

Introduction to Sociology, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations:

[http://www.edarcipelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Sociology%20\(Stanford,%202000\).pdf](http://www.edarcipelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20T%20-%20Introduction%20to%20Sociology%20(Stanford,%202000).pdf)

b. Quotes:

- "If you asked me what sociology really is, I would say that it must be insight into society, into the essential nature of society. It is insight into what is, but it is a critical insight, in that it measures that which 'is the case' in society, as Wittgenstein would have put it, by what society purports to be, in order to detect in this contradiction the potential, the possibilities for changing society's whole constitution" - Author (pg. 15)
 - **"It is an inherent characteristic of any dialectical theory - and the theory of society I am presenting to you in fragments here is a dialectical one - that, as Hegel said, it cannot be reduced to an 'axiom'.** You can only find out what such a theory is or should be by 'doing' it. Because of this I would say that any isolated piece of social insight or criticism which has been put into practice outweighs all general, comprehensive definitions, so that in failing to offer you such a definition here I am acting intentionally and from conviction. Exactly this kind of definition is a part of the traditional thinking which pins things down and organizes them in terms of rigid concepts. To criticize such thinking is the business of the position I am outlining to you here" - Author (pg. 15)
- **"Anyone who lacks the ability to perceive the essential truths which shine forth from isolated social phenomena,** anyone who cannot read individual *faits sociaux* as ciphers for a wider social reality, ought, judged by my conception of sociology, to steer clear of that discipline and become a social expert, or whatever such a function might be called, for he is **not a sociologist**" - Author (pg. 22)
- "...Marx was the first to formulate the concept of class objectively..." - Author (pg. 22)
 - "Contrary to Marx's prognosis and to the situation in the middle of the last century, class-consciousness is tending to diminish" - Author (pg. 23)
 - "It is a fact that within the totality of the working class the proportion of those doing material or productive work in the traditional Marxian sense, those directly involved in the sphere of production, has fallen very sharply, especially in relation to the sector concerned with repair. I have mentioned these different factors somewhat unsystematically; in reality, integration is the encompassing concept and the other moments I have mentioned to you are secondary moments which can be subsumed under integration" - Author (pg. 24)
- **"the central concept of sociology, the very concept which very many sociologists would like to throw overboard today, is the concept of society. For sociology...means: the *logos of societas* - the knowledge or science of society"** - Author (pg. 26)
 - "I would say that a vigorous praxis, which relates to the total structure of society and not to isolated social phenomena, needs a total theory of society. In addition, a praxis of the total society, that is, a structure-related praxis, is only possible if it in turn analyses structural relationships. That is, it should analyse the tendencies and power constellations within the existing society in principle, and not remain within the framework of mere particular questions" - Author (pg. 27)
- **"...sociology consists essentially of the reflection of science upon itself. That society is both its subject and its object was already implicit in that idea."** - Author (pg. 137)
 - "It is an essential part of sociology to concern itself with the relationship between the system and human beings." - Author (pg. 152)
 - "...the most important task of empirical social research today would be to investigate seriously how far people really are, and think, in the way the mechanisms make them." - Author (pg. 153)
- **"...in being made absolute, in losing its genesis, the fact appears as something natural, and therefore as something which in principle - as I explained to you earlier - is unalterable."** - Author (pg. 149)
 - *ideology

c. General Notes:

- Lecture 1 (pg. 1)
 - "I have to tell you that the career prospects for sociologists are not good. It would be highly misleading to gloss over this fact. And far from improving, as might have been expected, these prospects have actually got worse" (pg. 1-2)
 - "This gives rise to obvious contradictions between educational requirements and wishes, on one hand, and the possibility of finding employment, on the other. There is always a certain tension between these two factors..." (pg. 2)
 - **"[the aim of sociology] is the need to make sense of the world, to understand what holds our very peculiar society together despite its peculiarity, to understand the law which rules anonymously over us"** (pg. 3)
 - "One hears much talk about the concept of alienation - so much that I myself have put a kind of moratorium on it, as I believe that the emphasis it places on a spiritual feeling of strangeness and isolation conceals something which is really founded on material conditions" (pg. 3)
 - "sociology has the role of a kind of intellectual medium through which we hope to deal with alienation" (pg. 3)
 - "To the extent that one seriously pursues the goal implicit in such a concept of sociology, one estranges oneself from practical purposes, from the vocational requirements of society. It is extraordinarily difficult to reconcile truly profound sociological knowledge with the professional demands to which people are subjected today" (pg. 3)
 - "A contradiction of this kind - that the more I understand of society, the less I am able to participate in it, if I may put it so bluntly - cannot be attributed simply to the subject of knowledge, as it might appear to naive awareness. On the contrary, this impossible, contradictory aspect of the study of sociology is deeply bound up with the object of sociological knowledge - or, as I would rather put it - of social knowledge" (pg. 3-4)
 - "if you expect me, in these lectures, to explain how you can best plan your course of study, I am not quite equal to the task" (pg. 4)
 - **"there is no royal road in sociology** which would enable you to be told what are, first of all, the subject matter of sociology, then its main fields, then its methods. Or at least my own position, that I neither can nor wish to suppress, is that sociology really cannot be carried on in that way." (pg. 4)
 - "in the efforts being made to reform the universities, two contradictory motives are at work. One is a desire to streamline the university, to make it more like a school. This would strip away, in the name of vocational training, all detours, incidentals and much else. Such a view is entirely governed by the idea of load reduction, of rationalization along the lines of technical rationality. On the other side is the demand for a university reform which does not lead by the nose, which gives priority to free and independent thought" (pg. 5)
 - "If, at every step, you do not immediately insist on finding out whether you have understood that step, but just make the leap, I think this will benefit your understanding of the whole rather than hindering it. Of course, this does not mean that you should uncritically accept the *verba magistri* when their meaning is far from clear to you. It only means that you should not proceed from the outset in accordance with what I am not embarrassed to call a positivistic, Cartesian model, employing a step-by-step approach." (pg. 6)
 - "If one has acquired the deep-seated certainty that **the society in which we live** - and ultimately, despite the disagreement of some sociologists, society is the primary subject of sociology - **is contradictory in its essential structure**, then it is not so terribly surprising that the discipline which concerns itself with society and social phenomena or social facts, *faits sociaux*, does not itself represent such a continuity" (pg. 6)

- "This would mean that within the seamless exposition and systematization of social phenomena there lurks - unconsciously, of course, for we are witnessing the objective mind at work - a tendency to explain away the constitutive contradictions on which our society rests, to conjure them out of existence" (pg. 7)
 - "I shall do so by showing why **I do not believe one can proceed in sociology in the sequence: definition of academic field; compartmentalization of academic field; description of methods.**" (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "...sociology itself, as it exists today, is an agglomerate of disciplines which first came into existence in a quite unconnected and mutually independent way. And I believe that many of the seemingly almost irreconcilable conflicts between schools of sociology arise in the first place - although I am aware that deeper issues are also involved - from the simple fact that all kinds of things which initially had nothing to do with each other have been brought together under the common heading of sociology. **Sociology originated in philosophy**, and the man who first inscribed the name 'sociology' on the map of learning, Auguste Comte, called his first major work *The Positive Philosophy*" (pg. 7-8)
 - ▶ **as did law, politics, economics, etc.*
 - ◇ "...Comte was a scholar who adopted a highly rationalistic and even pedantic stance. At least on the surface he felt the need to present everything as if it had the coherence of a mathematical proof" (pg. 8)
 - ▶ "With regard to Comte, it looks as if, on one hand, he subscribed quite clearly to the scientific ideal of knowledge, and that one of his great themes was to complain that the science of society did not yet possess the absolute reliability, the rational transparency and, above all, the unambiguous foundation in strictly observable facts which he ascribed to the natural sciences. In doing so he did not pause to reflect that this might have to do with the subject matter itself" (pg. 8)
 - "sociology for him also meant philosophy. This is a very difficult aspect of Comte, for it can be said that Comte was an enemy of philosophy above all else" (pg. 9)
- Lecture 2 (pg. 10)
 - "...[a] conclusion should not be preempted one-sidedly, but that the argument should be carried forward through all its stages, as far as that can be done" (pg. 10)
 - "...it is feared that sociology is, eo ipso, something like an impregnation with socialism. But if the concept of sociology is understood as it came into being, with the historical meaning it has, it can be said that the opposite is actually the case. Such fears express a wholly naive inversion of the facts" (pg. 11)
 - "I should like to tell you that this conception of sociology, which was given its first and, perhaps, its most radical formulation by Vilfredo Pareto,³ seems to me to be fundamentally false. It is false, first of all, for the very simple reason that the negation of the idea of truth, which is implicit in this notion of the wholly ideological character of all society-related consciousness, makes it impossible to distinguish between true and false. Secondly, **one cannot talk of false consciousness unless the possibility of a true consciousness also exists.**" (pg. 11)
 - **likewise for 'truth' generally. Once cannot speak of what's false without also calling out 'truth'.*
 - **"It is wrong because it believes it can base itself on the subjective attitudes and behaviour of individual people, which are then generalized, while failing to perceive that such a thing as identifiable, objective, structural, social laws exist.** To this extent - and this is what I am really leading up to - the controversy over methods in sociology, about which you have heard so much in recent weeks, is saturated with questions relating to content" (pg. 11)
 - "Sociology, as it has come into being historically, has always had something almost technocratic about it, something of social engineering, a belief that if scientific experts, who make use of certain methodological techniques, are entrusted with the direct or indirect control of society, they will bring about the most balanced and stable possible state - that is to say, a functioning state, a state in which, through being extended and improved, existing systems are preserved." (pg. 12)
 - "...Comte, despite his vaunted positivism, was a complete idealist, in that his interpretations of history and society were based entirely on the mentalities prevalent in different epochs - that is, the theological, the metaphysical and the scientific mentality - while disregarding the real social forces which underlie such mentalities. And indeed, if you take the trouble to peruse *The Positive Philosophy*, you will be faced with a very tortuous piece of reading, not overly leavened with the esprit for which French authors are noted. But if you study sociology you will have at least to acquaint yourself with this work. In doing so, **you will see that of the two principles by which, according to Comte, society is ruled, and which, moreover, are very rigidly and mechanically distinguished by him, the static and the dynamic principles, the principles of order and of progress,** all his sympathy, all his really positive accents, are on the side of order, of the static; and that the problem he really poses is how the dynamic element is to be held in check" (pg. 12)
 - "...these problems, which I have set out here in order to show you concretely why sociology is not simply a unanimous discipline like medicine or law, arise not only from heterogeneous subject matter but from the specific nature of the discipline itself, from its inherently antagonistic character. That is what I wanted to bring to your attention first of all" (pg. 13)
 - "Sociology as conceived in the narrower sense, as the antithesis of what in Marx is called political economy or, more correctly, a 'critique of political economy', was really retrospective from the first. Its purpose, as in the natural sciences, was to analyse a given reality in terms of certain elements, and then to make predictions. Within such a concept there was no place for the idea of spontaneity or of radical change" (pg. 13-14)
 - "Pareto himself saw the irrationality of society as its last word. For this very reason, because - as I said earlier - there can be no such thing as truth in Pareto's concept of sociology, sociology itself takes on the chaotic and irrational aspect which enabled it..." (pg. 14)
 - "According to this tendency, nothing 'different' or 'new' can exist, since society is and must remain nature in the sense of a blind repetition of seemingly natural processes..." (pg. 14)
 - ◆ **"This character of what I might call the science of survival has been inherent in sociology from the first"** (pg. 14)
 - **"...there is nothing under the sun, and I mean absolutely nothing, which, in being mediated through human intelligence and human thought, is not also socially mediated. For human intelligence is not something given to the single human being once and for all. Intelligence and thought are imbued with the history"** (pg. 15-16)
- Lecture 3 (pg. 19)
 - **"...the essential cannot be identical with the so-called 'grand themes'.** Indeed, as often happens in the sphere of reflection, the grand themes are so heavily marked with the fingerprints of thought that it is difficult to achieve a truly primary relationship to them. It can therefore happen that we catch sight of the essential - and may even do so today - in relation to phenomena which seem to lack any such significance. In them the essence appears more completely than when we address the essential questions directly, equating them almost obsessively with what is regarded as great. I spoke against the concept of priorities, and you may also remember that I maintained that one cannot see straight away, just by looking at an object, whether it is essential or not. As a rule this is decided only in the execution, by what is revealed to us through the object" (pg. 19)
 - **"Positivism rejects the question of the essential"** (pg. 19)
 - "...positivism would rebut the demand that sociology should concern itself with the essential by arguing that there is no such thing as essence...that in reality there is only appearance, and essence does not exist" (pg. 20)
 - ◆ "Throughout history it has been one of the aims of enlightenment in the general sense to criticize such a search [something hidden

- and different beyond the world of appearances]" (pg. 20)
- **"Essence itself - as I believe I have already tried to explain - is not identical with meaning, is not a positivity *sui generis*, but is the context of entanglement or guilt in which everything individual is entwined, and which manifests itself in every individual entity"** (pg. 21)
 - **"...the objective laws governing the movement of society, which decide the fate of human beings, are essential.** These laws are human destiny - though a destiny, of course, which is to be changed. For, on the other hand, these laws contain the possibility, the potential, that all will be different, that society will stop being the coercive union in which we find ourselves. But these objective laws are valid only to the extent that they express themselves in social phenomena, and not if they are no more than a mere deduction from pure concepts, however deeply such deductions may be rooted in social knowledge" (pg. 22)
 - **"I now ask you not to understand this concept of essence in the narrower epistemological sense, as something existing in itself, something conceptual which is prior to facticity and is to be perceived in its purity. Most of what I have referred to as essential here...is not, logically speaking, essence in the sense of individual concepts, but **essence in the sense of individual laws, which manifest themselves and are relevant to society as a whole and to the fate of individuals within it**" (pg. 25)

 - **"...the term essence as used here only expresses the emphasis we place on such over-arching contexts as can be formulated in judgements; they are essential, but should not be understood as mere concepts in the narrower, logical sense"** (pg. 26)**
 - **"The greatest danger threatening this discipline today is that of becoming polarized in a bad sense: into the mere observation of facts, on one hand, and the irresponsible declamation of true or alleged insight into the essence of things, on the other"** (pg. 21-22)
 - **"What matters, as always, is the position of individual people within the production process - whether they control the means of production or are severed from them.** Whether or not they are conscious of themselves as proletarians, for example, is relatively unimportant; it comes under the heading of mere ideology and does not affect the essential structure of society" (pg. 23)
 - **"one ought to try to explain the non-appearance of class-consciousness, or the disappearance of the proletariat, in terms of the objective laws of society, from its essential regularity. I expressed this problem twenty years ago in *Minima Moralia*, by posing the riddle: 'Where is the proletariat?'"** (pg. 24)
 - **"...sociology should hold fast to certain essential definitions, such as that of classes, which continue to exist, decisively, in the dependence of most people on anonymous and opaque economic processes. On the other hand, however, sociology should deduce from this developmental tendency, or at least understand in relation to it, those modifications which are causing such a fundamental datum as that of classes no longer to manifest itself in the traditional form. Through this small model of the dialectic of appearance and essence I may have given you an idea of what we really mean by the relationship of critical sociology to empirical research, which we do not regard as non-existent beside theorizing, as our positivist opponents allege"** (pg. 24)
 - **"...you may already have seen that it is not just a manner of speaking when we claim that what is important to us is not rampant, unbridled theory, but an interaction of the kind I have indicated to you, an interaction which actually constitutes the concept of the dialectic itself"** (pg. 25)
 - **"...firstly, the essential concerns the laws of motion of society, especially the laws which express how the present situation has come into being and where it is tending to go; secondly, these laws are modified, and are valid only as far as they are really manifested; thirdly, the task of sociology is either to explain even the discrepancies between essence and appearance in terms of the essential - that is, theoretically - or to have the courage to abandon concepts of essence or general laws which are simply incompatible with the phenomena and cannot be dialectically mediated. One must have this courage, too; and among the convictions we may be called upon to stand up for today, I do not believe this to be the most despicable"** (pg. 25)
 - **"I would draw your attention once more to the peculiar difficulty inherent in the problem of pragmatism. By a curious reversal, the position opposed to mine appears to be the more practical, because - through negating all interest in the essential - it can concentrate unhindered on any tasks that come its way; whereas a type of knowledge which does not automatically engage in such praxis, but is really interested in essential laws - if you will permit that formulation - may well be accused of quietism. In reality, the type or 'practicism' cultivated by positivism is by its nature one which always and necessarily leads to the preservation of existing social systems. This praxis should be seen as that of improving the existing social systems from within, while excluding any consideration relating to the whole, simply because it mistrusts concepts such as the social system, the whole and the essential law, consigning them to the famous hell of metaphysics" (pg. 26)

 - **"I mention this in order to show you a problem on which Habermas has worked intensively in recent years, the extraordinarily complicated dialectic underlying the question of praxis in sociology. This is **the question whether praxis follows from knowledge acquired through sociology and social science, or whether this knowledge is simply applicable to certain given forms of praxis**" (pg. 26)****
 - Lecture 4 (pg. 27)
 - **"I would say that a vigorous praxis, which relates to the total structure of society and not to isolated social phenomena, needs a total theory of society. In addition, a praxis of the total society, that is, a structure-related praxis, is only possible if it in turn analyses structural relationships. That is, it should analyse the tendencies and power constellations within the existing society in principle, and not remain within the framework of mere particular questions"** (pg. 27)
 - **"How one views reform depends in part on how one evaluates the possibility of total structural change..."** (pg. 28)
 - **"For anyone who shrinks back from analysing the existing structure for the sake of a thesis to be demonstrated or a goal to be achieved thereby betrays both truth and theory; and that is quite certainly not what has ever been meant by the unity of theory and practice"** (pg. 28)
 - **"I should like now to talk in more detail about the central concept of sociology, the concept of society"** (pg. 28)
 - **"...when we speak of society in the strong sense...we are referring essentially to the element of 'socialization'"** (pg. 29)
 - **"This latter use of the term implies that there exists between people a functional connection, which varies considerably, of course, according to the historical level of development of the society, and which leaves no-one out, a connectedness in which all the members of the society are entwined and which takes on a certain kind of autonomy in relation to them"** (pg. 29-30)
 - ◆ **cf. D. Binseel, On The Theory of the Aggregate Image*
 - **"'Society' in the stronger sense, therefore, represents a certain kind of intertwinement which leaves nothing out; one essential characteristic of such a society - even though it may be modified or negated - is that its individual elements are presented as relatively equal, endowed with the same faculty of reason. They appear as atoms stripped of qualities, defined only by their self-preserving reason, and are not structured in terms of estates in the original sense"** (pg. 30)
 - **"In the state-capitalist and socialist forms which developed later, this moment of the functional interconnectedness of the whole, and of the virtual equality of those comprising it, has been maintained, despite the consolidation of forms of domination and all the dictatorial features of these societies. This functional interrelationship, therefore, is what I mean first and foremost by society, and I have defined it in these terms on a number of occasions previously"** (pg. 30)
 - ◆ **"Hans Albert, in his first polemical essay against Habermas, has criticized the concept of society I am advancing here as amounting to no more than the trivial observation that 'everything is connected to everything else', and as an abstract concept in the bad sense. Albert is the positivist sociologist who has conducted the argument against the dialectical theory of society most energetically in recent years. His standpoint is largely that of Popper; at least with regard to Albert's intentions there is clearly extensive agreement**

between the two" (pg. 30-31)

- ◇ "The reply I would give is that **society, in its 'socialized' form, is not merely a functional interrelationship between the socialized people of the kind referred to by Albert, but is determined, as its fundamental precondition, by exchange. What really makes society a social entity, what constitutes it both conceptually and in reality, is the relationship of exchange, which binds together virtually all the people participating in this kind of society**" (pg. 31)
 - ▶ "The abstract element here is not an idea which is content with the trifling observation that everything is connected to everything else. It is something which I believe to be a central feature of any theory of society..." (pg. 31)
 - **"The abstraction in question here is really the specific form of the exchange process itself, the underlying social fact through which socialization first comes about"** (pg. 31)
 - ◆ "The abstraction, therefore, lies not in the abstracting mode of thought of the sociologist, but in society itself" (pg. 32)
 - ◆ "I believe that **the decisive difference between a positivist and a dialectical theory of society lies in this objectivity of the concept inherent in the subject matter itself; positivist sociology denies this process of abstraction**, or at least relegates it to the background; **its concepts are formed solely within the subject which observes, classifies and draws conclusions**" (pg. 32)
 - ◇ "Media such as money, which are accepted by naive consciousness as the self-evident form of equivalence and thus as the self-evident medium of exchange, relieve people of the need for such reflection." (pg. 32)
 - **"once you grasp this functional exchange relationship as constituting the essence of socialization, with all the social problems which the elaboration of the exchange principle entails, the concept of society ceases to be the seemingly empty abstraction** stating that everything is connected to everything else for which Herr Albert takes me to task. **Such a concept of society becomes, through its very nature, critical of society, in that the unfolding of the exchange process it refers to, objectively located within society itself, ends up by destroying society"** (pg. 32)
 - "To demonstrate this was really Marx's intention in *Capital*. Society, therefore, if it is to continue to reproduce the life of its members - as we should have to formulate the matter today - must transcend the concept of exchange. The transition to criticism thus coincides with a perception of the way in which the objective structure is itself conceptually determined, whereas, were it not so determined, but merely an ordered agglomeration of facts, the notion of a critique of society would be nonsensical." (pg. 32)
 - ◆ *cf. I. Mészáros, *Beyond Capital: Toward a Theory of Transition*
 - **"...the concept of exchange is, as it were, the hinge connecting the conception of a critical theory of society to the construction of the concept of society as a totality"** (pg. 32)
 - "...society cannot be regarded, as common sense suggests, as the sum total of all the people living at a particular time or in the same epoch. Such a merely quantitative agglomeration would fail to do justice to society as society" (pg. 33)
 - **"...human beings cease to be something existing in itself, a mere fact, but define themselves by what they do and by the relationship existing between them, namely that of exchange"** (pg. 33)
 - "...the positivist criterion of a significant datum, that one must finally be able to point to something physical in order to say that it is the substrate which is sought, is inapplicable to the concept of society" (pg. 34)
 - "...while the functional concept of society is not physically given, while it cannot be directly apprehended as a mere fact, it can certainly be ascertained and known, and not by some irrational mode of knowledge. It is knowable simply by showing the complications and contradictions to which the unfolding of this principle of socialization necessarily gives rise. This unfolding, however, cannot be pursued beyond the social facts, but only in its interaction with a determinate reality" (pg. 34)
- Lecture 5 (pg. 35)
 - "Because society is not physically given, not directly tangible, it is elevated to the status of a mental or spiritual entity. To the extent that it is a category of mediation and is thus conceptual, this has a certain truth" (pg. 37)
 - **"...the concept of society refers to a relationship between people..."** (pg. 37)
 - "...society is always composed of individuals. A concept of society which omits the individuals of which society is composed and between whom this relationship exists is nonsensical" (pg. 37)
 - ◆ **"...the concept of society is, and must be, inherently dialectical."** (pg. 38)
 - ◇ "...this concept should be understood as a mediated and mediating relationship between individuals, and not as a mere agglomerate of individuals" (pg. 38)
 - ▶ "it is equally inappropriate to regard society as an absolute concept beyond individuals. It is neither the mere sum or agglomeration, or whatever you wish to call it, of individuals, nor something absolutely autonomous with regard to individuals. It always contains both these moments at the same time; it is realized only through individuals but, as the relationship between them, it cannot be reduced to them...This fact, that it cannot be reduced to a succinct definition - either as a sum of individuals or as something existing, rather like an organism, in itself - but represents a kind of interaction between individuals and an autonomous objectivity which stands opposed to them, is the macrocosmic or, as it tends to be called today, the macrosociological model of a dialectical conception of society. **It is dialectical in the strict sense...because the concept of the mediation between the two opposed categories - individuals on one side and society on the other - is implicit in both. No individuals, that is, people existing as persons with their own claims and, above all, performing work, can exist except with regard to the society in which they live, any more than society can exist without its concept being mediated by the individuals composing it.** For the process by which it is maintained is, of course, the process of life, of labour, of production and reproduction, which is kept in motion by the individuals socialized within the society. That is a very simple and - if you like - elementary example of what could be said to make it obligatory to adopt a dialectical approach to society" (pg. 38)
 - "For a view which takes neither individual moments nor their concept to be true being, but regards both poles as mediated by each other and thus diverges from commonplace naive logic, also plays a decisive role within our discipline" (pg. 39)
 - ▶ "...the concept of society is dialectical in the strict sense that it can be reduced neither to individuals, on one hand, nor to society, on the other" (pg. 41)
 - "the concept of society, in the sense in which I elaborated it in the last lecture in relation to the concept of exchange, is not an indefinite entity, but can be deduced, if you like, from its own essential dynamic. In the last lecture I tried to show you that society, especially today's society, is an essentially dynamic concept. I did so by pointing to the functionality of society, to the fact that **society is a relationship between people, and is neither something existing outside or above human beings nor something that can be located merely within the individual people**" (pg. 39)
 - **"It is an inherent law of capitalism that that which is can only maintain itself by extending itself, by expanding"** (pg. 40)
 - "Durkheim took over this thesis of growing integration more or less directly as it is formulated in Spencer.9 To begin with, this thesis means nothing

- other than that larger and larger sectors of society enter a relationship in which they are interdependent. When I spoke to you last time about the difference between the concept of society as applied to a horde or gatherer society, and to 'society' in the modern sense, I already had in mind this idea that **socialization, the web of social relationships spun between people, is growing ever tighter**" (pg. 40)
- "That has happened not only through the communications media, fashion and suchlike, but simply through economic processes, such as the movement of countless industries to the country" (pg. 41)
 - "...I should like to point out that the relationship between integration and differentiation is also subject to a dynamic. That is to say that the advancing integration brought about by the advancing rational control of labour processes does not automatically lead to advancing differentiation. Rather, society - and I am talking, Ladies and Gentlemen, about society in its existing forms - seems to develop a tendency, from a certain point onwards, to push forward integration to the utmost while at the same time suspending differentiation." (pg. 41-42)
 - "...the concept of society contains an historical dialectic with regard to the concepts of integration and differentiation which are essential to it, and which originate in sociology rather than directly in economics" (pg. 42)
 - **"...the concept of society has its objective basis in the conceptual nature of social objectivity itself, or in the relationship of abstraction introduced into it by exchange. In other words, the totality within which we live, and which we can feel in each of our social actions, is conditioned not by a direct 'togetherness' encompassing us all, but by the fact that we are essentially divided from each other through the abstract relationship of exchange. It is not only a unity of separate parts, but a unity which is really only constituted through the mechanism of separation and abstraction"** (pg. 43)
 - **"We live within a totality which binds people together only by virtue of their alienation from each other; and when I said that the present society is mediated only through individuation, that also had a critical sense which I did not stress in what I said earlier. For it is precisely through the insistence on the principium individuationis - in other words, through the fact that within the dominant forms of society individual people seek their individual advantage, profit - that the whole is able to survive and reproduce itself at all - even if while moaning and groaning and at the cost of unspeakable sacrifices. I should like to add, however, that precisely **because the whole or the totality of society maintains itself not on the basis of solidarity or from the standpoint of a comprehensive social subject, but only through the antagonistic interests of human beings, this society of rational exchange is infected in its constitution and at its very root by a moment of irrationality which threatens to disintegrate it at any moment**" (pg. 43)**
 - Lecture 6 (pg. 44)
 - **"...because the totality of society is maintained not by solidarity but by the antagonistic interests of human beings, by its antitheses, and not by the existence of such a thing as a unified social subject, society is developing tendencies of advancing irrationality, side-by-side with its advancing rationalization.** And if I were to sum up what the 'dialectic of enlightenment' means in real social terms, it is precisely this moment" (pg. 44)
 - "...I believe that the coexisting forces are in reality embraced and fundamentally determined by the all-controlling social system in which we live" (pg. 45)
 - "...the fact that this kind of apologetics is predominant today throws light on the general state of society. Clearly, **the potential for enlightenment, for intellectual maturity, the possibility of becoming conscious of social processes instead of simply accepting them without reflection, has increased so far that retrogressive, restorational arguments are no longer enough, and that what has fallen behind can justify itself only by purporting to be the more advanced**" (pg. 45)
 - **"...[essence] is by no means a mere fantasy, but a category of mediation without which the so-called facts themselves would not be what they are"** (pg. 46)
 - **"...our world is so dominated by abstract regularities, and the relationships between people have themselves become so abstract, that the concrete has become a kind of utopia** - which it is in any case. People believe that by being totally concrete and pointing to the *hic et nunc* they really have everything in the bag - regardless of the fact that the allegedly concrete, the facts, are themselves to a large extent an expression of the abstract order of relationships which I have attempted to demonstrate to you in defining the concept of society. This means that even in empirical research, as one's thought advances, one is driven again and again, and relatively quickly, to adopt precisely the concept of the social network which not only is prohibited by the rules of scientific empiricism but also flatly contradicts the libidinal connotations of the term 'concrete'" (pg. 49)
 - "...society can be perceived, almost physiognomically, in individual phenomena, but that, far more important, all explanations of individual phenomena lead on much more quickly than is supposed to something resembling the social structure" (pg. 49)
 - Lecture 7 (pg. 53)
 - **"...sociology does not comprise a closed theoretical structure, like law or medicine as traditionally understood. It is an agglomerate of quite disparate disciplines which have slowly grown together, although they have entirely different historical origins"** (pg. 54)
 - "What is known as theoretical sociology, on the other hand, arose from philosophy, and the name 'sociology', which, as I have told you, is not much more than a hundred years old and originates in Comte, has a somewhat arbitrary aspect; one might almost say that there has been no great philosophy which was not in some way concerned with social problems" (pg. 54)
 - "'theoretical sociology' is not an abstract universal in relation to the individual disciplines which it subtends, but examines the concrete regularities to which society is subject" (pg. 59)
 - "Sociology, of course, cannot entirely do without its relationship to ethnology and anthropology, but should not regard this relationship as its key" (pg. 61)
 - "present society cannot be understood - since it is not explainable as an abstract generality - as something like an agglomerate of all possible part-sociologies or even of social sub-units" (pg. 61)
 - "Society itself is not a mere juxtaposition of concrete moments, from which it emerges additively. Precisely as a 'concrete totality', as a concrete concept or a concrete generality, society documents itself in the relationships of dependency between these separate parts" (pg. 61)
 - "Even the first modern social thinkers who can be called sociologists, Saint-Simon and Comte, both had the gravest reservations a hour philosophy, which they called metaphysical, in keeping with the older tradition of the eighteenth century" (pg. 54-55)
 - Lecture 8 (pg. 62)
 - "...sociology cannot be made up from a sum of discrete sociological findings..." (pg. 62)
 - "I certainly do not wish to deny that formalization can bring to light some interesting and important matters. But it also has a very strong tendency to lead away from a specific interest in the predominant concrete society. This fact is generally suppressed by the passion for formalization which is everywhere rampant today. One might even say that the whole quest for formalization itself depends on the increasingly formal, abstractly functional character of society, so that formalization comes to appear less as a goal or ideal than as a problem of sociology. This formalism is, of course, closely linked to instrumentalism - that is, the belief that objectivity can be guaranteed solely by elaborating the most highly polished research instruments. Such objectivity is generally paid for, however, in terms of content, retaining only a rather thin residue of the phenomena which are really of interest." (pg. 64)
 - "The fact that **there is absolutely nothing between heaven and earth...which is not mediated by society** implies that sociology can deal, from a social perspective, with absolutely everything which exists. This applies even to society's seeming antithesis, nature and the concept of nature. For this concept is mediated essentially by the need to control nature, and therefore by social need" (pg. 64-65)

- "...the striving for formalization leads away from the specific interests of sociology" (pg. 65)
 - "[Simmel] sees social conflict as really nothing other than a competition between rival groups, just as, according to liberalism, separate individuals compete with each other in the capitalist system. According to the liberal doctrine, as we know, this is supposed to keep the whole process alive and even cause it to progress, as if it were moved by an 'invisible hand'. What is entirely overlooked is that this **conflict of interests, as manifested in competition, is itself a dilute derivative of much deeper conflicts**: those between classes. The former conflicts are really the ones which take place after the central conflict, over control of the means of production, has already been decided, so that the competition is carried on within the sphere of an already appropriated surplus value - to use Marx's term - which it does not explain. The truly central questions of conflict are therefore left untouched. For this reason the whole theory of social conflict in Simmel takes on the astonishing blandness" (pg. 67)
 - "To me, the decisive thing seems to be that by isolating or, as I put it, hypostatizing conflict as a formal category of society, independently of its specific social basis and content, conflict itself - which, of course, has destructive potential, represented in foreign policy today by the threat of the total annihilation of life on earth - is made to appear, through its isolation and formalization, as something fruitful. It may be said that, in the end, the only sense in which conflict could be credited with that kind of fruitfulness would be that social conflict can lead to the abolition of conflict, and to the elimination of the antagonisms which are now growing to a point where they have an immediate potential for destruction. By contrast, **the glorification of conflict implies a complete blindness to the reasonable goal of such conflict, the pacification of humankind, which Kant himself had so clearly in view in his own philosophy of history. In reality, this formal concept of conflict amounts to an apology for a bad state of affairs which is working towards its own destruction**" (pg. 67)
 - "...sociology does not actually have anything like a unified method" (pg. 69)
 - **"...method in sociology is very widely mediated by the subject, and the decisive thing is that sociology itself should become aware of this mediation"** (pg. 70)
- Lecture 9 (pg. 71)
 - "...the method of sociology must stand in a living relationship to this subject matter and must, as far as possible, be developed from it." (pg. 72)
 - **"...in every sociological investigation one should be very clear about what one is trying to find out. The objectives of knowledge must be clearly defined and a rationale of means and ends established.** One must therefore reflect on how the goals that have been set for cognition can best be reached" (pg. 73)
 - **"The basic problem, or aporia, confronting us in sociology is the problem of quantitative and qualitative knowledge.** Quantitative knowledge is the absolutely reliable form. But just to obtain quantitatively relevant numbers, you generally have to forgo the refined, discriminating research instruments which would provide you with really productive, detailed information. Conversely, if you rely solely on the qualitative method, this may well yield the most fruitful findings; but you immediately find yourself more-or-less defenselessly facing the question whether this abundance of specific, concrete insights can actually be generalized, or whether their validity is confined to particular cases" (pg. 74)
 - "My approach here, in contrast to prevailing sociological opinion, or rather technique, is far more radically sociological, in that I regard innumerable facts which empirical sociology attributes merely to individuals and then generalizes by including them in a statistical universe as social facts from the outset. In this way seemingly particular facts take on a far more general value than they appear to have at first sight." (pg. 75)
 - "the only productive knowledge is that which goes beyond pure analytical judgement, which transcends this operational-tautological character. I do not believe there is any relevant truth, and certainly none in the realm of sociology, which is not attended by the risk that it might be wrong, that it might be wide of the mark. And I would say that a thinking, a science, which does not expose itself to this risk is really quite empty from the outset, that it falls far short of the concept of science that was once upheld, and regresses to a mere clerical technique." (pg. 76-77)
 - "Max Weber introduced the concept of an 'interpretative sociology', believing fundamentally that sociological knowledge consists in understanding the 'means-end rationality', the assessment of opportunities made by social agents; whereas Durkheim took the view that sociology differed essentially from psychology (although Max Weber, too, distinguished sharply between them) in that real social facts - *faits sociaux* - cannot be understood, are impenetrable and opaque and ought, as he put it without himself quite realizing the implications of what he said, to be treated as 'things', as choses; thus, Durkheim's sociology was also called *chosisme*" (pg. 77)
 - "The second difference is that Max Weber, as you know, rigorously upheld the view that sociology was 'valuefree' - meaning that value judgements must be absolutely excluded from it. And I should like to say that the vulgar positivism of today has followed him precisely in this, whereas he himself, being still trained in idealist epistemology, refused to have any truck with vulgar sociologism. Durkheim, by contrast, although in some ways a far more unrepentant positivist than Weber, admitted value judgements to sociology. He did so, I believe, because of his more penetrating perception and analysis of the facts themselves. For he had realized that the mere distinction between true and false introduces a value relationship even into pure acts of cognition, which Weber - naively, I would say - thought he could separate from axiological acts, or acts which involve valuations" (pg. 77-78)
 - "These two moments, the impenetrable givenness of *faits sociaux* and their aspect of value, later crystallized out with utmost sharpness in Durkheim's theory of conscience (conscientiousness) and of the *esprit collectif* (collective mind)" (pg. 78)
 - **"Not by accident does the term 'value' call to mind economics and the market, and it was from there...that it found its way into the social sciences. It is itself an expression of reification, just as the opposed position of absolute value freedom also expresses a reified consciousness"** (pg. 78)
- Lecture 10 (pg. 80)
 - "we have begun to concern ourselves with the question of the relationship between method and subject matter. I pointed out to you that the belief in the method which is especially widespread in recent sociology and claims to be the only true method is refuted by the fact that, in the most diverse periods, sociologists have never really been able to agree about method" (pg. 80)
 - **"the task of a dialectical theory would be to bring together these two clearly opposed characteristics of society, its unintelligible opacity, on the one hand, and its reducibility to the human and thus its intelligible character, on the other. It would do so by deriving both moments from a common element, the life process of society,** which in its early stages demanded just as much autonomy, petrification, even domination - that, at least, was the view of the great socialist theoreticians - as is generated by the social work of the total society. Society thus becomes understandable once more, as the opposite of such institutionalization" (pg. 82-83)
 - "...the dialectical viewpoint...simply represents a more logical way of thinking" (pg. 83)
 - **"the real sin of positivism is to cut off this logic of thought, this advance of a theory driven by its own inner necessity, in favour of a naive and stubborn adherence to immediate facts.** Such an approach is quite alien to the natural sciences, which are far more advanced in this respect, and are constantly forced to develop theories of the very kind which the positivists forbid dialectical sociologists. That is the point I wanted to make you aware of in connection with the dispute over methodology" (pg. 83)
 - "Certain basic structures of society do manifest themselves in the most diverse methods" (pg. 83)
 - "I have always said that **the method should be governed by the substance, and should not be a mere classificatory schema**" (pg. 84)
 - "...ideologies, though immediate to the people themselves, do not have their social origin simply in these people and the consensus between them. They either come to them collectively, through tradition or other means, or - and this is characteristic of our present society - they are actually first produced by the highly concentrated and organized structure of opinion-formation, through the culture industry in the very widest sense" (pg. 84-85)

- "...you can see that the reason for the concern with the relationship between the content of social stimuli and social reactions...is neither a whim nor a kind of philosophical speculation. It is the outcome of reflections which are readily open to any unprejudiced person" (pg. 85)
 - "One cannot quantify anything which one has not first, in a certain sense, determined qualitatively. I believe that this is a basic principle of the whole problem of sociological method of which you are trying to form a picture" (pg. 86)
 - "What is necessary here is that **one should grasp the social content of the work through an analysis which immerses itself in the specifics of the material**. By presenting this content as concretely as possible, one can assess its possible effect on others" (pg. 88)
 - "...so little attention has been given to the rather obvious fact that **the content of highly organized and complex structures can only be grasped by analysing their meaning**, instead of defining them from the outset in terms of an effect which possibly is quite alien to them. What needs to be extracted and is of sociological relevance, therefore, is the content. And this will only be discovered by an analysis of the work's immanent structure, although that analysis can then be supplemented by surveys of the effects of the work" (pg. 88)
- Lecture 11 (pg. 89)
 - "I tried in the last lecture to demonstrate with reference to a concrete model how questions of method depend concretely on the question of content. The model I used was the famous, and for sociology highly relevant, problem of the relationship between quantitative and qualitative methods, and I took an example from a special area of sociology with which I myself am closely concerned, so-called 'content analysis'" (pg. 89)
 - "In order to be able to classify the material into so-called 'factors' the first necessity is to ascertain the idea or intention or, to put it less respectfully, the ticket - in the case of the mechanically produced culture industry. Only then can the functions of the individual devices and techniques used in the mental structure be recognized" (pg. 89)
 - "In reality, because **everything is related to a total structure, a whole which cannot be apprehended directly**, but only through such an analysis, these sub-scales or sub-syndromes are interconnected by meaning. Empirical investigations show us this over and over again, even in their process of quantification" (pg. 90)
 - **"...reification can give rise to a somewhat mechanical mode of understanding..."** (pg. 91)
 - "...the productivity of an investigation does not stand in a simple or positive relation to the exactness of the research means used. The relation between them is extremely complex, can even be such that one exists at the expense of the other" (pg. 92)
 - "I would only warn you not always to give preference to considerations of the logical purity of the instruments, rather than to the productivity of the means used." (pg. 92)
 - "...items in which a large number of dimensions converge often prove especially productive, because they are relatively untouched by the process of instrumental abstraction, and may therefore come especially close to **the intrinsic structure of the subject matter, which is the real object of the investigation.**" (pg. 92)
 - **"It is probably characteristic of all mental entities, all objectified intellectual structures...that they have a kind of dual nature.** On one hand, they have a certain kind of immanent logic, of immanent truth, which is explained finally by the fact that the mental functions of the human species have taken on an independent existence in the course of its natural historical development, and have thus acquired a kind of autonomous regularity. On the other hand, however, intellectual structures as such, in which an individual subject is never actually at work, but always a social subject, are always also *faits sociaux*, social facts, behind which stands society, either the whole social structure or the whole structure mediated through special group interests, and which in turn react on groups or on society as a whole. And it is therefore necessary to apply this twofold reflection to probably all mental structures" (pg. 93-94)
 - "Even in Marx one is sometimes unable to shake off the feeling that he really based his theory on the relatively innocent model of the single firm, the single factory, and that although he saw joint-stock companies and suchlike things appearing over the horizon, the socialization of monopolism is peripheral to his work, so that one would almost say that the whole work has a moment of naivety in relation to present conditions" (pg. 95)
 - **"...Comte's sociology, his *The Positive Philosophy*, is centered on a great dichotomy: the dichotomy between the static and dynamic laws of society - the laws of order, as he calls the static ones, and the dynamic laws of society, those of progress.** The crudity of this dichotomy is obvious, as is the fact that something as enormously differentiated and complex as society cannot be reduced to two dimensions in such a way. The less so as these two dimensions, the static and the dynamic, are, I would argue, dialectically mediated by each other. That is to say that the dynamic moments of society are brought into play precisely by the so-called static moments; the movement of the productive forces is initiated by the fact that, now as earlier, the relations of production fetter and hold back the productive forces. On the other hand, I would say that this whole question of the dialectic between relations of production and forces of production, which has become a decisive feature of Marxian theory and is, I think, still of central importance today, was first expressed, and in a very striking way, in these relatively crude concepts of Comte's" (pg. 96)
 - "The structuralists' concept of structure is really nothing other than this concept of integration, and its real roots, which lie in the concept of social development itself..." (pg. 97)
- Lecture 12 (pg. 99)
 - **"...I believe that sociology, simply by virtue of its subject matter, is not a clearly defined science with clearly defined content,** of the kind we are accustomed to find on what is sometimes called the map of learning. This attribute is what sociology has in common with philosophy and at the same time is the point which presents the greatest difficulty both to students about to study sociology and to the established traditional sciences in relation to that discipline. And I think that one only does justice to the essential nature of sociology if one recognizes its non-specialist character from the outset" (pg. 102)
 - "...as I have tried to show, **its central concept, the concept of society, is itself not an object but a category of mediation**" (pg. 103)
 - "But if sociology has not, and is not, such an area of subject matter, those of you whom I have not succeeded in frightening off with this appalling confession will rightly ask what sociology actually is. To this I would answer first of all quite simply that **it is reflection on social moments within any given area of subject matter** - reflections ranging from the simple physiognomic registration of social implications to the formulation of theories on the social totality. Sociology is orientated towards these social moments in a necessary, not a peripheral, way, so that, in order to be possible at all, it must have areas of subject matter within it which are, in themselves, alien to it" (pg. 103)
 - ◆ "One can only study anything, no matter what, in a meaningful way, and only do justice to the subjects - meaning, here, the great texts - with which one is concerned, if one treats them with respect" (pg. 103)
 - ◇ "As Hegel put it in the *Phenomenology* about 160 years ago: one cannot presume to stand above the matters in hand, simply because one is not inside them. On the other hand, however, the lure of such a definition - the sense it gives that if one adheres to it one will stand on solid ground from which one will have the whole of sociology at one's command, is no less strong, and the trick lies in neither trusting and blindly following authority in such cases, nor believing that as soon as you have recognized the problematic nature of that authority you are free to rise above it." (pg. 103)
 - "the whole study of institutions is not a study of action, although, obviously, it is connected with social action and with the theory of social action. But the entire meaning of the concept of the institution, or of the objective social arrangement or, as can be said in many cases, of the organization, and also of all that which in Marx is called the relations of production, resides precisely in the fact that we are here concerned not with direct action but, if you like, with congealed action, or with some form of congealed labour and with something which has become autonomously detached from direct social action" (pg. 105)

- Lecture 13 (pg. 108)
 - "...sociology is an attempt - even if a necessarily limited and partial one - to remedy the scholarly division of labour by relating the subject matter of scholarship back to the whole, which is society, yet cannot be grasped as an immediate fact." (pg. 108)
 - "Sociology can lead quite easily to what Max Weber - though in a somewhat spiteful formulation which is not to my taste - called 'mind mania' in contradistinction to 'fact mania'. This refers to a situation in which, in a sense, one knows in advance the answer to any question with which one is confronted regarding one's special subject matter. An essential attribute of the concept of reflection is that upon which one can reflect - in exactly the same way as the concept of the mediated, which, as I have tried to explain in these lectures, is constitutive of sociology, always presupposes something immediate running through these mediations and captured by them. In this sense I believe it is important to study what would earlier have been called a 'craft' in addition to sociology, although this craft certainly does not need to be what is called a 'hard discipline'" (pg. 109)
 - "...you should not understand sociology as the methodological integration of all these different specialist fields." (pg. 109)
 - "If I might state the matter as it is seen by the so-called 'Frankfurt School', what matters to sociology is not so much a collaboration of this kind, although direct co-operation with psychology and economics is undoubtedly indispensable, as I shall explain later. But what matters far more is that one should become aware of the mediations - or let me express that better - of the objective interactions operating within a single specialist area in which one immerses oneself; these interactions are immanent in the sense that within each separate specialist area with which sociology concerns itself, other specialist areas are necessarily contained" (pg. 109-1110)
 - "...sociology attempts scientifically, using the means of science, to establish the unity of science which the individual fields of science form socially and which at the same time, through science, is continuously, and inevitably, being lost. This process of thought - which, however, must immerse itself in the specific scientific fields and not escape into abstract, general structures lying above them - seems to me to be the true task of sociology. And the difference between the dialectical conception of sociology and the structural-functional theory so prevalent today lies in the fact that Parsons's theory seeks unity as a shell, that is, a kind of unity in which the categories are so selected that all the life sciences, or the so-called human sciences, are accommodated within it as a kind of continuum, whereas it is our conception to seek the concrete unity of society - instead of that abstract generality - through interpretative immersion in a given specialist area. This reflection also makes clear, incidentally, the central importance which the concept of interpretation has for the conception of sociology I am attempting to make clear to you" (pg. 110)
 - "...the social perspective is that which leads to social categories or to social interconnections within the particular specialist area being studied" (pg. 110)
 - "Psychoanalysis sets out, of course, to be a dynamic, topological and genetic psychology..." (p. 112)
 - "Now, it follows that if the concept of the vital need is made concrete in this way as the continuous, self-reproducing situation of shortage, then so-called psychological processes contain the social moment at their core. The social moment is, indeed, at the origin of that concept, and without it the psychological processes could not be understood at all. This, incidentally, merely confirms that the individual person with whom psychoanalysis concerns itself is an abstraction vis-a-vis the social context in which individuals find themselves. That is not to say - although I cannot go into this now - that there is not good reason for psychology to concern itself with the individual, since individuation, which in a certain way severs individuals from society, does refer to a natural circumstance: the fact that we come into the world simply as individual beings, and not as coral colonies, for example. However, this circumstance is reproduced once more by the arrangement of society, which, through the dominant form of exchange between individual contracting parties, is constituted as an individualistic society. For this reason the category of the individual, which is generally regarded as antithetical to society and is therefore excluded from sociology, is a social category in the fullest sense. It is not social only in that simply everything which is individual and takes place within the realm of individual psychology can be directly ascribed to society, but rather in that the category of individuation itself, and the specific factors which form individuality, must be interpreted as internalizations of social compulsions, needs and demands." (pg. 112)
 - "...at precisely the deepest stratum of the individual, of individuation, at the level to which the dynamic of individual drives does not extend, the social, collective moment asserts itself. You find here, if I might permit myself a short excursus, a surprisingly dialectical motif even in a theory as thoroughly positivist in conception as Freud's psychoanalysis, although, had this been pointed out to him, he would no doubt have burst out in the same expressions of horror as any positivist sociologist today. The dialectical motif lies in the fact that Freud made the discovery...that the more deeply one explores the phenomena of human individuation, the more unreservedly one grasps the individual as a self-contained and dynamic entity, the closer one draws to that in the individual which is really no longer individual!" (pg. 113)
 - ◆ "The Freudian treatment of the individual therefore provides a splendid example of my requirement that precisely by immersing oneself in the specific categories of the particular sciences, and not from outside them, one should become aware of the social content of these categories. According to Freudian theory, it appears that, on the surface, certain recurrent, similar, relatively abstract situations predominate, being standardized by the reality principle to which all human beings have to adapt, but that a differentiation emerges if one immerses oneself in the so-called psychical dynamic, in the unconscious mechanisms, and above all in the interplay between the unconscious and the individual ego; and then - at a still deeper level, as if at the core of individuation - one becomes aware of the collective" (pg. 113-114)
 - "Freud himself, moreover, going far beyond his theory of 'archaic images', formulated this as a fundamental principle in the theory of the generality and undifferentiatedness of the id, of the peculiar collection of psychical drives which lie at the basis of each individual and which, according to Freud, are really more-or-less identical as a collective inheritance in each individual. Freud's psychology, though individualistic in intention, not only leads beyond the individual plane, but then becomes more and more abstract - despite its highly concrete approach - in its analysis of individual observations. Closely connected to this, moreover, is something particularly exposed to sociological criticism: Freud's general tendency - because of the supposed invariance and constancy of the id, which is identical in all human beings - to underestimate the possibility of individuation, of variability, to an extraordinary extent. The same applies to the inclination of this theory, just because it has come across an 'archaic inheritance' within the individual, to regard human beings as very largely unalterable - although it has been supported in this from prehistory up to the present. As a result of these tendencies, finally, it regards the conditions of human repression as inescapable, being the only possible form of a socially acceptable resolution of the so-called 'Oedipus complex'" (pg. 114)
 - ◆ "Society extends further into psychoanalysis, of course, in the form of the theory of the so-called 'super-ego' - to use a third psychological category to illustrate my point. In his early phase Freud called this the 'ego ideal'. By this he meant, stated simply, the psychical authority sometimes referred to as conscience, but which he derives from the dynamic of the drives. It is really nothing other than the traditional paternal authority transmitted within the bourgeois liberal family to each individual through the father figure or a father symbol or image. It thus functions as an agency of society. The mechanisms of so-called 'socialization', that is, the mechanisms by which alone we, born as separate biological entities, are unable - I meant to say, are able - to become a *zoon politikon*, are precisely the mechanisms which are summed up by the term 'super-ego'. That 'unable', by the way, was a slip which Freud would undoubtedly have appreciated" (pg. 114)

- "I hope that, by these examples, I have demonstrated in a sufficiently concrete way the somewhat general thesis I put forward at the beginning of this lecture: **the assertion that immersion in particular disciplines necessarily leads, in a constitutive way, to recognition of the sociological moments which are either not clearly seen as such by the disciplines concerned, or are at best disregarded and consigned to the margins.** This can, incidentally, be given a far more general or, if you like, philosophical-dialectical twist, by saying that the dialectic of the particular and the general, as taught by Hegel, with the sense that the particular is the general and the general the particular, was rediscovered in the great scientific project of Freud, against the grain, so to speak, of psychology. For Freud came up against the fact that the innermost core on which the psychology of the single individual rests is itself something general: namely certain very general - though admittedly archaic - structures of the social context in which individuals are contained." (pg. 115)
 - "However, **these considerations concerning the relationship, or dialectic, of individual and society can and must be encountered in sociology also.** And it may be useful for me to point out that one of the temptations of sociology is to overlook the fact that the way in which the general manifests itself in the individual is very extensively mediated through psychology. This mediation occurs wherever the process is not rationally purposive, is not guided by truly rational considerations relating to social conditions. Sociology is prone to this misapprehension through its desire to remain true to its concept of society, and, above all, to preserve the preponderance which objective social reality actually has from being dissolved in mere psychology. I have just told you that the super-ego or the conscience was defined by Freud as the agency of social control over the individual represented by certain symbolic figures. This super-ego, as it participates in the process of socialization, is not, in the first place, something external, but is a psychical agency. Thus, the social universal embodied in the super-ego - the commandments and requirements: thou shalt not steal, thou shalt work hard, thou shalt be sexually faithful - all these commandments, which are in reality social, are largely internalized in the individual by psychological mechanisms. And I believe that **a sociology which forgets the mediation through individual subjectivity is no less false and inadequate** and - let me say it - no less dogmatic than, conversely, would be a sociology which maintained - as, incidentally, Freud was apt to do - that **sociology was nothing other than psychology applied to a plurality of people.** This latter idea is invalidated by the mere fact that the social compulsions to which we are subject are alien and external to us to such a degree that we cannot identify them directly with that which goes on within us and within our esteemed inner life. It is my intention to use this thesis as a concrete example of the principle of reciprocal effects, which you may recall" (pg. 115-116)
- "I tell you this only so that you can understand in a tangible form why we of the Frankfurt School found ourselves incorporating so-called 'psychological' considerations in the so-called 'objective' theory of society at a relatively early stage. We did it, in the first place, for the simple and tangible reason that without exact knowledge of the projection of society inside individuals it would not be comprehensible that countless individuals - one might well say: the overwhelming majority of all people - constantly act even now in a manner contrary to their own rational interests when confronted with real-life situations" (pg. 116)
- Lecture 14 (pg. 118)
 - "in the last lecture we dealt in some detail with the question of mediation through society, as it relates to single disciplines and the questions arising within them. I tried to demonstrate this mediation concretely to you by means of a number of models taken from Freud's psychoanalysis - a science which prides itself on its monadological structure, its disregard for society, and is conceived entirely in terms of the individual and against any idea of a special collective mind. I showed you, or tried to show you, how this Freudian psychology nevertheless comes up against social moments at its innermost centres, as if against its will. By contrast, a self-styled 'pure' sociology - to remind you of my earlier point - finally loses all specificity and turns into a form of mere applied statistics precisely through trying to seal itself off from all other disciplines and to be nothing other than sociology, on the basis of the factual content considered appropriate to it" (pg. 118)
 - "Max Weber is unquestionably one of the most important subjects of sociological study, and one needs to be familiar with his oeuvre far more widely than just by reading the few fundamental essays on the theory of science, and the studies on the 'spirit of capitalism' and the 'sociology of authority'. 8 But I should like to point out - and this might help you a little in your study of Weber - that if his work is examined really seriously, things turn out to be far more complicated than first appears" (pg. 119)
 - "To be sure, he tried to differentiate his concept of the sociological ideal type from a second concept of the historical ideal type, 11 but I don't know if that attempt was particularly successful. I think it is important for you to understand that the sociological ideal types in Weber are in no sense key theoretical categories through which, or through the interrelationships of which, something like a coherent theory of society is to be obtained. Rather, they are merely heuristic instruments, heuristic means, with which the historical material is to be compared. And it is through the comparison with these ideal constructs, which for their part are derived from the historical material by a process of classifying abstraction, that sociological understanding of the historical material, according to Weber, is to be advanced. I believe that the purpose of the ideal types in Weber can only be properly understood if one is clear about this point" (pg. 119)
 - "I believe that, in general, far too little attention is paid to this extremely peculiar structure of the ideal type in Weber: to its specifically heuristic character, the idea that the types actually arise like bubbles from water and then vanish in the same way into nothingness" (pg. 120)
 - "...in his work these ideal types are essentially modelled, in terms of their structure, on the method of legal definitions. Legal definitions are constituted in a way entirely similar to Weber's ideal types, and jurisprudence was, of course, the discipline originally taught by Weber, apart from historical political economy. And if you read the late works and are astonished by the curious way in which these ideal types are laid down like fixed definitions, you should always bear in mind the procedure used in jurisprudence. This peculiar manner of operating with concepts, or systems or complexes of concepts, as if they had a certain autonomy with regard to the material to which they are applied, a manner so characteristic of Weber's sociology, is a procedure he has in common with jurisprudence" (pg. 120)
 - "I am reminded at this point - and this is only seemingly a digression, Ladies and Gentlemen - of one of the motifs which, at least for me, has been decisive in attracting me to sociology and inducing me to practise the discipline. It is the need not to operate with ready-made, thought-out concepts in isolation, but to confront the concepts with that from which they arise, from which norms also arise, and in which the relationship of norm to reality is located - which is, precisely, the interplay of social forces. I believe that this need to escape from mere conceptuality - what I would call detached, self-sufficient conceptuality, as it is found in the systems of theoretical physics and, with far less legitimacy, in jurisprudence - by reflecting on society, is the simplest and perhaps also the most compelling of the motivations which induce one to take up sociology." (pg. 120-121)
 - "**...a discipline such as sociology can only have any meaning and usefulness if it is related to material which cannot be regarded as purely sociological**" (pg. 125)
- Lecture 15 (pg. 127)
 - "...a sociology which seeks to be nothing other than sociology is a fetishistic conception" (pg. 127)
 - "if sociology simply takes over the self-sufficiency of the other science-types, without incorporating a manner of reflecting both on itself and on its relationship to its subject matter, it will really suffer from deformation phenomena of the kind which Habermas referred to as 'restricted experience'; and in this phase of self-reflection sociology really does want to go beyond that. **If I were to try to define the difference between the concept of sociology we have in mind in the Frankfurt School and the prevailing concept, it would be that ours does not succumb to this fetishism**" (pg. 128)
 - "...the non-fetishistic type of sociology relates entirely to areas of thought which, while they have a practical purpose in that they aim

- finally at the transformation of structures, are much less able to be translated into directly practical demands than is the case with the usual methods of sociology, which are defined in terms of a strict division of labour. It is interesting, all the same, that although sociology today is incessantly solving practical problems, it has arrived at this fetishism primarily through its desire to cleanse itself of any suspicion of irresponsible grandiosity or utopian aspirations to change the world. This self-restriction of sociology, in the sense I have explained to you, has thus been apologetic in nature: sociology has attempted to secure its position within established academic science by demonstrating that it, too, is such a science. Yet precisely by relating itself to the proper location of science, and thereby reflecting on science, it is not such a science, but something qualitatively different" (pg. 128-129)
- "On one hand, it has sought to be a separate science on the model of the natural sciences - which, of course, have been constituted as a means of dominating nature, and all the categories of which can be defined as forms of the dominance of nature. But, on the other hand, sociology, provided it is not utterly 'restricted', has as its general object - which also, if you like, includes its own subject - society" (pg. 129)
 - "I believe that **if sociology is to live up to the demand I have referred to as reflection, or self-reflection, it will have to offer critical resistance to this idea that it should be the controlling authority within society.** From precisely a sociological point of view, sociology's claim to dominance over society is untenable. For this claim presupposes directly - from within the existing conditions of power - that a group which is defined solely in terms of intellect, and even solely in terms of the intellectual division of labour, as sociologists are supposed to be, has a right to social control on the grounds that - actually or supposedly, and in general I would say only supposedly - it knows better than the others. The error in thinking - for it is such an error, which in sociologists is rather hard to comprehend - lies in the fact that this allegedly or really adequate consciousness, of the kind that Mannheim had in mind in his perspectivism, is equated directly with power" (pg. 130)
 - "The thinkers whose names I have mentioned were all fundamentally convinced of the rationality of bourgeois society. That is to say that **they regarded the rationality of causal-mechanical thinking, of the kind which governs production within bourgeois society, as the key by means of which society itself, and the timeliness of developments within it, could be explained. In taking this view they entirely overlooked the immense, autonomous role played by the relations of production.** Or - to put it in a way which exactly matches the problematic I am talking of at this moment - they overlooked the fact that the much-vaunted rationality of bourgeois society, all that which is meant by the terms scientific age, scientific society or industrial society, is in reality irrational" (pg. 132)
 - "**By calling this society irrational I mean that if the purpose of society as a whole is taken to be the preservation and the unfettering of the people of which it is composed, then the way in which this society continues to be arranged runs counter to its own purpose, its *raison d'être*, its ratio.** Once this has been perceived the so-called irrational institutions themselves take on a function, and **the survival of irrational moments in society can be derived from the social structure itself.** I would say that this derivation of the seemingly anachronistic irrationality of society from the social structure is currently the primary task to be performed by a proper sociology. In our society it appears that the irrationality of the arrangement of this society is manifesting itself in countless moment..." (pg. 133)
 - "This means, however, that such sectors can only survive through irrational institutions like the family, through a kind of work in which the workers do not receive the full return for their labour, but are exploited once again within their closest association, which for this reason is called the germ-cell of society. It means, therefore, that **the irrational conditions of society can only be maintained through the survival of these irrational functions. I have demonstrated the irrationality of institutions by the example of the family. I could, no doubt, also demonstrate it by the example of armies and war expenditure, which have the function of guaranteeing the functioning of the system in purely economic terms while simultaneously promoting its annihilation. I could demonstrate it similarly by examining the function of the churches. This irrationality of institutions, and the irrational moments in our society, are to be understood only as functions of continuing irrationality.** While the means used by society are rational, this rationality of the means is really...only a means-end rationality, that is, one which obtains between the set ends and the means used to achieve them, without having any relation to the real end or purpose of society, which is the preservation of the species as a whole in a way conferring fulfilment and happiness. That is the reason not only why irrationalities survive, but why they reproduce themselves even further. And, incidentally, it is the deepest explanation why so-called psychological moments and sociopsychological moments have such importance in this society. **I believe that this objective derivation of irrationality, or, if you like, the rational derivation of the irrational, should be a centrepiece of sociological work today**" (pg. 133-134)
 - "It might be said that in this demand for control over society which is latent within it, sociology is really nothing other than an agency of control conforming to the technocratic ideal, but which is now being extended beyond the mere outward arrangement of the production apparatus to penetrate the communal life of human beings and finally the consciousness and the unconscious of human beings. This technocratization of the sociological ideal applies all the more, the more the so-called 'pure' sociology that we are discussing grows accustomed to operating a technology of its own. For the very concept of technology contains an ineradicable moment of dominance over nature, and as soon as this idea of technology as dominance over nature is applied directly and without reflection to human beings, the notion of dominance over nature is transferred just as directly to human beings" (pg. 135)
 - "**Our task is to criticize and disintegrate concepts such as elitist leadership - even one exercised by intellectuals - and not to extend our position by fetishizing it.** The best we can hope for from ourselves is that we may be granted a certain opportunity to come of age through the subject we study, and the freedom we have to study it. The misplaced dominance of present-day sociology lies in the fact that the technology of situations which are controllable by science, and therefore the reified relationship embodied in such situations, is transferred to society, which ought to be the subject of all those concepts. And that, Ladies and Gentlemen, is really the difference between what I would call the theory of society in a strong sense, and the narrower, the truly narrow concept of sociology" (pg. 135)
- Lecture 16 (pg. 136)
 - "**I tried to show you that sociology, in its claim to be able to control society, exerts the wrong kind of authority.** Its error lies in trying to extend the possibility of a scientific control of individual social situations - as when sociological findings contribute to improving the psychological conditions of work in a way which raises productivity - to the point where it becomes a control of society as a whole." (pg. 136)
 - "**...sociology consists essentially of the reflection of science upon itself. That society is both its subject and its object was already implicit in that idea.**" (pg. 137)
 - "But however straightforward this may sound, it actually conceals the central problem, the central difficulty, of sociology itself. For in the society in which we live a subject comprising the whole of society does not exist. Subject and object diverge in this society, and, to an unprecedented degree, living people are the objects of social processes which, in their turn, are composed of people. If you consider this for a moment, you realize that **the difficulty lies in the fact that in the sociological perspective the social subject, or society as subject, is treated as if it were indeed identical with society as object.** This happens because the concept of sociology which I am discussing critically with you here - a technocratic approach which is extended to human beings - is adopted in such an all-embracing way. The objectifying, reifying methods of sociology are applied to society as a subject, whereas these reifying methods ought, of course, to stop short at the living subject. My lectures in this semester comprise a catalogue and a critique of the basic ideas of positivist sociology. And if I am constantly reproaching that kind of sociology with being an expression of a reified consciousness, it is only now that you can understand this contention in the strict sense in which it is meant. **My criticism is that as soon as sociology is applied to society as a whole - which ought to be a subject - then, by its internal logic, it turns society into an object; and that in doing so - in the act of cognition, as it were - it repeats the processes of reification which, for their part, are already implicit in the logic of the commodity character**

which is spreading throughout society. I would say that **the true application of a critical, dialectical theory of society consists precisely in not equating society as subject with society as object.** For two reasons: on one hand, because society as object - that is, the social process - is not yet by any means a subject, or free, or autonomous; on the other, because society as subject, or as potentially a subject - that is, conceived as a self-determining, mature society which is also liberated in terms of its content - resists and is incompatible with precisely the objectifying, reifying kind of thinking which is inflicted on it by the established sociological methods" (pg. 137-138)

- "there is something very ambivalent about even the theory of politics as ideology. On one hand, politics as the expression of existing power relationships is ideological in that it behaves as if it were a kind of technique or procedure independent of the social power relationships; on the other, however, politics, or the political sphere, also contains the possibility, the potential, for social change. It might be said, therefore, to put this, too, in dialectical terms, that politics is and at the same time is not ideology" (pg. 143)
- Lecture 17 (pg. 145)
 - "...history, and the historical context, is constitutive of sociology itself, in the sense that, considered in a purely immanent way, **sociological categories have no meaning, and that society as such cannot be perceived without reference to the historical elements implicit within it. Historical knowledge is not something existing in the margin of sociology, but is central to it;** and the most decisive of the differences between a critical theory of society, represented prototypically by that of Marx, and sociology in the restricted sense that has been criticized by Habermas - and that I tried to characterize in the last lecture in particular - is the importance attributed to history" (pg. 145)
 - "One might, perhaps, express its purport by saying that what should be regarded as the essence of social phenomena - essence simply in the sense of the essential - is largely nothing other than the history stored up in these phenomena" (pg. 146)
 - **"...it is an essential, a central moment of sociology to interpret social phenomena as an expression of society, much as one may interpret a face as an expression of the psychological processes reflected in it.** One might say, more precisely, that the dimension of interpretation in sociology lies primarily in the fact that history is stored up in phenomena which are seemingly at rest, which seem to be something given and entirely momentary. The faculty for interpretation is essentially the ability to perceive that which has become, or the dynamic arrested within phenomena." (pg. 146)
 - **"...in being made absolute, in losing its genesis, the fact appears as something natural, and therefore as something which in principle - as I explained to you earlier - is unalterable.** To this extent the elimination of the historical dimension is an important instrument for sanctioning and justifying whatever happens currently to be the case. This is why I attach such decisive importance to the connection between history and sociology..." (pg. 149)
 - **"Society, therefore, cannot be understood other than historically, since it does not present itself in any other way than in the temporal dimension of its own character as function.** By disregarding this, the method falsifies the substance - one might say - a second time, by arresting society, which by virtue of its laws is something necessarily in motion, in its momentary state. **The status quo, a category encountered unavoidably in this context, is a leading category of the current ideology.** This is the blindness of anti-historical sociology to the immanent developmental tendencies of society and thus to what is really decisive in its subject matter. For the task of sociology is to perceive the direction in which this whole process is seeking to move, and to deduce from that whether and how one might intervene in this tendency. I repeat in this context what I hinted at earlier, that **a sociology which is focused solely on the momentary and calls itself empirical is devoid of experience, through neglecting in principle the dimension of time, of having become.**" (pg. 149-150)
 - "All reification is forgetting'..." (pg. 150)
 - "That everything now depends on people makes it easy for ideology to support itself. Subjects today are a negative moment; like all ideology, they are more ponderous, slower to change direction, than economic relationships and productive forces, and society maintains itself precisely through this inertia of the subjects. I once went so far as to say that subjects themselves today represent a large part of ideology, and I see no reason to withdraw that formulation. It corresponds in a way to the much older idea, probably originated by Horkheimer, that psychology, that is, the psychical composition of individual people, becomes a 'cement' holding together the integrated society on the subjective side..." (pg. 152)
 - "You can see, therefore, that the motif of social psychology as we understand it, as an instrument or a moment of the relations of production, has not only a rightful but a necessary place in a critical theory. It might be said that under present conditions the subject is both: on one hand, ideology, because in reality the subject does not matter, and because there is something illusory about even believing oneself a subject in this society; on the other, however, the subject is also the potential, the only potential, by which this society can change, and in which is stored up not only all the negativity of the system but also that which points beyond the system as it now is. I have said that, despite this, one needs to hold fast to the primacy of objectivity, but it should be added that recognition of the reification of society should not itself be so reified that no thought is permitted which goes outside the sphere of reification - that would lead to mechanistic thinking" (pg. 152)

d. Further Readings:

- Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, by S. Freud <https://mindsplain.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/introductory-lectures-on-psychoanalysis.pdf>
- Maps of Meaning, by J. Peterson <https://ia800701.us.archive.org/7/items/MapsOfMeaningTheArchitectureOfBeliefPetersonInwAdam/Maps%20of%20Meaning%20The%20Architecture%20of%20Belief-Peterson%20%28Inw%20Adam%29.pdf>
- The Collected Works of Carl Jung <https://ia600503.us.archive.org/26/items/the-collected-works-of-carl-jung-complete-digital-edition/The%20Collected%20Works%20of%20C.G.%20Jung%20-%20Complete%20Digital%20Edition.pdf>