The Future of Alienation, by R. Schacht

a. <u>People / Organizations</u>: *Understand that a non-essentialist is in the same instance a silent advocate for slavery, rape and murder as they readily deny that there can be any way in which to establish objective principles surrounding human action and such's respective 'value'. Meaning, they would argue that a 'value' (if can be identified at all) which is to be held as truly objective, so as to serve as a definitive normative principle, is impossible. Thus, the value (or, rather, the degradation of such as it pertains to the human as a living psychological fact) surrounding the action of raping a child cannot, in their eyes, be completely discerned and, therefore, annotated in the form of a principle. These folk are a pathetic miserable bunch who have horrendously failed to see their own "knowledge" for what it is. What's more, a non-essentialist doctrine cannot logically include 'objectivity', as to be 'objective' means for such 'to be removed from, therein residing beyond, what's 'here' subjective; and, it is for this ability to stand as beyond (i.e., as independent (of) or non-dependent upon) subjectivity, rinsed of such's bias such that it 'shines' (cf. Hegel, The Science of Logic), that what is 'objective' sits much closer, if not wholly wrapped up in, what's "essential" (i.e., constituted and endurant in-itself - e.g., 'truth'). So, to claim 'there' - i.e., "that there which is beyond me and does not wholly rely upon me in-itself" - is no 'essence' (whether with respect to the human as being or otherwise) likewise demands of those who subscribe to such a dogma the entire removal of 'objectivity' from such's concomitant doctrinal propositions. Said more plainly, if 'there' cannot be anything discerned as 'objective', 'between' (cf. M. Buber, I and Thou) you and me 'here', then all there (is) is individual opinion and mere speculation (as "knowledge" demands for-itself some semblence of agreement or harmony amongst those who share in such's 'object'), seeming as if a zero-sum game (i.e., the Hobbesian 'state of war', where each acts only in accord to each's own interests), which is exactly the 'reef of solipsism' (i.e., radical skepticism / relativism) (cf. J. Sartre, Being and Nothingness). The greatest shortfall of this book, however, is the author's utter lack to communicate clearly (which is reflected just as much in Jaeggi's book 'Alienation', as she tracks very closely this text in her "critique" of the concept) - rather, he has shown himself to take what's not too complicated a topic to turn it into something which needs to be re-read (and re-read) simply to understand what point the author is really trying to make. Take as example the author's remark "Social relations are phenomena the existence and nature of which are far from being independent of the manner in which the populations with which they are associated understand their lives and circumstances" (pg. 87). Schacht's whole book is as poorly written as this mere sentence. Aside from this, the author shows poor logic (or, deep analytical reasoning) - this is best witnessed in his complete misinterpretation of Hegel's quote "it is not what 'exists' that makes us vehement and causes us suffering; rather, it is what is 'not' as it 'should' be" (pg. 92); meaning, it is when we notice what could have otherwise been but 'is not' now that we realize such suffering as this suffering reveals to us a certain failure regarding ourselves and our very own ability 'to make' for-ourselves. However, Schacht draws the conclusion "his conviction...reveals that in many cases it 'must be' as it is, and so 'cannot' be otherwise..." (pg. 92). Furthermore, take as example the authors remark "Not everything that is disagreeable is objectionable, just as it is not the case that everything objectionable is disagreeable. It is one thing to dislike something, and quite another to be able to establish that there is something wrong with it. Thus, it makes perfectly good sense to grant that something is disagreeable, and yet question whether - or even deny that - it is objectionable" (pg. 57). To illustrate the ineffectualness of such, consider the instance of a rape - surely, everyone would disagree with such conduct (even if they were not the subject of such a crime). So, given that each would 'disagree' with such an act, what then makes such 'objectionable'? By the author's standards, this question has no answer - precisely because of his non-essentialist position (i.e., that there is no inherent value of a human which can be made to stand as an 'object', and therefore as something for which can receive 'objection'). The author's arguments on pg. 127 seem all-the-like weak and quite short-sited logically speaking. In support of what's been said, and serving as good example of the authors non-essentialist logical shortcomings, the author proceeds with saying, "Before one concludes that they ought to be able to make such a change, however, and that they ought to want to even if they don't, and that it further is wrong for their situation to exist and to continue, one ought to ask oneself how one might go about justifying such claims as these. And as I have already remarked, it would seem quite hopeless to try to construct a justification for the kinds of claims under consideration by appealing to considerations pertaining to our essential nature and to the character of genuinely human life" (pg. 57). Overall, this book says a lot about nothing - cf. pg. 98 where the author admits "The social-theoretical heart of the matter under consideration, as I see it, is to determine the kind and degree of personal influence upon what occurs in their lives to which members of a society such as our own might reasonably aspire, where 'reasonably' is understood to mean realistically, fairly, and with due regard to the importance of other social and cultural values. In this essay, however, I have not attempted to develop such an account"
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b. <u>Quotes</u>:
   - "there is nothing self-evident about any of this…" - Author (pg. 3)
   - "such questions are no less pressing today than they were in Hegel's and Marx's times, and earlier in our own century" - Author (pg. 6)
   - **"alienation is a *relational* concept; it is always a matter of the alienation (of) someone or something (from) [*i.e., indicating a distance between…*] someone or something"** - Author (pg. 59)
     - *cf. comments on pg. 22 - 'alienation, at its core, is an emotive concept' & cf. pg. 29 and comments.
   - "<u>The term 'alienation' historically had three basic senses</u> all of which derive from **the root concept of the 'alien' as the different**, the foreign, or the otherwise significantly 'other' [*i.e., 'what is otherwise', where what's subsumed (in) the structure of such are ideals or norms, which can achieve objective standing, so long as there is harmony or agreement between such*]" - Author (pg. 38)
     - *'different' is the key word, here. One can surely 'feel' apart [i.e., at a distance] from themself, as much as one can feel 'different' from that which is beyond themself [i.e., who/what they know they are 'not']. <u>**It is for this 'difference', which in-itself stands as an idea, that a "conceptual analysis" (cf. pg. 22) surrounding the nature of alienation is necessary**</u>. It should be noticed that 'difference' is 'distance'.
   - "the term 'alienation'…may be construed as having the character of some sort of separation, distance, or discord" - Author (pg. 59)
c. <u>General Notes</u>:
   - Introduction (pg. 1)
     - "What appeared for a moment to be the approaching end of the story of humanity's achievement of maturity has turned out to be but the conclusion of one more chapter and the beginning of another, with new uncertainties and perplexities abounding. We have no more arrived today at anything that might plausibly be deemed 'the end of history' than humanity had in Hegel's time when he first proclaimed it" (pg. 1)
     - "One of the great and sad jokes of doctrinaire Marxism was the contention that <u>in Marxist-socialist societies there was no such thing as alienation, because with the abolition of capitalism the very possibility of alienation had been eliminated.</u> The truth of the matter, of course, was that **this was mere ideological semantics**, and that the changes wrought under this banner <u>not only failed to eliminate the forms of alienation that were supposedly engendered by capitalism but also ushered in others as well</u>, of an even more insidious nature. That irony is now being followed by another, as we witness the eagerness of these newly emancipated societies to transform themselves in the direction of the very conditions supposedly responsible for the forms of alienation that were to have been eliminated a revolution ago" (pg. 1)
     - "this is not to say, however, that Marxism need no longer concern us" (pg. 1)
       - "the way has at last been cleared for it to begin to receive the attention it deserves as a serious contender in the contest of philosophical and social-theoretical interpretations" (pg. 2)
     - **"alienation theory…may prove to have a very real and important future**, as we seek to comprehend these problems beneath as well as above the surface…" (pg. 2)
       - "Alienation theory is inseparable from a variety of larger forms of inquiry dealing with social life, values, and the human good. It might be regarded as a point of entry into this broader arena of reflection and investigation, in which many disciplines have roles to play and contributions to make. **The very notion of alienation depends for its meaningfulness upon the conceivability of a contrasting condition**

of some sort of identification, participation, involvement, possession, control, or (in a word) unity. It conveys the idea of the absence of the latter, and so - in any particular instance - requires to be spelled out in terms of some such contrast. Much of our lives revolves around such relations; and so alienation theory not surprisingly casts a very wide net indeed. There is little that matters in human life to which it cannot be usefully extended" (pg. 3)

- "One issue to which increasing attention is being given in many quarters today is that of 'empowerment'. This issue looms large on the agendas of many who are convinced that some groups are greatly disadvantaged in relation to others in this respect in our society, and that something very crucial to the quality of the lives of any and all of us is at stake here. This may well be so; and the general point has long been a salient theme in the literature of alienation theory for this very reason. This is one of the respects in which alienation theory is of great and continuing contemporary relevance. The very idea of 'empowerment', however, depends both for its social significance and for its very meaningfulness upon the viability of the distinction between 'power' and 'powerlessness', upon the ways in which this distinction is made out, and upon the sorts of 'power' of which it is meaningful in a real sense to speak in modern societies" (pg. 3)
  - "if talk about 'empowerment' is to be anything more than emotional rhetoric, it must be backed up and grounded in careful consideration of what is and is not humanly and socially possible along these lines" (pg. 3)
- "the relations of human beings as members of a societies to the norms and institutions of their societies has long been another of the primary focal points of conceptions and discussions of alienation. Where these relations have the character of a loss or lack of acceptance, participation, and identification, forms of alienation have been discerned" (pg. 3-4)
  - "A variety of forces appear to be at work that are resulting both in the blurring of the identities of societies in relation to each other and in the fragmentation of societies internally. These developments in turn are making ever more problematic any attempts to ascertain and specify what the specific norms and institutions are to which particular individuals may be taken to stand in significant relations of either sort" (pg. 4)
    - *i.e., it is becoming increasingly more difficult to 'point out' what exactly is the underlying issue leading to 'alienation'. The growing multiplicity in society is making is more difficult to understand the very relations of individuals and therefore their 'failures'.
    - "for example, it would make no sense to deem individuals 'alienated' from every norm and institution that is a going concern for any subset of the population among which they happen to live. It would be utterly impossible for anyone to identify with and participate in all of them. It also would be highly artificial to take the norms and institutions with which the majority of some such population identify as necessary and sufficient for the determination of what is to count as 'alienation' (and self-realization) for anyone living among them. **A fundamental rethinking of the entire matter is needed**; and the issues that must be faced lead directly to the question of how human life as a social phenomenon is to be understood, and to the problem of the dialectic of human selfhood and social participation" (pg. 4)
    - "a new dynamic would appear to be at work in the world today that is rendering traditional ways of thinking about these matters outmoded. It presents the apparent paradox of simultaneous tendencies toward both homogenization and pluralization in social, cultural, political, and economic life. This dual dynamic is rendering old models of the 'individual-society' relation increasingly questionable. It also has profound implications for the notions of human identity, autonomy, and community. **The ideas of alienation and self-alienation have long been employed to mark out certain sorts of relations** - of individuals to social norms and institutions, to their work and other activities, to each other and to themselves-in which some sort of avoidable separation obtains. But one consequence of this new dynamic is to transform the conditions of the possibility of making sense of many such separations, and of the forms of unity with which they are to be contrasted" (pg. 4)
- "A point made much of by Hegel, which would seem to ring importantly true, is that once a certain rather modest level of self-consciousness has been attained, human beings come to have a profound need for some sort of identity that they can affirm. **The varieties of identity that may suffice to satisfy this need are highly diverse, and are by no means invariably individualistic**; but the absence or loss of any such positive self-conception would appear to be as dire a state of affairs as there can be in human life, bringing a host of individual and social pathologies in its train. The attainment of any such identity involves a complex dialectic of both identification and differentiation. **The materials and means of attaining an identity can only be found outside of oneself [i.e., 'identified'], in the social and cultural dimensions of one's environing world above all, and must be internalized through relations of participation and appropriation; and its affirmation is bound up with relations with others by whom it is recognized and respected**. Yet it is no identity at all if it is not different from other discernable identities one might have and others do have; and one's ability to affirm it requires that one find some way of valorizing this difference - which itself usually involves viewing it under some interpretive-evaluative description one has internalized" (pg. 5)
  - *this is all quite similar to psychoanalytical 'projection' (i.e., the making to-be 'there' so to receive it as such 'here') and 'introjection' (i.e., the reaching out 'here' to grasp and keep for-myself that 'there'). 'Between' these two movements - or, rather, that place which serves to bound each, as the boundary must be part of that which it serves as such - is the ground upon which each 'meet'. The dialectic is such that these two movements occur simultaneously.
    - *cf. G. Hegel, The Science of Logic https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d6b5ff86e6c087a92f8f89/t/5913a3bb197aeab3e23ff4d3/1494459337924/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel__The_Science_of_Logic.pdf
      - 'For-Itself' (pg. 126) & 'Ground' (pg. 386)
- "there are good reasons to be concerned with the character of our working lives, and with the kinds of power we can and cannot attain with respect to what transpires in our lives more generally; for they are crucially relevant to the sorts of identities we can achieve. There also are good reasons to examine issues relating to identification and nonidentification with social and cultural norms and institutions; for they are of the greatest relevance to the dynamics of identity formation. And there further are good reasons to continue to reflect upon the possibility of making sense of the general ideas of self-realization and self-alienation, of genuinely human life and dehumanization, and of a related critical social theory and normative theory with further applications; for these are matters that go to the heart of the entire question of how to think about and sort out the kinds of identities that are humanly possible and worth having and attaining" (pg. 5)
  - "We are going to have to bootstrap our way toward a comprehension of **the changing field of human possibilities** pertaining to the many kinds of relations that set the stage for whatever lives we do and might live. The **central themes associated with alienation theory** are useful points of departure as we do so. They include concerns with the character of our working lives, with forms of power and powerlessness, with questions about social norms and normlessness, with problems of differing stances in relation to social institutions, with the difficult issues of selfhood and fully or truly human life, and with the possibility of some sort of normative theory that would have application in these contexts.
    - *this 'field of human possibility' can (and is) represented by the phenomenological term 'for-itself' - otherwise, that which is (for)ward of oneself, off in the distance to oneself, 'there' to-be had by oneself 'here'.
    - "from its very outset in the writings of Hegel and Marx, alienation theory has been characterized by a twofold intent - both interpretive and evaluative. It has sought to analyze and distinguish various human possibilities in ways that would at once contribute to their comprehension and facilitate their assessment" (pg. 6)
      - **"the developments of the past few decades…have transformed the field of human possibilities…"** (pg. 6)
        - "[such has] become even harder to deal with, not only because the complexity of the issues they pose has increased as

what Marx called 'the ensemble of social relations' in which our lives are enmeshed becomes ever more dense and tangled, but also because the simplistic approaches to them that formerly found favor under the banners of a handful of competing ideologies have been largely abandoned" (pg. 6)

- ○ **"we now find ourselves obliged to take up anew the tasks of interpretation and evaluation of the array of human possibilities with which we find ourselves confronted in the various domains to which earlier alienation theory directed attention"** (pg. 6-7)
  - ▪ "The challenge alienation theory poses to the various forms of theory with which it is connected is to envision and articulate relations of identification, participation, and integration that are humanly possible in contemporary societies and the kind of world that is emerging, in the various dimensions of human life in which the character of these relations is of substantial and general significance. <u>There is no a priori way of determining what the dimensions and relations are that matter in this way</u>, just as there is no clear-cut way of deciding what kinds and degrees of unity are optimal for the quality of human life and its enhancement in the modern world" (pg. 7)
- ○ "some [thinkers] are instructive in their very inadequacies, while others remain of considerable value for the perspectives they establish and the insights they afford. My references to Hegel and Marx above should make it obvious that I place them in the latter category; and I include Nietzsche along with them" (pg. 7)
  - ▪ "to be sure, these philosophers have provided their critics with some pretty god ammunition. But for all their faults and shortcomings, **they have gotten a much worse press - and much less serious attention - than they deserve. Indeed, I believe that Hegel and Marx and Nietzsche were onto some of the most important problems there are**, and can be very helpful to us as we continue to grapple with them" (pg. 9-10)
    - ☐ "Hegel attempted a grand synthesis of the entire history of thought, and worked out an interpretive system embracing every aspect of natural and human reality. His philosophy is saddled with the label of 'absolute idealism', which he himself invented and adopted, in one of his less inspired moments; but <u>he was far from being a mere idealist of the starry-eyed sort</u>. **He sought to discern and comprehend what he took to be the fundamentally interconnected underlying rational structures of all existence, and the nature and direction of all development, in the realms of natural phenomena, social life, and cultural and intellectual affairs alike**. One of Hegel's basic propositions was that 'reason rules the world'. What he meant by this, however, is *not* that people always act 'rationally'. He knew very well that they often don't, and even held that in some contexts this is all to the good. His point was rather that <u>the world is a fundamentally rational place, as the laws of nature reflect, and that the same rationality is gradually working itself out on higher levels in human social, political, and intellectual history</u>. Hegel celebrated the place of the human spirit in this scheme of things, because **it is in human life and thought that this basic rational structure of all of reality achieves its most complete and adequate expression**, when 'consciousness-raising' has gone as far as it can go. In our knowledge of the basic structure and development of reality, this reality comes to know itself. Hence his talk of it as 'spirit' - by which he meant rationally structured existence graced and completed by self-consciousness" (pg. 10)
      - ◆ "[today,] <u>the idea that the world is fundamentally rational is commonly taken for granted</u>, and so are the ideas of history as a developmental process, and of our general form of society as the culmination of that development. *Freedom* is one of the main themes running through Hegel's discussions of these matters; but freedom for him is not the freedom of anarchy and impulse. Rather, [freedom] is essentially bound up with the development of social institutions and with the ideas of reason and law; and Hegel makes much of the point that they all develop together in human life and history. **Freedom and reason, and their gradual institutional expression and embodiment, are for him the fundamental nature of the human spirit; and the history of humanity is the story of the development of freedom so conceived**" (pg. 11)
    - ☐ "Hegel had a high opinion of the form of society associated with the emergence of the modern constitutional state. This was because <u>he believed it to be the kind of setting most conducive to the fourfold attainment of material well-being, personal self-expression, social participation, and intellectual sophistication</u> (culminating in knowledge of everything worth knowing), which together make up <u>his picture of what human-spiritual life at its best involves</u>. It may be that there is or can be more to a genuinely and fully human life than Hegel recognized, and that better forms of society are conceivable than he conceived. Marx and Nietzsche both thought so. But one could do a lot worse. And for most of human history, worse it has been. Hegel would settle for nothing less than this kind of society at this point in history. It now at last is really possible; and he could conceive of nothing more or better for humanity than its establishment-except for the adjustment and refinement of the workings of actual modern societies, the better to ensure such fourfold human fulfillment" (pg. 11)
    - ☐ "Marx, as everyone knows, had his differences with Hegel. But his philosophy is in many respects a kind of naturalistic recasting of Hegel's basic views of human spiritual and social life and history, rather than a radical repudiation of them" (pg. 11)
      - ◆ "<u>what [Marx] actually sought was to *bring him down to earth*</u> - the earth of concrete human practices, in which everything human has is foundations and material conditions. **Marx agreed with Hegel that human life is *social* through and through**. But he argued that it has biological and economic (or 'material') foundations that condition it, in ways he believed Hegel failed to recognize. So <u>he proceeded to elaborate a naturalistic conception of truly and fully human life in terms of materially conditional *social individuality*, anchored in advanced technology, and attained through self-directed productive activity in community</u>" (pg. 11-12)
        - ◇ "What *Marx* meant by "communism" (in contrast to many of his self-styled followers) was a social and economic arrangement in which the conditions of the possibility of the realization of this ideal would finally be firmly and adequately established. <u>His diatribes against exploitation echo Kant's Categorical Imperative always to treat human beings as *ends*, rather than as mere *means*.</u> So, for example, he spoke of 'the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being'. It was because he took this imperative so seriously that he considered it necessary to do more than preach, and therefore became a social revolutionary. **Human life cannot be improved, he believed, without changing the conditions under which people are obliged to live and work**. And this means transforming those institutions and practices that obstruct its improvement and contribute to its dehumanization" (pg. 12)
          - ▸ "What sort of society did Marx actually seek? Hardly a human anthill, in which the individual is reduced to a mindless cog in the machinery of a totalitarian state. That, for him, would be the quintessence of self-alienation and dehumanization. Rather, as he says (at the conclusion of the *Manifesto*, no less), <u>he looks to the replacement of 'bourgeois society</u> with its classes and class antagonisms, by an association in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all'. Those regimes and rulers cloaking themselves in Mary's mantle in this century turned him on his head, making a sad and tragic travesty of his program and principles" (pg. 12)
    - ☐ "Nietzsche emphatically repudiated the historical optimism of both Hegel and Marx" (pg. 12)
      - ◆ "Nietzsche juxtaposed his countermyth of the 'eternal recurrence'. Its basic message is that the more things change, the more they remain the same, in a world in which 'power' is the name of the game" (pg. 12)
      - ◆ "it was his hypothesis that a primordial tendency he called the 'will to power', rather than anything at all rational, is at the root of all events, both natural and human" (pg. 12-13)
        - ◇ "<u>Nietzsche maintained that human beings differ significantly in what they have it in them to become</u>; and he never tired of

insisting that the exceptions are superior in value to the general run of humankind for this very reason, in the absence of anything about us that makes each and every one of us matter intrinsically and equally" (pg. 13)

- ▸ *I disagree; to admit this is to admit the myth of 'humanness' - that is, that there is no more 'one' human but a variety of species which all seem human.*

- ◆ **"Nietzsche was anything but a _nihilist_.** He wrestled long and hard with what is sometimes called 'the problem of _modernity_' - the profound disillusionment associated with the increasing secularization of human life, and the passing of unquestioning acceptance of tradition. Nihilism was in fact one of his nightmares; and he took it upon himself to try to discern a possible future course for humanity, beyond the 'death of God' and the demise of old ideals and consolations, which would lead to a new and greater enhancement of life. Contrary to popular opinion, Nietzsche's highest human type is not the conqueror but the _creator_. **The basic disposition he calls the 'will to power' for him finds its highest and most significant manifestation not in domination but in creativity, and in the attainment of myriad forms of excellence**. He sought to convince those inclined to despair by the demise of traditional religious interpretations, and by the collapse of their secular successors as well, that life can have a meaning after all. And for him this meaning is to be conceived in terms of what he described as 'life itself raised to its highest potency', when human beings learn how to endow their existence with significance, through their artistic transfiguration of themselves and their world" (pg. 13)

- ○ "An underlying theme of the essays in this volume is that many of the things that have been meant by 'alienation' are with us still, and are likely to remain so - and that the questions of both what is to be made of them and what (if anything) is to be done about them turn out to be far more complex and difficult than they were generally taken to be when the notion came into vogue a generation ago. The notion and theory of alienation therefore seem likely to have a future in discussions of these phenomena" (pg. 14)

  - ▪ "One of my general concerns here is to promote an appreciation of the diversity and variety of the human phenomena that have been and may continue to be subsumed under the general rubric of "alienation." Another is to enhance sensitivity to the question of what is description, interpretation, and evaluation in attempts to deal with them. Confusions on this score have long bedeviled the "alienation literature," both popular and scholarly, and it is imperative that such confusions be avoided if discussions of alienation are to be theoretically and practically fruitful" (pg. 14)
  - ▪ "while these essays are very critical of what one finds in the literature on alienation-related matters, they at the same time are intended to serve as a kind of salvage operation. **If the notion of alienation is to deserve a future, it must be employed with greater sophistication and clarity than it has been…**" (pg. 15)

- ▪ Chapter 1 - Varieties of Alienation: Alienation, the 'Is-Ought' Gap, and Two Sorts of Discord (pg. 17)

  - ○ "The notion of alienation has excited a great deal of interest, especially among reformists and revolutionists in social-scientific circles. Much of this interest would appear to be related to the widespread belief that this notion enables one to bridge the seemingly impassable gap between 'is' and 'ought', by means of an 'ought not' - and thereby to establish normative conclusions without paying the price of going beyond the limits of sound scientific method" (pg. 17)

    - ▪ "Let us first consider briefly how the notion of alienation is supposed to enable the 'is-ought' gap to be bridged. In a word, it purportedly does the trick by virtue of having both a purely _descriptive_ content and also a _normative_ thrust. That is, **it is taken to signify both that some state of affairs exists and that this state of affairs is one which ought _not_ exist.** And it is then inferred that this state of affairs ought to be altered, in such a way that the resulting new state of affairs is one to which the notion is no longer applicable. The case is thus regarded as being analogous to that of a notion like 'disease'. Indeed, alienation is often conceived as a kind of 'social disease'…" (pg. 17-18)

      - □ "[alienation seen in terms of a mental illness seeks] to categorize people in terms of their relative ability or inability to function in the context of the norms, practices, institutions, and standard roles prevailing in specific societies, cultures, and subcultures" (pg. 18)

  - ○ "Writers from Hegel and Marx onward have construed [alienation] in such a way that it has an emphatically _judgmental_ as well as descriptive character in their hands. For them (and for many others influenced by them, alienation is a matter of some sort of separation, nonidentity, or disunity _which ought to be overcome_, for reasons pertaining to our essential human nature or to the character of true humanity. In this tradition, the idea of alienation is thus intimately linked with the notion of self-alienation. And the 'self' or kind of 'selfhood' in question is not construed in terms of the actual disposition and various felt needs and wants of particular human beings. Rather, [self] is understood in terms of certain traits and attainments regarded as constitutive of human life as it can and should be lived. Thus, 'self-alienation' here signifies either dehumanization or incomplete (stunted or thwarted) humanization" (pg. 19-20)

    - ▪ "Both conceptually and factually, it is held to be independent of anything one happens to feel about oneself and one's situation. The relevance to it of the character of one's relations to others and to one's society is therefore an entirely contingent matter, depending upon the content ascribed to the notions of 'self' and 'humanization'. In short, self-alienation is one of a pair of contrasting notions, the other of which is something on the order of self-realization. **Unless one is prepared to advance and defend a conception of some sort of essential human selfhood that particular human beings may or may not fully actualize, one is in no position to speak of self-alienation, and thus cannot legitimately avail oneself of the notion either explicitly or implicitly**. And what is more, the same holds true with respect to all judgmental or normative uses of the term 'alienation'. For it has such evaluative import only on the assumption that the phenomena to which it is applied constitute or result in some such form of self-alienation or dehumanization. To be sure, the notion of alienation can be (and, in the social-scientific literature, effectively has been) split off from the idea of self-alienation and the essentialism this idea presupposes. Under these conditions, however, it cannot legitimately be supposed to retain any normative significance. This contention is admittedly contentious; but a closer consideration of the matter will bear it out" (pg. 20)

      - □ *one need only turn to Sartre and Heidegger (i.e., existentialism) to find that the 'essence' (granted, which each say is 'nothing' in-itself) of the human (any and every human) is their consciousness (i.e., that all humans are conscious beings), for which freedom is a quality, where such free-ness enables 'each' human to 'choose' for-themselves 'how' they ought to live. And, it is precisely this 'nothingness' which is common to all human consciousness. So, in light of the fact that my subjectivity cannot be any other's, the 'self' surely exists; and, in conjunction with what's been said, each 'self' strives 'to-live' (cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity), where morality (i.e., the 'ought') establishes the object by which 'alienation' subsequently serves as the means by which to measure the distance between what-is and what-ought. In terms of 'self-realization', that is very easy to justify as significant - one need only turn to psychoanalysis and existentialism (i.e., the structure of the for-itself). At the very least, the essence of each human being is that of having been thrown into a world not of their own making, acquiring a sense of self through maturation, wherein they are forced to reconcile in the root of their psyche that which affords them pleasure and that which does otherwise. Every single human follows this path, where their 'free-ness' allows each to traverse such at their own leisure and to their own accord.*

  - ○ "for most social scientists…alienation is a matter of the existence of one or several of a variety of forms of _discord_" (pg. 20)

    - ▪ "these forms of discord fall into two broad groups…One group consists of certain kinds of _dissatisfaction_; the other, of various sorts of _dysfunction_" (pg. 20)

      - □ "In the case of the former, attention is focused upon **_psychological_ states** - upon people's perceptions of, feelings about, and attitudes toward the situations and relationships in which they find themselves. The forms of discord encountered here might thus be termed 'experiential', or **_subjective_**; and so, for purposes of convenience and generalization, I shall refer to them as instances of _S-alienation_, or _S-alienations_" (pg. 20)

        - ◆ "the first of these observations should be relatively uncontroversial. In the case of S-alienations, there may be methodological

problems associated with the accurate detection and measurement of psychological states" (pg. 21)

◇ "'work alienation' may be conceived in terms of disliking one's work, 'social alienation' in terms of feeling isolated from other people, 'political alienation' in terms of feelings of powerlessness in relation to political events…" (pg. 21)

▶ "under these circumstances, <u>nothing more of a conceptual or theoretical nature remains</u> to be done with respect to the conceptions of alienation in question" (pg. 21)

– *meaning, we are constricted to the theoretical level when discussing the emotive aspect of alienation - which, by the way, is all that alienation (is) in the first instance. Discussion of social structure might rope in alienation only in so far as such might be a contributing factor for someone 'feeling' alienated.*

□ "In the case of the second group, on the other hand, attention is focused upon **social relations** - upon the (lack of) integration or 'mutual fit' of the behavior and activities of individuals with the conventions and expectations of groups and with the laws and institutions of the socio-politico-economic order in which they live. The forms of discord encountered here might thus be termed 'social-structural', or (in this sense) **objective**; and so, for the same purposes, I shall refer to them as instances of *O-alienation*, or *O-alienations*" (pg. 20-21)

◆ *o.k., but these 'structures' are made by humans (i.e., they are 'human'-social-institutions). So, where is the bridge between the human and their makings? How does one simply leap so far from subjective to their being anything objective? Maybe, because there is some 'objective-ness' in humans themselves (i.e., as agents or beings-in-the-world)? Otherwise, that there is harmony 'between' humans as humans (i.e., a human-ness). Cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity - "Commonality serves as the establishment for objectivity in that it's what's common-between things, pointing to a lack in subjectivity. It is this commonality which is, in a sense, isolated from, outside of or beyond, not being wholly dependent upon, the subject itself - this non-dependability is the criterion for objectivity. Each human has a subjectivity which, if not for anything else, sets the ground for objectivity"* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_5516fdbb15b14b74855f044d0a6d8dc8.pdf

◆ "allowances must be made for the fact that dysfunctional behaviors and social relations differ from psychological dissatisfactions, and require to be detected and measured in other ways" (pg. 21)

□ "With regard to both sorts of discord, two complementary observations may be made. First: in neither case does the appropriateness of speaking of 'alienation' depend upon the evaluation of what takes place in terms of some extra-experiential and extra-societal (essentialist) standard. And second: in neither case does the applicability of the term 'alienation' warrant any critical evaluative inferences. These observations merely bring the conclusions reached in the previous section to bear upon the two groups of alienations under consideration; but they are sufficiently important to merit brief elaboration and comment" (pg. 21)

▪ **"What is then called for is neither conceptual analysis nor theoretical reflection upon the nature of alienation**, but rather merely the refinement of the appropriate techniques of statistical analysis and the description of institutions and behaviors relating to them. And once these analytical matters have been worked out, the task at hand is a matter of the construction of models facilitating the explanation and correlation of these phenomena of 'alienation'" (pg. 22)

□ *this is exactly the mistake of this whole effort. <u>Alienation, at its core, is an emotive concept.</u>*

▪ "it may be felt that, where there is psychological dissatisfaction and social-structural dysfunction, there obviously exists a need to change things in such a way that the former will give way to satisfaction, and the latter to functionality or integration" (pg. 22)

□ "This objection, however, is itself highly questionable. **The assumption of the undesirability of discord on which it is based is covertly essentialist;** and the sort of essentialist doctrine reflected in this assumption is neither tenable in the absence of justification, nor very plausible as essentialist doctrines go" (pg. 22)

◆ *what an idiot. I don't know where these people (Schacht and Jaeggi) are getting this. Every human feels (whether pain, pleasure, etc.). To advocate a non-essentialist position with respect to humans and their emotions is to deny in the same movement that emotions are a part of their 'make-up'. If so, then what the fuck is the Human?! If truly non-essentialist, then this question has no answer. "The idea of the 'human' is false", they'd surely say. Well, if this be the case, then there is no need for any investigation of anything in the first instance. But, yet, here's the author, exploring and discussing ideas to an audience which is Human.*

▪ "The elimination of any of the kinds of dissatisfaction under consideration (S-alienations) may be achieved equally effectively by altering *either* the situations and relationships in which those who are dissatisfied find themselves, *or* their perceptions of and attitudes toward them. And the elimination of the various sorts of dysfunction in question (O-alienations) may be accomplished by adjusting *either* the framework of conventions, expectations, laws, and institutions with which the behavior and activities of individuals do not jibe, *or* the pattern of the relevant behavior and activities" (pg. 23)

□ "the common view that it is the *former* of each of these sets of factors that ought be adjusted rather than the latter, thus reflects a form of implicit essentialism that does not stop with the relatively minimal (though still substantial) principle that human life ought to be free of such discords" (pg. 23)

◆ "that it is possible not only to spell out the general way things ought to be in human life, but moreover to do so in more specific and concrete terms than those that merely lay down certain formal conditions…is not only far from being obviously valid; it further asserts something that neither social-scientific inquiry nor any other form of empirical-theoretical endeavor is in any position to establish. The issue raise…is a philosophical one. It can be settled (if at all) only in the context of a fundamental and comprehensive philosophical anthropology and value theory" (pg. 23)

◇ *simply because an exhaustive account of all that 'ought' be done cannot be promulgated (i.e., that one cannot completely enumerate the entire 'realm of ought'), fitting to make a 'perfect system', does not justify the entire dismissal (or, absence) of identifying and codifying the select few norms (i.e., easy hanging fruit) which can aid in establishing a 'society' where individuals (at the very least) do not randomly kill each other, taking their land and family for themselves, or rape children. If a social scientist is not knowledgeable enough to see the 'value' in this (i.e., in constituting measures which serve to safeguard individuals becoming victims to these sorts of acts), then their entire profession stands severely in question. <u>We don't need 'perfect' so much as we do the staving-off of the 'horrendous'.</u>*

▶ *to this, F. H. Heinemann, in Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, remarks "it is a fundamental mistake to assume that what cannot be defined does not exist" (pg. 166)* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_f672969890724b53b81ed15b2df625b3.pdf

◆ "it is in principle doubtful that the states of mind and actions of any group of people in any set of conditions do or can serve as reliable indicators of anything at all…" (pg. 23)

◇ *rape, murder, theft, bribery, slavery…need I say more?*

◇ "it is quite another [thing] to maintain that the resolution of discord is intrinsically preferable to the continuation of discord" (pg. 24)

▶ *so, by this perspective, one cannot see the value of peace over war; of psychological comfort over complete distress; of love over hate?*

○ "[Marx's] thinking, at least during the period in which his attention focused on the 'problem of alienation', was covertly essentialist in certain

crucial respects…" (pg. 24)

- "for it was his commitment to a normative conception of human life as it ought to be that underlay his critique of modern (capitalist) society" (pg. 24-25)
- "The young Marx was deeply committed to an ideal that might be described as a form of *social individualism*, to which he felt that various aspects of life in modern society were antithetical. It was in connection with discords associated with this state of affairs that he employed the term 'alienation'. And **it was this normative commitment, with its implicit essentialist philosophical presuppositions, that led him to insist that it is imperative to bring about certain changes in the organization of modern society**. These changes are mandatory, in his view, in order to eliminate such alienations and make possible the forms of sociality and individuality he envisaged. Marx's summons to revolutionary activity thus did not proceed directly and immediately from his observation that certain discordances characterize social relations and human experience in modern society. Rather, it followed from this observation *together with* the conviction (springing from his early 'humanism') that these sorts of discordances ought not exist" (pg. 25)
  - **can a monetary system function as it should if all there is is theft - if I couldn't 'trust' my bank to hold my money for me, rather than steal it? And, in fact, we have plenty of evidence of what a functioning monetary system looks like - even though not 'perfect' (i.e., not completely devoid of corruption) - when we look at a host of countries.*
- "the fact that it was Hegel and Marx who elevated the term [alienation] from relative obscurity to a position of importance in social inquiry merely serves to suggest further that their examples require to be taken seriously" (pg. 25)
  - "[however,] **any suggestion to the effect that some phenomenon that may be so described [as alienating] ought to be eliminated presupposes some sort of normative - and ultimately, essentialist - commitment**, be it explicit or implicit" (pg. 25)
- "it undoubtedly would be unwise to prejudge the question of whether it is possible to meet with any degree of success in establishing the sort of philosophical foundation that would be required in order to warrant evaluative judgments with respect to instances of either of the types of discord distinguished above. But it is not to be expected either that social scientists will find the prospect of carrying out this undertaking an enticing one, or that they would be able to do so at all adequately were they to try. For any attempt to do so would of necessity involve the consideration of a number of large and difficult philosophical issues with which social scientists are not suitably equipped methodologically to deal" (pg. 25-26)
  - **then what good are you all?! Cf. comments on pg. 23*
- "The employment of the term 'alienation' in connection with these two types of discord, however, is a fact of life in the social-scientific literature. It cannot be denied and should not be ignored; and it is by no means inherently objectionable. **Employed independently of any essentialist presuppositions, the term is quite incapable of bridging the "is-ought" gap**. But it does not follow that it is therefore also incapable of playing any legitimate and positive role whatsoever in social-scientific inquiry. Indeed, its employment is at least arguably not only legitimate but also analytically useful and theoretically fruitful" (pg. 26)
  - "the most fundamental circumstance to be observed is that, in the absence of any connection with an essentialist philosophy of human nature, all alienation has a *contextual* character" (pg. 26)
    - S-Alienations (pg. 26)
      - "These forms of alienation are contextual in the sense that they have what might be called a *perspective-relative* character. That is, the dissatisfactions in which they consist center upon states of affairs that are *experienced* as dissatisfying owing at least in part to the *perspective* from which they are viewed and interpreted" (pg. 26-27)
      - "These dissatisfactions, in other words, are inextricably bound up with the self-understanding, beliefs, conceptual repertoire, attitudes, aspirations, desires, and feelings of those who experience them. Factors of this sort constitute a psychological framework that mediates the individual's perception of and reaction to his or her situation. They are a set of lenses, as it were, that filters, colors, and generally conditions one's apprehension of and response to it. And S-alienations are perspective-relative in the further sense that such lens-sets are variable, both from one individual and group to another and also for the same individual or group from one time to another. Consequently perceptions of the same situation may vary, and with them the relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction of those involved in relation to the situation" (pg. 27)
        - "Indeed, it often happens that the experience of some forms of this sort of alienation, in conjunction with a desire to achieve a more agreeable accommodation with one's situation, leads to a gradual readjustment of perspective that effectively extinguishes them. This is by no means to say, however, that this is the way S-alienations generally ought to be overcome, or even to imply that they ought somehow to be overcome or diminished. Indeed, it can be argued that at least some of them are indispensable - as persisting states - to a wide variety of creative endeavors" (pg. 27)
      - "in the case of S-alienation, the existence of certain sorts of psychological states is the sole and complete criterion of their occurance" (pg. 30)
        - "in the case of S-alienations, questions of the validity, accuracy, justifiability, and so on, of the perceptions and attitudes of the people under consideration are quite irrelevant. What matters is only that the designated psychological or experiential states obtain; the epistemic status of these states…is not at issue, and does not affect the appropriateness of using the term 'alienation' in relation to them" (pg. 30-31)
        - "The epistemic status of the views of the social scientist investigating these phenomena, with respect to the nature of the conditions of life prevailing in the society in which their subjects live, is equally irrelevant in this connection. It is only the reliability and accuracy of the social scientist's measures and descriptions of the psychological states of the subjects under investigation that matter here." (pg. 31)
        - "here what people think and feel is not only relevant but decisive" (pg. 31)
    - O-Alienations (pg. 27)
      - "Alienations of this sort are contextual in the somewhat different sense that they have what might be called a structure-relative character. That is, the dysfunctions in which they consist require to be viewed in relation to the character of some established (social) structure. O-alienations are not simply a matter of what certain people do (and do not do)" (pg. 27)
      - "they are a matter of the existence of a discrepancy between the two. No action or pattern of behavior is dysfunctional in and of itself. It may be termed dysfunctional only in relation to some social structure, the functioning of which is dependent upon actions and behaviors of a different nature, and is frustrated when such (dysfunctional) activity is engaged in instead" (pg. 28)
        - **wont of a certain structure is a 'norm'; and, to compare anything, one must identify a certain 'structure' to hold against the current (i.e., "is"). Thus, we soon find ourselves in the 'is-ought' relation with respect to 'social structure'. So, no, the author has not cleverly escaped (or, circumvented) the need to face head on norms and their values in mending the gap between what-is and what-ought.*
      - "O-alienations must be conceived relationally. What constitutes an instance of this sort of alienation depends upon the character of a given social structure and upon the derivatively defined character of what failure to act in accordance with it involves" (pg. 28)
        - "In short, O-alienations stigmatize neither the social structures nor the behavioral patterns in terms of which they are to be conceived. Indeed, they do not stigmatize at all, even to the point of identifying given configurations of social relations as unsatisfactory. They merely mark the existence of discordances between the two social-relational elements. And once

again, it may well be that the existence of at least some such kinds of discord is by no means as undesirable as is commonly supposed. Indeed, it may even be essential to the health and vitality of human societies" (pg. 28)

- ◆ "What counts here is rather the character of what the individuals and groups in question actually *do* in relation to the nature of some existing social *structure*, regardless of how they may perceive and feel about both what they do and this structure. For it is in terms of this 'objective' relation, and in terms of it alone, that such alienations are to be understood." (pg. 30)
  - ◇ *o.k., but this necessarily involves a norm. And, when deciding upon one norm over another, it often becomes a matter of why one 'feels' it 'ought' be one way or the other, where reason, too, is important for making such decisions. How can there be any 'structure' without my feeling in the first instance that some (any) 'structure' should exist? How can any object be evaluated absent a subjectivity?*
- ◆ "in the case of O-alienations…such alienations are to be conceived in terms of the actions and patterns of behavior of the subjects rather than in terms of their feelings and attitudes" (pg. 31)
  - ◇ "the epistemic views of the inquiring social scientist, on the other hand…is of cardinal importance. The soundness of the assessment made of both is crucial to the legitimacy of all assertions pertaining to O-alienations. For by their very nature, these alienations do not exist except insofar as the discordant social relations obtain in terms of which they are defined." (pg. 31)
  - ○ "To summarize: suppose it is agreed (either for programmatic reasons or on methodological grounds) to avoid using the term 'alienation' in ways that would raise all of the problems associated with the elaboration and defense of some sort of essentialist doctrine of human nature. The uses of the term that then remain open, at least within the general domain of social-scientific inquiry, are those that pertain to phenomena falling within one or both of two broad areas: **human subjectivity and human objectivity, experiential states and social relations - in a word, what people *feel* and what people *do*. It is not *any* feelings and doings in terms of which forms of alienation are to be conceived, however**; the relevant ones are those that involve certain types of discords, discrepancies, or separations. It is only for some (very uncommon) kinds of essentialists that it is possible to speak of consciousness and action as discordant with *themselves*. Disregarding this possibility, therefore, these discords require to be understood as unharmonious relations of other kinds. And if essentialist schemes of interpretation of human nature are also set aside, the only other candidates available are those that pertain to the contexts within which people feel and behave as they do" (pg. 29)
    - ▪ *this is exactly why I am confused. The author accepts feelings and emotions as part of the idea of alienation but immediately constricts which feelings qualify - that is, feelings which only raise in the individual a feeling of 'separation'. Yet, paired with each emotion is a norm. If a bad feeling arises, the human aims to escape it; if a good feeling, to follow and keep it. Even further, the human 'knows' what's "bad" precisely because it knows what's otherwise (i.e., good). Meaning, in each instance (i.e., whether experiences of good or bad behold the human in a certain circumstance), some ideal already exists, whether clearly defined or not, against such's opposite. See comments below on pg. 29*
      - □ *G. Rae (https://www.ucm.es/gavinrae/), in his article 'Alienation, Authenticity and the Self', remarks "Brian Baxter (1982: 3) has noted that 'to be alienated from something presupposes the existence of an opposite state of non-alienation'. In accordance with this interpretation, I understand that the concept 'alienation' only gains its meaning in contrast to nonalienation…" (pg. 23, History of the Human Sciences, vol. 23, n. 4, 2010, pp. 21–36)*
      https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49763905_Alienation_authenticity_and_the_self
  - ○ "in the case of S-alienations, the relevant contexts are perspectival" (pg. 29)
    - ▪ "in the case of O-alienations, the relevant contexts are social-structural" (pg. 29)
    - ▪ "in both cases, **what is at issue is nothing more or less than *intracontextual adjustment*** [*i.e., a within-context reformation; but, to (re)form implies some ideal (or, at least, already existing) form for which to affix the given context - otherwise said, to put something back together implies that there is, in the same moment, a norm by which such 'ought' to be, where it 'is' currently not*]. And the existence of alienations of either sort is simply a matter of such adjustment being incomplete in certain respects and to some degree or another" (pg. 29)
      - □ *F. Copleston, in A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism, remarks "social adjustment should be understood with reference to the whole nature of man and not simply with reference to his biological and economic interests" (pg. 216)*
      https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_2631d9844b764ac7aae28185ce5fa4ae.pdf
  - ○ "One final suggestion: it would be well to abandon once and for all the attempt to merge the many different specific social-scientific conceptions of alienation into a single (though complex) "multi-dimensional" super-conception of alienation, in which all of them would be related and correlated" (pg. 33)
  - ○ "In short, *there is no such thing as alienation*. Neither is there any such thing as S-alienation, or O-alienation. But there *are* myriad **alienations -** alienations that have existed, that do exist, and (no doubt) that will come into existence as the human adventure continues along its many different paths.
    - ▪ *it is for this that the author has made it impossible to understand what he's trying to say.*
    - ▪ "There is nothing wrong with the practice of using the term "alienation" in the characterization of the various phenomena in question, both experiential and social-relational even if there is no compelling reason to retain and expand it either. But it should not be supposed that the notion of alienation itself constituted a light capable of dispelling the darkness of incomprehension intially surrounding these phenomena, any more than the notion of 'unity' does" (pg. 34-35)
  - ○ "'alienation' is only a relational category of lending itself to a great many applications…" (pg. 35)
- ▪ Chapter 2 - Alienation and Economic Life: Economic Alienation, With and Without Tears (pg. 36)
  - ○ "The concept of economic alienation is often supposed to have originated with the young Karl Marx, in the mid-1840s. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. Similarly, economic alienation itself is commonly held to be a product of the rise of capitalism and the is commonly held to be a product of the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution. This belief too is mistaken. The concept of economic alienation has been around ever since the ancient Romans began using the Latin word "*alienatio*" to refer to the action of transferring the ownership of something to another person or agency; and it has been current coin in English, German, and the major Romance languages since the Middle Ages, as one can discover by looking in any historical dictionary of these tongues (and any good recent dictionary as well). As for the phenomenon of economic alienation: if we construe it as it is standardly defined, it must be recognized to be as old as the human institutions of ownership and economic exchange. So understood, economic alienation long antedates capitalism, and will survive its demise as long as it remains possible for a human being to possess property and part with it" (pg. 36)
    - ▪ "And even Marx himself would not have this possibility abolished altogether; for like Hegel before him, he saw that to do away with property entirely would be to preclude the very possibility of the development and realization of human personality. This was the last thing he would have wanted, or would even have been willing to tolerate. Indeed, it was in the name of a social individualism placing a premium upon the full actualization of this possibility that he issued his historic critique of capitalism, and his call for its revolutionary overthrow" (pg. 36)
  - ○ "Economic alienation has had a bad press for some time now, and consequently has come to have a most unsavory reputation in polite and common circles alike. Yet it seems to me that the matter is much more complicated than it might at first appear to be; and that this reputation is by no means entirely deserved" (pg. 37)
    - ▪ "First: nothing intrinsically objectionable is conveyed by the general notion of economic alienation as such. Second: if there is anything

warranting objection here, what is objectionable is some particular form or forms of economic alienation. And third: the case for any such objectionability must be made out - if it can be made out at all - in terms of some normative theory of values or goods pertaining to the character of human life" (pg. 37)

  □ *it cause for concern that the author, without first presenting a methodological way in which to conceive of (i.e., ground) 'economic alienation' (i.e., what does it mean to be economically alienated and what such entails), has already dismissed any objection against such.*

- "In short: it is my contention that one who would object to some form of economic alienation can sustain the objection only on the basis of a normative philosophical anthropology (or theory of human nature), in terms of which it can be argued that the form of economic alienation in question has the significance of a type or source of self-alienation or dehumanization. It is such a link between certain forms of economic alienation and the ideas of self-alienation and human self-realization that supplies the normative thrust of Marx's discussion of "alienated labor" in his early writings. And I would suggest that this sort of connection can be repudiated or avoided only at the price of restoring the notion of economic alienation to its status as a merely descriptive category pertaining to an evaluatively neutral phenomenon of human economic life" (pg. 37)

  □ *if the whole goal is to avoid the topic of 'human nature' (due to such being 'essentialist'), then what are we even talking for? Because, surely, to detail any idea has with it that it be heard by some audience, of whom the author would like to hopefully influence in some way, which means that, in this whole idea of writing to have what we write be read by another, we are relying on the very human nature which seems here to be dismissed.*

○ "The term 'alienation' historically had three basic senses all of which derive from **the root concept of the 'alien' as the different**, the foreign, or the otherwise significantly 'other' [*i.e., 'what is otherwise', where what's subsumed (in) the structure of such are ideals or norms, which can achieve objective standing, so long as there is harmony or agreement between such*]. In one sense, it refers to the kind of economic transfer already mentioned. In another, it refers to a condition of separation or estrangement from someone or something other than oneself, with which one once was or ideally should be united. And in a third, it refers to a state of mental derangement or disorder. When alienation in the sense of transfer occurs, one gives up or no longer has ownership of and control over something that once belonged to one. When alienation in the sense of separation occurs, one ceases (or simply is unable) to identify with someone or something with which one might under other circumstances be at one. And when alienation in the sense of derangement obtains, one is not oneself, and so might be said to be a stranger to oneself" (pg. 38)

  ■ *'different' is the key word, here. One can surely 'feel' apart [i.e., at a distance] from themself, as much as one can feel 'different' from that which is beyond themself [i.e., who/what they know they are 'not']. **It is for this 'difference', which in-itself stands as an idea, that a "conceptual analysis" (cf. pg. 22) surrounding the nature of alienation is necessary**. It should be noticed that 'difference' is 'distance'.*

○ "What is immediately at issue now is the character of my relation to the labor I perform and the results this labor yields. The fact that they are both *mine* provides some warrant for considering them to be analogous to property that can be both owned and transferred to someone else's possession. At best, however, the analogy is only partial; and when the disanalogies are taken into consideration, talk of ownership and its transfer has to give way to something else. The most likely candidates as replacements for them are the contrasting notions of *control* and its *relinquishment* (or loss) in relation to one's labor and products. The idea of economic alienation thus comes to be understood in terms of the performance of labor and the production of goods and services under circumstances in which control over what one does has passed into the hands of someone else, or under the sway of some external power. And this leads to the thought that economic alienation involves the loss of *autonomy* and the preclusion of *self-determination* in one's productive, working life" (pg. 39-40)

  ■ "In this way the economic alienation involved in my working for or under another, or under circumstances in which I am subject to forces over which I have no control, ceases to be viewed as merely a *transfer*, and comes to be interpreted as a *separation*. And the primary estrangement fixed upon here is not *inter*-personal, but rather *intra*-personal; for the passage of control to another agency is taken to create a separation between my needs, desires, and interests on the one hand, and what I do and produce on the other" (pg. 40)

    □ "here my personality is one thing, and my labor and products are another - something 'alien' to my personality [*or preference, where my 'personality' is an expression of my wants and fears and beliefs*], rather than its cultivating expression and concrete realization" (pg. 40)

  ■ "This separation, in turn, is then subjected to a further interpretation and evaluation, in terms of which it takes on the significance of *dehumanization*. For **the underlying idea at work here is that something basic to the essence or norm of genuine humanity is violated to the extent that one is reduced** to the status of a means to someone else's ends or an instrument subordinated to the workings of a larger process, is unable to act autonomously, and is prevented from achieving the kind of personal self-realization associated with self-determined productive activity" (pg. 40)

    □ *by this logic, child labor is not any bit of an issue as to call such an issue would require the "roping-in of a norm" to have what-is subsequently sit beside (or, against) what-ought.*

○ "Thus an economic activity is conceived as issuing in a psychological-practical condition, upon which a normative-anthropological judgment is pronounced. Beginning with the fact of an economic practice, a path of interpretation is followed that draws crucially on the idea of genuinely human life; and the notion of economic alienation is expanded and transformed accordingly - from relinquishment of control, to resulting separation, to fundamental dehumanization or self-alienation" (pg. 40)

○ "I shall devote most of the remainder of my discussion to two tasks of a preliminary nature, in an attempt to make clear what answering it in one way or another would involve and entail. The first will be to suggest how the notion of economic alienation might be spelled out in a descriptive rather than prescriptive manner, independently of any link to any essentialist or normative ideas of self-alienation and genuinely human life. And the second will be to consider what views along the latter lines one would have to subscribe to in order to endow this notion with evaluative significance of-, putting the matter the other way around, what the ascription of evaluative significance to this notion would commit one to holding along these lines, if indeed this would make any sense at all" (pg. 42)

  ■ "**It will perhaps be objected that the first of these tasks cannot in principle be carried out, on the grounds of the purported impossibility of framing any social scientific concept in a nonevaluative of "value-free" way.** To this I would reply that the dogma on which the objection rests greatly exaggerates the importance of a small truth and the difficulty of avoiding a real and potentially troublesome tendency…The tendency referred to is the tendency to import value-judgments antecedently arrived at into the account one gives of whatever one thus singles out for attention and characterizes" (pg. 42-43)

    □ *and such would be a correct objection. And, there isn't any specific dogma which need follow such an objection - that is just how scientific theories work: you cannot propose something completely stripped of any 'value' (or relevance or applicability) to the human as doing so would necessarily refute the existence of the proposition in the first instance. We propose things to have what we propose be used. In being used, we often have in mind some 'end' (or, objective or purpose or ideal or norm or reason); otherwise, what's the point of proposing anything? Yes, there is 'bias' in judgements; but, that's exactly why we take care to reason. The social scientists' duty is to reason well. And, in such reasoning, there is to be discovered ideals - things to hold 'as true' for the purpose of 'properly' managing this collective human existence.*

○ "the notion [of alienation] can be defined and explicated in terms of either *objective* or *subjective* factors. More precisely, one may fix upon either observable socioeconomic relations and behavior, or experiential and attitudinal states of those involved in economic activity. This dual approach is a virtual necessity in the case of social and political alienation; and it would seem that a similar course is indicated in the present case of economic alienation. For it is of the greatest importance to distinguish between how people *feel* about their work, and the factual circumstances

pertaining to the *manner* of their work" (pg. 44)

- "**The basic idea of alienation is the idea of *something becoming alien or passing under alien control***; and whether this comes about…either through the entrance into the picture of a capitalistic employer or in some other way, is a matter of relative indifference in relation to this basic idea" (pg. 45)
    - "**[one's] work is *alien* to them only if it further is at variance [i.e., is different - cf. notes on pg. 38] with their interests, inclinations, and intentions**" (pg. 45)
        - *i.e., what I do and produce is at odds with me if not aligned to what I had intended or wanted as part of my doing and producing anything. And, doe this not automatically rope in (i.e., encompass as a necessary factor) emotions (i.e., how one construes what they do against what they 'feel' they could - viz., what's possible for-them to do - or should otherwise be doing)? O.k., so, again, the author failure to methodically address the expanse between what's subjective and objective (i.e., how one can 'leap' from one to the other). Cf notes on pg. 20-21.
    - "economic S-alienation is essentially a matter of the feeling and attitudes of agents with respect to their work" (pg. 45)
        - "Drawing upon an old distinction, it may be said to exist in any case in which agents regard their work as a mere job that they do not feel to be at all intrinsically satisfying, rather than as something they do and want to do for its own sake. If agents are indifferent to or negatively disposed toward the content of their work, and perceive the labor in which they engage as but a set of chores they are obliged for extraneous reasons to perform, their work may quite appropriately be characterized as subjectively 'alien' to them" (pg. 45)
        - "If [one] derive[s] personal satisfaction from [their work] and at least to some extent enjoy it in its own right, as an end in itself rather than a mere means, it would (to that extent) be inappropriate to speak of economic S-alienation in their case" (pg. 45-46)
        - "From the fact that one is economically S-alienated, it follows neither that one's work ought to be changed, nor that one's attitude toward it ought to be changed, nor even that something or other ought to be changed in order to eliminate the S-alienation. And from the fact that one is not S-alienated, it follows neither that one has the 'right' attitude toward one's work, nor that one's work is a good thing, nor even that this is the way matters ought to be. **Issues of these sorts cannot even be intelligibly raised as long as economic alienation is conceived independently of normative presuppositions and commitments, and all questions pertaining to human values and the nature of genuinely human life are left in abeyance or dismissed**" (pg. 46)
    - "with respect to economic O-alienation…one might initially find it difficult to imagine what this sort of alienation might involve" (pg. 46)
        - "A beginning can be made in the direction of doing so, however, if one calls to mind the sociological concept of the *bearer or performer of a standardized role*. And the notion may be brought still more clearly into focus if one reflects upon the idea of a *rule-governed function*, which in extreme cases may be so thoroughly routinized and completely impersonal that it can be likened to the mechanical operation of a cog in a machine. Some economic activities involving the production of goods and the provision of services have a highly structured, impersonally regimented, and basically anonymous character, while others do not; and yet others do to some incomplete though still considerable extent. Economic agents who perform such activities operate as essentially interchangeable functional units. What they do on the job is to follow certain uniform procedures and play standardized roles in economic processes, doing the same things anyone else would be obliged to do in the same job. The things they do are fairly completely determined not only by the general job description, but also on the level of the particular kinds of actions involved in doing these jobs" (pg. 46-47)
        - "Work of the sort under consideration does not admit of any significant degree of control on the part of the economic agent. **The completely impersonal, strictly functional <u>nature of such work</u> guarantees that it will be <u>disassociated from the personal identity of the agent</u>**, whatever that might be. And these features of this kind of work - uncontrollability and impersonality - answer quite well to two of the basic senses of 'alienation'. There may be no explicit transfer by agents of control over their actions to someone else; but there is an *absence of control*, since **the nature of the job is what controls them**. And while one may become so accustomed to the kind of work in question that one does not mind doing it, there is nonetheless a significant sort of *separation* here, between *what one is as a person and what one does as an economic agent*" (pg. 47)
            - *I am completely confused. I thought this author was against any essentialist approach - yet, here is mentioned 'as a person', therein connoting some idea of 'personhood' which is at odds with the 'nature' of the job they perform.
        - "it is along these lines that I suggest the notion of economic O-alienation be understood" (pg. 47)
        - "<u>The crucial point</u> is the fact that the character and occurrence of the actions involved in the kind of economic activity in question are explicable without any reference to the personal identities of those who perform them" (pg. 48)
            - "**economic O-alienation…refers to work that by its very nature is <u>impersonal</u>**, involving the performance of actions dictated to a high degree of specificity simply by the sort of job one has taken or task one is assigned, and affording one little or no opportunity to do anything other than produce a certain result in the same way anyone else would be obliged to do in the same work situation. Work of this sort is anonymous; someone in particular may do it, but it makes no difference (to what is done and how it is done) who does it - as long as whoever does it possesses the requisite general capacities and skills and does what is called for" (pg. 51-52)
                - *cf. N. Berdyaev, The Fate of Man in the Modern World - "The impersonal and inhuman power of money has determined the fate of man" (pg. 76) & "The domination of the mass and the *impersonal* collective, which at one place takes the form of a bourgeois democracy with the dictatorship of money although always disguised and secret, and at another the form of the authoritarian state with the openly avowed dictatorship of leaders—this creates a most difficult situation for creative cultural forces, for a cultural elite" (pg. 111) https://ia601403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World_text.pdf
            - "it is divorced from the personal identity of the one who performs it, and stands in no relation to anything about the personal that might [serve to] distinguish that person from any other with the same ability to do the job" (pg. 52)
        - "Work of this sort is far from uncommon; and it is my suggestion that, whether one takes it to be a bad thing, a good thing, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, or simply a piece of life worth noticing and distinguishing from others, it may reasonably and informatively be designated as a type of (economic) alienation, **owing to this separation entailed by its impersonality** - and as an *objective* type of alienation, owing to its identifiability by reference to features it has that guarantee the existence of this separation. Hence my 'economic O-alienation'" (pg. 52)
            - *again, as said in the comments on pg. 38, the operative word here is 'separation' (i.e., difference).
- "the young Marx was deeply committed to what one might (rather playfully) call 'the cult of personality'. He attached great importance and intrinsic value to the human personality, as had Kant and Schiller and numerous others before him. Indeed, his morality is essentially that expressed in the second formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative; and the ideal society he envisioned may be conceived as a kind of Kantian Realm of Ends of the sort referred to in Kant's third formulation of it" (pg. 49)
    - "like Hegel, Marx recognized the developmental character of the human personality, and saw that its full flowering had both social and

practical presuppositions. In particular, he accepted the Hegelian thesis that the sphere in which personality achieves both expression and full realization is that of productive activity - that is, labor or work. But it does not do so whenever economic activity is undertaken and sustains life. Rather, it can do so only if individuals are able to engage in kinds of work that afford them the opportunity to express and thereby develop their initially merely implicit and potential personal qualities" (pg. 49)

- □ "what Marx called 'alienated labor' was work that afforded no such opportunity, and indeed had virtually the opposite effect on the worker" (pg. 49)
- □ "The capitalistic system he saw in operation, in which work was thus radically depersonalized, had a number of features that he took to be associated with the emergence of this result; and thus he both set himself against them and incorporated them into his account of economic alienation" (pg. 49)
  - ◆ *cf. E. Fromm, The Sane Society* https://historicalunderbelly.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/erich-fromm-the-sane-society.pdf
  - ◆ *cf. E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom*
- ▪ "my main point for present purposes is that **alienated labor for Marx is fundamentally…***depersonalized* **labor** - work that may be productive and life-sustaining, but that nonetheless draws only on the basic, impersonal capacities and generally acquirable skills of the worker, and thus has no personally self-expressive and self-developmental significance in the life of the worker who performs it" (pg. 50)
- ○ "I next turn to the difficult issue of the manner in which economic *self-alienation* - construed in a negatively evaluative sense - might be conceived…in entertaining any such notion, attention cannot be confined merely to the description of how people feel and what they are required to do. It must be shifted to a matter of another sort altogether: namely, that of what genuinely human life does or would consist in, and what the realization of one's truly human nature or true human 'selfhood' might be thought to involve" (pg. 53)
  - ▪ "no empirical-theoretical science (economics included) is methodologically capable either of establishing this general conclusion, or of determining which of the many possible forms of economic activity is the one in question. If this can be done at all, it can be done only within the context of a comprehensive normative-interpretive philosophical anthropology" (pg. 53-54)
    - □ "What I propose to do instead is to suggest, rather briefly, the sort of position one would have to take and defend in order to be justified in considering either of the forms of economic alienation I have been discussing to have the significance of dehumanizing influences or instances of dehumanization" (pg. 54)
  - ▪ "the first thing to be observed, in relation to the general matter of economic *self-alienation*, is that this notion is a meaningful one only on the supposition of some conception of economic *self-realization* or selfhood" (pg. 54)
    - □ *this is precisely where the phenomenological notion of the 'for-itself' enters, where such deals with potentiality and realization.*
      - ◆ *cf. G. Hegel, The Science of Logic* https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d6b5ff86e6c087a92f8f89/t/5913a3bb197aeab3e23ff4d3/1494459337924/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel__The_Science_of_Logic.pdf
        - ◇ *'For-Itself' (pg. 126) & 'Ground' (pg. 386)*
  - ▪ "One example of a conception of genuinely human life to which economic O-alienation (though not S-alienation) *would* be of great relevance finds expression in the writings of the young Marx. As has been observed, Marx subscribed to a form of social individualism in which the developed human personality was the greatest of goods. He further believed that engaging in self-directed, self-determined productive activity, in which there is ample latitude for self-expression, is a necessary condition of such development. Economic O-alienation involves the nonfulfillment of this condition; and thus it may be linked with the conception of self-alienation that signifies dehumanization construed in terms of this standard" (pg. 55)
    - □ "Hegel holds economic alienation to have the significance of self-alienation only in the event that it is so extensive as to leave individuals completely bereft of the possibility of actualizing and developing their personalities. For Marx, on the other hand, it would appear that any degree of depersonalization entails a comparable degree of dehumanization, and thus of self-alienation, even though his conception of genuine humanity does not refer to personality and economic activity alone" (pg. 55)
      - ◆ *this 'latitude for self-expression' in Marx (is) very similar to what's Hegel's idea of 'possibility of actualizing one's personality'.*
  - ▪ "*even if* it is supposed that our human nature is such that one may be self-alienated by virtue of the depersonalized character of one's work, and that self-alienation is a bad thing, it does not follow *either* that such depersonalization ought to be completely eradicated, *or* that it ought to be diminished by any means and at any cost" (pg. 56)
  - ▪ "The case of economic S-alienation is more problematical still; for there would appear to be no even remotely plausible way of construing genuinely human existence…" (pg. 56)
    - □ "S-alienation is a matter of experienced dissatisfaction; and it is natural to suppose that satisfaction is clearly preferable to dissatisfaction - and thus that where economic S-alienation exists, it is desirable if not outright imperative to try to eliminate it. I would suggest, however, that this supposition rests upon a confusion of the *objectionable* with the *disagreeable*. Not everything that is disagreeable is objectionable, just as it is not the case that everything objectionable is disagreeable. It is one thing to dislike something, and quite another to be able to establish that there is something wrong with it" (pg. 57)
      - ◆ "thus, it makes perfectly good sense to grant that something is disagreeable, and yet question whether - or even deny that - it is objectionable" (pg. 57)
      - ◆ "it would be little short of absurd to maintain that finding anything either agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, satisfying or dissatisfying, rewarding or unrewarding, and so on, constitutes a significant feature of what a human being essentially is or ought to be" (pg. 58)
        - ◇ "one simply cannot include references to specific attitudes in such a description without depriving it of all plausibility" (pg. 58)
        - ◇ "to declare that the humanity of those who are dissatisfied with the kind of work they do is in some significant sense deficient or incomplete in relation to someone who felt satisfied in this regard, would be to dilute and trivialize the notion of genuinely human life to the point of insignificance" (pg. 58)
    - □ "Where such alienation exists, those concerned may very well exert themselves in an attempt to change their circumstances. It is entirely understandable that they might. Others also quite understandably might sympathize, and even lend their assistance. But the fact that people can and do react in these ways is completely independent of any considerations pertaining to the existence of some sort of self-alienation and the normative necessity of overcoming it. And if this is correct, it would seem that the notion of economic S-alienation is best relegated to the role considered for it initially, of a merely descriptive category with no normative import or connotations" (pg. 58)
- ○ "In my discussion of 'economic alienation', **I admittedly construe it very narrowly**, focusing upon the relations of economic agents to their economic activity, to the exclusion of other things to which this notion might also be applied. I have done this deliberately, for several reasons. One reason is historical: both Hegel and Marx likewise make work or labor the focus of their treatments of economic alienation. Another reason is tactical: the topic of economic alienation would be hopelessly unmanageable if it were not narrowed in some way. My third and most important reason, however, is of a different sort; it could be considered as either implicitly critical or covertly reformative. **I believe it advisable to attempt to counter the common practice of construing the notion so very broadly that it encompasses many or all aspects and features of economic life that involve any kind of separation, or are regarded as somehow disagreeable.** This is a tendency characteristic of the literature

on alienation generally in the past few decades; and I seek to combat it because I feel that it is leading to the dilution of the notion of alienation to the point of virtual meaninglessness-or at any rate, of uselessness in serious discussion" (pg. 59)

- *but, the thing is, each is born (as) alienated. So, alienation is everywhere - it pervades the entirety of human existence. This is precisely the point made by existential philosophers.*
- **"alienation is a relation concept; it is always a matter of the alienation (of) someone or something (from) [*i.e., indicating a distance between…*] someone or something"** (pg. 59)
- "economic alienation is therefore always likewise relational - only here the relations involved are restricted to economic ones" (pg. 59)
  - *here the author refers to 'role-description', 'products', 'activities', 'processes', and 'systems' as all involved in such economic relations.*
    - "A relation of alienation between certain individuals or groups and the economic system in their society could be said to exist if the system is geared to the exploitation of the many by a few; or if it works to the advantage of some groups and to the disadvantage of others (whether minorities or the majority); or if it is responsive only to the wills or decisions of holders and wielders of power; or if it operates independently of anyone's interests and intentions, reflecting instead the determinations of the system's structure and impersonal economic laws pertaining to it" (pg. 61)
    - "One also could speak of alienation in this context to the extent that people feel powerless to affect the course of the economy and the structure of the system, or feel oppressed by it, or feel incapable of understanding its operations and fluctuations, or feel that the system is unfair to them in any of a number of ways; or if they feel antagonistic toward the system on any number of grounds, rational, irrational or ideological" (pg. 61)
    - "One final area should also be mentioned: that of interpersonal relations, as these are affected by economic processes and endeavors. Some interpersonal relations may be considered economic in varying ways and degrees; and of these, some could be suggested to involve kinds of alienation. Obvious examples may be drawn from situations in which people are set against each other through their occupation of adversary roles in an economic system —exploiters and the exploited, regulators and the regulated, the established and the aspiring, the employed and the unemployed, superiors and underlings, management and labor, and competitors for the same markets or jobs, to mention only some. Different conceptions of alienation in these contexts will of course result, depending on whether they are defined in terms of antagonistic feelings or attitudes on the part of those involved, or in terms of conflicts built into the objectively characterizable roles in question" (pg. 62)
- "economic S-alienation and O-alienation both pertain to relations between workers and the work they do. The former is a matter of experienced dissatisfaction with one's work, while the latter is a matter of the impersonal character of the work in which one engages" (pg. 60)
- "'the proper' referent of the expression does not exist, even though many possible referents of it do. The issue of the true nature of 'economic alienation' is not a genuine issue at all, which either ordinary language analysis or social-scientific research or philosophical inquiry of any sort might settle. Something is indeed at issue here; but **what is at issue** is the *kind of function the notion is to perform*, **and the specific sorts of circumstances in which it is to be employed**" (pg. 63)
  - "I believe that the specific construal of the notion I have suggested has a good deal to be said for it, even if the case for it is less than compelling. It is for this reason - as well as to show that and how the notion might be spared the sad fate of relinquishment to the suffocating embraces of political rhetoric and popular journalism - that I have proposed it. I cannot and do not claim validity for my explication of this notion, but rather only a reasonableness and usefulness as ample as the case admits-and a circumspection as extensive as such utility requires" (pg. 63)
- "Is there such a thing as economic alienation? Certainly - in the sense that economic life affords many instances of kinds of relations that may legitimately be so described. But to say this is to say very little; and to say no more is to say nothing at all of any interest. **It is only when the specific sorts of relations** intended are identified that anything informative is conveyed; and even then, nothing of theoretical or evaluative significance is settled. All of the important questions remain to be asked and answered; and while availing oneself of the notion may facilitate asking these questions and framing answers to them, it in no way will make answering them any easier methodologically, or more profound theoretically, or more telling practically. To suppose otherwise is to fall victim to the notion's unwarranted mystique, which it undeniably has come to have, but which requires to be dispelled if it is not to be a source of confusion and error. The notion of 'economic alienation' can be construed in such a way as to render it capable of performing a useful function in discussions of economic life. But it will be able to do so only if we refrain from what Marx would have called "mystifying" it, from trying to make it do too much work (especially where evaluation is concerned), and from employing it too promiscuously" (pg. 64)

- Chapter 3 - Alienation and Normative Theory: The Case of Marx (pg. 65)
  - "For many years, in English-speaking countries, ethical theory and moral philosophy have consisted chiefly in the kind of inquiry that has come to be called 'meta-ethics'. In keeping with the basic spirit of analytic philosophy more generally, our moral philosophers in the post-war generation seem to have decided that their proper primary task was to analyze the nature of moral language and moral concepts as people ordinarily use them, rather than to assess them critically, develop and defend improvements upon them, and apply such revised ethical principles and norms to general social and concrete interpersonal situations and issues. In recent years, however, many moral philosophers have once again become interested in *normative* ethics, venturing to undertake such tasks as these. This may be at least in part because they have become increasingly aware of the problematic character of conventional moral concepts and beliefs, and also of the inability of meta-ethics to contribute significantly to the resolution of real and pressing problems in personal and social life. The same remarks also apply with respect to social philosophy and value theory, which likewise have begun again among us to have a genuinely normative rather than a merely analytic-descriptive character" (pg. 65)
    - "Few of these philosophers are at all well acquainted with Marxian philosophy. Many of them are aware, however, that Marx's thought has what at least appears to be a strongly normative character; and some have actually been moved to wonder whether in fact it has any relevance to their concerns. This is a question to which it is difficult to give a simple answer. In some sense Marx obviously had normative pretentions. On the other hand, it is far from clear what these pretentions actually come to, and even how seriously they are to be taken. Thus **writers like Louis Althusser and Bertell Ollman have argued that there is not and cannot be anything like a genuinely Marxian ethics or normative theory**, on the grounds that the thought of the mature Marx precludes the possibility of this sort of philosophical inquiry" (pg. 65-66)
    - "So, for example, Althusser allows that the **early Marx did subscribe first to a Kantian-Fichtean outlook and then to a Feuerbachian way of thinking, each 'humanistic' and with a strong ethical component based upon a 'philosophy of man' appealing to a notion of our human 'essence'.** He contends, however, that Marx broke radically with all such views and notions around 1845 and thereafter rejected any 'recourse to ethics' and every 'humanistic ideology', relegating all ethical and valuational schemata entirely to the realm of 'ideology', which became for him merely an object of scientific analysis and an instrument of social organization rather than a component of Marxian theory itself. According to Althusser, the mature Marx radically distinguished his form of ('scientific' theory from - and opposed it to - 'ideology' generally, inclusive of any sort of ethics, allowing only that 'ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed, and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence'" (pg. 66)
      - "Ollman similarly contends that **'Marxian ethics' is clearly a misnomer**…" (pg. 66)
      - "like Althusser, Ollman argues that we not only will be disappointed but also misguided if we look for anything like a normative

ethical theory in Marx" (pg. 67)

- ○ "I shall attempt to contribute to the clarification of this issue by distinguishing between some of the different things that a Marxian ethical and normative theory might involve and, in my opinion, does involve in Marxian thought. **I shall argue that there is at least *one* sense in which Marx undeniably has such a theory,** which is interestingly similar in certain important respects to the analytic meta-ethics that was long the fashion in Anglo-American philosophical circles, even if different in the particular manner of the analysis given. I shall also suggest, however, that <u>it is a kind of theory that is no more helpful and satisfactory in the treatment of normative issues than is meta-ethics.</u> And I shall further argue that while Marx seems to have operated with a further kind of normative theory, and perhaps assumed that yet another kind is possible and desirable, his right to do so is far from clear. This circumstance, I shall contend, raises serious problems that must receive better solutions than they have so far if Marxian thought is to make good its apparent claim to have genuine normative significance, both as critical social theory and as a theory relevant to the way we live our lives and deal with each other" (pg. 67)
  - ▪ "Here I have in mind Marx's contention that **moralities, along with religions, philosophies, and other such products of human thought, are to be conceived as parts of the ideological outgrowths and machinery of social systems, reflecting their structures and the interests of the classes dominant in them.** <u>Engendered as devices by means of which these systems are sustained, they serve to induce their members to act in a manner conducive to the systems' functioning and preservation</u> (and thereby to the promotion of the interests of the classes in question). So Marx writes that 'religion, family, state, morality, science, art, etc. are only *particular* modes of production, and fall under its general laws'. They are but 'the ideological reflexes and echoes' of the 'real-life process' of 'definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way' and who therefore 'enter into [corresponding] definite social and political relations'" (pg. 68)
    - □ "Nearly always, when Marx refers explicitly to <u>ethics or morality</u>, it is as part of the same litany and to the same effect: the reality of 'religious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas' is granted, but <u>is linked inseparably to specific social systems, class interests, and class antagonisms</u>. **Moral/ethical 'ideas' are treated simply as elements of 'ideologies'** and analyzed accordingly, in broad strokes and with no tentativeness or qualifications" (pg. 69)
    - □ "The burden of Marx's repeated assertions to this effect, and of his assimilation of existing moralities to ideologies so conceived, is that **we must learn to view and understand them within this kind of very human, practical, historically variable but always specific context, rather than as though they are or could be 'pure or absolute or of universal and unconditional validity'.** They are real enough; but <u>their reality is that of historical phenomena constituting contingent and conditioned elements of specific social totalities.</u> They are to be analyzed and reckoned with theoretically and practically, rather than assessed in terms of their general justifiability and normative force" (pg. 69)
- ○ "The critical social theory of the mature as well as the early Marx has a strongly and strikingly normative dimension that cannot be ignored or eliminated without depriving his entire enterprise of what was to him its supreme purpose and significance for human life. It is reflected in his use of moral language…" (pg. 70)
  - ▪ "Marx makes no secret about his normative concerns" (pg. 70)
    - □ "he undertakes not merely to analyze but also to evaluate and pass critical judgment upon the kind of society with which he found himself confronted, to call for its radical transformation, and to argue for the establishment of a different set of social, economic, and political arrangements" (pg. 70)
    - □ "he considered 'a revolution' to be not only historically inevitable but also 'necessary'…" (pg. 70)
  - ▪ "Marxian thought *must* have a genuinely normative character if it is to serve as an impetus and guide to revolutionary praxis" (pg. 71)
    - □ "**Marx subscribes to and valorizes notions of human freedom, dignity, community, activity, and development that make it possible for him to distinguish between 'dehumanized' and 'genuinely human' forms of life.** These notions enable him to identify practices and social arrangements conducive and detrimental to both; and he draws upon them in detailing the damage wrought by capitalism and bourgeois society, and in targeting certain of their basic features as the focus of revolutionary change" (pg. 72)
    - □ "<u>Marx is concerned above all with the *quality* of human life under different actual and actually attainable social and economic conditions.</u> However, **he rejects all appeals to religious or metaphysical considerations**, which might be invoked either to privilege some forms of it over others or to justify the attribution to human beings of an essential nature that would do so, and insists that human nature takes differing shapes in differing historical circumstances" (pg. 73)
  - ▪ "While he seems to take for granted the possibility of a 'philosophy of man' or philosophical anthropology sufficing for this purpose in his early writings, invoking suitably naturalistic notions of 'man' and our human 'essence' quite freely, he is so critical of the use of such expressions in his later writings that it is far from clear whether he remains committed to any conception of a general human nature sufficient to do more than demarcate our species from others" (pg. 73)
    - □ *there is such a radical shift in his theorizing between his earlier and later works that it is difficult to discern his (if any) true stance on human morality and such's place in social theory.*
- ○ "There is yet a third important kind of notion that might be meant by a Marxian ethics or moral philosophy and that might constitute another part of a full Marxian ethical theory…Here the focus is not upon the critical assessment of social systems and the revolutionary praxis needed to transform them, but rather upon <u>our conduct and interactions as particular human beings, as we lead our daily lives and face the kinds of personal and interpersonal problems that call for decisions and choices</u>" (pg. 73)
  - ▪ "Marx was not content, as Hegel had been, to refer all questions of this sort to the established norms prevailing in the society in which one lives" (pg. 74)
  - ▪ "Even if, according to prevailing standards, we live our lives and relate to others in a morally acceptable or prescribed manner, we are 'isolated' from '*human* morality', and '*human* activity, *human* enjoyment, *human* nature' as well. **'Real community' is lacking**; and it is only in such 'community' with others that Marx considers the individual to be able to 'cultivate his gifts in all directions', and even to achieve 'personal freedom'" (pg. 74)
    - □ *and, this is precisely the flaw of Marx's logic - the individual (with their ego's and personal interests) only becomes increasingly frustrated the further inward one moves toward living in total community (i.e., ego's clash and interests inhibited by the pursuit of others who surround), as it is only 'there', each standing ever-close beside one another, therein crowding out every other, that the individual realizes the marginal benefit of moving-outward to live individually, sacrificing what must be along the way. Physical altercations only occur in crowds (i.e., bars, stadiums, battlefields, etc.). So, what intimately 'human' community does Marx have in mind?*
  - ▪ "[Kant's] conception of our essentially rational nature, transcending and contrasting with our mundane nature and possessing intrinsic value, likewise underlies many of the other notions that figure prominently in Kant's ethics - for example, dignity, autonomy, self-legislation, the idea and ideal of 'a kingdom of ends' as 'a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws' of their own making, and their essential equality and equal worth - and that reappear in Marx as the heart of the sort of ethics to which he appears to be committed. But Marx neither undertakes to supply anything along the lines of the 'Metaphysic of Morals' Kant provides in order to render his use of them coherent and justifiable, nor would he seem to have any way of doing so" (pg. 75)
  - ▪ "It must be admitted that, with the exception of a few such inadequate gestures in his early writings, **Marx has little to say with respect to the way in which one might go about fleshing out and justifying a morality of a sort that would transcend those associated with previous and present forms of social organization and class interest and that would be more appropriate to our humanity.** His

proposed interpretation and analysis of existing moralities, along the lines of the first sort of ethical theory identified above, is of no help in this connection…" (pg. 76)
- □ "in the end, the only real service of Marxian philosophy in this context is to help break the grip of traditional and prevailing ideologically motivated moralities…" (pg. 77)
- ▪ "Marxian moral theory (as far as it goes) would seem to echo that of Kant in taking a significant sort of freedom not enjoyed by human beings as long as they are ensnared in the toils of natural/ historical necessity to be a fundamental condition of the possibility of a genuine morality that would be more than a reflection and subtle device of such necessity" (pg. 79)
- ○ "My intention here is to issue a challenge and an appeal to Marx-minded philosophers who have not already cast their lot with dogmatic or orthodox and neo-orthodox Marxism or social scientism, to place normative theory high on their philosophical agenda, ceasing merely to pledge allegiance to the normative commitments expressed in Marx's writings, and undertaking to see whether a viable normative theory in the spirit of Marx can be developed and defended" (pg. 79)
- ○ "in any version of Marxian theory in which *all* normative theorizing is excluded, the concept of alienation can have no normative import; and thus its applicability cannot be taken to warrant any conclusions of a practical nature" (pg. 79)
- ○ "If the only sort of ethical or normative theory one is prepared to countenance, or is able to justify, consists in the ascertainment of whatever these norms happen to be in any given society and their interpretation as elements of the ideological apparatus of that (type of) society, one is in no position to pass any judgment upon those who do or do not conform to them. One likewise is in no position to pass any judgment upon the society itself, in light of the relative incidence of behavior and dispositions of one kind or the other. **Normative criteria are required in order to pass judgments** of either sort. Without such criteria, one may identify and interpret the kinds of judgments passed by members of the society, internal to it; but one cannot proceed to any critical evaluation of them" (pg. 80)
  - ▪ "If such things as the relative incidence of the sort of alienation and related forms of unhappiness in question are to have not only analytic-theoretical but also practical social-critical interest, **a different and richer type of Marxian theory with an explicit normative dimension is required**" (pg. 80)
  - ▪ "within the context of Marxian theory…**alienation may be construed very generally as a relation of indifference to or rejection of the *ethical-normative order* prevailing in some society** on the part of the people who are otherwise to be reckoned members of that society" (pg. 81)
    - □ "Marxian philosophers seem to be committed to trying to…develop a normative theory rich enough to ground a critical social theory enabling them to bring forms of society, social institutions and social practices before the bar of evaluative assessment, and to justify the advocacy of or modifications of or alternatives to them" (pg. 81)
  - ▪ "this conception…would have the basic signature of *self-alienation*, construed in terms of a disparity between the character of one's life as it is shaped and structured by the social system in which one lives and a kind of human life that is not only alternative but also arguably superior to it" (pg. 81)
    - □ "There is yet another conception of alienation that might also be usefully conceived in this general connection, and must be distinguished from both of those identified above. It may be introduced and elaborated in the context of the form of normative-ethical theory that focuses upon concrete human conduct and undertakes to work out normative principles appropriate to one's manner of relating to other people" (pg. 82)
      - ◆ "Alienation here might then be conceived as a certain sort of interpersonal estrangement consisting in one's encountering and dealing with others as though that morality had no application to one's relations with them" (pg. 82-83)
      - ◆ "Here one could be conceived to be alienated from others in a special and particularly profound way if one fails to accord them the respect and treatment due them as beings to whom one is related morally. This way of thinking would seem to be reflected in the Marxian polemic against exploitation of some human beings by others. To regard and treat other human beings as but so much exploitable material (whether as laborers or as consumers), and nothing more, would seem to be one of the cardinal sins of Marxian morality, if there is any such thing" (pg. 83)
- ○ "the jury is still out on Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach" (pg. 84)
- ○ **"alienation theory and ethical-normative theory can both benefit if pursued in more explicit association than is common**, at least in many philosophical circles" (pg. 84)
- ▪ Chapter 4 - Alienation as Powerlessness: On Power and Powerlessness (pg. 85)
  - ○ "I would urge that care must be taken not to read evaluative meaning into the very notions of power and powerlessness, and to distinguish clearly between the nature of the states of affairs specified by them, on the one hand, and judgments passed with respect to these states of affairs, on the other. Powerlessness per se is no more intrinsically evil or undesirable than power per se is intrinsically good or desirable. An intrinsic negative value cannot be assigned to the former without a counterpart intrinsic positive value being assigned to the latter. And while various sorts of power unquestionably may be assigned instrumental value, or desirability as means to certain further ends, it cannot plausibly be maintained that any of them - not to mention power as such - is of value in its own right, independently of any end or purpose for the attainment of which it might be used. It thus should not be supposed that the discovery of an instance or type of powerlessness is as such the discovery of a situation in need of transformation" (pg. 86)
    - ▪ **Again, I'm not too sure why the author is so adamant about professing that we begin (in), what seems to me, absolute neutrality. I would argue, such is quite impossible to wholly accomplish - we meet the world with who we are, where, as so, there is no position one can occupy to be between (or, beyond) either. It is a common theme among scientists to see themselves as some way beyond the matter for which they place beneath their microscope. Such, however, is a delusion - we, along with all that which we see and engage, are part and parcel of the very same world. To this, I. Murdoch, in Existentialists and Mystics, appropriately says "Modern behaviouristic philosophy attempts such an analysis in the case of certain moral concepts, it seems to me without success. One of the motives of the attempt is a wish to 'neutralise' moral philosophy, to produce a philosophical discussion of morality which does not take sides. Metaphors often carry a moral charge, which analysis in simpler and plainer terms is designed to remove. This too seems to me to be misguided. Moral philosophy cannot avoid taking sides, and would-be neutral philosophers merely take sides surreptitiously" (pg. 363)*
  - ○ "Social relations are phenomena the existence and nature of which are far from being independent of the manner in which the populations with which they are associated understand their lives and circumstances. Rather, they are patterns in a social fabric that is woven upon a warp of strands of meaning, in which are to be found both the accumulated residues of past schematizations of such relations and the results of an ongoing process of their modification and supplementation. They are our collective products, as Hegel long ago observed, and they are transformed as various interpersonal situations and possibilities are endowed with altered or different meanings through changes in the manner in which these are interpretively schematized" (pg. 87)
    - ▪ "broadly regarded, [social inquiry] is society reflecting on itself, affecting itself as it does so. **It is an enterprise of societal self-interpretation**, in terms of models and metaphors that even in the best of cases contribute to the coloring and structuring of the manifold of self-understanding that informs and partially directs the course of social life" (pg. 87)
      - □ "Thus in the present case it is important to understand that terms such as 'power' and 'powerlessness', like 'alienation', 'freedom', and most others in the lexicon of social thought, are not simply the names of various forms of social phenomena whose existence we have detected. Rather, they are interpretive categories that have come to be employed in the schematic comprehension of social events. And the schematization of social phenomena by means of such categories may be of no little consequence, to the extent that participants in

social life come to incorporate them into their view of themselves and their world - as has happened in these instances" (pg. 87)
- ◆ "This is by no means to say that "powerlessness" is merely a product of the creative imagination of social inquiry, and that there really is no such thing" (pg. 88)
- ○ "Social realities are realities of social life…" (pg. 88)
- ○ "Consider, for example, questions such as the following, which still are commonly used to measure (and, in effect, to explicate, by operational definition) the notion of "alienation-as-powerlessness": "Do you feel that most of the things that happen to you are the result of your own decisions or of things over which you have no control"? What a question! For anyone, at any time, in any society, most of the things that happen to one are at least greatly affected by factors over which one has no control, even in cases in which one's decisions do make a difference" (pg. 88)
  - ▪ *cf. my comments on pg. 59*
  - ▪ "Or suppose that powerlessness is conceived, in the words of Melvin Seeman in his now-classical article on alienation, 'as the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes... he seeks'. The consequence, I would suggest, is that (trivial cases of 'the occurrence of outcomes sought' aside) _everyone_ turns out to be powerless, whether or not all people 'hold this expectancy' - as any rational person cognizant of the way things are certainly would and should. For the unqualified capacity to 'determine the occurrence' of states of affairs selected from an unrestricted range of contingent possibilities would constitute a form of virtual omnipotence, which we as finite creatures most certainly lack. And powerlessness is here so characterized that it subsumes everything short of such omnipotence. Now it assuredly **is not the aim of Seeman and others to present powerlessness as a corollary of human finitude, and thus as a universally and ineluctably obtaining aspect of the human condition**. It is intended to apply selectively, and to admit of quantitative variability as well. This means, however, that care must be taken not to explicate or define the notion of 'powerlessness' in a way that results in the interpretive and evaluative assimilation of all cases involving limitations and restrictions upon assople's ability to affect what happens in their lives to the extreme or limiting case of utter impotence" (pg. 89)
    - □ *cf. M. Seeman, On The Meaning of Alienation*
    - □ *as for 'alienation' (where powerless is a representative measure of such) and 'human finitude', that's exactly the existential proposition - that is, because we are finite beings most of what (is) is beyond our ability to influence or control. However, with that, the great caution is learning what (is) underneath the bounds of our control and to learn to manage (or, perform) such well (i.e., as best one can - which is where, at that place between (is) and (not), morality (i.e., ought), spreading its wings, first gains flight).*
- ○ "There are many things about life and the world (and ourselves) that we cannot change, either alone or in concert with others. And it seems to me to be essential to distinguish between forms of powerlessness that might realistically be diminished and those that cannot, for practical social reasons as well as for purposes of conceptual and theoretical clarity. For failure to do so can lead to the growth of expectations and demands that cannot possibly be fulfilled, giving rise in turn to dangerous frustrations, suspicions, and dispositions to which demagogues may appeal and turn to their advantage" (pg. 91-92)
- ○ **"a state of affairs can properly be considered objectionable only if it is one about which something can be done"** (pg. 92)
  - ▪ "If we acknowledge, as he and most other philosophers have urged we must, that 'ought' implies 'can', then we must also recognize that whatever 'cannot' be otherwise than it is may not reasonably be held to be something that _ought_ to be otherwise. In such cases protest is out of place, demands for betterment are pointless, and remedies attempted will be ineffectual if not actually harmful. And I would suggest that a number of forms of powerlessness constitute instances of this sort" (pg. 92)
- ○ "The common association of the ideas of power and powerlessness with the ability or inability to impose one's will upon other people, noted earlier in my discussion, provides a case in point. There are many respects in which some people may be said to have power over others, and conversely to be subject to the power of others, and alternatively to lack power over them. But powerlessness in the last-mentioned sense cannot reasonably be complained of, since its alleviation in one's own case would of necessity involve one's attainment of a position of dominance in relation to others. And the ability to impose one's will upon others is not as such something to which anyone can reasonably claim to be entitled. It is no inalienable human right, but rather at most a contingently acquired capacity, the legitimacy of which requires always to be established by reference to ends and values transcending individual self-interest and desires. In the absence of any such special justification, this ability is not to be regarded as legitimate, and so cannot legitimately be demanded or aspired to. In short, in considering what sort of attitude is warranted with respect to powerlessness, one must consider what sorts of power people can and cannot justifiably seek" (pg. 93)
  - ▪ "many institutions, which serve to promote the attainment of a wide range of human values, essentially involve an inequitable distribution of powers, reserving forms of influence and control to some while denying them to others. And by seizing upon the existence of avoidable forms of powerlessness in such cases, while neglecting to consider the contexts in which they occur, the significance of the institutions of which they are features is only too easily misunderstood" (pg. 94)
  - ▪ "My remarks in this connection have been intended simply to call attention to it, and so to suggest the necessity of viewing the existence of forms of power and powerlessness in a larger perspective. Factors beyond the circumstance that some people happen to lack forms of power that certain others have (and that conceivably could be possessed by all in equal measure) may be of no little relevance to the question of how such situations are properly to be viewed" (pg. 94)
- ○ "A necessary condition is frequently far less than a sufficient one. In the realm of human action, this is almost invariably the case where the relation of individual exertions to the realization of individual objectives is concerned" (pg. 95)
  - ▪ "Either as a reality or as an attainable possibility, therefore, **the idea of power in the sense of _decisive personal control_ over courses of events pertaining to what happens in the course of one's life is largely a myth** when applied to matters of any real moment. And if the powerlessness that may be defined as the lack of such power is not itself likewise a myth, the idea of its eliminability or significant alleviation is. Personal _influence_ of varying degrees can be and sometimes is a reality; it may be diminished or extended through a variety of sorts of possible modification of the relevant circumstances. But it can never be extensive enough, in any except rather trivial cases, to admit of anything more than a relative contrast with complete impotence. All human beings are thus powerless, in the sense of being unable to exert decisive personal control over what happens in their lives. On the other hand, power may reasonably be attributed to anyone who is able to have any degree and form of such influence, in the same measure as the scope of this possible influence. In _this_ sense, _no one_ is utterly powerless, although the extent of that power enjoyed by most is not very great, and undoubtedly in the case of many could be considerably enlarged without either unfairness to others or detrimental effects upon social and cultural life. Its general enlargement, moreover, while possible, can only be brought about, I submit, in the context of the development of an appropriate network of _institutions_" (pg. 95-96)
    - □ "They may invariably limit what people can do, in one way or another. Yet they alone can establish the conditions in which large numbers of people, whose lives will inevitably impinge upon each other, can collectively attain and secure for themselves a substantial domain within which each can enjoy personal influence" (pg. 96)
      - ◆ "The sort of power presently under consideration, and in relation to which the notion of powerlessness can perhaps best be understood, may once more be usefully related to several other concepts that have long occupied a central place in social thought: those of _liberty_ (or freedom) and _autonomy_ (or self-determination). The former is generally regarded as involving the ability to do as one chooses and the absence of constraint, while the latter is usually taken to have to do with independence of externally imposed regulation and the selection of one's own manner of life. Power conceived in terms of personal influence does not simply reduce to these two concepts, but it can be thought of as building upon them. Thus it may be construed as a

matter of being able to affect a course of events through actions of one's choosing and in a manner pursuant to some objective one has determined upon" (pg. 96)

◇ "like liberty and autonomy, power is not and cannot be unconditioned and unrestricted in human life. If conceived absolutely, none of these notions is validly predictable of human existence, and none of them can meaningfully be employed to characterize the way human life should or even could be. The sooner the limited and conditioned nature of all actual and attainable human liberty, autonomy, and power is recognized, the better their understanding will be, and the more useful and significant these notions will become. And the same is true of the institutional presuppositions of their general attainment, preservation, and greatest possible enhancement" (pg. 96-97)

◇ "the widespread acceptance of a 'myth of power' that takes flight from reality, and promotes dissatisfaction with anything short of some degree or form of personal influence upon events that is in point of fact an impossible dream, can lead to the disintegration of the very social arrangements that hold the greatest promise of sustaining and extending people's actual ability to affect courses of events relating to what happens in their own lives" (pg. 97)

○ **"In short…I would urge that the ideal can prove, in the real world of human affairs, to be the enemy of both the possible and the actual"** (pg. 97)

▪ *I. Murdoch, in Existentialists and Mystics, says "Moral philosophy is the examination of the most important of all human activities, and I think that two things are required of it. The examination should be realistic. Human nature, as opposed to the to the natures of other hypothetical spiritual beings, has certain discoverable attributes, and these should be suitably considered in any discussion of morality. Secondly, since an ethical system cannot but commend an ideal, it should commend a worthy ideal. Ethics should not be merely an analysis of ordinary mediocre conduct, it should be a hypothesis about good conduct and about how this can be achieved. How can we make ourselves better? is a question moral philosophers should attempt to answer'' (pg. 363-364)*

▪ "Extreme and absolutistic conceptions of such principles, which take leave of the practicable and assume mythical proportions, can only too easily contribute to the emergence of contrary social developments through their power to distort peoples perceptions, alter their commitments, and dispose them to courses of action or inaction that in reality serve to further such developments. A strong dose of realism would thus appear to be in order for anyone who would make an issue of liberty and constraint, or of autonomy and heteronomy, or of power and powerlessness" (pg. 97-98)

○ "The social-theoretical heart of the matter under consideration, as I see it, is to determine the kind and degree of personal influence upon what occurs in their lives to which members of a society such as our own might reasonably aspire, where 'reasonably' is understood to mean realistically, fairly, and with due regard to the importance of other social and cultural values. In this essay, however, I have not attempted to develop such an account. My chief concerns have been to try to reformulate the issue at hand in a manner rendering it more amenable to fruitful exploration and sound treatment, and to offer a kind of prolegomenon to the undertaking of this formidable and important task" (pg. 98)

▪ Chapter 5 - Alienation as Normlessness: Doubts about Anomie and Anomia (pg. 101)

○ "Robert Merton's reformulation of Emile Durkheim's original conception of this condition has been virtually definitive of this notion for modern sociology. In his now-classic words: 'Anomie is... a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural-…goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them'" (pg. 101)

▪ "the theory of anomie as developed by Merton and taken over by others may indeed be 'intriguing' as its remarkable rise to prominence in sociological thinking shows; but 'well formulated' it is not…" (pg. 102)

○ "as Merton insists, and everyone agrees, the term 'anomia' (like 'alienation', properly conceived) is to be understood as referring to a relational characteristic of human beings…" (pg. 107-108)

○ "The basic point I wish to urge is that the conceptions of anomie and anomia are *backward-looking* in a way that renders them incapable of taking account of and doing justice to the very significant differences among societies departing from the traditional paradigm in relation to which they are construed. Moreover, they would appear to be *value-laden* in a rather transparent way, implicitly valorizing societies conforming or approximating to this paradigm, while imposing an indiscriminate negative valuation upon those departing from it. And for these reasons, social scientists might do best to drop them, in favor of more discriminating and less prejudicial social-analytical concepts" (pg. 112)

▪ *Consciousness can only 'see' what was, 'thinking' about what might be.*

○ **"human nature being what it is…"** (pg. 119)

▪ *I'm not at all sure why this author, taking the non-essentialist perspective, feels he can speak of such. To identity humans as having some nature (or, way about themselves which appears common across all) is, in the very same moment, to introduce values, which takes form in asking oneself 'what is human nature?' and 'what is such's value?' (i.e., what does it 'truthfully' mean to-be a human).*

○ "my general point is that this notion [anomia] is more misleading than it is helpful with respect to the understanding of these phenomena…" (pg. 120)

▪ Chapter 6 - Alienation in Social Life: Social Structure, Social Alienation, and Social Change (pg. 121)

○ "Alienation theorists and social critics who make much of the notion of social alienation often rely upon a conception of society that is questionable at best, both in terms of its applicability to existing modern societies and as a societal norm. I refer to what might be called a 'monolitic' model of human societies, according to which they are to be thought of (along the lines of the dictionary definition of this term) as exhibiting 'solid uniformity and one harmonious pattern throughout'" (pg. 121)

○ "I propose regarding...societies [as] assuming an increasingly pluralistic and heterogeneous internal character, and at the same time are losing their distinctive identities. What is happening in many contemporary societies, I suggest, especially in the Western world, is that a changing multiplicity of coexisting, sometimes loosely connected but rather autonomous and differing social institutions and practices is coming to replace the single integrated set of social structures constituting the fabric of a monolithic society, as the locus of the experience and activity of those living in these societies" (pg. 122)

▪ *sure; but, there is still 'the state', 'the society', 'the workplace', 'the economy', 'the monetary system'.*

▪ "If the monolithic model no longer applies to modern societies, then a conception of social alienation based upon and tied to it will have no meaningful application to human beings and human life in such societies. If modern societies no longer have the character of unified systems or configurations of institutions and practices with which people could meaningfully identify and in which they could concretely and fully participate, then it makes no sense to take the absence of such identification and participation on their part to warrant applying a notion of social alienation conceived along these lines to them" (pg. 122)

▪ "I am suggesting that…classical social alienation has had its day in the sun, as a salient possibility and phenomenon and problem at a certain juncture in the course of our social and cultural history; but that this day too is drawing to a close, as the social and cultural conditions of this possibility are transformed" (pg. 122)

○ "peoples are ceasing to be discernable; and social substances can no longer be identified" (pg. 126-127)

▪ *I have no idea what's here meant by 'social substance'. The author mentions 'human-historical unities' without ever defining what that exactly means.*

▪ "There likewise certainly are social practices and institutions, in abundance and with manifold interconnections; but in their profusion and development they have ceased to constitute integrated social totalities or systems cohering internally and contrasting externally with other such social substances. In these altered circumstances, the question of one's relation to one's people and associated social substance has lost

its urgency and indeed its very meaningfulness, since it is for the most part no longer under these descriptions that one encounters one's social world. One may or may not feel at one with various segments of the population among which one lives, and may or may not identify with and participate in various institutions existing in the society in which one lives; but the significance of such possibilities is different than it would be within the context of a world as depicted and interpreted by Hegel. And it is in this sense that my suggestion is to be understood that classical social alienation, like classical religious alienation, has had its day" (pg. 127)

- □ *what a ridiculous statement. At each and every moment there exists a social totality, cohering to form some integrated system. Now, is the appearance of such evolving? Yes, I'd imagine so - and, is it likely changing faster and in new ways with each passing decade. However, this does not equate, in any way, to a collapse of a 'social totality' - rather, such amounts to a distancing from what totality previously existed. Cf. J. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Book 1, Part I - Individual Praxis as Totalisation, pg. 79 https://files.libcom.org/files/jean-paul-sartre-critique-of-dialectical-reason-volume-1.compressed.pdf*
  - □ **"a society to which no definite comprehensive social substance is ascribable is nothing from which people *can* be alienated** - even if nothing with which they can be at one either"** (pg. 127)
    - ◆ *Again, a poor conclusion following poorer logic.*
      - ◇ "the thought of populations and social institutions failing to exhibit the characteristics Hegel imputed to peoples and social substances is dismaying to others" (pg. 127)
- ▪ "My argument has been that, with the demise of the idea of something on the order of Hegel's social substance as an integrated totality with which those living in a society may or may not exist in a relation of unity, the idea of social alienation as the absence of such unity ceases to be applicable and meaningful. As in the case of religious alienation upon the abandonment of the associated interpretive framework, the conditions of its intelligibility and possibility have been removed, and so it ceases to be a live issue. Social alienation in the classical sense may thus be said to have been brought to an end…Its supersession has come about in a rather unexpected way: not through the transformation of society into something with which people are able willingly to identify, but rather through a historical dynamic involving the transformation of the conditions of social existence, and more specifically through the withering away or disintegration of the social substance qua integrated totality, which has given way to a multiplicity of relatively autonomous social formations" (pg. 128)
  - □ *there is too great a reliance between the 'intelligibility' (or, lack thereof) of an 'integrated system' at any given period in history and the subsequent 'demise of a social totality'. Cf. J. Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Book II, Part VIII - The Intelligibility of History, pg. 805 https://files.libcom.org/files/jean-paul-sartre-critique-of-dialectical-reason-volume-1.compressed.pdf*
- ▪ **"the notion [of social alienation] must be recast in some way, bringing it into accord with the actual social conditions of human existence in the sort of world ours is becoming, if it is to be given a new lease on life"** (pg. 129)
  - ○ "The kind of situation I shall be discussing is one in which these social formations are quite diverse, comprehending a considerable variety of forms of activity, civic and cultural as well as political and economic. These formations, in such a society, are to be thought of neither as parts of a whole nor as the manifestations of some underlying set of principles, but rather as a profusion analogous to the biological forms of life to be found in a geographical region" (pg. 129)
    - ▪ "there may be similarities among some and interrelations between some; but each finds or carves out a niche for itself and develops in a way that is only partially influenced rather than determined by the others with which it coexists" (pg. 129)
      - □ *But, how can this be said when before the author declared "the conditions of its intelligibility…have been removed" (pg. 128)*
    - ▪ "In this case, however, neither the principle of natural selection nor anything comparable to it may be supposed to determine and explain their development; while, on the other hand, no teleological or metaphysical principles are to be considered at work here either. They are human creations, elaborated by human beings acting in ways comprehensible through historical narratives but ruled by none but very general necessities" (pg. 129)
      - □ "here larger society is little more than an abstraction…" (pg. 129)
    - ▪ "It is only these particular social structures in which they may meaningfully be said to involve themselves, and with which they may identify themselves, if they do achieve any significant measure of social involvement and identification" (pg. 130)
      - □ "People in the sort of society being described do not and cannot achieve the unity of participation and involvement *with it*, but rather only with various institutions *in it*, which do not stand to it as parts to a whole" (pg. 130)
        - ◆ "in such a society, unity - conceived in terms of involvement and identification - is a real possibility, and its realization or nonrealization is a live issue, only where one's relations to the particular social structures encountered in the social site are concerned" (pg. 130)
          - ◇ *meaning, I cannot possibly be alienated from 'society' but only those 'institutions' which constitute such a society. Such is like saying I can only be alienated from my particular bank with which I invest my money and not the banking system or economy with which it is intimately integrated with and dependent upon. An interest rate touches every bank across country - though, I may never know how any given change might impact each individually and what such means for the system at large; but, I don't need to in order to be put-off by raised interest rates.*
    - ▪ "In post-Hegelian societies, it is simply a fact of life that no person can even begin to approach realizing all of the possibilities of involvement associated with existing social formations. They tend to exhibit an increasing diversity and variety as the institutional and dispositional traces of earlier periods of totality fade. As they become increasingly free-standing, however, their significance…undergoes a major change. No longer parts of a unified structural whole, their assessment becomes a more piecemeal affair…" (pg. 130)
      - □ "all there is in such a society to which one might stand in relations of unity is a multiplicity of practices and institutions" (pg. 131)
      - □ **"[individuals] work out some sort of life for themselves characterized by [a] limited and selective type of social participation in some of the many institutions coexisting in the social site"** (pg. 132)
        - ◆ "social alienation…would involve a dissatisfaction on the part of individuals with whatever particular opportunities for such participation might be open to them" (pg. 132)
          - ◇ *here, and quite quickly, social alienation becomes wholly particularized; individual; subjective - which, ironically, seems at odds with exactly what the author has aimed for in his earlier discussion over O-alienation.*
        - ◆ "another form of such alienation…[is] *empty participation*. In case of this type, people would be involved in some subset of the institutions in the society, but would be lacking in any real commitment to and identification with them" (pg. 132-133)
    - ▪ "the context in which it is meaningful to speak of social alienation and its overcoming is that of the relation of an individual to an actual array of social institutions and practices, participation in some significant subset of which is or could be a real possibility for that individual" (pg. 133)
      - □ *again, says a lot without saying anything.*
  - ○ "human life involves the transcendence of the plane of mere animate existence" (pg. 133)
    - ▪ "what Hegel reasonably calls **spirituality is the mark of humanity**, insofar as humanity is more than a mere variety of animality" (pg. 133-134)
      - □ *cf. G. Marcel and N. Berdyaev*
    - ▪ "complete integration into the social order along lines of the unity that supposedly characterized life in archaic monolithic societies is

neither a real possibility in the modern world, nor something the loss or absence of which is to be lamented; for it would preclude the development of human personality and individuality, as Hegel recognized" (pg. 135)

- ◻ *the author is seeing 'integrated' in terms 'monolithic', which is not at all the way to understand it. His thinking seems as dated as such monolithic societies.*
- ◻ "If there are ways in which it would be well for modern societies to be changed, they should not be supposed to consist in the elimination of obstacles and the establishment of inducements to the attainment of immediate and unrestricted oneness with a reconstituted monolithic social system" (pg. 135)
  - ▪ "Hegel's version of the idea of generality, which he took to be essential to our human-spiritual self-realization, was a kind of 'universality' construed in terms of unity with one's people and its social substance. Abandonment of the idea of the desirability and attainability of such unity, as the social conditions of its possibility have ceased to exist, directs our attention to alternatives to it" (pg. 135)
    - ◻ **"the crucial step requiring to be taken, on my view, is to cut the idea of generality loose from the idea of comprehensiveness and totality…"** (pg. 135)
      - ◆ *i.e., to stop thinking in terms of abstractions.*
    - ◻ "Hegel's concept of social universality is a good deal closer to the idea of restricted generality I have in mind…" (pg. 136)
      - ◊ "the generality…is to be thought of as *selective* rather than as mediating a relation of unity with a comprehensive totality" (pg. 137)
      - ◆ "For Hegel did not expect or require the comprehensiveness of the social substance (as a totality of social structures) to be reflected and achieved in the life of an individual whose integration into it was sufficient to satisfy his criteria for the attainment of such universality. He conceived of its attainment as being possible and concretely realized only through the individual's involvement in particular substructures of the existing totality, and so as mediated by such involvements" (pg. 136)
      - ◆ **"[Hege'] had good sense to recognize that no one can be a member of every society, or a participant in every institution in one's own…"** (pg. 136)
  - ○ "if the idea of individual as well as general human self-realization is to retain any meaning…I would suggest that it should be understood along these lines. We have it in us to attain to enhanced spirituality and individuality, but carry no specific blueprints for identities of either sort. Our self-realization along both lines can occur only to the extent that the structure and content of our societies afford us the opportunities and means of accomplishing it, and then only through our availing ourselves of them. And I would further contend that (liberal) post-Hegelian society is in principle the kind of society most conducive to both attainments, owing to the proliferation of structured contexts into which selective entry is possible. For a broader and richer field of social possibilities should increase the likelihood of one's being able to discover some configuration of involvements according with one's abilities and interests sufficiently well to sustain commitment, and serving also to flesh out and enhance one's life in both respects" (pg. 137-138)
    - ▪ "In this connection, it may be noted that here, as for Hegel, there is an interesting and important link between social alienation and self-alienation, if the latter is understood along Hegelian (and early Marxian) lines as referring to the failure to achieve full realization of one's human-spiritual nature. For if the achievement of such humanity is granted to be a matter of self-realization involving the attainment of enhanced spirituality and the developed individuality it nourishes, and if involvement in some set of existing social formations is a condition of the possibility of this double attainment, then social alienation conceived in terms of the refusal of such involvement has the consequence and significance of self-alienation" (pg. 138)
  - ○ "[good] changes would consist not only in the further development and elaboration of the variety of social formations issuing from the prior social order, but also in the establishment of others, creating new structured contexts of involvement and activity answering differently to the interests and abilities of members of the society. And one would expect that the availability of a richer and expanding array of social formations, permitting of selection, modification, and innovation, would be far more conducive to social involvement than a more restricted and unresponsive range of social possibilities would be" (pg. 139-140)
  - ○ "Social alienation may actually serve as one source of such motivation, and so may have a beneficial outcome. The existence of such alienation in a society, however, neither mandates any particular course of action along these lines, nor warrants the conclusion that there is something wrong with the society (which warrants its transformation). And the establishment of additional social possibilities is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of its overcoming. For while it may be granted to be a problem, rendered all the more serious owing to the self-alienation associated with it, the problem is one for which there can be no grand and final solution. Societies can be faulted if they are not hospitable to its solution; but once they have become so, it falls to those living in them to respond. And it is the manner of their response that will ultimately be decisive, both with respect to whether they are or are not socially alienated and where the issue of their self-alienation or self-realization is concerned" (pg. 140)
- ▪ Chapter 7 - Alienation as Self-Alienation: Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and the Future of Self-Alienation (pg. 141)
  - ○ "Politics has been defined as 'the art of the possible'. But **where possibilities are concerned, choices must be made; and this leads us directly to value theory**, as do both educational theory and critical social theory. Indeed, they all lead not only to value theory, but to 'quality of life' theory - and this in turn raises what might be called the question of a *normative philosophical anthropology*, concerned with the interpretation and assessment of human life, not only in its general contours but also in its variability. It too deals with human possibilities; and it might be argued to be concerned with issues that are fundamental to any 'critical social theory' - political, cultural, or educational. Something like this transpired in the nineteenth century, for thinkers like Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche, when philosophy ceased to be fundamentally metaphysical and took an 'anthropological' turn - a turn that was also political, social, and cultural. For them issues pertaining to the quality of human life became central - **issues not so much matters of "what we can *know*" as of what we can (and can best) become.** And for them these issues could not be considered in abstraction from considerations of a historical nature, taking account of what human beings collectively have become and have to work with, and of the ways in which human possibility is conditioned - not only by their biology but also by the institutions and practices of various sorts that are the setting of all human life" (pg. 141)
    - ▪ "it was in this context that the notions of self-realization and self-alienation made their appearance in this history of modern philosophy" (pg. 141)
    - ▪ "The question I would like to consider is whether these notions have a future, and can still play useful roles in philosophy and critical/normative political, educational, cultural, social and 'quality of life' theory, *even if* we no longer are prepared to embrace the idea of some sort of timeless, Platonic 'human essence' as a blueprint somehow fixed beyond all nature and history that would determine in advance what truly human selfhood and life would be. **I believe they do and can**" (pg. 141-142)
      - ◻ "the Hegelian version of self-alienation may have a future" (pg. 142-143)
      - ◻ "we may well be on the threshold of a great new day for a form of neo-capitalism no more satisfactory than Hegelian "civil society," with results that do not bode well for the quality of human life as even Hegel conceived of it. So self-alienation may have a future after all, in both its Hegelian and Marxian formulations" (pg. 143)
  - ○ "The original home of self-alienation is in the tradition of modern thought that has taken as its fundamental theme the quality of human life. Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche were among the leading contributors to the debate about this topic that raged in the last century, and spilled over into this one, in such developments as existentialism and the 'critical social theory' of the Frankfurt School" (pg. 143-144)
  - ○ "For it seems to me that the problems with which they were concerned are still with us, and may be arising again with a vengeance. And some of their favorite concepts, such as self-alienation, may yet prove still to have their uses and important applications. If the idea of self-alienation is to

have a future, it cannot be burdened by metaphysical baggage that is no longer permitted by our philosophical consciences to be carried along with us" (pg. 144)
- "while I do not think that Hegel's idealism can be merely dismissed out of hand…I will not try to argue for its reprive or revival here" (pg. 144)
  - *cf. J. Harbermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking*
- "My intention is to be fairly faithful to the spirit of these thinkers on this matter, if not to the letter of their thought, in order to save what may deserve saving from what deserves to be left to those whose taste runs to historical-philosophical scholarship. I believe that there is more worth saving here than many suspect" (pg. 145)
- **"Any substantial and interesting notion of self-alienation, I would not only readily allow but also insist, is conceptually bound up with some idea of *self-realization* supposed to be <u>worth</u> achieving** —and so of some sort of *self* taken to be *worth having*, and of some sort of *life more worth living* and genuinely human than others. It may be hopeless to try to argue that any such notions of the self and self-realization and genuine humanity can be endowed with the status of essential truth and with timeless, necessary, and universal validity. Yet it does not follow that it is therefore bootless [i.e., pointless] to speak of such things. For these concepts can still usefully be employed in the context of a legitimate and even important sort of philosophical inquiry and reflection, as we attempt to sort out and consider different human possibilities and predicaments, the better to position ourselves to chart our future" (pg. 145)
  - "as sch, <u>philosophy may be able to do more for political, social, moral, and educational theory than is commonly supposed…</u>" (pg. 146)
- "I would suggest, is that **there is something to the idea of a distinction between mere human existence and human *flourishing***, and between human life in general and *genuinely* human life. We know very well - or at least we ought to be able to agree - that there can and should be more to human life than the sorts of lives many human beings are condemned to live, or even may choose to live" (pg. 146)
  - **"our philosophical task here…has to do with the consideration of our *human possibilities***, beyond what human beings have been and most commonly already are" (pg. 146-147)
    - "This in effect is to resume and extend consideration of <u>what Aristotle called the 'human good'</u>, and of what more recently has come to he called the 'quality of life', guided by the conviction that <u>it makes good and important sense to distinguish between commonplace and perhaps 'all too human' forms of human life, on the one hand, and 'enhanced' or more fully and truly human, more-than-"merely" human" life.</u> And if we are in fact able to get anywhere with this, we may well find that it is useful to avail ourselves of the notions of **human self-realization** and **self-alienation** - with the latter **marking some *significant and avoidable deficiency* in relation to the former"** (pg. 147)
  - "we are dealing with human possibilities…" (pg. 147)
- "The notion of self-alienation has a future, and a role to play in philosophy and critical social theory, because **reflection upon the quality of human life and the human good has a future** - beckoning to us and calling for our best philosophical efforts now more than ever, even after 'the death of God', of traditional metaphysics, and of all absolutism and essentialism in our thinking about human nature, value, and morality" (pg. 147)
  - "There may be no way of settling questions about the human good and the quality of life once and for all, by discovering some reasoning that will lead us into the real, ultimate truth about these matters. But <u>even though we may be obliged to recognize that there is no such truth awaiting our discovery of it</u>, and so to abandon the quest for it, we now find that a different challenge confronts us, and a different task appears on the agenda of philosophy. **We must chart our course on what Nietzsche calls the 'open sea' on which we find ourselves, with ever-receding horizons and no fixed and final port**. We must first take stock of what we have become, and of what we have to work with as well as of the boundary conditions we must reckon with - and <u>we then must consider what we are to make of ourselves, and how we might make the most of our human existence in this world</u>. This will require reflecting upon the different human possibilities that it is within our power to realize, upon the conditions of their possibility, and upon the ways in which they may variously support or exclude each other. It will also require considering how to assess them in relation to each other - for assess them we must, if we are to do more than wander aimlessly along the branching paths with which we will continually be confronted" (pg. 147-148)
    - "<u>The notions of self-realization and self-alienation are available to us</u>, and may be employed to assist us in discerning the differing contours of different conceptions held out to us, of sorts of *self more worth having* and *lives more worth living* than others" (pg. 148)
- "the basic question motivating the kind of reflection I have in mind is the question of *where are we to go from here…*" (pg. 148)
  - "where are we to go from here…is an open question" (pg. 149)
  - "the field of human possibilities is not fixed once and for all by anything about us as we are already constituted, or by the way things now are in our world, or even by both together. It is a field that has expanded in the course of human history, and that admits of further expansion. This is another respect in which the question of where we are to go from here is an open question, and will always remain one…" (pg. 149)
- "In short, **philosophy may perform a valuable service as we make the adjustment of shifting to the *identification and assessment of human possibilities* in our grappling with the problems of the human good, the quality of life, and how we are to live our lives**. And it is in this context that the ideas of self-realization and self-alienation may yet acquire a new lease on life" (pg. 150)
  - "Putting the matter very briefly and schematically, **the notion of *self-realization* may be recast in terms of some configuration of realized human possibilities constituting a form of selfhood proposed as especially worth attaining, owing to the character and quality of human life associated with it.** The notion of *self-alienation* may correspondingly be recast in terms of the failure to attain or sustain it by those who have it in them…to do so, either because they are *prevented* from doing so or are seduced away from it, or *forfeit* the opportunity of their own accord. So conceived, <u>these notions admit of being filled in in different ways</u>, reflecting not only variations in the content of the possibilities actually established or within reach at different junctures of human history, but also the different interpretations and evaluations that may be placed upon them" (pg. 150)
    - "I am supposing…that there is no standard available to us independent of human life itself by reference to which it can be discovered what this might involve or require or consist in" (pg. 150)
      - *it is incorrect to suppose any ideal or standard reside, in the first instance, 'outside' of the human, as if it were something similar to how humans construe God as 'above and beyond', as the concept itself, in combination with the concomitant relation the human assumes with respect to such a fictious entity, is ridiculous to begin with; so, then, much in the same way that it is fruitless to turn our focus to be outside of ourselves in search for that which does not exist, it is not at all necessary that what's ideal stand in the same position as 'god'. Meaning, human ideals stem from humans themselves, and they are 'ideals' insofar as such notion receive mass recognition, therein representing what's harmonious between each.*
- **"The task of philosophy, as Nietzsche came to understand it, is not merely to comprehend the basic character of our existence and all that transpires in this world, but also to discern and reckon with various human possibilities**, as these have been established in the course of the emergence of the kind of creature we are. On this way of thinking, our aim should be not merely to consider whether any of these pictures is in some ultimate sense true to our essential or primordial nature as human beings-as none of them are - but rather to determine which of them affords us the most attractive way of conceiving of what might constitute and contribute to what Nietzsche calls 'the enhancement of life'" (pg. 152)
  - "<u>the realization or nonrealization of the kinds of human possibility in question is significantly affected by the conditions of life that prevail,</u>

and does not depend entirely upon what individuals themselves may do or could be expected to do regardless of what these conditions happen to be. It is this point that establishes the link between these concerns and social, political, economic, and educational policy. If certain human possibilities are established as human possibilities, and may be <u>either facilitated or obstructed in their realization</u> by various sorts of concrete social arrangements and practices, then <u>the adjustment of these arrangements</u> and practices becomes of no little importance. And their adjustment in turn must be approached by way of a further reflection upon the 'conditions of their possibility'" (pg. 153)

- ○ **"these [personality, citizenship, and knowledge] are considered to be the three fundamental dimensions of self-realization** here because they are the realization of human selfhood conceived in terms of our threefold nature as conscious beings having both *particular* existence and the capacity to function *rationally* on the levels of both thought and action. *Personality* is the expression of our developed particularity as distinct individuals. *Citizenship* is the way in which our capacity for rational conduct on the plane of action is most fully manifested. And *knowledge* is the issue of our capacity for rationality on the plane of thought, as it develops and finds proper employment. But each of these attainments is possible only in a world in which their expressions are possible, and only through our embracing the *means* of their attainment…" (pg. 154)
- ○ "There can be no realization of our particularity as personality without some sort of *property*, in which it can be expressed as we may choose to express it and retain our unique relation to it. There can be no realization of our capacity for rationality on the plane of action without participation in rule-governed practices transcending our particularity, which *social institutions* alone can provide. And there can be no realization of our capacity for rationality on the plane of thought without submission to rule-governed intellectual disciplines transcending both our particularity and practices peculiar to our communities. **Personal *property*, social *institutions* and intellectual disciplines thus are indispensable mediators of our self-realization,** on this neo-Hegelian conception of our nature - or of the sort of self most worth having, and of the sort of life most worth living" (pg. 154)
    - ▪ "On this way of thinking, **self-alienation is fundamentally a matter of *missing out* on one or more aspects of this complex dimension of self-realization**, when the real-world conditions of their possibility have been established, but the opportunity of attaining them is either denied or passed by. Two sorts of problems may then be contemplated: <u>problems of *obstacles*, and problems of *motivation*</u>. Both may conceivably be addressed by adjustments of social policy, but of quite different sorts in the two types of cases" (pg. 154)
        - □ "as long as this way of thinking about the kind of human life to be aspired to for ourselves and others strikes a responsive chord…the language of self-realization and self-alienation will be useful in setting it out and considering what is to be done" (pg. 154-155)
        - □ **"individual lives find their highest significance in the contributions they may make to this further 'enhancement of life'**, and to the 'higher humanity' it realizes; and its realization is our highest human self-realization, from which our individual possibilities derive their fundamental meaning" (pg. 157)
- ○ "Possibilities unconceived are no real possibilities. Possibilities clearly conceived may not always be real possibilities either; but clearly conceiving them at least opens the way to their exploration, and even to making things come true that otherwise would be neither true nor possible at all. And having a way of framing the kinds of contrast they set up - as the articulation of associated conceptions of self-realization and self-alienation provides-enables them to be conceived more clearly than they otherwise would be" (pg. 159)

d. <u>Further Readings</u>:
- ▪ Realizing Freedom: Hegel, Sartre, and the Alienation of Human Being, by G. Rae
https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Gavin-Rae-Realizing-Freedom-Hegel-Sartre-and-the-Alienation-of-Human-Being.pdf
- ▪ (Article) Alienation and Self-Alienation, by M. Khan https://jdss.org.pk/issues/v2/3/alienation-and-self-alienation.pdf
- ▪ (Article) Alienation, authenticity and the self, by G. Rae https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49763905_Alienation_authenticity_and_the_self