

# The Jargon of Authenticity, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations: [https://ia801903.us.archive.org/0/items/adorno\\_jargon/adorno\\_jargon.pdf](https://ia801903.us.archive.org/0/items/adorno_jargon/adorno_jargon.pdf)

b. Quotes:

- "in retreating to the ideal of its pure nature, philosophy cancels itself out" - T. Schroyer (pg. xix)
- "Whoever stands behind his words, in the way in which these words pretend, is safe from any suspicion about what he is at that very moment about to do: speak for others in order to palm something off on them" - Author (pg. 14)
- "Existential philosophy would be lost immediately, if it once again believed that it knows what man is. It would again give us sketches of how to investigate human and animal life in its typical forms; it would again become anthropology, psychology, sociology. Its meaning is only possible when it remains groundless in its concreteness. It awakens what it does not know; it lightens and moves, but it does not fix and hold. For the man who is underway, this philosophy is the expression through which he maintains himself in his direction; the means toward preserving his highest moments-so that he can make them real through his life...Insight into existence, because it remains without an object, leads to no conclusion" - K. Jaspers (pg. 28)
- "Marxism, psychoanalysis, and racial theory are today the most widespread deceptions of mankind" - K. Jaspers (pg. 38)
- "**Without judgment [jargon] hands down the judgment of tradition.**" - Author (pg. 44)
- "...one should not speak of freedom without adding that it is identical with duty" - Author (pg. 129)

c. General Notes:

- Forward, by T. Schroyer (pg. vii)
  - "Existentialism has been described by Paul Tillich as 'an over one hundred year old movement of rebellion against the dehumanization of man in industrial society'" (pg. vii)
  - "**The Jargon of Authenticity is Theodor W. Adorno's critique of the ideology of German existentialism.** As a member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, Adorno's critique is a Hegelian-Marxist response to the existentialist rejection of critical reason" (pg. vii-viii)
    - "Adorno's critique is itself an attempt to transcend and include in the perspective of critical reason the truth of the existentialist concern for the fundamentalness of human subjectivity. In this sense Adorno's analysis parallels that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who in the introduction to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* argues that, correctly understood, existentialism is a moment of dialectical, or critical, reason" (pg. viii)
  - "However, Adorno's intent goes beyond a countercritique of existentialism and aspires to be a critique of the ideology inherent in its German formulations. **Adorno not only wants to salvage the notion of subjectivity from the idealistic tendency of existentialism, a concern he shares with Sartre, but he also wants to show that this theory has become a mystification of the actual processes of domination.** In this way Adorno's critique is within the tradition of critical theory's critique of ideology. The intent of critical theory is to reconstruct the generation of historical forms of consciousness in order to demonstrate how they misrepresent actual social relations and thereby justify historical forms of domination. In this way dialectical reason is actualized by critical theorists who, in their reflective critiques of the basic categories of historical consciousness, seek to reconcile men and women to the actuality of their historical possibilities. So conceived, critical theory is a theoretical moment of the 'class struggle'" (pg. viii-ix)
    - "It was precisely the failure of Marx's historical agent of change, the proletariat, to become a class-for-itself that stimulated the Frankfurt school's analyses of the ideological reifications that blocked human liberation. Their concern for the growth of false consciousness generated by the "culture industry" and the increased integration, and yet atomization, of persons in the industrial order resulted in a series of critical analyses of mass culture and ideological traditions, e. g., authoritarian social forms, the legacy of the Enlightenment's notion of Reason, etc. In the absence of a decisive agent of social change, and in the midst of what Marcuse termed a "one-dimensional society," **the basic interest of the Frankfurt school was to restore the actuality of critical rationality.** Indeed, their refusal to affirm "mechanical Marxism" or utopian hopes for liberation is perhaps evidence of their consistency in staying within the limits of negative critique. For them, only in the negation of pseudo-integrations and resolutions was emancipatory action clearly possible. Hence, the Frankfurt school became a tradition of revolutionary theorists who, in the absence of the objective possibilities for the transcendence of industrial domination, attempted to uphold the ideals of critical reason that anticipated the emancipation of mankind from the unnecessary power constraints of nature and history. In this way **their work is basically a critique of the reifications that conceal the truth of critical reason.** Since "reification" is for them "a forgetting," their work is essentially a remembrance, from the historical setting of the mid-twentieth century, of the notion of critical reason" (pg. ix-x)
  - "**Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity continues the critique of existentialism** that had always been an issue for Frankfurt theorists" (pg. x)
    - "Adorno shows that Kierkegaard's notion of love transcended human differences, happiness, and even historical morality itself." (pg. x)
      - "In oppressing both natural drives and the right of the mind to question, radical inwardness loses love's power of reconciling the antagonism between natural instincts and socially formed selves. In abstract inward love, both historical need and happiness are effectively denied. The real object of this love's "desire" is redemption-which becomes the ultimate reality sought." (pg. xi)
    - "Adorno shows that this radical Christian inwardness evades the actuality of secular injustice and inequality" (pg. xi)
      - "Adorno's central point is that Kierkegaard's radical inwardness has lost the dialectical mediation of subject and object-which was the achievement of Hegel's critical philosophy. That is, the constitutive presuppositions of human subjectivity must themselves be dialectically related to the historical context in which determinate subjects are formed. Failure to so relate the subject and object of historically situated knowledge results in the fallacy [objectivism and] the reduction of subjectivity to the in-it-selfness of facts (e.g., positivism) or the innate principles of mind (the idealistic philosophy of the identity of reason and mind). Both forms of objectivism are the loss of critical (dialectical) reason. Only the tradition of reflective critique conceived of human subjectivity in a way that did not reduce it to the determinateness of natural facts or absorb it into the spiritual principles of absolute idealism. Kierkegaard's radical inwardness becomes an idealistic objectivism by failing to comprehend subjectivity as a historical category" (pg. xi-xii)
  - "Kierkegaard is more deeply aware of the transformation of the person in the bourgeois epoch than his contemporaries or his later German existentialist followers. That is, he recognized the mechanisms of industrialization that force men into alienated social patterns and reified communications" (pg. xi)
  - "**Dialectically conceived "subjectivity" is historically formed and yet not reducible to historical determinations;** historical subjectivity is reconstructed from the framework of reflective critique in that the limits of constitutive synthesis establish the range of possible experience. Only in such a reflective reconstruction of the genesis of subjectivity is it possible to distinguish between real possibilities and those modes of appearance that are but abstract illusions, e.g., existentialism's transcendence of historical domination. So conceived, **the dialectical notion of subjectivity is a fundamental category of critical reason**" (pg. xii)
  - "In The Jargon of Authenticity Adorno applies the method of immanent criticism to contemporary German existentialists (Buber, Jaspers, Heidegger, etc.). **His basic thesis is that after World War II this philosophical perspective became an ideological mystification of human domination - while pretending to be a critique of alienation.** Use of existentialistic terms became, Adorno argues, a jargon: a mode of magical expression which Walter Benjamin called an "aura". In the aura of existentialism the historical need for meaning and liberation was expressed, but in a way that mystified the

- actual relation between language and its objective content. Adorno's critique focuses on the jargon's incapacity to express the relation between language and truth, in that it breaks the dialectic of language by making the intended object appear present by the idealization inherent in the word itself. The jargon, therefore, falls into an objectivism that conceals the difference between philosophical reflection and the in-itselfness of the object of reflection. Such objectivism loses the intent of reflection to maintain a self-consciousness of the mediation of fact through the thinking subject. Consequently, in the jargon objective consciousness is compressed into self-experience, and an idealism results" (pg. xiii)
- "Adorno's analysis here continues Marx's analysis of the fetishism of commodities, in that the symbolisms of the jargon do not represent actual social relations but rather symbolize only the relations between abstract concepts. Lost in the fetishisms of the jargon is the actuality of the historical development of human consciousness. That the subject itself is formed, and deformed, by the objective configuration of institutions is forgotten, and thus reified, in the jargon's pathos of archaic primalness. Consequently, there is a loss of the objective context of human society and an idealistic compression of all historical consciousness into the sphere of self-experience." (xiv)
    - "The resulting movement to a radical inwardness and its expressions of authenticity, freedom, etc., is an attempt to actualize these ideals outside of the objective social context: to fulfill heroic cultural models independent of the society. Behind these empty claims for freedom the socioeconomic processes of advanced capitalist integration continue, intensifying the dependence of all persons upon large organizational units for employment and welfare. The jargon's "blessings" conceal this objective context of unfreedom, and in the name of critical reflection the jargon joins hands with modern advertising in celebrating the meaningfulness of immediate experience" (pg. xv)
  - Hegel proclaimed philosophy a "homecoming" that critically reconciled objective discord and subjective consciousness. His intent was to maintain a meaningful totality by the reflective mediations of critical reason. Reflection had as its aim the critique of abstractions, or in Marxian terms, of reifications. In this way Marx's work attempted to demonstrate the nonequivalence of exchange in the capitalist economy-thereby restoring to human consciousness a critical mediation of economic exploitation." (pg. xv)
  - "Hence for Adorno, German existentialism and related genres, such as neoromantic lyric poetry (e.g., Rilke), come to a head in a **mythic jargon that reduces the dialectical relationship of reflective critique to the objective content and context of subjectivity.** The result is an ideology of the simple in which the primal sense of pure words is elevated in a futile attempt to overcome the "alienation" that remains linked to the political-economic framework of society" (pg. xv-xvi)
    - "Adorno's reconstruction of Heidegger's philosophy attempts to show that it becomes an ontology that retreats behind, rather than overcomes, the tradition of transcendental philosophy. In the universalization of transcendental subjectivity into Dasein, the empirical is totally lost and, as Adorno claims, an essence-mythology of Being emerges. This is exemplified in the claim that the primacy of Dasein is a realm beyond fact and essence and yet one which maintains itself as an identity. Whereas critical reason was able to show that maintenance of identity of consciousness presupposed a dialectic of subjective and objective reciprocity which was unified only in the constitutive activity of concrete subjectivity itself, Heidegger's notion of Dasein as both ontic and ontological stops the dialecticity of conscious existence in an idealistic elevation of the absolute subject" (pg. xvi)
      - "Adorno's thesis is that Heidegger's notion of selfness remains a reified tributary of Husserl's concept of subject" (pg. xvi-xvii)
      - "Adorno examines the notions of "Dasein," "authenticity," "death," "care," etc., and shows that their use evades the issue of historical determinateness by means of a primary and absolute creative subject which is, by definition, supposedly untouched by reification" (pg. xvii)
  - The Jargon of Authenticity (pg. 3)
    - "In the early twenties a number of people active in philosophy, sociology, and theology, planned a gathering. Most of them had shifted from one creed to another. Their common ground was an emphasis on a newly acquired religion, and not the religion itself. All of them were unsatisfied with the idealism which at that time still dominated the universities. Philosophy swayed them to choose, through freedom and autonomy, a positive theology such as had already appeared in Kierkegaard. However, they were less interested in the specific doctrine, the truth content of revelation, than in conviction" (pg. 3)
      - "Those united together were anti-intellectual intellectuals" (pg. 4)
        - "in philosophy [Heidegger] molded that which the authentics strive for less theoretically; and in that way he won over to his side all those who had some vague reaction to that philosophy" (pg. 5)
          - ◆ "Of course in Heidegger, as in all those who followed his language, a diminished theological resonance can be heard to this very day." (pg. 5)
      - "the sacred quality of the authentics' talk belongs to the cult of authenticity rather than to the Christian cult, even where - for temporary lack of any other available authority - its language resembles the Christian. Prior to any consideration of particular content, **this language molds thought. As a consequence, that thought accommodates itself to the goal of subordination even where it aspires to resist that goal.** The authority of the absolute is overthrown by absolutized authority. Fascism was not simply a conspiracy - although it was that - but it was something that came to life in the course of a powerful social development. Language provides it with a refuge. Within this refuge a smoldering evil expresses itself as though it were salvation." (pg. 5)
      - "In Germany a jargon of authenticity is spoken" (pg. 5)
        - "While the jargon overflows with the pretense of deep human emotion, it is just as standardized as the world that it officially negates; the reason for this lies partly in its mass success, partly in the fact that it posits its message automatically, through its mere nature. Thus the jargon bars the message from the experience which is to ensoul it" (pg. 6)
          - "The jargon has at its disposal a modest number of words which are received as promptly as signals. "Authenticity" itself is not the most prominent of them." (pg. 6)
            - ◆ "The words become terms of the jargon only through the constellation that they negate, through each one's gesture of uniqueness. The magic that the singular word has lost is procured for it by manipulations - of whatever kind" (pg. 7)
              - ◇ "The ether is mechanically sprayed, and atomistic words are dressed up without having been changed. Thus they become more important than the jargon's so-called system. **The jargon - objectively speaking, a system - uses disorganization as its principle of organization, the breakdown of language into words in themselves.**" (pg. 7)
        - "What is or is not the jargon is determined by whether the word is written in an intonation which places it transcendently in opposition to its own meaning; by whether the individual words are loaded at the expense of the sentence, its propositional force, and the thought content" (pg. 8)
          - "This formal element favors demagogic ends. Whoever is versed in the jargon does not have to say what he thinks, does not even have to think it properly. The jargon takes over this task and devaluates thought" (pg. 9)
            - "Communication clicks and puts forth as truth what should instead be suspect by virtue of the prompt collective agreement" (pg. 9)
        - "**Expressions and situations, drawn from a no longer existent daily life, are forever being blown up as if they were empowered and guaranteed by some absolute which is kept silent out of reverence.** While those who know better hesitate to appeal to revelation, they arrange, in their addiction to authority, for the ascension of the word beyond the realm of the actual, conditioned, and contestable; while these same people, even in private, express the word as though a blessing from above were directly composed into that word. **That supreme state which has to be thought, but which also refuses being thought, is mutilated by the jargon.** The latter acts as if it had possessed this state "from the beginning of time," as it might run in

- the jargon. **What philosophy aims at, the peculiar character of philosophy which makes representation essential to it, causes all its words to say more than each single one. This characteristic is exploited by the jargon.** The transcendence of truth beyond the meanings of individual words and propositional statements is attributed to the words by the jargon, as their immutable possession, whereas this "more" is formed only by the mediation of the constellation" (pg. 11)
- "According to its ideal, philosophical language goes beyond what it says by means of what it says in the development of a train of thought. Philosophical language transcends dialectically in that the contradiction between truth and thought becomes self-conscious and thus overcomes itself. The jargon takes over this transcendence destructively and consigns it to its own chatter. Whatever more of meaning there is in the words than what they say has been secured for them once and for all as expression. The dialectic is broken off: the dialectic between word and thing as well as the dialectic, within language, between the individual words and their relations. Without judgment, without having been thought, the word is to leave its meaning behind. This is to institute the reality of the "more." It is to scoff, without reason, at that mystical language speculation which the jargon, proud of its simplicity, is careful not to remember. The jargon obliterates the difference between this "more" for which language gropes, and the in-itself of this more. Hypocrisy thus becomes an a priori, and everyday language is spoken here and now as if it were the sacred one" (pg. 11-12)
    - "The jargon transgresses this rule blasphemously. When it dresses empirical words with aura, it exaggerates general concepts and ideas of philosophy - as for instance the concept of being - so grossly that their conceptual essence, the mediation through the thinking subject, disappears completely under the varnish. Then these terms lure us on as if they were the most concrete terms. Transcendence and concretion scintillate. Ambiguity is the medium of an attitude toward language which is damned by its favorite philosophy" (pg. 12-13)
      - ◆ "One's relation to his fellow man should be important prior to all content..." (pg. 13)
  - "The jargon channels engagement into firm institutions..." (pg. 13)
  - "**The empty chatter about expression is the ideology complementary to that silencing which the status quo imposes on those who have no power over it, and whose claim is therefore hollow in advance.** But whatever turns its back critically on the status quo has been discounted, by Germans in solid positions, as 'without expressive value'" (pg. 15)
  - "**The concept of statement appears in Heidegger as nothing less than the constituent of the *Da*, existence. Behind this jargon is a determining doctrine of the I-thou relationship as the locale of truth - a doctrine that defames the objectivity of truth as thingly, and secretly warms up irrationalism.** As such a relationship, communication turns into that transpsychological element which it can only be by virtue of the objectivity of what is communicated; in the end stupidity becomes the founder of metaphysics. Ever since Martin Buber split off Kierkegaard's view of the existential from Kierkegaard's Christology, and dressed it up as a universal posture, there has been a dominant inclination to conceive of metaphysical content as bound to the so-called relation of I and thou. This content is referred to the immediacy of life" (pg. 16)
    - "Theology is tied to the determinations of immanence, which in turn want to claim a larger meaning, by means of their suggestion of theology: they are already virtually like the words of the jargon. In this process, nothing less is whisked away than the threshold between the natural and the supernatural" (pg. 16)
      - "Buber's style of existentialism draws its transcendence, in a reversed analogiaentis, out of the fact that spontaneous relationships among persons cannot be reduced to objective poles. This existentialism remains the *Lebensphilosophie* out of which it came, in philosophical history, and which it abnegated: it overelevates the dynamism of mortality into the sphere of immortality." (pg. 17)
  - "**The jargon likewise supplies men with patterns for being human, patterns which have been driven out of them by unfree labor, if ever in fact traces of free labor did exist.** Heidegger instituted authenticity against the they and against small talk, without deluding himself that there could be a complete leap between the two types of existentials that he deals with; for he knew that they merge into each other precisely because of their own dynamism. But he did not foresee that what he named authentic, once become word, would grow toward the same exchange-society anonymity against which *Sein und Zeit* rebelled. The jargon, which in Heidegger's phenomenology of small talk earned an honored position, marks the adept, in their own opinion, as untrivial and of higher sensibility; while at the same time that jargon calms the constantly festering suspicion of uprootedness" (pg. 17-18)
  - "In professional groups which, as they say, carry on intellectual work, but which are at the same time employed, dependent, or economically weak, the **jargon is a professional illness**" (pg. 18)
    - "The stereotypes of the jargon support and reassure subjective movement. They seem to guarantee that one is not doing what in fact he is doing - bleating with the crowd - simply by virtue of his using those stereotypes to guarantee that one has achieved it all himself, as an unmistakably free person. **The formal gesture of autonomy replaces the content of autonomy. Bombastically, it is called commitment, but it is heteronomously borrowed.**" (pg. 18)
      - "The institutional and psychological superstructure, which in 1930 Kracauer diagnosed as a culture of employees, deluded the celluloid-collar proletariat, who were then threatened by the immediacy of losing their jobs. It deluded them into believing that they were something special. Through this delusion the superstructure made them toe the bourgeois line, while in the meantime, thanks to a lasting market boom, that superstructure has become the universal ideology of a society which mistakes itself for a unified middle class. They let themselves be confirmed in this attitude by a uniform mode of speech, which eagerly welcomes the jargon for purposes of collective narcissism" (pg. 20)
  - "**The undiminished irrationality of rational society encourages people to elevate religion into an end in itself, without regard to its content:** to view religion as a mere attitude, as a quality of subjectivity. All this at the cost of religion itself. One needs only to be a believer - no matter what he believes in. **Such irrationality has the same function as putty. The jargon of authenticity inherits it...**" (pg. 21)
    - "Sonnemann has described this phenomenon as not being able to get rid of a benevolent attitude which at all costs defends order, even an order in which all these things are not in order" (pg. 21-22)
      - "Benevolence is identical with being pre-decided. What is affirmative and wholesome doubles the curse of evil." (pg. 22)
  - "**All experts in the jargon, from Jaspers on down, unite in praise of positivity.** Only the careful Heidegger avoids a too open-hearted affirmation for its own sake, and indirectly pays his dues. He is eager and genuine about it." (pg. 22)
  - "**But shelteredness, as an existential value, turns from something longed for and denied into a presence which is now and here,** and which is independent of what prevents it from being. It leaves its trace in the violation of the word: the reminiscence of what is hedged-in and safely bordered remains joined to that element of short-sighted particularity which out of itself renews the evil against which no one is sheltered. Home will only come to be when it has freed itself from such particularity, when home has negated itself as universal. The feeling of shelteredness makes itself at home with itself, and offers a holiday resort in place of life" (pg. 26)
    - "A landscape becomes uglier when an admirer disrupts it with the words "how beautiful." The same happens to customs, habits, institutions which barter themselves away by stressing their own naivete instead of by changing it." (pg. 26)
    - "The logic of the jargon constantly smuggles in what is limited, finally even situations of material want, under the guise of positivity; and presses for their being eternally instituted at just that moment when, thanks to the state of human achievements, such a limitation no longer needs in reality to exist. A spirit which makes this limitation its cause hires itself out as the lackey of what is evil." (pg. 27)
      - "Nihilism turns into farce, into mere method, as has already happened to Cartesian doubt." (pg. 28)

- "...the jargon of authenticity, which takes pleasure in this situation, is committing itself to the philosophy of As If: through stage-setting, the now and here of a cult action is simulated, an action which through its omnipresence is annulled on television" (pg. 30)
  - "The benefit of the negative is transferred to the positive, as though by a single stroke of the pen: positive negativeness to warm the heart" (pg. 31)
- "On the one hand metaphysics means involvement with metaphysical themes, even if the metaphysical content is contested; on the other hand it means the affirmative doctrine of the transcendent world, in the Platonic model." (pg. 31)
- **"The more earnestly the jargon sanctifies its everyday world...the more sadly does the jargon mix up the literal with the figurative"** (pg. 33)
- "The Being of the sheltering space of shelteredness is simply derived from the necessity that man should "make for himself" such a space. The linguistic carelessness, in the unresisting mechanism of the jargon, admittedly lays shelteredness bare, as if out of compulsion; lays it bare as something that is merely posited. However, that which announces itself, in the game about the need for residences, is more serious than the pose of existential seriousness. It is the fear of unemployment, lurking in all citizens of countries of high capitalism. This is a fear which is administratively fought off, and therefore nailed to the platonic firmament of stars, a fear that remains even in the glorious times of full employment. Everyone knows that he could become expendable as technology develops, as long as production is only carried on for production's sake; so everyone senses that his job is a disguised unemployment. It is a support that has arbitrarily and revocably pinched off something from the total societal product, for the purpose of maintaining the status quo" (pg. 34)
- **"Socially, the feeling of meaninglessness is a reaction to the wide-reaching freeing from work which takes place under conditions of continuing social unfreedom.** The free time of the subjects withholds from them the freedom which they secretly hope for; their free time chains them to the ever-same, the apparatus of production - even when this apparatus is giving them a vacation. With this situation they are forced to compare the obvious possibilities, and they grow the more confused the less the closed facade of consciousness, which is modeled after that of society, lets through the conception of a possible freedom" (pg. 35-36)
  - "...in the feeling of meaninglessness which is the high-bourgeois expression of real need, the permanent threat of destruction is assimilated by consciousness. **What this consciousness dreads it turns in such a way that the threat seems to be an innate part of it, and thus it weakens that element of the threat which can no longer be grasped in human terms"** (pg. 36)
    - "The lack of something to hold on to is the mirror reflection of its opposite, of unfreedom" (pg. 37)
  - "Only because mankind failed to define itself did it grope for determination through something else: something that was safely out of the reach of the dialectical movement. The anthropological condition of so-called human emptiness...could be changed. The longing for some completing factor could be fulfilled, as soon as it was no longer denied - but not fulfilled, of course, through the injection of a spiritual meaning or a merely verbal substitution. **The social constitution essentially trains mankind for the reproduction of itself, and the compulsion extends itself into society's psychology**, as soon as it loses its external power. Thanks to the factor of self-preservation, which has blown itself up into a totality, the following happens: what man is anyway once more becomes his goal. Perhaps with this nonsense the appearance of meaninglessness might also disappear, the eagerly assured nothingness of the subject, a shadow of the state in which each person is literally his own neighbor. If it is the case that no metaphysical thought was ever created which has not been a constellation of elements of experience, then, in the present instance, the seminal experiences of metaphysics are simply diminished by a habit of thought which sublimates them into metaphysical pain and splits them off from the real pain which gave rise to them. **The jargon's whole hatred is directed against this consciousness.**" (pg. 37-38)
- "The practical usability of the enlightening disciplines is condescendingly granted in the beginning only to prevent more effectively any reflection on the truth content of criticism: **by arousing our indignation at the desire to destroy. Passionate grief about obliviousness to being is given the appearance of the essential - to the point where one would rather like to forget all Being"** (pg. 38)
- "Language uses the word "meaning" for the harmless epistemological intentional object of Husserl, as well as for the purpose of saying that something is justified as meaningful" (pg. 41)
  - **"The sign system of language, by its mere existence, takes everything, to begin with, into something that is held in readiness by society; and it defends this society in its own form prior to all content. This is what reflection stands firm against.** However, the jargon drifts with the current, and would be glad to increase it, in union with the regressive formations of consciousness" (pg. 41-42)
    - "The jargon simply ennobles the antiquity of language..." (pg. 42)
      - ◆ "Mixed with artificial coloring the words themselves, released from the relation to what is thought, are to speak a relation which should change them and so always demythologizes them. Language mythology and reification become mixed with that element which identifies language as antimythological and rational. The jargon becomes practicable along the whole scale, reaching from sermon to advertisement. In the medium of the concept the jargon becomes surprisingly similar to the habitual practices of advertising." (pg. 43)
    - "Without judgment [jargon] hands down the judgment of tradition." (pg. 44)
      - ◆ "The jargon, a waste product of the modern that it attacks, seeks to protect itself - along with literally destructive institutions - against the suspicion of being destructive: by Simultaneously accusing other, mostly anticonservative, groups of sinful intellectuality, of that sin which lies deep in the jargon's own unnaive, reflective principle of existence" (pg. 45)
- **"The bourgeois form of rationality has always needed irrational supplements, in order to maintain itself as what it is,** continuing injustice through justice. Such irrationality in the midst of the rational is the working atmosphere of authenticity." (pg. 47)
- "The jargon strives to turn the bitterness of the indigenus, of the mute, into something like a metaphysical-moral verdict of annihilation against the man who can speak out..." (pg. 48)
  - "That is the substantial element in authenticity, the holy fount of its strength. Taciturnity and silence are the best counterpoint to existential and existentialist babble. The order which this babble aims at is itself one that reaches for speechlessness of sign and command. In happy agreement with its consumers, the jargon fills the breach created by the societally necessary disintegration of language" (pg. 48)
- **"Heidegger has praise for the "splendor of the simple." He brings back the threadbare ideology of pure materials, from the realm of handicrafts to that of the mind - as if words were pure, and, as it were, roughened material.** But textiles of that sort are mediated, today, through their calculated opposition to mass production; and in just that way Heidegger wants, synthetically, to create a primal sense for pure words" (pg. 50)
- **"Another specifically social element plays into the category of the simple: the elevation of the cheap, in accordance with the wishes of the proudly declining elite** - an elevation related to youth music, which gladly goes along with the jargon and lets itself be accompanied by it. Being behind the times historically is no less eagerly converted into the feeling of the fatefully tragic, than into that of something higher; that too goes along with the silent identification of the archaic with the genuine" (pg. 50-51)
  - "But the triviality of the simple is not, as Heidegger would like it to be, attributable to the value-blindness of thought that has lost being. Such triviality comes from thinking that is supposedly in tune with being and reveals itself as something supremely noble. Such **triviality is the sign of that classifying thought, even in the simplest word, from which Heidegger pretends that he has escaped: namely, abstraction**" (pg. 51)
    - "Philosophical banality is generated when that magical participation in the absolute is ascribed to the general concept - a participation which puts the lie to that concept's conceivability" (pg. 51)
- **"Heidegger is filled with the disdainful pride of inwardness,** which he touches on philosophically, in his thought about Hegel's critique of it. **Whoever**

- is forced by the nature of his work to stay in one place, gladly makes a virtue out of necessity. He tries to convince himself and others that his bound-ness is of a higher order" (pg. 56)
- "Heidegger works with an antithesis between being alone and loneliness" (pg. 57)
  - "The human condition of the hero is, if anything at all, that ultimate being-thrown-back-on-oneself in which Heidegger trusts, somewhat optimistically." (pg. 57)
- "Heidegger's philosophy, which takes so much advantage of its ability to listen, renders itself deaf to words. The emphatic nature of this philosophy arouses the belief that it fits itself into the words, while it is only a cover for arbitrariness. Heidegger's primal sounds ape- as such sounds usually do." (pg. 58)
- "...the categories of the jargon are gladly brought forward, as though they were not abstracted from generated and transitory situations, but rather belonged to the essence of man, as inalienable possibility. **Man is the ideology of dehumanization.** Conclusions are drawn from certain categories which remind us of somewhat primal social relationships, where the institutions of exchange do not yet have complete power over the relationships of men. From those categories it is concluded that their core, man, is immediately present among contemporary men, that he is there to realize his *eidos*. Past forms of societalization, prior to the division of labor, are surreptitiously adopted as if they were eternal." (pg. 59)
- "The talk about man is so worthless because it prepares for untruth that which is of highest truth. There is great stress on the existential elements of man, in which slack and self-surfeited thought thinks it holds, in its hands, that concretion which it has lost through its transformation into method. Such maneuvers simply deflect us from seeing how little it is here a question of man, who has been condemned to the status of an appendage. The expression of the word "man" has itself modified its form historically" (pg. 60-61)
    - "...Man, whom the phrase enjoins us to care for, would not be so convincing if the phrase did not rely on a suspicion; the suspicion that, after all, the overpowering conditions of society really were made by men and can be undone by them. The overpowering strength of those relationships, like that of myth, has in it an element of fetishism and mere appearance. Just as the in-itself of the institution is mere appearance, a reflection of petrified human states of affairs, so in reality this appearance dominates men to the same degree. This is what debases the appeal to an inalienable essence of Man which has long been alienated. **It was not Man who created the institutions but particular men in a particular constellation with nature and with themselves. This constellation forced the institutions on them in the same way that men erected those institutions, without consciousness.**" (pg. 62)
      - ◆ "Both appearance and necessity are elements of the world of wares. Cognition fails as soon as it isolates one of these elements. He who accepts the world of wares as the in-itself, which it pretends to be, is deceived by the mechanisms which Marx analyzed in the chapter on fetishes. He who neglects this in-itself, the value of exchange, as mere illusion, gives in to the ideology of universal humanity. He clings to forms of an immediate togetherness, which are historically irretrievable if in fact they ever existed in any other form. Once capitalism has grown uneasy about theoretical self-assertion, its advocates prefer to use the categories of spontaneous life in order to present what is man-made. They present those categories as if they were valid now and here. The jargon busily splashes beyond all this, perhaps even proud of its historical obliviousness-as if this obliviousness were already the humanly immediate." (pg. 62-63)
  - "In the jargon, however, the word "Man" no longer relies on human dignity as idealism, in spite of the cult of historical figures and of greatness in itself. Instead, man is to have his powerlessness and nothingness as his substance; this becomes a theme in the philosophers in question. This powerlessness and nothingness of man is coming close to its realization in present society. Such a historical state of affairs is then transposed into the pure essence of Man. It becomes affirmed and eternalized at the same time. In this way the jargon plunders the concept of Man, who is to be sublime because of his nothingness. It robs him of precisely those traits which have, as their content, the criticism of states of affairs which preclude the divine rights of the soul. This criticism has been immanent in all enlightenment, as well as in early German idealism. The jargon goes hand in hand with a concept of Man from which all memory of natural law has been eradicated. Yet as an invariable, in the jargon man himself becomes something like a supernatural nature-category. Previously, the unbearable transience of a false and unsatisfied life was counteracted by theology, which gave hope of an eternal life. This hope disappears in the praise of the transient as absolute, a praise which of course Hegel had already deigned to bestow. As it runs in the jargon: suffering, evil, and death are to be accepted, not to be changed. The public is being trained in this tour de force of maintaining a balance. They are learning to understand their nothingness as Being, to revere actual, avoidable, or at least corrigible need as the most humane element in the image of Man. They are learning to respect authority in itself because of their innate human insufficiency. Although such authority now rarely calls itself god-sent, it still holds on to the regal insignia which once it borrowed from God the father. Insofar as this authority no longer has any legitimation, apart from merely being there, blind and obscure, it becomes radically evil. This is the reason why the universally human language-gesture is in good standing with the totalitarian state." (pg. 65-66)
    - "Humanity becomes the most general and empty form of privilege. It is strictly suited to a form of consciousness which no longer suffers any privileges yet which still finds itself under the spell of privilege" (pg. 66)
    - "Self-righteous humanity, in the midst of a general inhumanity, only intensifies the inhuman state of affairs. This is a state of affairs which necessarily remains hidden to those who suffer here and now. The jargon only doubles the hiding cover" (pg. 67)
      - ◆ "The jargon aims at a humility which is unquestioned and without relation. Such humility is presented as human virtue-in-itself. From the outset such humility has gone well with the insolence of the self-positing subject. The hiddenness of that which humility aims at, is in itself an invitation to be celebrated." (pg. 64)
  - "The empty phrase, Man, distorts man's relation to his society as well as the content of what is thought in the concept of Man. The phrase does not bother about the real division of the subject into separated functions that cannot be undone by the voice of mere spirit. The so-called Platonic psychology already expresses the internalization of the societal division of labor. Each function within the person, once firmly defined, negates the person's total principle. The person becomes simply the sum of his functions. In the face of this situation, however, the person becomes all the worse, since his own laboriously gained unity has remained fragile. **Each individual function, created under the law of self-preservation, becomes so firmly congealed that none can exist by itself, that no life can be constructed out of its functional pieces.** The individual functions turn against the self which they are supposed to serve. Life, insofar as it still exists, indicts such separation as false - for example in the verbal separation among thinking, feeling, and desiring. No thought is a thought - or more than a tautology - that does not also desire something. Without an element of cognition, no feeling and no will can be more than a fleeting motion. It is easy for the jargon to point its finger at the silliness of this division; for in the meantime it has swallowed the current term 'alienation'" (pg. 67-68)
    - "By means of the magic formula of existence, one disregards society, and the psychology of real individuals which is dependent on that society. Thus one insists on the changing of Man, who in Hegel's sense exists merely in the abstract. This results only in a tightening of the reins - not in elevation but in the continuing of the old suppressing ideology. While the authentic attacks psychoanalysis, they are really aiming at instinct. The degradation of instinct is taken over unreflectedly into their ethics" (pg. 68-69)
- "'Commitment' is the current word for the unreasonable demand of discipline. The term 'commitment' unites Heidegger and Jaspers together with the lowest tractatus-writers." (pg. 69)
- "People now dress up the factual state of commitment. The concept preserves the authority whose source of origin is cut off right from the

- beginning. The thing that is understood under the term "commitment" is no better than the word. Commitments are offered not for their own truth but as a medicine against nihilism, in the same manner as the values which were current a generation before, and which surreptitiously circulate again today." (pg. 70)
- "The genuineness of need and belief, which is questionable anyway, has to turn itself into the criterion for what is desired and believed; and in this way it becomes no longer genuine. This is the reason why no one can say the word 'genuineness' without becoming ideological" (pg. 70)
    - "In the jargon, however, it stands out in the unending mumble of the liturgy of inwardness. Like a ragpicker, the jargon usurps the final protesting movements of a subject which in its downfall is thrown back on itself and hucksters those movements off. The edge is removed from the living subject's protest against being condemned to play roles. The American theory of role-playing is so popular because it flattens out this protest into the structure of society. And the subject is told that the force from which he flees back into his cave has no power over him. Not lastly, the jargon is sacred as the language of an invisible kingdom, which exists only in the obsessive folly of the silent majority. So as not to scatter oneself today, through the consumer market-it is removed from its social context and interpreted as something which is of essence. But in that way it only negotiates something negative" (pg. 70-71)
      - **"Both Hegel and Goethe experienced and criticized inwardness as a merely accidental element.** They saw it as the condition for right consciousness, and as an element which had to be negated because of its limitation" (pg. 72)
      - **"The reconciliation between the inner and outer worlds, which Hegelian philosophy still hoped for, has been postponed ad infinitum.** Thus it has become unnecessary to advocate alienation, since the latter is in power anyway, as the law of those who are happy extroverts. At the same time the consciousness of the rupture becomes more and more unbearable. For slowly this rupture changes self-consciousness into self-deception. Ideology can grasp onto the fact that the growing powerlessness of the subject, its secularization, was at the same time a loss of world and concreteness" (pg. 72)
        - "With good reason, the first original philosophy after Hegel, that of Kierkegaard, has been called a philosophy of inwardness" (pg. 72)
          - ◆ "The jargon brought in to circulation many of the categories of inwardness and thus contributed its part to the destruction of inwardness by means of such a contradiction." (pg. 72)
        - "The less powerful the subject becomes, the more the sphere, which once self-consciously confessed itself to be inwardness, shrinks to an abstract point; the greater becomes the temptation for inwardness to proclaim itself and throw itself onto that same market by which it is terrified. Terminologically, inwardness becomes a value and a possession behind which it entrenches itself; and it is surreptitiously overcome by reification." (pg. 73)
    - "Those philosophers like Hegel and Kierkegaard, who testified to the unhappy state of consciousness for itself, understood inwardness in line with Protestant tradition: essentially as negation of the subject, as repentance. The inheritors who, by sleight of hand, changed unhappy consciousness into a happy non-dialectic one, preserve only the limited self-righteousness which Hegel sensed a hundred years before fascism. They cleanse inwardness of that element which contains its truth, by eliminating self-reflection, in which the ego becomes transparent to itself as a piece of the world. Instead, **the ego posits itself as higher than the world and becomes subjected to the world precisely because of this.** The hardened inwardness of today idolizes its own purity, which has supposedly been blemished by ontic elements. At least in this regard the outset of **contemporary ontology coincides with the cult of inwardness.** The retreat of ontology from the course of the world is also a retreat from the empirical content of subjectivity. In a classically enlightened attitude, Kant took an antagonistic stance toward the concept of the inward and separated out the empirical subject, which was dealt with by psychology, as one thing among others" (pg. 73-74)
      - **"In the classic texts of existentialism, as in that of the Kierkegaardian sickness unto death, existence becomes a relationship to itself, under which heading nothing further can be conceived. It becomes, as it were, an absolutized moment of mediation, without any regard for what is mediated;** and it pronounces a verdict, from the very beginning, against any philosophy of inwardness. In the jargon, finally, there remains from inwardness only the most external aspect, that thinking oneself superior which marks people who elect themselves: the claim of people who consider themselves blessed simply by virtue of being what they are. Without any effort, this claim can turn into an elitist claim, or into a readiness to attach itself to elites which then quickly gives the ax to inwardness" (pg. 75)
        - **"The jargon of authenticity, which sells self-identity as something higher, projects the exchange formula onto that which imagines that it is not exchangeable; for as a biological individual each man resembles himself."** (pg. 76)
          - ◆ "The over-all appearance of the immediate, which comes to a head in inwardness - now merely a specimen - makes it unusually hard for those who are steadily exposed to the jargon to see through it." (pg. 76)
      - "People console themselves, or are being consoled, by thinking that something has already been done about what is oppressing them when they talk about it" (pg. 79)
      - "The jargon proves itself as a piece of the negative spirit of the time; it institutes socially useful work within the tendency already observed by Max Weber; the tendency for administrations to expand out over what they consider as their cultural domain." (pg. 80-81)
        - "...he must use whatever cultural stuffing offers itself to him. And that is the jargon. This shelters him from the disagreeable task of expressing himself seriously on the matter at hand, about which he knows nothing. At the same time perhaps he can thus feign general acquaintance with the subject. **The jargon is so appropriate for that because, by its very nature, it always unites the appearance of an absent concreteness with the ennobling of that concreteness.** If there were no functional need for the jargon, which is hostile to function, it would hardly have become a second language - that of the languageless and those alien to language. The jargon, which is not responsible to any reason, urges people higher simply through its simultaneously standardized tone; it reproduces on the level of mind the curse which bureaucracy exercises in reality. It could be described as an ideological replica of the paralyzing quality of official functions" (pg. 81)
          - **"Society's regulatory violence becomes crassly tangible** to the people when they are obliged to request something from the inaccessible mouthpieces of the administration. Like these mouthpieces, **the jargon speaks directly to them without letting them respond"** (pg. 81-82)
      - "It is impossible to forget the image of those SA-men from the early period of Hitler's rule. In them administration and terror found themselves visibly joined; the folder of documents above, and below the high boots. The jargon of authenticity preserves something of this image in words like "commission." In such words there is calculated uncertainty about the distinction between something administratively arranged, justly or unjustly, and something absolutely commanded - between authority and sentiment" (pg. 83)
      - "In lyric poetry, as in philosophy, **the jargon acquires its defining character by the way it imputes its truth. It does this by making an intended object present - as though this object were Being without any tension toward the subject. That makes it, prior to all discursive judgment, into untruth.** The expression is sufficient unto itself. It discards as an annoyance the obligation to express a thing other than itself. Beyond its difference from that thing, which may already be nothing, and out of thanks, this nothing is made into that which is supreme." (pg. 85)
        - "In general, **the jargon behaves in this way itself. Indifferent to the matter at hand, it is to be used for commanded purposes.** Language, as once in major philosophy, no longer flows out of the necessity of the subject matter. Such language-procedural indifference has become a metaphysics of language: that which in terms of its form seems to fly above its correlative, thereby establishes itself as something higher" (pg. 87)
      - **"Heidegger, too, cracks the whip when he italicizes the auxiliary verb in the sentence, 'Death is'.** The grammatical translation of the imperative into a predication makes the imperative categorical. This imperative does not allow for refusal, since it no longer at all obliges like the Kantian imperative, but

- describes obedience as a completed fact. Possible resistance is then eliminated simply in terms of logical form. The objection raised by reason is banned from the range of what is at all conceivable in society. Such irrationality, in an element which still, in times of pawned-off myths, insists on calling itself thinking, was, of course, the blemish of the Kantian enlightenment. **The Kantian enlightenment asserts deceptively that it is not necessary to know the categorical imperative in order to act rightly. Meanwhile, the categorical imperative, if it is truly to be one with the principles of reason, trusts that each one who acts has reason, which if unimpaired would be philosophical reason**" (pg. 88-89)
- "The total content, however, is flowering non-sense. This becomes obvious in phrases like "To pronounce the question is to pose it," or, "No one knows better than man that which is of importance in the end." Such nonsense also has its reasonable basis in the world. It hides the fact that both it and the goal at which it aims are manipulated. For this reason all content is "bracketed," as it goes in administrative German" (pg. 92)
  - "The purpose, the intention, contracts itself into an intentionless underworldly language, truthful to the objective determination of the **jargon itself**, which **has no other content than its wrapping**" (pg. 92)
    - "After the fact, the jargon adapts itself to the need for a philosophy which was current in about 1925. This was a philosophy that strove for the concretization of experience, thought, and behavior in the midst of a total state of affairs which oriented itself according to something abstract - according to exchange. For this reason the jargon is neither able nor willing to concretize the elements which condemn it to abstractness. The jargon turns in a circle. It wants to be immediately concrete without sliding into mere facticity. It is consequently forced into secret abstraction..." (pg. 92-93)
      - "This can be grasped in existential ontology's theoretical criticism, especially in the paired concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity in *Sein und Zeit*. Already there the drive for concretion is coupled with a hands-off attitude. One speaks from a depth which would be profaned if it were called content. Yet this depth wants to be this content, which in turn wants to express itself. Heidegger's defensive technique [is] with-drawing into eternity..." (pg. 93)
        - ◆ "Heidegger cannot get enough of the ritual preliminaries for the "step into the temple," although hardly anyone nowadays dares to tie a warning bell around the cat's neck. **Heidegger is by no means incomprehensible**, as one might gather from the marginalia of the positivists, **but he lays around himself the taboo that any understanding of him would simultaneously be falsification.** The impossibility of saving what this thinking wants to save is cleverly turned into its own life element. This thinking refuses all content which would have to be argued against" (pg. 93)
  - "**Culture includes even the material infrastructure of society, in which human work and thought are rooted**, and the only means by which work becomes real societal work. This does not mean that the contrast to the suprastructure becomes any less sharp" (pg. 98)
    - "In the **universally mediated world** everything experienced in primary terms is culturally preformed. Whoever wants the other has to start with the immanence of culture, in order to break out through it. But fundamental ontology gladly spares itself that, by pretending it has a starting point somewhere outside. In that way such ontology succumbs to cultural mediations all the more; they recur as social aspects of that ontology's own purity. Philosophy involves itself all the more deeply in society as it more eagerly - reflecting upon itself - pushes off from society and its objective spirit" (pg. 99-100)
  - "With the downfall of market liberalism, relationships of domination stepped nakedly into the foreground" (pg. 100)
    - "The jargon of authenticity continues all that..." (pg. 100)
  - "Heidegger's complaints against cultural philosophy have fateful consequences in the ontology of authenticity: what this ontology at first bans into the sphere of cultural mediation it now shoves directly on into hell. To be sure, the world is similar enough to hell, dipped as the world is in a gloomy flood of nonsense, the fallen form of language." (pg. 100)
    - "Heidegger believes that under the domination of the *They* nobody needs to take responsibility for anything" (pg. 102)
    - "A human right of students, their need for the essential, becomes blurred in the jargon, in the Heideggerian essence-mythology of Being." (pg. 107)
  - "the jargon of authenticity speaks as though it were the voice of men and things that are there for their own sake. Through this manoeuvre, the jargon becomes all the more a for-others, something for planned and pedagogically decorated effect-contexts." (pg. 108)
    - "The jargon pursues artisanship under the shadow of industry, as carefully chosen as it is cheap; it gathers reproductions of kitschy life-reforming impulses that real life has buried under itself, and spares them the hopeless testing ground of actualization. Instead, **language rolls up its sleeves and lets it be understood that right action, in the right place, is worth more than reflection. In that way a contemplative attitude, without any perception of the praxis which brings about changes, sympathizes all the more strikingly with the here and now, the servicing of obligations presented within the given.**" (pg. 108-109)
  - "Heidegger sees himself forced, in the analysis of curiosity, to intimate something of the historical dynamic that necessarily dissolves static relationships. On those relationships the theory of readiness to hand nourishes itself..." (pg. 109)
    - "**For Heidegger, the way to free consciousness is pre-established, inevitable...**" (pg. 110)
      - "He equates emancipated consciousness with curiosity. His hatred toward curiosity is allied to his hatred toward mobility..." (pg. 110)
      - "In the question of curiosity the thinker abuses thinking; **without curiosity the subject would remain imprisoned in a dull repetition-compulsion and would never open himself up to experience.** Of course such an enlightenment insight is not the whole story. It is equally untrue that, through Heidegger's admonitions about "the They," that social state of affairs whose symptoms he reprimands grows better. It is only that his objection to curiosity stems from yea-saying at any price:" (pg. 110)
  - "Curious people are characters whose childish longing for the truth about the sexual was never satisfied; their longing is a shabby substitute" (pg. 111)
  - "By denouncing a purely ontological possibility according to his own teaching, Heidegger becomes the advocate of the unfulfillment of life. Like the empty phrase of idealism, **authenticity, in projecting its existentialism right from the beginning, sides with want, over and against satisfaction and abundance. In spite of its eager neutrality and distance from society, authenticity thus stands on the side of the conditions of production, which, contrary to reason, perpetuate want**" (pg. 112)
  - "How deeply rooted are the societal elements in Heidegger's analysis of authenticity is involuntarily revealed by his use of language. As is well known, **Heidegger supplants the traditional category of subjectivity by Dasein, whose essence is existence.** Being, however, which "is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine ." This is meant to distinguish subjectivity from all other existent being. It intends, furthermore, to prohibit existence from being "taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand." This construction, which is inspired by Kierkegaard's doctrine of the "transparency" of the self, would like to make possible a starting out from some element of being. This latter is valued as the immediate givenness of the facts of consciousness in traditional epistemology; yet, at the same time, this element of being is supposed to be more than mere fact, in the same manner as the ego of speculative idealism once was. Behind the apersonal "is concerned," nothing more is hidden than the fact that Dasein is consciousness" (pg. 113)
    - "From an abstract concept Being turns into something absolute and primary, which is not merely posited. The reason for this lies in the fact that Heidegger reveals an element of Being and calls it Dasein, which would be not just some element of Being, but the pure condition of Being - all this without losing any of the characteristics of individuation, fullness, bodiliness. This is the scheme that the jargon follows, intentionally or unintentionally, to the point of nausea. **The jargon cures Dasein from the wound of meaninglessness and summons salvation from the world of ideas into Dasein.** Heidegger lays this down once and for all in the title deed, which declares that the person owns himself. The fact that

Dasein belongs to itself, that it is "in each case mine," is picked out from individuation as the only general definition that is left over after the dismantling of the transcendental subject and its metaphysics. The *principium individuationis* stands as a principle over and against any particular individual element. At the same time it is that essence. In the case of the former element, the Hegelian dialectical unity of the general and the particular is turned into a relation of possession. Then it is given the rank and rights of the philosophical apriori" (pg. 114)

- "...**authenticity and inauthenticity have as their criterion the decision in which the individual subject chooses itself as its own possession . The subject, the concept of which was once created in contrast to reification, thus becomes reified**" (pg. 115)
  - ◆ **"Such a philosophy need no longer be concerned with how far society and psychology allow a man to be himself or become himself, or whether in the concept of such selfness the old evil is concentrated one more time. The societal relation, which seals itself off in the identity of the subject, is de-societalized into an in-itself. The individual, who himself can no longer rely on any firm possession, holds on to himself in his extreme abstractness as the last, the supposedly unlosable possession. Metaphysics ends in a miserable consolation: after all, one still remains what one is. Since men do not remain what they are by any means, neither socially nor biologically, they gratify themselves with the stale remainder of self-identity as something which gives distinction, both in regard to being and meaning. This unlosable element, which has no substratum but its own concept, the tautological selfness of the self, is to provide the ground, as Heidegger calls it, which the authentics possess and the inauthentic lack. The essence of Dasein, i.e., what is more than its mere existence, is nothing but its selfness: it is itself. The quarrel with Heidegger's language is not the fact that it is permeated, like any philosophical language, with figures from an empirical reality which it would like to transcend, but that it transforms a bad empirical reality into transcendence." (pg. 115-116)
 
    - ◇ "Heidegger is careful to have alibis against the charge of epistemological subjectivism. Mineness, or the self-sameness of the authentically existing self, is to be separated from the identity of the subject. Otherwise, these would break through the idealism of a thinking that claims to be a thinking of origins. But Heidegger's Being, to which, after all, some considerable creative acts are attributed, becomes the Fichtean absolute ego. It appears beheaded, as it were , in contrast to the traditional, merely posited ego. But the distinction from Fichte does not hold. If the distinguishing element, the fact that mineness belongs to real persons, was not their abstractly preordained principle, their ontological primacy would be done for." (pg. 116)**
  - ◆ "Not only Heidegger's philosophy, but also **the whole jargon of authenticity that follows, depends on the staging of the elaboration of this structure.** It is pointed out at a very early stage in *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger deals with the primacy of Dasein. Heidegger interprets subjectivity as a concept of indifference: essence and fact in one . The primacy of Dasein is said to be twofold. On the one hand it is to be ontic, namely, determined by existence. In other words, existence defines something in the nature of fact, something existent. On the other hand "Dasein is in itself 'ontological,' because existence is thus determinative for it." Thus something contradictory to subjectivity is immediately attributed to subjectivity: that it be itself fact and reality, and, in line with the demand of traditional philosophy, that as consciousness it make facticity possible. As the latter it becomes pure concept, in contrast to facticity; it becomes essence and finally Husserl's *eidos ego*. Against the traditional doctrine of the subject this double character, which is also an absolute unity before the fall into differentiation, claims the rank of an important discovery. For that reason Heidegger uses an archaizing, scholastic method. Both these characteristics of the subject he ascribes to Dasein, as attributes, without considering that they conflict with the principle of contradiction when they are attached in this way. **According to Heidegger, Dasein "is" not merely ontic, which would be tautological in regard to what is grasped under the concept of Dasein, but it is also ontological.** In this predication of the ontic and the ontological, from the standpoint of Dasein, the falsity of the regressive element can be recognized. The concept of the ontological cannot be attached to a substratum, as if ontological were its predicate. To be a fact is no predicate which can attach itself to a concept; and, since Kant's criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, any philosophy should be careful not to affirm this" (pg. 117-118)
- "To say that Dasein "is ontic or ontological," can, strictly speaking, not be judged at all, for what is meant by existence is a substratum. It is for this reason that the meaning of Dasein is nonconceptual." (pg. 118)
  - ◆ "There is nothing between heaven and earth that is in itself ontic or ontological; rather, everything becomes what it is only by means of the constellation into which it is brought by philosophy" (pg. 119)
  - ◆ "According to usual terminology, it is obvious that the concept that says what essentially belongs to something that is, is ontological. If, however, this becomes unnoticeably the ontological essence of the existent in itself, then the result is a concept of Being that is prior to the concepts of reflection" (pg. 119-120)
    - ◇ "At first this occurs in *Sein und Zeit* through the hypostasis of an ontological sphere that is the nourishment for all of Heidegger's philosophy." (pg. 120)
      - ▶ "The amphiboly resides in the following: in the concept of the subject two elements flow together - the subject's own definition as something existent, in which form it still remains fixed in the Kantian interlocking of the transcendental subject with the unity of consciousness *per se*, and, secondly, the definition of subject as constituent of everything existent. **This togetherness is unavoidable in the concept of subject. It is an expression of the dialectic between subject and object in the subject itself,** and evidence of its own conceptuality. **Without mediation subjectivity cannot be brought to either of its extremes,** which belong to different *genera*. This aforementioned unavoidability becomes an imaginary thing by virtue of the deficiency of the concept: mediation toward the immediate identity of the mediating and mediated elements. Certainly one element is not without the other, but the two are by no means one, as Heidegger's fundamental thesis alleges. In their identity, identity thinking would have swallowed up the nonidentical element, the existent, which the word Dasein intends. **Thus Heidegger secretly reinstates the creator quality of the absolute subject,** which was supposedly avoided, as it were, by starting with mineness in each case. The notion of the double character of Dasein, as ontic and ontological, expels Dasein from itself. This is Heidegger's disguised idealism. For the dialectic in the subject between the existent and the concept becomes being of a higher order; and the dialectic is brought to a halt. Whatever praises itself for reaching behind the concepts of reflection - subject and object - in order to grasp something substantial, does nothing but reify the irresolvability of the concepts of reflection. It reifies the impossibility of reducing one into the other, into the in-itself. This is the standard philosophical form of underhanded activity, which thereupon occurs constantly in the **jargon. It vindicates without authority and without theology, maintaining that what is of essence is real, and, by the same token, that the existent is essential, meaningful, and justified.**" (pg. 120-121)
- "In spite of Heidegger's assertion, mineness, and consequently authenticity, result in pure identity." (pg. 121)
  - ◆ **"Whatever is inauthentic for him, all the categories of the They are those in which a subject is not itself, is unidentical with itself."** (pg. 121)
    - ◇ "However, identity, the hollow kernel of such selfness, thus takes the place of idea. Even the cult of selfness is reactionary. The



- concept of selfness is here being eternalized precisely at the moment in which it has already disintegrated" (pg. 121-122)
- "But **whoever stubbornly insists on his mere so-being, because everything else has been cut off from him, only turns his so-being into a fetish.** Cut off and fixed selfness only becomes, all the more, something external. This is the ideological answer to the fact that the current state of affairs is everywhere producing an ego weakness which eradicates the concept of subject as individuality. That weakness as well as its opposite march into Heidegger's philosophy. **Authenticity is supposed to calm the consciousness of weakness, but it also resembles it. By it the living subject is robbed of all definition,** in the same way as it loses its attributes in reality. However, what is done to men by the world becomes the ontological possibility of the inauthenticity of men. From that point it is only a step to the usual criticism of culture, which self-righteously picks on shallowness, superficiality, and the growth of mass culture" (pg. 122)
  - "**What is essential in phenomena, and what is accidental, hardly ever springs straightforwardly out of the phenomena.** In order to be determined in its objectivity, it has first to be reflected on subjectively" (pg. 122-123)
    - "**In many cases the distinction between essential and inessential, between authentic and inauthentic, lies with the arbitrariness of definition, without in the least implying the relativity of truth.** The reason for this situation lies in language. Language uses the term "authentic" in a floating manner. The word also wavers according to its weightiness, in the same way as occasional expressions. The interest in the authenticity of a concept enters into the judgment about this concept. Whatever is authentic in this concept also becomes so only under the perspective of something that is different from it. It is never pure in the concept itself. Otherwise the decision about it degenerates into hairsplitting. But at the same time, the essential element of a thing has its *fundamentum in re*. Over and against naive usage, **nominalism is in the wrong to the degree that it remains blind toward the objective element of meaning in words,** which enters into the configurations of language and which changes there. This element of objectivity carries on an unresolved struggle with those acts that merely subjectively give meaning." (pg. 123)
      - "The essence of a thing is not anything that is arbitrarily made by subjective thought, is not a distilled unity of characteristics. In Heidegger this becomes the aura of the authentic: an element of the concept becomes the absolute concept. **The phenomenologists pinpoint the *fundamentum in re* as the particularization of essence. This particularization becomes in itself thingly like a *res*, and can be called upon without regard to the subjective mediation of the concept"** (pg. 124)
        - ◆ "**[Heidegger] thus turns the authentic into a special domain.** Hence the substantiation of authenticity, its promotion to an existiale, to a state of mind. By means of an alleged independence from thinking, the objective moment of that which is essential raises itself to something higher. Finally it becomes an absolute, the *summum bonum* over and against the relativity of the subject, while simultaneously it is presented as purely descriptive diagnosis in the manner of Scheler" (pg. 124)
          - ◇ "The word says nothing about what a thing is, but questions the extent to which the thing realizes what is posited by its concept. The thing stands in implicit opposition to what it merely seems to be" (pg. 125)
            - ▶ "The primacy of the concept over the thing is now, through the alliance of authenticity with mineness, pushed into mere detail. That detail is as artificial as was the *haecceitas* of Duns Scotus' late Scholasticism...made it a paradigm of an ontologizing of the ontic" (pg. 125)
        - "The taboo concerning subjective reflection is useful to subjectivism: authenticity, in the traditional language of philosophy, would be identical with subjectivity as such. But in that way, unnoticed, subjectivity also becomes the judge of authenticity. Since it is denied any objective determination, authenticity is determined by the arbitrariness of the subject, which is authentic to itself." (pg. 126)
          - ◆ "Hatred toward reifying psychology removes from the living that which would make them other than reified. **Authenticity, which according to doctrine is absolutely unobjective, is made into an object.** The reason for this is that authenticity is a manner of behavior that is ascribed to the being-a-subject of the subject, not to the subject as a relational factor. Thus it becomes a possibility that is prefixed to and foreordained for the subject, without the subject being able to do anything about it" (pg. 127)
    - "**The findings of Heidegger's existential analysis, according to which the subject is authentic insofar as it possesses itself, grant special praise to the person who is sovereignly at his own disposal; as though he were his own property;** he has to have bearing, which is at the same time an internalization, and an apotheosis, of the principle of domination over nature" (pg. 127-128)
      - "**It is not for nothing that in Kierkegaard, the grandfather of all existential philosophy, right living is defined entirely in terms of decision. All his camp followers are in agreement on that, even the dialectical theologians and the French existentialists. Subjectivity, Dasein itself, is sought in the absolute disposal of the individual over himself, without regard to the fact that he is caught up in a determining objectivity"** (pg. 128)
        - "Self-possession, unlimited and narrowed by no heteronomy, easily converges with freedom." (pg. 129)
          - ◆ "Men would be reconciled with their essential definition if the time came when their defining limitations were no longer imposed on them. This would mean a happy reversal of the domination over nature. However, nothing is more unwanted by the philosophy and the jargon of authenticity. Apart from the right to come into one's own, self-control is hypostatized. No end to controls is sought; rather, the controls are carried over into the Being of Dasein" (pg. 129)
      - "Today, nevertheless, a thing is essentially only that which it is in the midst, of the dominant evil; **essence is something negative**" (pg. 130)
      - "once authenticity can no longer be either the empirical condition of mortality nor the subjective relating to it, then it turns into grace. It turns, as it were, into a racial quality of inwardness, which man, either has or does not have - a quality about which nothing further can be stated than that, tautologically, there is mere participation in it" (pg. 132)
        - "**authenticity once more transforms theoretical lack, indeterminability, into the dictate of something that must be accepted without question.** But what ought to be more than mere Dasein sucks its blood out of the merely existent, out of just that weakness which cannot be reduced to its pure concept, but which rather cleaves to the nonconceptual substratum. The pure tautology, which propagates the concept while at the same time refusing to define that concept - and which instead mechanically repeats the concept - is intelligence in the form of violence. The concern of the jargon, which always insists on having a concern, is to equate essence - "authenticity" - with the most brutal fact of all. Nevertheless this repetition compulsion betrays a failure: the violent mind's incapability of capturing what it should think about if it wanted to remain mind." (pg. 133)
          - "**Violence inheres in the nucleus of Heidegger's philosophy,** as it does in the form of his language. That violence lies in the constellation into which his philosophy moves self-preservation and death. The self-preserving principle threatens its subjects with death, as an ultima ratio, a final reason; and when this death is used as the very essence of that principle it means the theodicy of death. By no means in a simply untrue way. As Hegel sees it, the ego of idealism, which posits itself absolutely, and insists entirely on itself, turns into its own negation and resembles death" (pg. 133-134)
      - "What asserts itself in self-preservation, the ego, is at the same time constituted by self-preservation; its identity constituted by its nonidentity. This still reverberates in the most extreme idealistic sublimation, the Kantian deduction of the categories. There the moments in which the identity of consciousness presents itself, and the unity of the consciousness which puts itself together from those moments, reciprocally condition one another, in opposition to the deductive intention-insofar as these and not other moments are absolutely given. The Kantian "I think" is the only abstract reference point in a process of holding out, and not something self-sufficient in relation to that process. To that extent it is already self as self-preservation" (pg. 135)



because it is removed from the They, which in turn is justified by the fact that there cannot be a proxy in death. Heidegger criticizes all thinkable real attitudes toward death as manifestations of the They" (pg. 148)

◇ "Only a solipstistic philosophy could acknowledge an ontological priority to "my" death over and against any other" (pg. 150)

- **"For Heidegger the They becomes a cloudy mixture of elements which are merely ideological products of the exchange relationship."** (pg. 151)
- "Death becomes the essence of the realm of mortality. This occurs in opposition to the immediate, which is characterized by the fact that it is there. Death thus becomes something that is artificially beyond the existent. Saved from the They it becomes the latter's sublime counterpart; it becomes the authentic. **Authenticity is death**. The loneliness of the individual in death, the fact that his 'non-relatedness singles out Dasein unto itself', becomes the substratum of selfness. This attitude of total self-sufficiency becomes the extreme confirmation of the self; it becomes an Ur-image of defiance in self-abnegation. As a matter of fact, abstract selfness *in extremis* is that grinding of the teeth which says nothing but I, I, I. Thus it is characterized by the same nothingness that the self becomes in death. But Heidegger's language blows up this negative element into that which is substantial." (pg. 151-152)
  - "Involuntarily, Heidegger's doctrine becomes an exegesis of the futile joke: Only death is free and that costs your life. **He is smitten with death as that which is supposed to be absolutely removed from the universal exchange relationship. Yet he does not realize that he remains caught up in the same fatal cycle as the exchange relationship which he sublimates into the They.** Insofar as death is absolutely alien to the subject, it is the model of all reification. Only ideology praises it as a cure for exchange. This ideology debases exchange into the more despairing form of eternity, instead of getting rid of proper exchange by letting it fulfil itself properly. **For Heidegger, Dasein is not sufficiently able to justify itself, because of its shameful historical form. It redeems itself only in its destruction, which it itself is to be.** The highest maxim of such an attitude results in saying that "it is so," that one has to obey - or, in positivistic terms, that one has to adapt oneself. This is the pathetic commandment that he must obey that which is. It is not even really obeying, for in any case Dasein does not have a choice. Precisely for this reason death is so ontological in regard to Dasein. If one were to call nonideological a kind of thinking which reduces ideology to the zero limit, then one would have to say that Heidegger's thinking is nonideological. But his operation once again becomes ideology because of his claim that he recovers the meaning of Dasein. This happens after the fashion of today's talk about the loss of ideology - talk which tramples down ideology but would like to trample down the truth" (pg. 152-153)
- **"Alienation, however, designates a social relationship, even if it is the relationship to death. Man and the institutions of piety reproduce commercially the unconscious will to forget what one has to fear."** (pg. 153-154)
- "Heidegger does the same thing as fascism; he defends the more brutal form of Being, negative as it may be. It is possible to think of a social state in which men would no longer have to sublimate death and might be able to experience it in another form than fear. To experience death in fear is a mark of the crude natural state that Heidegger's doctrine has eternalized in supranaturalistic terms. **Death is sublimated because of a blinded drive for self-preservation; its terror is part of the sublimation.** In a life that is no longer disfigured, that no longer prohibits, in a life that would no longer cheat men out of their dues-in such a life men would probably no longer have to hope, in vain, that this life would after all give them what it had so far refused." (pg. 155)
  - **"From the fact that men sublimate death, one cannot conclude that death is itself the authentic"** (pg. 155-156)
- "In his doctrine of death, however, Heidegger extrapolates such a mode of behavior from Dasein, as the positive meaning of Dasein. He affirms self-abnegation as an instance of the self, and he spoils the insight he has gained. Resignation becomes an obstinacy which turns the dissolution of the self into an inflexibly stoic positing of the self. By means of relentless identification, of the dissolution of the self with the self, self becomes the absolute positing of the negative principle. All the categories that Heidegger then uses to explain Being unto death are linked with obstinacy" (pg. 159)
  - "The subject is never so authentic for Heidegger as in that holding out in which it endures an extreme of pain, following the example of the ego" (pg. 159-160)
- **"The jargon of authenticity is ideology as language, without any consideration of specific content. It asserts meaning with the gesture of that dignity by which Heidegger would like to dress up death.** Dignity, too, is of an idealistic nature. There was a time when the subject thought itself a small divinity, as well as a lawgiving authority, sovereign in the consciousness of its own freedom" (pg. 160)
  - **"Dignity was never anything more than the attitude of self-preservation aspiring to be more than that. The creature mimes the creator"** (pg. 161-162)
- "Language wants to grasp what is escaping, without believing it or naming it." (pg. 163)
  - "The falseness of giving meaning, nothingness as something, is what creates the linguistic mendacity" (pg. 163)
- **"The weaker the individual becomes, from a societal perspective, the less can he become calmly aware of his own impotence. He has to puff himself up into selfness**, in the way the futility of this selfness sets itself up as what is authentic, as Being" (pg. 163-164)

d. Further Readings:

- The Critique of Domination, by T. Schroyer