

Against Epistemology, by T. Adorno

- a. People / Organizations: <http://www.edarcepelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20%20-%20Against%20Epistemology%20%28Polity,%202013%29.pdf>
- b. Quotes:
- "The dialectic, as Hegel conceived it...was later turned against him..." - Author (pg. 3)
 - "...**equivalence is not truth and that a fair trade-off is not justice.**" - Author (pg. 26)
 - "All reification is indeed a forgetting." - Author (pg. 221)
- c. General Notes:
- Preface (pg. 1)
 - "...**the question I shall broach - by means of a concrete model - is the possibility and truth of epistemology in principle.** Husserl's philosophy is the occasion and not the point of this book." (pg. 1)
 - "A number of Husserl's own texts, especially in the second volume of the Logical Investigations, are a densely complex thicket and certainly even ambiguous. Should my interpretation occasionally be in error, I would be the last to defend it." (pg. 1)
 - "I did not allow myself to be intimidated by Husserl's assurance that pure phenomenology is not epistemology, and that the region of pure consciousness has nothing to do with the concept of the structure of the given in the immanence of consciousness (*Bewußtseinsimmanenz*) as it was known to pre-Husserlian criticism." (pg. 2)
 - "Comprehensiveness was never my aim" (pg. 2)
 - Introduction (pg. 3)
 - Procedure and Object (pg. 3)
 - "Husserl's programme deals with a 'sphere of being of absolute origins'..." (pg. 3)
 - Immanent Critique (pg. 5)
 - "**Dialectic's very procedure is immanent critique.** It does not so much oppose phenomenology with a position or 'model' external and alien to phenomenology, as it pushes the phenomenological model, with the latter's own force, to where the latter cannot afford to go. Dialectic exacts the truth from it through the confession of its own untruth" (pg. 5)
 - "The thought of dialectic, however, does not leave this contradiction abstract, but uses it as the motor of conceptual movement to the binding decision concerning what has been phenomenologically asserted." (pg. 6)
 - "The concept of the absolutely first must itself come under critique. Were it to turn out that the givenness with which epistemology deals, postulates the mechanism of reification, while in philosophy of immanence, to which that term belongs, reified existence refers back to the structure of the given, it does not reciprocally follow that the reified has primacy over the given." (pg. 6)
 - Mediating the First (pg. 7)
 - "The first and immediate is always, as a concept, mediated and thus not the first. Nothing immediate or factual, in which the philosophical thought seeks to escape mediation through itself, is allotted to thinking reflection in any other way than through thoughts" (pg. 7)
 - Mathematization (pg. 9)
 - "In dogmatic anticipation of later philosophical identity claims, it already imprints a uniformity on what is to be thought, though it is uncertain whether continuity actually belongs there. The identity of spirit with itself and the subsequent synthetic unity of apperception, is projected on things by the method alone, and thus becomes more ruthless as it tries to be more sober and stringent. That is the original sin of prima philosophia. **Just in order to enforce continuity and completeness, it must eliminate everything which does not fit from whatever it judges.**" (pg. 10)
 - Concept of Method (pg. 11)
 - See text
 - Promoting the Subject (pg. 14)
 - "By furnishing the principle from which all being proceeds, the subject promotes itself." (pg. 14)
 - "For the sake of mastery, subjectivism must master and negate itself. Just to avoid mistake - since that is how they promote themselves - they abase themselves and at best would like to eliminate themselves. **They use their subjectivity to subtract the subject from truth and their idea of objectivity is as a residue**" (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "All prima philosophia up to Heidegger's claims about 'destruction' was essentially a theory of residue. Truth is supposed to be the leftover, the dregs, the most thoroughly insipid." (pg. 15)
 - "Hegel just let slip what otherwise poor sages mostly kept to themselves, i.e. that philosophy itself is true being." (pg. 15)
 - Persistence as Truth (pg. 17)
 - "With the imposition of the persisting (*das Bleibende*) as the true, the onset of truth becomes the onset of deception. It is a fallacy that what persists is truer than what perishes." (pg. 17)
 - "The invariance of the concept, which would not be unless the temporal determinacy of what is grasped under concepts were ignored, is confused with the unchangeability of being in itself." (pg. 17)
 - "The metaphysics of the persisting draws its epistemological foundation from the constancy of the thing over its appearances" (pg. 19)
 - The Elementary (pg. 20)
 - "...primitiveness and truth are brought together. That is perhaps the most disastrous consequence of the assumption of immediacy, with which the subject desperately deceives itself about itself as mediation. A tendency to regression, a hatred of the complicated, is steadily at work in theory of origins, thus guaranteeing its affinity with lordship. Progress and demythologization have neither exposed nor extinguished this tendency, but rather have let it appear even more crassly wherever possible. **The enemy, the other, the non-identical is always also what is distinguished and differentiated from the subject's universality.**" (pg. 20)
 - "To its greater glory, the pure concept abuses the more highly developed individual as impure and decay. No progress of scientific and philosophical rationality without such retrenchment" (pg. 20)
 - "Fascism sought to actualize philosophy of origins. The oldest, what has existed the longest, should immediately and literally rule." (pg. 20)
 - ◆ "The identity of originality and lordship came down to whoever had the power being presumably not just the first, but also the original. **Absolute identity as a political programme turns into absolute ideology which no one any longer believes**" (pg. 21)
 - The Regressive (pg. 21)
 - "First philosophy has in no sense been pure lordship. Its initial goal is liberation from the context of nature, and rationality has never entirely given up the memory of autonomy and its actualization. But as soon as it was absolutized, it almost constantly approached the feared

- dissolution. The philosophy of origins - which through self-consistency, the flight before the conditioned, turns to the subject and pure identity - also fears that it will lose itself in the determinacy of the purely subjective, which, as isolated moment, has precisely never reached pure identity and bears its defect as well as its opposite. Great philosophy has not escaped this antinomy. Thought, which regards itself as the ground of being, is always on the point of prohibiting itself as a disturbing factor in being. Even idealistic speculation has only apparently transgressed this prohibition, that is, so to speak, de-subjectivized the subject. The self-concealed abstraction mechanism immanently inclines to the same ontology as it works against" (pg. 21)
- "Subject-object was still disguised subject." (pg. 21)
 - "its absolute in-itself is merely absolute delusion about its own subjective mediacy, which is immanent to the question of being itself. The movement of thought which aims at knowledge of origins announces its own bankruptcy with its both dogmatic and empty positing of being. It celebrates origin at the expense of knowledge" (pg. 22)
 - "The irrationality, in which the philosophically absolutized *ratio* perishes, confesses to the arbitrariness of whatever seeks to eliminate the arbitrary" (pg. 22)
 - Philosophy of Origins and Epistemology (pg. 22)
 - "The philosophy of origins took shape scientifically as epistemology. The latter wished to raise the absolutely first to the absolutely certain by reflecting on the subject - not to be excluded from any concept of the first. But **the drive to identity is also strengthened in the course of such reflection. Thoughts...seal themselves off more and more from whatever does not emanate from them and their jurisdiction, the immanence of the subject.**" (pg. 22-23)
 - "Arbitrariness, the complement of compulsion, already lurks in the assumption that such a recourse is the sufficient condition of truth, even though it be motivated step by step by scientific contemplation. **Epistemology falls into this arbitrariness by its own process. The qualification of the absolutely first in subjective immanence founders because immanence can never completely disentangle the moment of non-identity within itself, and because subjectivity, the organ of reflection, clashes with the idea of an absolutely first as pure immediacy.** Though the idea of philosophy of origins aims monistically at pure identity, subjective immanence, in which the absolutely first wishes to remain with itself undisturbed, will not let itself be reduced to that pure identity with itself" (pg. 23)
 - ◆ "What Husserl calls the 'original foundation' (Urstiftung) of transcendental subjectivity is also an original lie. Hence **immanence itself is constantly being polarized into subjective and objective moments in epistemological analysis.**" (pg. 23)
 - "The return of subject and object within subjectivity and the duality of the one is detailed in two types of epistemology, each of which lives on the unrealizability of the other. These fall roughly into the rationalist and empiricist sort. As complementary enemies, they are not so radically distinguished in their internal structure and their conclusions as traditional history of philosophy suggests. The metacritique of epistemology should deal with both. Empiricism has never defended as conclusively as rationalism and its idealistic successors the idea of the absolutely first and absolute identity. It seems less entangled and thus abandons itself with far diminished energy to the process which leads through entanglement up to the bounds of the qualifications of immanence itself. Thought capitulates into empiricism too early and with too little resistance. **By humbly deferring to sheer existence, thought fails to come to grips with it and thus abandons the moment of freedom and spontaneity**" (pg. 23-24)
 - "**Logically consistent critical and self-reflective thought grasps, in the very jurisdiction of immanence, incomparably more about essence - viz. about the life process of society - than a procedure that resigns itself to registering facts, and really lays down its arms before even beginning.** Though empiricism as an epistemology tracks down the conditions of all knowledge in factual-psychological consciousness which it regards as an underlying principle, this consciousness and what is given in it could always be different, according to empirical ground rules. Such consciousness contradicts the idea of the first which is nevertheless the only motivation for analysis of consciousness, even the empiricist analysis of the 'human understanding', as philosophical method. The isolated subjective antipode within consciousness, however, or 'spirit', which withdraws from the isolated objective encounterability of the entity or the 'given', thus withdraws from determination just as much as its opposite. Both spirit and its 'actions' defy analysis. It does not let itself be established in the way that epistemology as scientific method should demand, while what can be established itself is already formed according to the model of that facticity to which spirit should present the antipode. But **spirit can as little be separated from the given as the given from spirit. Neither is a first. Since both are essentially mediated by one another, both are equally unsuitable as original principles.** Were one of them to want to discover the original principle itself in such mediacy (Vermitteltsein), then it would confuse a relational with a substantial concept and reclaim the *flatus vocis* as origin" (pg. 24)
 - "**Mediacy is not a positive assertion about being but rather a directive to cognition not to comfort itself with such positivity. It is really the demand to arbitrate dialectic concretely.** Expressed as a universal principle, mediacy, just as in Hegel, always amounts to spirit. If it turns into positivity, it becomes untrue." (pg. 24)
 - "The metacritique of epistemology requires constructive reflection upon its structure as one of guilt and punishment (Schuld und Strafe), necessary error and futile correction. With growing demythologization, philosophical concepts become ever more spiritual and more mythical." (pg. 25)
 - "Certainly the immanent critique of epistemology itself is not exempt from the dialectic. While philosophy of immanence - the equivocation between logical and epistemological immanence indicates a central structure - can only be ruptured immanently, i.e. in confrontation with its own untruth, its immanence itself is untruth. Immanent critique must transcendently know of this untruth just to begin" (pg. 25)
 - "The concept of immanence sets the limits on immanent critique. If an assertion is measured by its presuppositions, then the procedure is immanent, i.e. it obeys formal-logical rules and thought becomes a criterion of itself. But it is not decided as a necessity of thought in the analysis of the concept of being that not all being is consciousness. The inclusiveness of such an analysis is rather thereby halted. **To think non-thinking (Nichtdenken) is not a seamless consequence of thought. It simply suspends claims to totality on the part of thought.** Immanence, however, in the sense of that equivocation of conscious and logical immanence, is nothing other than such totality. **Dialectic negates both together. Epistemology is true as long as it accounts for the impossibility of its own beginning and lets itself be driven at every stage by its inadequacy to the things themselves. It is, however, untrue in the pretension that success is at hand and that states-of-affairs would ever simply correspond to its constructions and aporetic concepts. In other words, it is untrue according to the measure of scientificity which is its own.**" (pg. 25)
 - System and Debit (pg. 26)
 - "Despite its static-descriptive tenor and apparent reluctance to speculate, Husserl's epistemology is also roped into a debit structure. Its very system resembles, in modern terms, a credit system. Its concepts form a constellation in which everyone must redeem the liabilities of another, even though the presentation conceals the litigation pending between them" (pg. 26)
 - Opposing Forces in Epistemology (pg. 26)
 - "Epistemology, the quest for the pure realization of the principle of identity through seamless reduction to subjective immanence, turns, despite itself, into the medium of non-identity. As advancing demythologization, it does not simply consolidate the jurisdiction of the concept, purified of everything heterogeneous, but rather also works at breaking through that jurisdiction" (pg. 26-27)

- "Husserl's logical absolutism mirrors in its own foundation the fetishization of the sciences, which mistake themselves and their hierarchy as an entity in itself." (pg. 52)
 - "In the *Cartesian Meditations*, the ideal of philosophy and that of science - 'universal science' - remain the same. Philosophy is described faithfully to the schema of Cartesian rationalism as a hierarchy of scientific cognitions" (pg. 53)
- 'Realism' in Logic (pg. 54)
 - See text
- The Logical In-Itself (pg. 56)
 - See text
- Presupposition of Logical Abolutism (pg. 58)
 - "Husserl is blinded by individualism..." (pg. 60)
- Essence and Development (pg. 60)
 - "Objectivity and ideality in logic - its reified being in-itself - which is supposed to be proved by philosophical critique, is already presupposed by a method which attributes to logic a rationality and clarity independent of the state of its development and is thus satisfied with substantiating it descriptively." (pg. 60-61)
- Calculators, Logic and Mechanics (pg. 61)
 - See text
- Reification of Logic (pg. 64)
 - "...Husserl retains mathematics within his philosophy as a sort of pre-philosophical model" (pg. 65)
- The Logical 'Object' (pg. 66)
 - "Mainly Husserl feels no doubt about the law of identity. Concepts remain what they are" (pg. 68)
- Autosemantic and Synsemantic Expressions (pg. 68)
 - See text
- Logical Laws and Laws of Thought (pg. 69)
 - "Logical absolutism is two things. It is reflection in the subject of the reification which is performed by the subject, which itself ultimately becomes a thing. It is also the attempt to break the spell of universal subjectivization and intercept, by means of something straightforwardly irreducible, a subject which for all its power suspects itself of arbitrariness if not impotence. The most radical subjectivism becomes a fantasm of its own overcoming." (pg. 70)
 - "Both the empiricist and the idealistic theory fall short of truth because they pin it down as an entity - Husserl calls it 'being'. Truth is, rather, a field of force" (pg. 72)
- Aporia of Logical Absolutism (pg. 73)
 - "**Logic is not being, but rather a process (Prozess) which cannot be reduced purely to either a 'subjectivity' or an 'objectivity' pole. The consequence of the self-critique of logic is the dialectic.**" (pg. 74)
- Relating Genesis and Validity (pg. 74)
 - See text
- Genesis and Psychology (pg. 76)
 - "He raises logic to an entity in itself just as pre-critical consciousness did to things. As a result, he correctly asserts that the laws of thought of the individual - psychologically speaking, of the ego, whose categories are indeed turned towards reality, and are formed in reciprocal action with reality, and are therefore 'objective' - do not receive their objectivity from the individual. The judgement that society is organized before the individual prevails in a distorted form. **The priority of the individual, the self-deception of traditional liberalism**, is shattered by Husserl's post-liberal conception. But the ideology, nevertheless, maintains its power over him. The social process which he never understood was just the truth for him. Its objectivity was spiritualized into the ideal being of propositions in themselves." (pg. 76-77)
- Thinking and Psychologism (pg. 77)
 - See text
- The Law of Non-Contradiction (pg. 78)
 - "Every logical synthesis is anticipated by its object, but its possibility remains abstract and is actualized only by the subject. They need each other. The point is correctly made in logical absolutism that validity, the highest instrument for the mastery of nature, is not exhausted in such mastery. What is done and united in human logical synthesis, remains only humanity and not the empty form of its arbitrariness. Rather, in virtue of the shape of the object of synthesis, which would evaporate without synthesis, synthesis extends beyond sheer doing. Judging means ordering and more than mere ordering into one" (pg. 80)
- The Law of Identity (pg. 81)
 - "The law of identity, therefore, is not a state-of-affairs, but rather a rule of how to think which, once detached from the acts for which it was advanced, hangs in the wind." (pg. 82)
- Contingency (pg. 82)
 - "**All bourgeois - all first - philosophy has struggled in vain with contingency. For every such philosophy seeks to reconcile a really self-antagonistic whole**" (pg. 82)
 - "Philosophical consciousness qualifies the antagonism as one of subject and object. Since it cannot sublimate the antagonism in itself, it strives to remove it for itself, i.e. through reduction of being to consciousness. Reconciliation demands - equating everything with itself. And that is also the contradiction of reconciliation" (pg. 83)
 - "The more recklessly the subject insists upon identity and the more purely it strives to establish its mastery, the more threateningly looms the shadow of non-identity. The threat of contingency is simply advanced by the pure a priori which is its enemy and should allay it." (pg. 83)
 - "**The false point of departure of the philosophy of identity comes to light in the insolubility of contingency. The world cannot be thought as a product of consciousness. Contingency is frightening only in the structure of delusion.** If thought were to escape from this structure, contingency would silence and extinguish it." (pg. 83-84)
- Abandoning the Empirical (pg. 85)
 - "[Empirical] relativism is anything but enlightenment" (pg. 85)
- Phenomenological and Eidetic Motifs (pg. 86)
 - "**Pure subjectivity and pure objectivity are the highest of such isolated and therefore inconsistent qualifications.** If knowledge should be exclusively reducible to the subject or the object, then isolability and reduction are raised to a law of truth. **The entirely isolated is sheer identity which refers to nothing beyond itself.** The complete reduction to subject or object embodies the ideal of such identity. The untruth of relativism is just that it abides by the negative determination - which is correct in itself of all individuals, instead of going further. In its

- faithfulness to mere appearance (Schein), it is just as absolutistic as absolutism. If knowledge is not unconditioned, then it should forthwith be untenable." (pg. 88)
- Chapter 2 - Species and Intention (pg. 89)
 - Propositions in Themselves and Essences (pg. 89)
 - **"All of Husserl's philosophy is directed to resistance.** It is the abstract negation of the subjectivism it sees through, though it remains imprisoned in the subjectivistic domain. It partakes of the feebleness it denounces. Phenomenology hovers in a region for which the favourite allegory in those years was the cloud daughters, a no man's land between subject and object, the deceptive mirage of their reconciliation. Philosophically, the sphere in which pale disembodied young things in flower are called 'essences', is reflected by meaning (Meinen) as the subjective gesture towards an opposite, whose content is nevertheless exhausted in the subjective act." (pg. 90)
 - Lived Experience (Erlebnis) and 'Sense' (pg. 91)
 - See text
 - Critique of Singular 'Senses' (pg. 93)
 - "Just as **no lived experience is 'singular' but rather interlaced with the totality** of individual consciousness, and thus necessarily points beyond itself, so there are no such things as absolute senses or references. Any sense, of which thought becomes aware at all, possesses, by dint of thinking, an element of universality, and is more than just itself" (pg. 93)
 - Origin of Essential Insight (pg. 95)
 - "He stood for the idea of a single truth, and tried to force together the unspoiled concretion of individual experience and the binding force of the concept. He never rested content with the pluralism of truth according to the realms of knowledge" (pg. 97)
 - 'Ideational Abstraction' (pg. 97)
 - "Goal and method cannot be united" (pg. 101)
 - Abstraction and *noema* (pg. 101)
 - "Hence phenomenology has not critically reflected; it resigns itself to a demand for positivism as scientifically self-evident." (pg. 103)
 - "In its quest for such concretization, Husserl's philosophy wanders helplessly around between its two abstract poles, that of the sheer 'here' and that of the sheer 'in general'. It splits asunder in positivism and logic and shatters in the violent attempt to unite the irreconcilable poles. Husserl transposes his representation of the sheer 'here' or datum to the content of higher categorial functions in such a way that at every step he is encouraged by the predicates of a rigid being-in-itself (Ansichsein) untouched by the subject-object dialectic" (pg. 105)
 - The Primacy of Meaning Analysis (pg. 106)
 - "Reified thought is the copy of the reified world. By trusting its primordial experiences, it lapses into delusion. **There are no primordial experiences**" (pg. 109)
 - The Function of the Noema (pg. 109)
 - See text
 - Noema (pg. 110)
 - See text
 - Relation Between the Two Reductions (pg. 112)
 - See text
 - Noema as Hybrid (pg. 113)
 - See text
 - Essence and 'Factual States of Consciousness' (pg. 115)
 - See text
 - Antinomy of Subjectivism and Eidetics (pg. 116)
 - See text
 - 'Eidetic Variations' (pg. 117)
 - See text
 - Essence as Fiction (pg. 120)
 - "Something is falsely mediated that Husserlian logic cannot mediate. **The context of a concept demands the question of the existence of what is contained in the concept**, and not just its meaning (Meinen). Even the later Husserl's doctrine of essences remains a prisoner in the hot house of intentionality. Corresponding to this is the reified and rigid view of fantasy as a mere discovery of objects distilled from the factual which should have no advantage over the factual except the fact that they are not. Husserl's qualification of essence settles for just that. He calls it fictional. What he calls 'the atmosphere of absolutely pure imaginability' in the *Cartesian Meditations*, in which the [**greek word*] 'floats', was the climate of his entire philosophy, the crystalline kingdom of a cognition which confuses the flight before fleeting existence and the negation of life with the citizenry of its infinity. Essences remain without essence, though the arbitrary thoughts of the subject dare, by their means, to fancy the desolate entity an ontology" (pg. 123)
 - Chapter 3 - Epistemological Concepts in Dialectic (pg. 124)
 - Phenomenology as Epistemology (pg. 124)
 - "Phenomenology strains to bring the non-homonymous down to a common denominator, in this case the static higher concept of 'poles'. Its most effective thoughts were a vehicle designed for just that purpose. They were theoretical constructions. Only when we cease to be mesmerized by a radically new and original beginning, such as phenomenology and its successors aspire to realize, and only when we cease to deny phenomenology's epistemological inclination to ascertain how knowledge of objecthood is in general possible and how it may be identified in the structure of consciousness - only then will those categories, which phenomenology claims to have simply discovered, become clear." (pg. 125)
 - **"the positivistic norm...restricts thought to the practically technical procedure of abbreviation and attributes the substance of cognition only to what is supposed to exist without the supplement of thought**, and what certainly ends up as the flimsiest and most abstract of findings" (pg. 125)
 - "Phenomenology falls everywhere into error because even those concepts introduced in the name of the description of the so-called states-of-affairs or encounterings (Vorfindlichkeiten) of pure consciousness do not at all describe cognitive processes or types of such processes. Rather, they just present those processes, so that something like a structural unity in the framework of the 'reduction' may be possible." (pg. 126)
 - Positivism and Platonism (pg. 126)
 - See text
 - Husserl's Concept of Givenness (pg. 128)
 - See text
 - 'Foundation' (pg. 131)

- "Husserl clings so tenaciously to the concept of givenness that he would sooner sacrifice epistemological consistency than this concept and continues to speak of perception as a 'primal mode of self-giving' and the like in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. He will not forego the doctrine of the foundedness of all cognition. One intention is supposed to rest in another" (pg. 131)
- Ontologization of the Factual (pg. 132)
 - "Phenomenology remains theory since it necessarily reflects on cognition and does not 'directly' judge, so to speak, empirically. It wants to be theory-free, for its ideal is to transform every assertion into givenness and thus avoid the possibility of false conclusions as well as that of critique. The two are incompatible." (pg. 135)
- Thing as Model of the Given (pg. 136)
 - See text
- Givenness Mediated in Itself (pg. 139)
 - See text
- The Subject of Givenness (pg. 141)
 - See text
- Paradoxia of Pure Intuition (pg. 145)
 - "So much is true in the Kantian critique of speculative Idealism which fused the opposition of form and content. **No matter can be isolated from form. Nevertheless, form is only as the mediation of matter**" (pg. 147)
 - "Such a contradiction expresses a comprehension of nonidentity and the impossibility of capturing in subjective concepts without surplus what is not of the subject. It expresses ultimately the breakdown of epistemology itself." (pg. 147)
- Matter as Fulfilment (pg. 148)
 - See text
- Sensation and Perception (pg. 151)
 - "The primacy of intentionality obscures the difference between it and the non-intentional. Indeed both moments do interpenetrate in truth." (pg. 151)
- Antinomy of the Doctrine of Perception (pg. 154)
 - "Naive realism would save the character of immediacy and precategoriality for perception, but it would also rupture immanence to consciousness on whose analysis the claim to certainty on the part of epistemology is grounded. The insistence on the categorial role in perception for epistemology certainly would remain immanent and 'critical'. But it would sacrifice immediacy and thus the claim of perception to originally and absolutely ground transcendent being in pure immanence." (pg. 155)
 - "Husserl, however, wants to have the one and not forego the other. Hence he does not theoretically resolve the antimony and so all the more falls victim to it. Since he chases after the phantom of a simple first, though the analysis of 'pure consciousness' never leads to it, he must follow its proper concept and turn the first into a second and the second into a first. The structure of his epistemology, however, consists in unremitting effort to correct those contradictions through the introduction of auxiliary concepts, which are created from the misery of logic, and yet must always come forward as descriptions of states-of-affairs." (pg. 155)
- Sensation and Materialism (pg. 155)
 - "Husserl falls into the difficulties of perception theory..." (pg. 155)
 - "But sensation does not become pure immediacy through the somatic moment. The insistence on the mediacy of each and every immediate is the direct model of dialectical thought as such, and also of materialistic thought insofar as it determines the social pre-formedness of contingent individual experience. But dialectic, therefore, has no materialistic foundation in sheer sensation, for sensation, despite its somatic essence, is completely diluted of full reality through the reduction to subjective immanence." (pg. 156)
 - "Neither can the immediate moment of sensation be isolated from mediation, nor as in the post-Kantian Idealists, can mediation be isolated from the moment of immediacy. Sensation is not to be sublimated (verflichtigen) in 'spirit'. That would be spiritualism and ideology. It should rather be checked by the constraint that **if mediation and immediacy are split off from one another, one moment or the other would be absolutized.**" (pg. 156)
- Epistemology as Elementary Analysis (pg. 157)
 - "No sheer sensation can be detached from perception in the real life of consciousness" (pg. 157)
 - "On the other hand, however, individual perceptions are also not the source of justification for cognition. The foundational role which epistemology unjustly attributes to sensation cannot be arbitrarily transferred to the next higher level of consciousness. Perception as consciousness of each object, as rudimentary judgement, is for its part exposed to disillusion and not incontrovertibly there. Sensation occurs as little without perception as perception does without sensation (provided it is not entirely nugatory). If one were to turn seriously to experience and not to its surrogate in the philosophy of immanence, then one would encounter a 'perception as such' as little as a sensation as such. The fact that someone 'perceives this house' and nothing else occurs only in epistemological colloquia. The triviality of such examples says something about the inadequacy of epistemology to cognition. Of course, **the concept of perception is just an expedient, devised simply to reconcile the demand for the originary with the fact that consciousness is not composed out of the partial moments into which epistemology must analyse it, in order to reproduce plausibly the world out of the closed structure of immanence.** Epistemology could do that only if it were to have everything out of which the world is formed together in consciousness like a basket." (pg. 157)
 - 'Gestalt' (pg. 158)
 - "Gestalt theory has been correctly reproached with wanting immediately to uncover metaphysical sense in the datum of the structure of positivistic research. It presents itself as a science without paying the price of demystification. Hence it serves to lay an ideological smokescreen for divided reality, which it claims to know as undivided and 'healthy', instead of naming the conditions of the division. Within epistemology, however, the concept of Gestalt becomes a source for errors. It makes epistemology neglect, in the name of the dominance of the whole over the parts, any insight into the reciprocal effects between the two moments and their mutual dependence. Epistemology must immediately equate the given as something elementary with the whole and hence makes as little room for mediation as does phenomenology. The very concept of the elementary is already based on division. This is the moment of untruth in Gestalt theory." (pg. 159)
- Intentionality and Constitution (pg. 160)
 - See text
- Enter Noesis and Noema (pg. 162)
 - See text
- The Forgotten Synthesis (pg. 163)
 - "The phenomenologist desperately forgets synthesis and fixates with manic obsession on the world of self-made things, a world reduced to infinity and thus phantasmagorical. Even when he encounters himself in those things, he does not recognize himself." (pg. 163)

- Critique of Correlation Theory (pg. 164)
 - See text
- Pure Identity and Noematic Core (pg. 166)
 - See text
- The Primacy of Objectifying Acts (pg. 169)
 - See text
- Thing as Clue (pg. 171)
 - "Thinking the thing, in which thinking forgets itself, becomes givenness of the thing." (pg. 171-172)
- Antinomy of the Noema (pg. 172)
 - See text
- Critique Dismissed (pg. 176)
 - See text
- Antagonism to System (pg. 178)
 - See text
- Husserl's Transition to Transcendental Idealism (pg. 181)
 - See text
- Fragility of the System (pg. 184)
 - See text
- Chapter 4 - Essence and Pure Ego (pg. 186)
 - Husserl and his Successors (pg. 186)
 - "Husserl's ontological, anthropological and existential heirs are just as little justified in disowning the antecedent of their thought property. They are beholden to Husserlian method, and not to the method alone. This method was just so thoroughly covered over with bourgeois circumspection and critical responsibility that those disciples were simply unwilling to recall Husserl. That is true for Scheler as much as for Heidegger. It did seem in *Being and Time* that Kierkegaard's concept of existence had undone the posture on the part of the 'observer' in which the phenomenologist felt himself vindicated." (pg. 187)
 - ◆ "However striking and close to experience Heidegger's pronouncements may be, they simply do not connect to the reality of society. Both Husserl and Heidegger let the breach between necessity and contingency disappear by beginning with the principle of the ego which Husserl called the transcendental ego and Heidegger being there (Dasein). In both philosophies there is an interplay of idea and fact. Heidegger's tendency to camouflage irresolvable contradictions, like those between timeless ontology and history, by ontologizing history itself as historicity and turning the contradiction as such into a 'structure of being' is prefigured in Husserl's epistemology. Husserl also sought to hypostatize irresolvability as a solution to the problem." (pg. 187-188)
 - ◆ "Drowning phenomenology seeks to pull itself out of the swamp of contemptible mere existence (Dasein) by its own essential bootstraps. Such a fraud provides the factual foundation for the linguistic correspondence with Heidegger. In both, concepts drawn from experience are repeatedly disguised with an antique dignity by transplantation into the eidetic realm" (pg. 188-189)
 - Phenomenology Attempts to Break Out (pg. 189)
 - "In phenomenology, the bourgeois spirit strives mightily to break out of the prison of the immanence of consciousness, the sphere of constitutive subjectivity, with the help of the same categories as those implied by the idealistic analysis of the immanence of consciousness. Epistemology would like to penetrate the cells in which the world of self-made objects as an illusory image of 'nature' posits itself absolutely by means of its direct reducibility to subjective 'performance' (Leistung) - viz. labour" (pg. 189)
 - "Essence does not just protect thinking from facts, it also opposes fact as sheer appearance whose validity is doubted and then posited in the [*Greek word], in order to bring the underlying lawfulness to consciousness." (pg. 190)
 - "Against every one of his original intentions and from its ownmost, Husserl's philosophy produces all the categories of subjective appearance against which it was mobilized. At its end one understands that, as soon as the central concept of idealism, that of transcendental subjectivity, is assumed, nothing more is thinkable which is not subject to this subjectivity and in the strictest sense its property." (pg. 190)
 - Self-Revocation (pg. 190)
 - "Nothing makes one's comprehension of Husserl's fundamental concepts and their structure more difficult than the intersection of rationalistic and empiricistic tendencies." (pg. 191)
 - Character of Immanence and the Fetishism of the Concept (pg. 193)
 - **"Phenomenology resembles a circle because it arises out of idealism and reproduces idealism at every one of its stages, as usual as a sublated moment"** (pg. 193)
 - 'Attitude' (pg. 195)
 - See text
 - Fantasy and Body (pg. 197)
 - See text
 - Categorical Intuition (pg. 200)
 - See text
 - The Paradoxical Apex (pg. 201)
 - "Categorical intuition is no newly discovered principle of philosophizing. It proves to be a sheer dialectical moment of transition: imaginary altitude." (pg. 201)
 - The Provenance of Logical Absolutism (pg. 201)
 - See text
 - Fulfilment of Unsensed Moments (pg. 203)
 - See text
 - 'Becoming Aware' (pg. 205)
 - See text
 - Motivation of Objectivism (pg. 207)
 - "Categorical intuition is no 'seeing' of essentialities, but rather a blind spot in the process of cognition." (pg. 207)
 - Withering Away of Argument (pg. 209)
 - "Phenomenology gives notice, provisionally and inadequately, of the end of the discussion. It remains inadequate by persisting with the categories of meaning (Meinen) and sheer subjectivity. It takes the non-identical state-of-affairs as the immediate givenness of consciousness, something purely mental. But the factual existence of that state-of-affairs becomes ideal being or thought" (pg. 210)

- Phenomenology as Philosophy of Reflection (pg. 210)
 - See text
- The System in Ruins (pg. 211)
 - "Husserl's doctrine of ideas is the system in ruins..." (pg. 212)
- Advanced and Restorative Elements (pg. 212)
 - "The capital proof of the difference between logical and psychological laws has, at all events, simply shown that the norms by which individuals think do not coincide with the norms according to which the life of their own consciousness and unconscious proceeds. The individual himself does not belong in the very activity in which it fancies itself most at home, the 'free' activity of thought. **Autonomy and isolation of the individual as a thinking individual are just as much an illusion (the illusion necessarily produced by bourgeois society) as relativism which, in contrast, hopes to escape the binding obligation for knowledge by recourse to the illusory individual.**" (pg. 214)
 - "Husserl, the retail scholar (Detailforscher) and converted positivist, persists before the solid foreign object of cognition till it submits to the Medusa's glance. The thing as identical object of cognition opens itself up and presents for an instant what its solidity should hide, viz. its historical accomplishment" (pg. 216)
- Natural History Museum (pg. 217)
 - See text
- Abstract Ideal of Security (pg. 219)
 - See text
- Infinitization of the Temporal (pg. 220)
 - "Husserl more or less took over from the pragmatist William James the empirical thesis of 'fringes' and expressed it eidetically in Ideas. For he then advocated a thorough parallelism between psychology as a pure science of laws and eidetic phenomenology which should have inclined him to be suspicious of its self-sufficiency" (pg. 220)
- Origin of the[*Greek word] Ego (pg. 222)
 - See text
- Consciousness, Pure Essence, Time (pg. 224)
 - "The structure of intentionality as retentivity and protentionality, which, according to Husserl, alone renders the life of consciousness possible, is the structure of time. The findings of all psychology, however, are for Husserl 'facts' (Fakten). They become facts precisely by their temporal determinacy." (pg. 226)
- Transcendental Ego and Facticity (pg. 226)
 - See text
- Equivocation of 'I' (pg. 227)
 - See text
- Solipsism (pg. 228)
 - See text
- The Aporia of Transcendental Experience (pg. 230)
 - See text
- The End of Idealism (pg. 233)
 - "Idealism is not simply untruth. It is truth in its untruth. Idealistic illusion (Schein) is as necessary in its origin as in its passing. That consciousness assumes a monadological shape, that the individual feels knowledge of himself (von sich selber) is more immediate and certain than the same knowledge of all others - this is the correct appearance of a false world in which men are alien and uncertain to each other and every individual immediately relates only to his particular interests but in which, nevertheless, universal 'essential' laws are indeed realized: such as Husserl's transcendental [*Greek word] in the monad" (pg. 234)
 - "An enemy of both the necessary illusoriness of induction and the illusory necessity of deduction, he strived to confine idealism in a paradoxical stand-off. The ground of the paradox, the monadological constitution of man, could only be sublated if consciousness were at some time finally to rule over being, which it constantly only with untruth asserts is grounded in consciousness." (pg. 234)

d. Further Readings:

- Adorno, Heidegger and the Critique of Epistemology, by B. O'Connor <https://philarchive.org/archive/OCOAHA#:~:text=In%20Adorno's%20view%2C%20the%20structure,conscious%20acts%20and%20of%20knowledge.>