

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, by T. Adorno

- a. People / Organizations: [http://www.edarcepelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20%20-%20Kant%27s%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason%20\(Stanford,%202001\).pdf](http://www.edarcepelago.com/classici/AdornoTheodor/Adorno,%20%20-%20Kant%27s%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason%20(Stanford,%202001).pdf)
- b. Quotes:
- "I cannot deny that I still believe that this work is one that deserves the very greatest respect." - Author (pg. 4)
 - "If you refuse to make any assumptions, if you attempt to understand a thing purely on its own terms, then you will understand nothing." - Author (pg. 13)
 - "...Heidegger...has made an absolute of the concept of origin and turned it into a metaphysical entity." - Author (pg. 53)
 - "...the entire history of philosophy is in reality a history of criticisms...In other words, then, the movement of philosophy, even when it looks as if it is putting so-called radical questions and starting once again from the very beginning, is always criticism of texts already in existence with which it is in a constant state of friction. The more philosophers insist on their own radicality, the truer this is." - Author (pg. 56)
 - "...the different philosophies are mediated through one another.." - Author (pg. 56)
 - *philosophy is merely the series of interpretations, of which the layman hardly has patience for. So, where the lay holds no care for what - to others - seems important, philosophers place their care in matters useless for the majority - and so, are themselves the meaningless minority. Each stands opposed to the other; and so, each is fallen.
- c. General Notes:
- Lecture 1 (pg. 1)
 - "We might begin by saying that whenever one aspect of a philosophy becomes public knowledge it tends generally to obscure its true meaning rather than elucidate it. The formulae to which philosophies are commonly reduced tend to reify the actual writings, to sum them up in a rigid fashion and thus to make a genuine interaction with them all the harder." (pg. 1)
 - "...I would say that the Kantian project can actually be characterized not as one that adopts subjectivism in order to do away with the objectivity of cognition, but as one that grounds objectivity in the subject as an objective reality." (pg. 2)
 - "...I believe, therefore, that if you accept right from the start that the interest of the *Critique of Pure Reason* lies in its intention to establish the objective nature of cognition, or to salvage it, if I may anticipate my future argument, this will afford you a better access to the work than if you simply surrender to the widespread idea of Kant's so-called subjectivism. This remains true even though these two aspects of Kant's philosophy are in constant friction with one another." (pg. 2)
 - "Let me say right away that the so-called question of 'Being' does not represent an innovation when compared to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, or a happy rediscovery." (pg. 3)
 - "The crucial feature of the Kantian work is that it is guided by the conviction that reason is denied the right to stray into the realm of the Absolute, to stray into intelligible worlds', as he terms it." (pg. 6)
 - "What makes this possible for Kant is the **self-reflexive nature of reason**. By this I mean that, as a rational being, I am capable of reflecting on my own reason, and through this reflection I am able to give myself an account of what it can and cannot achieve. This dual aspect of self-reflexivity is what enables Kant to claim that he has established the foundation of experience - in other words the original leading concepts of our knowledge of nature; and on the other hand, it is what prevents us from going beyond this knowledge and entering into speculations about the Absolute." (pg. 7)
 - "Kant's work is called *The Critique of Pure Reason*, and the emphasis here doubtless falls on the word 'critique'. In essence there is nothing new in this since we might say that the entire history of philosophy is nothing but one vast nexus of criticism which has led consciousness to its ideas, its concepts and ultimately to itself. In this sense the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an encounter of philosophy with itself." (pg. 8-9)
 - "In the old tradition of logic, judgements were defined as the union of subject, predicate and copula - that is to say, an object which corresponds in grammatical terms to a subject has something *different* predicated of it. This is expressed in the form of 'is', as in 'A is B'. This is a somewhat superficial characterization of a judgement because it presupposes that these components are discrete entities, which is not in fact the case." (pg. 9)
 - *cf. T. Adorno, *Ontology and Dialectics*, pg. 36
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uq/d7b063_58c729aa39b04dbd80711ff064ea4624.pdf
 - Lecture 2 (pg. 12)
 - "Kant's concern is always that reason should not be criticized from the point of view of pure logic, that is to say, **the task facing reason is not to discover whether it is internally coherent** - for the validity of logic is everywhere taken for granted and reason itself is held to be identical with logical thinking. **Instead the meaning of Kantian reason is always that reason should reflect on its own possible relationship with objects of different kinds**. And as I pointed out last time, it is always assumed - and this is a very bold assumption - that reason is capable of making an authoritative statement, a really compelling statement about its own relation to these objects." (pg. 14)
 - "A mode of thought that is absolutely free of assumptions would in reality be a kind of thought that is tied to nothing but pure thought itself." (pg. 15)
 - "...to put it quite simply: transcendental means all those enquiries that relate to the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. But not just to the possibility of synthetic judgements; over and above that, transcendental in Kant means every investigation of basic concepts or, let me put it more precisely, basic forms of a conceptual or intuitive kind, that enables our reason, according to the Kantian theory, to make such synthetic a priori judgements. Thus a **transcendental enquiry is an enquiry of mind or consciousness from the standpoint of how far it is possible for this mind to posit valid synthetic a priori judgements, that is, judgements that are independent of experience**. This transcendental enquiry is articulated in the positive part of the Critique of Pure Reason. It breaks down, on the one hand, into the Transcendental Aesthetic, that is, the doctrine of the forms of intuition that are necessary and constitutive givens which are not reducible to anything else and through which all our intuitions are filtered if they are to be 'our' intuitions at all. In addition, there are the categories, that is, the basic concepts - for instance, the concept of causality or the concept of substance or the concept of reciprocity - beneath which our understanding must necessarily subsume the given objects of intuition. The whole of the so-called positive part of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely the Transcendental Aesthetic and the analytical section of the Transcendental Logic, is concerned to crystallize these elements." (pg. 19-20)
 - "...while Kant must indeed accept the forms of intuition as something ultimately given because they are not conceptual in nature, he believes that the forms of thought have to be derived from the unity of thought, that is, from the unity of logical reason itself. This attempt to derive the forms from the original unity of our thought as an activity is what he has undertaken to do in the principal section of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely the so-called Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding." (pg. 20)
 - "Let me just make a brief comment on the relationship between 'transcendental' and 'transcendent'. Where words are related like this, where they are so obviously connected, there is generally more involved than pure historical chance: the connections are a matter of essentials. **Transcendent means 'going beyond'** and the concept of '**going beyond**' is capable of a variety of meanings; in fact, there are three meanings of significance here. You may speak of logical transcendence; that is found when you measure a proposition not on its own terms, but as it were from outside. For example,

- a transcendent critique would be one where a cultural conservative criticizes Samuel Beckett from his culturally conservative point of view. That would be a case of logical transcendence. Secondly, there is a narrower, epistemological concept of transcendence that refers to a concept of being that is different from consciousness, beyond consciousness: thus, for example, the difference between the thing-in-itself and the consciousness through which it becomes known. Lastly, there is the consciousness of metaphysical transcendence. That would be the kind of transcendence that is found if we go beyond the limits of the possibility of experience, as Kant would put it, and make judgements about absolute matters, such as God, freedom, immortality, the essence of being, or whatever else occurs to us." (pg. 20)
- "In the Kantian use of the term 'transcendental' you may well have to recollect this third meaning of transcendent in order to grasp the specific distinction between 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'. For both 'transcendental' and this third meaning of 'transcendent' belong together in their common opposition to the concept of experience; they are both concerned with whatever is independent of experience. But **the concept of the transcendental conceives of whatever precedes experience, what makes experience possible, as an attribute of reason, an attribute of mind.** This stands in contrast to metaphysical dogmatism, which, according to Kant, understands the transcendence of experience as something otherworldly in the sense of an absolute substance - something that even goes beyond the mind itself - a divine substance, in short. **Thus the transcendental in Kant represents the transcendent nature of our minds in the sense that it supplies the conditions that make something like experience possible, and in that sense may be said to go beyond experience, but on the other hand** - and this is one of the most remarkable difficulties of the Critique of Pure Reason - **these conditions can only be held to be valid if they do in fact relate to experience. They do indeed transcend experience, but they possess no absolute, transcendent truth; they possess truth only in so far as they relate to experience, to possible experience, and in general are saturated with the objects of experience.** Thus we might say that the concept of the transcendent is significantly restricted by its translation into the transcendental; and it is at the same time interiorized to a significant degree. This means that it ceases to be a dogmatically postulated principle standing beyond and opposed to human beings, and becomes instead a principle of mind itself and an attribute of human consciousness as such." (pg. 21)
 - "Thus in Kant all enquiries that are concerned with these propositions that are independent of experience, these synthetic a priori judgements, may be said to be transcendental. At the same time, the concept refers to all enquiries that extend to the possible relation of mind to experience and hence to objects in general. This, then, is the concept of the transcendental. Thus the sphere of the transcendental is neither one of formal logic - because it is concerned with the possible knowledge of objects - nor is it a sphere concerned with the contents of knowledge - because it does not presuppose such contents, but only the possibility of possessing such contents. It is, then, a curious no man's land of knowledge positioned somewhere between psychology and logic (if I can put it in this somewhat provisional way). This curious intermediary realm is the realm in which the *Critique of Pure Reason* unfolds, and it is this that has earned it the title of a transcendental enquiry." (pg. 22)
 - Lecture 3 (pg. 23)
 - "**We are talking here of judgements which are valid independently of experience or which hold good for all future experience.**" (pg. 23)
 - "This means that everything that can be regarded as ephemeral, transitory, deceptive, and illusory is left to one side, so that what remains is supposed to be indispensable, absolutely secure, something I can hold permanently in my hands. **I have called this idea of truth the residual theory of truth.** As I have said, it is common to almost the entire philosophical tradition and includes Descartes and Leibniz among Kant's immediate predecessors. **This theory asserts that truth is whatever remains once everything sensory, everything ephemeral and hence deceptive has been subtracted. To put it in economic terms, it is the profit that remains after deducting all the costs of production.** For sensory experience cannot entirely be dispensed with - all these philosophers concede this after their own fashion, even old Plato. It is merely that in this tradition the epistemological value of experience is highly problematic: it must be regarded as the point of departure, but it may not be regarded as the actual source of knowledge - as we can see from the very first sentence of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is in complete agreement with the view of experience I have just outlined..." (pg. 25)
 - "Now, so as to extract from knowledge everything that does not spring from experience and that therefore does not change and perish with experience - this is what we may broadly, less technically, describe as the motivation that leads us to a preoccupation with synthetic a priori judgements and that then becomes inextricably linked with the attempt to provide a grounding for the exact natural sciences by reflecting on their epistemological foundations." (pg. 25)
 - "We should really ask ourselves how this equation of binding truth with timeless or eternal knowledge comes about. You then realize that you are dealing with something primordially bourgeois." (pg. 26)
 - "That is to say, **underlying this is an idea that nothing new should come into being, that the new is actually a source of insecurity, a threat, something worrying.**" (pg. 26)
 - "There may even be something quite archaic underlying it, namely the fear of difference, the fear of anything that is not cocooned in the web of our concepts and which therefore frightens us when we encounter it. There is, then, a kind of taboo on the new and on change that declares itself in the way in which the right to truth, the emphatic claim to be true, is given only to what is permanent, while whatever changes and is new is degraded in the first instance to the illusory, the transient, and condemned to inferior status. But over and above that, what is at stake here is the way in which this archaic need for security can be extended into ideas of property." (pg. 26)
 - "What is generally referred to as Kant's Copernican revolution is essentially concerned with the fact that those absolute truths are independent of experience but form the object of criticism so that criticism drives a trench through the middle of their realm, accepting some propositions and rejecting others. Kant's Copernican revolution is nothing other than the fact that this entire realm is no longer simply visited so that these things can be discussed and judged directly, but instead they are involved in the process of reflection. **When I said to you earlier that the novel aspect of the Critique of Pure Reason was the reflection of reason on itself, that reflexivity is what lies at the heart of the Copernican revolution.** The truths that are the object of concern in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are not supposed to be externally demonstrated and presented or asserted any more - as free-standing things as in Plato's theory. Instead, they are to prove their worth by the fact that **reason examines itself and then discovers in itself the constitutive elements thanks to which something like a universally valid and objective knowledge can be made possible.** This is the revolution which Kant regarded as his own particular achievement. It is important that you should understand me rightly here. It is not simply the turn to the subject that is crucial here. That turn had been accomplished long before in sceptical and empirical philosophy, but also in the philosophy of the great rationalists. **The specifically novel element here is that objectivity itself, that is, the validity of knowledge as such, is created by passing through subjectivity - by reflecting on the mechanisms of knowledge, its possibilities and its limits.** In this system the subject becomes if not the creator, then at least the guarantor of objectivity. This, in short, is the decisive thesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and if you use this intention as a guide it may help you over the obstacles presented by the work." (pg. 32-33)
 - Lecture 4 (pg. 34)
 - "to put it more radically, metaphysics asks questions about whether there is material of any kind available to me; whether these conditions of reason can be applied to any sensory experience of whatever kind; whether they can be said to run amok and freewheel; whether they spontaneously perpetuate themselves and imagine that they can make all the crucial decisions on their own. Thus the unity that exists between the question of a priori synthetic judgements and **the question of metaphysics in Kant is the unity of reason itself,** or more precisely, of the propositions about experience that I am justified in making. The distinction between the two is only to be found in the question of whether these conditions of reason can be filled with something else, with something that is not them, with something non-identical - or whether they retain their absolute identity and may

- be said to produce the Absolute from within themselves." (pg. 43)
- "With this I have brought you to a problem, to a pair of concepts that are fundamental to the understanding of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that we have now arrived at without too much effort, or so I hope. **These are the twin concepts of the *form of knowledge* and the *content of knowledge*.** In line with what I have already said, and with the primacy of reason in his philosophy, the content of knowledge in Kant is always what comes to me from outside: it is the contingent, or, as he sometimes says, the chaotic, the sensory manifold over which I have no control, but to which my knowledge refers. Moreover, it does not refer to it in the sense that we know the sensory. The fact is that we do not know the sensory; it is something that we possess, it is given to us. But it is opaque, blind and impenetrable." (pg. 43)
 - "However, what is known as knowledge in an emphatic sense in Kant is something we might really describe as a question of organization. It is a question of whether and how far we succeed in unifying, in organizing the sensory elements that are given to us with the aid of the forms both of our intuition and also the forms of our thought. By 'organize' we mean both to differentiate and distinguish between them and also to bring them together with the aid of unified points of view. Now since this content is something accidental and contingent, something changeable, which therefore does not belong in philosophy as Kant understands it, it follows that the whole of philosophy cannot really be anything other than the analysis of form. This element of form is really decisive for the whole of Kantian philosophy." (pg. 43-44)
- Lecture 5 (pg. 46)
 - "...the propositions that Kant regards as metaphysical are what the mathematicians call invariants. In other words, they do not refer to changing contents, but instead make the claim that they are absolutely valid for all time." (pg. 46)
 - "The so-called Copernican revolution means, among other things, that what is criticized is not metaphysical propositions as such, but rather the possibility that our reason can rationally articulate them, or utter valid judgements about them without violating the rules of discursive logic." (pg. 47)
 - "In Kant speculative knowledge, we can say, is synonymous with metaphysics. Looked at subjectively, metaphysics is all knowledge that owes its existence to pure speculation. I would ask you to think of the word 'speculative' in a completely straightforward sense, in the sense which will presumably occur to you if you have not been affected by Hegelian philosophy: namely, as a form of knowledge that is acquired purely by the application of reason, without its deriving any sustenance or limits or anything non-identical from experience, or any element, in short, that would create resistance or friction with it. Thus speculative thought is the same as pure thought; speculative knowledge is knowledge that is spun out of thought itself without measuring itself in any way against material emanating from experience." (pg. 48-49)
 - "...the contents do not determine the forms, nor do the forms have any influence over the contents. There is a precise sense - and I do not say this to belittle it, but simply to describe it - in which the relation between form and content in Kant is external. That is to say, you really must **imagine the forms as a sort of container through which the materials coming from outside are filtered.** Once these materials have passed through the forms, what emerges at the other end are the valid modes of knowledge, the synthetic a priori judgements." (pg. 50)
 - "In this respect Kant quite simply regards the matter much like the English psychologists: on the one hand you have reason, the faculty of intuition, man as a kind of tabula rasa, who finds himself bombarded with sense impressions, without really knowing where they come from. On the other hand, we do not really know what these sense impressions are. This is because they acquire all their properties through this filtering process, and unless it takes place they are quite indeterminate. But he really does conceive of this in the naive terms that we use in ordinary life: thus we are mental creatures, endowed with powers of intuition and thought, and then various stimuli come along (to use the language of the physiology of the senses, albeit one somewhat alien to Kant), and the collision of these two elements or the friction between them is what constitutes knowledge. This basic idea of the relation between subject and object - before any analysis of the way it is constituted - is something that you must take for granted in Kant if you wish to understand him at all." (pg. 50)
 - "By way of objection to this we should remind ourselves that **the contents of every concretely available or even conceivable metaphysics are always a matter of experience.** If I were to rely on existing metaphysics in the way in which Kant thinks he can rely on the natural sciences in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we would quickly discover that this rigid dichotomy of experience and reason does not exist in the form he imagines." (pg. 53)
 - "It is the idea that **the freedom and sovereignty of spirit amounts to what he calls autonomy.** This element is represented here by the judge who can freely resolve all these matters; **it is the ability to give oneself laws, to restrict oneself and to determine one's own limits. Autonomy literally means that you give yourself laws - and autonomy is the supreme concept in Kant's moral philosophy, and by implication also of Kant's theory of knowledge.** The concept of autonomy actually contains that paradox, that contradiction, which I have drawn your attention to: namely, that the judge and the accused are one and the same; that the authority that is free and independent simultaneously represents the law. This is the founding conception of his entire universe. It contains the idea - I believe you can only picture this if you attempt to translate it into a kind of experience - it contains the experience of bourgeois society in its conviction that **only by virtue of this autonomy can society become free, mature and able to escape the bonds of tutelage** - only with the aid of this conviction can it organize everything and arrange matters for itself so that it will be able to manage its own life in a proper and meaningful way. In short, **acting in accordance with laws appears as a function of freedom - or, conversely, freedom manifests itself as a function of law.** This idea, that **freedom and obedience to the law are one and the same thing**, means that there is indeed an end to tutelage, but that freedom ends up merely as something that is determined by law. This is the kernel of Kant's philosophy. **It does in fact articulate a very dark secret of bourgeois society. This secret is the reality that the formal freedom of juridical subjects is actually the foundation of the dependency of all upon all, that is to say, it is the foundation of the coercive character of society, its conformity with law.** This is what lies behind this very strange theory that in Kant reason is a tribunal which has to sit in judgement over reason as the accused." (pg. 54-55)
 - Lecture 6 - Enlightenment (pg. 57)
 - "...it is vital for a thinker to become conscious of the relation between the intention implicit in a problem, what the problem itself implies, and the organization of a line of thought in terms of a specious argument in the interests of an already fixed *thema probandum*." (pg. 61)
 - "[Kant] states: 'To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e. within one's own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is enlightenment.' You can see, then, that on the positive side the concept of enlightenment, as Kant developed it, corresponds precisely to what I have shown you as being the kernel of the Kantian method in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. That is to say, it consists essentially in the demand for the unfettered use of reason and the installation of reason as the supreme authority. The disputes in which reason becomes involved, including those disputes with itself, are to be seen as reason's own life-blood. On the negative side, however, a couple of points will no doubt have occurred to you. The first is that in Kant enlightenment always refers to thought that does not allow itself to be dictated to; you have to have the courage to think for yourself as far as possible according to the principle of autonomy, that is, the laws of thought. But enlightenment does not really mean to be critical of the structures of objective spirit, that is, to be critical of whatever is not thought. We may say, then, that **the concept of enlightenment in Kant is subjectively restricted from the outset: it is restricted to the way the individual behaves within the world of his own thoughts.** The question of the objectification of spirit and therewith the institutions and arrangements of the world is not really included in this definition of enlightenment. Closely related to this is a second factor. This is that there is no real connection between enlightenment and the concept of practice, of action - even though this does indeed play a major role in Kant. Enlightenment as a pure mode of behaviour of reason is exclusively theoretical in nature." (pg. 62)
 - "this is part of the tradition of bourgeois rationalism as a whole. On the one hand, reason is deemed to be the supreme and indeed the only authority by which to regulate human relations; on the other hand, this is always accompanied by warnings to the effect that reason must not be 'taken to extremes'" (pg. 64)

actually one of extrapolation. In other words, it consists in focusing on the way in which such contradictions as the one about identity or non-identity are anchored in the text, and the way in which they define its specific character. If you then refuse to accept these contradictions simply as intellectual flaws, and attempt instead to show how they are motivated within the structure of the text overall, you really do arrive at the point of understanding the ideas as containing more than appears on the surface: they are the precipitate of a force field. Once you have defined such a force field, and have identified the forces at work in it, forces that are in a state of constant friction with each other, you then acquire the right to call such forces by their names, and in so doing, you go beyond the immediate meaning on the page." (pg. 79-80)

- Lecture 8 (pg. 81)
 - "...compartmentalized thinking...[is] thinking of the ordinary man, the petty bourgeois who likes everything to be neat and tidy, and who feels secure if his machinery does not break down and his ideas all function smoothly and without disruption." (pg. 81)
 - **"...our aim is not to juggle concepts, arranging and rearranging them as neatly as possible like a stamp collection, but to deploy concepts in order to bring the subject, whatever it may be, to life.** The unending problem arises because what that subject and that life are is not something we have in our pockets. Nevertheless, philosophy directs its efforts precisely towards the recuperation of what has been lost through this conceptual cleansing operation, this so-called contradiction-free, bland presentation of philosophical problems. This appears to me to provide the profoundest reason, the deepest justification of the claim that the philosophical interpretation of a text should focus less on the absence of contradictions, less on systematic consistency, than on its opposite, on the contradictions themselves. **The aim should be not to nag away at these contradictions, but to discover the fissures, the chinks, that - if I may use an image from mountain-climbing - enable us to get a foothold and eventually to reach the peak from where we can obtain a freer view of whatever intellectual panorama we are examining.**" (pg. 81-82)
 - **"...philosophy is really a matter of 'thinking on thinking', as Aristotle defined it..."** (pg. 82)
 - "I should almost like to assert that **the profundity of a philosophy** - a concept I hope I shall be able to enlarge on in a more fundamental way in a later lecture - **is not a matter of its capacity for resolving contradictions, but rather of its ability to bring to the surface contradictions that are deeply embedded in the subject under investigation, to raise such contradictions to the level of consciousness, and at the same time, to understand the necessity for them; that is, to understand their meaning.**" (pg. 82)
 - "It is not so easy, firstly, to realize how, just beneath the surface of a coherent body of thought, the various strands that make it up come into conflict with one another; and although the philosopher has sought to reconcile them, they retain their distinct identity. Nor is it a simple matter, secondly, to grasp just what a specific configuration of ideas means." (pg. 83)
 - **"The thrust of Kant's philosophy as a whole...is aimed at *salvaing*, and the salvaging of *ontology* in a quite specific sense.** He wishes to salvage specific fundamental spiritual realities that can be said to be valid for all time and that are secure from the vicissitudes of history as well as from what Kant would have called a 'reasoning' reason." (pg. 85)
 - "...in the *Critique of Pure Reason* a 'thing-in-itself' means roughly: the entirely unknown and indefinite cause of phenomena, the cause of the 'affections', the cause of sense data" (pg. 91)
- Lecture 9 (pg. 93)
 - See text
- Lecture 10 (pg. 105)
 - "Idealist philosophies of the kind advocated by Kant and Fichte see the world much more as a process, and much less as something fixed and thing-like." (pg. 114)
 - **"...the more subjectivization you have, the more reification there is.** There is a reifying quality in the very attempt to relate all phenomena, everything we encounter, to a unified reference point and to subsume it under a self-identical, rigid unity, thus removing it from its dynamic context. The same reifying element may be found more generally in the tendency to ground permanent existence in the idea that the rules of thought, that is, the actual constituents of subjectivity, are themselves immutable. But I would go further. With the growth of subjectivity there is a corresponding growth of reification because thanks to this process of subjectivization the poles of knowledge are drawn further and further apart. To put it another way, the more that is inserted into the subject, the more the subject comes to constitute knowledge as such, then the more that determining factors are withdrawn from the object, and the more the two realms diverge." (pg. 114-115)
- Lecture 11 (pg. 117)
 - **"It is important not to fall into the trap of thinking in ready-made slogans"** (pg. 117)
 - **"Thus for Kant concepts are the products of thought - that is what you must hold onto. The concept of synthesis, that is, the gathering together of dispersed ideas into a unity, the bundling together of scattered ideas to form a unity - this is a fundamental concept of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.** This concept of synthesis is nothing but the theory of nominalism brought to the highest pitch of abstraction because it declares not merely concepts, but everything that can be meaningfully discussed, to be the consequence of mental activity." (pg. 125)
- Lecture 12 (pg. 128)
 - See text
- Lecture 13 (pg. 138)
 - See text
- Lecture 14 (pg. 149)
 - See text
- Lecture 15 (pg. 160)
 - **"...the truth is that these two concepts [e.g., subjectivity and objectivity] are mutually interdependent"** (pg. 169)
- Lecture 16 (pg. 170)
 - See text
- Lecture 17 (pg. 180)
 - See text
- Lecture 18 (pg. 190)
 - See text
- Lecture 19 (pg. 201)
 - "The reason for Kant's rejection of the concept of essence and the resultant deviation of Kantian depth from what is generally understood by that term will be obvious to those of you who have followed my argument up to now. It is that the insight into the essentials of being, insight into the noumenal world that would constitute such a world of essential being, is simply denied to us; we can have absolutely no knowledge of whatever lies behind the façade, behind the appearances. If then after Kant, above all in Hegel, the concept of essence was able to spring back to life, that was a function of the restructuring process that the entire system underwent in post-Kantian idealism. To make the point another way: I have told you that post-Kantian philosophy ignored the Kantian block; that it said that the things-in-themselves which we find in Kant are nothing but an empty phrase, and that, moreover, the things-in-themselves are after all cognizable by us - simply because things-in-themselves are nothing but reason conscious of itself.

Since reason is empowered to have knowledge of the Absolute, it is likewise empowered to have knowledge of essences - without, of course, remaining fixated on them. Instead **Hegel had the brilliant insight that the two spheres which point in two different directions in Kant - the world of phenomena and the world of noumena, which are separated by one of those trenches so familiar in Kant - stand in a necessarily reciprocal relation to each other. This means that there is no essence without appearance and no appearance without essence.**" (pg. 209)

- **cf. pg. 207-208 for context on how Kant understands noumena, phenomena and depth.*

- Lecture 20 (pg. 213)

- "...**the pure subject presupposes objectivity, just as, conversely, objectivity presupposes subjectivity.** A price has to be paid for this shortcoming by a subjectively orientated analysis such as epistemology. The price is that ultimately all the concepts it creates prove to be inadequate. Each concept may be said to be an IOU that can be redeemed only by a further concept. Expressed more vulgarly, **epistemology resembles the man who can only block up one hole by digging another.** The entire history, the internal history of epistemology, is actually the history of this debt relationship; that is to say, the history of the repeated postponement of this debt, this deferral of the non-redeemable share in knowledge of an object to a further piece of knowledge that recedes further and further from the object of redemption, from the moment of fulfilment through the act of knowing. It is this process that ends up by making such makeshifts as the transcendental an unavoidable necessity. This explains also what is truly profound in Kant. On the one hand, from the point of view of positivism in the broadest sense of the term, equivalents, objective correlatives, cannot be discovered for what he calls the transcendental. On the other hand, however, his construction of this entire edifice is governed by a coercive force that thinking cannot resist. Thus in the 'mistakes' that Kant makes we see the protest of the entire epistemological method. And I do indeed hold the view that the profundity of a philosophy can only be measured by the profundity of its errors - rather than by the smooth success of its harmonious conclusions." (pg. 218-219)

- Lecture 21 (pg. 224)

- See text

d. Further Readings:

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