

An Existentialist Ethics, by H. Barnes

a. People / Organizations:

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b. Quotes:

- "we must recognize the truth of Sartre's claim that not to choose is already to have chosen. The refusal to choose the ethical is inevitably a choice for the nonethical" - Author (pg. 7)
- "When you inhabit an unjust world, it is useless to hope by any method to be purified of injustice; what would be necessary would be to change the world, and I do not have the power for that. To suffer from these contradictions is of no use; to forget them is to lie to oneself." - Simone De Beauvoir, *La Force de choses*, pg. 681 (pg. 32)
- "**Taking care of the world is a strictly do-it-yourself project, and we are all amateurs together**. Sartre pointed out long ago that we must not make the mistake of thinking that things in the world appeared with values already stamped upon them. The time when ethics is most needed is in the period of conflict, struggle, and uncertainty, not when some approximation of Utopia has been achieved" - Author (pg. 46)
- "like [Sartre] I am optimistic enough to believe that some approximation to a just society will someday be achieved..." - Author (pg. 43-44)
 - "I accept Sartre's description of human consciousness and its relation to the rest of reality" - Author (pg. 47)
- "the ethical choice as such involves a justification of conduct in reference to a definite concept of what reality is" - Author (pg. 48)
 - "the initial choice to be ethical always stands outside any particular ethics" - Author (pg. 49)
 - **I disagree. If I choose to be ethical, there is a reason for my choice; unless, then, we presume the choice in the first instance absent any reason. But, then, how can such be deemed 'ethical'?*
- "There is a nothingness between man's present awareness and his past, between what he is now and what he will be in the future. **There is a nothingness between consciousness and its objects, between a man and himself**. More accurately, it is this nothingness which renders man forever incapable of being himself and condemns him to being the perpetual pursuer of himself. From this nothingness stems man's freedom; here if anywhere are the possibilities for his guilt" - Author (pg. 79)
 - "consciousness is nothing but the awareness, the process of relating, etc." - Author (pg. 249)
 - "as a process of relating, it is **both there and here**; as nonmaterial, it is **in neither place**" - Author (pg. 249)
 - **cf. D. Binseel, A Phenomenology of "That!": An Introduction to the Dialectic of Consciousness https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf*
 - "there is always a slight nothingness between consciousness and any of its objects..." - Author (pg. 253)
 - "It is because **consciousness is temporal** that existentialism can defend its seeming paradox - that man is free and yet associated with a distinct personality. 'Self' has meaning both as **referring** to a recognizable quality associated with the past acts of awareness of a particular consciousness in a particular body and as **pointing** to the kind of future which consciousness projects" - Author (pg. 267)
- "humanistic existentialism rejects belief in God or any kind of impersonal Absolute, and...throws into question most of our social structures..." - Author (pg. 81)
 - "existentialism, which relentlessly refuses to allow anyone to avoid responsibility for what he has been, is less despairing than determinism. Its vision of what one is reveals no fixed nature but rather the necessity of choosing one's future and the possibility of choosing a future which will be altogether different from one's past" - Author (pg. 84)
- "**the social structure is based on a contradiction which involves a certain dishonesty**" - Author (pg. 90)
 - **cf. K. Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth <https://merton.bellarmino.edu/files/original/f8327de5adb7b4804bbe41b3fbdeadb0e4f27670.pdf>*
 - **cf. K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_0984af27bd64e4b87bf0ebcae3360c1.pdf*
 - **cf. K. Horney, Our Inner Conflicts https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_b1993d639e9b4b3b98263fb7f8184f49.pdf*
 - **Society has yet to learn how to distinguish between, and therefore reconcile, faith and reason. And so, it's lost 'between fact and fiction', absolved (through themselves) of the thought that there's such a difference in the first instance. Cf. comments below beginning with 'the premises most fundamental...'*
- "To see the big without the small is to exclude much of reality just as surely as to stay within the limits of the microscopic. If there is a falsification of boundaries at the one end, there is a blurring of details and elimination of foreground at the other" - Author (pg. 113)
- "**man's being is that of a creature who is always about-to-be**. In a peculiar sense also, he is, in his being, always outside or beyond himself, out there in the objects of his intentions or - more accurately - in his projects in the world" - Author (pg. 114)
 - **if this is the case, what, then, can we say (is) death? Cf. notes below on pg. 94.*
- "A human being cannot live his life moment by moment; a human consciousness preserves a certain continuity and demands a certain degree of integration whether a man seeks it or not. A human being needs a frame of reference, a comprehensive view of existence, no matter how rudimentary, and, since his consciousness is volitional, a sense of being *right*, a moral justification of his actions, which means: a philosophical code of values" - Ayn Rand, *For the New Intellectual*, pg. 16-17 (pg. 126) https://ia801405.us.archive.org/17/items/ForTheNewIntellectual/For_the_New_Intellectual.pdf
- "**thinking is hard [as] it demands intelligence, constant effort, and the strength** to recognize something as true when it would be more convenient to believe otherwise" - Author (pg. 132)
 - **cf. M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~cavitch/pdf-library/Heidegger_What_Is_Called_Thinking.pdf*
 - "Modern man is threatened by a world created by himself" - Ruth Ashen (pg. xi)
 - **cf. notes on pg. 95 on "the free and responsible development of a unique self"*
- "there is no one right pattern for man, but many possible patterns to be discovered and invented" - Author (pg. 133)
 - ◆ **it's incorrect to equate 'rightness' with 'oneness' - meaning, what's right can exist in the plural sense; right doesn't have to exist in the singular (that's exactly the falsity purported by narrow-minded subjectivism - i.e., that 'truth' is only what the individual subjective consciousness deems is true). Even in the above, the author is admitting plural 'rightness' - otherwise, that 'what's right' (i.e., the correct way in which to see the world and human existence) is that there's many ways in which such can be done.*
- "**self-deception, artificiality, neurosis, and rigid personality structures impede sexuality as they impair all human relations**" - Author (pg. 163)
 - ◆ "promiscuity is as likely to prevent a person from establishing a meaningful love relationship as to aid in the search for it" - Author (pg. 164)
- "they are afraid of finding themselves imprisoned within the structures of their own crystalized thought" - Author (pg. 202)
 - ◆ **this IS the neurotic. In fact, it is this fear of commitment which leaves them to be torn between each and every direction, aiming to be everywhere while really not-being anywhere.*
- "**the premises most fundamental to humanistic existentialism** [are] that we are all responsible for the situations within which men must make themselves; that no human being may claim, by right of birth or nature, a position above that of another; that equality does not mean conformity but rather the right of

- each person to work out his own values and way of life freely so long as he does not infringe upon the same right on the part of others" - Author (pg. 206)
- ◆ *equality is 'resistance' to conformity - cf. comments on pg. 34-35 & 95.
 - "I am sometimes disturbed by what seem to me traces of the anti-intellectualism and irresponsibility which I find to be characteristic of the apolitical, more nihilistic rebels. **Resistance to ideological formulation may on occasion be a mere cover-up for refusal to think through all the implications and consequences of a decision.** I admire those students who resent the pedantic academicism of our graduate schools and search for ways to develop themselves creatively in spite of those of us who work tirelessly to frustrate them. I deplore the numbers of those whose unwillingness to acquire the self-discipline which any productive life requires is disguised as a proud refusal to play the game. Not all who have displayed so admirable an eagerness to correct blatant social evils have shown equal integrity in recognizing their responsibilities in personal relations and commitments. **Impulsive, generous, and warm feelings have indeed a certain intrinsic worth; they are inadequate, even dangerous, if they substitute for thinking instead of corroborating it.**" - Author (pg. 206)
 1. "Faith is a feeling" - Author (pg. 63) *it's a "lost" (i.e., un-grounded) wandering. M. Heidegger, in *Mindfulness*, says "philosophy is grounding" (pg. 46).
 2. "thinking is hard [as] it demands intelligence, constant effort, and the strength to recognize something as true when it would be more convenient to believe otherwise" - Author (pg. 132)
 3. "it is by reason that we calculate the wisdom of earlier choices as having produced what they promised, as to be repeated, to be avoided, etc." - Author (pg. 63)
 4. "sincerity is essential but not sufficient" - Author (pg. 207) *feelings are oft construed as being-'sincere'.
 - "extreme conduct is justified only in extreme situations" - Author (pg. 208)
 - ◆ "genuine commitment is not the same as blind devotion to a system set up by somebody else. The wish to avoid the necessity for thinking through each choice and recognizing one's responsibility for each act is what engenders loyalty to extremist groups whether they be fascist, communist, racist, or fanatically patriotic" - Author (pg. 299)
 - "Sartre has pointed out that every negation is a particular negation; even as a negation it is - negatively - qualified by that which it negates" (pg. 211)
 - ◆ *meaning, the qualitative aspect of any said 'particular' negation - where negation, as a principle itself, figures into the world through human choice - is that (i.e., pointing-out 'there') which stands opposed to it (as not) elected. Cf. D. Binseel, *A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity - "Negation", in economic jargon, is 'opportunity cost' - that is, what you forego through any particular choice. As example, for \$30 you could buy a book; but, in buying the book, and given you have a limited amount of money (i.e., that there's finitude in the world of things and in (Be)ing itself), you, in the same instance, give-up (or, 'let' slip away to be at an impossible dis-stance) buying a drink and burger at the bar*".
 - "there seems to be little point in studying the philosophy of the East since it has been expressed already by Western philosophers" - Author (pg. 215)
 - "any ethics must be closely articulated with a metaphysics..." - Author (pg. 215)
 - ◆ *'negation' deals with the meta-physics of 'choice'.
 - "language functions as surely as any of Kant's categories to make thought and emotion, too, into a product and to universalize them" - Author (pg. 255)
 - "Theoretically, followers of Zen resist the idea that its insights constitute a philosophy - much as Kierkegaard did. They deny that the essence of man's life and the solutions to his problems, or even the problems themselves, can be adequately treated by direct conceptual thought or ever fully communicated" - Author (pg. 257)
 - ◆ *I know a few individuals who treat the human condition in such a neglectful attitude. And, I personally despise each of them for it.
 - "Enlightenment in Zen Buddhism is called Satori and is as important for Zen as Moksa or Nirvana is for Vedanta. Paradoxically, Zen insists that the insight gained in Satori is the realization that there is nothing to seek, that what is found was here all the time" - Author (pg. 263)
 - ◆ "With or without mystic overtones, **Satori is essentially a 'letting go'**. What one lets go of is the feeling that one is, or ought to be, or ought to want to be, in control of his own situation. This may seem to be in contradiction with the famous excellence of Zen-trained archers or the strict discipline of Zen temple schools, but it is not. The whole point is that 'one' does not 'do' anything. The 'one' exists only as an immediate center of awareness, but this awareness is only a point, so to speak, in a complex of responses to an ever-changing environment, an environment which is, in turn, part of the totality of 'related functions'" - Author (pg. 264)
 - ◇ *One ought to control their Be-ing - and, too, being-in-a-situation. Letting go in such a circumstance equates to submitting to any given situation. Such is enslavement - more precisely, our enslavement of ourself to conditions which 'appear' beyond our control. This perspective closely aligns with Stoicism and Religion - that one should automatically, without question (i.e., thinking), submit to cosmic forces outside of themselves. If this were 'true' (i.e., the answer to conflict, resistance, uncertainty, being-in-the-world, etc.), then slavery would still (be) (e.g., stillness is the full manifestation of "not do-ing"). There is no (ing) in be-ing. Meaning, there is no activity. And, it's the absence of activity which leads such to (be) still - or, to still be. But, such is, in fact, death, as only death is 'truly' still. So, **to be still is the death of human be-ing.** Yet, even this is not reality, as everything is in 'constant flux' (i.e., rotation; changing - and, it's this change which points out the liv-ing). The sun's rays pass over distances; water rapids scurry, washing down rocks; and, the wind hurls itself against trees, breaking branches and letting leaves twirl freely. So, why individuals think stillness is 'life', I'm sure I'll never understand. Though, what I will say is that such a perspective is as pathetic as one who cries out to a God in hopes that it may save him from himself. This attitude, surely, is not the answer - much less an appropriate method for conducting oneself in-the-world which acts and is acted upon each individual's be-ing. However, this all is not say that 'letting' doesn't at all have a place (in) be-ing. Indeed, half of all (be)-ing is 'letting (be)' have ground to stand and (be) for-itself. Where (ing) is the activity, (be) is letting; and, in letting be, we let there be activity in be-ing. This is Life. And, to be sure, death is (in) Life. But, death is not Life itself - rather, it's Life's only partner.
 - ◇ *cf. D. Binseel, *A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity*, pg. 4 - I. Kant, in his *What is Enlightenment?*, says "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance. Dare to know! (*Sapere aude*). "Have the courage to use your own understanding," is therefore the motto of the enlightenment. Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of mankind gladly remain minors all their lives, long after nature has freed them from external guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor" (pg. 1) https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_5bddcd681ad94ca0bf2e5fdc33bf6bea.pdf
 - ◆ "what disturbs me about Zen is that it seems to me to preclude the creation of a value system, both because of its denial of temporality and because it allows for no real sense of responsibility" - Author (pg. 274)
 - "one seeks no further; one merely does what needs to be done. Where nothingness and suchness are one, there is no choice, no imperative" - Author (pg. 275)
 - *cf. D. Binseel, *A Phenomenology of "That!"*: An Introduction to the *Dialectic of Consciousness*, pg. 20 - "Care has lost any need. Since need is needed - that is, needing to-have; needing to-keep; needing to-feel; needing to-think; needing to-be - it all but suffocates Care, immediately collapsing its openness (cf. Simone de Beauvoir, *Letters to Sartre*, pg. 324 - "my love, I don't know if you can feel the need that I have for you. I've borne it with all the patience I could muster, but now that I'm relaxed...it utterly suffocates me"). As suffocating, need dis-distances any love of letting (be)ing Be free. https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf

- "humanistic existentialism, starting with the isolated consciousness, **stresses social commitment and the need to reorganize society**" (pg. 276)
 - ◆ "existentialism proceeds from a pluralism of concrete (I)'s to an ideal (We)" (pg. 276)
- "Eastern philosophy promises a higher irrationality which transcends the admitted limitations of human reason and opens the door to an infinite expansion of consciousness. It is my belief that **this promise is an invitation to avoid working to achieve such progress as reason can make**, despite its restrictions, and a temptation to escape the burden of responsibility which inevitably accompanies individual consciousness. It is neither self-expansion nor self-realization but **a refusal to engage any longer in pursuing or making a self**" (pg. 277)
- "metaphors are used when one wants to express a truth which ordinary language seems to express inadequately" - Author (pg. 331)
 - "it is a truism that actions, like words, lose their value if too often repeated and cannot be easily restored to their original significance" - Author (pg. 349)

c. General Notes:

▪ Part 1 - The Choice

○ Chapter 1 - The Choice To Be Ethical (pg. 3)

- "Among the heroes and anti-heroes of existentialist literature, one who should never be forgotten is Dostoevski's Underground Man. His violently individualistic protest remains at the heart of the existentialist revolt in the twentieth century. His defiant rejection of any appeal to rational self-interest may serve for a touchstone as we examine the possibilities of an existentialist ethics" (pg. 3)
 - "In writing the novella *Notes from Underground*, Dostoevski was attacking the easy optimism of certain nineteenth-century liberals, their idea of inevitable progress, their insistence on viewing man as rational and inherently good. The Underground Man objects to these ideals, not out of cynicism so much as because they seem to him a travesty of that human dignity which they pretend to affirm. The Underground Man takes offense at this picture of man as a predictable creature who can be counted on to act rationally and to pursue his own self-interest - the assumption being, of course, that there is no contradiction between these two activities. Such a man is left with no freedom, with no will of his own. In a flight of fancy, the Underground Man envisions a future society without conflict, one where all possible conduct is so rationally tabulated that everybody will quickly perceive what he ought to do for his own advantage—and do it" (pg. 3-4)
 - ◆ "the Underground Man does not represent a positive ethical ideal for Dostoevski or for me. His life is wretched in his own eyes and harmful to others. He remains an anti-hero. But he can be valuable to us" (pg. 4)
 - ◆ "The Underground Man clearly demonstrates the fact that the choice to be ethical is conditional, not categorical" (pg. 10)
- "Youthful revolt against authority, artistic bohemianism, delinquency, radicalism - these we have always known. They are in any case defined relative to their background; often the world is better because of them. What is new, at least in terms of the numbers involved, is the aggressive rejection of all that society has to offer - not only its materialistic comforts and its professed ideals of rationality, happiness, and altruism, but the very concept of community and ethical responsibility" (pg. 5)
 - "As with the Underground Man, this stubborn defiance does not point toward any goal, nor is it motivated by anything except the bitter pleasure of asserting one's right to be against oneself. **The inmost self is preserved but by a process of allowing only destructive relations to exist between it and the world.** The purely arbitrary alone has value, and it is recognized chiefly in acts which sever not only self from others but the immediate choice of self from the moments of one's own past and future" (pg. 5)
 - ◆ "It is exactly **this identification of the arbitrary with the authentic free choice of self which has been thought of as the insurmountable obstacle in the way of any humanistic existentialist ethics.** If every man is free both to choose and to establish the value of what he chooses, then it is not easy to find any argument to convince the Underground Man that he ought to make a different kind of choice. But if he is right, even from his own point of view, in choosing to be miserable himself and to injure others, there appears to be no hope for either ethics or humanism" (pg. 5)
 - "There is a tendency today, more popular than strictly philosophical, to identify as 'ethics' any personally chosen value system and code of behavior. This extreme of relativism is exactly parallel with what has happened to 'religion'" (pg. 5)
- "it is not true that every person is committed to his particular ultimate concern (his religion) or to a specific mode of conduct designed to further his personally selected values (his ethics). **What characterizes many, if not most, people is precisely a lack of commitment and consistency.** They do not have a coherent life plan either as ideal or reality. One cannot truthfully say even that they have chosen to respond spontaneously to each new situation as it occurs, for their responses are frequently not genuine but only what they feel is expected" (pg. 6)
- "**Usually the idea of ethics is associated with the notion of obligations, the necessity of recognizing that acts have consequences, and the idea that consideration of more remote aims may act as a check on immediate impulses. Ethics is thus an inner control which the individual exercises over himself.** Or again, a system of ethics serves as a set of reference points, by which to adjudicate conflicts of interests - whether this conflict is within a single person or in personal relations with others" (pg. 8-9)
 - "I believe that in the choice to be ethical there is something still more basic. This is the recognition of the need to justify one's life. To put it another way, the decision to be ethical is a choice of a particular value: the sense of satisfaction derived from knowing that one may judge his own life as he would judge another's and find it good. To justify one's life involves the belief that one's conduct is harmonious with the image which he has selected as the ideal pattern of a life he can admire or deem to be in itself a positive value. **The ethical calls for continuity between the moment of decision, the act itself, and the later judgment passed upon it.** In the justified life there is harmony and perfect continuity between the subjective process which one is and the objectified self which he has become in his relation with the world and others— outside himself" (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "The choice to be ethical as such involves the bare idea of the inner demand for justification as a self-imposed necessary relation between actions and judgments by and within the same individual" (pg. 9)
- "Sartre's psychology is incomprehensible without reference to his fundamental distinction between Being-in-itself-which is all of nonconscious reality, and Being-for-itself - which is human Being, with consciousness. At times in his discussion of these two types of Being, Sartre almost but never quite seems to equate them with that other famous pair-with Being and Nothingness. The consciousness which sets man apart from the rest of Being is defined as the process of causing Nothingness to emerge like a hole at the heart of Being. Man is described as the being through whom Nothingness comes into the world. But **neither consciousness nor man is Nothingness.** He is that part of Being which is able to stand back and, by a sort of psychic withdrawal, assume a point of view on the rest of Being, to question it, to judge it and to establish a definite relation between it and himself. Sartre is certainly not the first to emphasize the idea that man is the only creature capable of detaching himself - at least mentally - from the rest of nature and able to achieve a clear sense of self-identity. What is distinctive in his philosophy is the peculiar emphasis which he places on the negativity of consciousness, and his corollary views of freedom and the Self" (pg. 11)
 - ◆ **I disagree with the statement "neither consciousness nor man is Nothingness".*
 - "Starting one step earlier than Descartes, **Sartre claims that in its primary structure, consciousness is neither reflective nor personal.** Descartes's *cogito ergo sum*, 'I think, therefore I am', is both. It points to a well-grounded subject reflecting upon its own activity. It presupposes too much" (pg. 11)
 - "The 'there is' implies an awareness on the part of consciousness that **the awareness and the object of awareness are not the same.** Thus any act of consciousness involves two aspects: an implicit self-consciousness and the psychic distance which consciousness establishes

between itself and its object. This subjective recoil Sartre called "nihilation." He speaks of consciousness as enfolding its objects in a shell or muff of nothingness" (pg. 12)

- ◆ "Even on this nonreflective level, we see that consciousness introduces a separation which is the basis for all that complexity of differentiation, distinction, significance, and meaning which characterize the world as each conscious being knows and lives it. At this first stage, however, consciousness is not directly its own object. Nor is there any sense of 'I' or 'me'. The first beginnings of a personalized consciousness come when consciousness reflects back upon [itself]" (pg. 12)
- ◆ "All, and Sartre too, would agree that the highly personalized Ego is slow and gradual in its development. For all but existentialist psychologists, consciousness or the psyche is some sort of entity and is identical with what we think of as the full person" (pg. 12)
- "Sartre says of man that because he has consciousness, he is the being who is not what he is and is what he is not. **Consciousness is not entity but a process of attention**, as William James put it, **or of intention**, to use the phenomenological term as Sartre does. Apart from its objects, **consciousness is nothing at all**. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. What prevents it from being one with its object is precisely nothing, and this nothing is that nothingness or psychic withdrawal which is the act of consciousness. Since **consciousness is thus only a constant relating**, the assuming of a point of view, there is nothing in consciousness, certainly no unconscious and no reservoir of determining traits or tendencies. **Sartre rejects completely the Freudian concept of the unconscious**. Most startling of all, the accumulation of memories, habits and personal characteristics, even the strong sense of being and having been a definite "I" or "me" —all of this psychic material Sartre puts over on the side of Being-in-itself, making it the object and product of consciousness rather than an intrinsic primary structure of Being-for-itself." (pg. 13)
 - ◇ "in denying that there is any Unconscious...What he denies is that there are buried experiences or parts of our psyche, on principle out of reach, which are actively participating in our immediate choices while a conscious Ego acts in ignorance of its own motives" (pg. 14)
 - ▶ "even without appeal to an Unconscious, it is obvious that the greater part of our awareness is on the nonreflective level" (pg. 20-21)
 - ◆ "If we leave the level of abstraction and attempt to see what Sartre means in terms of ordinary human experience, we find a radical affirmation of human freedom and a view of Self as a value to be pursued rather than either a determining nucleus of possibilities or a hidden nugget to be uncovered. **We are, in our inmost being, a power of choosing again at each moment the relation which we wish to establish with the world around us and with our own past and future experiences in that world**. As a consciousness, each one is individualized by the accumulation of individual acts of consciousness..." (pg. 13)
- "Recalling that consciousness is nothing at all without an object and yet that it is not the same as its objects, we may understand how consciousness is nothing except its experiences and at the same time not one with them. We may see, too, how **every consciousness is never without a personal coloring, yet is not identical with the ego or definable personality**. Sartre's paradoxical description of man as the being who is not what he is and is what he is not finally makes sense. Man is not what he is, for he is free to put everything into question - his past, his present project, the future which he envisions for himself. He is what he is not. Sartre says that as a being-for-itself, man *is*, in the manner of an event. Nobody exists except in a given situation, located in time and space" (pg. 14)
 - ◆ "Man exists in a situation, he internalizes that situation and bestows on it a particular meaning and significance. **He lives it by transcending it**" (pg. 14)
- "Sartre allows that we may will to ignore certain of our own past acts. We may refuse to reflect upon our present motives or even lie to ourselves about them. This is the procedure of a consciousness in bad faith. Sartre differs from Freud in insisting that a consciousness is never totally the dupe of its own lie" (pg. 14-15)
- "When Sartre discusses the Self, he speaks of it as that which is forever pursued but never attained. This is because man is a self-making process and because the consciousness which man *is* always stands at a distance from what it has experienced. **Consciousness is freedom**. Yet it is consciousness which by its own intention establishes the unity of life as it relates its own past, present, and future acts in a meaningful pattern. For **consciousness is nothing without an object**. It exists as an awareness of the things in the world, an awareness of its own relation to them, and an awareness of its relation to its own past and future intentions" (pg. 15)
- "Existentialism insists that the individual is free to revise his attitude toward his own past. Insofar as it is correct to say that each man carries his past within him as a part of his present total attitude toward the world, we may add that at every moment, he remakes his past by the attitude which he takes toward it, not only looking reflectively back upon it, but, through his options, actively deciding the part it will play in his choice of a future. By the same stroke he acknowledges that he is at this moment forming what will be the past which he will have to remake in the anticipated future" (pg. 16)
 - "my past *is* what I make; it *was* then what I made it then" (pg. 16)
- "Temporally a consciousness pursues a Self which is an essence gradually evolved from a self-making existent. **This Self is the creation of consciousness**. Self-realization here is the rounding off the project, the particular choice of Being" (pg. 16)
 - "justification is reflective and demands a coherence between the present judging consciousness and its other intentions - whether they be in the remembered past or in the projected future" (pg. 17)
- "The second kind of self-realization is immediate. It is the direct intuition of freedom. I am not speaking of the reflective and abstract idea *that one is free*. **The experience of freedom is best realized in the nonreflective spontaneous act** in which consciousness' implicit self-awareness of itself as acting takes the form of a nonreflective comprehension that the act is free of any considerations save the immediate willing. I do not mean to say that consciousness is ever for an instant wholly nontemporal. Even the process of reaching out toward a desired object implies a coherence of time. The totally isolated instant is pure imagined abstraction. If we may speak of instants at all, they are not entities but phases of a continued process. Speaking relatively, however, we may say that a consciousness may will itself nontemporal to the extent of refusing to make remembrance or anticipations of its more remote states into a significant aspect of its present choice. In a response which is radically inconsistent with its reflective pursuit of a coherent self-pattern, a consciousness vividly experiences itself as truly being that freedom which it is." (pg. 17)
- "Sartre, of course, has presented the view that man is both Being and Nothingness. **Man's Being derives from his 'facticity', his finite existence in a specific situation in the world**. It would not be quite right to say that his consciousness is Nothingness. More accurately, **consciousness is a process of effecting a nothingness or separation between itself and its objects, of enfolding each of its objects with a nothingness which thereby introduces differentiation, significance, relations into the world**. Sartre has stressed this psychic distance in man as the source of his freedom. He recognizes that it is this which results in man's having to choose what he will be rather than simply being it. Sartre, however, has stressed the idea that a consciousness' recognition of its nothingness and consequent freedom is a moment of anguish and despair. **Most people flee from it in bad faith, taking refuge in 'the serious world'**. **This is the realm of convention where one unquestioningly accepts as absolutes the prevailing values of the group in which one finds oneself**. I do not deny that this is the pattern followed by the majority of people" (pg. 18)
 - "I think Sartre has failed to realize that the confrontation of freedom may just as well be grasped as a moment of self-realization and that

one may cling to it as such, either with an attitude which Sartre, too, would call ethical or by making of it a reason for choosing the nonethical" (pg. 18)

- "In short, the choice is not merely between authenticity and unauthenticity. It is threefold, and those critics are right who have pointed out that authenticity by itself does not necessarily result in what may properly be called the ethical life. Persons who take refuge in unauthenticity and bad faith do not deliberately choose the nonethical. They recognize a need to justify their lives but are terrified at the thought of trying to do so without some clearly defined, impersonal standard which from outside themselves would guarantee certain absolute rights and wrongs. They want a certainty which they cannot feel so long as they realize that the choice of values derives from their own freedom. We cannot call their position ethical inasmuch as it is based upon self-deception, but it is the very opposite of an open choice of the nonethical. It is in reality a choice of the appearance of the ethical" (pg. 18-19)
 - "The choice to live unauthentically rests upon a refusal to recognize the existence and demands of freedom; it seeks to hide from itself the very fact that it is a choice. The choice to be ethical embraces both the recognition that one is free and the acceptance of the responsibility which freedom entails. It is an authentic choice, for it recognizes that the decision to justify one's life derives from one's own spontaneous desire and is not imposed from the outside" (pg. 19)
 - "There remains a third alternative, which is that of the Underground Man. We cannot call his choice unauthentic, for the Underground Man is fully aware that he and he alone is responsible for what he chooses. Indeed it is freedom itself which he chooses as the value so far beyond all others that he pits it against all possible values which might in the future result from submitting this freedom to any sort of calculated restriction, external or internal. The moment of his recognition of freedom is identified with self-realization and in so far as is possible, the Underground Man severs it entirely from the temporally limited Self. To put it another way, the Underground Man asserts that he prizes his freedom not to be ethical. He does not have to justify himself, he is not obliged to choose happiness or any other self-evident good. **He chooses his independence of all regulating value systems**. The Underground Man chooses to live this recognition in a deliberate choice of present unhappiness. More often the **refusal to justify one's life takes the form of choosing at whim the immediately desirable without concern for being able to defend the choice objectively**. In this case, too, there is a deliberate rejection of responsibility for one's own past and future as for that part of one's self-projection which involves others. **To reject the temporal is to reject the objective side of oneself; it is to identify oneself solely with the subjective**" (pg. 19)
 - ◆ **the author is trying to distinguish, I believe, between "authenticity" and "ethical" - i.e., the Underground Man is not unauthentic; but, neither is he ethical.*
- "**in practice an ethical system is lived as a personal value system and moral code**" (pg. 20)
 - "At this point we are admittedly going beyond the point at issue and beginning to talk about requirements for a specific ethics rather than the problem of whether or not one ought to choose to be ethical. I have allowed the slight digression in order to underscore the point that the choice not to be ethical, not only is a real possibility, but seems to offer certain genuine values" (pg. 22)
- "Since a consciousness cannot be unaware of its temporality, it is forced to choose its own way of living this temporality and to choose the value it will assign to the two possibilities of realizing a Self. Consciousness cannot avoid being reflective, for its past experiences are there as part of the background of every choice" (pg. 22)
 - **if "consciousness cannot avoid being reflective", how "free" is it actually?*
- "In speaking of "ought," we imply the presence of a compelling factor of such a sort that to recognize it is simultaneously to grant that it sets up a demand which must be filled" (pg. 23)
- "in insisting that one ought to choose to be ethical, we are on sure ground in affirming at least these things: first, the choice not to be ethical is almost wholly a rejection. Its bare minimum of positive value is the true recognition that one is in fact free not to subject himself to any demands whatsoever if he so chooses. **Although this realization of the film of nothingness between a consciousness and its own projects may bring dread to most people, it is possible to embrace it in joy and attempt to make it the sole absolute value of a life**. The wholly arbitrary excludes any consistent motivation. The purely nonethical life is as impossible to sustain practically as the perfectly ethical one. Insofar as it can be lived, it takes the form of rejecting all rational calculation, all responsibility for others and for one's own past and future—at least in the sense of feeling that one's acts should be governed by such considerations. **It places all value on spontaneous self-realization and none on the temporal kind. Thus it is a choice of subjectivity and a rejection of objectivity, not an expansion of life but a reduction**" (pg. 24-25)
 - "The choice to be nonethical is not a choice of being or of becoming. It is in truth a choice of Nothingness. In it, consciousness, like the Schopenhauerian Will, seeks to prey on itself. **In the name of asserting itself as a free relationship to all things, it denies the importance of all those relations it establishes and of those objects without which it would be nothing at all**" (pg. 25)
- "**The choice to be ethical affirms the importance of realizing oneself objectively in time**. It does not deny or preclude freedom's spontaneous self-realization...Although the nonethical choice embraces the constant possibility of ignoring all demands for imposing a consistent value system on one's life, the ethical choice requires that we recognize all of the truth about man as part of the data on the basis of which we make our decisions" (pg. 25)
 - "Once we grant that the choice to be ethical is a commitment to the need to justify one's life, we can fairly rapidly set up certain basic requirements which will have to be met by any system which purports to be an ethics" (pg. 25-26)
 - ◆ "First of all, if **the idea of justification demands that there be a harmony of subjective judgment and objective experience**, then our ethics must never knowingly assume a view which conflicts with what is believed to be reality. **An ethics must introduce rationality as one of its criteria** even though it may at the same time insist that its goal is happiness or satisfaction or some other state which is closer to emotion than to reason. Fidelity to the truth of man and the Universe is essential. Philosophical systems vary as to the degree to which such Truth is thought to be absolute and attainable by everyone, but **no ethics may be allowed to act contrary to what it believes to be real and true**. Possibly honesty would be the better term here, but I use the word to comprise more than the quality of not deceiving oneself or others. It includes, as well, the determination to know insofar as possible what reality is and never to allow conduct which cannot be justified without denying what one holds to be given. An example is the existentialist belief in human freedom. If one accepts freedom as a fact, then no act is ethical which acts as if men were not free. **Rationality involves more than intellectual honesty. It requires as one of its corollary values a respect for consistency**" (pg. 26)
 - ◆ "Finally an ethics must meet a certain minimum of pragmatic tests. It must provide clearly discernible ways of attaining the values which it promises. Moreover, if the ethical choice is to have preponderance over the nonethical, it must offer the opportunity of achieving *more* value. The traditional problems of all hedonistic calculations still remain —qualitative distinctions among types of value, diversity versus intensity, immediate satisfactions versus anticipated, and so forth. However it may try to solve these difficulties, a specific ethics must make the individual feel and believe that this way of life offers the highest degree of value experience open to him. Otherwise there is no reason at all for him to choose the ethical. If there is any one universal fact about man, it is the experience of values and disvalues. There is no one who does not experience a sense of reaching out toward some things, of welcoming them when they are grasped, and of shrinking from others, wishing they were not present when they are. If words have any meaning at all, values are good and disvalues are bad - relative to the one establishing the values and dis-values. To

say that one would choose a disvalue is nonsense. To say that one always chooses value may be tautological, but it at least recognizes a reality and offers some clarification. **The minimum aim of any ethical system is to promote value and to reduce disvalue.** The ethical choice differs from choice as such in this way: Any choice is a selection of one value in preference to another. The choice of the nonethical is a resolve to possess certain immediate values, one of which is freedom not to make the effort to determine whether or not one is going to enjoy the highest degree of value possible for him. The ethical choice is the will to live the life which may be reflectively appraised as holding in truth the greatest value" (pg. 27)

- "for we must thus argue abstractly that one ought to choose the ethical. One ought to choose what offers the greater value, for **value is the only object of choice and its sole motive**" (pg. 27)
- Chapter 2 - Sartre's Choice (pg. 29)
 - "in the late fifties I tried show that the connection between Sartre's fictional examination of ethical choices and his ontology was closer than most critics were willing to admit" (p. 29)
 - "Sartre himself has stated flatly that he no longer has any interest in writing an ethics. More than that, he apparently believes that the project of working out a formal ethics is an irrelevance, an escapism, if not a downright impossibility" (pg. 29)
 - ◆ "Sartre, who was born in 1905, has declared that he dreamed the first fifty years of his life. *The Words*, the autobiography of his childhood, was first written in 1954. **Its theme is an awakened reappraisal after almost fifty years of delusion.** Sartre's particular dream had been that it was possible to be saved through literature" (pg. 30)
 - ◆ "In answer to a question as to whether he had abandoned the somber view of man presented in *Nausea*, Sartre replied, 'No. The universe remains black. We are shipwrecked animals...But I discovered suddenly that alienation, the exploitation of men by other men, undernourishment - these make metaphysical unhappiness a luxury and relegate it to second place. Hunger — now that *is* an evil'" (pg. 30-31)
 - "it is evident...that he has not really abandoned ethics" (pg. 31)
 - "Sartre seems ready to risk everything now for the sake of achieving certain absolute goods which will then create for us a society where we may safely indulge in abstract justifications of our conduct. In short, ethics, which is unimportant anyway and a luxury at best, is to be put on the shelf while we do the hard work of helping men and women attain the condition which will allow them to fulfill themselves as human beings. **All of this seems to me quite backward. Sartre's present position is not consistent with his earlier existentialism, and I personally do not think it is defensible.** I do believe that it is understandable and that Sartre himself has given us the clues which we need in hunting for an explanation. Why, then, does Sartre reject the idea of an ethics for existentialism *now*?" (pg. 31)
 - "Sartre's refusal to write an ethics appears to be based on two conviction: First, an existentialist ethics is at present impossible. Second, the act of trying to formulate any theoretical ethics is not at present ethically justified" (pg. 31)
 - "He seems to have two other reasons. First of all, he is convinced of the impossibility of purity of action in an unjust society" (pg. 32)
 - "Sartre's second reason for finding an ethics impossible raises more seriously the question of whether he has renounced the most fundamental of all existentialist theses - the belief in man's freedom" (pg. 32)
 - "We should note that this philosophy of freedom is not contemporary existentialism as we know it. Sartre envisions a dialectical movement: First, existentialism will modify Marxism from within by reinserting at its heart the 'existential project', thus conferring upon Marxism once more the 'human dimension' which the heirs of Marx have all but destroyed. Then, existentialism will cease to exist in its own right but will live on, 'absorbed, surpassed and conserved by the totalizing movement' of the revitalized neo-Marxism it has helped bring into being. Finally, when the world's inhabitants have been freed from economic pressures induced by the 'problems of production', Marxism itself will be surpassed and conserved in the new 'philosophy of freedom'" (pg. 33)
 - "Sartre's hopeful prediction represents one of the few instances where he takes seriously his own pronouncement that human life is a continuing self-transcendence, that human nature is not fixed, that man is indeed a creature who makes himself by a process of constant change. **Humanistic existentialism has always insisted on viewing man as he exists concretely in a specific situation, in a milieu defined as to time and place and human institutions.** It would be illogical to expect that the ethics and social philosophy for men and women living in an environment dominated by material scarcity and economic competition would remain the same in a society where the problems of production had been adequately solved. It is akin to attempting to solve beforehand the specific problems of human relationships in a world where extrasensory perception would be the established means of communication. The philosophy of man, whose very existence is a continuing self-transcendence, ought to be itself self-transcending" (pg. 33-34)
 - ◆ "Sartre has explicitly stated that in his opinion socialism 'is the movement of man in process of making himself; other parties believe that man is already made'. **The dialectical progress of history is carried on by men and women who refuse to live the life which conditions impose on them and who find ways of changing those conditions**" (pg. 34-35)
 - ◇ **i.e., "progress" is "resistance"*
 - ▶ "Sartre's form of Marxism could not exist apart from the premise that men are free to choose how they will live the situation in which they find themselves. He has never confused the freedom to choose with the power to do what one would like to choose" (pg. 35)
 - ◆ "In fairness, however, we should point out that it is the immeasurability of man's potentials that provides much of the motivating force for Sartre's insistence that all men must be liberated from the factual limitations of their practical freedom. Sartre seems to restate with added psychological overtones Rousseau's political manifesto that 'Man is free and everywhere in chains'" (pg. 35)
 - "If we look further, it seems to me that Sartre's belief that an ethics of freedom is impossible now depends less on his sense of present restrictions to men's actions than on an implied definition of ethics not consistent with his own philosophy. When he says that ethics is 'a collection of idealist devices' to help one endure a life one cannot change, he may be accurately defining certain ethical systems —Stoicism, for example, or Epicureanism, or some of the philosophies of India. **Such a quietist ethics would hardly be what one would expect of a philosophy such as existentialism which maintains that each man defines himself through his acts.** Yet it is in the name of action that Sartre rejects the idea of an ethics for our period, finding the writing of an ethics to be an irrelevance, a luxury, even going so far as to suggest that it is an escape in bad faith for those who would like to find an excuse to neglect their social responsibilities. Clearly Sartre is thinking here of an ethics which would be little more than an abstract, introspective search for principles to solace our metaphysical unhappiness. In short, Sartre seems to associate ethics with our need for absolute salvation" (pg. 35-36)
 - "I think it is appropriate to observe that his view of literature has progressed in three stages: Sartre began by seeing literature as a means of salvation. In a middle period, he continued to feel that through it the writer might be saved, but he emphasized that literature could represent as well a dangerous temptation. Finally he concluded that literature is a damnation" (pg. 36)
 - ◆ "in *The Words* Sartre says that he was Roquentin..." (pg. 37)
 - ◆ **"the great temptation of the writer is to write for immortality and not for his own time"** (pg. 38)
 - ◇ **(ed.) by S. Churchill & J. Reynolds, Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, pg. 1 - "he positioned his life's work as a writer as rooted in his desire to achieve a kind of immortality through his writings..."*

- ◆ "The way to do this is to refuse to put anything into question, to pose purely aesthetic problems with formal solutions, equally valid for any generation and equally nonchallenging. Sartre argues that the writer must engage himself. He must confront the concrete problems of his period. Furthermore, he must write to promote human freedom, for anything else is to betray both humanity and literature" (pg. 38)
 - ◇ "literature is action. Its function is to show man his reflection as in a mirror, a magic mirror which images potentiality as well as the actual" (pg. 38-39)
- ◆ "the theory of engaged literature rests upon an implied ethics of responsibility" (pg. 39)
 - ◇ "just as Sartre says of all of us that with each act we choose ourselves, that not to choose is already to have chosen, so we may say that a writer commits himself by the very act of writing" (pg. 39)
 - ◇ "the choice in good faith is a choice that is fully aware, one in which the chooser recognizes his responsibility in choosing" (pg. 39)
- "Sartre as writer, Sartre as philosopher, and Sartre's existentialist heroes all quite obviously sought a way by which one could justify one's life. Everywhere implied was the idea that one must be faithful to the facts of the human condition, and this required both the scrupulous recognition of the absolute subjectivity of every individual freedom and the assumption of one's own responsibility for what he made of his life and for the consequences of his acts in molding the situations within which other freedoms made their choices. Although Sartre did not formulate an abstract system of ethics, one felt everywhere the presence of an implied ethics, whose general outline at least was clear" (pg. 40)
 - ◆ **what the author is arguing is that, though Sartre himself denied any formal ethic was possible, he was quite involved in ethics from the very beginning as a writer.*
- "[Sartre had] gradually come to disdain all activity which is not immediately involved in the economic and social liberation of man. It is in this spirit that he cynically relegates literature to secondary importance, even as he continues to write it, and seems to regard ethics and indeed all philosophy as leisure activity - except for the socio-political" (pg. 41)
 - ◆ "In this final stage Sartre sees literature as a species of damnation, a damnation in that it once nourished in him a false hope, one which turned out to be one more particularly subtle and powerful form of bad faith, promising salvation where there was none. **'Out of the need to justify my existence, I had made literature into an Absolute. It took thirty years for me to get out of that state of mind'**" (pg. 41)
 - ◇ **cf. D. Binseel, A Phenomenology of "That!", A Note to the Reader - "the situation each academic faces is one in which those who are in most dire need of learning what's there to be learned have already set themselves on a path which coddles their understanding, therein pre-emptively avoiding anything which might challenge their juvenile judgements, where the result is intellectuals preaching to themselves and to an imagined audience (i.e., one each wishes were there, but in reality is far from here)"*
 - ◆ "Sartre evidently sees all activity as damnation - if to hold that there is no salvation means that men are damned. For he goes on to say that one is not saved by politics either, nor by anything. 'There is no salvation anywhere'. The idea of salvation implies an Absolute, Sartre maintains, and the Absolute is not to be found. I feel that we are hearing again, more than twenty years later, a new variation on that theme stated so powerfully in *Being and Nothingness* - that man is a useless passion for a missing God" (pg. 42)
 - ◇ "indeed Sartre views his own development as a religious evolution, but it is my belief that his self-appraisal is incomplete" (pg. 42)
 - ◇ "like [Sartre] I am optimistic enough to believe that some approximation to a just society will someday be achieved..." (pg. 43-44)
 - ▶ "yet Sartre seems to overlook the fact that if we insist that no concerns are valid save the socio-political, we establish an empty regression" (pg. 44)
- "it is my belief that we must begin now to formulate the philosophy of freedom, of which Sartre speaks, if we do not want to be lost forever in despair" (pg. 44)
 - **"Sartre's attitude toward the role of ethics in this process is indeed a strange one. Ethics must be universal, he insists, and he seems to imply that for this reason, there can be no ethics until all men's situations are the same.** I find in Sartre now a curious mixture of two attitudes: At times he seems to feel that ethics must be a set of absolute commandments, established objectively and imposed regardless of specific situations and the subjective colorations imposed by those who live those situations. (E.g., his use of "Thou shalt not lie.") If this is what ethics is, then no wonder Sartre rejects it. The only question is how he could conceive of there ever being a time when such an ethics would be anything but bad faith. On other occasions he apparently sees ethics as the purely psychological device of managing to feel content with one's life - or as I have been saying, to justify it. Here again **his position is ambiguous**" (pg. 44)
 - ◆ "Sartre himself...refuses to save himself until he can take all mankind with him. More often Sartre seems to associate ethical justification with an ideal Salvation by means of some nonexistent Absolute. Then he declares that nobody is saved, not even by politics. 'There is no salvation anywhere'" (pg. 44)
 - "I thought that in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre had come to grips with his 'useless passion' and 'desire to be God'. But the 'missing God' still haunts him and molds the very language he speaks" (pg. 45)
 - ◆ "Obviously neither the Absolute nor Absolution exists as an abstract, universal value or guarantee imbedded in the structure of the Universe or coming from any other source than human consciousness. It is from this premise that Sartre's existentialism derives, and we should hardly expect its goal and final discovery to be the contradiction of its point of departure" (pg. 45)
 - **"Humanistic existentialism does postulate an Absolute.** It is precisely the irreducible reality of the free individual consciousness. In one sense, we may even argue that the values which each consciousness creates from its experience are absolute as they are experienced" (pg. 45)
 - ◆ "Sartre pointed out long ago that there are certain absolute evils which cannot be re-deemed. He uses as an example the torture which reduces a person to a near-thing and leads him to betray himself and what he has held most sacred. Sartre acknowledges that the opposite, the man who does not break under torture, reaffirms the value of the human. If there are specific absolute evils, it seems that there must be specific absolute goods, and Sartre formerly claimed that this was so" (pg. 45)
- "A life is justified if he who lives it can say: First, that he has freely chosen the values by which he has guided and judged his life and that he has found it good; second, that insofar as was in his power, he has willed that each of his acts should keep open the door to such self-justification by other free subjects. This is subjective justification, if you like. If those whose lives have been directly or indirectly touched by his could in good faith support that self-judgment, I personally am willing to say that the life has been objectively justified" (pg. 46)
- "I should like to conclude this discussion of **Sartre's rejection of ethics** with two concluding observations. First, it is Sartre himself whom I am

opposing to Sartre" (pg. 46)

- "it is only in his expressed view of formal ethics and of man's obligations that I believe Sartre has made statements which are inconsistent with his own systematic philosophy, whether early or late" (pg. 46)
 - ◆ "Sartre has remarked in *The Words* that he has always made it a habit to think against himself" (pg. 46-47)
- "Finally, **we must not make the mistake, which I think Sartre has made, of assuming that an ethics without God must posit and fulfil the same needs as an ethics which is theologically grounded.** We must not let the missing God determine our thought by His very absence. If we replace Absolute Being with a radical human freedom, then some things are irretrievably lost. New values will appear in new forms and cannot be expected to fit comfortably in the old places left empty" (pg. 47)
- Chapter 3 - The Existentialist Choice (pg. 49)
 - "It is never possible to take a principle which a philosophical system has established in response to the challenge to be ethical and then seek to use it as a categorical imperative to compel the original choice to be ethical" (pg. 49)
 - "**most of Sartre's friends and enemies both have concluded that his concern for others resulted from his personal choice of being and was in no way consequent to his philosophy**" (pg. 50)
 - "there are **three concepts absolutely fundamental to humanistic existentialism** which many persons, without further examination, accept as self-evident proof that any existentialist ethics is impossible. First, there is the idea that values are 'created' by the individual who chooses them; they are not discovered. At most we may say that they are revealed and chosen in the way that the sculptor decides to bring into being these potentialities of a piece of marble rather than any others. Values are in no sense a priori. They do not fall into any objectively established hierarchy. Second, there is no ultimate independent and impersonal reference point by which to judge human conduct. There is neither a God nor Absolute Mind nor pre-established Human Nature. Third, **the Sartrean view of human relations excludes the possibility of a communion between persons which would dissolve the subject-object relationship. Subjects never become each other or directly experience each other's inner life**, no matter how great the sympathy or how nearly perfect the communication between them. Subjects may be reciprocally related, they interact, but there is no merging. My oneness with mankind is a metaphor, or it refers merely to our inhabiting the same planet and sharing those biological and other finite characteristics which make up the 'human condition'. To sum up, the existentialist man is an isolated individual who is not compelled to acknowledge his involvement with others unless he cares to do so. His one certainty is his own freedom. He has no source or origin in any divine Being or rational plan, and no pre-established goals. Without a sure pattern, he makes himself be" (pg. 50-51)
 - "**I accept this view of what man is. I deny that it leaves no room for an ethics**" (pg. 51)
 - "When Sartre says that man is a useless passion and that it doesn't matter whether a person gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations, he is speaking within a precise context; namely, in reference to man's desire to be the impossible union of Being-in-itself-for-itself, his own Causa Sui, or God. Sartre contends that the ruling passion of most persons, or what might be called their choice of being, is the contradictory desire to realize their freedom and yet at the same time have it supported and guaranteed by something outside itself. To put it another way, they want to feel that they are absolutely free to choose and yet may find outside themselves the directives and guarantees which would enable them to know that their choice is the right one. Thus their freedom would possess an absolute value derived from some other source. Consciousness tries to hide from itself the fact that its own subjectivity is what brings values into the world, and it projects them outward onto objects" (pg. 51-52)
 - ◆ **But, if an individual's freedom does not derive from any other source, and 'man is absolutely free' (i.e., condemned to be free), then is man not also the absolute ground for his own freedom? Sartre even says, "freedom is not a being: it is man's being, i.e., his nothingness of being" (BN, pg. 579). And, "freedom coincides with the nothingness that lies at man's heart" (BN, pg. 578). And, "man is the being whom nothingness comes into the world" (BN, pg. 60).*
 - "Man will never become his own Self-Cause. God does not exist. If man is free, he is free all the way. If he tries to say that the value structures which his freedom has brought into being are the absolute Being which causes and supports his freedom, the lie to himself is as much self-deception for the leader of nations as it is for the solitary drunkard" (pg. 52-53)
 - "Sartre's claim that most human beings, in their anguished flight from the confrontation with their own freedom, spend their lives in a vain attempt to become the impossible union of two types of being; they want to be a being-in-itself-for-itself. They wish to realize the freedom which distinguishes them from things and the other creatures in nature and at the same time to possess their absoluteness. This self-contradiction, which we have already met in the form of God or the Self-Cause would be - if it could exist at all - a conscious self-consciousness, a free life possessed of a fixed being. The problem is how, once we abandon this pursuit, a consciousness may remain a consciousness in-the-world without letting itself be imprisoned by the situation in which it finds itself" (pg. 53)
 - "the ideal which existentialist freedom chooses is the realization of itself as process, as the creator of a nothingness between itself and its objects, between itself and its own continually renewed self-projection. I think it is fair to say that in this choice, a person recognizes that he is the Nothingness which cuts him off from the rest of Being" (pg. 54)
 - "nothingness exists only in relation to Being. Each nihilating act of consciousness is a nihilating of something" (pg. 54)
 - "Sartre concludes first that an individual can constantly maintain in his awareness the realization that he himself establishes his relations with the rest of Being. Sartre asserts immediately afterward that the freedom which wills itself to be its own value and source of value will situate itself (not be situated) by recognizing the responsibilities for the structures of the world which it has brought into being. Thus freedom is both absolute and conditioned" (pg. 55)
 - "Sartre suggests that the existentialist in good faith will recognize that at any moment, simultaneously, he is and is not his situation. He is not his situation in the sense of being determined by it and finally identified with it. He is his situation in the sense that it is this situation and no other which he has already by his past choices constituted as having these particular structures rather than all others and which by his present choice he will reconfirm or transform" (pg. 55)
 - ◆ "if a fully aware freedom must logically admit its capacity to choose as it will, then by the same token it must grant that it has chosen as it willed, which is to confess its responsibility for what it has chosen. The tantalizing comments at the end of *Being and Nothingness* suggest that in **the ethical choice, a freedom must choose itself both as Being and as Nothingness.** Whether or not such was actually Sartre's intention, this is at any rate the starting point for an ethics which seems to me to be logically derived from Sartre's existentialist description of what man is" (pg. 55-56)
 - "If a person has chosen to be ethical, then an existentialist ethics - like any other kind - must provide its own justification as a way of achieving the highest possible degree of value consistent with its view of all reality, including the human. Fundamental to an existentialist ethics will be the recognition of the importance of both kinds [e.g., Being and Nothing] of self-realization. Theoretically an ethics need not give equal weight to all aspects of man" (pg. 56)
 - "Aristotelian ethics, despite its emphasis on the golden mean, rightly gives the greater weight to the rational side of man inasmuch as reason is not only the gateway to the highest truth and purest happiness, but the sure guide to the maximum of success and enjoyment even on the lower levels" (pg. 56)
 - "**Existentialism resists the temptation to argue that there is any objective hierarchy of values which must be the same for everyone. To do so**

- would be to make values into objective entities or to attach them to things; we would fall back at once into the spirit of seriousness" (pg. 56)
- "What is necessary is that neither the temporal nor the spontaneous aspect of human reality should ever be totally excluded from any choice. Commitment to the value system one has chosen should never be so complete as to suppress one's awareness that one has chosen it and that one is always free to effect a totally new orientation to Being and one's relation to the world. On the other side, freedom cannot ethically prolong the enjoyment of its own withdrawal from Being, certainly not to the extent of denying its dependence on its own situation and its responsibility for the way it has and will structure its own lived environment. **Being and Nothingness are not only two aspects of human reality. They represent the limits beyond which the self cannot be pursued.** If an individual tries to find himself wholly in Being, he tries in vain to make himself one with the things of the world; or - as Sartre says - he denies himself as Man in order that the missing Self-Cause might exist. But if he seeks to identify himself only as the abstract possibility of nihilating Being, he forgets that freedom itself does not exist, but only particular freedoms. Without external objects, there can be no self-consciousness, for consciousness is only an awareness of its objects plus an implicit or reflective awareness of that awareness. **Freedom can value itself only indirectly via the Being to which it relates itself. Without some recognition of its temporality, freedom is nothing at all**" (pg. 56-57)
 - ◆ *"to say consciousness would not be without external objects is to admit objectivity. So, we have objectivity and we have ethics (i.e., nothingness, freedom, transcendence, being-in-the-world, etc.). So, what's preventing us from saying there can be no objective ethic? Because, without the objective, there'd be no consciousness - and so no ethic. What's more, part of that which stands beyond oneself (in-the-world) are other people. And, in fact, it's our meeting people-in-the-world (who comprise the 'external') which, to me, lends the basis for saying that ethics derives from our first encounter with Others and the world for which they are (in). So, ethics is objectively rooted - it's the fruit which grows from the tree we choose to water.*
 - "Sartre has continually argued the case for man's psychological freedom, against Behaviorists, Freudians, and all sociologists or academic Marxists who attempt to reduce man to the status of a passive reactor to hereditary and environmental pressures, whether biological, social, or economic, conscious or unconscious" (pg. 57)
 - "I have been one of the comparatively few who have supported his radical claim" (pg. 57)
 - **"That man is free is the absolute starting point of an existentialist ethics.** At no point will we admit the validity of any position which either denies the reality of this freedom or deliberately ignores it. To do so would be the equivalent of a present-day scientist's assuming that the earth does not move in space. Furthermore, it is my view that **no ethics, qua ethics, can exist without presupposing freedom.** It may, like Stoicism, rest upon a doctrine of ultimate necessity and determinism. Yet when the Stoics speak of the individual's attempt to live the best life, they make it perfectly clear that the will is free to choose its own attitude, its personal mode of relating to the predetermined world events" (pg. 58)
 - "Yet while "ought" implies the possibility of genuine choice, we must be wary of adopting, with all its implications, Kant's I ought implies I can. "I ought" implies "I have a choice." This is safe and sure. "I ought" implies "I can" is too often misinterpreted as claiming that the sense of what should be entails its realistic possibility. Existentialist freedom of choice emphatically does not mean that a person can do whatever he chooses or that all persons are born with equivalent potentialities" (pg. 58)
 - ◆ "There must *be* a freedom of choice in order for practical freedom from factual limitations to have any value. Once again, the two kinds of self-realization are relevant. Realizing oneself as free in relation to all of Being is always open to man. He may at any time in a spontaneous act refuse to recognize any of the contingent obligations of his situation by embracing his own nothingness. Self-realization in Being is the harder thing, for my choices here are inevitably intertwined with those of others" (pg. 59)
 - "Some critics of existentialism have argued that its famous authenticity and good faith refer solely to structures within the individual consciousness and need not include any consideration of other people. If a person acts always in accordance with what he actually feels, and if he never pretends that anything but his own choice is responsible for what he has done and become, then it seems we must acknowledge that he is authentic and in good faith, regardless of what sort of life he has chosen. **Authenticity guarantees neither rational self-interest nor concern for others**" (pg. 59)
 - ◆ *"it's important to note the use of the word 'feel' as opposed to 'know' - feelings are not the same as knowledge. Feelings we 'experience', whereas knowledge we do not.*
 - **"To choose to live unauthentically in bad faith is to choose the nonethical and to abandon all pretense of wanting to justify one's life. Once the decision to be ethical has been made, the unauthentic life is ruled out.** Bad faith, a lie to oneself, is on principle excluded from the ethical, which as we have seen comprises as a minimum requirement the intent to present a true picture of reality and not a falsification. The unauthentic is forbidden inasmuch as it involves the refusal to confront one's freedom, the necessity of which is the very cornerstone of an existentialist ethics. Even without going beyond Sartre's preliminary suggestions, it is possible to go one step further and to establish that the **authentic choice in good faith must include respect and concern for other freedoms.** Authenticity, good faith, and the original choice to be ethical all demand that one not knowingly shut his eyes to the data on the basis of which the choice is made, that the choice be reflectively (i.e., objectively) defensible. Sartre has put it in terms of good faith, which in this context is practically the same as honesty" (pg. 60)
 - ◆ **"Since I recognize that freedom is my essence, both as myself and as a human being, I cannot truthfully deny that the same is true for all other persons.** Their freedom is as much a part of the data as my own. Therefore, if I declare that the development of my own free projects is the goal and good of my life, I must - if I am in good faith - allow simultaneously that my freedom holds no privileged place over this assertion when it is made by someone else. If the ethical choice includes acknowledging my responsibility for the way in which my consciousness has objectified itself in the world, then part of this objectification has resulted from my being the author of acts which have structured in a particular way the situation in which the other has made his choices. If the ethical choice is a resolve to justify one's life, my relations with others cannot be ignored" (pg. 61-62)
 - **"The choice to be ethical and to realize oneself both as Being and as Nothingness demands that a freedom willingly subject itself (Sartre's word is "engage") to a self-imposed value system and code without ever forgetting that at any time it is free to choose another way of being.** There is certainly an interplay of reason and emotion in this process" (pg. 62)
 - ◆ "We find that in any of the traditional defenses of either reason or the irrational, there is always an implicit or explicit appeal to the opposite of what one is defending. In recent times Santayana has perhaps presented the best case for reason by an open appeal to animal faith. It has been suggested also that we could give extra support to Santayana's position by adding that reason alone meets the test of consistency (thus not requiring constant readjustment of all basic positions) and that it passes the pragmatic test by enabling life to be lived with more ease than by any other method. Yet each one of these arguments involves an appeal to the emotions. **Faith is a feeling**" (pg. 63)
 - ◆ "Even if it is by emotion that we establish our basic goals or values, it is by reason that we set up our plans and estimate our chances for attaining these goals. Reason enters into our evaluative comparisons of one goal with another. It is by reason as well as emotion that we judge goals as constituting dead ends or, on the contrary, as likely to lead to other possibles; it is by reason that we calculate the wisdom of earlier choices as having produced what they promised, as to be repeated, to be avoided, etc." (pg. 63)
 - ◆ **"reason is consciousness' perception of those organizations and relations which the universe is capable of sustaining, and it is the**

perception of relations established in human products (language, etc.) of such a sort that any human being may recognize them" (pg. 63-64)

- ◊ "the irrational or emotional is consciousness' personal relation to the universe" (pg. 64)
- "Sartre has shown that we *choose* whether we will live on the rational, deliberative level or on an emotional one. The choice, of course, is not made once and for all but at each moment renewed (or changed). This basic choice is man's personal relation to being - to unconscious matter and to other people as well as to that combination of body and psychic states, present and remembered, which contribute to the making of the sense of self. **The individual consciousness must choose whether it prefers to live primarily within the sustaining limits of universalizing reason or amidst the evanescent, flickering disconnections with external reality which are produced by the emotions.** This is the fundamental paradox of human reality - that by a pre-rational choice it must decide whether or not to accept the responsibility of being rational" (pg. 64)
- "There is a group of existentialists, strongly influenced by Husserl's phenomenology, who have tried to maintain a position midway between theism and atheism. I am inclined to call them **Being Philosophers**. Foremost among them is Martin Heidegger, whose influence upon existential psychology is perhaps even more important than his impact on philosophy - if we except his recalcitrant pupil Sartre. **Heidegger's 'listening to Being' or 'standing in the openness of the Truth of Being'**, clearly points to something more than conceptual knowledge though I, for one, have never been quite sure what it is. Heidegger does not, however, advocate the validity of purely individual emotional responses in reckless disregard of objective reality" (pg. 64-65)
 - "The world of science is never comprehended as a thing-in-itself independent of the intellectual structures imposed upon it. It is the contention of phenomenologists and existentialists alike that even if we could know that the latest scientific field theory was the final and absolutely accurate interpretation of the Universe, **the scientific world would still not be the world that anybody lives in. We may make use of it as the stuff of our projects, but it remains only part of the furniture of the life-world in which we truly reside.** The life-world is the world as it appears to each one of us with its 'horizon of meanings', its values, its organization in relation to ourselves as vantage point and center of reference. In the life-world, objects are not portions of matter but instruments and possibilities. Social institutions may include material buildings and impersonally formulated constitutions; they, like all of human culture, are colored with variegated tones of approval and disapproval, smiling invitations, and threatening prohibitions. **The life-world is both objective and subjective**, just as consciousness is always outside in its objects and yet - as a point of view upon these objects - is never identical with them. Similarly, the life-world is both public and private. In communication with others, I not only establish common reference points and meanings. I find that my own attitudes toward the external environment and toward myself change as the result of the 'views' which other persons disclose to me" (pg. 65)
 - ◆ "Kant's noumenal world is approachable only through the categories, which stand as the lenses everyone must look through. In viewing the life-world, one adds to these the special lenses of his period and the colored glass of his own temperament and personal history. **We all look at the same world; we do not see the same world**" (pg. 66)
- "Sartrean existentialism does not make this mistake. Sartre, for example, has traced explicitly the movement in bad faith which jumps from the assertion that my strongest "knowledge" is really only "belief" to the conclusion that I am, therefore, justified in holding any belief whatsoever. He at no time advocates holding a position which is in open contradiction with what today appear to be the facts of science or the demands of logical consistency. He resists the idea that science or logic has or can establish a hierarchy of values within which the individual ought to choose his way of being. Sartre is acutely aware of those ultimate choices which are prior to all science and all logic. At the same time, the Sartrean position allows us to maintain that once a person has chosen **to be ethical - i.e., to try to justify his life** - he has in effect committed himself to establishing a harmony between the subjective and the objective. He pledges himself to act in such a way that he would still approve of his conduct even if it were that of another. More accurately, he is prepared to assume toward the objectified part of himself a point of view in which consciousness assumes, as best it can, the role of the other while still acknowledging that this role is freely chosen" (pg. 67)
- "Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* emphasizes that **the Self, like Being, is that which is always pursued but never attained.** In this respect it is like the Future; it is always present as the meaning and the ideal goal of each act, but we never coincide with it. Any psychologist, I suppose, would agree that the Self is not complete until the moment of death. Sartre would argue that I am still pursuing my Self even then. **There is always the enfolding shell of Nothingness between the reflecting consciousness and the consciousness reflected-on**, and it is not correct to identify the Self as exclusively one or the other. Perhaps the most fundamental reality in this Being-for-itself, which I am, is the reflecting consciousness, but this is nothing at all without an object - neither an 'I' nor a 'Me'. Thus **'my' being-for-myself is indeed both the reflecting consciousness and the consciousness reflected-on**, but the union is never one of identity. **The ethical goal for existentialism is a harmony of the two, not a suppression of either or a total subordination of one to the other**" (pg. 67-68)
- "Humanistic existentialism sees man as a creature of inner distances who lives in a world into which he introduces his own spaces. It is a psychology eminently appropriate to a space-age. More than anything else, **this existentialism projects an open future for the individual and for mankind collectively. Each person will make himself, men and women together will make their history by freely chosen projects. Every man is responsible for the future.** The ethical choice is the decision to live this responsibility in a way which one can justify. This justification will include the two questions which have always been the proper concerns of ethics: the problem of the normative with respect to right and wrong; the problem of how to find meaning and a personally satisfying life" (pg. 68)
 - "if God is dead, is everything allowed?" (pg. 68)
- Chapter 4 - Sin Without God (pg. 69) *cf. *M. Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation & Envy and Gratitude*
 - "for most of us, the idea of Sin speaks softly from yesterday - like saloons and shivarees and the cancan" (pg. 69)
 - "'The Sinful' is more luridly intense than 'the naughty', but it is almost as outmoded. **'Guilt' is not the same. It seems to belong to us whether we choose it or not**" (pg. 69)
 - ◆ "it seems that guilt is so inseparable a part of the human condition that not to recognize one's guilt is in itself a moral lapse. We feel guilty if our sense of guilt is less acute than we are told it ought to be" (pg. 70)
 - "For both psychologist and sociologist, guilt feelings stem from an awareness of having failed to meet the prescribed or implicit requirements of authority. The commands of parents or internalized super-ego, the laws and pressures of a given society may be cruel or humane, destructive or sincerely directed toward fostering the individual's personal growth. In any case, the sense of guilt is considered to be relative to the code by which a person has learned to judge himself" (pg. 70)
 - "There is seldom, if ever, an attempt to find an 'ought' or to offer a description of man which is more fundamental than the sociological. The sociological view of guilt does not point to anything beyond man. In a curious way, one may say that within its perspective, guilt feelings and guilt are both ethically neutral. They may be good or bad, harmful or protectively fostering. There is no definite point of view from which to judge them. They are comparable to any other human emotion, to be judged only in context" (pg. 71)
 - "let us consider first the nature of guilt feelings, taken phenomenologically; that is, just as they appear..." (pg. 72)
 - "**My thesis is that even without God or neurosis, guilt feelings are inevitable.** Since we are speaking here of feelings, I suppose we could call them psychological phenomena. Nevertheless, I believe them not to be a purely social manifestation but to constitute an existential

structure derived from the very nature of consciousness and its relation with the outside world. There is probably no human situation which is not a possible source for the sense of guilt" (pg. 72)

- ◆ "first, and the most evident, I suppose, is the inner discomfort which arises when we are aware that we are not what another thinks we are..." (pg. 72)
 - ▶ "sincerity is the ideal cure for this kind of guilt feelings" (pg. 73)
 - ◇ "In the first place, my judgment of the other-like his of me—is necessarily based on outward signs. Yet my appraisal of my own acts and words is accompanied by a complexity of mixed motivations and marginal awarenesses which considerably color its appearance to me but are not included in the overt expression" (pg. 73)
 - ▶ **"the inner and outer points of view are never the same"** (pg. 73)
 - ▶ *cf. D. Binseel, *On The Theory of the Aggregate Image*, pg. 8
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_eea5e9a5a0ca40c3b1fd3d4e4fa4d913.pdf
 - ◇ "I am not my "Self-for-others," to use Sartre's expression. This statement is true in two ways. In the first place, **only the surface of my act, as it were, appears to the other**. He must guess at its "inner horizon," its depths and shadings. Moreover, I am not the role I play. It is not only that my potentialities cannot all be manifested at one and the same time. **Whereas the things I say and do have an objective being, my own consciousness is a process, a becoming**. Therefore **I am always a bit beyond myself** if by "self" here we refer to something already brought into existence" (pg. 73)
 - ▶ *cf. D. Binseel, *A Phenomenology of "That!": An Introduction to the Dialectic of Subjectivity*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf
 - ◇ "We claim to judge an act in the light of all its inner structure of motivations and intent - in other words, by the way it appeared to be the one who performed it. But there are two things wrong here. First, **we can never really see how the act appeared to him**, for to abstract the motive and purpose of the particular act from the total context of the life-world of the performer is to distort and falsify. Second, many a crime, when seen from the point of view of the one who performed it, is innocent. Either it seemed best to do at the time, or it was performed under intolerable pressures. Within its proper life-world it was the right act. It may still be so in the eyes of the one responsible" (pg. 89-90)
- ◆ "a second origin of a sense of guilt stems from the very nature of emotion" (pg. 74)
 - ◇ "Just as our sensory perception or our mental concentration, no matter how sharply focused, is always accompanied by a **multitude of peripheral sensations and reflections, so no single emotion ever overwhelms us completely**, at least not when we reflect upon it" (pg. 75)
- ◆ "Basic to any ethical system, and another obvious source of guilt feelings, is the problem of conflicting demands. Once again, the drama is played out both in our relations with others and in the arena of the individual psyche" (pg. 75)
 - ◇ "Within a single person, there are just as evidently conflicting demands. These arise partly as the result of the complex emotional situation discussed earlier. More than this, there is the problem of the manifold potentialities of the human being. Contemporary psychologists, both existentialists and others, have placed new emphasis on the need for self-realization. But **the process of realizing one's potentialities is - like every other human activity - one of exclusion as well as a reaching out**. To become the self which at this moment I am means that I have renounced being that self which I might have been" (pg. 76)
 - ▶ "there still remains a myriad of unexploited opportunities, facets of ourselves, rich experiences which we have forever missed" (pg. 76)
 - "It might have been better or worse, but at any event something which craved fulfillment has been pushed aside and has left a haunted emptiness. I believe that this sense of carrying within us the unsubstantial shadows of these other might-have-been-lived existences is one of the roots of the reasons for the myth of reincarnation, which perpetually exerts its fascination even upon those of us who cannot finally accept it. A secret fear that one has not chosen the best combines with the hidden wish to have been also what one has most rejected, and the feeling of guilt is inescapable" (pg. 76-77)
 - ◆ "There still remains one psychic factor which is bound to subject us to self-judgment and resulting guilty discontent. This is my realization that I am subject to the same kind of judgment that I pass upon the other. Once more there is an outer interpersonal aspect and an intrapersonal one" (pg. 77)
 - ◆ "most important of all for ethics is the appraisal which I myself make of human behavior" (pg. 77)
- "Considering these various sorts of guilt feelings, we find that they have one thing in common; that is, a sense that **there is a discrepancy between a governing idea and an existing state of consciousness**" (pg. 79)
 - ◆ "Always there is a gap between a demand, or what is expected and what actually exists" (pg. 79)
 - ◇ "Such a state of affairs is possible for man because he carries within himself the capacity to effect a kind of nonbeing, because he is—as Sartre has demonstrated—both Being and Nothingness. This Nothingness is naturally not restricted to guilt feelings. Its presence is essential to all consciousness. **There is a nothingness between man's present awareness and his past, between what he is now and what he will be in the future. There is a nothingness between consciousness and its objects, between a man and himself. More accurately, it is this nothingness which renders man forever incapable of being himself and condemns him to being the perpetual pursuit of himself. From this nothingness stems man's freedom; here if anywhere are the possibilities for his guilt**" (pg. 79)
- "so far we have merely indicated that an awareness of certain types of discrepancies gives rise to uncomfortable feelings which we may call a sense of guilt" (pg. 79-80)
- "There have been **two kinds of sin in our Judaeo-Christian tradition**, both of which involve the existence of a discrepancy between what is and what ought to be, a failure to meet a demand. There is sin as transgression or trespass, and there is Original Sin. Sin as transgression is a deliberate breaking of God's commands - usually as interpreted by the rules of a specific church. We are morally responsible for sin as transgression, and we can, by resolute perseverance bolstered by prayer for assistance, avoid it. If out of human weakness we fail now and then, we can wash sin away by repentance and atonement, by a heartfelt "I'm sorry." We are saved from sin as transgression both negatively, by avoiding acts of disobedience, and positively, by carrying out the prescriptions for righteous living - in short, by works. Original Sin is the more interesting kind. This is what we are born in. We have no choice. The only way to get out of it is to admit that we can't do it by ourselves" (pg. 80-81)
- **"I do not believe...that the implications of bad faith for an ethics have been fully investigated"** (pg. 81-82)
 - ◆ *cf. R. E. Santoni, *Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre's Early Philosophy*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_5e1171a4ad474fa7ad7e904ff09c3c8c.pdf
- "To put it briefly, **bad faith is a particular kind of lie to oneself. It involves an illicit shifting back and forth between identifying oneself with his situation and conduct and dissociating himself from them**. Bad faith is revealed in one's attitude toward himself and in relations

- with others - both the personal and the social" (pg. 82)
- "Bad faith, like most forms of sin, is always easier than the bleak path of virtue; that is why so few of us are saved. Bad faith involves a discrepancy as all sin does, and this discrepancy is an actual falsification. Fundamentally **it is a lie about one's freedom. Bad faith is a way of declaring that one is not responsible for what he has been or not free to choose what he will be.** It seeks refuge in the idea that man may either cut himself off completely from his situation or that he is identical with his situation and determined by it. Good faith, as the existentialist sees it, lies in accepting the truth about man's being - namely, that one is always in a situation but that he lives and makes himself by constantly transcending it. Perhaps it would be more nearly accurate to say that **man always exists in relation to a given situation and that he is perpetually in process of choosing what his specific relation will be.** Bad faith denies the inextricable union of freedom and responsibility which is the very essence of human reality. It is a lie based on cowardice and fear of the human condition" (pg. 84-85)
 - ◆ "In our relations with others, we find Bad Faith manifested in either or both of two related ways. Either there is an identification of the Other and of oneself with the accidents of our social situations, or there is an illicit postulating of one's own freedom as being intrinsically more important than the Other's. In either case there is usually involved also a surreptitious treating of the person (either Self or Other) as if he were only an object or only a subject, whereas in fact **everyone is always both**" (pg. 85)
 - "I call bad faith 'sin as transgression' because it introduces deliberately a discrepancy between human actions and the facts of the human condition as one knows them to be" (pg. 86)
 - ◆ **cf. pg. 86 for remarks on race, religion, national origin, etc. as 'in bad faith' - "all cut off the possibility of an open future" (pg. 86)*
 - "A second over-all manifestation of bad faith in society parallels still more closely what happens within the sphere of the individual's inner relations with himself. One of the most ubiquitous forms of bad faith on the personal level is the cluster of devices to escape responsibility for what one has done and has made of oneself" (pg. 86)
 - **"The varieties of bad faith are infinite; the essential structure, whether within the person or in interpersonal relations, remains the same. It always involves the suppression of the fact of freedom and responsibility. It introduces a willed discrepancy between what exists and what one postulates.** Just as with the sin of transgression in the religious context, one may save oneself by works. Here obedience is not to any external authority but to the logic impelled by the honest recognition of the demands of human freedom. There is no God to help. Instead one accepts with anguish the realization that one can look only within. What one finds there is freedom and responsibility" (pg. 87)
 - "[Sartre] explains that there are two ways in which I am guilty before the Other. In the first place, I bestow upon him a new dimension of Being, which he experiences as an alienation. By my look, by my very existence as a consciousness, I make him realize that he has an outside, that he is - to me - an object. Even his subject-being as a freedom becomes - for me - an objectified subjectivity, a nature with such and such potentialities. Sartre feels that this Self-for-others, this object side, may be experienced in shame or in pride. In either case, the Other is alienated from that which is in some sense himself, for he can never grasp this self which he is for me" (pg. 87-88)
 - "In the second place, I am guilty because even while I try to acknowledge the Other as a freedom and as a subject, I make of his freedom the instrument of my own project. To use Sartre's term, my awareness of him constitutes him as a 'transcendence-transcended'. I make of him a thing even as I may declare him to possess the possibility of making me a thing in turn. Try as I will, **I never arrive at meeting him as subject**" (pg. 88)
 - "Original Sin manifests itself in our relations with others as we live by obviously false 'as-if' fictions. We live as if there were one world, whereas there are as many worlds as there are individual persons. This is not to deny the existence of a world of matter external to those consciousnesses which are aware of it. But this world is never experienced as one and the same world or even as a total world by those who live in it" (pg. 88)
 - **this is quite idealistic - that each consciousness is its own 'world'.*
 - **"the social structure is based on a contradiction which involves a certain dishonesty.** Claiming to be objective, we hypothesize an impersonal world, but it is a world which nobody inhabits" (pg. 90)
 - **"there will always be some residue of guilt, no matter how liberal and enlightened the society. To some degree the majority will always live at the expense of the minority"** (pg. 90)
 - "There are other ways in which our existence involves a false 'as-if'. For one thing, even apart from the question of passing judgment, we are forced to use some people as objects, no matter how firmly we are resolved to respect their subjectivity. **One cannot in every single contact with those one encounters take time to be intimately concerned with the subjective personality of the Other.** The guilt here is relatively slight except in the case where one does not limit himself to a formal and provisional acceptance of the Other as his role - waiter, delivery boy, etc. - but behaves as if he were in reality a thing. **(There is a difference between bracketing the Other's personal subjectivity and acting as if it were nonexistent)** More serious is the conflict of subjectivities. Sartre has pointed out that **one limit of freedom is the existence of other freedoms.** In the fulfillment of my own projects or in helping certain others to fulfill theirs, I will necessarily use some people as means, as instruments, as objects. Although each Other is a process of becoming, a continual self-creation, I inevitably, in my own inner world, make use of him as a being, an entity, an object" (pg. 91)
 - "I commit myself wholly and responsibly but never with full knowledge nor with the power to guarantee the particular future which I have projected" (pg. 92)
 - "So far we have been considering Original Sin in the context of one's relations with others" (pg. 92)
 - "Can we find Original Sin within the structure of the Self and its own inner relations? I think that we can and do in the way that we have already examined in connection with guilt feelings. I am guilty in that I fulfill some of my potentialities at the expense of others. I am guilty if I prevent myself from responding to new possibilities of growth, but this willingness to change to meet the demands of my freedom may involve me in infidelity to my old emotions, to my old commitments to an ideal self" (pg. 92)
 - ◆ "all action is, at least to some slight degree, guilty action" (pg. 92)
 - **"In examining the kinds of guilt and of guilt feelings, we have found that they are always centered around a discrepancy - as is true of sin in the traditional sense.** One way or another, the manifestations seem to involve one or more of three things. First, **as process, not entity, man is free and responsible.** Sin, guilt, or evil involves denying this fact, either in oneself or in another person. Second, there is no merging of the private worlds although the object side of man's being and experience necessitate a sphere of selves-for-others, which we posit as being neutral, impersonal, and objective - though nobody ever really experiences it as such. Third, everyone is a subject but appears as an object to others (and reflectively to himself). Our actions affect the Other in his being though all we ever know of him is his appearing. Of his being we can only form hypotheses to which, at most, he may give assent" (pg. 94)
 - **what's the purpose of saying each 'appears' as an object if such is preceded by saying each 'is' a subject?*
 - **The intellectualistic 'god' is the idea (rather, insistence) that an individual's subjectivity "cannot be objectively validated" (D. Carveth, Psychoanalytic Thinking, pg. 54-55); i.e., "there is no merging of private worlds". Meaning, consciousness cannot be held outside of me to be judged by those other than me - that is, I cannot extricate my consciousness from my being to therein place such on the table as 'object'*

between myself and any other for the other to look upon and qualitatively appraise such's merits. You're right, we can't do this. But this is like demanding we first possess the power to manipulate gravity and light before understanding that they're merely given features of this place for which we all reside. These things are simply the conditions under which we manage our existence - to say we must operate against them before we can ever understand and utilize them is preposterous; even more, unproductive. So, I ask: does life and sharing in this truly need to be forced all the way to this juncture of impossibility before we can ever move forward in a useful and ethical manner, acting under and with the commonality every human naturally possesses? We need to stop leveraging such as a criteria when looking at social relations and ethics.

- *man is a 'process' by way of Da-sein (or, the for-itself) - that is, by man's thrownness and projection (cf. I. McMullin, *Time and the Shared World, Thrown Project*, pg. 24 https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqd/d7b063_95afc4f64e944874a0ea434bfcf4ab40.pdf)
- "existentialist ethics, like any ethics, may be said to have...an unattainable ideal of perfection..." (pg. 94)
 - "there is no way by which every freedom might have full scope to actualize all of its possibilities. So long as human beings remains individual consciousness, there can be no hope of completely knowing another's private world" (pg. 94-95)
 - ◆ *again, this has idealistic undertones
 - "there is no method by which to transform our present relations of subjects and objects into one in which the Other and myself might be considered solely as subjects in a relation of pure subjects. If these ideals could be achieved, the human being as we know him would not exist, and there would be no need for an ethics" (pg. 95)
 - ◆ *I disagree entirely.
- "Although I have stressed the importance of recognizing the absolute quality of the Other's freedom, his private life-world, and his subjectivity, the same is true for myself. Obligations toward myself are at least as important as toward others" (pg. 95)
 - ◆ *it is this 'recognition' which serves as the medium through which concrete human relations are transformed from subject-object to subject-subject (i.e., being-with).
 - "sin is the prevention of the free and responsible development of a unique self" (pg. 95)
 - ◆ *cf. C. Jung, *The Undiscovered Self* <https://fleurmach.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/jung-the-undiscovered-self-1957.pdf>
 - ◇ "it is not the universal and the regular that characterize the individual, but rather the unique" (pg. 5)
 - ▶ "The mass crushes out the insight and reflection that are still possible with the individual..." (pg. 2)
 - ◇ "The bigger the crowd the more negligible the individual becomes. But if the individual, overwhelmed by the sense of his own puniness and impotence, should feel that his life has lost its meaning - which, after all, is not identical with public welfare and higher standards of living - then he is already on the road to State slavery..." (pg. 10)
 - ▶ *C. Jung, in *Approaching the Unconscious*, remarks "I am inclined to the view that things were generally done first and that it was only a long time afterward that somebody asked why they were done" (*Man and His Symbols*, pg. 64)
 - ◇ "Resistance to the organized mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organized..." (pg. 43)
 - ▶ "Both demand unqualified submission to faith and thus curtail man's freedom, the one his freedom before God and the other his freedom before the State, thereby digging the grave for the individual. The fragile existence of the individual, the unique carrier of life, is threatened on both sides, despite their respective promises of spiritual and material idylls to come..." (pg. 27-28)
 - ◆ *cf. N. Berdyaev, *The Fate Of Man In The Modern World* https://ia801403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World_text.pdf
- "certainly the emphasis on respecting the Other as a subject suggests the Kantian Kingdom of Ends" (pg. 95)
 - "That existentialism is closer to Kant than to Plato or Aristotle or Leibniz or to innumerable other philosophers one might mention is certainly true-both in its ethics and in its epistemology" (pg. 95)
 - ◆ "De Beauvoir's *The Ethics of Ambiguity* has been labeled a neo-Kantian commentary..." (pg. 95)
 - "Sartre's rejection of the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal worlds makes it impossible to call his theory of knowledge Kantian in any significant sense..." (pg. 95-96)
 - ◆ *cf. D. Binseel, *A Phenomenology of "That!"*, pg. 28-29 https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqd/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf
 - "Kant holds that man is completely determined within this phenomenal world, which means that he is determined insofar as we can observe and interpret him empirically. He may be transcendently free, to be sure, but the movement from the idea that man may be free as nomenon to the idea that he ought to act as if he knew himself to be free, involves for Kant all sorts of unprovable hypotheses: the existence of God, immortality and the goal of eternal happiness, and the claim that we may take as self-evident the inner sense of duty (the moral law within like the order of the starry firmament above). Granted that Kant does not establish these conclusions in the same way that he sets up the a priori forms of thought by the process of pure reason" (pg. 96)
- "Where Kant's freedom is hypothetical, Sartre's is a fundamental given. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty performed for its own sake alone. Sartre says that man is his actions. Kant presupposes an impersonal absolute to which all conduct is ultimately referred; Sartre denies it. For the existentialist, man has no future eternal life in which to reap the desserts of his present performance. Kant's categorical imperative to universalize our behavior, to act as if our act were to be made a universal law is not precisely opposed to the existentialist position. Yet everything about it is somehow not quite in line. Most fundamentally, Kant states it as a categorical imperative. To the existentialist, all imperatives are hypothetical, beginning with the principle that it is only when one wants to justify oneself, that the question of ought or good faith or ethics arises" (pg. 96-97)
- "In the chapter on guilt, I tried to show that respectful acknowledgment for other people as free subjects and recognition of our responsibility for them is an inevitable part of good faith and that guilt stems from the attempt to deny it. In that discussion, I associated ethical responsibility with self-realization in the over-all pattern of a life, i.e., with self-realization in being" (pg. 110)
 - *see comment below on pg. 106 - "pre-existing pattern"
- Chapter 5 - The Far Side of Despair (pg. 98)
 - "Among the accusing adjectives which hostile critics have attached to humanistic existentialism, one of the most frequently heard is "nihilistic." Existentialists, it appears, believe in nothing; hence nothing stands to block their destructive impulses, and we may expect anything from them. Whether spoken naively or formulated with philosophical sophistication, this attitude contains an important assumption: that there is a logical connection between what one believes about ultimate reality, one's sense of purpose, one's values, and one's concrete action" (pg. 98)
 - "It is generally assumed that a lack of higher meaning or overall purpose in the Universe is a terribly bad thing. Even Sartre has remarked that it would be much better if God the Father existed. Our forlornness is due to our discovery that He is not there" (pg. 102)
 - *this tracts with the IR conception of there not being any 'higher' entity above the state to govern inter-state relations - otherwise, such is the confounding principle of 'inter-national anarchy'.
 - "most important of all for our present selves is the thought that the specific role we play in this far future is determined by the way we conduct

- ourselves here and now" (pg. 102)
- **"Humanistic existentialism finds no divine presence, no ingrained higher meaning, no reassuring Absolute. At the same time, no humanistic existentialist will allow that the only alternative is despair and irresponsibility"** (pg. 105)
 - "Sartre...makes no clear distinction between 'meaning' and 'value'" (pg. 106)
 - ◆ "value and meaning are subjective structures which one imposes upon the world. They cannot, of course, exist independently of the world" (pg. 106)
 - ◆ "existentialism holds that there...is no pre-existing pattern" (pg. 106)
 - ▶ **I disagree. I think chemistry, neurobiology, and quantum physics would say otherwise. However, that's not to say that pre-existing patterns in certain corporeal and incorporeal structures means that there is 'inherent' meaning - rather, it's to say that such 'inherent structures' afford there to be meaning at all. So, the author's choice of the word 'pattern' should really be 'meaning'. There are patterns in life. And, it's from these patterns we draw meaning.*
 - ◇ **"It is illogical to conclude that human values and meanings are unreal and of no importance simply because they do not originate in the structure of the nonhuman Universe.** It is enough that the world serves to support these subjective structures for the consciousness which lives them" (pg. 114)
 - ▶ "An impersonal Universe cannot sustain these subjective structures. But we do not exist in an impersonal Universe. We live in a human world where multitudes of other consciousnesses are ceaselessly imposing their meanings upon Being-in-itself and confronting the projects which I have introduced. It is in the future of these intermeshed human activities that I most fully transcend myself" (pg. 114-115)
 - ◆ "while this lack deprives man of guide and certain goal, it leaves him free to create his own pattern" (pg. 107)
 - ◇ "Sartre has declared that the creation of a value system by which one is willing to live and to judge one's life is man's most important creative enterprise" (pg. 109)
 - "Every such life is unique, no matter how hard the one who lives it may have tried to mold himself after the pattern of his contemporaries. **Existentialism prizes this uniqueness and resists all attempts to reduce it to the lowest possible minimum.** Existentialism recognizes and exults in the fact that since **everyone is a point of view**, there is no more possibility of all persons becoming the same than there is of reducing to one perspective the views of two people looking at a landscape from different spots" (pg. 109)
 - ◆ "Someone will object that this is exactly what is wrong with existentialism - that it is nothing but a chaos of arbitrary outlooks and that if uniqueness is cherished and justified, then no ethics or supraindividual value system can exist. **This book is, of course, an attempt to show that chaotic relativism is not the only alternative.** Let us admit, however, that **an existentialist ethics is chosen, that it is not a priori.** Is this any reason for finding it untenable? As we have seen, any ethics is hypothetical, not categorical. So are most human activities. The man who values freedom of movement does not insist that everyone must go where he goes. It is the possibility of choice which he holds as the absolute, not the specific choice itself" (pg. 109)
 - "We must live by a view of things which goes beyond our confirmable knowledge since our choice involves to some degree an attempt to predict the future" (pg. 115)
 - "Sartre and de Beauvoir explicitly deny the existence of any human nature" (pg. 116)
 - "neither Camus nor any other existentialist philosopher holds that man's moral traits are predetermined or determining. Such a position means that we must give up both the belief in inevitable progress and the gloomy predictions of decline. Along with the latter must go those old saws which claim that war is inevitable, that human life is and always will be merely a more subtle manifestation of the tooth-and-claw struggle for survival, that man is essentially selfish, lawless, and cruel - in short, that 'you can't change human nature'" (pg. 116)
 - "Sartre is at least theoretically aware that both the social structure and the so-called "human character" are open to such willed modification that the life of man in the future may well be as different from that of our contemporary as ours is from that of the Neolithic inhabitants. It will not necessarily be better or worse. **What it will be and the extent to which it develops beyond our present concepts depends on us. Thus, in choosing for ourselves, we are indeed choosing for mankind**" (pg. 117)
 - "There are, then, two possible ways in which to respond to the challenge to create meaning in a Universe where we have found none already inscribed. The first looks toward founding a society in good faith, to changing the external life of man in such a way as to give the fullest possible scope to his creative freedom. The second is more profoundly a self-creative process. It seeks self-transcendence of a kind which might well transform the very concept of meaning and purpose and the possible ways of satisfying our demand for them" (pg. 118)
- Part 2 - Existentialism and Other Rebels (pg. 119)
- "Like man himself, **philosophy is always 'in situation'**. Existentialism in particular, which goes so far as to define man as 'a point of view', is acutely aware of its own position in the specific world order of the twentieth century. It can envision its own transcendence. It lays no claim to being a final statement. But it insists absolutely upon its relevance to the society within which it has been formulated even as it directs itself toward a future which it strives to mold and determine" (pg. 121)
 - "I have in mind three trends...which seem to me to stand in significant relation to existentialism..." (pg. 122)
 - "diverse as these three trends are, they all - and existentialism too - are significantly related as contemporary forms of rebellion. **All three groups are made up of persons who believe that man has somehow lost his proper center and concept of selfhood. In one way or another, they feel that man must rediscover himself**" (pg. 122-123)
 - ◆ "perhaps the most important thing about them is the fact that all of these rebels believe that man is able to change" (pg. 123)
- Chapter 6 - Egoistic Humanism: Ayn Rand's Objectivism (pg. 124)
- "The very name '**Objectivism**' suggests that this philosophy would be the antithesis of **existentialism, which is generally thought of as a philosophy of extreme subjectivity.** That the two are natural opposites seems borne out by the association of Objectivism with conservative capitalism and of existentialism (at least in the case of Sartre and de Beauvoir) with socialism or Marxism" (pg. 124)
 - "Despite all this, the popular images of the Rand hero and the Existentialist have something in common. Both are commonly held to be totally selfish and solitary individuals who acknowledge no authority save their own arbitrary whims, whose human relationships are motivated solely by immediate self-interest, who recognize no responsibility" (pg. 124-125)
 - "one could sum up in a few sentences the essence of these two philosophical revolts. It would not be a distortion to say that both Objectivism and existentialism call for the assertion of the free individual against those theologies and those oppressively conformist societies which seek to make him deny his unique self in the interests of ready-made social molds and values. Both oppose a psychology which would reduce man to the animal level or to a mechanistic pattern of stimulus and response. They are equally opposed to the soul-body dichotomy of traditional theology. Objectivists and existentialists argue that every person is responsible for what he has made of his life. Each man is ultimately a free choice. In so far as they claim that man himself is his own end and purpose, both may properly be called humanistic" (pg. 125)
 - "[though,] Rand and Sartre differ as to how the individual should go about engaging his freedom and asserting his newly discovered self. One discovers that somehow words have not meant the same things in these descriptions. The self and its freedom do not mean for Rand what they mean for Sartre" (pg. 125)

- "only one [basic premise] is left standing as a common landmark. That is the rejection of God or of any form of belief in an eternal spiritual world beyond the human. Man remains the author of his own destiny, the creator of his own values" (pg. 125)
- **"A human being cannot live his life moment by moment; a human consciousness preserves a certain continuity and demands a certain degree of integration whether a man seeks it or not. A human being needs a frame of reference, a comprehensive view of existence, no matter how rudimentary, and, since his consciousness is volitional, a sense of being right, a moral justification of his actions, which means: a philosophical code of values"** - Ayn Rand, *For the New Intellectual*, pg. 16-17 (pg. 126)
 - ◆ **I disagree with the use of the term 'needs'.*
 - "This statement is something with which Sartrean existentialism can agree. **Man's consciousness is fundamentally a reaching out toward, a volition, a desire, a choice.** Since a choice is the same as a declaration of a desire or a want, it is equivalent to an evaluation" (pg. 126)
 - ◆ "In simplest terms, one may say that one's value system is a coherent method of relating past, present, and future choices in such a way that one's present choice is not undermined by an awareness of chaotic inconsistency with what was or is yet to come. **Choice is both a way of making oneself and relating oneself to the outside world**" (pg. 126)
- "Rand, like Sartre and the phenomenologists, recognizes that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Thus **man is choice, but he makes himself by what he chooses**" (pg. 126-127)
- "In metaphysics, [objectivism] is the principle that reality is objective and absolute, that it exists independent of anyone's consciousness, perceptions, beliefs, wishes, hopes or fears—that that which is, is what it is - that 'existence is identity', that A is A. In epistemology, it is the principle that man's mind is competent to achieve objectively valid knowledge of that which exists. In ethics, it is the principle that the values proper to man are objectively demonstrable" - Nathaniel Branden, *Who Is Ayn Rand?*, pg. 56 (pg. 127)
 - **"[to Rand,] a man is what he is. His essence is Reason. His values are rational. In short, every man insofar as he fulfills his potential essence as Reason, knows what is right what is wrong - absolutely"** (pg. 127)
 - ◆ "if we were to prepare a comparable formulation for existentialism, it might run something like this: Man is a being who is what he is not and is not what he is. In him existence precedes his essence. Or better, man's essence is freedom itself, the choice of making his essence what he will. For himself he decides what is right and what is wrong, from his own point of view. His task is to make himself and to help prepare the definition of what man will have been" (pg. 127-128)
 - "Sartre has pointed out that it is precisely this ideal pattern which is in question. Being a man means deciding what man will be. Reason, instead of being essence and self-evident guiding principle, is but one part of man. Rand, like Aristotle, sees man as differentiated from other animals by his reason and so concludes that reason, being the essentially human, is that which mankind should most develop" (pg. 128)
- "Rand holds that the ultimate goal of life is joy or happiness" (pg. 131)
- **"existentialism...asks for commitment** and proposes an either/or" (pg. 131)
 - "this refers to one's basic choice of Being" (pg. 131)
 - ◆ "when it comes to specific choices in the real world, existentialists are aware that the complexity of life is such that almost no action is pure and that still we must choose as best we can" (pg. 132)
 - ◆ "thinking is hard [as] it demands intelligence, constant effort, and the strength to recognize something as true when it would be more convenient to believe otherwise" (pg. 132)
- **"the existentialist...confronts his freedom in anguish"** (pg. 133)
 - "he realizes that all is open. His freedom is not just the choice between thinking and not thinking, between seeing what is right or refusing to see it. He knows that being free means creating standards of right and wrong. It means that there is no one right pattern for man, but many possible patterns to be discovered and invented" (pg. 133)
 - ◆ **it's incorrect to equate 'rightness' with 'oneness' - meaning, what's right can exist in the plural sense; right doesn't have to exist in the singular (that's exactly the falsity purported by narrow-minded subjectivism - i.e., that 'truth' is only what the individual subjective consciousness deems is true). Even in the above, the author is admitting plural 'rightness' - otherwise, that 'what's right' (i.e., the correct way in which to see the world and human existence) is that there's many ways in which such can be done.*
 - **"one of the sources of existentialist anguish and despair is our realization that we cannot control the future of those present acts for which we are responsible"** (pg. 195)
- "it is nonsense to say that the concrete external action, the 'objective', is all that should be considered. **An act, if it is to be thought of as in any way different from a bolt of lightning, contains an inner structure of motive and intention as well as over motion. In short, it includes the whole context of the individual's private world**" (pg. 136-137)
 - ◆ **cf. comment above on pg. 73*
 - "this is what the Objectivists would like to leave out in their judgements. They would, of course, allow for a broad, gross distinction between accident and premeditation. Motive would not be left out entirely" (pg. 137)
 - ◆ **this all has legal application*
- **"This doctrine [e.g., objectivism] is unabashedly egoistic.** Rand does not reject such adjectives as 'self-centered' and 'selfish'. She embraces them and strives to demonstrate their rational beauty. Her chosen term for the guiding moral principle of Objectivist ethics is 'rational self-interest'" (pg. 138)
- "any ethics, I am convinced, sooner or later makes some sort of appeal to the need and desirability of the expanded self" (pg. 140)
 - **"surely, in an ethical system is anything, it is a way of appraising and directing the growth of a self which seeks to enjoy more and more of the feeling of value"** (pg. 140)
- **"I reject Objectivism,** not because it is self-centered or because it seeks self-aggrandizement. I criticize it for being selfish in the pejorative sense of restricting the horizon of the Self so as to leave the self-center, not enriched but impoverished, not blown up but withered and blighted" (pg. 140)
 - "Objectivism claims to be a humanism and to reaffirm the essential worth and dignity of the human being. In reality it is one more form of evasion, seeking to escape the vision of what it really means to be human. Objectivism declares that every man is an end in himself and that it respects the right of every person to seek his own self-interest. Yet its basic ethics is a refusal to acknowledge any positive responsibility for others. Objectivism proclaims that individual freedom is its starting point and goal. But for the Objectivist, this freedom does not direct itself toward the creation of a unique self. Free enterprise is its summum bonum, not the free choice of values" (pg. 140-141)
 - **"Objectivism proposes two categorical imperatives.** Every man should seek his own self-interest. One should never use force against another to prevent him from seeking his self-interest" (pg. 141)
 - "In theory, Objectivism, like Plato's *Republic*, simply gives to every individual the opportunity to advance as far as his ability will take him and to enjoy proportionate rewards" (pg. 146)
 - "Finally we see that existentialism and not Objectivism is really in favor of an open society to foster the growth of unique self-centers, each

- one pursuing its genuine self-interest and allowing every other to do the same. Objectivism is for free enterprise but not for the free creation of values. It equates creativity with productivity" (pg. 148)
- ◆ "Existentialism rejects Objectivism because it ignores the two sources of existentialist despair instead of seeking some way to overcome them. Objectivism hides the fact that to be free to become what one chooses means also that one must choose what one feels one ought to become. **Objectivism tries to evade the knowledge that to exist means not only to be-in-the-world but to-be-with-others**" (pg. 148)
 - "existentialism, like Christianity, proclaims the infinite value of every human soul or person" (pg. 146)
 - ◆ *cf. F. Olafson, *Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism, Chapter 2 - Theological Voluntarism* <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/67853>
 - "For existentialism, the [Christian] 'infinite value' refers to the immeasurability of the person, actually as well as potentially. This immeasurability derives from the absoluteness of the private world within which each one makes himself and his life. Existentialism realizes that we must keep separate our levels of judgment. One forms one's individual estimate of a person, in accordance with one's own value system. This purely private point of view predominates in all personal relations..." (pg. 147)
 - "**existentialism recognizes a kind of Original Sin in the universe inasmuch as people are forever being treated as if all lived within the same frame of reference as objects, whereas all are subjects in private worlds**" (pg. 147-148)
 - "existentialism seeks something less subject to the arbitrary whims of the market" (pg. 149)
- Chapter 7 - The Negative Rebels (pg. 150)
- "The real objection here is not to materialism as such but to the low level of satisfaction for which the average American is willing to settle. The trouble is not that he works too hard for money, but that he doesn't know how to get his money's worth when he spends it. There is nothing radical in all of this" (pg. 160)
 - "The thrust toward positive values is generally expressed in one or more of four separate but related manifestations. First, there is absolute insistence on everyone's right to a fuller and freer sexual experience, combined with a naïvely sentimental faith in the power of sex to dissolve all other problems. Second, there is a desire to value each person for his unique-ness, to let him be himself. This ideal is in no way opposed to another which at first might seem to be inconsistent with it, the claim that human relations ought to be based on a more authentic sort of communication. Third, there is a drive for more intense experience, usually sought either by deliberately courting danger or by trying to expand the consciousness by means of drugs. Fourth, there is a longing for some sort of noninstitutionalized religious value, which may on occasion turn to Eastern philosophy but which more often expresses itself in a species of neo-primitivism. All of this could perhaps be summed up as a thirst for total experience..." (pg. 162)
 - ◆ "it is pre-eminently for an experience which is not subjected to rational control" (pg. 162-163)
 - "The motivating force is the individual's desire to think and feel for himself, to *be* himself. At the outset, what is prized is all that individualizes and makes the person unique. It is his awareness whose lucidity he is reluctant to see dulled by the unthinking routine of the people around him. I do not claim that this impulse is wholly toward rationality. Feeling may be involved more than thinking. Nevertheless, there is an insistence on wanting to maintain an unclouded consciousness of one's free being and one's choices. Among these negative rebels the revolt once launched almost inevitably takes the form of retreat into the irrational...**Ultimately this search for depths of feeling experience leads to a regressive neo-primitivism in which the individual seeks to evade the differentiating potentialities of rational consciousness and to take refuge in an instinctual life of the senses** where the individual no longer need decide on his own but is guided by certainties coming from outside his conscious knowledge" (pg. 192-193)
 - "Even if a return to the primitive certainties of the jungle were possible, it would be a regression, not an advance to greater complexity and to individual fulfillment" (pg. 196)
 - "Sartre claims that revolutions take place when men suddenly realize the impossibility of their existence. The first hostile withdrawal from society resulted from the individual's sense that his personal life was being suffocated, that the discrepancy between what society professed and what it practiced was too great to be endured. For a time the rebels limited themselves to a reversal of values, to living against rather than for. Or else they retreated into new games of role-playing, just as artificial and confining as those against which they revolted. Gradually some of them came to recognize that **if a person is to realize himself as a free existence in the world, he must change the world, not merely maintain a hostile distance between the world and himself**" (pg. 196)
 - "Camus did not intend to advocate quietism, however his opponents may have interpreted him" (pg. 205)
- Chapter 8 - The Temptation of Eastern Philosophy (pg. 211)
- "**Sartre has pointed out that every negation is a particular negation; even as a negation it is - negatively - qualified by that which it negates**" (pg. 211)
 - "I believe that in America today, **much of people's feeling of meaninglessness and moral chaos derives in large part from the sense of a missing God**, that personal Father-Judge who for so many centuries assigned our tasks and goal, rewarded our efforts, punished and forgave our mistakes. I have deliberately contrasted the ethical positions of humanistic existentialism with a fundamentalist or at least a conservatively traditional view of Christianity. I have done so partly because this has been the focus of the attacks by existentialist writers. In addition, I believe that, regardless of the degree of naïveté or sophistication in the Christian faith of our ancestors, the essence of what is now felt as a lack remains the same; that is, the belief in a transcendent Deity, who in some way guaranteed that the Universe was ordered and purposeful and who served as final reference point for standards of human conduct" (pg. 211-212)
 - "the ambiguous existentialism of Heidegger...is certainly not religious in any traditional sense but which nevertheless holds on to such concepts as the Holy and speak of 'Being' in language hardly discernable from that of the New Theologians" (pg. 212)
 - ◆ "Martin Heidegger has acknowledged an affinity between his more recent work and the intentions of Zen Buddhists" (pg. 213)
 - ◆ "**existentialism, Zen, and pragmatism have much in common...**" (pg. 214)
 - "Among the works of Erich Fromm, I know of none which deals specifically with the relation between existentialism and Oriental philosophy. Fromm does, however, find marked resemblances between Marx and the existentialists and a strong affinity between Western psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism; he is hopeful that Marx and a psychoanalysis enriched by Zen may significantly improve the lot of mankind" (pg. 214)
 - "Vedanta is much closer to an important though minor part of the Western tradition. Zen Buddhism, as I hope to show, is more easily related in a meaningful way to existentialism" (pg. 215)
 - "Vedanta seems to me to offer a clear either/or in relation to any kind of existentialism. What is essential in it appears absolutely opposed to that small but significant least common denominator which serves to link all existentialists from Kierkegaard through Heidegger to Sartre. Existentialism has already confronted and rejected a parallel way of thinking in the setting of Western philosophy. This is what Huxley calls "the perennial philosophy," which he feels has been most adequately expressed by Vedanta but which has appeared and reappeared intermittently throughout the world in the myths and dogmas of many religions for some three thousand years. It was present in Plato, fully formulated by Plotinus, restated by Schopenhauer. We find it in the mystic experiences of a number of slightly heretical Christians. Reduced to its bare skeleton and stripped of its myths of incarnate deities, Vedanta comprises these things: **There exists a**

- Divine Ground (the godhead, the one, or Brahman) which is immanent in all things and yet transcendent**, a nonmaterial unmanifested principle behind all manifestation. The individual consciousness is only superficially separated from this Eternal Reality, and it may, even in this life, realize its **union-in-identity through an experience transcending conceptual knowledge or ordinary sensory perception**. The realization that the true self-center, Atman, is ultimately in impersonal Brahman ought to be the goal and purpose of every person, for it alone satisfies and liberates. Only this is Truth. The phenomenal world of separated entities is as ephemeral and superficial as the individual personality. The illusion of separate substantiality is maintained for as long as the individual willfully clings to his sense of separation in a series of reincarnations. **"To know ourselves is to know our source," as Plotinus said. To exist eternally as all, we must refuse to live separately as ourselves. For the more there is of Ego, the less there is of the Divine Ground"** (pg. 216)
- ◆ *"to 'identify' is to constitute a union between. Now, where this 'unity' seemingly flows from 'identity', in fact such 'unity' (was already) in order that it could at all be identified. Cf. A. Benjamin, Towards a Relational Ontology, ctrl+F "after-affect"*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_28b81f8d11db461e929802c0dc1e6060.pdf
 - ◇ *"particulars are only ever the after-effect of relations..."* (pg. 219)
 - ◆ "Sartrean existentialism can no more accept this doctrine than it can reconcile itself with a fundamentalist Christian eschatology" (pg. 217)
 - ◇ "the Sartrean theory of consciousness, of the self, and of the outside world simply will not fit" (pg. 217)
 - ◇ "Sartre has stated that generally we decide on emotional grounds whether or not to accept the hypothesis of God and then proceed to hunt for reasons to justify our faith or our atheism" (pg. 217)
 - "the three central concepts of Vedanta which increasing numbers of Westerners are finding meaningful are these: reincarnation and gradual salvation, Enlightenment, and the ultimate oneness of all consciousness" (pg. 218)
 - "for humanistic existentialism, consciousness is nothing but an awareness of its objects, an awareness which always includes an implicit self-awareness of not being the object" (pg. 220)
 - "Kierkegaard and Unamuno have both had the courage - or the recklessness - to argue that the grandeur of man's need and the persistence of the longing for God and immortality are surer guides for men to live by than the Reason, which says No. Here humanistic existentialism sides rather with Freud, not hesitating to label vast areas of human aspirations as centered on nothing more than wish fulfillment. **Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* views almost all of human enterprise as the mistaken attempt to be God as *Causa Sui*, at once necessary and contingent, free and yet secured.** Christian immortality and reincarnation are similarly gigantic self-contradictory wish fulfillments" (pg. 220)
 - ◆ "one need not be an existentialist or even a psychologist to arrive at the conclusion that reincarnation, like any other concept of immortality, has been invented to satisfy human longings" (pg. 222)
 - "**Existentialism cannot rely on the concept of the Unconscious...**" (pg. 222)
 - *"I disagree with this. In fact, I think acceptance and integration of such is the final bridge between current and future existential psychoanalysis.*
 - "unacknowledged awareness remains alive on the non-reflective level" (pg. 223)
 - ◆ "the Sartrean consciousness is always aware of not being its objects. Its emotions and actions are only its way of living its particular situation" (pg. 223)
 - ◆ "I can never intend all of [my] psychic material at once..." (pg. 223)
 - "I cannot see, however, that belief in reincarnation is intellectually any easier than Christian immortality for a person in our scientific age - or any harder. **Both demand the supreme degree of faith and willingness to renounce the rational, scientific approach which has certainly been responsible for what we all call the positive achievements of civilization"** (pg. 224)
 - "William James took us a long way in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. James demonstrated unequivocally that there is a common essence of all mystic experiences, whether they involve a sense that the individual consciousness is lost in a greater union or whether, more simply, there is merely the sense of the presence of, and one's own presence to, the supernatural. All involve an ineffable noetic quality. All appear to be something which happens to a person, to which he opens himself, not something which he actively effects" (pg. 225)
 - "For Huxley - and for Vedanta - it is all a matter of levels of truth. One could almost say layers. Our ordinary view of things is a limitation and thereby to some degree a falsification. **The Being of things is something more and other than they seem. Transcendent to them as well as immanent in them is an eternal nonmaterial reality, manifesting itself in cosmic play. What impedes our coming closer to it is our individualized consciousness, which we falsely take to be an ultimate center, without which we feel we would be nothing at all.** Thus the fear Huxley explains in the passage quoted is, from his standpoint, both justified and mistaken. Consciousness, as the individual knows it, might in fact disintegrate if one opened oneself freely to Reality. But the disintegration would be a transformation into something much greater, which would include the individual consciousness but without its personalizing restrictions. Borrowing from Tibetan metaphors, Huxley often speaks of ultimate Reality as a bright light and of the individual consciousness as a self-restricting clot, refusing participation in the light" (pg. 234)
 - "Sartre himself, of course, believes that his theory of Being and Nothingness strikes the proper balance between realism and idealism, avoiding the difficulties of both views" (pg. 235)
 - "When Sartre writes abstractly on the fundamentals of his ontology, he states definitely that **Being-in-itself is a plenitude, is undifferentiated mass.** When he discusses man's concrete existence in the world, he implies the independent existence of separate portions of Being - e.g., the sun and moon - to which we attach a purely human significance via our projects. If the two kinds of statements are reconcilable, we must find our point of departure in the abstract formulation" (pg. 236)
 - ◆ "Everything hinges on Sartre's concept of 'the transphenomenality of Being'. Sartre is faithful to phenomenology when he insists that **whatever becomes the object of a consciousness is exactly what it appears to be; that is, there is no underlying substance or anything hidden which supports its apparent qualities.** Yet as we are aware of the outside world, we are aware that it is, we are aware of its being. In other words, there is a phenomenon or appearance of Being itself to consciousness, which causes us to postulate the transphenomenality of Being. By this obscure term, **Sartre refers to the inexhaustibility of the appearances of the object. Perception does not use up an object. There is always something left over.** Neither any one awareness nor any sum of awarenesses, however large, could take in all of an object. Furthermore, **consciousness of the object or of Being always implies a separation. Consciousness is not the object. Consciousness never becomes Being-in-itself"** (pg. 236)
 - ◆ "We can easily see how Sartre's view suggests and yet is different from Kant's. As with Kant, **there is no objective knowledge or perception unmodified by the consciousness of the knower or perceiver. The thing-in-itself is outside our awareness of it.** Kant, however, in speaking of the thing-in-itself, constantly implies that if the human mind were perfect, there could be a knowledge of what a thing is in itself. Something is there which the limited forms of our mind prevent us from grasping without alteration. **Knowledge is what is limited.** Thus the world of appearances is to some extent a world of illusions even though the illusions are shared by all humanity. The true world exists and may be legitimately introduced as the subject matter of our regulative hypotheses. **Sartrean existentialism rejects the idea that an object is anything other than it appears.** Nevertheless we do not absorb its

- appearances, and in this way it is something more than any of its appearances-to-date. It points beyond them" (pg. 236)
- ◊ "we might say that Being is its own transphenomenality" (pg. 237)
 - ◆ "*Being and Nothingness* stressed particularly the part played by consciousness in ordering experience. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, published almost twenty years later, Sartre gave more emphasis to the world of which we are conscious. In this book Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself are barely mentioned. They are replaced by two other terms, "praxis" and the "pratico-inerte," which, while not synonyms, perform much the same function. "Praxis" refers to any purposeful human activity and is closely related to the "project" which held so important a place in Being and Nothingness. The chief difference is that (in the second work) Sartre is particularly concerned to show the way in which individual praxis is continually blocked, frustrated, and deviated by the structures of the outside world. It is here that we meet the "pratico-inerte." "Hell is the pratico-inerte," Sartre declares, a remarkable departure from the early statement in *No Exit*, that "Hell is others." **The pratico-inerte includes those human structures in which one's free project is entrapped** - institutions, communication systems, the formal rules of language, contemporary connotations of words, etc. Sartre gives full weight, too, to the natural world - to physical space and the terrain, to climate, to the presence or absence of natural resources. He suggests surprisingly that it is even possible that there exists some sort of dialectic in nature though at present we do not have enough knowledge to support either a strong affirmation or a denial. On one point he is emphatic. The world "steals my action from me." As I act to carry out my project, it is as though I "inscribed myself in matter." Matter may evoke from my action a "counter finality," as a result for which I am responsible but which I had neither intended nor wanted" (pg. 239)
 - ◊ "Superficial reading might see in this a shift from extreme idealism to an almost naive anthropomorphism endowing inorganic nature with life and purpose. Yet if we read carefully, we find that Sartre is quite consistent, and I think that the Critique bolsters and clarifies the interpretation of Being-in-itself which I believe to be the correct one in all of Sartre's writing on that subject" (pg. 240)
 - ▶ **I absolutely disagree with this. And, I'm not sure what has led the author to stipulate such.*
 - ◆ "[to Sartre,] there cannot be destruction without negation and temporality, both of which depend on consciousness" (pg. 241)
 - ◆ "I think there is no concept in Sartre's philosophy more difficult than that of a consciousness which bestows meaning and significance on a chaotic world, a consciousness which is absolutely free and unique, which is separated (psychically) from all that of which it is conscious, and which is finally defined as distinguished from the rest of reality precisely by Nothing! Just what is consciousness and where is it?" (pg. 241)
 - ◊ "consciousness cannot, I believe, be identified with simple awareness..." (pg. 241-242)
 - ▶ "animal consciousness is clearly not free, and there seems to be every reason to associate instinctual living with fixed characteristics of the species" (pg. 242)
 - **I don't know if I agree with this.*
 - ◆ "What is the relation between human being, consciousness, and Being-for-itself? At times Sartre writes of them as if they were identical. Certainly they are so inextricably united that to use any one of the terms implies the presence of the other two. I do not think they are synonyms. Being-for-itself may be equated with the human person, which - to paraphrase the description applied to the Stoic Universe - may be equally well described as body infused with consciousness or consciousness invested with body. We must remind ourselves that it is as important in connection with Sartre as it was with the Stoics to avoid all suspicion of dualism. The human being, as a For-itself, is still a part of Being, but he is that part which is characterized by the peculiar quality of being able to effect a psychic withdrawal, to introduce a cleavage or Nothingness into Being, to take a point of view on Being. We may say correctly that man is both Being and Nothingness, since it is he who brings Nothingness into the world. At the same time it would be wrong to claim that the Body is Being, and Consciousness the Nothingness. Consciousness is the process of introducing the Nothingness, of assuming the point of view. **One cannot say that it is itself Nothing.** It is the awareness of an object, along with an implicit awareness of not-being-the-object" (pg. 242)
 - ◊ "the body both is and is not consciousness. It does not have a consciousness nor does consciousness have a body" (pg. 243)
 - ◊ "to have a body and to be a consciousness are one and the same for Sartre, who prefers to say that 'consciousness exists the body'" (pg. 243)
 - ◆ "since consciousness is not an entity, it cannot be identified with body or viewed as a thing. Since it is a process which depends on a being - i.e., both body and the outside world - it is always localized as a point of view. Thus it is particularized and isolated" (pg. 243)
 - "it is important to be precisely clear as to what we mean by the word 'self'. Usually, at least in everyday terms and in psychological treatise, the term includes - if it is not limited to - the ego and the whole complex of personality structures which serve to differentiate one person from another in the judgment of others as well as in his own sense of being a separate creature" (pg. 245-246)
 - "If we take the Sartrean view of consciousness, the situation is quite different. To start with, the individual consciousness is not to be identified with the personality structure. Thus **one cannot say that consciousness is the self.** Nor does consciousness have a self in the form of a finished entity which can be possessed. Sartre speaks of the self as that which is pursued but not finally attained so long as consciousness lives. From one point of view, it is hardly distinguishable from the Ego. The Ego (both the 'I' and the 'me') is a psychic structure on the side of Being-in-itself" (pg. 247-248)
 - "**The Self cannot exist as a fixed entity, for it changes with each new act of consciousness** as consciousness decides how to remake the past and what sort of future it will choose for itself. For convenience we may designate the ideal unity of experiences and habits as 'Self', but there is always the same psychic distance between this Self and consciousness as there is between consciousness and any other of its objects. The difference is that as consciousness contemplates its own products, its very reflection alters that which it contemplates. Thus we have that play of mirrors, that impure reflection or never quite effected scission of consciousness by self-reflection which Sartre has compared to a game of musical chairs" (pg. 248)
 - "We might expect to find some kinship - at least an affinity of mood - between Zen Buddhism and existentialism inasmuch as both are movements of revolt against the transcendentalism of their respective traditions. Zen, early in its history under the influence of Mahayana Buddhism, rejected both the concept of self-entity and that of a transcendent Absolute. There is neither Atman nor Brahman" (pg. 256)
 - "Theoretically, followers of Zen resist the idea that its insights constitute a philosophy - much as Kierkegaard did. They deny that the essence of man's life and the solutions to his problems, or even the problems themselves, can be adequately treated by direct conceptual thought or ever fully communicated" (pg. 257)
 - "The great insight of Zen is that the transcendent Nothing-yet-everything which the Hindus call Brahman, is present here and now in whatever object is before one - as well as in oneself" (pg. 258)
 - ◆ "**Nothingness is Suchness**" (pg. 259)
 - "I think we might very well conclude that Zen thought offers precisely the same mid-point between idealism and realism which we have found in Sartre's Being and Nothingness. The central kernel, as it were, is indeed the same. At any given moment, in any act of

- consciousness, the world of nature is nothing other than it appears" (pg. 259)
- ◆ **I categorically don't accept this position*
 - "Two things distinguish the Zen view from the existentialist. First, the Zen doctrine does not differentiate between the idea of the Self as complex entity and the immediate self-awareness of the individual consciousness. Second, it does not allow for a psychic separation between consciousness and the object" (pg. 260)
 - ◆ **"Zen is careful to preserve an ultimate monism"** (pg. 260)
 - "all human reaction is interaction" (pg. 262)
 - "Enlightenment in Zen Buddhism is called Satori and is as important for Zen as Moksa or Nirvana is for Vedanta. Paradoxically, Zen insists that the insight gained in Satori is the realization that there is nothing to seek, that what is found was here all the time" (pg. 263)
 - ◆ "With or without mystic overtones, **Satori is essentially a 'letting go'**. What one lets go of is the feeling that one is, or ought to be, or ought to want to be, in control of his own situation. This may seem to be in contradiction with the famous excellence of Zen-trained archers or the strict discipline of Zen temple schools, but it is not. The whole point is that "one" does not "do" anything. The "one" exists only as an immediate center of awareness, but this awareness is only a point, so to speak, in a complex of responses to an ever-changing environment, an environment which is, in turn, part of the totality of 'related functions'" (pg. 264)
 - ◆ "It is the central precept of Zen that if one gets over the illusion that there is an actor standing back of all actions, then every action functions harmonically and naturally as in any well-performing organism. It is the interposition of a false sense of self which impedes the function - like any foreign object thrust into the midst of a closely meshed mechanism. The blissful liberation in Satori stems from the sudden insight that 'one' does not exist except as a closely integrated part of a whole" (pg. 264)
 - ◇ **"one is nothing but awareness of experience; since all patterns overlap, there is quite literally no end to experience"** (pg. 265)
 - ◇ "Satori is the realization that what is simply is, that our own being is bound up with it, and that there is no necessity for us to do anything about it" (pg. 265)
 - ▶ "in Satori one perceives that nothing exists or is real except the present moment" (pg. 265)
 - **which means that such neglects to consider the future - or, that there is no future.*
 - ▶ "This doctrine is in some ways more difficult to comprehend than the Vedanta view that time is a superficial structure imposed upon a reality beyond time. It is far more radical than Sartre's doctrine which does, to be sure, put time on the side of Being-for-itself but which assigns an essential importance to the triple temporal dimension. In my opinion, this claim of Zen not only is false but strangely out of line with the rest of its teaching" (pg. 265)
 - **"the temporal context is as essential as any other contextual relation"** (pg. 266)
 - ◆ **cf. I. McMullin, Time and the Shared World*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_95afc4f64e944874a0ea434bfcf4ab40.pdf
 - "Every motion is a preparation for that which is to follow; none of it would be even possible - let alone satisfying - without some sort of unifying theme and even, to some small degree, purpose" (pg. 267)
 - ◆ "It is because **consciousness is temporal** that existentialism can defend its seeming paradox - that man is free and yet associated with a distinct personality. 'Self' has meaning both as **referring** to a recognizable quality associated with the past acts of awareness of a particular consciousness in a particular body and as **pointing** to the kind of future which consciousness projects" (pg. 267)
 - "Sartre says that consciousness is always in-the-world. This is because it is consciousness of the world. But because it is present to the world by virtue of the nothingness which it brings into being, consciousness is at least non-reflectively aware of not being the world" (pg. 262)
 - "for Sartre, the ego is a psychic structure which emerges as consciousness reflects upon its own - always past - states" (pg. 262)
 - ◆ **one could also say that it is the ego which is turning consciousness to focus on itself - it's in this way we say the ego is 'self'-ish.*
 - "both Sartrean and Zen psychology reject the primacy of the ego" (pg. 263)
 - **"Ultimately humanistic existentialism say No to Vedanta and Zen, just as it rejects the nearer tradition of Judaeo-Christianity"** (pg. 268)
 - "the intuition that all men are one simply cancels out differences" (pg. 271)
 - ◆ **see top of pg. 273*
 - "'Going nowhere in a timeless moment' is the goal of Zen. Existentialism, of course, denies that any moment is truly timeless for a temporal consciousness" (pg. 273)
 - ◆ "In choosing between the two values of genuine spontaneity and the creation of a coherent life plan and value system, Zen has chosen the former exclusively" (pg. 274)
 - ◆ **"what disturbs me about Zen is that it seems to me to preclude the creation of a value system, both because of its denial of temporality and because it allows for no real sense of responsibility"** (pg. 274)
 - ◇ "In Sartrean existentialism man *is* desire as he is choice, as he is freedom. Through desire he relates himself to the world, carves out his place in Being. The aim is to live more intensely, more broadly, to enrich the pursuit of self via an ever-increasing network of desires, extending the horizon of experience until finally the needs of others too are included as significant to one's own consciousness. Complete liberation from desire would be the annihilation of consciousness" (pg. 274)
 - ◇ "one seeks no further; one merely does what needs to be done. Where nothingness and suchness are one, there is no choice, no imperative" (pg. 275)
 - **"humanistic existentialism, starting with the isolated consciousness, stresses social commitment and the need to reorganize society"** (pg. 276)
 - ◆ "existentialism proceeds from a pluralism of concrete (I)'s to an ideal (We)" (pg. 276)
 - **"Eastern philosophy promises a higher irrationality** which transcends the admitted limitations of human reason and opens the door to an infinite expansion of consciousness. It is my belief that **this promise is an invitation to avoid working to achieve such progress as reason can make**, despite its restrictions, and a temptation to escape the burden of responsibility which inevitably accompanies individual consciousness. It is neither self-expansion nor self-realization but a **refusal to engage any longer in pursuing or making a self"** (pg. 277)
 - Part 3 - Responsibilities (pg. 279)
 - Chapter 9 - Existentialism and Education (pg. 281)
 - "the goal of education has generally been twofold: to instill in the child and student the values...of his society; and to provide him with sufficient mastery of inherited knowledge to enable him to fit comfortably into the society, contributing his fair share to maintaining the status quo" (pg. 282-283)
 - "In abstract formulation, the existentialist view of the proper relation between the individual and his society might not be perceptibly different from the basic assumptions of simple democracy. The ideal would be a state providing for the maximum opportunity for the free development of the individual's creative possibilities and happiness which is consistent with protecting the same opportunity for all others. Existentialism

would, of course, emphasize the active, responsible side of government; that is, it advocates our responsibility to correct inequities and to foster freedom, not merely to refrain from interfering with the projects of free individuals. **Its ideal is closer to the Welfare State than to laissez-faire capitalism**" (pg. 283)

- "aside from obvious injustices resulting from the discrepancy between theory and practice, existentialism mistrusts the manner in which the central aim of our democratic way of life has been gradually interpreted" (pg. 283-284)
- "Inasmuch as it is individuals who compose and constitute the group and yet the group which sustains and supports the individual, I suppose any political theory must search for some sort of mean in reconciling the conflicting claims of freedom and responsibility - just as any individual ethics must do" (pg. 284)
 - ◆ "If we are to have a reasonable hope that many people will succeed in living satisfying lives in good faith, society and its institutions must be in good faith. This is not to deny the responsibility of the individual" (pg. 285)
- **"the 'We' makes possible the fulfillment of each (I) as well as the reverse"** (pg. 285)
 - "freedom is no exercised in a vacuum. It is meaningless except where there is an obstacle to overcome - i.e., a choice which must be made. Freedom is always 'in situation'" (pg. 289-290)
- "it would be fair to say that most American children receive absolutely nothing of what can in any significant sense be called education in ethics" (pg. 292)
- "As an existentialist, I object both to the content of this collection of half-truths and falsehoods and to the fact that it is never brought out into the open for direct examination and discussion. **An existentialist approach would formulate very differently its view of what man and society are and ought to be; it would commit itself to a definite program of implementing its ideals and values**" (pg. 294)
 - "To start with, existentialism does not believe that at bottom everybody is, or ought to be, like everyone else. Existentialism does not even hold that everyone should on all occasions be like, or be, himself. Ludwig Lefebvre, following Heidegger, has well phrased the existentialist goal in saying that **the psychotherapist's aim should not be to help someone to 'be himself' but to 'come to himself'**. Sartre, too, has pointed out that **'to be oneself is to come to oneself'**. The emphasis throughout is on the 'coming to', not on a self finally attained. The idea that a person is a free, continuous process of self-making introduces several corollaries. Obviously we will be doing violence to the individual if we try to persuade him that in order to be his real or best self he must fit into some ready-made mold. Furthermore, one of **the most important consequences of freedom is that a person can change and radically**; that he may at some point or points in his life effect so total a reorientation in his relations with the world..." (pg. 294)
 - ◆ "obviously no single consciousness can ever develop all of its possibilities" (pg. 295)
 - "the view that man is a free self-creation requires that we convince the child to see himself as a never-ending **open process**" (pg. 295)
 - "I maintain that **three needs of the child are being ignored if not deliberately frustrated**. They are: the right to live the extreme choice, the right to change, and the right to spontaneous self-realization" (pg. 296)
 - "I do not believe that passionate commitment to intense living is a giving up of oneself to something else. It is rather the choice of being the kind of person who lives this sort of life rather than another. I can agree with Hesse's statement, however, if we assume that the "self" which is lost in intensity is the idea of self which is imposed by society and which, in bad faith, a man accepts as his essence. **Living a passionate commitment inevitably takes one beyond the horizons of conventional social ethics, and one is obliged to chart one's own way. In this sense authenticity and the extreme choice have a certain affinity**. The right to choose the intense one-sided rather than the balanced life is perfectly consistent with existentialist ethics" (pg. 297)
 - "Two things should be said by way of explanation. First, commitment is indeed an existentialist virtue, but it is not the only one. We can better understand the idea of commitment if we consider the closely related concept of action. Existentialism emphasizes action for two reasons: First, as Inez says in *No Exit*, **'You are your acts'**. A man will have been what he will have done, not what he kept as a daydream or potentiality. **It is by his actions that man defines himself. Man acts, man chooses, man makes himself**. These assertions come close to being synonymous. To refrain from action is in itself an act just as not to choose is already to have chosen. Therefore we must agree that action is primary for existentialism, but this is not to say that all action is good. By his act a man may define himself as being in good faith or in bad faith" (pg. 298)
 - "A second point to be made is that **genuine commitment is not the same as blind devotion to a system set up by somebody else**. **The wish to avoid the necessity for thinking through each choice and recognizing one's responsibility for each act is what engenders loyalty to extremist groups whether they be fascist, communist, racist, or fanatically patriotic**. Surrender of self and self-transcendence are opposites, not synonyms. Self-transcendence alone involves true commitment" (pg. 299)
 - "Man is 'unjustifiable', and his existence is 'contingent'. There is no Providence or inner law of history which determines the course of human events, nor is there any fixed human nature to enable us to predict how man will behave or to serve as a yardstick by which we can say how he ought to behave. **Man alone is responsible for his destiny; better yet, each individual man decides what mankind will be by his own choices as he makes his life**. Therefore any given society exists without any guarantee of its ultimate 'rightness' and may be transcended toward another kind of society. The values of any existing society are always those which both reflect the social structure and tend to preserve it. Therefore men may always seek to go beyond an existing set of values since the new values are anticipated, even invented by men's very effort to pass beyond the present social order" (pg. 302-303)
 - "It seems to me that the same sort of open future may be posited as a legitimate goal for the individual. In each case the possibility of progress toward a more satisfying level of existence is kept open. It is not the easy inevitable progress of the Enlightenment. **Genuine self-transcendence means a new goal and new values, not merely a closer approximation to a Utopia** clearly envisioned in all of its details. I suppose one could represent such a life diagrammatically as a series of plateaus, resembling the upward curve of the learning process. **There is no final level of attainment**, unless it is that which is formed artificially by death or by the destruction of the human race. Naturally one hopes that each plateau will be higher than the earlier one, more inclusive in its view. We must expect, however, that even when this is true, the greater spaciousness of the later landscape will be accompanied by loss of certain closer delights which the earlier afforded. It is entirely probable, too, that the vista of the later plateau will be no more spacious but simply different" (pg. 303)
 - ◇ **"We should not be afraid of the Utopian in our thinking, for it is only belief in the possibility of what has not yet been attained which makes progress even conceivable**. A willingness to rethink all of our aims and to throw the whole system into question will prevent our painting the walls when we ought to be getting rid of the termites and strengthening the foundations. At the same time education cannot wait for Utopia any more than politics can. We are going to be living within our present structure for a long time yet. Internal improvements simply must be made; in fact, it is only by working with them now that we will learn how to build a better building later" (pg. 306)
 - ▶ **meaning, it is ideals which give foundation to the idea of progress.*
 - ◆ **"Most often we remain fixed without recognizing that our reactions have become mechanical, automatic responses to stimuli, that we look at things in terms of an old classification without investigating to see whether it still fits or whether we are still classifying the same objects. Neither freshness nor genuine spontaneity remains. At this point, it depends on us whether or not we find the**

- energy and courage to move on. It is now that we must battle it out between those two needs of our organism - growth and safety, being and becoming. As existentialists, we must recognize that the plateaus of being must be left behind if they are not to be transformed into pockets of bad faith" (pg. 304)
- **"successful adjustment, whether personal or social, is a series of plateaus and not a mountain peak. The only absolute knowledge is a dynamic knowledge which is ever in process"** (pg. 305)
 - ◆ **cf. M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 24 - "to know means to be able to learn"*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_90a3aa2168f645f09f2aea1a4380fa1d.pdf
 - "A legitimate aim of teaching...might be this: to instill in the individual the realization that the process of making oneself is never-ending, that the interest and rewards it offers are directly commensurate with the psychic labor and anguish which one is willing to put into the task" (pg. 315)
 - "we should urge upon him his responsibility to change the social structure for the good of the community" (pg. 316)
 - "We ought to teach people that we are responsible and free, that authenticity and the ethical life are values worth striving for. We should show them the difference between being-with others and being-one-with others. We should help them to understand their relation to their own emotions, to realize that they are not enslaved to their past and that they will themselves determine the quality of their own future. We should unashamedly proclaim the doctrine of the irreducibility of each independent subjectivity and affirm that nobody should ever be relegated to object status because of some accident of his birth or social circumstances. **To enlarge this list of presuppositions and aims and to implement them is the task of an existentialist philosophy of education which has yet to emerge"** (pg. 316-317)
 - Chapter 10 - Personal Pronouns (pg. 318)
 - "Existentially 'It' and 'They' are impersonal pronouns and have no place in a discussion of human relations in good faith. 'It' belongs properly to the realm of Being-in-itself. Illegitimately 'It' creeps into the human world when one person regards another as an object. 'They', as the equivalent of the German *das man*, is Heidegger's famous term for the unauthentic anonymous crowd" (pg. 318)
 - "In spontaneous self-realization, it is the sense of my subjective 'I-ness' which emerges. In reflective self-realization, what is important is that I recognize with approval the responsible relation which my present 'I' sustains with both the past 'I's' and the anticipated future 'I's', now viewed temporarily as objective 'Me'. Thus even within my own consciousness there is need for more than one pronoun to designate this person which I am. In a world where there are others, any person - *potentially* at all times and *actually* most of the time - exists as not only an I but as He or She, We, You, and They in both the subjective and objective cases. Human relations' is simply the term we use to describe the fact that every 'I' is a multiple of pronoun forms" (pg. 318-319)
 - **"Religious existentialism** - including both the openly theistic position and the being-philosophies of those writing under the strong influence of Heidegger - **has linked authentic existence with love**. In these writers one finds love presented as the Unconditional, as the highest value, as the natural reality and only true fulfillment of the human creature. By contrast, when one thinks of humanistic existentialism, what immediately springs to mind is the climactic moment of Sartre's *No Exit*: Garcin's declaration, 'Hell is Others'" (pg. 319)
 - "Religious existentialism seems to offer a personalized world in which the individual centers of consciousness, through the radiant power of transcendent Being, unite in their essence with one another. Sartrean human relations appear more reminiscent of the Lucretian universe, composed of isolated atoms, endlessly clashing, entering into transient combinations where there is contiguity but neither merging nor interpenetration" (pg. 319)
 - "For the record, we may note that **Sartre has stated explicitly that his analysis of human relations in *Being and Nothingness* applies only to relations in bad faith**. In a footnote following his description of the collapse of all attempts to resolve the subject-object conflict, he says, 'These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we cannot discuss here'" (pg. 320)
 - "Still we must admit that the absence of any philosophical justification by Sartre of love as a positive existential structure of human reality is a serious lack" (pg. 320)
 - "Hostile critics maintain that the reason Sartre has not offered a philosophy of love and of human relations in good faith is that he cannot do so consistently with the view of human consciousness presented in *Being and Nothingness*. I do not accept this judgment. At the same time I certainly recognize that Sartre has raised serious difficulties" (pg. 320)
 - "I would like to start with the most concrete and personal - with the possibilities for an intimate relationship between two people. **In the discussion of guilt and sin, we have seen that I cannot, in good faith, deny or seek to destroy the Other as a free subject**. This we recognized to be a factual restriction of my own freedom" (pg. 321)
 - "There are two fundamental concepts in Sartre's picture of human relations which have understandably created the impression that the only existential structures presented by his philosophy are conflict and frustration. The first of these is *Le Regard*. We may translate it neutrally as The Look" (pg. 321)
 - "The second source of difficulty arises from the fact that Sartre says-or is taken as saying —that I never communicate with another as subject-with-subject, that although I seek to reach him in his subjectivity, I can never grasp more than his object-self, his self-for-me" (pg. 321-322)
 - ◆ "For existentialism, as we have seen, each life-world is a private world, ordered by the unique subject who lives in it. Within my life-world everything **points** to my consciousness as a center of reference. If the Other appears on the horizon and is aware of me, if he assumes a point of view upon me, then - as Sartre puts it - he effects a hemorrhage of my world; it "bleeds in the direction of the Other." I am suddenly aware that the world and I myself possess - for someone else - a dimension which does not exist for me, one which I can neither grasp nor control. I realize that I possess an object-side. This awareness includes more than the knowledge that since I possess a body, I share to some degree the fragile materiality and "being-thereness" of all existing things. Mere forces of nature could bring that illumination. The stare of the Other is different. His awareness is directed at an object which is not a thing. Even the man who stares idly at a woman's legs is not looking at things-in-the-world; through the legs his gaze is directed at a living consciousness. Conscious of the Other's look, I sense the emergence of a new structure of my existence-my self-for-the-other. To the Other, this self is always an object, whether the Me whom he meets is the result of conscious, careful, molding on my part or an encounter in which, without restraint, I simply let myself be seen. In either case this self exists only for the Other. I may have my own ideas as to how I have appeared to him, but I can never see or know that self with his eyes or with his consciousness" (pg. 322)
 - ◇ **Yet, if "consciousness is nothing but the awareness, the process of relating, etc." (pg. 249), and it is "that!" standing beyond consciousness which is 'pointing', then how can we say consciousness is the 'center of reference'? Would not everything which is pointing be the center (i.e., origin)?*
 - ◆ "in the Sartrean encounter, too, there are four selves involved" (pg. 323)
 - ◇ **"the question is whether there ever occurs a moment in which the two selves-for-others are simultaneously transcended so that the subjects meet directly"** (pg. 323)
 - ▶ "Sartre denies that it is possible. I believe that Sartre is right" (pg. 323)

- "consciousness for us involves a nihilating withdrawal, a psychic separation from Being-in-itself" (pg. 323)
 - "both on the basis of existentialist psychology and by appeal to empirical observation, I reject the idea that there is any merging or full identity of two consciousnesses" (pg. 324)
 - ◆ **then what is language. If I am speaking to someone who 'knows' English and ask them to spell out the word 'table', are they not conceptualizing the word in the exact same way as how I intended? Is that not a 'meeting' of the minds? Have we not each 'identified' the same structure (i.e., t-a-b-l-e)?*
 - "I think we need not belabor the point that **there is never any actual merging of consciousnesses where one person fully comprehends the whole of what goes on in the mind of the Other**. If we are to think of two consciousnesses as being like two circles, which might be precisely fitted together to form one, this is obvious nonsense" (pg. 326)
 - ◆ **again, I would challenge this criterion of 'oneness' as it pertains to 'meeting'. For instance, each snowflake is its 'own' unique shape; but, where each is so, they all are snow and fall together.*
 - "the awareness of mutuality comes only via an interpretation of the Other's behavior or by an intuitive comprehension based on previous knowledge" (pg. 327)
- "Most of these claims of oneness involve a touch of mysticism, a reliance on something that is more than the emotional and which belongs strictly to the realm of the irrational, and the mysterious. There is a modified point of view which would speak less of merging than of meeting. Erich Fromm, for example, says: 'In love the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two'. Fromm emphatically does not believe that the boundaries of the personality are destroyed or that such a state of affairs would be desirable if it were possible. To the degree that any man does lose himself in another or two people in each other, Fromm calls the result a 'symbiotic union' in which there is a mutual parasitism stultifying to both partners. 'In contrast to symbiotic union, **mature love is union under the conditions of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality**'" (pg. 327)
 - "I cannot accept Fromm's statements. In the first place he does not explain just how one person knows another in his essence. Fromm implies, without actually stating, that this is by some sort of intuitive total comprehension which lets me suddenly see the Other and his world from within. Nothing in the rest of Fromm's work shows how this internalization is possible" (pg. 328)
 - ◆ "Fromm's view of man is still linked with the Aristotelian. Fromm does not deny that a person is free to change. Yet the fundamental choice which this freedom enjoys is that of choosing whether it will pursue its own self-realization or allow others to stunt and distort its growth. In other words, we are back with the acorn theory. To know a person's essence is possible for Fromm, at least in theory, because a person is an entity, even if part of what he is remains potential" (pg. 328)
 - "If we seek in the present to know what a man's essence is, then we can only say that it is a freedom; that is, a consciousness, a process, an ever-future project, or - as Sartre puts it - 'an always future hollow'. One can never fully grasp such a freedom-essence even objectively" (pg. 329)
- "**Both Fromm and Frankl emphasize the importance of valuing the Other as a separate being in his 'uniqueness and singularity'**. Neither quite satisfies our wish to know just how we are to apprehend this unique quality which the inward life of the other possesses. Frankl, more than Fromm, seems to me to suggest that it is by our own sympathetically imaginative insight. His use of the term "image" implies that it is our idea or feeling of what the Other is in himself which causes us to value and love him, not some mysterious ability to experience his inwardness directly. I do not believe that Frankl, or Fromm either, means to say that in our apprehension of the Other's essence we have succeeded in penetrating his private world and attaining his total view of reality" (pg. 330)
 - "To live the experience of another in its uniqueness and singularity would be to become the other. It would be also to cease being myself. For even if, by any of the irrational methods hinted at by some writers, I could comprehend directly the contents of another's consciousness, even if by extrasensory perception I could have all of his thoughts and sensations put into my own consciousness, I would still not be living his experience as he lives it" (pg. 330)
 - ◆ **in this criterion of 'as he lives it', we inflate the stature of the Other*
- "The truth is that since to be an I-subject means to be a center of reference for a consciousness, I-subjects can never merge nor even overlap, if by overlapping we mean that they actually have an identity of experience. Let us recognize once and for all that claims of united essences and merged I-subjects and stepping into the center of another's life-world must be taken for metaphorical exaggerations or for sentimental wish-fulfillment. **Human beings meet as existents, not as essences**" (pg. 330-331)
 - "[we must] acknowledge our ultimate separateness as individuals living our particular lives in the world" (pg. 331)
- "**The wonder of love** is not that, by a metaphysical chemistry, like elements seek out each other. It is that separate beings, on their own impulse, resolve in some way to bridge the gap between them and to move on in a direction which both choose together. It is the creation, not the discovery of mutuality which needs to be explained" (pg. 331)
 - "love between human is a human triumph, whether God exists or not" (pg. 331)
- "Let us return to that Look by which I first became aware of the existence of the Other. Sartre has emphasized that it is the Other's Look which makes me realize my own existence as an object. This realization is, of course, inseparable from my awareness *that he is a subject*, for I cannot be an object except to a subject. Knowing that he is a subject is obviously not the same as knowing him from within as subject, and we have shown that the second is impossible. Nevertheless, as a step toward a positive view of human relations in good faith, we must recognize that even hostility and hatred, in Sartre's theory, stem from the fact that the Other is irreducibly a subject, no matter how hard I try to prove that he is only an object for my manipulation. The wearisome struggle to reduce him from subject to object and the attempt to lose my own being-as-subject in his subjectivity are each one an abortive attempt to flee from the fact that free subject is what each of us irrevocably is. **It is surely illogical to insist, as some critics have tried to do, that the only human relations possible for humanistic existentialism are those in bad faith which pretend that we are what we are not**" (pg. 332)
 - ◆ "the Look need not be limited to the Stare. It can be an exchange or a looking-together-at-the-world. What happens in the exchange? The content may vary. I think the underlying meaning remains the same. **There is a simultaneous recognition by each one that the Other is a free subject and recognizes him as a free subject**" (pg. 333)
 - ◇ **Sartre does NOT at all accept that the Look is a "simultaneous recognition" of each as a free subject. He admittedly claims that there cannot be a subject-to-subject relation (cf. BN, pg. 538 - "we can never concretely take up a position of equality, i.e., a position in which the recognition of the Other's freedom [as subject] might lead to the Other's recognition of our freedom"). What this means, then, is the author has grossly misunderstood the concept of 'the look' - mainly, such's nuances and implications. Cf. pg. 320 above - the author mistakenly emphasizes the value of a footnote over the entirety of Sartre's discussion of 'the look'. Meaning, she let a footnote outweigh the whole concept Sartre detailed in BN.*
 - "Obviously any human relation in good faith will retain at its heart the awareness on the part of each one that the Other is a free subject and not an object. As one of de Beauvoir's characters says, 'Between us there is reciprocity. . . . At the moment when you recognize a consciousness in me, you know that I recognize one in you too'. If we stopped here, we should have accomplished at least something. We could establish that upon the basis of my approving appraisal of the objective aspect of the acts of another as they appear to me, I

recognize and value his being as a consciousness. **I resolve to protect and further the well-being of this subject** whom I cannot grasp in order that I may continue to enjoy my contact with his self-for-me" (pg. 332-333)

- ◆ **with regard to 'resolve to protect' cf. M. Heidegger, Building, Dwelling, Thinking - "the basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve" (Poetry, Language, Thought, pg. 148)*

- ◆ "this is in truth a meeting of existents. We cannot legitimately call it a union of essences" (pg. 339)

- ◇ "Sartre is right in claiming that hate and indifference strive to reduce the Other's subjectivity to his objective Self-for-others, which is to deny him as a freedom, to transform him from person into thing" (pg. 340)

- ▶ "This raises the interesting question as to whether or not one can hate another in good faith. The strictly honest answer is No. **Hate involves either the will to destroy or a total condemnation or both.** Either wish can be sustained only so long as I judge the other person solely in relation to my own value system and by ignoring all those aspects of his life and personality which are not in opposition to my own values. **Good faith compels me to realize that his acts have another aspect and color when seen within the framework of his own private world** and that "the one who" performed these acts does not stand in the same relation to them as the man whom I condemn. His being is not exhausted in the acts which have aroused my hatred. We all recall the annoyance which we feel when someone tries to show us that the person we hate is not truly depicted in the portrait our anger has painted of him. This is because we sense the fact that once we allow ourselves to recognize his subjectivity, either we must give up our hate or acknowledge our guilt in denying to another free consciousness his right to organize the world as it appears to him. In hate we feel a pleasure akin to that we have recognized in a certain experience of spontaneous self-realization; the recognition that we do not have to be ethical. To admit and not repress our flashes of hatred is both psychologically wise and philosophically honest. Such an admission should be accompanied by the confession that insofar as one has indulged in these emotional outbursts, one has failed to live up to the ideal of good faith" (pg. 340)

- **"consciousness is not an entity, and it is nothing without an object"** (pg. 333)

- "although our worlds have not merged, each one will henceforth include structures which the other has led me to embrace" (pg. 333)

- "Heidegger has pointed out that a consciousness is always outside, 'in the street'. He means, of course, not that consciousness is outside itself in ceasing to be its own center of reference but that even as a self-consciousness it always has an object other than itself" (pg. 352-353)

- "In love, I open myself to the inward life of the Other. What I desire most of all is that he and I may both comprehend and live the new relations to the world which each reveals to the other. Although I encounter his self-revelations as objects coming from the outside, I strive to internalize them in such a way that I relate myself to the world and to his experiences in the same way that he has done. It is no wonder that in the first stages of reciprocated love, each member of the happy pair experiences simultaneously an enlargement of himself, a fulfillment, and a sense of insulated isolation from the rest of the world" (pg. 334)

- "in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Sartre attached far more value to the 'We', which he develops under the concept of 'Group-in-fusion'. This is any group involved in immediate action in a common project to accomplish the same objective goal" (pg. 335)

- "What Sartre leaves out is the 'You'. Or if one insists on the archaic, he omits the 'Thou'. Because he does so, we are left with the uneasy feeling that even the group-in-fusion, although each one puts his 'I-ness' in parentheses, hardly becomes a true 'We'. Why Sartre has altogether omitted all discussion of the second-person pronoun, I do not know. To speak of all encounters with the Other as if only first and third persons were involved is to do violence to experience as well as to language" (pg. 337)

- **"No Exit is concerned only with the negative aspect of human relations. All three of the characters are in bad faith. No one of them posits a genuine "You" or even seeks a "We." They try to use one another as a means of bolstering false images of themselves, to convince themselves that they are in truth the Self-for-Others which they try to persuade the Other to accept.** More than anything else, the play is concerned with the way in which there is always a third subject to break down the fragile pretense which the other two try to construct as a mutual protection. Even as we recognize that this particular study of Sartre's is deliberately restricted and one-sided, we are forced to admit that Garcin's agonized "Hell is Others" goes beyond the immediate situation. It would be nice if we could say that "Hell is Others" applied to human relations in bad faith and that there is a counterpart "Heaven is Others" for relations in good faith. The fact is that we do not have two precisely equivalent poles of value and disvalue, of perfection and corruption. One can avoid the sort of Hell which comes into being when people struggle to destroy each other's subjectivity and to assert themselves as sole subject with their own object-side wholly transcended. To acknowledge that others are subjects and to be reciprocally recognized is certainly possible. Yet here as in all phases of self-fulfillment, to choose one possibility is to forego another, to engage one's freedom is both to make it meaningful and to restrict it. The structures which make it possible for human relations to be Hell are transformed but not wiped out. The most we can say is that when human relations are at their best, one feels no need of Heaven. Possibly this is enough" (pg. 340-341)

- "Humanistic existentialism is free of theological and churchly claims. It regards all traditional mores as at least open to question and re-examination. It is equally insistent that within the limits of his finitude, man sets up his own relations with nature. Therefore our existentialism rejects any argument that either asceticism or natural animality is the "right" solution. Nor will we be satisfied to say simply that the position of humanistic existentialism lies between these extremes - as if that would solve anything. **Any statement of an existentialist attitude toward sexuality ought to be developed with two different problems in mind.** There is first the question of morality; that is, what we believe to be the correct relation between the individual's sexual life and the demands of the society in which he lives. Second, there is the question of how sexuality fits into the over-all value system of the life in good faith" (pg. 342)

- ◆ "indoctrination is unacceptable" (pg. 343)

- "I feel that the absolute removal of censorship is necessary for a free literature..." (pg. 345)

- ◆ **cf. pg. 63 - "Faith is a feeling"*

- "I urge that the only proper existentialist attitude is that each man and woman should be allowed to work out his or her own destiny without hostile interference. If a woman is forced into prostitution by economic pressures, we may feel that it is right to change the structures of a society which offers her no other recourse. For many reasons, we may feel that the life of the prostitute does not recognize a full development of human potentialities in good faith, and we may work for programs which would make more easily available the possibilities of more significantly satisfying ways of living. The question of whether any man or woman wants to engage in sexual activity for financial reward - inside marriage or out of it - should remain the private problem of that individual. Love affairs of all sorts, adultery, homosexuality, incest, and the varied catalogue of nonviolent sexual deviations - all these, if they are to be opposed, should be discouraged by informative discussion and for reasons other than that they are outside some normative pattern established by God, nature, or society. **The problems of sex belong to the realm of personal psychology.** In so far as sexuality becomes one of the legitimate concerns of ethics, it is not the biological question which is important but the problem of commitments between human beings" (pg. 345)

- ◆ **the decision to take up such an activity may be 'private' (and, true, can only be justified through that individual's consciousness); however, such is not to accept that such a decision doesn't directly impact the values / attitudes / judgements of the society for which*

the individual is inherently embedded. The decision to engage in porn does impact the societal character. And, from the societal perspective - looking at how society today teaches the children of tomorrow - the responsibility each has in their everyday decisions is exactly this temporal nature - i.e., decisions made yesterday are precisely what 'generated' the circumstances of today (meaning, acts are not so confined to the boundary of the singular moment in which they transpire; but, persist through the humanly devised mediums of communication / inter-action). So, it is incorrect to say that the issues surrounding sexuality belong strictly to the 'personal' (or, individual) realm. No. We must remember the co-occurrence of individuals and society - specifically, that as much as individuals make society they are equally made by society. That is dialectical relation humans have with their institutions.

- "Removing sex from the province of law and sociology (with the exceptions already mentioned) and allowing the individual to work out his own solutions as he does in other matters involving personal human relations would be a tremendous step forward. So far I sympathize with the earnest endeavors of the Playboy staff. It is only the first step. Like any liberation from outside constraint, it frees the individual to choose for himself what he will do with his possibilities. It does not relieve him of responsibility for his choice and its consequences" (pg. 346)
 - ◆ **this assumes people are knowledgeable enough to make wise decisions (i.e., in the interest of themselves and others) - but, society continually proves this assumption wrong.*
- "Sartre claims that we choose our own way of living or condition as men or as women. **Our human being is not determined by our being male or female**" (pg. 347)
 - "existentialism, more than any other philosophy, does not consider the ethical requirements for men and women as being in any way different. It is a philosophy which refuses to define any person by his or her social role or biological function..." (pg. 359-360)
 - ◆ **"existentialism is particularly concerned with the problems of living beings in their concrete situations"** (pg. 360)
- "an existentialist will never countenance conduct which aims at reducing the Other (or himself) to being nothing but a sexual object as an instrument of pleasure. Such conduct is as much in bad faith as sadism, masochism, or an indifference which pretends that people are only objects or, at most, their selves-for-others" (pg. 347)
 - "Existentialism does not seek to ally itself with Puritanism. If there exists no question of betrayal of one's commitment to another, if the sexual pleasure is shared, freely bestowed and appreciatively received, if there is mutual respect, and if neither partner has any secret sense of merely using the other or of being used, then there seems to be no theoretical reason why such a relationship is in bad faith" (pg. 348)
- "love demands some sort of temporal commitment..." (pg. 349)
 - **"two people who accept each other and themselves as subjects...is the only personal relationship which is in good faith"** (pg. 352)
 - "Even for two people who genuinely respect their own and each other's being-as-subject, the continued life of love in good faith is a difficult undertaking, and there are innumerable unsuspected pitfalls. To start with, we may note that many people destroy this fragile structure by demanding too much of it, by wanting those things which, if they could be attained, would destroy love. The ideal of perfect understanding is a pertinent example. Adolescents almost always long for someone who will perfectly understand everything that is in them; most of us as adults are grateful that nobody does" (pg. 353)
 - ◆ "If I could know the Other so thoroughly that nothing new or unexpected could emerge from him, then I could hope for no future enrichment. Moreover, he could no longer offer to me anything more than I could find in myself. It is only love in bad faith which mistakenly seeks this goal. Love in good faith, perilous though it be, demands the constantly renewed pledge that each will seek both his own and the Other's continued growth" (pg. 354)
 - ◇ "Two people who continue to face honestly the responsibilities of their freedom are more likely to look together at the world as a We-subject than a couple one of whom insists on keeping his eyes fixed on the same objects" (pg. 354)
 - ◇ "in love one not only acknowledges the Other as a subject; one affirms that one values this subjectivity and its well-being" (pg. 357-358)
 - ▶ "the argument that to enter into any close knowledge of a member of the opposite sex must involve sexual relations is dubious when used as an argument for promiscuity. Where one is unwilling to devote the time and care necessary for love, recourse to sex may serve to narrow the possibilities of knowing another rather than broadening or deepening them. **The physical may be a shortcut to attaining an illusory sense of breaking down separation while it by-passes completely the exploring of those intricate traits of personality which constitute the Other and his private world as unique**" (pg. 358)
 - **cf. pg. 332-333 - 'preserving' this uniqueness is the fundamental value of love.*
 - ◆ "From the existentialist point of view, the only absolute demand is honesty and mutual agreement on the part of both persons as to what their commitments to each other really are and what each wants them to be" (pg. 359)
 - "Freedom is not meaningful unless it is in some way engaged. If it engages itself too closely, forgetting **the psychic nothingness which consciousness sets between itself and its objects**, then it denies itself as freedom" (pg. 356)
 - "In love, consciousnesses do not merge, but private worlds are affected and reflect each other. In love I may indeed arrive at the point at which I place so high a value on the life and happiness of the Other that at critical moments I will choose to protect his well-being at the expense of my own. Strictly speaking, this preference for the Other is neither egoism nor self-sacrifice. It is self-transcendence of the highest order. Man is a self-transcendence, which means that he lives by going beyond what he has been toward some further relation between his consciousness and the world around him, one more step in 'inscribing himself in Being'. In loving another, a person recognizes that the self which he is not simply the pure awareness of immediate consciousness. It is all that which consciousness has internalized as a part of its private world. **The Other whom I love is an object in my world.** I can never perfectly know him as he is in and to himself. Yet this object and the subjectivity which I recognize as existing there beyond my grasp may come to represent the highest value which I have found in my self-projections. If I choose to perpetuate this value even when my consciousness is no longer there to enjoy it, I am not denying my freedom. Neither am I making myself an object. Rather I engage my freedom in a final act of self-realization. If a man dies for another as the result of a contemplative decision, he blends in one unique tragic and heroic act the two forms of self-realization. He affirms the ultimate validity of that objective value hierarchy which he has set up as his coherent life plan, and he asserts the freedom of his consciousness to posit a value higher than its awareness of those values which it has chosen. Man is an always future project, Sartre has said. In love I can project myself in a project which is no longer my own future" (pg. 374-375)
 - Part 4 - Being Here and There (pg. 377)
 - Chapter 11 - Being and 'Thou': The New Theologians (pg. 379)
 - **"man makes his being-in-the-world, but he is not the maker of Being"** (pg. 379)
 - "material being existed before man and will continue to do so even if man carries out his threat to destroy himself" (pg. 379)
 - "Heidegger himself has never allied himself with Christianity or with any specifically religious position. Nevertheless there is no question as to the primacy of Being over beings in his philosophy" (pg. 380)

- "we must determine our own attitude with regard to transcendence, faith, and the still unfathomed 'mystery' of existence" (pg. 382)
 - "I will begin by flatly stating my conclusion to the first of these questions and then attempt to justify it. I do not believe that religious existentialism is compatible with a position based on Sartrean premises. I do not find in Tillich's Being-itself a concept which is logically tenable or a reality existentially meaningful. I cannot see that Heidegger's Being is a valid or more valuable alternative to Sartre's Being-in-itself" (pg. 382)
 - ◆ "theologians seem at times to argue for a position scarcely discernable from naturalism" (pg. 382)
 - ◆ **"supposedly [God] is both transcendent and immanent, the Universal manifesting itself in the individual.** It is the Transcendence beyond all transcendence, the Unconditioned which makes possible the commitments of our conditioned relationships, it is the Unworldly in the midst of the world. It is the Suprapersonal which is revealed in the personal. Above all, it is Love, seen by faith, in defiance of all outward appearance, as the essential structure of the Universe and History. Finally, *It is I-Thou*" (pg. 386)
 - ▶ **"Being-itself is the ground of our being;** we already participate in Being even as we try - in vain - to separate ourselves from it" (pg. 386)
 - ◇ *cf. D. Binseel, *A Phenomenology of "That!"*: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Subjectivity https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqgd/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf
 - ◆ "mysticism is too closely dependent on the psychological make-up of the individual and comes dangerously near to resembling a specialized technique of 'knowing'. It cannot be the principal path of revelation to that Truth of Being which underlies our daily experience of ultimate concern. Furthermore, it destroys the importance of everything that is personal and individual" (pg. 387)
 - ◆ "faith has always maintained that there is an irrationality above reason as well as the subrational" (pg. 390)
 - ◇ **the purpose for this is to excuse that which cannot be explained through reason. However, usually those who rely on this method also don't know the full breadth and power of reason.*
 - "As Sartre says, it would be better to think of being as the condition of all revelation of reality. The being of the phenomenon is not reducible to the phenomenon of being" (pg. 387)
 - ◆ "Robinson apparently holds, as Tillich does, that true love for others comes about when we recognize that the Ground of our being is the same for all of us. **It is doubtless true that we could hardly have a relation of love and sympathy with others if there were no common ground between us.** I do not see that more is called for than the obvious realization that as human beings we all partake of the same finite human condition and that the same Being-in-itself is the stuff of our projects. We need not postulate any other source or medium. The difference between our specific situations is significant as well as the general similarity of our condition. French existentialists have recognized, as one cause of the feeling of human solidarity, precisely the awareness of our mutual loneliness" (pg. 393)
 - ◇ **this is where we begin to speak of a 'commonality-in-difference' (or, commonly different)*
 - "I do not see that human transcendence necessarily entails a self-transcendence on the part of the world. Transcendence implies some sort of consciousness. Furthermore, **the transcendence which is indeed an essential aspect of every conscious intention does not require another, more inclusive transcendence as its origin or goal.** To postulate such an ultimate transcendence would necessitate a radical alteration in our concept of what a transcending consciousness is. In the process of going beyond its objects - whether they be external and physical, or internal and psychic - a consciousness always retains itself as an implicit center of reference. A consciousness is a transcendence. There is no need to posit Being-Itself as the ground for individual transcendence and self-transcendence" (pg. 396)
 - ◆ "I confess that I do not understand what the theologians mean when they argue that beneath all conditioned relations we must postulate the Unconditional. Either this is a mere playing with words and a reification of abstractions, or it is the equivalent of the old argument that God as perfect being must exist in order to explain our concept of perfection in an imperfect world" (pg. 397)
- Chapter 12 - Letting Being Be: Heidegger (pg. 400)
 - "Being, in his work, does not appear as a Thou, nor as Love. **Heidegger has stated explicitly that Being is not to be equated either with 'God' or 'Nature'.** All the same, the problem of whether or not to call his existentialism 'religious' is a difficult one" (pg. 400)
 - **"Heidegger speaks of Being as something which has been lost and must be recovered. Man must learn to find his way home in Being.** Heidegger speaks of man as the 'shepherd of Being', as the 'guardian of Being', as one who 'ex-sists' in 'the clearing of Being'. These expressions could, as metaphors, be applied to the Sartrean For-itself without straining them to the breaking-point. Yet there is something in all of them which does not quite fit. There is an air of the numinous about Heidegger's Being which we do not find in Sartre's ontology, neither in Being-for-itself nor in Being-in-itself" (pg. 401)
 - **"it is hard to imagine what Being and Nothingness would have been if Sartre had not encountered Heidegger.** The emphasis on authenticity and unauthenticity (further developed by Sartre in the concepts of engagement and bad faith), the view of man as a free self-project and of the world of matter as an instrumental hierarchy, the ecstatic projection of Dasein in temporality, the idea that the human person is a 'being of distances', the importance given to existential states of anguish, despair, forlornness, abandonment - these are only some of the fundamentals of Heidegger's view of human reality which Sartre adapted to his own philosophy with varying degrees of modification. Yet if in 1943 (the publication date of Being and Nothingness) Sartre's Being-for-itself was but a first-cousin to Heidegger's Dasein, the gap between Sartre's ontology and Heidegger's more recent discussion of Being can no longer be bridged" (pg. 402)
 - "Sartre, according to Heidegger, uses the words 'existence' and 'essence' in their traditional metaphysical sense whereas when Heidegger speaks of Being, his approach is prior to such distinctions of potentiality and actuality. For Heidegger, man's essence does indeed rest in his ex-sistence, but the sentence means something quite different. 'The sentence says rather: **man is essentially such that he is 'Here' (Da), i.e., within the clearing of Being. This 'Being' of the Here, and only this, has the basic trait of ex-sistence: i.e., it stands outside itself within the truth of Being'**. Heidegger is not quite right in accusing Sartre of putting nothing more into the concept of existence than actuality. Man's being, Sartre holds, is characterized by its standing apart from the rest of Being by its power of effecting a nothingness between itself and its object in each intentional act of consciousness. It would not be inaccurate to say that for Sartre too, human existence is 'ex-sistence' Despite this objection, I am willing to agree that the two philosophers in their understanding of the nature of this ex-sistence and its relation to Being hold almost nothing in common" (pg. 403)
 - "Both Sartre and Heidegger try to maintain a middle path between old-fashioned idealism and realism by insisting that man is the revealer but not the creator of Being and that Being appears to man without any sort of Kantian distinction between the noumenal thing-in-itself and the phenomenal thing which I perceive. There the similarity ends. We have observed that Sartre postulates a 'transphenomenality of being', but he means by the expression only the fact that **existing objects are not exhausted by their appearances. In short something is really there outside us which we have not created by our perception although we must not say that it exists as substance independent of its appearances.** Sartre at no time abstracts this Being as if it were something apart from existing things, nor does he make it an object of knowledge or of reverence. One does not *know Being*; one knows existing things and is *aware* that they exist outside of the consciousness which is aware of them. Their significance, wholly, and their differentiation, partly, depend on the intending consciousness. In terms of meaning, Being-in-itself is more, not less, when it becomes the object of a consciousness. Furthermore, while Being-in-itself

- may be approached in practical activity as well as by thought, perception, and imagination, it is always revealed through specific beings to a consciousness which exists in a situation and which takes a definite point of view on the world. A consciousness may, if it likes, think of Being as a totality and of the fact that there is Being or more abstractly, that **Being is**. We cannot, even by an act of abstraction, attain to any direct contact with a Being which is behind all beings. No such Being is there" (pg. 403-404)
- "[to Heidegger, Being] is that in which we dwell - almost, but not quite, that which we are" (pg. 405)
 - "man in homeless, estranged, and Heidegger would call him back. Heidegger's first step for recovering Being is an attempt to purify language which, as it is used today, chiefly conceals the truth of Being" (pg. 405)
 - "for Heidegger, the unhiddenness and the truth of being are one and the same..." (pg. 405)
 - ◆ "truth is something which belongs to Being in its relation to Dasein; it is not a characteristic of propositions or statements about Being" (pg. 406)
 - "Heidegger's second prescription for finding the Thought which guards Being is an attack upon conceptual thinking" (p. 408)
 - ◆ "Indeed Heidegger has remarked that insofar as he understands Zen, he and the Zen masters have been saying the same thing" (pg. 408)
 - ◇ "Like the Zen thinkers, Heidegger insists that man's most genuine existence is on a level which precedes the subject-object split. Heidegger claims that the world is not a being nor the realm of beings. It is 'the openness of Being'. Man is not a subject relating himself to the world. He is 'ex-sistent in the openness of Being'. As Zen argues that Sunyata is always there and yet cannot be grasped by one who deliberately searches for it, so Heidegger argues that Being is both nearest to us and yet most remote. 'The strange thing in this thought of Being is its simplicity. This is precisely what keeps us from it'" (pg. 409)
 - ◆ "I do not believe, however, that Heidegger intends us to think of Being as separated from beings but rather as revealing itself by means of them" (pg. 409)
 - "for Heidegger, the thought which speaks the truth of Being is characterized by *lassen* or 'letting be'" (pg. 409-410)
 - ◆ "Heidegger, too, puts activity on the side of Being, not merely in the attentive subject. Or more precisely, he denies the separation. Thought is "l'engagement de l'Être." Heidegger prefers the French *de*, which allows "of Being" to be both a subjective and an objective genitive. "Thought is of Being, in so far as thought, eventuated by Being, belongs to Being. Thought is at the same time thought of Being insofar as thought listens to, heeds, Being. Listening to and belonging to Being, thought constitutes what it is in its essential origin." Heidegger dislikes the expression "there is" or "il y a" in connection with Being. He prefers "Es gibt Sein" or "It gives Being," where the "It" which gives is Being Itself. "Being is the transcendens as such." It is Being which projects Dasein into the world, and Being itself is the relation between Dasein and Being. In short, **Being is both transcendent and immanent** as we found it to be in the philosophy of Tillich. In *Being and Time*, **Heidegger told us that consciousness is always outside in its objects**: Dasein was homeless, always in the streets. Now we find that man is the prodigal with a welcoming home he may return to at will. Man exists outside himself, to be sure, but he "ex-sists" outside himself "within the truth of Being." **Thus Heidegger's "existentialism" ultimately makes essence and being prior to existence**. "The humanity of man . . . rests in his essence." Man is before he acts (if he acts). We cannot say of Dasein as Sartre says of the For-itself, that a man is his acts" (pg. 410)
 - ◇ "it is easy to see why so many of Heidegger's readers feel that his philosophy is religious. Being remains It and not Thou" (pg. 411)
 - ◆ "Supposedly Heidegger's philosophy enables the individual person to live authentically by finding his unique Self in the Truth of Being. To me there is a contradiction here. Authenticity comes about when the individual freely establishes his own relations with the world, acknowledging that their origin lies within himself. The instant we give priority to absolute Being, we undercut not only the anguish of freedom but freedom itself" (pg. 411)
 - "Followers of Heidegger are right in recognizing that ultimately Sartre's philosophy and the later Heidegger works are irreconcilable. What I object to is the bland assumption that **Sartre leaves us with only despair, cynicism, and arbitrary whim whereas Heidegger provides hope, community, and a sustaining ideal**. Despite Heidegger's objection to looking at things in terms of their human value, I think that a few evaluative comments relative to the two philosophers are in order" (pg. 411)
 - "We have spoken of Heidegger's insistence that we must "let Being be." The statement seems to me to comprise metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical consequences which are opposed both to Sartre's explicitly formulated position and to the particular possibilities of an ethics based on Sartrean premises which I have attempted to develop in this book. Heidegger's pronouncement refers, first of all, to the attitude which we as humans have toward the natural world. **He finds totally repugnant the old idea that man is the master of beings and that we should learn to know nature in order that it should serve us. Although he himself delineated man's relation to the things around him as that of the user of instruments in an instrumental hierarchy, still for Heidegger this by itself is an unauthentic relation**. Sartre does not designate man as the Lord of the Universe with all the old-fashioned connotations of that expression. Yet man encounters Being-in-itself as the matter in which he carves his projects, in which he inscribes himself, by means of which he makes himself known to himself and to others. Sartre certainly does not deny that there is an influence coming to me from the external world" (pg. 412)
 - ◆ "**Sartre is as acutely aware as Heidegger that in seeing myself objectified in the self-image which I have projected into the world, I may, if I am not careful, become the prisoner of this object form of myself**, of the "me" which is out there, as a degraded replica of the free consciousness which I really am. In all of this interaction with nature, there does remain for Sartre a sense of mastering, of using Being-in-itself, and this is what Heidegger dislikes" (pg. 412)
 - "Sartre has paid too little attention to the fact that there is a genuine, nonexploitative *Mitsein* for man and the nonhuman as well as between people - though its structure is radically different. I do not believe, however, that this sort of aesthetic and sympathetically imaginative relation to the natural world is all that Heidegger has in mind. The idea that Nature "reveals itself" to a consciousness is true for both Sartre and Heidegger, but it means something different to each one. **For Sartre, things do not point beyond themselves except insofar as a consciousness transcends them. For Heidegger all things, by being what they are, point to Being**. In Sartre's ontology, beauty is introduced by consciousness as much as fear, wonder, hate, or any other attitude. Heidegger would agree that Being reveals itself only to Dasein, but there is a curious passivity introduced into the consciousness which "lets Being be." Man becomes in some way the recipient of a revelation in which more is revealed than appearances. If we think of beauty and meaning as concepts, Heidegger would grant that they are products of Dasein. Yet he seems to feel that in some preconceptual way such experiences as we would normally define by terms like these are conveyed to man by Being. **For Heidegger Truth is openness to Being**, not correctness in our statements or beliefs. While we are not justified in reifying it, Truth nevertheless is, independent of all concepts. Either it is something experienced or it is the experience itself. In either case Truth is something other than the Rational. Thus **Heidegger's plea to "let Being be" turns out to be something quite different from merely letting beings be what they are**" (pg. 413)
 - ◆ "when it comes right down to it, Heidegger seems to be interested in cutting down the claims of man to make himself the center of his own world..." (pg. 413-414)

- ◆ "Heidegger's Being is said to come to us "in the clearing." I cannot help feeling that it simply stands in the way and blocks the light. To define truth as a direct contact with Being results in removing all criteria of truth other than the immediate experience" (pg. 422)
 - ◇ "We find ourselves in the worst sort of irrationalism from which there is no exit. Whatever Being is, if it is, it offers no clear apodictic message as to what we should do about it. We must still make, each of us, our own being by means of our specific projects in the world. Heidegger's Being seems to call to us to come back to it beyond the things of the world. I am convinced that if man obeys the summons, he will do so at the expense of what ought to be his ultimate concern for himself and for mankind" (pg. 423)
 - "To sum up - **"Letting Being be" calls upon us to give reverence to something there behind appearances. Heidegger enfold this something in mystery, gives it preeminence over the human** although he seems to feel that it is in this very acknowledgment that man best fulfills himself as human. Sartre argues that Being simply is and that it is up to man to decide what to make of it and how to make himself by means of it. If here **I choose Sartre over Heidegger**, it is for two reasons: First, **I do not believe that Heidegger's Being is. He has presented us with an abstract concept, which he defends by telling us that it cannot be grasped conceptually.** Things are, forces are, consciousness is (though not as an entity). Being is, as the whole of existence, contrasted with nonexistence. "Being" is a term which we use when we mean that something, potentially or actually, directly or indirectly, is capable of being made the object of a consciousness - though even here we distinguish between "being" as the condition of things existing outside a consciousness and the condition of those existing only within the imagining consciousness. Being as something separate from all the beings that are or Being as a spiritual accretion entwined about whatever exists or Being as the Ground of the existing - this Being is not. I cannot find in any of the pages of either Heidegger or Tillich any evidence, empirical or conceptual, that it is. If Heidegger were willing to bestow on Being any discernible quality or effect whatsoever, I should be willing to be persuaded. **Whatever Being may say to Heidegger, when he listens to it, Heidegger has kept it a deep secret"** (pg. 414)
 - **"As the Guardian of Being, Heidegger's Dasein cares for Being or has concern for it.** In addition Dasein cares for itself that it may find its own self-center in its relation to Being. And Dasein may have care for others since it is with-them in the world. Being and Time contained the possible genesis of an ethics of responsible freedom. These first beginnings Sartre has fostered and developed in working out specific problems both in his fiction and in his essays-though not as yet in any formally complete ethical system. **As first principles Heidegger laid down the necessity of authenticity in one's relation to oneself and the obligation to respect and foster authenticity in others.** In each case Heidegger used the word "conscience" in discussing these imperatives. **Conscience in the authentic man is the call which comes from the inner being of Dasein, demanding that he fulfill his unique possibilities of Being, that he remove himself from his "fallenness," his subservience to his immediate, external present, and that he live creatively for the future the possibilities which he brings with him out of the facticity of his Past.** Conscience, in short, is the recognition of the necessity to choose freely what one will be, not denying the Past but re-creating its meaning in an authentic future" (pg. 415-416)
 - ◆ "In a splendid phrase Heidegger extends this "call of conscience" (Der Gewissensruf) to the Mitsein, appealing to Dasein to "become the Conscience of the Other" and thus free the Other to realize his own possibilities. To become the conscience of the Other does not imply that one sets the standards for the Other. Just the opposite. One tries to awaken him to his own possibilities for being and to inspire him to choose himself authentically. If anyone wants to point out that in these premises Heidegger has stated in essence the demand for good faith toward oneself and others which I have laid down as the foundation stone of a humanistic ethics, I will gladly agree. My objection is that Heidegger has vitiated these possibilities by failing to provide a context that would make them meaningful and by returning to an idealist concept of Being which undermines the earlier humanistic promises. Already in *Being and Time* and in reiterated declarations since then, Heidegger has emphasized that the call of conscience and Dasein's authentic choice of himself are transmoral, that they have nothing to do with either ethics or religion and are prior to both. That they are existentially prior, I agree" (pg. 416)
 - **"I have expressed my dissatisfaction with Sartre for his unwillingness to formulate an ethics until society has solved its immediate social and political problems,** but at least two things may be said in his favor. First, he has proved by his acts - and much of his writing should be considered political and social action as well as literature - that he believes it is important to do what one can to alleviate the suffering and injustice in the world. Second, he has made it abundantly clear that his own commitment lies in the direction of what he feels to be a liberating, revitalized Marxism" (pg. 417)
 - "Sartre as political activist acts through his philosophical writing and speaking; Sartre as philosopher has always held the position that man makes himself by his actions, that he is his acts" (pg. 417)
 - **"In *Being and Time*, Dasein was used both for individual human existence and for human existence as such - just as we may speak of each man as being a for-itself or of the for-itself in contrast to Being-in-itself"** (pg. 419)
 - "The Freiburg speech and Heidegger's writing since then reveal the great drawback and positive danger of Being-philosophy. The idea that truth is a direct communication with absolute reality not only serves as an excuse for not investigating political and social problems and for not committing oneself to action which one can justify. It positively impedes the development of any consistent human value structure" (pg. 422)
- Part 5 - Existentialist Faith
 - Chapter 13 - Death and the Cooling Sun (pg. 427)
 - "humanistic existentialism too recognizes that faith is a necessary ingredient, perhaps even an ontological structure of the human being" (pg. 445)
 - "The faith of humanistic existentialism is not merely a reaffirmation of the eighteenth-century belief in progress. It differs in two ways. First, our faith in the possibility of human improvement is not a conviction of inevitable progress. To hold that humanity moves by some inner or outer necessity toward some distant perfection is to deny that man is the arbiter of his own destiny as surely as the doctrine of inevitable decline denies it. The existentialist is acutely aware that man might blow himself up. He is frightened by the possibility that man will allow himself to be suffocated in the population explosion, or tranquilize himself to torpor in conforming comfort, or put himself into such a straitjacket of repressive political structures that the nineteenth century may forever stand as the high peak of human happiness-as some twentieth-century writers have already begun to designate it. If as existentialists we believe that this will not be the future of man, this faith has nothing metaphysical about it. We believe in man in the same way that we believe in individuals, knowing that our hopes may be disappointed but committing ourselves confidently to the belief that they will be fulfilled. Like both James and Dewey, existentialists acknowledge the validity of an ideal which will become a reality only if we believe in its potential existence sufficiently to work toward it. The second difference between the existentialist faith in progress and that of the Enlightenment lies in the greater openness of the ideal future. The progress of Rational Man was quantitative. The goal envisioned was the perfect happiness to be achieved by all and already grasped by a few. Reason was to solve existing problems but had no expectation of being itself modified in the process of solution. Human Nature was fixed like the precious kernel of gold in the nugget. Reason had seen it shining and was already sharpening tools to remove the encrusted layers of ignorance. Existentialist faith does not clearly foresee its goal. Its confidence lies in the conviction that if it moves forward, it will discover points worth climbing to" (pg. 445-446)

- "Existentialism regards Being-in-itself, not as something Holy or infused with the Holy or even regulated by the Holy. It is simply that within which man makes his individual being-for-himself. This does not mean that we are uninterested in Being-in-itself or that we do not hope that our understanding of it will advance as we ourselves develop" (pg. 449)
 - "If man changes, his relations with the external world and his understanding of it will change. Being-in-itself will certainly reveal far different profiles to a for-itself which has learned new forms of transcendence" (pg. 453)
 - Chapter 14 - Ethics and the Future (pg. 454)
 - "We sustain three types of relation with the future of the world. Two are strictly ethical: At least for so long as humanity continues to exist or to leave its imprint in a universe where there might conceivably be some other form of consciousness, we know that we are responsible for helping to make the future. And we know that we will be judged by the future. The third relation is metaphysical: As members of the human species, our view of our own existence is inevitably colored by our speculative "over beliefs" concerning the probable future story of mankind" (pg. 454)
 - "Existentialism recognizes no divine or natural imperative to regard sex as solely for purposes of reproduction. Obviously it recognizes no obligation to bring into existence as many consciousnesses as possible, regardless of the sort of future they are born to. Its immediate responsibility would be toward those now living, that they might control their lives as fully as possible and bestow their intelligent devotion upon children who are desired and who may enjoy the opportunity of leading satisfying and significant lives" (pg. 455)
 - "[existentialists] insist that an individual is more than his genes..." (pg. 457)
- d. Further Readings:
- Notes from Underground, by F. Dostoevski
 - Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude, by C. O. Schragg
 - For the New Intellectual, by A. Rand https://ia801405.us.archive.org/17/items/ForTheNewIntellectual/For_the_New_Intellectual.pdf
 - The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, by A. Rand https://dn790009.ca.archive.org/0/items/AynRandTheVirtueOfSelfishness/Ayn_Rand-The_Virtue_of_Selfishness.pdf
 - Existentialism and Indian Thought, by K. Guru Dutt https://ia804603.us.archive.org/32/items/ExistentialismAndIndianThoughtK.GuruDutt/Existentialism%20and%20Indian%20Thought%20-%20K.%20Guru%20Dutt_text.pdf
 - Toward a Psychology of Being, by A. Maslow
 - Critique of Religion and Philosophy, by W. Kaufmann
 - (Article) Novelist-Philosophers V - Jean-Paul Sartre, by A. J. Ayer <https://www.unz.com/print/Horizon-1945aug-00101/>
 - (Article) Difference, J. Derrida <https://mforbes.sites.gettysburg.edu/cims226/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Week-5a-Jacques-Derrida.pdf>