

Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations, by I. McMullin

a. People / Organizations: <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/24960/pdf>

b. Quotes:

- "how I am with somebody deeply affects what they mean" - Author (pg. 177)

c. General Notes:

- Introduction (pg. 3)
 - "This book analyzes the implications of Heidegger's critique of traditional theories of subjectivity for any conception of "intersubjectivity," demonstrating that one can benefit from Heidegger's radically new characterization of human selfhood without being committed to the distorted and solipsistic social ontology that is often deemed to be its direct consequence. Dominant interpretations tend to misunderstand Heidegger's work in this regard by characterizing the Heideggerian self—Dasein—as either too solipsistic or too selfless. In response I develop an account of Dasein's social nature that is grounded in Heidegger's notion that Dasein's originary temporality expresses itself in a heedful accommodation of the temporalizing presence of the other Dasein. In doing so I am able to provide an account of Dasein-to-Dasein relationships as a type of mutual recognition of individuated personhood within everydayness. Such an "interdasein" relationship is neither suffocated under das Man anonymity nor dependent on a previously accomplished authenticity." (pg. 3)
 - "By demonstrating the manner in which Dasein's fundamental being-with-others is first and foremost a responsive acknowledgment of the other's particularity, I am able to provide a Heidegger-inspired account of respect and the intersubjective origins of normativity. I thereby show how Heidegger may serve as a valuable resource for developing an appropriately complex understanding of the relationship between persons" (pg. 3)
 - "It is important to note, however, that an enormous amount of interpretive and reconstructive work is necessary in order to produce a feasible "Heideggerian intersubjectivity." Heidegger himself only provided fragments—which means that **this book is not so much an interpretation as a creative restructuring of his work** aimed at building from it a coherent, unified position that explicitly addresses this issue" (pg. 4)
 - "Heidegger rejects traditional characterizations of selfhood largely because they present the self as an isolated, independent substance required to "bridge the gap" to reach or recognize the world and others like itself. This stance is evident, for example, in the traditional "problem of other minds," which takes as its starting point the independent subject and then seeks to provide an epistemological account of how it is possible to know that others have an inner life analogous to one's own, despite the fact that one only ever has access to one's own inner life" (pg. 4)
 - "Taking such an epistemological orientation means that the problem of other minds is derivative of the 'problem of the external world'" (pg. 4)
 - "the problem of the external world and the problem of other minds thus rely on a conception of the self as a type of autonomous subject that can be radically isolated and distinguished from the world, the others who share the world, and even the thinker's own body" (pg. 4)
 - "Heidegger typically refers to such a picture of selfhood as 'Cartesian', since it finds its most profound expression in the self-enclosed independence of Descartes's *cogito sum*" (pg. 4)
 - ◆ "Having assumed at the outset that there is a gulf between self and world, the philosophical game since Descartes has been to "prove" that the gulf is not unbridgeable" (pg. 4-5)
 - "**such stances simply assume the isolated subject and its 'inner' life as the philosophical starting point**" (pg. 5)
 - "This starting point has infected all accounts of intersubjectivity, which tend to derive an understanding of social/political relationships on the basis of the nature of the individuals that are taken to be the basic units comprising them" (pg. 5)
 - "The social arena is merely a reflection of the inner life of the self-enclosed subject" (pg. 5)
 - "Rather than seeking an ontological bridge from self to other, Heidegger rejects the philosophical commitments underpinning the traditional problem of other minds according to which such a bridge is needed. We can no longer begin with an isolated self who must then "reach" the others through explicit acts of knowledge or inferences from analogy. **Heidegger argues, rather, that there is no human self in the absence of the other**" (pg. 5)
 - "Beginning with a particular characterization of an "a" - or "pre" - social form of human existing is a seriously misleading approach..." (pg. 5)
 - "**For Heidegger, we need others to become knowers at all**" (pg. 5)
 - **it should be noted, too, that such a way of thinking is close to African philosophy, where "I am We".*
 - Cf. (ed.) F. Hord & J. Lee, *I Am Because We Are: Readings in Africana Philosophy*
 - Cf. P. Coetzee, *The African Philosophy Reader*
 - Cf. (ed.) E. Eze, *African Philosophy*
 - "Contrary to Kant's claim, Heidegger argues that "the 'scandal of philosophy' does not consist in the fact that this proof [of the external world] is still lacking up to now, but in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again" (BT 205/190)" (pg. 6)
 - "The existence of the external world and of other minds is only problematic insofar as we engage in a highly theoretical characterization of subjectivity that is modeled on the existence of things; a characterization in which one subject is trapped in its cabinet-like self with no key to the "cabinet doors" of others. Theories that begin with such an autonomous self cannot hope to overcome the solipsism with which they have begun" (pg. 6)
 - "**The self does not need to "find" a way to the world** and the others who share it since it is always already defined by its worldly commitments, activities, and relationships. As we will see, **to be Dasein is to always already be "in" the world**" (pg. 6)
 - "For Heidegger, any philosophical position that demands an account of how the self "reaches" the world has already failed to recognize the phenomenon to be explained" (pg. 6)
 - "Rather than accounting for how one isolated subject encounters another, then, Heidegger argues that the whole endeavor must be dismissed as a dramatic misrepresentation of human experience" (pg. 6)
 - "the Heideggerian account of the self is an attempt to transform this Cartesian picture of the isolated or monolithic subject" (pg. 6)
 - "**Heidegger does not characterize this essential "being-with" (or *Mitsein*) in terms of a primal struggle for recognition or participation in a language community.** Others are encountered, rather, in terms of a shared immersion in the public roles, orientations, and norms through which Dasein understands itself. Others play a necessary role in the very constitution of one's being because each self is dependent on the others to institute and maintain the shared world in terms of which it understands who it can be" (pg. 7)
 - "By simply stipulating that human being is a "being-with" others—a "being-with" that is not accomplished or created through direct encounters—Heidegger appears to move the generality, anonymity, and mediation that may characterize particular social roles to the level of an a priori category that characterizes one's very way of being. In defining human selfhood as fundamentally characterized by with-others-ness, Heidegger seems to be guilty of advocating a position that cannot accommodate the immediate experiences of others in their concrete particularity" (pg. 7)

- ◆ **this is where we turn to Martin Buber's I and Thou.*
 - "By simply stipulating that a self is always with others, then, Heidegger cannot do justice to the social encounter in all its particularity—the role that being with this or that other person plays in the very constitution of the self" (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "Heidegger's very efforts to accommodate the self's fundamental other- directedness seem to have the ironic consequence of preventing it." (pg. 8)
- **"my purpose in this book is to show that concrete encounters between individuals are possible from within the confines of everyday existing"** (pg. 8)
 - "The task of the book will be to articulate the manner in which a self can be both dependent on others to be what it is and yet display an individuation that prevents it from being merely an interchangeable token of the type 'Dasein'" (pg. 8)
 - "The majority of this text is an articulation of what I believe Heidegger ought to have said—or was "trying" to say—based both on his other philosophical commitments and the nature of the 'things themselves'" (pg. 8)
 - "this book reads Heidegger as a transcendental phenomenologist deeply indebted to the innovations of Edmund Husserl" (pg. 13)
 - "this discussion presents Heidegger as a phenomenologist concerned with the first-person experience of meaning—despite the fact that his project was aimed at transforming the way in which the first-person is to be understood" (pg. 13)
 - "For Heidegger, there is no philosophy or "thinking" without the self" (pg. 14)
 - "As Heidegger himself said, his interest is in articulating the "subjectivity of the subject" (BT 24/ 21)" (pg. 14)
- Chapter 1 - The 'Subject' of Inquiry (pg. 15)
 - "Heidegger answers the problem of other minds by rejecting the modern conception of selfhood that gave rise to it and by insisting that any account of human existence in which it appears as a problem is misguided from the outset. Indeed, Heidegger's use of the term "Dasein" is itself a protest against such accounts and their tendency to characterize the self as an atomic substance that is "initially *worldless*, or not certain of its world, and which basically must first make certain of a world" (BT 206/ 191)" (pg. 15)
 - "With the notion of Dasein Heidegger instead names a self that only is insofar as it is social and worldly. He repudiates demands for proofs of external reality because Dasein is not a self-contained substance independent of the world but is instead "being-in-the-world." **To be a self is to occupy a way of being characterized by relationality and responsiveness to the world and others**" (pg. 15)
 - "Though the notion of being-in-the-world may conjure images of distinct inside and outside realms, Heidegger uses this expression to characterize the way in which we do not live "outside" the world, only to find our way "into" it or "prove" that it's really there. Rather, we exist embedded in its social, practical, and axiological meanings and we understand ourselves in terms of them" (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "what Heidegger means by "world"...is not merely the totality of objects but is instead the network of meaningful references in terms of which we understand ourselves" (pg. 15)
 - **"Selfhood is a way of being characterized by directedness toward and dependence on the worldly context of meaning**—not by a self-enclosed worldless independence. To be-in-the-world, then, means that we orient our lives according to the meaning frameworks that it provides, not that we are just one more object positioned within a larger collection of things—the traditional notion of the 'world'" (pg. 15-16)
 - ◆ "Dasein's relation to the world is not a contingent feature of its selfhood but is its very way of being" (pg. 16)
 - **"Being in-the-world is relationality, dependence, and directedness—in Heidegger's terms, transcendence."** (pg. 16)
 - "By "transcendence" Heidegger does not intend the popular philosophical meaning according to which "to transcend" means for something to exist outside or beyond the immanent sphere of subjectivity. Such characterizations simply return us to the isolation of the Cartesian subject" (pg. 16)
 - The original meaning of *transcendere*, Heidegger claims, "signifies literally to step over, pass over, go through, and occasionally to surpass." **Transcendence is the stepping over or beyond the "borders" of one's internal life to be with or at the thing toward which it is directed:** "The transcendens, the transcendent, is *that which oversteps as such* and not that toward which I step over" (BPP 299). **It is a fundamental openness** to that which lies outside or beyond the immanent sphere of subjectivity—an openness that is not some kind of occasional activity of the self, but its very essence..." (pg. 16)
 - "to be a self is to be fundamentally shaped by and directed toward the web of significance that is the world" (pg. 16)
 - ◆ "We are only selves insofar as we are engaged in the world's meaning framework and understand ourselves in terms of it. Indeed, our capacity to comport ourselves to things—to choose, to love, to organize, to regret—relies on precisely this openness to the world" (pg. 16)
 - ◆ "Heidegger argues that to be a self is to be committed to the deeply personal project of understanding who one is to be" (pg. 17)
 - ◇ "'care' is the term that Heidegger uses to designate this specifically human way of existing as a being that understands itself from the context of activities and meanings through which it plays out the possibilities that matter to it. **We care about certain possibilities because they define who we will be**" (pg. 17)
 - ▶ Cf. M. Heidegger, *Letter on Humanism*, pg. 199-200 - "In the final chapter of division one of *Being and Time* Heidegger defines "care" as the Being of Dasein. It is a name for the structural whole of existence in all its modes and for the broadest and most basic possibilities of discovery and disclosure of self and world... 'Care' is the all-inclusive name for my concern for other people, preoccupation with things, and awareness of my proper Being".
<http://timothyquigley.net/cont/heidegger-lh.pdf>
 - "Thus Heidegger claims that transcending "does not only and not primarily mean a self-relating of a subject to an object; rather, transcendence means to understand oneself from a world" (BPP 300)" (pg. 16)
 - ◆ "Heidegger will reject the Kantian I "because it exists only as 'I think' and not as 'I think something'" (pg. 18)
 - ◇ "[however,] the "I think something" is the essence of Husserl's characterization of intentionality" (pg. 18)
 - ◇ "The theory of intentionality was Husserl's resistance to the isolation of the traditional subject..." (pg. 18)
 - ▶ "Thus characterizing Husserlian intentionality as worldless is a misunderstanding at best, insofar as intentionality is Husserl's attempt to designate the way in which the self *always* exists immersed in its relation to the world" (pg. 18)
 - **this is what Sartre latched onto through his use of "consciousness if always consciousness (of) something"*
 - ◆ "Heidegger was deeply indebted to Husserl's insights" (pg. 18)
 - ◇ "This becomes clearer once we acknowledge that the kind of transcending toward the world dubbed being-in-the-world is already present in protoform in Husserl's notion of intentionality (since all "I thinks" are "I think something")..." (pg. 19)
 - ◇ "Heidegger did not so much reject Husserl's intentional I, then, as object to the tendency to characterize the intentional relationship as primarily cognitive" (pg. 19)
 - **this is what makes Sartre different from Heidegger - Sartre kept to the cognitive aspect of being (i.e., consciousness)*

- ▶ "Thus Heidegger believes that Husserl's approach inappropriately prioritizes the epistemic relation to the world..." (pg. 19)
 - "Husserl's focus on the "sphere of ownness" and the "solipsistic" perceptual horizon lead Heidegger to conclude that Husserl did not recognize the import of his own discovery. Namely, how intentionality means that **the self is only in terms of its interrelation with the world and those who share it**" (pg. 19)
- ◇ "the very essence of phenomenology is a *rejection* of the legitimacy of such metaphysical existence disputes in favor of analyses of how existence claims show up as meaningful within experience" (pg. 19)
 - "Husserl's call for a rigorous science means that philosophy must take responsibility for its claims" (pg. 20)
 - "Phenomenology—Heidegger's chosen method—is "to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (BT 34/ 30)" (pg. 20)
 - "Allowing the nature of human existence to show itself from itself therefore involves both a commitment to the Husserlian phenomenological approach..." (pg. 20)
 - "much contemporary Heidegger scholarship...takes Heidegger's relationship with Husserl to be a radical break rather than an enrichment and development" (pg. 21)
 - ◇ "Heidegger was a philosopher deeply concerned with the legitimacy of philosophical method" (pg. 21)
 - "As Heidegger recognized, phenomenology must be existential if it is to succeed in understanding how philosophy itself is possible—but existentialism must be phenomenological if its claims are to be grounded in anything other than speculation and construction" (pg. 22)
 - "It is for this reason that Husserl has little patience when Heidegger appears to wander into speculative waters with his talk of "Being" in the absence of any reference to how such Being is experienced as such. This type of account cannot possibly be justified, Husserl thinks, since philosophical self-responsibility demands that we refrain from making ontological claims about things that transcend the bounds of possible experience. If it does not show up within the field of possible experience, how do we even know to speak of it—let alone have any standard for assessing the legitimacy of what we say?" (pg. 22)
 - ◆ "Thus Husserl insists on the first-person nature of phenomenology—all ontological claims must be traced back to an analysis of how they show up as making the claim that they do in the lived experience of transcendental subjectivity" (pg. 22)
 - ◆ "it must be recognized that Husserl himself was not entirely consistent in the application of his own method" (pg. 22)
 - "Heidegger understood Husserl's method better than he himself did, and **Dasein is the name for the self and its field of experience understood in the absence of any such presuppositions or commitments**" (pg. 23)
 - "Heidegger's understanding of this point manifested itself in his greater focus on the preconceptual and non-theoretical dimensions of lived experience" (pg. 23)
 - "Heidegger's understanding of intentionality as transcendence is not so much a rejection of Husserl as a call for Husserl's position to be fully consistent with the method he endorsed. Heidegger's development of phenomenology, then, involves re-conceptualizing intentionality to prioritize the pre-cognitive and practical engagements with the world from out of which any theoretical knowledge of scientific objects can arise" (pg. 23)
 - "His re-characterization of transcendental subjectivity as Dasein succeeds in highlighting the manner in which care—the lived experience of attuned practical commitment to an existence that fundamentally matters—takes Husserl's notion of transcendental subjectivity in a direction that it was required to go" (pg. 23-24)
 - "For Heidegger, practical immersion in one's way of being in the world takes precedence in human existing; detached, contemplative, scientific modes of being are derivative attitudes that must be accomplished, despite philosophy's fondness for pretending that they are the norm" (pg. 17)
 - **this 'practical immersion' sits close to G. Marcel's theory of engagement.*
 - Thrown Project (pg. 24)
 - "Heidegger makes particular use of the concepts "projection" and "thrownness." Thrownness refers to the sheer "thatness" of existence, to the fact that one aspect of the way we exist is to be always already cast into the world, burdened with the fact that we simply find ourselves in possibilities not of our own choosing. Dasein cannot simply define itself, then, because it is always already defined by the worldly situation in which it simply discovers itself to be" (pg. 24)
 - **I'd say that this inability to account for our own existence brings us shame - we feel shameful at the fact that we don't wholly know why we're here-in-the-world. And, seeing as we bring our thrownness along with us, shame follows, hauntingly.*
 - "This mode of disclosure reveals the whole of being-in-the-world insofar as it "assails Da-sein in the unreflected falling prey to the 'world' of its heedfulness" (BT 136/ 129). In other words, attunement reveals that the world I've been thrown into always has a particular orientation; I find myself in a situation where things and options already matter. I do not choose to be drawn to or repulsed by things; rather, the way I exist in the world is one in which I am "solicited and summoned" by it" (pg. 24)
 - ◆ "Attuned existing means that things in the world are encountered primarily in a "circumspective" way: as useful, attractive, frightening, and so on. **These "subjective" colorings are not somehow added on afterwards to raw data accumulated by an indifferent observer, but define Dasein's very experience of things as meaningful.**" (pg. 24)
 - ◆ "Letting things be encountered in a circumspect, heedful way has—we can see this now more precisely in terms of attunement—the character of being affected or moved" (BT 137/ 129). **To be Dasein is to be moved by the world**" (pg. 25)
 - "'Project' or 'projectedness' refers to Dasein's capacity to live into given possibilities of its worldly situation; to take over and own them as its own..." (pg. 25)
 - "Project is the appropriation of this thrown ground from and as which one *must* be, in light of that towards which one *might* be. It designates Dasein's ability to commit itself to different possible ways to be itself. While attunement reveals Dasein's being-in-the-world qua thrown, **understanding discloses being-in-the-world in terms of projectedness**; the fact that **Dasein's existence is suspended among possibilities into which it has been thrown and among which it must choose**" (pg. 25)
 - ◆ "Through understanding Dasein's existence is revealed qua potentiality—as balanced amidst possible activities of existing—thereby enabling it to address itself practically to the options that attunement has revealed as mattering. Understanding discloses the fact that I exist among possible ways to be me and that I can choose to pursue or neglect these different possibilities" (pg. 25)
 - ◆ "Understanding thereby discloses Dasein's existence as one in which its being is always still open and incomplete" (pg. 26)
 - "We are not simply passive observers in the face of our own possibilities; **we are our possibilities** and how with live them" (pg. 26)
 - ◆ "Because **Dasein has no fixed 'essence'** it is an entity "*whose what is precisely to be and nothing but to be*" (HCT 110)" (pg. 26)

- "we must speak of Dasein not as a 'what' but as a who; "the authentic entity of Dasein, the who, is not a thing and nothing worldly, but is itself only a way to be" (HCT 237). **Who the self is, is fundamentally a matter of how I am to be—not what I am to be"** (pg. 26)
- Meaning (pg. 27)
 - "Though the condition of meaningfulness is grounded in Dasein's openness to possibility, Dasein does not simply project meanings onto things arbitrarily. Rather, Dasein's ways to be in the world discover or reveal—disclose—potential connections among the things at hand. The potentiality of these connections means that they are characterized not only by openness to change and interpretation but also by a certain limit or resistance to my activities" (pg. 28)
 - "Dasein's way of being gives rise to meaning through its interpretive encounter with that which it is not" (pg. 28)
 - **"This place of meaning is Dasein itself**, understood in the primary sense of meaning: the "formal, existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding" (BT 151/ 142)" (pg. 29)
- Being-With (pg. 29)
 - **"In addition to Thrownness and Projectedness, Being-with (Mitsein) is the third fundamental dimension of care and designates Dasein's essentially social nature"** (pg. 29)
 - "For Heidegger, every possibility that human existence offers must be understood in terms of the presence of other people. Even when we are alone or solitary the others are present as an absence" (pg. 29)
 - ◆ "For Heidegger, then, coexistence with others is not simply a contingent feature of the world. Being-with does not refer to the fact that I am rarely alone in places with no traces of other humans; rather, "being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factually present and perceived. The being-alone of Dasein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only *in and for* a being-with" (BT 120/ 113)" (pg. 31)
 - "Being-with does not mean that there are always others physically there with me but characterizes the way in which being in the world is always already permeated with the presence of others" (pg. 29)
 - ◆ *"I would say instead "presence of other-ness"*
 - "Dasein exists immersed in the world..." (pg. 30)
 - "Dasein's encounters with others are an existing along with other Dasein *in the shared world*." (pg. 30)
 - "Like the self, then, experiencing others requires no "espionage on the ego" to take them as its object qua subject. Though we may treat them as such, **others are never experienced as objects but only ever as other selves** engaged in particular practices, tasks, and activities—the projects in which they pursue their possibilities" (pg. 30)
 - "The physical actions of the other's smiling and waving aren't experienced as the mere 'appearance' of her inner desire to greet me—the smile and wave *are* a greeting" (pg. 30)
 - **"I understand the others with whom I share the world just as I understand myself**: as pursuing projects within a shared world" (pg. 31)
 - "Heidegger's point is that there is never simply "stuff"; I only ever encounter anything against the background of meaningful contexts of relevance that are always already heavy with the presence of others..." (pg. 31)
 - **"Human co-being with others constitutes a structural characteristic of human existence itself..."** (pg. 31)
 - "The with-one-another implied in being-with is a way of being constitutive of selfhood" (pg. 31)
 - "It is an ontological, rather than ontic or factual feature of my way of existing: 'We ourselves are determined through a Being-with the other'" (pg. 31)
 - "Thus this "having to do with one another in the one world" can also be described as a "*being dependent on one another*" (HCT 240). The publicity, commonality, and social interdependence of the world in which I exist are themselves essential features of my existing" (pg. 32)
- Das Man (pg. 32)
 - "According to Heidegger, the everyday way that I exist in terms of the publicity of the world is fundamentally in terms of *averageness*. **I understand myself and others in light of a context of social roles and meanings in which we are all, for the most part, engaged in behavior that is interchangeable and anonymous**" (pg. 32)
 - "This everyday form of existence—in which my way of being is simply the average way of being—Heidegger refers to as *das Man*. Various translations as 'the they', 'the crowd', or 'one', these terms are designed to illustrate the way in which we understand ourselves in terms of anonymous social roles and practices infused with the interchangeability of those participating in them" (pg. 32)
 - "Because we all participate in, and understand ourselves from, these average and public understandings, **Heidegger is designating a way of being in which the self is initially and for the most part not differentiated from the others**" (pg. 33)
 - "The existential nature of the way we are with others in terms of das Man refers not to some type of group subject, but to the way in which communal standards determine our engagement in particular activities and how these activities are carried out. Since selfhood is understood as a way of existing, not as a kind of substance, it becomes clear how I can become a seemingly indistinct and anonymous one among many..." (pg. 33)
 - **"The creation and maintenance of averageness involves our tendency to adapt ourselves to the others**. Dasein is caught up not only in taking care of the different things and projects in which it is immersed, but also in taking care of *how* this taking care compares to that of others" (pg. 33)
 - "We recognize the unspoken standard of how one does things and constantly, unthinkingly modify our behavior to meet this standard, to control this distance between others and ourselves. This tendency to manage our distance from others is what Heidegger refers to as *distantiality*" (pg. 33)
 - "Though this urge to conform to the 'normal' and the 'average' can be quite explicit, it generally operates on an unthematized level that infuses all of our activities..." (pg. 34)
 - ◆ "The implicit nature of this constant adjusting to the public standards and understandings in which we are immersed is in keeping with Heidegger's claim that we do not adapt to das Man standards only after we have become full-fledged independent subjects—that we in some sense autonomously choose to adapt to these standards. Rather, "in terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially 'given' to 'myself.' Initially, **Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so**" (BT 129/ 121)" (pg. 34)
 - ◇ "The they is a normative construction that determines the way in which one's taking care *can* manifest itself; it "prescribes the kind of being of everydayness" (BT 127/ 119)" (pg. 34)
 - ◇ "The manner in which das Man dominates my everyday way of being, then, involves its tendency to delimit and control the possible interpretations of self, world, and others that are available" (pg. 34)
 - ◇ "My everyday way of existing is determined on the basis of the easy and familiar patterns provided and encouraged by the public meanings and standards in which I find myself" (pg. 34)
 - "Under such an influence, we can lose our awareness of ourselves as entrusted with our own possible ways of being. Indeed, the structures of averageness, distantiality, and leveling down—all of which together constitute what Heidegger terms publicness—implicitly encourage the loss of this self-responsibility" (pg. 34-35)

- Intentional Mattering (pg. 49)
 - "Heidegger claims that "one does not have representations, but one represents" (ZS 226)" (pg. 49)
 - "Heidegger recognizes that intentionality is not simply the directedness toward the world and the standards by which this directionality is measured—rather, on the most basic level, it is a caring about succeeding in measuring up that is present in every intentional act that one undertakes. Intentionality demands that meeting those conditions matters to the agent and thereby gives Dasein a way of "understanding itself existentially in it" (pg. 50)
 - "on the most basic level Dasein's sustained caring for who it will be—its commitment to the way in which its various activities reflect it back to itself—is basic to self-awareness. All of my actions are grounded in the implicit awareness that whether I succeed or fail matters to me and reveals something about who I am" (pg. 50)
 - ◆ "For Heidegger, this investment in all of my actions and understandings is rooted in the fact that everything I do falls under my overarching responsibility for who I am" (pg. 50)
 - ◆ "'caring always exists in a determinate or indeterminate, secure or wavering, direction. Life finds direction, takes up a direction, grows into a direction, gives to itself or lives in a direction, and even if the direction is lost to sight, it nevertheless remains present' (PIA 70–71)" (pg. 50)
 - "There is no "self-object" to be grasped in introspection because the self is not a thing but a mode of existing that can only be experienced in and through the existing itself" (pg. 50-51)
 - "For Heidegger, to exist as a self—as an I or a you—is to exist in light of a concern for what it means to be this self, a concern rooted in the fact that I am not guaranteed success and must therefore strive to achieve it. I care about this being who I am because I may fail at being it..." (pg. 51)
- Mineness (pg. 51)
 - "Actions and understandings only have the structure that they do insofar as they are always already infused with the normative weight that is the essence of selfhood" (pg. 52)
 - "Because my beliefs and intentions express who I am, however, they are fundamentally characterized by mineness. For Heidegger, then, **self-awareness must be understood as a way of living—not knowing or observing—one's selfness**" (pg. 52-53)
 - ◆ "Heidegger was inspired by Dilthey in this regard..." (pg. 53)
 - "the self-responsibility of existing comes explicitly to light only in the condition that Heidegger calls authenticity" (pg. 53)
 - ◆ "Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic selfhood in this manner—whereby the latter is understood as a fallen forgetfulness of self in the anonymity and averageness of das Man, and the former is a radical individuation accomplished through Angst, being-toward-death, and conscience..." (pg. 53)
 - "The manner in which this existential care structure is present in and through everydayness lies in Dasein's commitment and responsiveness to norms—in the fact that meeting them matters to it. " 'I' means the being that is concerned about the being of the being which it is" (BT 322/ 296)—and this concern accompanies and shapes even Dasein's inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world" (pg. 53)
- The Worldliness of the Self (pg. 53)
 - "It is for these reasons that Heidegger claims that **the everyday self understands itself from the world...**" (pg. 53)
 - "I understand myself from the world by successfully subordinating myself to the norms of success inherent in the meaning of things and practices" (pg. 54)
 - "To find one's bearings is to have access to the markers and measures by which to orient oneself. It is to have one's "directedness" find signs that one is heading in the right direction. In this case, the directedness under consideration is the intentionality that characterizes our way of being. We understand ourselves from the world because the world grants us standards by which to judge whether we are succeeding or failing at existing—whether we've gotten our bearings straight, so to speak" (pg. 54)
- The Existential Roots of Philosophy (pg. 56)
 - "**the early Heidegger was committed to phenomenological methodology—a method focused on first-person lived experience rooted in the recognition that any talk of appearing— that is, of phenomena—includes an essential reference to the lived experience of the one for whom things appear.** By rethinking the being of the experiencer, however, Heidegger can account for methodological requirements overlooked by Husserl himself" (pg. 56)
 - "Heidegger develops Husserl's account by emphasizing (1) how the meaning of Dasein's existence *matters* to it, (2) the fact that Dasein is responsive to norms capable of being made explicit, and (3) the manner in which failures or breakdowns in Dasein's smooth coping provoke a shift to a reflective stance in which the meaning of its undertakings is explicitly considered" (pg. 56-57)
 - "[phenomenology's] purpose is not to say something new, but to bring to light the structures that are always already operative on a pre-theoretical level" (pg. 57)
- Chapter 3 - Being and Otherness: Sartre's Critique (pg. 58)
 - "Given his account of Dasein as a care-driven intentionally directed immersion in the shared world, Heidegger seems to avoid the difficulties associated with other accounts of social relations. For Heidegger, there is no private cabinet of consciousness to which others have no access—on the contrary, Dasein's selfhood is defined by an existential self-responsibility that expresses itself in publicly articulated satisfaction conditions. Insofar as the Heideggerian self is rooted in this mineness of self-responsibility, however, it may be argued that his account suffers from a type of existential solipsism. Though this mineness only finds expression in the public arena of shared meaning, Heidegger defines this arena in terms of anonymity and averageness, undermining the sense that his reformulation of the Cartesian subject offers much in the way of resources for adequately characterizing the interpersonal encounter" (pg. 58)
 - "The problem, as we will see, is that Heidegger's account seems to fall into the danger of viewing other Dasein merely as interchangeable representatives of the public norms and meanings through which we all pursue our particular abilities to be" (pg. 58)
 - "Many thinkers have argued that Heidegger's focus on the existential ontological sense at the expense of the concrete encounter means that he cannot account for the ability to encounter the other in all her particularity, and that this is, in fact, a—if not *the*—major flaw in his work. Indeed, this criticism is so widespread that it has come to be accepted as a kind of truism" (pg. 59)
 - "By articulating how Sartre interprets—and misconstrues—Heidegger's concept of being-with, it will become clear that **Heidegger has better resources with which to account for concrete encounters between individual selves**" (pg. 60)
- Sartre (pg. 60)
 - "Sartre's assessment of Heidegger's view is not entirely negative; indeed, he thinks that Heidegger made huge advances over Husserl and others ..." (pg. 60)
 - "Heidegger's approach represents a step forward because he does not characterize the intentional relationship in subject/object theoretical knowledge terms, but **emphasizes the deep pre-theoretical commitments and entanglements in terms of which we encounter the world and those who share it with us**" (pg. 60)
 - "Sartre, like Heidegger, rejects the tendency to "measure being by knowledge" (BN 329)—a tendency associated with figures like Husserl and

- Hegel" (pg. 60)
- "Heidegger's position represents progress, Sartre believes, because it recognizes that an adequate account of the experience of the Other must meet the following requirements: "(1) the relation between 'human-realities' must be a relation of being [and] (2) this relation must cause 'human-realities' to depend on one another in their essential being" (BN 330). In other words, **the very nature of my being in the world must depend on other Dasein...**" (pg. 60)
 - "Despite its promise, however, Sartre ultimately rejects Heidegger's approach to intersubjectivity for two reasons—one substantive, one methodological. The methodological concern relates to the fact that Heidegger merely stipulates being-with as a kind of existential given. In other words, Sartre argues that Heidegger simply claims being-with as an ontological determination that belongs to Dasein qua Dasein; he does not show how this way of being is supposed to depend on the other Dasein who actually share the world with me...He defines Dasein as being-with without examining the relationship to the specific others with whom Dasein must be" (pg. 61)
 - "On Heidegger's account, then, **being-with will always be one of Dasein's ontological structures**—regardless of whether other Dasein are ever directly encountered such that this structure comes to its realization. As Heidegger explicitly claims: "Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factually present and perceived" (BT 120/ 113)" (pg. 61)
 - "But for Sartre, this type of account can only reach the abstract other and cannot give us others in their concrete presence" (pg. 61)
 - ◆ "Because being-with is merely an ontological structure belonging to Dasein's way of being, Sartre argues, it provides a type of a priori condition for the possibility of ontic encounters, thereby reducing the social dimension of being-in-the-world to a structure of the self. Individual others are secondary to the dimension of sociality that precedes them..." (pg. 61-62)
 - ◆ "Because Heidegger characterizes sociality as such an abstract, universal, and essential quality, he ultimately reduces the social dimension of being-in-the-world to an a priori structure of the self. Heidegger's account is essentially "metaphysical solipsism in disguise" because possible modes of encounter are established in advance on the basis of the preexisting structures of self that permit the encounter to occur..." (pg. 62)
 - ◆ "Though Sartre commends Heidegger's attempt to provide "a being which in its own being implies the Other's being" (BN 333), then, he condemns him for simply *asserting* that "the characteristic of being of human-reality is its being *with* others" (BN 330)" (pg. 64-65)
 - "despite his criticisms, Sartre continues to rely on the subject/ object model on which such philosophies of knowledge are based. He thereby undermines his own ability to meet the intersubjective criteria that he himself established..." (pg. 62)
 - "Because Heidegger's account characterizes the relation to the other in terms of an anonymous "we" rather than a "you," it "can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other" (BN 334). Heidegger only provides an account of the conditions for the *possibility* of sociality—immersion in a shared world through which we understand self and others—he does not account for its *reality*. By defining being-with as an *ontological* structure of my being, Heidegger cannot account for the *ontic* encounter with another Dasein in all the particularity of his mineness" (pg. 63)
- Possibilities of Heideggerian Response (pg. 63)
 - "Jean- Luc Nancy's Being Singular Plural attempts to develop Heidegger's account of being-with further in this direction, arguing that this commitment to essential **plurality is not a weakness but a strength**. For Nancy it is not merely Dasein that is fundamentally characterized by plurality, but reality itself. Thus he argues that the Heideggerian notion of being-with is an articulation of the fact that Being itself is fundamentally plural or 'with'" (pg. 63)
 - "He wants to speak, instead, of the "plural singular essence of Being" itself (55)" (pg. 64)
 - "Nevertheless, Nancy's development of Heideggerian themes fails in precisely the same methodological way that Sartre thinks Heidegger's own position does" (pg. 64)
 - "Nancy's "development" of Heidegger's work must be recognized as a misstep" (pg. 65)
- Sartre's Response (pg. 65)
 - "In contrast to Heidegger's position, **Sartre argues that it must be the very contingency of the encounter that testifies to the otherness** and transcendence of the other self in all her particularity and immediacy" (pg. 65)
 - "[Sartre attempts] to remain true to the fact that it is the existence of other Dasein in their concrete particularity that grounds this social way of being in the world..." (pg. 65)
 - ◆ "Sartre shows this by turning to an analysis of the mode of experience that is capable of revealing the other's subjectivity as such" (pg. 65)
 - "For Sartre, the other's subjectivity is encountered through a perception that does not objectify but *refers*" (pg. 67)
 - "Sartre is arguing that my concrete encounter with the other subjectivity involves a referral to the relation in which **this encounter places me**; the perception of the other refers by its very nature to a primary mode of connection between me and the other qua subject" (pg. 67)
 - ◆ **'here' cannot arise without a 'there'*
 - "This being-placed-in-relation occurs, Sartre claims, through an experience of the other as a "centering" of the world; the world seen by the other person presents a face that exists only from that person's perspective" (pg. 67)
 - "Sartre's phenomenological descriptions reveal that **experiencing the other's subjectivity involves an encounter in which I am placed in a relation such that I experience myself as an object seen in the world**. I experience myself as having dimensions that are seen only by the other from her perspective. Thus the primary experiences that reveal the other's subjectivity to me are, according to Sartre, ones in which I experience myself as vulnerable, embodied, limited, and exposed—experiences in which my easy mastery of the situation has been called into question" (pg. 67)
 - **with respect to 'placed in a relation', cf. A. Benjamin, Towards a Relational Ontology, Chapter 1 - Being-in-Relation*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqad/d7b063_28b81f8d11db461e929802c0dc1e6060.pdf
 - "When I am simply absorbed in my project of spying on people through the keyhole, he argues, I am not aware of myself as object in the world" (pg. 67)
 - "By engaging in this type of phenomenological analysis of the direct encounter with others, Sartre hopes to reveal the fact that through such encounters my identity is no longer mine alone: I am thrust into a type of ontological dependence on the other who gives me the dimensions of myself that are accessible only from her perspective" (pg. 68)
 - "**the other's look gives me dimensions of myself that I cannot otherwise access**" (pg. 68)
 - ◆ "such experiences reveal a dimension of myself that I cannot determine in advance or completely appropriate as my own" (pg. 68)
 - "Living in a shared world means that I am always open to a determination of self by another. For Sartre, the other's free subjectivity manifests itself primarily as a limiting of my freedom, as the "solidification and alienation of my own possibilities" (BN 352) such that the possible ways for me to be are "infected" with the presence of the other's possibilities" (pg. 69)
 - "the experience of "objectification" that Sartre discusses is not a type of reduction to thing-status. Rather, he is here attempting to express the manner in which one self—a being that is suspended among possible ways to be—encounters others as such" (pg. 69)

- ◆ **I disagree. Sartre's objectification is a reduction of Being to the category of 'thing'.*
 - "Unlike Heidegger's emphasis on the averageness of the intersubjective arena, then—the *das Man* tendency to engage in the predictable and the settled in advance—Sartre highlights the other's *unpredictability*, her being engaged in projects that I cannot always foresee or control" (pg. 69)
 - ◆ "I cannot naively rely on my different abilities to be, but must take the other's possibilities into consideration because his presence both opens up and closes down different ways for *me* to be" (pg. 70)
 - ◆ "Because of the other person's presence, however, my possibilities are called into question..." (pg. 70)
 - "For Sartre, then, it is the contingent, factic presence of other beings defined by possibility—able to transcend the situation toward another situation undetermined by the present one— that evokes a profound change in how I experience both myself and the world." (pg. 70)
 - Sartrean Difficulties (pg. 70)
 - "Despite the effectiveness of Sartre's phenomenological descriptions, there are nevertheless serious problems with his characterization of the intersubjective encounter" (pg. 70)
 - **"A major source of difficulty is the fact that, on Sartre's account, the relationship between self and other can only ever be that of objectifying and objectified"** (pg. 70)
 - "encountering the other necessarily involves a radical bifurcation of the self into either subject-seeing or object-seen" (pg. 72)
 - "Because of his adherence to the Cartesian legacy and its endorsement of the subject/object model for understanding the subject's modes of encounter, Sartre only leaves room for an either/ or picture of intersubjectivity: one is either transcending the other or suffering the other's transcendence" (pg. 70-71)
 - "The consequence of such a view, however, is that in order to overcome my object status I must effectively strip the other of his subject status." (pg. 71)
 - ◆ "this leaves us with a highly unappealing account of the intersubjective domain, since it will essentially rule out the ability to simultaneously experience self and other as subjects" (pg. 71)
 - "he implies that one retains one's awareness of the capacity to reverse the objectification by turning the transcending look back upon the other. But I am never purely an object if I sense that I am able to recover my position of subjectivity by reversing the objectifying/objectified dynamic. Such a blurring of the subject object divide demands a more complex characterization of the intersubjective encounter, however, than Sartre's mutually exclusive oscillation between subject and object status allows" (pg. 72)
 - "Indeed, later in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre will come to characterize such either/or modes of understanding as bad faith—a stance in which one attempts to avoid coming to terms with an acceptance of both aspects of one's existence by fleeing from one to the other" (pg. 72)
 - **"we cannot make use of such dimensions of Sartre's approach"** (pg. 73)
 - "If the presence of the other qua subject is torn from me the minute I transcend it toward my own free subjectivity, then so too is all trace of the other's subjectivity lost to me in transcending the very objectification that was necessary to experience any dimension of foreign subjectivity. Thus the contingency and particularity of the Sartrean encounter makes the establishment and maintenance of such intersubjective arenas and artifacts impossible" (pg. 74)
 - "As it stands, Sartre's characterization of intersubjectivity along sharp subject/object lines means that the encounter with another subject *cannot* change one essentially" (pg. 75-76)
 - **"Sartre is ultimately unable to support his own claims"** (pg. 76)
 - ◆ "it is precisely [his] failure to understand his own ontological presuppositions that afflicted Sartre's ontical explanations" (pg. 90)
 - "Sartre's understanding of the categorial status of the Heideggerian *existentials* is off the mark" (pg. 104)
- Chapter 4 - Heideggerian Apriority and the Categories of Being (pg. 77)
 - "in the following sections I will demonstrate that the primary motivation for Sartre's critique of Heidegger's position—the fact that it seems to preclude the concrete immediacy of another person from being experienced as such—does not apply" (pg. 77)
 - "According to Tugendhat, Heidegger simply equates truth with unconcealing, thereby dropping truth's normative dimension, which demands that the latter—in order for it to be true—must reveal the thing as it is in itself, and not simply in whatever way one's preexisting horizons of understanding happen to reveal it" (pg. 78)
 - "Tugendhat aims his critique at what he sees as the arbitrariness and relativism of Heidegger's historically and culturally determined horizons of meaning" (pg. 78)
 - "Though Dasein encounters the world as meaningful through its projects, it does not simply "project" meaning onto things arbitrarily..." (pg. 78)
 - "Indeed, as Henry Pietersma notes, **drawing one's conceptuality from the beings themselves is what Heidegger means by his notion of "letting be"** (Seinlassen): 'An agent lets something be if he allows his actions to be determined by the nature of the things in the environment or world, rather than imposing his own preconceived ideas'" (pg. 78)
- Encountering Things (pg. 79)
 - "Our engagements with things are definitive of who we are, and we care about who we are; the result being that we care about the consistency and appropriateness of our engagements with things" (pg. 84)
- Encountering Others: The A Priori Nature of Being-With (pg. 85)
 - "Dasein cannot encounter others as it does things" (pg. 85)
 - "Encountering others "in" the world does not mean that there is some sort of equipmental screen thrown up between me and others—the other is not simply "mediated by equipment," as Theunissen claims; rather, equipment is "mediated" by the other" (pg. 86)
 - "For Heidegger, the thingly does not have priority over the social dimension of worldly encounter" (pg. 87)
 - "For Heidegger, the way in which the being of other Dasein is disclosed differs fundamentally and categorially from the way in which things are disclosed" (pg. 87)
- The Heideggerian A Priori (pg. 88)
 - "Heidegger's aim in Being and Time is to ground the apriority of the I in its particular existence, emphasizing the fact that the existence character of the I is precisely what cannot be bracketed" (pg. 88)
 - "The existential analytic's shift away from traditional accounts lies in its insistence on recognizing that the a priori categories are only ever found within this or that Dasein's particular, finite existing. Thus Heidegger asserts in the first pages of *Being and Time* that questioning the meaning of being cannot simply be assumed as an abstract ability belonging universally to all things of the type 'human', because the attitudes and activities of inquiry are 'themselves modes of being of a particular being, of the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are' (BT 7/ 6)" (pg. 88)
 - ◆ "such abilities cannot be understood in abstraction from the concrete context of the particular life in which they come to be, but must be responsive to it in its concrete particularity" (pg. 88)
 - "To take seriously the fact that **the mode of being of Dasein is always this or that finite, factual existence involves recognizing that the**

categories are themselves dependent on the particular beings encountered in that existence. For Heidegger, ontic encounters reveal and evoke the ontological categories operating within my existence; they initiate and enrich them. Heidegger's claim that **"ontology has an ontical foundation"** (BPP 19) means not only that the question of the meaning of being arises in the ontic existence of concrete Dasein; it also points to concrete encounters as the necessary condition for the possibility of an ontological category's meaning holding for what it does" (pg. 88-89)

- ◆ **"To exist as a finite being is to always already exist in certain determinate possibilities that involve encountering concrete particulars"** (pg. 89)
 - ◇ "in the complete absence of particular instances of concrete encounter, there could be no genuine being-with" (pg. 89)
 - ◆ "The ontic encounter is what "summons" the ontological structure to "unfold" or come into concrete existence" (pg. 90)
- Heidegger's shift to the existential analytic allows him to claim that **the categories of meaning only ever arise in this or that existence and are responsive to its concrete texture.** Heidegger does not want to claim that Dasein's essential structure qua being-in-the-world means that Dasein necessarily exists—rather, he says that **"if Dasein in fact exists, then its existence has the structure of being-in-the-world"** (MFL 169). My related claim is that *if* Dasein in fact exists, then other Dasein also in fact exist or once existed and it is only in inaugural encounters with them that the existential category "being-with" comes into being" (pg. 90)
 - ◆ Heidegger goes on to clarify that the categories are ways in which to "bring out" the "content of a subject matter" (HCT 71) and are "not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they actually present the entity more truly in its 'being-in-itself'" (HCT 70)" (pg. 91)
 - ◇ "Dasein does not exist in such a way that it can have a possibility simply waiting to be triggered, a "free-floating potentiality of being" (BT 144/ 135). On the contrary, "it is the possibility it is only if the Dasein becomes existent in it" (BPP 276)" (pg. 93)
 - ◆ **"The framework in which the possible relations of being-in-the-world occur is itself relational, changing, and incomplete"** (pg. 94)
 - ◇ "Anything that I can encounter exists in a regulating and enriching relationship to the categories through which it is encountered" (pg. 94)
 - ▶ "Analyzing the relationship of the understanding to the thing known...is the heart of Heidegger's enduring effort to find a middle way between a naive realism and a simplistic idealism. It is this aim that must be kept in mind as we explore more fully Heidegger's account of the relationship between spontaneity and receptivity, understanding and intuition, a priori and particular" (pg. 94-95)
- **"the a priori categories and the categorial intuition on which they are based are rooted in the fundamental structure of Dasein's way of being as transcending toward the world"** (pg. 95)
- Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (pg. 95)
 - "The transcendental project in both Kant and Heidegger lies in articulating the ontological knowledge that makes comporting oneself toward particular ontic beings possible; the quest for the synthetic a priori is a quest for the preexisting conditions of finite knowing that are nevertheless responsive to the being itself" (pg. 95)
 - "Pining for the thing-in-itself is a consequence of humanity's failure to accept our radical finitude; we yearn for an infinite knowing that allows all aspects of the thing to be unconcealed simultaneously and forever, but this knowledge is necessarily unavailable to us and cannot even be proved as such from within the confines of our own finitude" (pg. 96)
 - ◆ **cf. Sartre's concept of god (i.e., being-in-itself-for-itself)*
 - "Heidegger is not advocating a simple idealism, he is not claiming that the things known just *are* the way in which they are known..." (pg. 96)
 - "The relatedness of thought and intuition—this responsiveness of the former to the latter—springs from the nature of human subjectivity as fundamentally temporal. Temporality is the form that all Dasein's intuition must take and it is thus to temporality that the categories are in service" (pg. 96-97)
- The Imagination (pg. 97)
 - "Heidegger (and Kant via Heidegger) is interested in the essential possibility of ontological synthesis—whereby "pure intuition and pure thinking should be able to meet one another a priori" (KPM 49). **Such a synthesis is what grounds the possibility of any transcending toward particular beings:** "The problem of the transcendental, i.e., of the synthesis which constitutes transcendence, thus can also be put this way: **How must the finite being that we call 'human being' be according to its innermost essence so that in general it can be open to a being that it itself is not and that therefore must be able to show itself from itself?"** (KPM 30)" (pg. 97)
 - "Heidegger hopes to capitalize on the claim that the unity of the self—a unity that guarantees the responsivity of Dasein's a priori categories to the things themselves—is fundamentally the unity of time" (pg. 98)
 - "A schema is described in Kant's "Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment" as a "third thing" that lies between the sensible and the intelligible⁴⁶—through the schema, seemingly heterogeneous elements enter into relation by way of this mediating "third thing" that is itself homogenous with both elements" (pg. 98)
 - **Sartre uses 'The Third' as a mediating (i.e., synthesizing) notion in his Critique of Dialectical Reason - viz., it's 'the third' which unifies two others 'to form' a group.*
 - "For Heidegger, Dasein's primordial openness to relation itself has the character of a passive offering of a site at which encounters can be given to intuition..." (pg. 100)
 - "the pure power of the imagination lies in its simultaneous forming and being offered of the general horizon of intuition that makes specific empirical intuitions possible. For imagination to be the root of Dasein's very being, then, is for this complex interplay of spontaneity and intuition to allow Dasein to serve as the site at which a being may "announce itself." The synthesizing of this interplay is Dasein's transcendence—the primal unity of the subject that guarantees a relationship in which thought can be said to hold of the representations received in intuition" (pg. 100)
 - ◆ "such structures can only be understood in terms of Dasein's primordial temporality. For Heidegger—and for Heidegger's Kant—**this prior horizon of possible encountering given in intuition is time.** Such a formal intuition accounts for both the passive and active dimensions of encounter since it encompasses Dasein's turn toward the thing encountered in such a way that it enables it to come to appearance as what it is" (pg. 100-101)
 - ◇ "Thus Dasein's intuition announces or presents an object by representing a unified horizon in terms of which all possible particular intuitions may be received. Depending on the type of intuited concrete particular being given to/through intuition—be it numbers, rocks, persons, and so on—a corresponding horizon will be given in terms of which this concrete particular may be "taken in stride." And for Heidegger, as for Kant, what unifies these particular horizons of intuition is the form of all of Dasein's intuition—temporality. The unified horizon in terms of which all things can announce themselves to Dasein's experience is not a function of the conceptualizing work of spontaneity, then, but is rooted in the passivity and particularity of Dasein's finite temporality" (pg. 101)
 - ▶ **"Temporality itself accounts for Dasein's structure as the active passivity or passive activity** which Heidegger here

- refers to as a “pure self-affection” (KPM 132) that “lets-(something)-stand-in-opposition” and **“allows a space for play”** in the “letting-stand-against-of” the object (KPM 50–51). **Temporality is the underlying unity operating at the root of both receptivity and spontaneity—that “ambivalent middle voice at the heart of experience”** (pg. 101)
- **“One can find this structure throughout Heidegger’s work:** in formal indication, authenticity, conscience, hearing, and the impersonal grammatical structures familiar from *es gibt* (“it” gives) and *es waltet* (“it” worlds). Such an actively passive structure is also what Heidegger is attempting to articulate with the notion of *Seinlassen*—in which Dasein enables that which it encounters to present itself from itself. This notion is often translated as **“letting be”** in order to capture this middle-voice structure...” (pg. 101-102)
 - **“Dasein itself is essentially “middle-voiced” because its very being is a unifying horizon of givenness in terms of which it opens itself to receiving encounters with otherness.** The imagination’s interplay between spontaneity and receptivity produces a mode of encounter which is “less that of causing than *enabling*”—and this is possible because **active-passive temporality is the essential structure not only of all of Dasein’s encounters, but of Dasein’s very existence as finite transcendence**” (pg. 102)
 - **“Dasein’s way of being qua transcendence is nothing more than the synthesis of activity and passivity, intuition and understanding found in original time”** (pg. 102)
 - **“Heidegger argues that schematism charts the trajectory of finite transcendence”** (pg. 102)
 - ◆ **“The combination of categorial subsumption and passive receptivity that allows for transcendence—for finite beings to encounter the thing as it shows itself from itself—is rooted in the synthesizing unity of Dasein’s temporal mode of being”** (pg. 102)
 - **The Temporal in the Concrete** (pg. 103)
 - **“As our analysis of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* has illustrated, **this temporal horizon is the self-given openness or orientation to receptivity that makes possible the transcendence of Dasein’s way of being.** Dasein’s primordial temporality is the condition for the possibility of the encounter with that which it is not, a transcendence characteristic of its way of being: “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside of itself’” (BT 329/ 302)”** (pg. 103-104)
 - **“Thus, contrary to traditional accounts of the a priori categories as organizing principles imposed from above, here they are understood as responsive to the givenness of intuition. The categories are not some type of established interpretive framework—rather, they articulate possibilities of experience that are dependent on the fundamentally temporal dimensions of Dasein’s intuition”** (pg. 104)
 - **“it will become clearer how the category being-with is a mode of openness to the specific temporality of other Dasein.** This point brings us to Division Two of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger clarifies and deepens his analysis of Dasein’s care structure by demonstrating the way in which it must be understood most primordially in terms of temporality” (pg. 104)
 - **Chapter 5 - The Temporality of Care** (pg. 105)
 - **“William Blattner notes in *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* that “Heidegger is not introducing an independent, unifying scheme to explain care; he is showing how **care’s internal structure is inherently unified because originally temporal**”** (pg. 105)
 - **“Instead of occupying particular regions of the linear sequence of undifferentiated moments, past, present, and future must be understood as lived dimensions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.** Thus Dasein’s **projectedness**—and the understanding that discloses it—is rooted in a fundamentally *futural way of being...*” (pg. 105)
 - ◆ **“the primordial meaning of the future is not some moment that is simply waiting to be actualized— rather, it is the manner in which Dasein is always moving toward being the self that it has the potential to be”** (pg. 106)
 - ◆ **“thrownness relates to the sheer “that it is” of existing that permeates every moment of this existence—the fact that Dasein is always already defined by the situation in which it simply discovers itself to be. This dimension of existence is the primordial meaning of the past since it refers to the conditions from out of which one’s understanding must always arise”** (pg. 106)
 - **“The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in having-been. The formulation of the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality or facticity with the expressions ‘before’ and ‘already’”** (BT 328/ 301)
 - **“Heidegger equates having beenness with thrownness, and futurity with projection”** (pg. 108)
 - **Being-With or Fallenness?** (pg. 109)
 - **“there is an ambiguity in Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between being-with and fallenness—an ambiguity with which any interpreter must come to terms”** (pg. 109)
 - **“Heidegger’s account would be more structurally coherent if he maintained his initial distinction between being-with and fallenness by designating the former as the modally indifferent existential that is expressed in either an authentic or inauthentic way”** (pg. 109)
 - ◆ **“the distinctness of these concepts must be maintained”** (pg. 109)
 - **“Such a blurring of the fallenness/being-with distinction is present at BT 328/301, for example, where Heidegger points to the lack of a clear indication of the connection between temporality and the third constitutive dimension of care, which he here describes as ‘entangled being-together-with’”** (pg. 110)
 - **“authenticity is not an escape from Dasein’s care structure, but a different mode of existing in terms of it”** (pg. 110)
 - ◆ **“If the original characterization of the care structure as thrown, projecting, being-with is maintained, then, Heidegger can avoid the difficulty that the authentic/ inauthentic modalities pose to any account that includes falling prey as a fundamental dimension of care”** (pg. 110)
 - ◆ **“Authentic being one’s self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential”** (BT 130/ 122)
 - **“If we recognize being-with as a constitutive dimension of being-in-the-world, Heidegger can make room for being-with both in its authentic and inauthentic modes of being”** (pg. 111)
 - **“there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts regarding the relationship between original temporality and authentic temporality”** (pg. 112)
 - **“Heidegger’s position is that neither authentic nor inauthentic temporality can be equated with original temporality. Though inauthentic temporality does not directly “spring” from original temporality, neither, I will argue, does authentic temporality; rather, both are modifications of world time—and it is world time that arises out of original temporality. Though inauthenticity may be characterized as a “springing away” from authenticity, then, this does not allow us to conclude that authentic temporality just is original temporality. Rather, both are modifications of original time’s worldly expression”** (pg. 113)
 - ◆ **“The strongest justification for my interpretation, however, is found in the general structure of Heidegger’s project. Like the refusal to equate being-with and fallenness, Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as fundamentally suspended between authentic and inauthentic ways of being supports the distinction between modally neutral temporal structures of selfhood and its authentic manifestation. **Structurally, Dasein is not just authentic or inauthentic but is defined in terms of the underlying ontological makeup that makes both modes possible**”** (pg. 114)

- "in clarifying the nature of the originary present, I will bracket considerations of the explicitly authentic and inauthentic manifestations of Dasein's present. Heidegger refers to the former as the *Moment* (Augenblick) and the latter as a type of abstract and distorted 'now'" (pg. 115)
 - The Originary Present (pg. 115)
 - "the originary present is the modally indifferent primordial temporalizing that enables the being-with dimension of Dasein's care structure" (pg. 115)
 - "Just as futurity can only be understood in terms of Dasein's projecting toward potentialities of being and pastness can only be understood in terms of Dasein's being burdened with what it always already has been, so too must the present be understood in terms of a primordial dimension of Dasein's being. In this case, **the originary present is the space opened up by the tension between pastness and futurity such that an encounter—an "enpresenting"—is enabled. The originary sense of the present is Dasein's letting something be encountered** through its temporal unifying of awaiting and retaining..." (pg. 115-116)
 - "According to Heidegger, the modes of disclosure belonging to the care structure—understanding, attunement, and discourse—are themselves derivatives or manifestations of the expressive nature of the temporal disclosure that is the essence of Dasein. The modes of disclosure must be understood in light of the fact that primordial temporality always expresses or interprets itself in time" (pg. 116)
 - ◆ "To understand Dasein's primordial temporality as expressive or ecstatic is to recognize the fundamental other-directedness of Dasein's existence—the fact that its very way of being is a pressing out into relations with that which it is not" (pg. 117)
 - "**Dasein's very way of being is to be the site of encounter with otherness**— the genuine subjectivity of the subject is to be opened up to world and in this very openness to simultaneously express the "who" of its own existence. Dasein's existence "is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes back to self, and enpresents" (BPP 267). **Dasein's originary now is the moment of openness in which both things and Dasein itself become present as what they are**—a moment characterized by the "carrying away toward something" (BPP 267) that is the essence of temporality's ecstatic structure" (pg. 117)
 - "spannedness, datability, publicity, and significance...are the different ways in which Dasein exists outside of itself in relation to otherness" (pg. 117)
 - Dimensions of Ecstasis (pg. 118)
 - "Spannedness...designates the space or "span" opened up by the now's simultaneous relation to both past and future (BPP 270)" (pg. 118)
 - "Spannedness is a type of temporal stretch, the lasting or enduring quality that arises because Dasein's temporality is a drawing of the past and the future into relation with the present" (pg. 118)
 - ◆ "**each now is always pulled open between the past and the future**" (pg. 118)
 - ◇ "every now is a now only insofar as it is simultaneously a coming back to and a going toward" (pg. 118)
 - "Heidegger will claim that "as the primary outside- itself, temporality is stretch itself" (BPP 270). This primary "outside itself"...is what enables Dasein to transcend toward entities. Note also that this primary outside-itself is only possible on the basis of temporality's structure as articulated unity—a point that supports Heidegger's claim that his temporality analysis will serve to demonstrate the fundamental unity of the care structure. Dasein is always outside itself because it is **always simultaneously on-its-way-to and on-its-way-from...**" (pg. 118-199)
 - "the duration of some now—its span—will depend on what is occurring "within" it" (pg. 119)
 - "In the case of datability, this "something" is some worldly thing or event of encounter. Datability is temporality's expressive relatedness to some instance of such making-present" (pg. 119)
 - "Datability is therefore the primary temporal expression of Dasein's practical way of being." (pg. 119)
 - "The futural ecstasis of originary temporality operates in and through this now—not some yet to be actualized now—and in datability, it does so by allowing particular things or events that are made present to achieve a particular import for Dasein's self-understanding." (pg. 121)
 - World Time (pg. 122)
 - "In both of these cases the ecstatic nature of the now is characterized by what Heidegger calls a particular type of "double visage": its relational structure both maintains that which it expresses—originary temporality—while simultaneously granting it a type of detachment through its relation to otherness" (pg. 122)
 - "Thus the now occupies a pivotal role: using admittedly dangerous language considering Heidegger's attempts to overcome this dichotomy, it brings the "subjective" into the "objective"... " (pg. 122)
 - "Originary temporality expresses itself in a world time which then constitutes the intratemporality definitive of things" (pg. 123)
 - Publicity (pg. 124)
 - "Heidegger's claim [is] that nowness is always "*otherness, being-other*" (BPP 248)—**the now is a paradoxical structure in that it is a context of sameness that nevertheless expresses difference**" (pg. 125)
 - "The ecstatic nature of the now has its vector of ecstasis not simply in terms of the temporal extension of my own being, but primarily in terms of the others with whom the intersubjectivity of world time is established and maintained" (pg. 126)
 - "Without the other Dasein speaking out their "nows" it would not be possible to recognize a now other than the one within which my own originary temporality is always expressed" (pg. 127)
 - Reckoning with Time (pg. 129)
 - "It is this time- measure that establishes world time—the shared arena of significance, datability, and duration necessary for innerworldly beings to become accessible. Dasein submits itself to standards of temporal ordering that are available to all and thereby establishes a public "arrangement" of time—a point essential for the transition from ecstatic original temporality to sequential ordinary time. Through measure, the multiplicity of nows are brought into an ordered alignment. In developing these orienting measures that are available for everyone, Dasein essentially builds on its intersubjective co-temporality to create an established context that is more explicit, efficient, and inclusive by looking for objects or events (such as sunrise) by which it can engage in shared "datings" of the simultaneous now- saying" (pg. 129-130)
 - "This urge to measure—the very manner in which time becomes public—is, according to Heidegger, the essential structure of all of Dasein's comportments" (pg. 134)
 - ◆ "Underlying the norms and measures characterizing world is Dasein's nature as a being- entrusted with its own being, a self-responsibility that manifests itself in the commitment to these norms and measures" (pg. 135)
 - ◆ "This existential self-responsibility is a necessary condition for understanding the world as normative context of significance, since Dasein must care about how it is to be in heeding the other's temporal claim and committing itself to shared measures. The appropriateness relations definitive of the public arena depend on the fact that this appropriateness matters to Dasein. Thus speaking itself out into world—Dasein's mundanizing temporal self-expression—must be understood as directed by the mineness of the way in which this self- expression is accomplished" (pg. 135)
 - "Dasein dates the now primarily in light of the others with whom it must share time by developing an ecstatic relation to public norms or standards of time-reckoning according to which all Dasein orient and order their different temporalities. Dasein is "heedful" of the others by submitting itself to measures that allow for a shared temporal space" (pg. 130)

- "Properly understood, however, "reckoning" or time measure does not involve Dasein subsuming itself to thingly being—the clock or the sun—but to some intersubjectively shared making- present that establishes parameters for temporality's self- expression in dating the now." (pg. 131)
 - Significance (pg. 131)
 - "The world is the normatively structured public context defined by significance: the fourth feature of expressed originary temporality" (pg. 132)
 - **"Heidegger...claim[s] that "time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world" (MFL 210)"** (pg. 132)
 - "Primordial temporality expresses itself in an intersubjective time of shared significance through reckoning, measuring, and ordering with the others—thereby constituting the context of sequentiality and significance in which Dasein finds meaningful standards for orienting its way of being in the world" (pg. 132)
 - "For Heidegger, then, world is the context in which Dasein enacts its ability to be according to public norms or measures" (pg. 133)
 - "Things encountered in the world are understood in terms of what they are *for*—an understanding with an inherent recognition of the normative possibilities of succeeding or failing" (pg. 133)
 - "in 'On the Essence of Ground' Heidegger defines Dasein's temporalizing transcendence as "that surpassing that makes possible such a thing as existence in general" and as that which "constitutes selfhood" ("OEG" 108)" (pg. 135)
 - "We can see here echoes of our earlier discussion of Heidegger's indebtedness to Kant and Husserl: the active- passive structure of the fundamental horizon of intuition—expressed temporality's world-forming—is evident here. Dasein speaks itself out in a responsive, relational transcending toward the world that is both constituted by, and makes possible, Dasein's way of being. Though such a structure may appear to be somewhat paradoxical, it is important to be clear that this is a transcendental claim and cannot be understood as a type of occurrence that takes place in time...There is not first a worldless, originary temporal Dasein and then, through its temporalizing, world is formed. Rather, **Dasein is always already worldly and as such it is always already sharing this world with the others.** What is being articulated is the condition for the possibility of a shared intratemporal world within which the finitude and mineness of Dasein's originary temporality are nevertheless expressed" (pg. 135-136)
 - ◆ "[Heidegger] starts with our worldly, intersubjective way of being and attempts to demonstrate that the finitude and mineness of originary temporality is a condition for its possibility" (pg. 136)
 - Inauthentic Temporalizing (pg. 136)
 - "Heidegger will claim that Mitdasein is a kind of being of "something encountered within the world" (BT 140/ 131– 32)—a worldly encounter that depends on a more primordial Mitsein way of being: "Only because it has the essential structure of being-with, is one's own Da-sein Mitdasein as encounterable by others" (BT 121/ 113). Mitdasein is the innerworldly or intratemporal manifestation of the other's being, which is made possible by the very world that presupposes— and is established on the basis of—Mitsein..." (pg. 137)
 - "Like the others, I too am encountered as Mitda-sein when I am encountered as an innerworldly entity, and such innerworldly being is made possible by the world. What this means is that I am encountered—and I encounter others—in terms of the public norms and measures that define this intersubjective sphere. Dasein's everyday way of encounter with others is delineated by public, worldly roles and meanings" (pg. 137)
 - "It is the more primordial dimension of intersubjective encounter—a mode forgotten and yet operative in everydayness—that establishes and maintains the "world-together" that is presupposed in all innerworldly Mitda-sein encounters" (pg. 137)
 - ◆ "in order to avoid the conclusion that the shared nature of the world is only experienced when concrete others are present—the problem that afflicted Sartre's account—it must be the case that the world itself contains references to the others with whom I share it. Once a public, shared time has been established based on communal standards of measure, the intratemporal things encountered therein will point to the other Dasein who can potentially encounter or use a thing" (pg. 138)
 - "the "openness" and anonymity of the intersubjective reference at play in the thing's referral to possible others is dependent on the concrete encounter with another Dasein's temporal particularity. The reason for this is that the recognition of another now that is simultaneous but transcendent to my own—the type of transcendence essential for establishing a shared world time— could not be accomplished as a type of imaginative variation on my own now" (pg. 139)
 - "The category Mitsein is operative qua category, but it is characterized by a temporal responsiveness to the concrete encounter" (pg. 1139)
 - "The "with" of being-with is a constant speaking out of my now to the others such that we come to *share* a particular temporal now and thereby establish a common space of measured meaning. And because my encounter with the other who says "now" is a direct experience of her originary temporality—the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being—such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an a priori category, as Sartre claims. Simultaneous "speaking out" of temporality into world time—expressions that first institute the possibility of simultaneity—are concrete encounters with others unmediated by abstract categories or worldly interpretations. Other Dasein are given in the particularity of their temporal self-disclosure—their expressive now-saying—and it is only thus that we can co- constitute the world" (pg. 140)
 - Chapter 6 - Fürsorge: Acknowledging the Other Dasein (pg. 141)
 - "the encounter with the originary temporality of other Dasein is acknowledged in the very fact that there are public standards to which one submits oneself. **The existence of foreign nows to which I must accommodate my own originary temporality is a necessary condition for the bindingness and publicity of the norms and shared structures of meaning that characterize what Heidegger means by world.** It is for this reason that worldly structures and objects speak to me of the presence of others..." (pg. 141)
 - **"Other Dasein and the traces of their work are not encountered as "chance occurrences" but as practical agents expressing their attuned, projective being-in-the-world through purposive worldly roles and activities.** Others are not simply part of the referential context of meaning delimited by one's projects—another "part" of the world. Rather, they are encountered "as they are in their being-in-the-world" (HCT 240): thrown into the world and committed to projects that center meaningful contexts of reference. These equipmental contexts, these roles and activities, are manifestations or expressions of the care that makes them meaningful as publicly significant equipment or action. Without others who exist in this heedfulness to one another and the public measures evoked by such heedfulness, the world qua context of significance would not be possible as such" (pg. 141-142)
 - ◆ **"the world is one I share with the others, not vice versa"** (pg. 142)
 - Specific Intersubjectivity and Solitude (pg. 142)
 - "The worldly space of shared significance demands that some others be recognized as such—it requires an 'open intersubjectivity'..." (pg. 142)
 - "Fürsorge is Heidegger's answer to this requirement. **Generally translated as 'solitude' or 'concern', Fürsorge is meant to designate a mode of care specific to encountering other Dasein...**" (pg. 142)
 - ◆ "In concern Dasein recognizes a being that differs fundamentally from the innerworldly things..." (pg. 142)
 - "Fürsorge designates Dasein's way of being toward the others who express their originary, ecstatic temporality in a co-constituting of the world. Insofar as it is the way of being- toward specific to Dasein, then, *Fürsorge* inherently acknowledges the temporalizing care operating

- in and through the innerworldly forms in which it is encountered" (pg. 142-143)
- "For Heidegger there is a continuum of such acknowledgment, the extremes of which he characterizes as **"leaping-in" and "leaping-ahead."** Though one pole of the *Fürsorge* continuum involves such a minimal level of Dasein-acknowledgment as to encompass all sorts of abuse and disregard, we will show in this chapter that every point on the continuum registers the other Dasein as a being defined by originary temporality—despite the tendency to forget this in light of everyday, 'vulgar' time" (pg. 143)
 - "This chapter will discuss the everyday ways in which the other is typically encountered as co-Dasein" (pg. 143)
 - "Though the term *Fürsorge* or "solicitude" seems to indicate a genuine involved connection between two people, this is a technical term that Heidegger uses to characterize the range of possible ways of being toward others. Thus behaviors and attitudes that we would characterize as indicating a lack of concern are themselves different modes of concern on his account" (pg. 143)
 - "Even in behaviors and attitudes where the other is treated callously—as if he were a thing—this 'as if' can never completely conceal the ontological difference between things and persons experienced in every encounter with other Dasein..." (pg. 144)
 - ◆ "There is a fundamental difference in kind between intraworldly beings and world-expressing Dasein" (pg. 144)
 - Respect (pg. 144)
 - "Heidegger's basic distinction between persons and things—his characterization of the intersubjective encounter as **involving an ontologically based inability to experience the other as a thing—points to the ethical implications of his position**" (pg. 144)
 - "Like Kant, Heidegger offers a characterization of encounters with other persons as profoundly different from encounters with things, a difference that is grounded in fundamental elements of Dasein's ontology" (pg. 144-145)
 - "basic aspects of the moral encounter—the acknowledgment of the other Dasein's status as fundamentally distinct from a thing and the moment of claim inherent in this acknowledgment—lie deeper than authentic/inauthentic ways of being in the world. Indeed, we have already seen that **the temporal accommodation that constitutes the acknowledgment of the other Dasein's claim on me is the very basis on which world has its being**" (pg. 145)
 - "Though the requirement of a prior authenticity is an issue to which we will be returning, then, the other three requirements seem to be necessary structural dimensions of the minimally ethical encounter: recognizing the other's personhood, the immediate claim that the other's personhood makes on me, and the capacity to respond or avoid responding to this claim" (pg. 145)
 - ◆ "Though there is more to morality than acknowledging the other's humanity and experiencing a certain type of limit or claim in light of this acknowledgment—one must respond to this claim appropriately in order to be moral—the **foundational elements of acknowledgment and claim within the interpersonal encounter are necessary dimensions of morality**" (pg. 145)
 - "These elements characterize the entire *Fürsorge* continuum" (pg. 145)
 - Ends in Ourselves (pg. 148)
 - **"the corpse and the person are differentiated primarily by the existential self-giveness—the care-defined first-person having to be—that leads Kant to characterize persons as purposive 'ends in themselves' and prompts Heidegger to describe Dasein in terms of mineness or being-for-the-sake of itself..."** (pg. 149)
 - **"The essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility.** Kant expressly emphasizes that the definition of man as rational animal does not suffice, for a being can be rational without being capable of acting on behalf of itself, of being practical for itself" (EHF 179–80)" (pg. 149)
 - "It is this character of mineness that accounts for the sharp distinction between persons and things: **"The Dasein exists; that is to say, it is for the sake of its own capacity-to-be-in-the-world.** Here there comes to be the structural moment that motivated Kant to define the person ontologically as an end, without inquiring into the specific structure of purposiveness and the question of its ontological possibility" (BPP 170)" (pg. 149)
 - "Heidegger's analyses in *Being and Time* are aimed at overcoming this failure by showing Dasein's status as an 'end in itself' to be grounded in its ecstatic, finite, temporal particularity" (pg. 149)
 - "By pointing out the temporalizing finitude and particularity that underlie Dasein's status as end in itself, Heidegger provides a more personal understanding of this self-giveness—attempting, thereby, to continue and deepen Kant's fundamental insights regarding the personhood that distinguishes us from things" (pg. 150)
 - The Mineness of the Other (pg. 150)
 - "Heidegger is clear that he does not mean mineness or 'I-ness' to refer only to me but not to you. Rather, he is interested in articulating the structures of selfhood that characterize both the 'I' and the 'thou'" (pg. 150)
 - "to experience another Dasein as Dasein would involve experiencing him as a self. Thus, **I must in some sense encounter the concrete and particular "having to be-ness" of the other's existence**" (pg. 151)
 - ◆ "Heidegger argues that interpreting the claim that Dasein exists for the sake of itself as a type of solipsistic egoism is to completely misunderstand his meaning" (pg. 151)
 - ◆ **"Dasein's mineness—its existential self-responsibility—can only be understood in terms of the temporal structures that define its way of being since "temporality makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution" (BPP 280), and "every character of the being of Dasein is governed by this fundamental determination" (HCT 154)"** (pg. 152)
 - "this temporal specificity is far from being solipsistic in structure—on the contrary, it is defined by a sameness brought into ecstatic relation with the otherness of past and future, of worldly events, of other Dasein, and of structures of significance. Though time is, for Heidegger, the "true principle of individuation"—it is an individuation that occurs in relation not only to the finitude of its being-toward-death, but also in relation to the alterity of other Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger makes clear at the very outset of *Being and Time* that Dasein's being is an ecstasis that nevertheless permits individuation: "The transcendence of the being of Da-sein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation" (BT 38/ 34)" (pg. 152)
 - "Understood in terms of temporality, then, it becomes clearer how it is possible for one transcending Dasein to encounter another being so defined by temporalizing mineness: "Facticity and individuation are grounded in temporality, which, as temporalization, unifies itself in itself and individuates in the metaphysical sense, as principium individuationis. But this individuation is the presupposition for the primordial commerce between Dasein and Dasein" (MFL 209)." (pg. 152)
 - "As Alfred Schutz notes in his analysis of the mutual immediacy of the we-relationship, there is the "pure awareness of the presence of another person. His presence, it should be emphasized, not his specific traits." Though I meet others through the worldly activities and objects with which they are concerned—their specific traits—they do not thereby take on the innerworldly within-timeness that characterizes things—"they are not encountered as objectively present thing- persons" (BT 120/ 113). They are defined, rather, by the transcending, world-expressive toward-which of Dasein's ecstatically temporal way of being..." (pg. 153)
 - ◆ "The other Dasein always retains her Dasein-character—her way of being as originary temporality speaking itself out in a shared world- forming— despite being encountered from the world. As Heidegger says, the world itself is "what happens in being- with-one- another" (HCT 278). **This distinction between the innerworldly thing and the world-constituting other who is nevertheless**

- encountered in the world is what ensures the ability of one Dasein to encounter the other in its selfhood, in its temporalizing being-entrusted with its own way of being in the world" (pg. 154)
- ◇ "This characterization of Dasein as simultaneously world-constituting and innerworldly brings to mind Kant's distinction between noumenal and phenomenal dimensions of the self..." (pg. 154)
 - ▶ "In keeping with our earlier comments regarding the tendency to overemphasize authenticity, commentators have attempted to map Heidegger's notions of authenticity and inauthenticity onto these Kantian notions of the noumenal and the phenomenal" (pg. 154)
 - "it seems more in keeping with my distinction between Dasein's innerworldly (Mitda-sein) and world-constituting (Mitsein) dimensions, both of which are features of the first-personal structure of Dasein's temporalizing particularity that precede and make possible its authentic and inauthentic manifestations" (pg. 154)
 - "In light of the fact that "mineness belongs to existing Da-sein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity" (BT 53/ 49), **these two modalities are better understood as ways of being-toward this fundamentally ecstatic, complex structure of Dasein's worldly and world-expressive existence**. Experiencing the distinction between persons and things cannot be dependent on a prior authenticity, then, despite the tendency to equate the world-constituting nature of mineness with authenticity" (pg. 154)
 - "For Heidegger, as with Kant, this having of oneself to be defines Dasein's existence regardless of whether we have explicitly and authentically taken over or lived up to this way of being" (pg. 155)
 - ◆ "Kant characterizes the fundamental distinction between persons and things on the basis of humanity, however, because our obligation to preserve and respect rational nature is unconditional; it applies even when self or other is acting contrary to this rational nature" (pg. 155)
 - "[Heidegger's] emphasis is on beings capable of explicit self- responsibility and accountability—not just on those displaying its actualized form but on those whose way of being allows for the possibility of such owned self-responsibility. The condition of being able to succeed or fail at living up to my self-responsibility—having myself to be, whether responsibly or irresponsibly—just is Dasein's way of being qua mineness" (pg. 155)
 - "While Heidegger recognizes that it is possible to engage in such abstract characterizations of Dasein and its being-in-the-world—including an articulation of the qualities through which the other is experienced as other Dasein—his intent in the existential analytic is to provide a thorough phenomenological examination of Dasein's existing in its first-person particularity" (pg. 157)
 - **"what is needed is an analysis of how the other is actually experienced in the immediacy of an encounter in which one Dasein meets the particularity of the other"** (pg. 157-158)
 - ◆ "This approach, as we noted above, is evident in Heidegger's attempt to ground Kant's person/thing distinction in the concrete temporal particularity of *this* Dasein" (pg. 158)
 - **"it is neither necessary nor sufficient for recognition to occur in the immediacy of encounter"** (pg. 158)
 - ◆ "the other's way of being qua other now-sayer can only be understood insofar as it is lived through a second person being- limited or relativizing of my own now-saying" (pg. 158)
- The Other's Claim (pg. 158)
- "Recall from the previous chapter the manner in which the ecstatic encounter with other Dasein occurs on the most basic level: **in the mutual taking heed of the other's temporalizing in the originary present**. Other Dasein require me to accommodate my temporalizing to their temporalizing through the establishment of binding public standards" (pg. 158)
 - "For Heidegger, then, **the other's presence involves a type of demand that I accommodate myself to it**, and this experience of claim is prior to, and a condition for, public norms and universal definitions of human nature. Indeed, **the heedfulness characteristic of the intersubjective encounter—shared temporal measure—is responsible for instituting the very publicity and universality** that such third-person accounts make use of. The immediacy of recognition that occurs on the most fundamental level of the *Fürsorge* encounter does not involve an explicit cognizing or reflection, then, but occurs in the very way we navigate time in light of the other's presence. The limitation of the I by the other occurs in **the most primordial dimensions of Dasein's ecstatic temporality, in its pre-reflective and immediate taking heed of the other's temporal expression**. This limiting and relativizing of my now-saying by the other is, we can recall, the essential requirement for the establishment of the sequentiality of everyday time, since sequentiality depends on the recognition of times other than my own—nows other than this now. Experiencing a now that is simultaneous but transcendent to my own could not be accomplished as a type of third-person imaginative variation on my own—since this presupposes the very temporal alterity that is instituted in the encounter with the other" (pg. 158-159)
 - ◆ **I'm not sold on this author's argument - and, this IS the author's main argument.*
 - "On Heidegger's account, then, **such encounters involve a type of immediate claim to temporal acknowledgment—an acknowledgment that involves some minimal degree of heedful self-limiting**. The notion of limit is fundamental here, for it allows us to reconcile the dimensions of recognition and obligation mentioned above. **What distinguishes the encounter with the other Dasein is the experience of the other as a particular type of check or boundary**" (pg. 159)
 - "Respect, for Heidegger, is a type of encounter that involves an openness and responsiveness to the experience of being limited and claimed" (pg. 159)
 - ◆ "I experience the other person as a person through the limiting of my own temporal expression in the face of her temporal alterity—and respect is the name of this experience." (pg. 159)
 - "Levinas's idea of diachrony or the 'time of the other' [is] the fact that the other has a past that will never be available to me as a present" (pg. 160)
 - **This I agree with. And, in fact, it is precisely for this 'inability' to share in the Other's past which enforces the notion of 'self'. The past of the Other for which I cannot experience constitutes part of what makes the boundary between me and the Other - now, to be sure, this boundary has no qualia, which means that such a boundary ought not create any affects (i.e., it ought be "silent") in either of such persons who together stand in relation with each other. This means, then, that the relation between any two or more people is wholly dependent upon the quality each person introduces through their individual acts (i.e., judgement, choices, etc.).*
 - "Though there are clearly significant differences between Heidegger and Levinas's positions, it is my contention that despite the many attempts to portray them as fundamentally at odds with each other—both by Levinas and by others—Levinas and Heidegger (and indeed Husserl) should be understood as existing much more on a continuum characterized not by unbridgeable divides but by a gradual progression toward understanding **the nature of time as 'a relationship to the other as other'**" (pg. 160)
 - **"the Heideggerian self must be understood in terms of a temporal particularity in heedful relation to the temporal particularity of others**—despite Levinas's many attempts to portray Dasein as fundamentally solipsistic" (pg. 160)
 - "Heidegger's position can and should be read as advocating a position on temporality somewhat similar to Levinas's own: namely, that **'time itself refers to this situation of the face-to-face with the Other'**" (pg. 160)

- ◆ "Heidegger's characterization of the encounter with other Dasein [is] a type of *originary limit* on my temporal self-expression..." (pg. 160)
 - ◇ **"he characterizes the intersubjective encounter as an experience of always already having responded to the demand that I accommodate my temporalizing self-expression to that of another.** Despite the tendency to conceal the particularity of Dasein's way of being behind the anonymity of general standards, then, this particularity is evident in every encounter with other Dasein. This is clear insofar as we are limited by the presence of the other's temporal alterity and seek to overcome this limitation through establishing and maintaining public measures to level down the difference—the most obvious being vulgar time's imposition of clock regulations for all life. Despite such efforts, however, **the other's originary temporality always continues to speak itself out in and through these worldly norms**" (pg. 160-161)
 - ▶ **if we are "seeking to overcome this limitation"...is not that, then, the opposite of "letting"? Does not "seeking to overcome" comprise a tonality more in accord with Sartre's 'concrete relations with the Other'?*
- Everyday Modes of Acknowledgment (pg. 161)
 - "Such heedful acknowledgment of the other's temporalizing presence does not generally involve explicit cognizing or reflection, then, but occurs in our very relationship to time. **This being-limited by the other's now is evident not only in the world-constituting establishment of worldly norms, but in every Dasein-to-Dasein encounter.** This is so because even in the most basic modes of encounter **the presence of other Dasein is structured in terms of their temporal ecstasis.** Each of us is unique in our temporal particularity and in the past experiences and the future anticipations that this particularity generates" (pg. 161)
 - "The other Dasein's selfhood is rooted in the finitude and uniqueness of its originary temporality and though this temporality always speaks itself out into the shared world, its ecstatic character makes itself known in a past that I can never fully access and a future that I can never entirely predict. With every experience of the other's resistance to perfect predictability, **I am forced to acknowledge the existence of a temporal stretch that is not my own**" (pg. 161)
 - "Thus the other's temporal alterity gives her projects and attunements a foreignness and unpredictability constitutive of my experience of her as something other than me and as something other than mere thing in the world. My continuous failure to entirely control what the future brings is testament to the fact that being-in-the-world is a constant project of heedfully acknowledging a temporalizing presence other than my own. **The other person's presence thus makes it impossible for me to understand the world solely in my own terms**—an experience that Mensch refers to as "decentering"..." (pg. 161)
 - ◆ **this 'decentering' is very similar with Sartre's 'The Look'*
 - ◇ "Accounting for the experience of the other as a kind of "decentering" is reminiscent of Sartre and his claim that the contingency and alterity of the other subject creates a shift in my relationship to my own possibilities. In the presence of the other, he argues, my possibilities become mere probabilities (BN 352–55)" (pg. 162)
 - **"we can see how Dasein's very experience of time is shot through with the presence of the other—an experience that shifts Dasein's self- understanding from the simple confines of the I to the complex, heedful responsivity of the we"** (pg. 162)
 - "Unlike Sartre, however, Heidegger recognizes that it is a temporal alterity that is responsible for this decentering experience. And because of the simultaneity of our now saying—a temporal expressiveness that is both shared with the other and expressive of each Dasein's originary temporality—the Heideggerian account can accommodate a decentering experience that arises without the subject/object dialectic characteristic of Sartre's approach. For Heidegger, both Dasein are simultaneously engaged in the project of speaking themselves out into the world, and it is this very simultaneity that gives rise to the demand for heedfulness. In opposition to Sartre's position, then, Heidegger's emphasis on the "double visage" of time accounts for a Dasein-to-Dasein experience of the other's ecstatic subjectivity that does not require a corresponding experience of one's own objectification. Though such an encounter is an experience of one's temporality being limited and placed in relation to the other, **this is not a destruction of one's status as ecstatic subjectivity, but an essential element of its very structure**" (pg. 162)
 - "The others do not simply objectify Dasein, then, but help create the very arena in which its selfhood can be meaningful; **the arena of shared time** that "first makes possible the being of the factual existing self, that being which, as is now well understood, is the meaning of care" (BT 419/ 384–85)" (pg. 162)
 - ◆ "Heidegger often uses the language of "binding" and "dependence" to characterize being-with others" (pg. 162)
 - ◇ "The point of import here, however, is the fact that on the most fundamental level the others are present in and through the public sphere as those who one must heed; those to whom one is obligated—"in bondage"—and upon whom one is 'dependent'" (pg. 163)
 - ◆ **"The existential relationship cannot be objectified.** Its basic essence is one's being concerned and letting oneself be concerned. [It is] a responding, a claim, an answering for, a being responsive on grounds of the clearedness of the relationship' (ZS 185). Indeed, Heidegger explicitly notes that it is **this immediacy of involvement or dependence that distinguishes the concrete presence of a particular other from mere open intersubjectivity...**" (pg. 163)
 - "For the most part, however, we do not *explicitly* acknowledge the other's temporal alterity or the manner in which we are dependent on it. Just like everybody else, we simply engage in the worldly structures that give our behavior the very predictability that allows for the smooth, uncomplicated interaction that defines our everyday practices. We drive immediately into the intersection because the light has turned green, for example—trusting our lives to the fact that others will stop on red (except in Houston). **It is, in fact, rare for others to entirely escape our predictions in such a way that we are forced to explicitly acknowledge their alterity.** But for Heidegger, this is not because this originary temporal particularity and unpredictability does not characterize our experience of the other Dasein's being, but because we specifically design standards and practices to accommodate and manage it. Heidegger therefore generally characterizes our dependence on the others in terms of the anonymity and averageness of public norms—ways in which we have institutionalized this dependence to such an extent that we no longer recognize it as such. However, though we often fall into an inauthentic way of thinking that encourages us to view the standards governing self and other as thinglike, unchanging, and perfectly predictable, they do not thereby achieve a law-like hold that necessitates conformity—despite the inauthentic belief that they do or Heidegger's own hysteria over the recalcitrance of the average. **Underlying this averageness is the alterity of the other's temporal ecstasis.** And it is the very foreignness of the other's experience, memory, anticipations, motivations—rooted in the finite particularity of his way of being qua *Jeweiligkeit*—that necessitates the imposition of these public standards" (pg. 163-164)
 - The Other Self (pg. 164)
 - "the existential self-responsibility that is a necessary condition for the binding force of these norms...is an expression of that individual's care for who she is to be" (pg. 165)
 - "Experiencing the other Dasein's responsive commitment to meeting and establishing norms of appropriateness that can be publicly instituted—and that do not simply flow from the "private" constraints of a means/ end rationality—is the everyday way in which I can experience the other Dasein's mineness and temporal particularity—not just as a disruption of the world, but as a creative source of its significance. **Recognizing another Dasein as Dasein** does not arise through a perception of some actor "behind" the actions—it involves

understanding particular events as actions; in other words, as commitments to possible ways for this other to be his or her own self" (pg. 165)

- ◆ "a distinction must be made between the *care* for self that commits one to public norms, and the *source* of the norms to which one is committed. This distinction is evident not only in the self, but also in the encounter with all other Dasein. Though our everyday way of being encourages unthinking interpretations of self and others in terms of ready-made public measures and meanings, and the inauthentic tendency is to simply focus on the content of these standards—the responsive committedness that always operates in and through these standards is the public, worldly expression of the other's existential self-responsibility and the temporal particularity on which it is grounded" (pg. 165-166)
 - ◇ "Dasein's responsiveness to others as beings committed to public standards is evident, for example, when Heidegger speaks of distanciality—that tendency to seek and maintain averageness. Even as representatives of *das Man*, the co-Dasein of others and their efforts to succeed in living out their own care are recognized on some minimal level" (pg. 166)
 - ▶ "Dasein assesses itself not only in terms of generalized standards of success and failure, but always in terms of the comparative successes of the particular others who are also attempting to live up to these standards" (pg. 166)
 - ▶ **"It is because the other individual's self-responsible commitment to these shared standards is always operative that it is possible to be with another as other..."** (pg. 167)
- "The ideas of empathy and projection already presuppose being-with the other and the being of the other with me. Both already presuppose that one has already understood the other as another human being; otherwise, I would be projecting something into the void" (ZS 162)" (pg. 167)
 - **this really pertains to Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity - cf. M. Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, Chapter 3 - The Goal of Husserl's Theory (pg. 83)*
- "going along' with the other in shared attempts to meet, maintain, and institute worldly meanings and measures—a going along with in which we always remain other—is definitive of the mode of disclosure that Heidegger refers to as *discourse*. **Discourse is the everyday way in which a type of shared being-in-the-world with other Dasein is accomplished**; a sharing in which the temporal particularity and commitment of the participants are nevertheless implicitly respected and maintained. I understand the other through the world in which I encounter her, but because of her status as co-constitutor of this world and its "remarkable possibility"—"that it lets us encounter Dasein, the alien Dasein as well as my own" (HCT 242)—I understand her as *more than worldly*" (pg. 168)
 - "In light of Heidegger's existential reformulation of understanding, to say that one "understands" the other Dasein is to say that one is skillfully responding to and participating in its mode of being" (pg. 168)
 - ◆ "As our discussion of discourse will demonstrate, **the world itself is made available to me—it is discovered and understandable—through my being with other Dasein**. "Dasein-with means not only: being also at the same time, even simply qua Dasein, but rather the mode of Being of Dasein first brings authentic sense to the 'with.' 'With' is to be grasped as participation, whereby foreignness as participationlessness is only an alteration of participation. The 'with' therefore has an entirely determined sense and does not simply mean 'together,' nor the being-together of such that have the same mode of Being. 'With' is a proper way of Being." [Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 85] My everyday way of being with others is to participate in their being or existing like I do—a notion that is essential for understanding what Heidegger means by discourse" (pg. 168)
- Discourse: Disclosing Mitsein (pg. 169)
 - "Discourse is the everyday way that particular Dasein are disclosed as concrete individuals co-constituting the world—a mode of disclosure that is only accomplished by taking part in the other's purposive, committed way of being. To more fully determine the everyday way in which one encounters others in solicitude, then, we must examine Heidegger's account of discourse as a type of co-participation in the other's being-in-the-world" (pg. 169)
 - "Though each of the different modes of disclosure—attunement, understanding, and discourse—disclose Dasein's being-in-the-world, they bring this to light in different ways; if this were not the case, Heidegger would have no basis for differentiating disclosure into three modes. Though the different modes are equiprimordial dimensions of Dasein's unified care structure, then—and thus intimately linked—nevertheless they can be considered in thematic separation. In doing so we have noted that **attunement is the mode of disclosure belonging most specifically to Dasein's thrownness, while understanding discloses being-in-the-world primarily in terms of its character as project and possibility. Discourse is the mode of disclosure specific to being-in-the-world qua being-with**" (pg. 169-170)
 - "this communicative aspect makes it possible to *share* with others the intelligibility that arises through one's practical, affective activities—a sharing that is 'institutionalized' in language but is on the most basic level a prelinguistic encounter with the other Dasein as temporal co-constitutor of the world. In this sense, discourse is the foundation for language but irreducible to it because it first makes possible the co-appropriation of meaning necessary for the publicity of the world's significance and the linguistic forms in which this is normally communicated. Or in Heidegger's words: "There is language only because there is discourse" (HCT 265)" (pg. 170)
- Language (pg. 170)
 - "Heidegger generally refers to this public normativity delineating possible ways to be and do—and the intelligibility arising through them—as *das Man*, a term meant to capture precisely the anonymous publicity of these shared meanings" (pg. 172)
 - "language appears to make explicit a more basic shared context of meaning—what Heidegger refers to as *world*" (pg. 172)
- Articulation (pg. 172)
 - "for Heidegger, "all discourse . . . is, as a mode of the being of Dasein, essentially being-with. In other words, the very sense of any discourse is discourse to others and with others" (HCT 263). Discourse is not simply the articulation of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world, it is an articulating of intelligibility to and with and in terms of others that reveals my existence as always imbued with the presence of the others who share in this intelligibility. It is this presence that I actively share in discourse: "Being-with is 'explicitly' shared in discourse, that is, it already is, only unshared as something not grasped and appropriated" (BT 162/ 152)" (pg. 174)
 - "the communicative aspect of discourse is nothing more than a sharing with the other of that about which the discourse is, *through* what is said (HCT 263). The saying is merely the medium through which communication—*sharing with*—is accomplished" (pg. 174)
 - ◆ "this is a mode of sharing that makes possible a co-directedness toward the same thing" (pg. 174)
 - "Recall that it is precisely this co-participation in what is manifest that characterizes the publicity of temporal expression—Dasein speaks itself out into a shared world time by participating in the other's reckoning with time. Everyday instances of communicative encounter demonstrate this same structure of taking part in the world's meaning together" (pg. 175)
 - ◆ "my attuned understanding orients me to a particular situation such that certain options matter and certain aspects of the context become salient. Discourse refers to Dasein's sharing of these orientations with others" (pg. 175)
 - ◇ "Through communication multiple Dasein become oriented toward the same things that matter, they become responsive to the same "structures of appropriateness." In communication, our mineness can be brought into alignment, so to speak" (pg. 175)

- ◇ "This creation or evocation of co-orientation is what Heidegger means by the communicative moment in discourse; communication is "discourse expressing itself. Its tendency of being aims at bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed being toward what is talked about in discourse" (BT 168/ 157)" (pg. 175-176)
- "Heidegger is clear that there are four structural moments characterizing discourse..." (pg. 176)
- **"discourse is a sharing with the other** of which orientation ought to be taken in this situation—a sharing that offers to the other the stance that the particularities of self and context strike one as eliciting. In discourse multiple Dasein don't just experience each other through some public role or norm, then—rather, **they share with each other their way of being as responsive to situations in and through such roles and norms**" (pg. 176)
 - **"discourse is a sharing of one's being-in-the-world"** (pg. 177)
 - ◆ "how I am with somebody deeply affects what they mean—and communication includes the sharing of the 'how we are together'" (pg. 177)
- "We can see now that the understanding given in discourse—understanding in Heidegger's sense of ways for me to be in the world—can therefore be characterized as a type of participation in the other's meaningful, committed activities of existing. Particular ways of being in the world are not simply mine, but *ours*. Thus Heidegger asserts that **being-with "belongs" to discourse**, "which maintains itself in a particular way of heedful being-with-one-another" (BT 161/ 151)—a heedful being together that allows the articulated intelligibility of the world to manifest to us because of our shared involvement in this manifestation. **Discourse is being-with made explicit**, and the explicitness refers to how I am this being-with as particular ways in which I take part in the existing of particular others as co-constitutors of the world and its meaning" (pg. 177-178)
 - "The essence of discourse is to *place* us "in the dimension of understandability . . . discourse gives something to be understood and demands understanding" (FCM 306)" (pg. 178)
 - ◆ **cf. A. Benjamin, Towards a Relational Ontology, pg. 219 - "relation can be thought in terms of place."*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqgd/d7b063_28b81f8d11db461e929802c0dc1e6060.pdf
- "discourse norms govern language since it is language that is grounded on a more basic norm- sharing and co- instituting that defines the publicity of world" (pg. 179)
 - "discourse is an expression of Dasein's particular orientation to the world—a mode of expression that enables other Dasein to come to share in this orientation" (pg. 179)
- Idle Talk (pg. 179)
 - "Despite the irreducibility of language to discourse, Heidegger believes that language in some sense encourages us to misconstrue the nature of its ontological grounding in discourse. The tendency, he argues, is to distort our everyday way of discoursing by covering over its communicative dimension and concealing the recognition of other Dasein inherent in it" (pg. 179)
 - "Heidegger refers to this superficial discourse as 'idle talk'..." (pg. 180)
 - "discourse, especially poetry, can even bring about the release of new possibilities of the being of Dasein" (pg. 181)
 - ◆ **and, to be sure, thinking is discourse.*
 - "understanding found in discourse—understanding in Heidegger's sense of ways for me to be in the world—is therefore a type of participation in the other's existence that can make available to him particular ways for him to be in the world—authentic or inauthentic. Discourse's structure as a sharing in the other's being in the world means, however, that even in the most inauthentic modes of encounter—in which the communicative, Dasein-manifesting dimensions of encounter are overlooked or ignored—these dimensions and the Dasein- acknowledgment they express are nevertheless always operative" (pg. 182)
- Concluding Words (pg. 182)
 - "The key contribution of discourse lies, then, in this: **it discloses the everyday way in which we participate in the other's way of being qua existential selfhood**. The public world designates which public, average roles, norms, and contexts of meanings it is generally possible to share, whereas the communicative dimension of discourse refers to the actual sharing itself, a sharing that brings to light the other's shifting commitments and stances on these possibilities as well as the selfhood that makes such norm-responsiveness possible" (pg. 182)
- Chapter 7 - Authenticity, Inauthenticity, and the Extremes of Fürsorge (pg. 184)
 - "Despite defining both leaping-in and leaping-ahead in terms of a structurally minimal recognition of the other's way of being qua Dasein, what characterizes the former seems, rather, to be the extent to which my understanding of and behavior toward the other are based on the categories applicable to things" (pg. 184)
 - "This is possible because Dasein have both a worldly and a world-constituting dimension, so to speak—dimensions that we designated in the above distinction between **Mitsein and Mitda-sein modes of being**. In treating the other as a thing, I treat her only in terms of the worldly— that is, intratemporal—face that she shows me" (pg. 184)
 - ◆ "insofar as I treat her simply as an innerworldly entity and not also as temporal co-constitutor of the worldly space of meaning, I am forcing her into a simplistic category opposed to her kind of being. In doing so, however, I do not thereby destroy the distinction between persons and things—I never encounter the other as a thing, or succeed in changing her into an entity that is no longer defined by this status of temporal co-constitutor. Rather, **it means that I have fallen into a narrow mode of thinking and acting toward others defined primarily in terms of their intratemporality, forgetting the fact that underpinning this worldly dimension is a world-constituting self expressing its committed, temporalizing having to be** in a way that I always immediately recognize" (pg. 185)
 - ◇ "The extent to which we tend to focus on either the other's innerworldly being or on the other's temporalizing mineness or selfhood represent the poles of the concern continuum within which the different ways of being toward others may fall" (pg. 185)
 - "Even at the extremes of this continuum, however, both dimensions are always present; **one can never encounter the other purely in terms of her intratemporal or her temporalizing dimensions**. Leaping-in and leaping-ahead merely articulate the ways in which we can overwhelmingly emphasize one or the other" (pg. 185)
 - Leaping-In (pg. 185)
 - "At the innerworldly-focused end of the spectrum is that minimal mode of solicitude Heidegger terms 'leaping- in'. In this extreme mode one Dasein "does the other's job for him"—a way of being- toward the other that encompasses domination and abuse. Leaping-in, he argues, is when my being-toward the other person takes "the other's 'care' away from him and put[s] itself in his place in taking care, it can leap in for him" (BT 122/ 114)" (pg. 185)
 - **"we must always understand care to be what is radically one's own—the first-person self-responsibility each self has for living into different possible ways for it to be"** (pg. 185)
 - "The most extreme forms of this displacement and interference in the other's care include instances in which the tasks I take from the other are basic to her very survival, as in cases of torture or murder. In an everyday way, however, leaping- in exists in more subtle forms— higher up on the concern continuum, so to speak. In all instances of leaping-in, however, there is an element of displacement of the other whereby the

other's expression of his care for who he is to be is inhibited" (pg. 186)

- "Indeed, such a mode of being- toward the other seems to involve forgetting one's own mode of world- constituting temporality—one's person in favor of one's world. A certain degree of symmetry in forgetting is therefore necessary, since **taking over the other's possibilities as my own requires me to forget the uniqueness and mineness of my own possibilities and the way of being through which they arise**. Instead, I focus solely on possibilities—the other's and my own—as if they were innerworldly on-hand things somehow separable from the particularity of the life that is to live them. This leads Theunissen to characterize the displacement characteristic of **leaping-in as a type of domination of the other.."** (pg. 186)
 - ◆ "Leaping- in is correlatively a type of *self*-domination, however, insofar as it involves subsuming an appropriate understanding of my way of being to an innerworldly characterization of possibilities as objects for trade" (pg. 187)
 - ◇ "One may argue that this type of self- forgetting is in fact the purpose of such domination and abuse, since it creates the illusion of an infinity of bald, free- floating possibilities—it allows the abuser to believe herself free from the temporal particularity that anchors her to the responsibility (and limits) of her having to be. Simone de Beauvoir makes a similar point in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* about those who *suffer* abuse: she argues that there is, ironically, **a certain feeling of safety that can come with being treated as a thing. Things cannot be held responsible for their own existence or feel the anxiety associated with finite freedom**— namely, having to act into some possibilities and thereby choose to forfeit others" (pg. 187)
- The (II)logic of Deficient Modes? (pg. 187)
 - "Not only does Heidegger want to claim that we always already experience others as persons through our being- with them in the world, but he also seems to want to claim that this "always already" can somehow accommodate instances of the (seemingly) total absence of recognition that this involves" (pg. 187)
 - ◆ *cf. K. Hartmann, *The Logic of Deficient and Eminent Modes in Heidegger*
 - "The question, in other words, is how Heidegger can claim that participatory acknowledgment of the other's being-in-the-world is an essential feature of my very being and yet that there are cases in which I appear to directly contradict this acknowledgment. How can leaping-in be a mode of *Mitsein*, if it amounts to the denial or destruction of the other's status as co-constitutor of the world—and we have defined all modes of *Mitsein* as involving degrees of acknowledgment of this status?" (pg. 188)
 - "the *Zuhanden* and *Vorhanden* represent the poles of the continuum characterizing the possible ways of being-toward objects—in terms of their usability or in terms of their objective presence, respectively—and though the former represents the ontologically primary orientation against which behaviors emphasizing the latter are deemed deficient, the entire continuum is characterized by a positive transcending toward the object" (pg. 189)
 - "**Leaping-ahead and leaping-in represent the poles of the continuum characterizing the possible ways of being-toward others**—in terms of their co-temporalizing or in terms of their intratemporality, respectively—and though the former represents the ontologically primary orientation against which behaviors emphasizing the latter are deemed deficient, **the entire continuum is characterized by a positive transcending toward the other**" (pg. 189-190)
 - ◆ "Heidegger indicates that the normal way of being-toward objects is simply an immersed practical coping, whereas our everyday encounter with other Dasein falls somewhere closer to the "middle" of the *Fürsorge* continuum." (pg. 190)
 - ◇ "Heidegger generally characterizes the deficient modes as extremely *minimal* and *concealed* manifestations of a condition" (pg. 191)
 - ◆ "the meaning of the word "deficient"—not an absence, but a failure to fully live up to what is standard or required. It is in the same way that **leaping-in must be understood as a deficient mode of *Fürsorge***—not as an absence of this way of being-toward specific to other Dasein, but as a way of being-toward the other that fails to fully live up to the standard of acknowledgment that is set in the immediacy of Dasein-to-Dasein recognition. In leaping-in Dasein both registers the other as a being defined by co-temporalizing care, and subsequently acts toward him solely in terms of the intratemporal manner in which he manifests himself in a worldly way. This way of being toward, Heidegger claims, is a type of inconsistency in my way of being that undermines the manner in which my care expresses itself in the world" (pg. 191)
 - ◇ "Such deficiencies are essentially an existential discrepancy in which Dasein's behavior contradicts its fundamental structures of care; a way of being in which it fails to live into the appropriate modes in which care "comes to" what it is concerned about. In the deficient modes of being-toward, care does not lose its concern or cease to relate to the object of its concern, but it ceases to do so in a way that "accords with its own sense." **This is the reason that Heidegger characterizes leaping-in as *inauthentic***: leaping-in is defined by a profound inappropriateness insofar as that toward which Dasein transcends is recognized as having a particular type of being, but the mode in which this transcending finds worldly expression is distorted and inconsistent with this way of being—a discrepancy that is both harmful for the other Dasein ("it is detrimental to what it is with," IPR 65) and **prevents one from fully encountering it** ("the care cannot come to what . . . it is concerned about," IPR 65)" (pg. 191-192)
 - Inauthenticity (pg. 192)
 - "**Leaping-in involves a type of turning away from the world-constituting dimensions of the intersubjective encounter** in favor of its innerworldly dimensions—a turning away that involves a mischaracterization of Dasein's nature as a temporalizing possibility-being. This mode of solicitude is inauthentic because it disguises Dasein's genuine nature by focusing only on the worldly, intratemporal aspects of Dasein's being and tending to assume that this worldly dimension simply makes Dasein the same as worldly things. **Such a thing-oriented interpretation of Dasein's being—in both self and other—inhibits the full recognition of this way of being and therefore results in behaviors that are inadequate to it**" (pg. 192)
 - "Inauthenticity is the tendency to live in an undifferentiated and anonymous way in which one is simply one among many—a tendency enabled and enforced by the interpretation of self and other as *thinglike*, because it allows us to understand our possibilities not as "mine to be," but as interchangeable qualities accruing to me and to you like predicates. In such a condition, possibilities are experienced "not for me as me, not for you as you, not for us as us, but for one. Name, standing, vocation, role, age and fate as mine and yours disappear" (FCM 136)" (pg. 193)
 - ◆ "Heidegger claims that the self's individuating, temporally particular mineness is forgotten and thus not explicitly lived as such. Nevertheless, this condition of mineness—the existential responsibility of selfhood—continues to operate despite the fact that Dasein looks away from this toward its own worldly manifestation" (pg. 193)
 - ◆ "Possibilities are no longer mine and yours—given to us by the temporal particularity of our having to be, our "fate"—they become bare, "general" possibilities disassociated from the particularity of our existences. In this way, **inauthenticity allows Dasein to forget its responsibility for having to be...**" (pg. 193)
 - "In the Dasein-to-Dasein to encounter I always already experience the other as both temporalizing and intratemporal, but by becoming too focused on the intratemporal dimension I can slide into a way of thinking and acting that treats Dasein like the other intratemporal

- things that I encounter. Dasein is essentially intratemporal and innerworldly—it is always expressing itself into a world time that relativizes and publicizes its originary temporalizing, but this in itself is not enough to inauthentically mischaracterize Dasein as being only this. The distortion characteristic of **inauthenticity lies in its tendency to take an interpretive stance equating Dasein's way of being with things because in focusing only on the worldly dimensions of Dasein's existence, it forgets or ignores that this worldly dimension does not simply make it the same as worldly entities**" (pg. 193-194)
- "A problem arises once we recognize that **Heidegger sometimes seems to imply** that it is not only this innerworldly dimension but the inauthentic stance that is an inevitable aspect of our being-with-one-another—namely, **that all being-with is inauthentic**. His talk of *das Man* certainly encourages this interpretation. As a result, articulating authentic modes of being-with—which Heidegger explicitly designates as a possibility—becomes extremely hard to reconcile with this implicit view that being-with-one-another is inherently inauthentic. As we have already shown in chapter 5, **Heidegger is in fact extremely inconsistent on this point**, and the difficulties in interpretation that this produces are significant. As Michael Theunissen notes: 'Heidegger, regardless of his recognition of authentic being-with-one-another, very often simply equates the inauthentic everyday with being-with-one-another.'" (pg. 194)
 - "the assumption that all being-with is inauthentic is rooted in Heidegger's general failure to adequately maintain his own distinction between being-with—the existential—and its inauthentic manifestation." (pg. 194)
 - ◆ "Heidegger encourages us to overlook the range of everyday ways of being that fall between these extreme modes in which being-with can be instantiated" (pg. 194)
 - "[Any] move to separate everydayness and inauthenticity is somewhat controversial, considering Heidegger's tendency to speak of it in terms of inauthenticity—such as his claim that Dasein tends to plunge "into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness" (BT 178/ 167). Such inconsistencies between the logical demands of his position and his careless forms of expression lead thinkers like Theunissen to note that "the relationship of inauthenticity to 'everydayness' is extremely problematic"—even going so far as to describe it as the 'murkiest point in *Being and Time*'" (pg. 195)
 - "Despite Heidegger's tendency to blur the difference between the two, making sense of his position as a whole requires that everydayness be understood as a modally indifferent condition that can be modified in a movement toward inauthenticity (through falling) or in a movement toward authenticity (through resoluteness)" (pg. 195)
 - "We can also note **Heidegger's tendency to understand Dasein's existence as a continuum in which everydayness is stretched between the poles of authenticity and inauthenticity** when he claims that "authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity" (BPP 171)" (pg. 195)
 - "This notion is more clearly expressed, however, when he characterizes inauthenticity and authenticity as modified grasps of the more basic average everydayness: "Authentic existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness" (BT 179/ 167). **There will always be a dimension of self and other expressed in the intratemporality of the world, and though this worldly averageness is an unavoidable aspect of Dasein's being, this does not allow us to equate average everydayness with an inauthentic stance in which this averageness is characterized in terms of thingliness**" (pg. 196)
 - Falling . . . Not Fallenness (pg. 196)
 - "Despite his confused formulations, then, **the everyday worldly modes of being with others are not inherently fallen but merely display a tendency toward inauthenticity**" (pg. 196)
 - "In this falling away from itself Dasein "drifts toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed" (BT 178/ 166). As we have seen, falling is a covering-over of Dasein's being-in-the-world that "operates by way of reinterpretation" (HCT 316)—a reinterpretation of oneself and other in terms of categories inappropriate for Dasein-being. **Falling is a "tendency of being"** (BT 313/ 289) or "kind of 'movement' of Dasein" (BT 178/ 167), and **inauthenticity—or fallenness—is essentially the extreme condition of self-alienation** that is accomplished when Dasein has given in to this "constant temptation of falling prey" (BT 177/ 165)" (pg. 196)
 - "**everydayness is a condition in which the temptation to inauthenticity—the tendency toward falling—is always present**. This does *not* allow us to conclude, however, that everydayness is therefore inherently inauthentic. Although we are always exposed to this tendency, we do not always give in to it. Though everydayness is defined by the temptation of inauthenticity, of itself it is neither authentic nor inauthentic" (pg. 196-197)
 - "The '**generic drift**' of this public arena pulls Dasein away from recognizing its own concrete particularity, thereby accounting for its tendency to fall further and further toward the completely self-forgetful banality of fallenness. Indeed, Heidegger implies that such inauthenticity is just the cultivation of this generic drift..." (pg. 197)
 - ◆ "Dasein's everyday way of being is always already characterized by such a generic drift insofar as it encounters a now-saying other than its own; another now that relativizes its own. In the Dasein's encounter with another mineness and its move to express itself through shared worldly measures evoked by this encounter, **Dasein's way of being opens the possibility of losing itself in the encounter**" (pg. 197-198)
 - "Heidegger speaks of inauthenticity as something that inhibits or conceals the fundamental structures of selfhood and its temporal heedfulness—structures that are nevertheless always operative" (pg. 198)
 - "Inauthenticity is not a lack of these structures or a total lack of awareness of them—since we must be aware of that from which we are fleeing in order to cultivate stances of avoidance—it is, rather, **a way of being that fails to fully live up to the standard of acknowledgment that is set by the structures of its existing**" (pg. 198)
 - Ontological Imperatives (pg. 198)
 - "my account of **Heidegger's establishment of world time—shared significances according to which we can heedfully accommodate the temporal expression of all the others**—is not so different from Levinas's requirement that justice temper ethics. Both thinkers emphasize the necessity of establishing public measures to accommodate the multitude of beings whose way of existing is nevertheless irreducible to such comparison and measure" (pg. 200)
 - "we can understand the fact that, for Heidegger, Dasein's temporalizing way of being demands expression into a world time that accommodates the many now-sayers by establishing shared standards of measure. Understood as such, **these worldly standards have their ultimate source of sense in the heedful encounter of Dasein to Dasein**" (pg. 200-201)
 - Leaping- Ahead (pg. 202)
 - "In contrast to the inauthentic tendency of leaping-in—in which I acknowledge but subsequently conceal or turn away from the other's temporalizing care by focusing only on intratemporal modes of existing—leaping-ahead acknowledges the ontological difference. **Leaping-ahead is a way of being-toward another Dasein that takes the complexity of his way of being as its guiding principle**. Unlike leaping-in, which conceals, distorts, and resists the other's status as co-constitutor of the world and the temporal taking-heed that implicitly recognizes it, leaping-ahead explicitly acknowledges and nurtures it" (pg. 202)
 - "Leaping-ahead involves a more explicit concern for the other in the full complexity and particularity of her being, a concern that builds on the most basic structure of recognition that characterizes all *Fürsorge*" (pg. 202)

- ◇ "the relationship of caller and called is a complex one in which genuine concerned being-with is not simply a derivative of a prior authenticity on the part of both Dasein. **The recipient of the call clearly cannot be in a prior state of authentic resoluteness if the disruptive, disclosive nature of the call is to succeed in interrupting the fallen modes of Dasein interpretation.** In this sense, at least one of the parties first has the possibility of authenticity communicated to her through this relationship" (pg. 225)
 - ▶ "the authentic Dasein-to-Dasein relationship need not be such a rare thing, since it does not require a prior authenticity in at least one of the parties, and it may not require it in either" (pg. 225)
 - Love, Justice, and Giving the Other Time (pg. 226)
 - "the most positive human relationships are encompassed within Heidegger's notion of the leaping-ahead that frees the other and the call of conscience that is its voice..." (pg. 226)
 - **"Heidegger defines calling in terms of an "anticipatory reaching out" that brings together and establishes a relationship in which the relationship of caller and called is "to commend, entrust, give into safekeeping, to shelter" (WCT 387)"** (pg. 226)
 - "Behavior toward the other that is oriented toward a positive nurturing that returns the other to peace in its "essential being" characterizes all of our most positive modes of human interaction" (pg. 226)
 - ◆ **"Heidegger is essentially talking about loving concern..."** (pg. 226)
 - ◇ "To embrace a 'thing' or a 'person' in its essence means to love it, to favor it. Though in a more original way such favoring [Mögen] means to bestow essence as a gift. Such favoring is the proper essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be." - Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, pg.196 (pg. 226) <http://timothyquigley.net/cont/heidegger-lh.pdf>
 - ◆ "if the other that I seek to protect and nurture is defined in her very being by an ecstatic openness and incompleteness, respecting her essence will require me to give her the necessary space and time in which to realize it herself" (pg. 226)
 - **"Love is essentially a call to the other's inner potential to be herself**—a self that I have put myself in the service of evoking" (pg. 227)
 - "Such a creative invocation is the essence of what Heidegger means by leaping-ahead—a summoning of the other's being in its wholeness that is given voice in conscience and expressed in behaviors that instantiate this being-in-service to the other" (pg. 227)
 - "Justice is, on the other hand, the stance in which I share presence with the other. In its more extreme forms, such leaping-ahead can take the form of a love in which I not only share presence with the other, but encourage him to take his time, granting him presence at the expense of my own. In this mode of Fürsorge, I offer the other my care and silently summon him toward a greater self-flourishing" (pg. 230)
 - Conclusion (pg. 231)
 - "Though Heidegger himself did not develop a detailed theory of intersubjectivity to correspond with his new understanding of subjectivity, he provides the resources with which to do so and indicates the direction in which this development must occur" (pg. 231)
 - **"Dasein's individual, first-person selfhood is always already its way of being**—even when it is inauthentic—and this is the meaning of the existential mineness that Heidegger emphasizes throughout. Despite its inauthentic tendencies, **Dasein is always already a self individuated by its existential commitment to its having to be**" (pg. 231-232)
 - "All of the structures of temporalizing— spannedness, datability, publicity, and significance—are defined by this transcending that establishes and maintains Dasein's relation with otherness" (pg. 232)
- d. Further Readings:
- Heidegger and Being and Time, by S. Mulhall
https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/thought_and_writing/philosophy/Heideggers%20Being%20Time%20-%20Mulhall.pdf
 - Glossary of Terms in Being and Time, by R. Munday
https://www.sfu.ca/~poitras/Glossary-Heidegger_Being_and_Time.pdf
 - (Article) Heidegger and the ethics of care, by J. Paley
<https://uwethicsofcare.gws.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Paley-J.-2000.pdf>