

# Philosophical Elements of a Theory of Society, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations: <https://platypus1917.org/wp-content/uploads/Adorno-Theodor-W.-Philosophical-Elements-of-a-Theory-of-Society.pdf>

b. Quotes:

- "it is always better to admit to, and hopefully explain well, an existing lack than to conceal it through some ideology" - Author (pg. 1)
- "a science of society cannot actually be envisioned except through theoretical thought" - Author (pg. 4)
- "I would almost say that those who are generally most hostile to theory are the epistemologists, the people who are, in a sense, the most theoretical and abstract, and who do not allow the experience of their objects to lead them towards theory" - Author (pg. 12)
- "I think that **the task of a theory is precisely to grasp all changes of consciousness**, and also of reality, that are generally, according to the dominant thinking habits today, simply tolerated and accepted as such" - Author (pg. 40)
  - "a phenomenon that has spread throughout society as a whole...[is] the decision to clench one's teeth and avoid looking beyond what is closest at all costs, that this is where we find something resembling solidarity in society as a whole" - Author (pg. 41)
- **"theory must also respect appearances**; that is the element of truth in positivism which one must concede, and which was conceded by no less a person than Hegel, in the famous formulation in the second part of his *Science of Logic* that 'essence must appear', and that, if it does not appear, it is not actually the essence" - Author (pg. 50)
- "...a person is exactly what they believe themselves to be. There is an element of truth in this..." - Author (pg. 61)
- "...I keep having occasion or feel the need to criticize the prevailing positivist mindset in the social sciences..." - Author (pg. 72)
  - **"I believe positivism itself to be a manifestation of ideology today, and an especially dangerous one**, because the positivist mindset declares itself the most anti-ideological, sober, objective one of all, but, by rejecting everything that is not a fact, through this exclusivity of the factual, it bestows an aura upon factuality that is generally drawn from the very same metaphysics which the current positivists consider such a taboo. So that is why, when I inveigh against positivism...it is not with the intention of salvaging, in opposition to positivism and for the sake of the social reality in which we live, something like a positive meaning in that which is the case as something existent, but rather the opposite: **the point of my critique of the positivist method is, in fact, precisely to prevent the reflection of merely existent facts, whose falsity is not even judged according to any theory, from fraudulently claiming, *faute de mieux*, the very meaning whose non-existence is so often the object of these theorems**" - Author (pg. 73)
- "... after many decades, I truly began to understand Kant at all..." - Author (pg. 100)
- **"philosophy is such that the greatest things are located in the nuances**, and that therefore the Devil is in the detail, and only in the details" - Author (pg. 101)
- "[Walter] Benjamin once told me...how much stupidity is required to think a decent thought..." - Author (pg. 113)

c. General Notes:

- Lecture 1 (pg. 1)
  - "The task I have set myself is twofold: on the one hand, I would like to give you a notion of what a theory of society actually is, what it can be and what it might look like. But, on the other hand – in keeping with both the brevity of such a lecture and my own way of approaching such things – I would also like to use a number of models to develop for you the elements, as announced, of such a theory of society itself" (pg. 2)
    - "I will not begin by presenting a definition of a theory of society and its elements, as some of you might expect, because I believe that an understanding of such a theory can be attained only by addressing the philosophical epistemological questions on the one hand and the factual structural questions of society itself on the other" (pg. 2)
      - "if I say first of all that a theory is understood here as a body of more or less coherent contexts of ideas about society, that will be enough for now. I must add at once, however, that this deliberately very general definition of what such a theory is will form the framework for something that, at least epistemologically, is a central intention of what I have begun here: the distinction between a genuine theory of society and mere containers or collections of data" (pg. 2)
    - "Although I told you that, **in certain basic tendencies, Weber can be considered an exponent of positivism, and thus of an actually anti-theoretical stance**, and although I will add to this by noting that there is nothing by Weber that truly resembles a theory of society – that he did try out sociologies dealing with specific topics such as the great sociology of religion, or finally individual sociologies such as the outline 'On the Sociology of Music', or that he examined certain interconnections between categories but never produced anything like a theory of society as a whole – it is still unmistakable that Weber's output, going by the work that is generally viewed as sociology, as science today, by no means seems so atheoretical" (Pg. 4)
      - "one of [Weber's] central concepts...[is] that of 'understanding', which is his attempt to understand social behaviour from within rather than applying concepts of identity to it from the outside, as it were, on the basis of particular similarities or consistencies, and through this 'understanding from within' to find **a way of identifying something substantive about the interrelatedness of social actions among all individuals, instead of overlooking from the start the ways they come together** and merely providing the data" (pg. 5)
        - "...this concept of understanding as an attempt to grasp from within is actually profoundly opposed to the positivist impulse" (pg. 5)
      - "to draw your attention directly to what makes this structure special in Weber's work, what we find is that – in agreement with Durkheim – he now does not want to view this 'understanding' as a psychological understanding of separate individuals but, rather, sets himself the task of understanding social behaviour from within as social behaviour, not in terms of the subjective motivations of the individuals" (pg. 5)
        - "he knows that, in so far as we act socially, in so far as **we move within the context of society, we generally act not as psychological beings but actually as functionaries** – to use a term that is fashionable today, one might say as 'role-bearers' within the social context – and the key role carried by the concept of the rational, of 'rationality' in Weber's sociology, can be understood precisely from this perspective. **Rationality plays such a decisive part in Weber's work because rationality, as the organ of adjustment to reality** – or, as contemporary psychoanalysis calls it, testing reality – is removed from psychology, from the unconscious of the respective individuals, but **can simultaneously be understood on the basis of its objective mechanism**, namely the mechanism of calculation. That means one can grasp from within, if you will, what makes a person act socially" (pg. 5-6)
          - ◆ "this fact, which is initially indisputable, was what led **Weber to make rationality the key category of sociology – not that he thought everything happens rationally in society**; on the contrary, completely irrational categories such as that of social prestige, to name only one example, play an extremely important part in Weber's sociology – but one can say that he saw this as the point of access where social behaviour can be understood from within..." (pg. 6)
            - ◇ "one could say that the incredible emphasis he places on the concept of rationality suggests something almost like the concept of 'objective spirit', which, of the many things that positivist science finds offensive about Hegel's philosophy, is probably one of the most offensive." (pg. 6)
        - "[Weber] is a thinker...whose analyses possess far greater theoretical force than his purported epistemology" (pg. 6)
          - **"Because he retains rationality as the ultimate authority** for the sake of the objective validity of mathematics, because of its irresistibility...he

- views the overall tendency of society as a tendency of progressive rationalization, an ever-advancing development in the calculation of all socially relevant actions in the sense of a probability calculation – not only as a heightening of rational and mathematical procedures that are available to society" (pg. 7)
- "For Weber, this point, namely the development of the procedures in themselves, was only of secondary interest; **what was most important was that**, in his view, according to his theory, which he supports with extremely historical material, calculation according to the model of such a probability affects more and more sectors of society, that **society itself is increasingly becoming rationally controllable and controlled**" (pg. 7)
  - "according to Weber...rationality must spread to ever greater sectors of life. This, he argues, goes hand in hand with a change in the mechanisms of power, without which he cannot imagine society, to rational mechanisms of power – that is, mechanisms of power that are dealt with by a social group which, as he envisages it, is ultimately no more than an executive body of this rationality itself, namely bureaucracy" (pg. 7)
  - "It goes without saying that a way of thinking like Weber's was highly ill-disposed towards a **concept such as dialectic**, something that is **deeply rooted in philosophical speculation and cannot be separated from philosophical, specifically critical-philosophical, reflection**. And this hostility was expressed in Weber's scientific mindset, after all, in his polemical stance towards materialist dialectic, a position that, as most of you probably know, is the real motive for Weber spending such a massive amount of time and work on his sociology of religion, and why he plunged even into the most obscure exotic materials: in order to attack one of the centrepieces of Marxist dialectic, namely the principle that the so-called spiritual superstructure is dependent on the economic substructure" (pg. 8)
  - Lecture 2 (pg. 10)
    - "In the previous session I showed you that a thinker, a sociologist, who can be considered a positivist in the sense that he rejects any autonomy of the concept from the facts encompassed by the concept, is nonetheless forced in spite of himself – and precisely because of the material, the facts, the data in which he immerses himself – to incorporate theoretical elements into his work far beyond what his own epistemology would lead one to expect" (pg. 10)
      - "The fact that **even so-called positivist research, if carried out seriously, cannot avoid forming theories** has naturally been observed by the positivists" (pg. 12)
        - "In this context I reminded you both that he constructs a large, continuous social tendency and that there are dialectical elements in his work, and the example I cited to illustrate this was the reversal of charismatic authority into traditionalist authority and the transformation of rational and democratic administration, bureaucracy, into a blind, opaque, irrational rule" (pg. 10)
      - "The conclusion to be drawn from what we covered in the previous session is that **even such essentially anti-theoretical or atheoretical thought and research as that of Weber...necessarily either turns into theorizing or cannot dispense with theory**" (pg. 10-11)
        - "And the very simple conclusion I would draw from this is that one should not accept this shift into theory as a form of necessary evil that cannot be avoided but, rather, that one becomes aware of and theoretically formulates this connection between even extremely material-based work and theory" (pg. 11)
      - "the kind of theorizing I mean really depends on the facts in question, so – to exaggerate somewhat – one does not come closer to theory in general by moving away from the facts, by isolating some particular characteristics of the facts, forming theories from them and neglecting the rest; with **the notion of theory I have in mind, it is precisely the immersion in the concretions that allows us to move beyond the merely factual. One must devote oneself to the individual materials so thoroughly as to reveal more than simply the blind, conceptless material**" (pg. 11)
        - "as long as prevailing scientific thought, including the field of sociology, engages in forming theories, it is simply obeying the logic of classification – that is, theory consists merely in the ordering of materials, the establishment of logical classes and the possible conclusions to be drawn therefrom." (pg. 11)
          - "In other words, then, to the extent that theory is in evidence, it lies at a distance from the factual material, which leads to that somewhat unfruitful dualism between a blind material on the one hand and relatively empty concepts on the other, which means that theory, instead of leaping out of the material itself, really becomes – and I will show you this in detail – a shell for the facts encompassed by it" (pg. 11)
            - ◆ "if there is a concept of theory to be found that lies beyond that unfruitful dualism, it can only be one that disregards the usual rigid antithesis of fact and concept" (pg. 11-12)
              - ◇ "I will mention only in passing that this marks the very nerve centre of dialectic..." (pg. 12)
        - "the social-scientific argumentation of positivism is, I feel, at best highly inconsistent. For, on the one hand, the necessity of forming theories as opposed to pure fact-finding is conceded, but, on the other hand, the development of theoretical reflections is really only tolerated as a formulation of hypotheses that can then be fulfilled by finding the facts. To put it dialectically, then – and even the positivists sometimes find themselves in a dialectic – something is supposedly necessary, because one cannot do without it, but simultaneously superfluous, because, according to this view, once the hypothesis is fulfilled, once it proves true or is refuted, it can be discarded; so, in such a view of things, the autonomy of theory as an expression of something in society that is not limited to the ascertainment of individual facts is reversed again" (pg. 13)
          - "**It does seem to me...the ultimate goal of scientific work, is precisely the formation of theories**, the summarizing explanation of the individual observable facts, and that, in general, scientific experiments are only carried out from the perspective of forming theories; no experiment, no ascertainment of any pure, existent fact takes place for its own sake" (pg. 3)
            - "In positivist, statistically oriented social science...it is really mere fact-finding that takes precedence, and, from this perspective, the construction of theories itself seems to be a mere useless ingredient that is essentially superfluous, or at least a somewhat disreputable matter" (pg. 13)
              - ◆ "If you pick up the *Journal of Sociology*, for example, and take a general look at the short abstracts that tend to follow each report on whatever empirical investigation, you will find that there are really only classifications of facts, perhaps only in the form of charts, without any of the theoretical conclusions being drawn that are characteristic and central for the genuinely scientific method" (pg. 14)
          - "despite its advanced age, **sociology does not show the slightest inclination to approach the ideal of a genuine theory of society**, one that would illuminate its workings. On the contrary: if one looks at the history of sociology, it is more fitting to speak of it moving away from the formation of theories than towards it" (pg. 15)
            - "The anti-theoretical trait lies in the restriction of sociology to pure empiricism, and sociological empiricism...is at its most sensitive when one reminds it that **the purpose of sociology is not fact-finding, not the mere collection of opaque data, but rather a concept of theory that reveals something substantive...about society**" (pg. 15)
          - "I would at least say that a decent scholar, by which I mean a scholar – or a researcher, one should almost say – who takes the truth seriously will consciously and emphatically incorporate the possibility of such self-reflection as one of the most important aspects of their work" (pg. 16)
          - "**in sociology, theory is not simply something that results from the facts automatically as long as one follows the rules, but that there is a sort of leap between theory formation, between an insight into socially relevant factors and the gathering of facts, that there is not a straightforward and reliable continuum between the fact and the theory**, but that, to a certain extent, these two areas, as closely as they are obviously and necessarily

- connected, cannot be imagined in such a way that the path leads from the one to the other without the addition of a further element" (pg. 17)
- "if one is to develop a genuine authority for sociology and social contexts, one must, on the one hand, always be aware that one cannot simply move from the concept of society to the facts...but also that, on the other hand, it is equally impossible to arrive at a theory by proceeding from a mere arrangement and gathering of facts and merely placing these in a vaguely logically stringent context" (pg. 17)
    - "So I think that the crux of the question of fruitful sociological work lies in how clearly one is aware of this necessary and inevitable qualitative leap..." (pg. 17)
  - "what we group together under the name of sociology or social science today, and to a considerable extent also political science, is not an internally consistent area of knowledge with a consistent categorial structure of the same kind as in most of the traditional, the so-called classical sciences, but simply a more or less unconnected and unconsidered agglomeration of very different things – such as philosophical reflection on society and its purpose, institutional and historical analysis of social facts, and finally what are more strictly considered 'research techniques' on the model of so-called market research" (pg. 17)
    - "And I do not think that the future of sociology and sociological theory formation lies in attempting to knock this agglomerate into shape by adapting it to some consistent categories and making a unity of it, a unity that corresponds neither to its category nor to the matter itself; rather, to the extent that there is any unity, it can be determined only by determining precisely these qualitative differences and by first marking the different areas off from one another and then thinking through the extremely complex and mediated relationships that exist between these sub-disciplines and sub-complexes, which are in themselves entirely dissimilar things" (pg. 17)
      - "the interpretation of social facts is closely connected to the facts themselves and their divergence, and necessarily changes with them" (pg. 18)
  - "But I think it is necessary at this point to move on with our subject and to ask why the facts within society do not simply lend themselves to theory, and to theory formation, of the same type as one finds in the natural sciences" (pg. 18)
  - Notes on Lecture 3 (pg. 19)
    - "**A genuine theory of society does not prophesy**; that would be a relapse into that realm of expectable individual facts which theory is meant to rise above" (pg. 20)
    - "Tendency is the ability of theoretical thought to grasp the non-identical quality of a concept within the concept itself. One really expects theory to be not a cupboard with many compartments in which one can store whatever comes along but, rather, a hope of truth, of something qualitatively different. To the extent that truth is something qualitatively different, we are compelled towards dialectic – and this compulsion comes no longer from the concept of absolute spirit but, rather, from the phenomena of today" (pg. 21)
      - "Society cannot be imagined without the concept of tendency, because it contains the decisive mediations between what is socially given and the concept thereof, the concept of a nature of society, of what society aims for and what it has stepped up to do" (pg. 20)
        - "Tendency exists only in so far as society is already the totality, the system that is presupposed as soon as one speaks of tendency. Tendency makes no sense in more or less unconnected groups or with markets that are only loosely connected. The underlying laws of society exist only to the extent that there is at least unity in the sector where such laws are alleged to apply" (pg. 22)
    - "Regarding the convergence of the conceptual frameworks of philosophy and sociology: the concept of theory is not tautological but, rather, concerns the new, the non-identical. **Theory is only ever attained when, starting from an analysis of the concepts that actually apply to society, it arrives at the definitions which these concepts demand, yet which also differ from them**" (pg. 21)
      - "Theory in an emphatic sense exists only when society is dynamic" (pg. 21)
  - Lecture 4 (pg. 23)
    - "Regarding what I said to you about the concept of tendency, I should perhaps add that it would be highly worthwhile, and a very promising piece of methodological work, to compare the concept of trend, which is common in empirical sociology, with that of tendency as I attempted to elucidate to you in the last session" (pg. 23)
      - "**...there is no absolute rupture, no absolute *chorismos*, between a theory of society (whatever that might be) and the empirical investigation of society**" (pg. 23)
        - "I think it is important for you to be aware of this from the start, so that you avoid reifying and hardening the concept of social theory in the same way that is disastrously evident with empirical insight into society" (pg. 23)
    - "the concept of trend differs in one decisive point from what I have explained to you as tendency. Perhaps you recall that, in those explanations, I placed the greatest emphasis on the fact that recognizing a **tendency means recognizing, within the theoretical analysis of a given state, that element which qualitatively differs from this state itself, from the direction of its development, which means that it is not simply an extension of how the current state presents itself. This is precisely what is absent from the concept of trend**" (pg. 24)
      - "...empirical observation does actually involve, in a certain sense, the same types of subjective phenomena and behaviour that theory examines, but with a different emphasis..." (pg. 24)
        - "...theories of society are not equally possible at all times" (pg. 24)
          - ◆ "...theory is generally imagined first of all as a unity, as a system of society..." (pg. 25)
            - ◇ "...Marx's theory is entirely traditional in viewing society as a system, a self-enclosed deductive system..." (pg. 26)
          - ◆ "if the system could truly be deduced purely from its concept, this would essentially mean that, in the final reckoning, despite all contradictions in the details, there was something like unity" (pg. 26)
    - "It is no coincidence...that a theory of society in an emphatic sense came about only with the Industrial Revolution and emergent economic liberalism, which was already anticipated in extremely radical fashion by the classical national-economic model in liberal theory..." (pg. 24)
      - "**...the current society is so complex and so difficult in its construction that it resists theory**, at least in the initially naive sense of an unambiguous, unqualified, direct explanation based on a few concepts" (pg. 25)
    - "I told you last time that the concept of tendency is constitutive of this systematic model – that is, that one can only ever speak of a system of society as a tendency, and not as something fully realized, and this, strictly speaking, already means that society *tel quel*, society as it is, is not the system that, according to its own concept, it should be" (pg. 27)
    - "today, with these gigantic organizations in the background, the worker is no longer in this position of relative powerlessness in relation to the employer but rather, to an extent, in a situation that has been termed the monopoly of work..." (pg. 30)
  - Lecture 5 (pg. 32)
    - "...I tried, and will continue today, to show you with a few models how difficult it is to form an adequate theory that addresses relevant questions about society" (pg. 32)
    - "On the one hand, **the entire sphere of politics is certainly an aspect of ideology**, that is to say, it seems as if the power struggles take place in the **political sphere proper** – the sphere of government, the sphere of legislation, the sphere of elections, in all these elements of political institutions – **as if they were the matter itself**, whereas they are epiphenomena over the real social process that carries them. It is especially difficult to see through this – as simple as it may sound if I say this to you now – because the things with which people are first confronted, aside from persons, are really political institutions that represent the social, and because it already demands a substantial and analytical process of abstraction to perceive the

- underlying play of social forces. It is no coincidence that the theory of the state is incomparably older than the theory of society, which, though it too can be traced back to the Stoics, is – as a distinct theory – little older than the eighteenth or, at the earliest, the late seventeenth century." (pg. 39)
- "If you want to see a demonstration of what is meant by dialectic, by social dialectic, in a very simple model, then such a definition of the nature of the political is probably the best paradigm one could find, because here you find two opposing aspects united in a single concept and almost in the same sphere: on the one hand, this ideological aspect that politics only conceals what is really going on underneath, and, on the other hand, the political as the potential to change precisely what is going on underneath" (pg. 39)
    - "to be precise, politics is the manifestation of ideology that can take hold of the substructure and move it in a different direction" (pg. 39)
  - "instead, politics in general is seen only as the ideology it also is, namely as the sphere of a negotiation of interests that is actually determined by far stronger interests over which individuals believe they have no power, and which as a result they view largely with disinterest" (pg. 39)
    - "This is analogous to the psychopathology of people who are incapable of abstraction and therefore do nothing but cling to what is closest" (pg. 40)
      - "Expanding one's consciousness, having a wide, unrestricted view, is itself already a form of privilege, yet those of us who like to think we have such a consciousness often fail to realize how much it is due to our inherited advantage that we are even able and allowed to have it." (pg. 41)
  - Lecture 6 (pg. 42)
    - "you will perhaps remember that the last concept **we arrived at was the concept of concretism, which is the tying of consciousness to the immediacy of the given conditions**, and more specifically the tying of consciousness to the consumer goods that people are presented with on such an overwhelming scale today. This overwhelming quantity of consumer goods, incidentally, like the advertising apparatus, points back to objective structural problems in society...namely the whole question of overinvestment and overproduction, as well as the necessity for the system, in order to survive, to exert an additional pressure in every conceivable way in order to shackle people to these very consumer goods" (pg. 42)
      - "I would think that the true origin of this phenomenon of concretism lies much deeper, that it is not really true that one cannot trace social processes to their relatively simple roots in economic planning and economic power structures, but rather that, because of the incredible disproportion between all individuals, every individual, wherever they might be, and the concentrated power of society, the notion of resisting this agglomerated power seems illusory" (pg. 43)
    - "people do not only consume or attach themselves to utility values; rather, they are attached to exchange values. By this I mean that what an object represents as a monetary value, its exchange value, already becomes a source of pleasure on that basis, almost becoming a utility value, yet not directly, but mediated through this exchange value that such an object has on the market..." (pg. 45)
      - "if one speaks of a reified consciousness, I would say that one of the central aspects of **this reification of consciousness is that it attaches itself to the fetish character of commodities, to what things represent on the market, instead of attaching itself to what these things actually mean for people**" (pg. 45)
    - "When a worker in a study refers with a certain generality to 'the powers that be', for example, without any accompanying idea of who 'the powers that be' actually are and what their function is...[a] delusion – like all social contexts of delusion – has a social reason, namely that they will simply never reach 'the powers that be' in the hierarchy; society is arranged and constructed so hierarchically that the possibility of coming across the managing director is eliminated from the outset" (pg. 45-46)
      - "...this leads – to continue this point – to the appearance that the need somehow to voice one's wishes spontaneously, and be heard, will no longer even be felt..." (pg. 46)
        - "So the division of labour between the workers and the lobbyists will be reproduced within the workers themselves, as it were; it repeats itself, which then leads both to the familiar consolidation phenomena within the labour organizations and ultimately also to the monopolistic structures that are becoming apparent in all labour organizations, the so-called political ones as well as the apolitical trade unions" (pg. 46)
    - "Marxian theory, like every theory of society that seeks to understand society as a totality, is essentially a theory of the existing capitalist society of its respective time..." (pg. 47)
    - "Though I spoke of concretism as the inability to perform what the German Idealists called 'self-elevation'...this concept of concretism is insufficient to describe what I meant; rather, one should say that it also has a correlate which Horkheimer once termed 'abstractism'" (pg. 47-48)
      - "This abstractism I would like to call the inability to have genuine experiences, and this inability to have experiences and the fixation on the mere objects of immediate exchange, which are affectively charged, idolized and fetishized by people, are essentially the same thing" (pg. 48)
    - "Probably experience is tied to what – if you will permit this abstract formulation for the moment – one might perhaps call the possibility of the new, or the openness of the world – namely that the world is not subject to laws of its own reproduction that are preordained and set in stone, that at any moment there can be something which is not already pre-arranged or, in modern parlance, 'scheduled'. But wherever that is not the case, where precisely those forms of mass production which constantly produce the same under the guise of the new result in such fixity, experience is very severely compromised in objective terms" (pg. 49)
      - "I would almost call [this] ideological, something that pretends human immediacy and human destiny still exist, whereas we are actually all debased, even in our innermost being, to mere masks of the ghastly reality principle to which we are bound" (pg. 50)
  - Lecture 7 (pg. 51)
    - "Hegel taught that we do not have immediate consciousness of the whole, which is meant to be the truth, and that it should not be the abstractly separated, overarching concept of the whole but, rather, that the whole is realized only through the individual steps, the individual movements of the consciousness, and through reality..." (pg. 51)
      - "And Marx's theory was in agreement with this strangely paradoxical notion that a way of thinking which bases its truth claim on a totality nonetheless sees the truth manifested in the particular, the detail, rather than the general outline of the whole..." (pg. 51)
    - "what one might perhaps describe as the **system-immanence of proletarian consciousness**...means that consciousness itself submits to the dominance of conditions and the implicit conviction that nothing significant can be changed about them, that all reflections automatically take place within the limits of the given conditions, and that the potential for establishing a reality in which things are truly different never comes within reach" (pg. 54)
      - "This aspect of system-immanence, I would say, reflects what one might observe in the consciousness of the workers more accurately than the overly abstract assertion of a levelled society when it comes to the material basis of their existence" (pg. 55)
    - "**one of the greatest sources of error in the whole of our contemporary sociology is probably the fact that it knows no higher norm than the so-called objectivity**, unprejudiced view and verifiability of its findings; that it is subjectivist, in so far as it generally contents itself with recording what people think about themselves and their social situation, without reflecting...that people's awareness about themselves can, and probably does, differ infinitely from their opinion about themselves and society" (pg. 55-56)
      - "...we should not content ourselves with recording what people think, want, and do of their own accord, but rather, while still recording what they think, want and do, and certainly acquainting ourselves with it, that we should at all times see it in relation to the objective circumstances" (pg. 56)

- "The connection between an empiricist mindset and that form of blindness through subjective consciousness is extremely profound, and I think it is important – precisely for those who already concern themselves with the research – that they gain an awareness of these things, unless they wish to follow a stubborn, naïve and therefore ultimately factually unproductive practice" (pg. 56)
    - "the more the subjective understanding of reason, the means–end relation of self-preservation as it presents itself to individual humans – the *volonté du tous*, as Rousseau calls it – becomes the medium of truth in conjunction with the progress of occidental nominalism and the loss of faith in something like objective reason as such, the stronger, in keeping with this philosophical trend, the tendency becomes to view the average of subjective opinions – the average of subjective reason, as it were – as the pinnacle of objectivity. The philosophical task of getting beyond this is an extraordinarily difficult one. **The only way is a critique of precisely this subjective reason**, in the sense of merely subjective judgements, by showing in detail that there is a concrete and clear discrepancy between the upshot of this opinion and the things to which it refers" (pg. 56-57)
- Lecture 8 (pg. 60)
  - "The trick of the matter, the squaring of the circle that is required of someone who thinks socially, is simultaneously to avoid covering up structures through details and nuances...and, nonetheless, to conceive of the structural problems themselves in as detailed and complex a fashion as they present themselves in reality..." (pg. 61)
  - "**One of the greatest achievements of Hegel...was stating with the greatest emphasis that the mere self-awareness of humans, as long as it does not somehow enter their social reality (or externalize itself, as Hegel put it), runs the risk of becoming a mere ideology.** And that is indeed what has happened with the belief, associated with the 'philosophy of inwardness', that people define themselves purely through their awareness of themselves, not by what they are in reality" (pg. 61)
  - "I said that the theory must therefore be very nuanced in these matters and incorporate all these aspects – but incorporate them precisely to ensure that structural differences are not treated nominalistically nonetheless. After all, that same nominalism, the same tendency to deny the reality of concepts that once served the purpose of clarification, has largely changed its function and today serves primarily to prevent anything like objective definitions of social phenomena beyond subjectivity, both the subjectivity meant by these definitions and cognisant subjectivity" (pg. 62)
    - "For epistemology is by no means always a tool of clarification but may also be used as a way to elude any clarifying reflection. There is nothing in the world, not even something as seemingly objective as epistemology, that cannot potentially take on a social status, a function in society, which changes it into the opposite of what it originally took itself to be" (pg. 63)
  - "you must be aware – and here I am first of all describing to you the difficulty of a theory of society, for one can only gain access to these things if one takes on board their extraordinary difficulties unreservedly, without any illusions – that, because of the nuanced character which I described to you as a necessity, the theory of society loses that same unambiguous nature which was one of its merits, especially because the subjective aspect has simply taken on a far greater significance than it once seemed to have, due to the quantitative increase in subjective so-called integration factors; and, naturally, this initially compromises the strictly objective character of the theory, namely the plausibility of an unreserved economic objectivism" (pg. 63)
    - "I think it is important for everything we will go on to say about the possibility of formulating a new social theory that you are aware of this fundamental difficulty, which consists in **having to choose between, on the one hand, something that is theory, yet dogmatically ossified and no longer capable of nuance, and, on the other, a form of nominalism and faith in facts that, ultimately, no longer differs at all from conceptless positivism and turns into something like pure empiricism**" (pg. 63-64)
  - "The whole distinction between 'inner-directed' and 'outer-directed' persons is quite simply a way of saying that, with the radical consolidation of the exchange principle, with the radical capitalization of all interpersonal relationships, the sphere of individuality, which seemingly sets all these gears in motion, is increasingly devalued; that, in the processes of social adaptation which are incessantly demanded, **there is really not much more left of the so-called individual than its ideology** – namely that the individual is the highest value, but without anything truly concrete corresponding to this abstract notion of the individual" (pg. 65)
    - "On the other hand, in opposition to this growing socialization is the fact that, still, in our society, nothing resembling a unity of interests, a reconciliation of the interest of society as a whole and the interests of individual people, has been realized, and, from this perspective, **society is surely light years away from the notion of integration, which it uses largely as an ideology**" (pg. 65)
      - "But I think one should not stop at this differentiation I have attempted but should, rather, try also to approach the question of integration, not simply by making the concept more specific but by highlighting its own immanent contradiction as an expression of a social reality; though here I would say...that **social integration grows in tandem with social contradictions, with social antagonisms**" (pg. 65)
        - ◆ "Perhaps I can express that a little more clearly by saying that society becomes integrated not through the isolated spontaneities of its separate individuals, of its own accord, as classical liberal theory still postulated; rather, what we call integration today takes place from above, through the technologically applied methods of standardization in the work process, as well as in mass communication and the extensive planning by the most powerful groups, which assert themselves in incredibly influential spheres such as advertising and propaganda – and I consider any distinction between advertising and propaganda to be pure ideology – in such an extremely drastic fashion." (pg. 65)
        - ◆ "So, while the different groups in this society are coming ever closer to one another, to the point of indistinguishability, in their 'patterns of behaviour' [Eng.], in their customs and conventions...**the reality is that, precisely because society is ruled by a few very strong power groups thanks to the monopolization process and its organizational forms of reflection, the struggles and confrontations taking place in this society are increasingly reduced to struggles between the most powerful groups** – one could almost say to pure clique battles. The sphere of the political, meanwhile, which presupposes something like the independent, autonomous and spontaneous formation of the will of the demos, is largely a mere semblance or reflex motion by comparison and no longer constitutes anything at all substantial" (pg. 65-66)
    - "we know that, in the realm of individual psychology, integration based on a social pressure that has reached disproportionate levels is extremely closely related to a disintegration of one's person" (pg. 66)
      - "Many years ago I stated...that the individual's organic composition grows within the individual itself...What I meant is quite simply that **people are increasingly becoming instruments, means of their own self-preservation at the expense of the sector** – forgive the quantitative turn of phrase – at the expense of those parts of their person that the instruments into which they are turning themselves should really be serving" (pg. 66)
        - "In other words, the increasing rationalization of humans themselves, in which people are turning into their own means of production and becoming ever more suited to reality, contradicts their own reality principle because there is nothing really left for these tools to work for. Then they become an end in themselves within people, they become irrational; they are no longer for anything, because what should be for another becomes something 'in itself'. Hence this rationality approaches irrationality and, ultimately, even something like a system of delusion" (pg. 66-67)
    - \*\*\*\*"This problem presents us with the following choice: if one believes in society's integration in the way its objective spirit demands of us, and in the way the prevailing ideology demands of us in countless areas of life, and in almost all of public opinion – in other words, **if one defines society**

- with two seamlessly reconcilable concepts based on extensional logic, one is falling for a mere semblance.** So the system of society which one then constructs as a theorist actually conceals, through the unanimity, the smoothness, the identical and contradiction-free character it assumes, the continued existence of the antagonisms – and that, ladies and gentlemen, **this concealing function of the system, is really the basis of my objection to the conventional systematic content of theory formation in sociology.** And this is also the reason for the difficulty in formulating a theory of society that penetrates to its core but simultaneously divests itself of the wrongly, falsely systematic character of which I hope I have at least given you some notion. The antagonisms continue; they are not directly visible, often not even indirectly visible as contrasts of lifestyle or contrasts between terrible poverty and abundant wealth, but they continue in the shape of an antagonism of social power and social powerlessness that has reached an extreme level, and – **this is the dialectical essence**, this is why I told you before that I would try not simply to differentiate but to dialecticize – **this contrast of power and powerlessness prevails today precisely because of the increasing integration of society as a whole**" (pg. 67)
- "...the art of social thought also includes not letting the knowledge that something has always been the case blind one to the fact that, through the growth of certain quantities or qualities, even something old and immemorial takes on a new quality" (pg. 67)
  - "in a society that was held together by free and fair exchange and which had always been integrated in the name of the exchange principle, the different functions were brought down to a common denominator, truly unified, by this exchange. This concept of exchange, or this reality of exchange, was at once the medium that enabled the formation of class, perhaps not originally creating it but certainly reinforcing it, meaning that the model of such a **disintegration, or an intensification of antagonism through integration**, has existed since ancient times" (pg. 67)
    - "...the more integrated society is, and the fewer are left outside in the literal or the metaphorical sense, the more each of us is devoured by this society from head to toe; and the more we ourselves are modelled even in our very structure by this imposed form of society, the more powerless each of us automatically is before this whole. That is precisely the definition of the increase in antagonism or, if you like, the disintegration through the growing integration that I have attempted to show you" (pg. 68)
  - "While the great classics of German philosophy, first Kant and later Hegel most of all, taught that the identity of the general and the particular was the telos of history, one might say that the world in which we live today has arrived at something like a false identity of the general and the particular; that is, frequently the particular is already as mutilated to begin with as the general could ever want to make it" (pg. 68)
    - "It is beyond doubt, however, that **the primary reactions of countless people today, owing to an unconscious knowledge of the hopelessness of resistance and the need to make things easier for themselves, follow what psychoanalytical theory calls 'identification with the aggressor'** – they voluntarily affirm and even seek the forms of repression that are forced on them from without. And this truly produces a ghastly parody: the identity between the objectively prevailing state, or the conditions objectively forced on people, and their own consciousness..." (pg. 68)
  - Lecture 9 (pg. 70)
    - "You will recall my saying last time that **a false identity between the general and the particular is emerging**, meaning that, in a great many areas of life, the particular already seems so deformed by nature, having internalized and embraced the deformation visited upon it, that the rupture between the general and the particular is no longer properly visible" (pg. 70)
      - "And I spoke of a **negative unity of society in its overall unfreedom**...and I also pointed out that countless conflicts reveal the damage done time and again to individual people, that this unity, which the prevailing ideology considers one of the essential concerns...to assure us of and to drill into us as a positive, that it is actually a mere semblance, that this integration is not true." (pg. 70-71)
        - "the phenomenon I am describing to you, namely **the semblance of freedom that is created only by a certain visible satisfaction of needs**, without any change to one's real status in the production process, also manifests itself in the ruling view...namely in the fact that even the members of the ruling class have infinitely less freedom of choice, and also far less opportunity to enjoy their property and their independence, than one imagines" (pg. 71)
    - "Today there is undoubtedly a tacit, extremely widespread social regulation which ensures that anyone who uses their wealth unreservedly exposes themselves to a sphere of, shall we say, petty bourgeois scrutiny that not only spoils the enjoyment they might otherwise have had but in addition – and this is far more important – could also lead to all manner of commercial disadvantages" (pg. 71)
      - "This already points to an **objective aspect of this situation**...namely that, within a system defined by the necessity of accumulating and exploiting capital, **the individual people appear, to an almost unimaginable degree, merely as 'character masks' or, put more simply, as functionaries of the capital relation**, which determines every one of their decisions and naturally, in case of conflict, necessarily sucks in their private life too...whether partially or completely" (pg. 71)
        - "[such] is a semblance that conceals coercion, oppression and forced adaptation" (pg. 71)
    - "to me, the significance of exploring and criticizing ideologies lies primarily in the fact that, in the ideologies, one can show to a large extent what I am talking about, namely the semblance of society's freedom" (pg. 71-72)
      - "By analysing the ideologies that are promoted today, especially those provided by the culture industry, one can see how much the antagonisms live on, despite the semblance of levelling, simply through those constant efforts **to make people forget the antagonisms**..." (pg. 72)
        - "one can elevate it to a concept, that is, one can show in detail that such **ideology...falsifies this reality by making the central antagonisms disappear and replacing them with merely private conflicts**..." (pg. 72)
          - ◆ "naturally the culture industry also includes a great many products seemingly connected to so-called social issues, but that is precisely where the falsifications I mean are carried out most cunningly..." (pg. 72)
    - "I am talking about these things so that you might understand, as we are speaking here about a theory of society and must therefore consider the status of individual sociological interests, why the analysis of the products of mass culture, of the culture industry or of ideology forms a not inconsiderable part of my own work" (pg. 72)
      - "it seems that ideology today merges to an ever greater degree with the image of reality as it actually is, so that, to refer to Max Weber once again, **the 'disenchanted world'...is glorified** as its own meaning or its own ideology. I say 'glorified' because **the presentation of this world creates the impression that it must be so, that it cannot be any other way**, and that, what is more, this is something very profound" (pg. 72)
    - "In this book [*The Jargon of Authenticity*]...I dealt with the concept of the human being, the only one that counts, and at least tried to show...how the assertion that it is always a matter of the human being and nothing else, that only the human being matters, that this, if one could one day conceive a typology of ideologies, is what one might call a complementary ideology; because, in this world that is completely dominated by social objectivity, it is precisely not the human being, the individual subject, that matters" (pg. 73)
      - "here I will say that the important and telling thing is that, when the human being is presented as something meaningful, this concept of the human is thus robbed of any meaningful relationship, and it seems as if one need only say 'a human being' with a verbal roll of the eyes, as it were, and this will prove how meaningful a human is" (pg. 74)
        - "The simple reason for this is that, as soon as the ideologues claimed some positive transcendence on the part of this human being, it would immediately bring them into conflict with the ruling state of enlightenment, or rather jadedness, among their consumers. So they have no choice but to employ their taboo words, their sacred words, as precisely that – as sacred words – because any attempt to define their content in some way or other would immediately turn into an outright lie, which would immediately bring all the fun to an abrupt end. **This also shows you a very peculiar dialectic**, in the sense that, because the existent *tel quel*, the way it is, is made the ideology of

- itself today, when there are not really any meaningful ideologies left, **the ideology of truth moves extremely close, creating the impression that one has only to pull a little and the ideological veil will fall. But it strikes me as a sociological law that, the thinner the veil between reality and ideology becomes, the more difficult it becomes to destroy this veil**, and that if there is no ideology left anyway, as it were, then the ideological, that is, reified consciousness will have reached its greatest height. If I am not mistaken, this phenomenon is one reason why ideology critique must primarily and essentially become language critique..." (pg. 74)
- "The antagonisms of which I have spoken...are, at least in the most developed countries...the growth of the extremes of social power and social powerlessness, which leave those people who, according to ideology, are all that matters in a state of complete nullity – as indeed the idea of 'nothingness' usually accompanies the ideologies of the human being or, as they are more nobly termed, of existence [*Dasein*]" (pg. 74)
    - "the mistake I have criticized and whose correction is the purpose of ideology critique, namely to deny the existence of antagonisms and pretend that, thanks to technology, we have come so wonderfully far that there are no longer any contradictions, without people giving much thought to how technology alone is supposed to achieve that without substantially affecting the conditions of social production" (pg. 75)
      - "...there is also what one could describe as the danger of mythologizing those antagonisms..." (pg. 75)
  - "the very fundamental questions we are dealing with, namely that **one cannot hammer a theory into people against their own experience and that, as soon as the kind of discrepancies between theory and experience that I have described appear, when the theory of antagonisms runs amok, then something is wrong with the theory itself**, at least in the established form that is imposed on people" (pg. 75)
    - "The task of a theory of society today – and this, I think, takes us to one of the central difficulties faced by the conception and formulation of such a theory of society today – is that it must incorporate even what is contrary to it, what deviates from it, and, if one proceeds from this point, one can open up a new way to the concept of dialectics as a theory that is capable of incorporating even those elements which are theoretically contrary to it at first. This would not be the worst definition of dialectics, if indeed one insists on such a definition, and **at this moment the concept of dialectics is meant subjectively, in the sense of a theory of society; but naturally the concept of dialectic also has an objective meaning, namely the antagonistic process of society itself**, of which I would like to remind you. In other words, one must also grasp the rupture between theory and experience theoretically – which is a great deal to demand of a theory" (pg. 75-76)
      - "one probably has to say that, on the one hand, people are disappointed and sceptically opposed to theories that try to talk them into ideologies, they distrust theory formation in general, but that, on the other hand, they are increasingly incapable of experience in subjective and anthropological terms, that their ability to have a primary experience is withering away, and they are thus **willing to make do with substitutes for experience** which no longer enable a confrontation between what they view as experience and what is actually the case" (pg. 76)
        - ◆ *\*this counting other's experience (as) their own (i.e., projection & identification & internalization) is the ground upon which ideology springs.*
  - "If you think back for one second to what I have just told you about **the necessity for the theory to incorporate the irresolvable elements, those aspects to which the theory qua theory cannot be reduced**, one might also take the view that theory today is forced to be at once system and non-system – a system in so far as it must express the wholeness and unity of society that we encounter, or at least encounter as a potential, and to which I referred you, but on the other hand also a non-system in so far as it has transpired that this wholeness itself reproduces the antagonisms, that this unity itself, in its absoluteness, creates precisely this division by its own nature. One might also say that a theory of society must itself be rational in a twofold sense: on the one hand, it reveals the rationality of society, as indeed everything in this society happens as it should, according to its rules; on the other hand, it is also rational in the sense that it does not simply acknowledge the elements of irrationality displayed by society in countless aspects as a corrective – that would leave us with precisely the sort of patchwork theory with which we cannot content ourselves – but rather, in principle at least, elaborates the irrationalities of the prevailing society from the very nature of its own rationality. So that would really be the idea, or, if you prefer, the model or archetype, of the only theory of society that seems possible and certainly necessary to me today" (pg. 77-78)
  - Lecture 10 (pg. 79)
    - "that reality which ultimately dictates the rules for any theory that seeks to grasp or recognize it, is internally contradictory, and that any theoretical construct whose highest value is the absence of contradictions will therefore contradict its very object, even as it flatters itself that it has mastered it with the utmost logical elegance and soundness. **One could say that reality is itself both logical and allogical**" (pg. 79)
      - "Now that is nothing really new; it is an inherent structural determinant of bourgeois society" (pg. 79)
        - "Marx already viewed society as rational and examined its own claim that everything is in order, with commodities being exchanged for their equivalents, and – and **this is exactly the dialectical salt in Marx's theory of society** – showed, or at least tried to show, that precisely because everything proceeds as it should, because equal is exchanged for equal, everything is not in order, for the principle of equality results in inequality, whether created or reproduced" (pg. 79)
          - ◆ "...social antagonisms establish themselves because of their integration, not in spite of it, perpetuating and possibly consolidating power structures within society" (pg. 79-80)
    - "people tried for too long to come to terms with an internally contradictory and antagonistic society using a concept of contradiction-free and unified theory. Incidentally, you can see that the assertion of the link between rationality and irrationality, indeed their interconnection, is not something that was inserted into the equation after the event by the fact that, in the classically rational formulation of a theory of society, namely Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, in addition to the laws of exchange that he defines objectively, the author already introduced the principle of fair play, which subsequently entered everyday language, even the German language. So this means that the entire construction applies only if certain irreducible irrational moral laws are followed, laws whose essence is that one should follow the rules of the game" (pg. 80)
      - "One could say that, here in particular, one finds one of the central reasons why such strictly rational models are no longer adequate for understanding society, namely that **society is increasingly disregarding its own defined rational rules**" (pg. 80)
        - "for a philosophical theory of society, I would say it shows that, **even a category such as reason**, which was taken as an invariant formal-logical rule, for example by Kant, as a permanently self-identical and eternal category, **changes with the structures of society**. So this means that, if one is the weaker party facing an outwardly incredibly powerful and aggressive dictatorship, the reasonable thing to do is precisely the opposite of the concept of reason, the contradiction of reason as classically understood, though with the addition of the specifically fascist dynamic, where reason itself now turns into manifest unreason" (pg. 80)
          - ◆ "I consider it especially important for you to understand that rational and irrational elements do not exist alongside each other in society...What I mean is that, on the one hand, there is an incredible degree of technological rationalization while, on the other hand, say in the organization of agriculture, agriculture can only survive if the weaker family members, women and children, are exploited in the most irrational fashion because the family is respected as having absolute value; that is an example of this coexistence of rationality and irrationality" (pg. 81)
          - ◆ "the rationality within the prevailing conditions, that is, rational work, calculation, financial accounting, where the stronger party receives the maximum benefit, that this **rationality itself naturally produces the irrational elements**; or, if it does not produce them directly, it is at least the reason why, despite all the particular and partial rationalizations in our society, the irrational sectors survive, indicating in a sense that the whole, in all its rationality, has remained something irrational after all" (pg. 81)

- **"The fact that the reality which the theory needs to grasp is an antagonistic reality in this very radical sense**, a sense that can be dated back to the concept of its own reasonableness, **demands a dialectical theory, as formulating a dialectical theory of society**, quite simply means understanding the inner workings of society in such a way that one elaborates these irrationalities from its own concept" (pg. 81)
  - **"...the central tasks of a theory of society, and of sociology in general, is to understand even those aspects that seemingly contradict a unified theory formation.** And a theory that is capable of grasping precisely those things that elude the traditional concept of deductive theory is the exact elaboration of this paradox, if you will. **That is really what can be expected of a dialectical theory** – which is anathema to the conventional attitudes with which we are all infused – and this is the real effort which I would say that both philosophy and sociology demand of you" (pg. 81)
    - "...the task with which you, with which we, are confronted is quite simply to liberate ourselves from the notion that, simply put, the best and truest and most adequate theory is that which is most coherent and contradiction-free in an immediate sense, without consideration for what the reality actually is and what reality imposes on us" (pg. 81-82)
- "Naïve thinking – and this naïveté, ladies and gentlemen, by no means refers merely to pre-scientific thinking but, rather, is a naïveté that I would argue is possibly hardened and consolidated in us by the traditional concept of science and its classificatory structures – insists on a kind of choice. Here we are expected to choose all or nothing, to think in binary terms. So the demand is to select either theory in the sense of a contradiction-free, possibly deductive or at least unanimously organized system or, if one stumbles on the fact that this system is not without problems, that something is lacking, one immediately throws the entire system overboard...So all one has to do is start with a clean slate, without prejudices, as they say, collect facts and arrange them into an order. **This form of binary thinking is precisely what undialectical thinking means, namely a form of thinking which simply distinguishes between two opposing possibilities and demands that we choose between them, as it were, without asking whether the extremes thus defined might not actually condition one another, or, as one says in the language of dialectics, whether they are not mutually mediated.**" (pg. 82)
  - "...of all the thinking habits with which people generally approach theory, one of the most dangerous is to do so with demands that stem from their own needs rather than being immanent to theory itself, in particular such needs where one simply cannot say a priori whether a theory will fulfil them" (pg. 82)
    - "It is the same if one approaches theory with a need for absolute security of knowledge, be it a security elaborated from a concept purely on the model of mathematics or a security of absolutely indisputable facts, and it is highly characteristic of this way of thinking that it essentially always operates with this 'all or nothing' approach" (pg. 82-83)
      - ◆ *\*this 'all or nothing' approach illustrates a neurotic tendency*
    - "This 'all or nothing'...is quite simply the demand that theory should satisfy the need for absolute security of knowledge, instead of knowledge being determined by what is actually known" (pg. 83)
      - ◆ **"This way of thinking, the traditional way, is quite simply incapable of behaving openly..."** (pg. 83)
        - ◇ "...if one takes my earlier demand seriously, the one concerning an open approach, then this is possible only by adopting a very pointed critical stance towards science that respects it but does not fetishize it" (pg. 84)
- **"for countless people working in the field of social science, it is more important to have something like a unified theory covering as many things as possible, with enough space to accommodate whatever facts one finds, than to have**, instead of such a sociological theory designed to act as the measure of what is true or false, **a theory of society that is not so unified in itself, namely one that reflects the nature of society. This glorification of unified knowledge at the cost of truth**, which is not unified, essentially amounts to what I wish to describe as the fetishization of science" (pg. 83)
  - "...Leibniz's theorem....essentially boils down to the fact that...every individual really carries the entire universe within itself without realizing it and can produce it purely from within itself, through its own thought" (pg. 85)
  - "One might even say that science, in the context of the overall nominalist tendency to focus on the outward aspects of things and to slur any insight into their inner workings as speculation, becomes its own most precious commodity, the *summum bonum*, the more it actually dispenses with truly understanding anything" (pg. 86)
- "I cannot provide you with a history of the concept of science here, so let me just say this much: with the decline of the great idealistic philosophy, all that really remains of this equation of science with truth is the absolute certainty of the individual insights as its truth" (pg. 85)
- **"...the fact that the method becomes more and more critically refined, and rules out more and more things that are not methodologically applicable, brings us closer to the matter**, which is why I have no intention whatsoever of opposing the sharpening of scientific standards with a 'loosening' of scientific norms, criteria and validity" (pg. 87)
  - "But it does ultimately make a decisive difference whether the method and its consistency, the coherence of the method, is made the *summum bonum* of the scientific method, with everything measured in relation to this ideal, or whether reflection on a matter might possibly be capable not of abolishing or suspending the scientific rules, but of pushing them towards a reflection that reveals objective areas in which the norms established by science are simply not adequate to grasp reality" (pg. 87)
  - "If one proceeds from what I have told you – namely that the scientific method would come closer to the heart of the matter through its own critical purification, if I can put it like that – if one simply and straightforwardly infers from this that, the more purely the scientific method is designed, the more smoothly and directly it leads us to the matter itself, then this is precisely where the mistake lies, which leads to science obstructing our view of the truth" (pg. 87)
- Lecture 11 (pg. 89)
  - "I wish to show you that the ideal of the scientific method which is familiar to you from the positive sciences, especially the natural sciences, does not contribute to the truth in the social context but, rather, can counteract the truth in a determinable sense, because the structure of this context does not correspond to what the traditional ideal of science – which is not itself philosophical – demands" (pg. 89)
    - "...the third of [Descartes] principles, the third rule, is 'to guide my thoughts in an orderly way by beginning with the objects that are the simplest and easiest to know and to rise gradually, as if by steps, to knowledge of the most complex, and even by assuming an order among objects in cases where there is no natural order among them'" (pg. 89)
      - "For now, I will pass over one problem that will become central later, namely the assumption that the first thing is at once the simplest, or, put differently, that the intrinsic aspects from which one would have to proceed to the epiphenomena are at once the simplest, and everything else follows from them" (pg. 90)
  - **"the very thing we are considering today...[is] the conflict between the postulates of scientific method on the one hand and the structure of the matter on the other"** (pg. 90)
    - "It is a strange business that while, on the one hand, this specifically scientific pathos, if one wants to call it pathos, this emphasis on being scientific in the specific sense, has something so anti-philosophical about it that many positivist scientists essentially mean it as an insult when they call a philosopher a philosopher...and yet, on the other hand, it is precisely these positive sciences, because they have become so distant or estranged from the advances in philosophical reflection, that unthinkingly carry all manner of baggage with them from the very philosophy they have declared obsolete..." (pg. 90-91)
    - "The crucial point I wish to show you is that, **in a society like ours, the individual and society are not only not in direct harmony but, in their interests and, one might also say, in their internal composition, stand in such contradiction to each other that this demand for a scientific**



- continuum with a uniform conceptualization does not take us any closer to the matter**, or rather deeper into the matter, but instead becomes more superficial at both poles – that of psychology and that of sociology..." (pg. 91)
- "What matters to me here is quite simply that psychology leads deeper into the structure of the individual the more it ignores what could, in a superficial sense, be referred to as social aspects of individual psychology. In the language of analytical psychology we call this 'ego psychology'" (pg. 92)
    - "In Freudian theory, the ego is that part of the overall structure of the psyche that largely corresponds to consciousness and whose function in the individual's life process is essentially to test reality, to distinguish between what is in keeping with reality and what is not. According to Freud's very plausibly demonstrated theory, **this zone we call the ego**, which also reacts to social stimuli in a clear and directly observable manner by acting as the authority that supervises the individual's adjustment to society, **is actually an extremely thin layer**, while the entire force of the drives, the entire libidinous energy from which the ego energy is simply siphoned off psycho-genetically, lies beneath it and is not so willing to participate in this reality testing" (pg. 92)
      - "one can show in detail that the attempt directly to sociologize psychology failed because individuals in their individual formation are largely archaic and are not connected to the socio-psychological stimuli around them so directly – which, incidentally, corresponds to the thesis of the essentially archaic and, if you will, static character of the unconscious formulated by Freud long before this controversy. This separation of the individual from society, the fact that the individual and its drive energy have remained so archaic that it has not kept up, in a sense, has social reasons itself, namely that same mechanism of universal refusal by culture which has repeatedly imposed not only its ontogenetically but also its phylogenetically archaic layer on them" (pg. 92-93)
      - "this deep layer of the individual is, of course, also of a social nature; that is, **the images and fundamental constellations one encounters in the unconscious themselves also refer back to social conflicts**. But these social conflicts, as mediated through the father figure, are something completely different, something much older and far less tangible than the immediate ego conflicts one experiences through narcissistic injury, or if one goes through the so-called ego neuroses that so many people suffer from today and which are familiar to all of you under the name 'inferiority complexes'..." (pg. 93)
        - "In other words, what genuinely proves collective and social when one immerses oneself in psychology is not the immediate effect of society on the unconscious here and now but, rather, a pre-stored, sedimented form of social pressure and social control that is therefore much deeper, much harder to take away, but also impossible to access so readily through changes in social situations" (pg. 93)
    - "...to conduct sociology as a form of applied psychology, to think that it is nothing but the application of certain basic psychological categories to the forms and content of socialization...[is to] deal only with a relatively limited area of socialization, namely the area where one is really dealing with unconscious or pre-conscious human reactions in very specific constellations, omitting precisely the aspect that generally determines their social actions: the pressure of social objectivity, mediated in relation to people's consciousness by their own rationale" (pg. 93-94)
      - "one always finds – because of **an overall social constitution in which the interests of the individual people and the construction of the whole point in different directions** – that the individual people are largely character masks, even where they believe they are acting as psychological persons, where they think they are free, act freely and are identical to themselves, and do only what is dictated by their function, their objective function within society (pg. 94)
        - "This, incidentally, is the true reason for the phenomenon that has become so terribly fashionable under the name of the 'role'...[yet] this concept of role, which very much depends on concrete social aspects, is being hypostasized as if the role were some kind of primal quality in the nature of society itself, which is roughly like trying to derive an ontology of reality directly from theatre" (pg. 94)
        - "At any rate, individual psychology does not reach the decisive, socially relevant form of action, namely economic action" (pg. 94)
    - "...the key concept in Max Weber's thought is that of rationality" (pg. 95)
      - "For **rationality is certainly identical** to what I described to you earlier, when I was speaking of psychoanalysis, as **the layer of the ego**, or of reality testing..." (pg. 95)
        - "rationality certainly represents the sphere of something understandable. On the other hand, rational social behaviour is always the behaviour that, as I told you, being adequate to reality, adapts itself more or less completely to the given objective social circumstances" (pg. 96)
          - ◆ "So one generally behaves rationally – by following one's ego principle and not allowing one's drives or one's super-ego, one's conscience, to dominate – as far as, and only as far as, demanded by the objectively social structure, that is, the prevailing conditions of social production. What is actually mediated by this subjectively understandable rationality is really just the primacy of social objectivity over the subjective drives and the immediate subjective impulses..." (pg. 96)
    - "**closer examination of the problematics of psychology and sociology has shown that they by no means constitute that continuum, that direct continuum in which psychological and sociological facts can be understood using the same categories**. Rather, the opposite is the case: the categories that apply to the one are invalid for the other" (pg. 96)
      - "...the category which appears positively in the one [science] is negated in the other; in this sense, one can say in all simplicity that there is a true dialectical relationship within the matter itself..." (pg. 96)
    - "my thesis [is] that so-called methodological questions are not irrelevant to the matter, that not every road leads to Rome, that one cannot proceed like clockwork from psychology to sociology and from sociology to psychology, but that considering the relationship between these disciplines means reflecting on them in such a way that one rises above the semblance of their uniformity and recognizes in the scientific structure those antagonisms which, in reality, obviously stem from the matter itself" (pg. 97)
      - "...one is forced not to act unmethodically but to reflect critically on the concept of method itself" (pg. 97)
  - Lecture 12 (pg. 98)
    - "In the last session we examined the relationship between scientific methodology and the matter itself, and I tried – if I may just recapitulate – to give you a more concrete idea of the thesis that the fetishization of methodology replaces insight into the matter by showing...that **the attempt to create a form of conceptual continuum in the so-called human sciences for the sake of a unified method can only fail**" (pg. 98)
    - "Initially...method simply means that one makes the forms of logic – the forms that have crystallized in logic itself, that is, the forms of correct concept formation, of adequate judgement and, above all, of the correctly drawn conclusion – into general principles, not only of the individual insights gained in these logical forms but also of demands aimed at knowledge as a whole, or at the ideal of science" (pg. 98)
      - "because science or knowledge is impossible without thought, it is self-evident that the forms in which thought takes place remain valid as much for the aforementioned individual logical operations as for the overall context. Without that, thought would genuinely regress to mere arbitrary reaction, the mere spontaneous idea..." (pg. 98-99)
        - "Such a regression must be avoided, for it would actually mean that the thought would stop being a thought at all" (pg. 99)
      - "**I think the mistake that is made here is that the unconnected appearance of these insights – that is, the mode of their acquisition, the way in which they appear – is equated too easily with their objective structure, their truth content**. I would say that, **for a thinking that is in control of itself, that genuinely shows it is worthy of the name both in itself and in the matters it deals with, the so-called spontaneous ideas**, which we are always told cannot be learned, are not the present from heaven which they have always been imagined as by the theories of intuition in

- particular, or, on the other hand, through their defamation by theories of science; rather, in general, **when one 'has an idea', it is often a case of thought processes that began unconsciously, far in advance, suddenly rising to the surface and becoming visible**, in the same way a body of water sometimes does" (pg. 99)
- "I would actually say that a thinking fundamentally shows its quality, its carat value, in whether the unintentional element is genuinely unintentional or, rather, represents the unity of the intentional and the unintentional within itself – that is, whether it possesses that quality of the spontaneity of the suddenly emergent yet still results from an unconscious continuity. So I would almost say that, **the more intensive a way of thinking is, the more emphatically one thinks about something, the greater the chance...that one will have an idea, that is, the spontaneous ideas could then be considered the fruits of these thoughts that continue working underground, not aware of themselves at all**" (pg. 99)
    - ◆ "Without this aspect of the suddenly and unconsciously emergent, which generally tends to be the new quality of a thought, there can be no such thing as productive thinking; on the other hand, if it is not present in this continuity, it is entirely worthless. But it seems to me that, **wherever these so-called sudden ideas are truly of significant weight, they have stored up the power of unconsciously continuing thought processes inside themselves**" (pg. 99)
      - ◇ *\*this is where dialectics has significance - drawing out of its hiding place the innerness of such deep ideas.*
  - "There is a distinction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*...namely the distinction between so-called formal logic and transcendental logic. For one could dismiss this distinction as superficial with the very concrete objection that, for Kant, the unity of the entire system lies in the concept of reason, and that reason – and thus logic – is always the same, which means that the basic categories of reason must always be the same too; and indeed Kant himself emphasized this by essentially using the same arrangement for purely logical categories and categories referring to objects" (pg. 100)
    - "the profound insight that Kant had here – and, I would say, an insight that contradicts his own doctrine of reason but which should be highlighted all the more because he discovered it precisely in relation to the construction of his total philosophy – seems to me that **the character of reason itself changes according to how reason, in its progress, is substantially dominated by its own mechanism**, that is, by formal logic expanded into a method, or whether this progress of reason confronts itself with the aspects of things, with that to which it refers, when it is not remotely clear a priori whether it actually follows these rules of logic and their expansion into a method" (pg. 100)
      - "It makes a difference – a decisive difference, albeit a mere nuance – whether the laws of formal logic and method are imposed on experiences as an ordering principle or whether their validity, their applicability, is constantly confronted with what the things themselves are saying" (pg. 101)
  - "...the demand of formal logic and method is that of freedom from contradictions" (pg. 101)
  - "... as I have attempted to show you...individual human existence and social human existence contradict each other" (pg. 101)
  - "I would say method means precisely that, on the one hand, one [...] the allogical or anti-logical, contradictory elements of reality, that is, one does not directly order them according to the categories of formal logic, but that, on the other hand, one does seek thoughtfully to grasp these contradictions or deviations from formal logic; and when I speak of seeking to grasp them thoughtfully, this refers us to a form of higher freedom from contradictions, because we are so bound up in the mechanism of our own thinking" (pg. 101)
    - "...we have no choice but to incorporate the contradictions that come about between the thinking and the facts – into thinking once more, that is, **at least to integrate them into the thought in such a way that these contradictions appear as part of reality but do not constitute the simple contradictoriness of the thought itself**. And if dialectical philosophy has placed such value on the concept of totality or unity, I should say here that this is not simply the principle of identity gone wild, running amok, thinking it can subject everything in existence to its dictate, the dictate of the conceptual mechanism; rather, it also dictates that, on the one hand, thought is not fully absorbed by the facts and the facts are not fully absorbed by thought, but, on the other hand, thought itself, as logical thought, does not actually permit anything except an attempt to reconcile the two" (pg. 102)
  - "**Capitalism is not simple at all; capitalism is something extremely complicated and extremely complex**, and anyone who thinks they can reduce it to its simplest and most coherent concepts for the sake of a method, and understand the world from that perspective, is actually falsifying the real state of things for the sake of a structure of representation, for the sake of didacticism, for the sake of doctrine" (pg. 103)
    - "Marx's procedure...proceeds from a relatively basic and relatively simple analysis, namely an analysis of the exchange relationship, and tries to elaborate not only the totality of economy from this analysis but even the totality of the social context, which also means power structures" (pg. 103-104)
      - "My former teacher Grossmann described the Marxian method, and I think he was quite accurate in philological terms, as a method of progressive differentiation or progressive self-correction, and this has the exact meaning that ultimately the categories of circulating capital, the circulation process and the overall process of capital also feed back into the categories of capital production, into the capitalist production process" (pg. 104)
        - ◆ "... in Marx, we certainly also find this aspect that one cannot deduce the entire world from exchange, as with some naïve scientific method" (pg. 104)
  - "...the concept of methodology we have treated here, as it generally manifests itself today, is turned on its head in the sense that it actually no longer reaches the things themselves" (pg. 105)
  - "there is something like a unity between a thinking that is methodical and controlled by logic and that other aspect which, on its subjective side, I have characterized as the spontaneous idea, and which one might perhaps better refer to in its objective quality as the abruptly emergent contentual component of insight" (pg. 99-100)
  - Lecture 13 (pg. 108)
    - "It may have amazed some of you that I keep harping on about **this difference between method for its own sake**, or as a primarily methodologically oriented way of thinking about society, **and an approach that corrects the method based on reflection about the matter**" (pg. 108)
      - "the point on which I was so fixated, if I am not mistaken, is truly at the heart of the entire current socio-theoretical controversy" (pg. 109)
        - "This issue, with the so-called flawless, foolproof method on the one hand, where the concept of science becomes an end in itself, and on the other hand the attempt to grasp the matter even if that matter, because it is internally contradictory, eludes any contradiction-free logic and any total context of foundation – that is essentially what the whole dispute is about between positivist thinking, in the broadest sense, in social science, on the one hand, and on the other hand those sociological positions which God knows you will find represented here in Frankfurt by our sociologists and philosophers" (pg. 108)
    - "I would almost hazard the paradox that it is the task, not only the task of professors, but also your own task in particular, if you are to work critically on yourselves, as they say, to acquire naïveté" (pg. 109)
      - "what I call scientific fetishism, that is, the predominance of a method that has been declared valuable in its own right and cultivated accordingly, is so immense that naïveté, in the sense I mean here, is actually what people find most difficult, and that this is what they actually need to acquire first" (pg. 109)
        - "from the outset, as if under a spell – the spell of science as organized in the university – [people] forbid themselves to have any unregulated idea, and especially any direct view of the matter" (pg. 109)

- "one would think that a concentration on method would lead to a constant sharpening and intensification of awareness towards undisciplined thinking, that the mental capacity, by becoming specialized, by training as an independent skill, grows stronger in a similar way to particular muscles" (pg. 110)
  - "These thought processes thus take on something mechanical, with the ultimate result that the connection to the matter itself, which is devalued by the primacy of the method, is increasingly truly lost. So it is already the case that concentration on more and more polished and more and more cunning methods, if I might put it like that, leads to the point where a kind of stultifying process sets in" (pg. 110)
    - "**this concentration on the method truly leads to an inability to understand the matter itself**, and this, ladies and gentlemen, even becomes an ideology in the dominant positivist mindset, that proud ideology which, as soon as it encounters an intellectual construct guided primarily by the matter itself, declares with a more or less heavy shrug of the shoulders, 'Well, I don't understand that'" (pg. 110-111)
      - ◆ "...there is a precise correlation between material-collecting on the one hand and the cult of methodology on the other. This means that, wherever method becomes an end in itself and something more or less formal [...], as a kind of corrective or to assuage its guilty conscience, it has a tendency to accumulate the greatest possible amount of material and then attempt to place this back inside its famous casing" (pg. 111)
- "this exact aspect of **instrumentalizing reason**, that is, of **separating the method from the matter and from dialectic too, is very much a social phenomenon, deeply interwoven with the bourgeois spirit...**" (pg. 111-112)
  - "It seems to be a universal law of bourgeois society as such...that there develops something like a predominance of the means over the ends. And **this general predominance of the means over the ends then became what one can observe today as a fetishism, if not a religion of science.**" (pg. 112)
- "this instrumental mindset, this united front of material accumulation and methodology, has led to something like a general defamation of spirit in science as such, and I think it is important for you, in your academic training, to be aware of this education-sociological or knowledge-sociological fact of the defamation of spirit" (pg. 112)
  - "do not, for heaven's sake, confuse the fact that the concept of spirit, which I have now tried to contrast with the concept of method, meaning a purely formal cleverness, as well as with the blind material – do not think that I am confusing this concept of spirit with an idling of the thought mechanism within itself, which then satisfies itself via itself, as it were" (pg. 113)
  - "**spirit is what attempts to overcome the separation of the thought as a means and the matter as the material to be worked on by this means, through a form of constant self-examination with reference to the material...**" (pg. 113)
    - "nothing is more beneficial to spirit than for it to surrender to the material as a blind, intentionless material, not one that is already prepared, classified and mutilated to suit what is cultural and strong. **Spirit is realized in the material, not in the mere contemplation it finds within itself.**" (pg. 113)
      - ◆ "[Walter] Benjamin once told me...how much stupidity is required to think a decent thought..." (pg. 113)
    - "**when I spoke earlier of naïveté, I did not simply mean that one comes up with an idea about the material...but that one really surrenders to it exactly as one finds it**" (pg. 113)
      - ◆ "if one has lost the ability to surrender blindly and unguardedly to the material, this is no better than, on the other hand, embracing an empty and abstract methodology, and I would argue that the two behaviours are in fact virtually the same" (pg. 113-114)
        - ◇ "for the solid, very solid majority stands against what you have heard here, and engaging with these ideas can only possibly be fruitful for you if you are also fully aware, from the outset, of their powerlessness in the reality we inhabit and the almost desperate isolation that awaits you if you pursue such ideas seriously." (pg. 114)
    - "there are unquestionably also subjective reasons for the specific scientific fetishism of today, by which I mean reasons that also point back to the social element, namely **the ego weakness of individual people**" (pg. 115)
      - "...ego weakness among individuals, whose real powerlessness in society makes it increasingly hard for them to believe (intellectually too) that they can get by on their own, under their own steam, autonomously. **This is based on the excessive need for security** that people have in general." (pg. 115)
        - ◆ "Good that can be taken for granted and follows automatically, as it were, is something we have every reason to view with great suspicion. It is quite simply **a withering of the aspect of play**, of genuine experimentation in thought, which is only one aspect, but **destroys truth itself if it is entirely absent**" (pg. 115)
- "Today the situation in intellectual matters is the same as what we are confronted with everywhere in social and political reality, namely that what causes people the most difficulty is the very thing which one would initially think is the primary concern, the one their entire needs revolve around: freedom" (pg. 116)
  - 'I would say that a thinking which is essentially and primarily method-oriented is actually, I am exaggerating again, an employee mentality...' (pg. 116)
    - "**...it is a thinking where one no longer really has the confidence to think**" (pg. 116)
      - ◆ "So the reason for this need for security, and thus for scientific fetishism, is the insecurity of the individual subjects, the uncertainty of us all, in so far as we – rightly – view ourselves as social objects" (pg. 116)
- Notes on Lecture 14 (pg. 117)
  - "Systems regress to what they were before philosophical dialectics, to mere modes of representation that organize their material from without, making systems of little compartments without understanding the matter itself – which would be possible only if the categories unlocked the phenomena themselves. A twofold deformation results: that of classification and the arbitrariness of instrumental categories that fulfil only practical requirements for organizing material. In addition, the means-to-end relation in philosophy falls apart; the end, namely to understand the matter itself, is driven out of theory. The system becomes a contradiction of its own idea; it pushes administrative schemata and procedural rules into the foreground. The systematics of smooth subsumption already prevents thought itself; it matches the demands of the administered world. The concept of system becomes an empiricist image of reality in which everything stems from an organizational form comprising arbitrary concepts...The unity of subject and object is attained, an identity from which objectivity, the attempt to define the matter itself, is spirited away. Such identity is the opposite of a system and a world in which subject and object would be genuinely identical" (pg. 120-121)
    - "Instead, one should call for an understanding type of systematic standard. The essence must be the focus. It is not tied to seamless unity, as the system once claimed. One can distinguish between essence and appearance, even if one is not keeping to an abstractly superordinate schema. On the other hand, one must hold on to an emphatic concept that is not limited to the classification of the facts it covers but, rather, has an element of independence." (pg. 121)
- Notes on Lecture 15 (pg. 122)
  - "The necessity of the intuitive idea, of spontaneity and unregulated experience as a precondition of social-scientific behaviour: **a true artist, for example, can command their ideas out of the necessity of observing something they face, calling them forth out of an awareness of the problem**" (pg. 122)

- "The danger with a spontaneous idea, as opposed to stubborn methodology, is 'thinking up' something simply to be different, without any element of necessity coming from the matter itself" (pg. 122)
  - "Productive thought requires a subjective element that cannot be eliminated from science" (pg. 122)
  - "One must reflect on this reification in order to come closer to the objects. **In reified consciousness, truth appears only as a residual category:** whatever remains after deduction of the subjective production costs" (pg. 123)
  - "To be realistic today means to recognize the state of actual conditions as a product of manipulated power relations and to hold on to the idea of a better society. By comparison, the so-called realists are unrealistic. The mechanism that reifies consciousness has expanded so far that most people have fallen under the spell of the ruling apparatus and their immediacy has been cut off. The majority of people are mutilated. It is not possible for all people simply to gain insight; consciousness would have to be changed first. Subjectivity is not an ingredient, an ornament or a sauce that one adds to objectivity to make for a tastier write-up. The subjectivity which the matter requires in order to reveal itself must be extinguished in the matter. The ideal of insight is this extinguishing, but it cannot be gained by the trickery of making subjectivity eliminate itself from the start. 'There must be correct customs for everything' – but insight begins where there are no customs, where one finds oneself in the unknown, unprotected, without the stronger battalion behind one. **Subjectivity is not itself objectivity, nor can objectivity disappear in subjectivity.** Perhaps objectivity takes precedence, but, just as there is nothing subjective that is not mediated, there is likewise nothing objective that is not mediated. This is the truth in idealism" (pg. 124)
- Notes on Lecture 16 (pg. 125)
  - See text.
- Lecture 17 (pg. 130)
  - "...society does not even live up to the notion of rationality in question" (pg. 130)
    - "...the overall constitution of society, the purpose of human coexistence, remains largely irrational and at the mercy of a blind interplay of forces." (pg. 130)
  - "What lies behind these terms ['administration', 'bureaucracy' or 'management'] are not so-called purely sociological categories, that is, ones which refer to the form of interpersonal relationships; rather, they consistently express power relations, power relations that are still – and consider this the decisive point for a theory of society today – based on control over material production" (pg. 131)
    - "...this entanglement of social content and administrative rationality as a form is now acting as an ideology for the fact that people really consider this administrative form the decisive thing, with the implication that, whenever a rational planning of society and organization stands in opposition to an anarchy of commodity production, such power relations must be reproduced there; but this is a false assumption, for these forms take on that disastrous social meaning only because they already constitute themselves within the concrete differences of power to control the means of production. So the identity of bureaucracy and power does apply empirically..." (pg. 131)
  - "**The central antagonisms**, which continue to be located within the structure of society and not in the sphere of so-called politics, and which consequently appear in internal political tensions, **are ideologically foisted off on foreign-policy conflicts**" (pg. 133)
  - "...the reality in which we live, this antagonistic reality that is forced upon us, shows a tendency to become an ideology of its own" (pg. 134)
    - "People see fulfilment, reality itself, in things that are mere substitutes, substitutes imposed on them by profit interests. And their so-called realism is an ideology, in the sense that their behaviour reproduces this behaviour which is forced on them...They participate in what is forced on them, they submit unconsciously to the ruling apparatus, and they consider themselves realistic because the context of delusion connecting them with what exists has become so complete that there is no longer any daylight between the false reality and their false consciousness." (pg. 134-135)
      - "Because all these sectors are seamlessly interlocked, and also substantially connected by unity of ownership and administration, the result is that seamless social façade which gives people the illusion that the airtight semblance in which they are operating is actually semblance-free reality." (pg. 135)
  - "**The less ideology stands out, the more directly it becomes the objective spirit under which we are living**" (pg. 137)
    - "the 'reified consciousness'...[is] a consciousness which obeys the technological veil and unthinkingly speaks exactly the language that is imposed on it, and which moulds it according to its own thought structure" (pg. 137)
      - "**What I mean by reified consciousness...is a consciousness that is really incapable of having any experiences at all, because this objectification of what should be living relationships stands between it and its objects like a layer of armour.** Being incapable of experience, it is atomistic, isolated, incapable of remembrance, gratitude or contemplation. As an acceptance of the façade it is uncritical, a peculiar second naïveté that is splendidly compatible with the jadedness of the so-called sceptical generation. It is a consciousness that adapts to the increasing reification of the world through the fact that, in this reification of consciousness, people act on the need both to turn themselves into things as far as possible and really to be dead simply in order to survive" (pg. 137-138)
      - "while the world is increasingly hardening, ideology becomes increasingly thin because it is a mere duplication of the existent; although it becomes unresponsive, being fashioned from an almost impenetrable material, it has also become so thin that it can now barely serve its traditional function, namely that of concealment. Because humans have succeeded so completely in adjusting to the violence inflicted on them, it is now the soft spot; and it is therefore no coincidence, I would say, in the sense of historico-philosophical innervation, that so much critique today concentrates precisely on a critique of consciousness and ideology" (pg. 138)
- d. Further Readings:
  - The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, by M. Weber <https://gpde.direito.ufmg.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/MAX-WEBER.pdf>