pg. 39)
            - [https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.218475/2015.218475.Civilization-And\\_text.pdf](https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.218475/2015.218475.Civilization-And_text.pdf)
            - ▶ "on both the mechanism and the organism models of the psyche, the conflict between the demand for drive gratification...and the competing demands of social reality is central to human experience" (pg. 39)
        - ◆ "Regardless of how one reads the relationship between Freudian drive theory and the speculative biology in terms of which it is articulated, as I have argued, Freud maintains a view of internally generated drives that are only secondarily and derivatively turned outward toward objects—libido being the displacement of Eros, and aggression the displacement of the death drive. On this view, the death drive is an internal tendency toward disintegration, and aggression its outward deflection" (pg. 41)
      - "Klein radically reconceptualizes the drives as fundamentally oriented or directed toward objects. For her, the drives are not just interior, psychic forces that can be shaped by the social environment through the medium of one's relations to others; they are relational passions" (pg. 38)
        - "although, to be sure, like Freud she views the drives as constitutionally given or innate motivational forces, she fundamentally reimagines the nature of these forces" (pg. 38)
        - "as I have said earlier, **all emotions, phantasies, anxieties and defenses involve internal and external objects; thus, object relations are at the center of our psychic life**" (pg. 38)
      - "for Klein, because libidinal and aggressive drives are inherently directed toward objects, they are relational through and through; indeed, they are best understood as competing modes of relationality" (pg. 39)
        - "for Klein, the central human conflict that finds its roots in the duality and the ambivalence of the drives is between two competing modes of social relatedness" (pg. 39)
          - ◆ "Greenberg and Mitchell explain, 'the central conflict in human experience... is between love and hate, between the caring preservation and the malicious destruction of others. Love and hate are already object-related and therefore have an unmediated connection to social reality'" (pg. 39)
      - "**Klein...reinterprets the death drive as primary aggression**, understood not as principle governing the psychic organism that can subsequently be deflected outwards onto objects but rather a destructive mode of relation between psyche and primary object" (pg. 41-42)
        - "for Klein, the 'predominance of destructive impulses...goes with the excessive weakness of the ego'" (pg. 42)
          - ◆ *\*meaning, a weak ego knows itself to be vulnerable. This 'feeling of vulnerability' plays out through aggressive expression as a defensive mechanism (i.e., as a way to protect itself from being annihilated)*
          - ◆ "Klein links the predominance of aggression or destructive impulses with the disintegration and fragmentation of objects and ego in the paranoid-schizoid position" (pg. 42)
      - "By contrast, in the depressive position, love or the erotic drive is primary, in at least two senses. First, as I already indicated, it is the primary caregiver's love that enables the infant to move out of the paranoid-schizoid position and attain some measure of coherence and integration. Second, the ability to relate to the object as a whole object that has both good and bad, loved and hated parts, and to hold these features of the object together without resorting to splitting or other manic defenses is itself a manifestation of Eros" (pg. 43)
        - "In the Kleinian paradigm, ego integration is a hard-won and fragile achievement facilitated by Eros, understood as the drive to bind things together into ever greater unities. However, as will become clearer in the next chapter, ego strength for Klein refers not to the capacity to master instinctual drives but to the ability to expand and enrich the ego by incorporating more and more unconscious content; as a result, ego integration is, for her, a necessarily incomplete and open-ended process" (pg. 43)
    - Phantasy, or, Internal Objects (pg. 43)

- "The concept of phantasy is central to Klein's conception of object relations and also to her unique conception of the interplay between intrapsychic and intersubjective dimensions of experience. Building upon the Freudian notion of psychic reality, Klein's account of phantasy—spelled with a 'ph' in order to indicate that it is unconscious and thus distinct from our everyday conception of fantasy as daydreaming—presupposes that **all of our relations with others, going all the way back to our early relationship with our primary objects, are necessarily and inescapably mediated and filtered through our internal object world in ways that are unconscious**" (pg. 43)
- "A phantasy is a psychical representative of a drive, according to [Susan] Isaacs, in the sense that it 'represents the particular content of the urges or feelings (for example, wishes, fears, anxieties, triumphs, love or sorrow) dominating the mind at the moment'. In other words, phantasy refers to the specific shape, structure, and content taken by the drives in our unconscious experience" (pg. 44)
  - "phantasy is 'the "language" of...primary instinctual impulses'" (pg. 45)
    - ◆ "that is to say, phantasy gives the drives - understood as general and inchoate dispositions or modes of relating to objects lovingly or destructively - specific meaning, structure, shape, and texture" (pg. 45)
    - ◆ "this means that Klein's account of the infantile experience should be understood as an account of the shape, structure, and content of our most basic fantasies. For example, Klein's good breast doesn't refer simply or straightforwardly to the body part that the infant encounters while feeding but to the crude phantasy of a part-object that arises out of the experience of having one's hunger satisfied" (pg. 45)
      - ◇ "through the operation of phantasy, the infant imbue the breast, as Klein says, 'with qualities going far beyond the actual nourishment it affords'" (pg. 45)
        - ▶ *\*i.e., the infant begins on a journey 'to think of it' - that is, to wonder to themselves as to what 'this object' might be.*
      - ◇ "yet phantasy is in no way reducible to bodily sensations" (pg. 45)
    - "Phantasy stands in a complicated relationship to drives, as well as to the dynamics of introjection and projection that are so crucial to Klein's account of psychic development. Isaacs calls these dynamics 'mental mechanisms', and she characterizes phantasy as 'the operative link' between such mechanisms and the drives. On the one hand, phantasies represent the meaningful content of drives that are understood as fundamentally directed toward objects; as such, phantasies are also necessarily 'directed to objects of some kind'. On the other hand, phantasies are bound up with the mechanisms of introjection and projection, which are psychic processes through which objects are either 'taken into the self and become part of it' or 'disowned and attributed to some person or group of persons, or some part of the external world'" (pg. 45-46)
      - ◆ *\*for 'mental mechanism' cf. G. Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, Table 4.1: Ego-Defense Mechanisms (pg. 67-68) <https://perpus.univpancasila.ac.id/repository/EBUPTI90498.pdf>*
      - ◆ "The phantasy of incorporation represents the erotic or libidinal drive and is correlated to the mechanism of **introjection**, by means of which external objects or part-objects are brought into and made part of the self; the phantasy of spitting out represents or gives content to the aggressive drive and is correlated to the mechanism of **projection**, by means of which parts of the self are split off or disowned and projected into some other person or persons" (pg. 46)
        - ◇ "an early phantasy is omnipotent in the sense that it 'tends to be felt as actually fulfilling itself, whether with an external or an internal object'" (pg. 46)
          - ▶ "although the young infant does not exist in a state of complete undifferentiation, they are easily overwhelmed by phantasy and must slowly and painfully learn to bring their phantasied, internal objects into closer alignment with the actual, external others on whom they are based" (pg. 46)
            - *\*i.e., they must learn they are not 'creators' of the world for which they exist (in), but that they exist in a world already 'there'.*
  - "**Klein's notion of the internal object is rooted in Freud's account. The internal object, for Klein, refers to a phantasied image of an object (or part-object) taken to be part of one's internal psychic world.** In this sense, Klein's phantasied internal object has a functional similarity to the Freudian notion of primary narcissism: it refers to the inner psychic reality that must slowly, over time, and through difficult and painful experiences, be brought more closely into alignment with the demands of external reality. However, although Klein acknowledges that this gap can never fully be closed, as this would mean the elimination of unconscious phantasy, the Kleinian subject is nonetheless related to others and to external reality from the very start, inasmuch as Klein's internal objects are themselves phantasmatic representations of actually existing external objects" (pg. 47)
    - "On Klein's account, **phantasy inevitably shapes and potentially distorts our perception of reality**, and thus of the flesh and blood others with whom we interact, in fundamental and ultimately unsurpassable ways. That is to say, it is not possible to interact with others in a way that isn't filtered through our own phantasy life. However, as I've indicated, Klein believes that we can and should strive to bring our unconscious phantasy life, or our relation to our internal objects, more in line with the actual others on whom those internal objects are based..." (pg. 47)
  - Intrapsychic and the Intersubjective, or, Klein and Critical Theory (pg. 48)
    - "Although Klein was often faulted for ignoring or downplaying environmental factors in child development and for a related overemphasis on unconscious phantasy, internal objects, and psychic reality, as I read her, the intrapsychic and inter-subjective dimensions of experience are in a constant and complicated interaction" (pg. 48)
      - "more intersubjectively oriented critics such as Greenberg and Mitchell have [thought]...Klein's continued adherence to drive theory stands in the way of her developing a full-fledged object-relational view, rendering her theory internally inconsistent" (pg. 48)
    - "**For Klein, object refers not only to the object of the drive, but also to a specific object relation—namely, the relation between infant and primary caregiver.** As she puts it, 'My use of the term "object-relations" is based on my contention that the infant has from the beginning of post-natal life a relation to the mother (though focusing primarily on her breast) which is imbued with the fundamental elements of an object-relation, i.e., love, hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences'" (pg. 49)
      - "although our relationship to external objects is necessarily structured by and filtered through our intrapsychic phantasies and projections, it remains a relationship (however mediated) to an external object" (pg. 50)
        - ◆ "given the centrality of her conception of the relation between drive and object, then, Klein at least implicitly recognizes the importance of environmental factors throughout her work" (pg. 50)
          - ◇ "[take as example] her claim that move to the depressive position is enabled by the infant's receiving consistent love and care from their primary caregiver. Klein acknowledges repeatedly that the love and responsiveness of the primary caregiver enables the infant to internalize the good object and begin to transition to the depressive position" (pg. 50)
    - "For Klein, the integration of the ego enhances perception of both internal and external objects and thus facilitates the synthesis of internal psychic reality with external reality. That is, an important aim of working through the depressive position is to bring one's internal and external objects into closer alignment" (pg. 51)
    - "In other words, in the **transference**, the analyst represents *both* the external objects on which the analysand's internal objects are based and their role in specific situations that mark the analysand's psychic development *and* the internalized objects that populate the analysand's psychic reality. And the aim of the analysis is to allow for constant interaction between reality and phantasy while ultimately preserving the

- distinction between the two" (pg. 51-52)
- "it seems too strong to say that Klein denies the role of environment and the relation to external others in psychic development. What she does deny... is that aggression and persecutory anxiety are caused by a bad environment. In fact, this is perhaps her most substantial disagreement with Winnicott..." (pg. 52)
  - "it actually rescues her from the problematic tendency to suggest that all psychopathology is the result of bad parenting" (pg. 52)
  - "to the extent that Klein breaks with the Winnicottian view that all psychopathology is rooted in failures of the environment, then, I would say: it's a good thing, too" (pg. 52)
- "Thus, for Klein, although the infant is object-related from the start and although the drives themselves are understood relationally, as dispositions or tendencies to interact with others lovingly or destructively, we can never experience an external other except through the lens of our own phantasies, anxieties, and projections" (pg. 52)
  - "[**what**] is true for the infant, for whom 'every external experience is interwoven with his phantasies and on the other hand every phantasy contains elements of actual experience'... **is equally true for the adult**" (pg. 52-53)
- "On the Kleinian view, intersubjectivity is basic to subjectivity, but it is also always entangled with intrapsychic phantasy and projection. In this way, Klein allows us to view subjectivity as socially and intersubjectively constituted while emphasizing that these dimensions of experience are inevitably mediated through (intrapsychic) unconscious phantasy and therefore, ultimately, through the drives (because phantasy is what gives content, structure, and meaning to inchoate drives). This makes Klein's account of intersubjectivity much more complex and ambivalent than other social and intersubjective accounts of the self that reject the notion of the drives and view the self as intersubjectively constituted all the way down" (pg. 53)
- "as I see it, the distinct advantage of **Kleinian drive theory is that it does not commit us to a problematic assumption of a biologically determined antisociality**. Rather, on the Kleinian account as I have reconstructed it, aggression and destructiveness are relational passions - constitutive tendencies to relate to others in certain ways, modes of sociality itself rather than innate antisocial tendencies. Moreover, as I have argued, Klein's account of the drives is not biologically reductionist. Kleinian drives are psychological and relational forces that express themselves through the body" (pg. 53)
  - "Kleinian drive theory is compatible with critical theory's basic methodological commitment to understanding subjectivity in social or intersubjective terms. Not only that, Klein's emphasis on both the complex interplay between reality and phantasy, between the intersubjective and the intrapsychic dimensions of human experience, offers critical theorists a realistic conception that understands persons as fundamentally **social beings who are torn between two different and conflicting modes of sociality, between our drive to connect with others and our urge to destroy those connections**" (pg. 54)
  - "[Klein's] work beautifully highlights what Jessica Benjamin calls the 'double-sidedness of the relation to the other' - that is, the fact that we are always at the same time relating to both the outside other and the other within" (pg. 54)
- "[Klein] understands object relations as necessarily mediated and filtered through the lens of unconscious phantasy, thus preserving the richness, complexity, and ambivalence that is often missing from intersubjectivist accounts that dispense with the language of drives" (pg. 54-55)
- Chapter 2 - A System of Scars: The Problem of Ego Integration (pg. 57)
  - "In his 1995 book, *Perversion and Utopia*, Joel Whitebook outlines what he calls "the problem of the ego" in Freud, a problem that stems from a deep tension, if not outright contradiction, in Freud's work" (pg. 57)
    - "For Whitebook, the answer lies in the fact that the realization that the ego is not the master of its own house prompts a decentration and humbling of the ego that is crucial for the curbing of infantile omnipotence - and thus for the ego's own process of enlightenment. Hence, the choice between strengthening or dismantling the dominating ego is a false one; the task, instead, is to envision a decentered, humbled, and finite yet still coherent ego capable of rationality and autonomy" (pg. 58)
  - "I contend that Klein's account of ego strength and integration should be understood not in terms of the triumph of the narcissistic ego against the discourse of the unconscious, but along the lines that Whitebook has traced: as a function of its expansion and enrichment through the ongoing incorporation of previously split-off unconscious content" (pg. 59)
- Paradoxes of the Ego (in Adorno) (pg. 60)
  - "The idea that the rational ego is a coercive, narcissistic, paranoid, and dominating structure is a prominent theme in Adorno's critical theory, closely linked to his reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. This theme emerges perhaps most clearly in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where Adorno and Horkheimer mobilize Nietzschean and Freudian insights to produce a damning critique of the formation of modern, bourgeois subjectivity through the domination of inner nature. Drawing on Freud's critique of civilization as founded on the renunciation of instinctual drives and his account of the ego as the psychic agency tasked with bringing the id to heel under its rational mastery, Adorno and Horkheimer transform this structural account into a historical one, generating a searing indictment of bourgeois society's entanglement with domination" (pg. 60-61)
    - ♦ *\*D. Held, in Introduction to Critical Theory, remarks "in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the task of Horkheimer and Adorno set themselves was nothing less than to discover 'why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism'" (pg. 148) [https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_4f54c133bb7741e8b6df1b24771d8843.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_4f54c133bb7741e8b6df1b24771d8843.pdf)*
    - "[the believed] the ego is held together through violence, through an injurious relation to inner nature" (pg. 61)
    - "the corollary of this conception of the compulsive and coercive character of the rational ego is an understanding of freedom as the dissolution of the ego" (pg. 63)
  - "Whitebook's claim that Adorno and Horkheimer view ego integration as *inherently* violent and coercive is questionable" (pg. 63)
    - "I read *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as telling a more historically contingent story about the development of enlightenment and related notions such as bourgeois rationality or subjectivity" (pg. 63)
      - ♦ "it is a mistake, I think, to read *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as offering a negative philosophy of history. Although the concept of bourgeois enlightenment subjectivity is, in a broad sense, entangled with the domination of inner nature, the particular forms that this takes in modern capitalist societies are contingent. Recognizing this point is essential for understanding the sense in which *Dialectic of Enlightenment* aims to hold up a mirror to enlightenment in order to enable it to disentangle itself from blind domination" (pg. 64)
  - "[Lars] Rensmann contends that the "essential link" among the various elements of the authoritarian personality-conventionalism, submissiveness to authority, aggression, coldness, love of power, cynicism, tendency to stereotypical thinking and projection, and fixation on sexuality-is the weakness of the ego in postliberal subjectivity. Ego weakness renders the individual incapable of mastering internal conflict, including, most notably, the demands of the superego. Under such conditions, individuals are more likely to externalize their conscience in the form of blind submission to an authoritarian leader" (pg. 66)
  - "the main question of [Adorno's] essay ['Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda'] is what transforms otherwise rational individuals into a mass who will support aims that are incompatible with their own rational self-interest" (pg. 66)
    - "On Adorno's analysis, fascism is authoritarian in its structure; therefore, individuals undergo the regression that transforms them into a mass because of their willingness to submit to authority. This means, in turn, that fascism rests on and exploits authoritarian



- personality structures. Fascism exploits the tendency to ego weakness by directly manipulating and controlling the unconscious..." (pg. 66)
- "he is simply calling our attention to one of the contradictions of our own society" (pg. 67)
    - ◆ "This, after all, is what he sees as the job of the critical theorist, given that we live in a thoroughly antagonistic society, a society that 'is not a society *with* contradictions or *despite* its contradictions, but *by virtue of* its contradictions'. It is the deeply antagonistic, contradictory nature of our society that gives rise to the need for a negative dialectics, a dialectics not of identity but of nonidentity, a dialectics that, rather than culminating in a higher order synthesis, strives to articulate the unreconciled state of our concepts and our social reality" (pg. 67)
  - "Klein offers an intersubjective psychoanalytic perspective that avoids Adorno's critique of revisionism and provides us with a model of ego integration that is noncoercive, nondominating, and open-ended" (pg. 68)
  - Adorno's Critique of Revisionism (pg. 68)
    - "revisionist psychoanalysis was Adorno's term for the post-Freudian school of psychoanalysis that rejected Freud's theory of drives and emphasized the importance of social and cultural environment on individuals" (pg. 68)
      - "The general thesis of Adorno's critique of revisionist psychoanalysis is, then, that it represents a false and problematic way of relating psychology to sociology, one that denies and obscures rather than articulating and illuminating the fundamental antagonism between individual and society. Revisionism is thus a 'sociologization of psychoanalysis' that emphasizes social, cultural, and environmental influences on the psyche 'at the expense of hidden mechanisms of the unconscious'. As such it is too superficial to provide critical insights into society" (pg. 69)
        - ◆ "by failing to acknowledge the diremption between society and individual, the revisionists are led - perhaps unintentionally - to a position of naïve optimism, social conformism, and conventional morality" (pg. 70)
          - ◇ "misunderstanding the source of the conflict between individual and society, revisionism expresses a 'sympathy for adaptation' to contemporary society" (pg. 70)
            - ▶ *\*this can be seen in R. Jaeggi's 'Alienation' where she suggests the way in which an individual is to overcome alienation is for them to comport themself to meet society's mold.*
          - ◇ "ironically, although revisionism was motivated in part by a reaction against Freudian orthodoxy and authoritarianism, **revisionist psychoanalysis is, because of its conformist tendencies, friendlier to authoritarianism and repression than Freudian thought was**" (pg. 70)
            - ▶ "By replacing Freud's emphasis on the conflictual and ambivalent drives with an account of social, cultural, and environmental influences on individual psychology, the revisionists turn a blind eye to the antagonistic relation between individual and society and endorse conformity and adaptation to the status quo as the goals of analysis. Ironically, in their attempt to do justice to the relationship between social and cultural forces and individual psychology, the revisionists deprive themselves of the resources that could enable them to illuminate this relationship" (pg. 71)
              - "psychoanalysis captures the historical truth of contemporary society...only when it focuses on the individual psyche and its internal conflicts" (pg. 71)
      - "although Klein is not inattentive to the impact of environmental factors on individual development, and although she recasts Freud's theory of the drives in a relational mode, she remains a drive theorist. Given her commitments to primary aggression, to the fundamental ambivalence of the drives, and to the ineliminable nature of unconscious phantasy, Klein's theory is very much an id psychology, not an ego psychology" (pg. 72)
        - "Klein thus provides...a psychoanalytic theory that emphasizes antagonism, nonidentity, and ambivalence without relying on a reductive biologism about drives" (pg. 72)
        - "A primary goal of analysis, for Klein, is to enable the analysand to more securely establish her internal good object, which in turn helps to facilitate further integration. In some sense, this requires the analyst to *be* the good object for the analysand. This means that **for Klein, the analyst's job is to supply love, support, and nourishment so that the analysand can more securely internalize the good object and draw on it for the integration, expansion, and enrichment of the ego**" (pg. 73)
          - ◆ "the analyst's task, for Klein, is to give the analysand good, nourishing interpretations - even if doing so requires telling the analysand something they do not want to hear" (pg. 73)
        - "both love and analytic transference are, for Klein, deeply marked by ambivalence and as such contain a significant 'admixture of despair'" (pg. 74)
      - "In sum, despite her emphasis on intersubjectivity, Klein's commitments to drive theory, primary aggression, and ambivalence render her conception fundamentally distinct from that of the revisionists. Moreover, her thoroughly relational conception of the drives provides a way of preserving the negative, antagonistic moment that Adorno found so crucial in drive theory without resorting to a reductive biologism" (pg. 74)
    - Klein on Ego Integration (pg. 74)
      - "On [Adorno's] view, integration is closely aligned with identity thinking: the subsumptive logic by means of which concrete particularity and difference are swallowed up by concepts is a logic of integration. The centrality of this theme to his critical theory and his deep-seated opposition to this logic are both evident from the fact that he frequently referred to his own philosophical method of negative dialectics as a logic of *disintegration*. For him, the logic of integration is characteristic of both modern philosophy - in particular of the idealist tradition of Kant and Hegel - and of capitalist modernity. **The integrative logic of modern capitalism is a central theme in Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the culture industry, which, they claim, destroys spontaneity and difference, enforces sameness and uniformity, and absorbs consumers into the universal by positioning them as fungible, replaceable stereotypes.** In so doing, the culture industry directly imprints the power of bourgeois capitalism onto individuals" (pg. 74)
        - *\*I think the logic of (dis)integration speaks not so much of the want to-disintegrate (i.e., to disassemble or destroy unity) so much it is the want to let stand that which is-different (i.e., embracing difference and diversity as a necessary quality of life).*
      - *\*cf. Dialectic of Enlightenment, Chapter 4 - The Culture Industry*  
[https://monoskop.org/images/2/27/Horkheimer\\_Max\\_Adorno\\_Theodor\\_W\\_Dialectic\\_of\\_Enlightenment\\_Philosophical\\_Fragments.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/2/27/Horkheimer_Max_Adorno_Theodor_W_Dialectic_of_Enlightenment_Philosophical_Fragments.pdf)
      - "it therefore makes sense that Adorno was sharply critical of psychoanalytic approaches that focus on integration. For him, to say that the goal of psychoanalysis was the achievement of a well-integrated psyche was to suggest that the subject should reconcile itself to a world that is riven by internal conflict and contradiction. Such integration constitutes, for Adorno, 'a false reconciliation with an unreconciled world'" (pg. 75)
        - "once we understand what Klein means by the integration of the self that is called for...we will see that her account actually coheres with Adorno's [claim] remarkably well" (pg. 75)
      - "[for Klein,] the key moment in the transition to the depressive position [from the paranoid-schizoid position] is when the infant recognizes the mother, who has up to now been split into good and bad part-objects (i.e., good and bad breasts), as a whole object" (pg. 76)
        - "this move represents a more integrated mode of experience, whereby the infant realizes that the bad, persecutory breast that they have

- attacked and destroyed in phantasy is one and the same as the loving, nourishing good breast that they both love and depend upon, but it also gives rise to depressive anxiety, rooted in the fear of the annihilation of the loved object" (pg. 76)
- ◆ "integration, for Klein, has nothing to do with a (false) conception of reconciliation whereby the fundamental antagonism between hate and love is overcome" (pg. 76)
  - ◆ "integration signals, for Klein, not the reconciliation or overcoming of ambivalence but rather a mode of experience in which the psyche can withstand the fundamental ambivalence of its relationship to its primary object without resorting to the splitting and internal fragmentation that are the hallmarks of the paranoid-schizoid position" (pg. 77)
    - ◇ "this connection reveals that ego strength for Klein has nothing to do with establishing rational mastery or the dominance of inner nature, it simply refers to enhancing the ego's capacities for integration" (pg. 78)
  - ◆ "in the depressive position and in the analytic situation, love and the drive for reparation emerge as countervailing forces that can help to mitigate the destructive effects of primary aggression" (pg. 78)
- "the emphasis on love indicates that Klein's is an essentially expansive conception of the ego where integrating and strengthening the ego means augmenting or enriching the personality in a way that doesn't eliminate but rather embraces both ambivalence and difference" (pg. 78)
- ◆ \*see comments on pg. 74
  - ◆ \*G. Rae, in his article 'Alienation, Authenticity and the Self', remarks "We have to understand that tragedy, heartache and existential difficulties are part of the human existence. Part of the challenge of human existence is learning to deal with these existential difficulties. To seek an existence free from the experience of existential difficulties is, I would argue, not only unrealistic, but also to seek an existence that is not truly human" (History of the Human Sciences, vol. 23, n. 4, 2010, pp. 30) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49763905\\_Alienation\\_authenticity\\_and\\_the\\_self](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49763905_Alienation_authenticity_and_the_self)
    - ◇ It is in this way that existentialism and psychoanalysis combine to give account of 'the human condition' and what's required for its progress.
- "Klein views both love and integration as fundamentally open-ended processes that are by definition incomplete and ongoing" (pg. 79)
- "aggression constituted an ever-present force that perpetually threatens us with falling back into splitting and fragmentation and that must be mitigated in an ongoing way through our capacities for love and reparation. Because primary aggression is ineliminable, there can be no ultimate reconciliation of ambivalence; the best we can hope for is to develop the capacities that enable us to better manage ambivalence" (pg. 79)
  - "the depressive position is, after all, *depressive*, melancholic. It emerges in response to an experience of loss - specifically, the loss of the idealized good object" (pg. 79)
    - ◆ "for Klein, **the idealization of the object is a defense** against persecutory anxiety" (pg. 79-80)
- "insofar as moving to the depressive position entails overcoming splitting and experiencing the object as a whole object, as both good and bad at the same time, it also entails the loss of idealization. In other words, **moving to the depressive position requires giving up the phantasy of the idealized, all-powerful, and all-nourishing good breast...and accepting the ambiguity and complexity of one's primary object and the ambivalence of one's relationship to it**. Thus, the depressive position is predicated not only on the fear of having destroyed the good object with one's destructive attacks, but also on the actual loss of the idealized good object" (pg. 80)
- "genuine reparation...involves accepting the loss of the idealized good objects and the harm that one has done to the object in phantasy and in reality and containing all the resulting ambivalence, complexity, and ambiguity" (pg. 80)
    - ◆ \*sounds like the core to what's 'responsibility' - cf. D. Winnicott, *The Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment, The Sense of Guilt* - "Gradually as the infant finds out that the mother survives and accepts the restitutive gesture, so the infant becomes able to accept responsibility for the total fantasy of the full instinctual impulse that was previously ruthless" (pg. 23) & "acceptance of responsibility which is called guilt" (pg. 24) & see pg. 66 for tabulation of "childhood is a progression from dependence to independence" & cf. *The Development of the Capacity for Concern* - "Concern implies further integration, and further growth, and relates in a positive way to the individual's sense of responsibility...[where] Concern refers to the fact that the individual cares, or minds, and both feels and accepts responsibility" (pg. 73) <https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Winnicott-D.W.-1965.-The-maturational-processes-and-the-facilitating-environment.pdf>
- "[in] the paranoid-schizoid position...the psyche is caught up in its own projections and overwhelmed by phantasy and psychic reality" (pg. 80)
- "the paranoid-schizoid ego mirrors Adorno's account of the ego in the grips of identity thinking..." (pg. 80)
- "Ego integration, for Klein, is an ongoing, incomplete process of incorporating more and more unconscious content into a richer, more internally differentiated, and more expansive ego that can tolerate the ambivalence that results from the duality of the drives and can mitigate the distortions of phantasy in its object relations" (pg. 81)
- Kleinian Psychoanalysis and Adornian Negative Dialectics (pg. 81)
- "to acknowledge the mortality and finitude of the subject is tantamount to acknowledging its own limitations..." (pg. 81)
    - \*cf. R. Schacht, *The Future of Alienation*, pg. 89 for 'finitude', 'alienation', and 'existentialism' [https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_98da7c4763c146e8a3023b4eae766667.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_98da7c4763c146e8a3023b4eae766667.pdf)
  - "If the problem is that the radical separation of subject from object leads to the subject's swallowing of the object, reducing the object to itself, the solution, for Adorno, lies in the infamous primacy (or priority or preponderance) of the object. This means that there is an irreducible asymmetry between subject and object; although objects can and do exist independently of subjects, subjects cannot exist independently of their status as object, which includes both their bodily nature and their rootedness in society" (pg. 83)
    - "as Jessica Benjamin has argued, to the extent that it remains on the terrain of the subject-object relation, this model does not offer critical theory a compelling account of intersubjectivity" (pg. 84)
  - "Klein's account of subject-object relation is at the same time an account of intersubjectivity inasmuch as the primary object is, for her, another person" (pg. 84)
    - "we might say that Klein's account of reparation corresponds to Adorno's notion of genuine reconciliation" (pg. 84)
      - ◆ "In contrast to the false harmony or reconciliation that is achieved through the denial of the deeply antagonistic character of the drives or their subsumption under the mastery of the rational ego, Klein's vision of the depressive ego's ability to withstand the ineliminable ambivalence between hate and love corresponds to Adorno's description of negative dialectics as the *nonidentity of identity and nonidentity*. Her emphasis on ambivalence...coheres with Adorno's focus on social antagonisms and contradictions" (pg. 84-85)
      - ◆ "Like Adornian negative dialectics, Klein's model of ego integration avoids the tyranny of identity thinking, which seeks to merge identity and nonidentity into a higher order of identity (or unity). And yet she offers a distinctive and compelling vision of genuine reconciliation: an account of integration that focuses on preserving and gathering together in a nonviolent, nondominating, even loving way the nonidentity of identity and nonidentity - that is, of subject and objects (both internal and external)" (pg. 85)



- "Freud's unofficial position on civilization has seemed to many readers to leave him mired in a conservative cultural pessimism that denies the possibility of any meaningful improvement in the human condition" (pg. 111)
  - "In his unofficial position, Freud not only reveals the source of the aggression and violence bottled up within judgments of relative civilizational value; he also holds up an unflattering mirror to our desire to sustain our self-congratulatory illusions of cultural superiority and progress with social-evolutionary arguments" (pg. 111)
- Chapter 4 - The Cure Is That There Is No Cure: Psychoanalysis and the Idea of Progress (pg. 121)
  - "psychoanalysis is...bound up with progress in the forward-looking sense of the possibilities for individual and social improvement. Insofar as it aims to bring about some sort of change for the better in the analysand, psychoanalysis is implicitly committed to a forward-looking notion of progress at the level of the individual..." (pg. 121-122)
  - Regression as Progress in Marcuse (pg. 124)
    - "Freud himself saw the struggle between the pleasure and reality principles as eternally antagonistic..." (pg. 125)
  - From Reconciliation to Reparation (pg. 132)
    - "[C. Fred] Alford contends that Kleinian love is more productive for critical theory than Marcusean Eros, insofar as the latter is inherently selfish, immature, and narcissistic" (pg. 132)
    - "I shall argue that Klein's account of love and reparation provides the basis for a realistic and nonutopian but still critical conception of the possibility of progress" (pg. 132)
    - "love...stands in a complex relationship to reparation. Reparation is made possible by love..." (pg. 134)
      - "love is the unifying force that enables the psychic integration characteristic of the depressive position" (pg. 134)
      - "depressive love is...in large part about living with, managing, and withstanding ambivalence" (pg. 134)
      - "Genuine reparation thus depends upon accepting the real or phantasied harm that one has done to the object, withstanding the fundamental ambivalence of one's relation to the object and to one's self, and integrating that complexity and ambiguity into one's ego. This, in turn, entails accepting that neither the damaged object nor oneself can ever be made fully whole-indeed, that complete reconciliation is an omnipotent illusion" (pg. 135)
        - ◆ "reparation may be able to mitigate the effects of primary aggression, but it can never, on Klein's view, eliminate, defuse, or bind the death drive entirely" (pg. 135)
    - "Klein's perspective thus offers important resources for understanding how we can deal with the death drive both ethically and politically. Indeed, **for Klein, ethics not only remains possible in the face of the death drive but in fact can be understood as emerging from the death drive**" (pg. 136)
      - "Freud had already in some sense understood ethics as an expression of the death drive. However, for him, ethics and the death drive come together in the superego, a turning inward of the death drive that enforces adherence to moral and social norms" (pg. 136)
      - "For Klein, the ability to identify with or put yourself in the place of the other—an ability that is fundamental to ethics - is generated within the dynamics of dependency, frustration, aggression, loss, and guilt that characterize early childhood" (pg. 137)
        - ◆ *\*this sounds, to me, a lot like 'empathy'; and, if so, shares greatly with Husserl's 'empathy' as a mean for discovering the Other. Cf. M. Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, pg. 91 - "'empathy is 'putting oneself in the standpoint of the Other'"*
      - "**destructiveness gives rise to guilt and the urge for reparation**" (pg. 137)
        - ◆ "This means that guilt and the drive for reparation needn't be imposed *from without* in the form of strict moral rules and laws that must be anchored in a superego through a process of internalization and aggressive self-beratement; they emerge *from within*, as an internal consequence of the move to the depressive position" (pg. 137)
        - ◆ "the depressive position is predicated upon loss" (pg. 141)
          - ◇ "what matters is the infant's perception that it has been lost as the result of their own destructiveness" (pg. 141)
  - Creativity as the Work of Mourning (pg. 138)
    - "Freud vacillates between two very different understandings of sublimation: as a *species of* and as an *alternative to* repression" (pg. 139)
      - *\*cf. comments on pg. 108*
    - "Klein, by contrast, provides an account of sublimation that is not modeled on repression" (pg. 140)
      - "sublimation for Klein entails not the redirection of repression toward higher aims, but the ongoing integration, enrichment, and expansion of the personality. Although she is highly attuned to the dynamics of ambivalence, Klein does not leave us in the uncomfortable position of longing for our own repression as a precondition of our freedom" (pg. 140)
    - "creativity for Klein is not only a matter of working through loss; it is also a process of harnessing and usefully channeling the energy and instability of previously split-off, painful, and anxiety-provoking unconscious impulses and aspects of experience" (pg. 142)
      - *\*cf. comments on pg. 108*
    - "for Klein, the psyche in the depressive position is forged through the acceptance of painful reality and is engaged in a process of working through the loss of idealizations entailed by this acceptance" (pg. 142)
      - "the painful reality in question for Klein is not so much human finitude but rather the fundamental ambivalence of all human relationships due to the ineliminability of the death drive" (pg. 142-143)
        - ◆ *\*the existentialist believes such suffering to derive from human finitude (which Buddhism shares in - cf. C. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, pg. 71-72 (\*pg. 59-60 of link below) - "everything in this world is conditional, relative, limited...everything being conditional and relative is necessarily momentary and what is momentary must perish")* <https://ia800804.us.archive.org/25/items/IndianPhilosophyACriticalSurvey/Indian-Philosophy-A-Critical-Survey.pdf>
      - "thus Klein's is less an existential form of resignation than a social and relational one" (pg. 143)
        - ◆ "However, both accounts of resignation are linked to a strong critique of idealization. Idealization, for Klein, is a mode of paranoid-schizoid defense against persecutory anxiety, a way of protecting one's good objects by splitting them off from the bad and thus attempting to keep them pure and safe. As such, it is a relatively immature and omnipotent attempt to cope with a reality that is all too messy, complicated, and ambivalent" (pg. 143)
    - "Creativity for Klein is therefore, first and foremost, a productive response to constraints imposed upon the human condition by the death drive. In this picture, the death drive is figured in negative terms: as a feature of existence and human sociality that may be mitigated through acts of reparation and creativity but that is primarily something to be suffered and borne. However, some contemporary Kleinians urge a less wholly negative view of the death drive" (pg. 143)
      - "aggression [according to Thomas Ogden] has a distinctive value, of particular importance for creative pursuits: it clears space for something new by destroying existing structures, modes of thought, and patterns of relationship" (pg. 143)
    - "Reparation and creativity for Klein are not about restoring a phantasied state of wholeness; rather, they are about reassembling the shattered pieces of a ruined, lost object and world in a way that acknowledges the depth of the loss and nonetheless resolves to make meaning and beauty out of the remaining fragments" (pg. 144)
  - Progress (Without a Cure) (pg. 145)

- "Klein argues [that] the sublimation of aggression is crucial for creativity and art..." (pg. 145)
- "Klein contends...that efforts to promote progress as a forward-looking moral or political imperative that are predicated on a denial of the death drive are grounded in a kind of wishful thinking that dooms them to failure. In this way, the failure to do justice to the death drive might itself constitute an impediment to progress" (pg. 145)
- "Freud was an ardent defender of both the reality and the possibility of progress, understood as the progressive rational mastery of the ego and the related rise of secular science" (pg. 145-146)
- "On the Kleinian account, progress in the future would consist in nothing more - but also nothing less - than working to ameliorate the aggressive tendencies toward splitting and the mirror image processes of demonization and idealization, hallmarks of the paranoid-schizoid position, that fuel the dynamics of domination" (pg. 149)
- Chapter 5 - Transference (pg. 151)
  - "the idea of modeling critical theory on psychoanalytic method received its most explicit and systematic articulation in Jurgen Habermas's early work *Knowledge and Human Interests*..." (pg. 151)
  - "any attempt to model critical theory on psychoanalytic method must grapple with the role of transference..." (pg. 153)
- Psychoanalysis as Model of Critique (pg. 154)
  - "Psychoanalysis, for Habermas, thus aims at a reflective act of self-understanding, specifically of those portions of our life history that have been alienated, split off, or repressed; its goal is that of making the unconscious conscious by translating it into a communicable language" (pg. 154)
    - "his account of psychoanalysis emphasizes and places conceptual and temporal priority on the role of linguistic interpretation and rational insight in the process of self-reflection" (pg. 154)
    - "for Habermas, psychoanalysis works...through the medium of insight" (pg. 155)
    - "Therefore, critique becomes the process of methodical self-reflection applied at the level of the social whole; it is the attempt to restore a broken or distorted internal dialogue within a society, by restoring open and free communication with those parts that have been internally split off or alienated. It may be guided by an emancipatory interest-that is, an interest in overcoming social suffering or political domination—and it may, if all goes well, result in practical social and political transformation, but critical power inheres in critical insight, specifically in a process of communicative, rational enlightenment" (pg. 155)
  - "On Honneth's view, critical theory starts from a stance of negativity, from the identification of injustices and other forms of social harm and suffering. These forms of suffering are experienced as such insofar as they violate legitimate expectations of the social conditions that are necessary for individuals to lead a good life" (pg. 156)
    - "the idea of a social pathology of reason necessarily presupposes a conception of intact social rationality, for it is only against the background of such a conception that a pathology of reason can be identified as pathological" (pg. 156)
    - "On Honneth's reading, psychoanalysis rests on an individual interest in rational enlightenment and self-realization that parallels the emancipatory interest that fuels social critique. Thus, psychoanalysis serves as a model for critical theory insofar as the emancipatory aim of each is the achievement of a more rational mode of self-relation or society. **This enhanced rationality is understood as the fuller realization of the rational potential that is inherent in both the individual and in the modern social order, but deformed by neurosis.** in the former case, and capitalism, in the latter. Moreover, for Honneth, the method for achieving this emancipatory aim - in both psychoanalysis and critical theory - is the reactivation and mobilization of the very rational powers that have been distorted either by neurosis or by social pathologies of reason. On this view, psychoanalysis and critical theory work by mobilizing rational, reflective insight and processes of critical self-understanding whereby previously split off components of the personality or the society are integrated into a rational psychic or social whole" (pg. 158)
- Psychoanalytic Method (pg. 161)
  - "Although these three versions of the analogy between critique and psychoanalysis differ in their details, each rests on a rationalist interpretation of psychoanalytic method. For Habermas, psychoanalysis is a process of enlightenment that works through the medium of critical insight; for Honneth, it is the repair of a distorted form of rationality; for Celikates, it is the enhancement of the analysand's capacities for critical self-reflection. Even as all three authors acknowledge, to varying degrees, that analysis is not merely cognitive but also affective, motivational, and practical in character, they converge on the assumption that psychoanalysis works, if and when it does work, through the medium of rational insight or reflection. It is this assumption that we should pause to consider" (pg. 161)
  - "The transference situation gives expression to the ongoing interplay between conscious and unconscious mental processes, between the analysand's perception of reality and their unconscious phantasies...To analyze the transference is thus to analyze this complicated set of processes and relationships" (pg. 165)
    - "Analysis of the transference aims to reveal to the analysand how their experience of their object world (both inner and outer) came to follow a certain pattern, and it is by bringing this home to the analysand that transformation becomes possible" (pg. 165)
    - "transference bring the analysand face to face with the fact that the analyst cannot give them the knowledge that they seek because the analyst does not have it..." (pg. 167-168)
- Transference and Critique (pg. 169) *\*what the author seems to be doing is equating the position of the 'critical theorist' toward society with the 'analyst' to analysand; otherwise, drawing "the analogy between psychoanalysis and the methodology of critique..." (pg. 176) - thus the title of her book 'Critique on the Couch'.*
  - "Klein contends that transference concerns not just the one-to-one relationship between analyst and analysand but a more complex situation that represents the analysand's entire world of internal and external object relations..." (pg. 170)
  - **"Situated at the level of the symbolic, transference is a spontaneous construction of the past within the present that is accessible to interpretation and directed to the Other"** (pg. 170)
- Philosophy as Interpretation (pg. 175)
  - "Philosophical idealism has failed, for Adorno, because present social reality is thoroughly irrational. Any philosophical position that holds that the real is the rational and the rational is the real only serves to obscure the deeply antagonistic, contradictory, and irrational nature of current social reality and thus to justify the status quo. In order to make this contradictory reality visible, philosophy requires a different, nonidealist method" (pg. 177)
    - "To find a meaning in reality is to justify it - and this is decidedly not the goal of interpretation, as Adorno understands it. Moreover, reality as such has no reason and thus no meaning; **it is not produced intentionally**" (pg. 177)
      - ◆ *\*a 'rational' society is defined by its 'coordinating effort' (or, mutual engagement toward shared ends). Given this, Adorno is partly correct - 'society' as a collectivity does not 'act' through united means (i.e., in harmony). However, such does not equate to their not being at all rationality in individual or group 'action' (i.e., praxis). Cf. I. Kirzner, Market Theory and the Price System (2011), pg. 38 - The Problem of Coordination*  
[https://oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/2491/Kirzner\\_1538-02\\_LFeBk.pdf](https://oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/2491/Kirzner_1538-02_LFeBk.pdf)
    - "if the totality is 'inconceivable as such', then it can be approached only through the interpretation of its fragments as assembled in constellation" (pg. 179)
  - "Just as psychoanalytic interpretation, when offered under the right conditions and at the right time, can light up the analysand's

idiosyncratic world of object relations or structure of desire in a new way, enabling the analyst to practically transform those structures, philosophical interpretation can light up social reality in a new and strikingly conclusive way, thus enabling its transformation" (pg. 178)

- "Philosophy as interpretation provides a form of words that, by revealing the contradictory and incoherent yet fractal quality of social experience lights up social conflicts or problems in a new way, enabling social actors to make conscious, effective transformations in their modes of thinking and acting. Together, they provide the backbone of a critical methodology that is rational without being rationalistic, attuned to the ambivalences and contradictions of social reality, and oriented to practical transformation" (pg. 181)
- Conclusion: From Theory to Practice (pg. 185)
  - "in the introductory chapter, I offered three reasons that critical social theory in the Frankfurt School tradition stands to benefit from a renewed engagement with the strand of psychoanalytic drive theory that stretches from Freud through Klein to Lacan. Although this list is not intended to be exhaustive, psychoanalysis offers critical theory at least the following: a realistic conception of the person that can mitigate critical theory's tendencies toward normative idealism; the possibility of rethinking the developmentalist conceptions of individual and social evolution that pervade critical theory; and the resources to understand critical theory's conception of the aims and methods of critique beyond problematic forms of utopianism and rationalism. Subsequent chapters have explored each of these reasons in greater detail" (pg. 185)
    - "Klein's noncoercive, nondominating, and open-ended conception of ego integration provides a compelling alternative to the Habermasian model of individuation through socialization" (pg. 186)
    - "a renewed engagement with a certain strand of psychoanalysis can help to address problems that have arisen within critical theory as an intellectual project: normative idealism, developmentalism, utopianism, and rationalism" (pg. 187)

d. Further Readings:

- .