Relationality: From Attachment to Intersubjectivity, by S. Mitchell

a. <u>People / Organizations</u>:
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b. <u>Quotes</u>:
  - "Language…is the house of Being. Man dwells in this house" - Heidegger (in J. Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, pg. 127) (pg. 12)
    - "Heidegger regarded modern, technologically based living as shallow and empty…Loewald similarly regarded contemporary, conventional life as shallow and empty" - Author (pg. 12)
  - "**There is a sense of enchantment in early experience, and an inevitable disenchantment accompanies the child's growing adaptation to the consensual world of objective reality**. Loewald argued repeatedly that it is a fateful error, which has become a cultural norm, to equate the world of objectivity with the true, sole reality" (pg. 23)
    - "Health for Loewald is a state in which fantasy enchants objectivity, and the past enriches the present" (pg. 24)
      - "we lose the power to endow the external world with our dreams and so lose our sense of its significance" - Marion Milner, *On Not Being Able to Paint,* pg. 27 (pg. 24)
  - "Loewald's understanding of 'objects' is quite different from all these accounts. For Loewald, **experience begins in an undifferentiated state; there are no objects, no drives, no self, no others, no now, no then, no external, no internal.** Everything is experienced in terms of what Loewald calls a 'primal density'. All the distinctions and boundaries with which we are familiar are superimposed upon this primal density" - Author (pg. 39)
  - "analytic work often gets bogged down in speculative interpretations of what things mean…" - Author (pg. 61)
  - "**All psychoanalytic theories depict individuals as seeking objects.** The question is, What are they seeking objects for? For Freud, objects are sought for sexual and aggressive discharge. For Sullivan, objects are sought for the satisfaction of various integrating tendencies. In itself, as Greenberg reads it, object-seeking means nothing; it is an empty slogan, restating the obvious and making none of the specific motivational claims that make a theory interesting and useful, with all the attendant risks. So, why *do* babies and other people seek objects? What exactly makes an object an object? **An object, Greenberg asserts, can only become meaningful, psychologically speaking, because it serves some purpose, provides some sort of gratification, meets some need. Thus, any object relations theory presupposes some basic need that objects are sought to meet**" - Author (pg. 105)
  - "Psychoanalytic authors have been struggling with the central tension between sameness and differentiation…" - Author (pg. 111)
    - "**we need to move toward a more sophisticated way of thinking about the dialectic between union and differentiation, in which they are regarded not as opposites, but as blended together in different forms on different levels**" (pg. 111-112)
      - *cf. D. Carveth, Psychoanalytic Thinking: A Dialectical Critique of Contemporary Theory and Practice*
        https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_5d09e53b85d0468889e9e4410d7836f2.pdf
  - "Guilt can be understood as reflective of the very real and inevitable betrayals generated by conflicting loyalties to multiple significant others and multiple versions of oneself" - Author (pg. 123)
c. <u>General Notes</u>:
  - Chapter 1 - Language and Reality (pg. 3)
    - "Cosmologists tell us that our universe began in a primal density in which all the structures and differentiations we take for granted were collapsed in on one another. The constituents of future atoms and molecules were all there, but they were packed together tightly. Our world, the world as we know it, has evolved into atoms and molecules, stars and galaxies, and planets, animals and people, and spaces, vast spaces. The explosive force that powered all that development into differentiated and bounded entities is called the 'Big Bang'. But perhaps the greatest mystery of modern astronomy is that the extraordinary centrifugal rush into differentiated structures and boundaries and spaces seems to be balanced by an opposite, centripetal force that keeps all those structures from flying apart, that brakes the force of the Big Bang, that connects the seemingly separate and autonomous elements of our universe, and that may eventually draw them all back together again into yet another cataclysmic rebirth. There is something else, 'hidden matter' in the seeming vacancy of all that space, that generates enough gravity to tie together even galaxies rushing apart across mind-numbing distances into a single force field" (pg. 3)
      - "perhaps it is not too fanciful to think of psychoanalysts as astronomers and cosmologists of the mind. Patients begin treatment with fragments, pieces of a life that seem bounded and separate from one another: symptoms, current 'reality' problem, memories, dreams, and fantasies" (pg. 3)
    - **"Hans Loewald developed a psychoanalytic vision of the nature and origins of mind, a vision of extraordinary richness and explanatory power"** (pg. 3-4)
      - "<u>We begin</u>, Loewald suggests, <u>with experience in which there is no differentiation between inside and outside, self and other, actuality and fantasy, past and present</u>. All **these dichotomies**, which we come to think of as givens, as basic features of the way the world simply is, are for Loewald complex constructions. They arise **slowly over the course of our early years and operate as an overlay**, a parallel mode of organizing experience that accompanies and coexists with experiences generated by the original, primal unity. That earliest form of experience, Loewald suggests, never disappears. <u>It underlies the later differentiations and bounded structures that make adult life possible</u>. That original and continuing primal density, in Loewald's vision of mind, operates as 'hidden matter', tying together dimensions of experience that only appear to be fully separate, bounded, and dis-connected. In fact, in Loewald's view, psychopathology most broadly conceived represents <u>an imbalance between the centrifugal and centripetal forces of mind</u>. In <u>psychosis</u>, the primal density undermines the capacity to make adaptive, normative distinctions between inside and outside, self and other, actuality and fantasy, past and present. In <u>neurosis</u> or, Loewald occasionally suggests, the normative adaptation to our scientistic, hypertechnologized world, the constituents of mind have drifted too far from their original dense unity: inside and outside become separate, impermeable domains; self and other are experienced in isolation from each other; actuality is disconnected from fantasy; and the past has become remote from a shallow passionless present" (pg. 4)
    - Language (pg. 5)
      - "Loewald understood every dimension of experience as proceeding from the original primal density, any of the major topics Loewald concerned himself with - drives and objects, fantasy and reality, time, memory, and mourning, internalization and sublimation -can be traced back to its entanglements with the others" (pg. 5)
      - "**following Wittgenstein and Ryle, thinking is often discussed as interiorized speech**; following Lacan, many understand the unconscious itself in terms of linguistic structures" (pg. 5)
        - "a divide has opened up between the early months of life, before the child is inducted into the linguistic-semiotic system through which he will become a person, and his later psychological self" (pg. 5)
          - "Freud also made a sharp distinction between the preverbal and verbal realms. Language is associated with secondary process, the reality principle, the "word-presentation," the present-day adult world and is at considerable remove from the "thing-presentation," the preverbal, fantasy-driven workings of primary process. In fact, consciousness itself is linguistically coded. In order for the unconscious, infantile impulse that generates the motive force of a dream to enter awareness, it has to piggyback

onto words provided by the residue of the present day's experience. Thus <u>Freud too saw a gulf between the preverbal and verbal domains</u>" (pg. 7)

- "humanity, Sullivan believes, takes place in interpersonal interaction. For Stern, on the other hand, the richest forms of experience emerge in the preverbal realm, with its densely sensual, cross-model textures" (pg. 7)
- "<u>The key feature of Loewald's understanding of language is his challenge of that separation.</u> For Loewald, language transcends the distinction between preverbal and verbal; **language begins to play an important role in the earliest days of life**. The most important distinction is not between preverbal and verbal, or between primary and secondary process, but between the ways in which language operates in these two developmental eras and levels of mental organization" (pg. 7-8)
  - "Loewald suggests, language is a key feature of an original 'primordial density' in which feelings, perceptions, others, self are all part of a seamless unity" (pg. 8)
  - "<u>Loewald is suggesting that the very distinction between preverbal and verbal developmental epochs is misleading, that there is no preverbal domain per se</u>. Rather, **language is an intrinsic dimension of human experience from birth onward**. The meaningful distinction is between a developmental era when words, as sound, are embedded in a global, dense undifferentiated experience, and a later era, when the semantic features of language have taken precedence over its sensual, affective features. In his retooling of Freud's own language, Loewald characterizes the significant divide as a distinction between language in primary process and language in secondary process" (pg. 8)
- "Perhaps most important for Loewald, the earliest experience of language is deeply embedded and embodied in **the child's <u>undifferentiated union</u> with the mother inside of whom he slowly grows into awareness**. In the beginning, the word, the body, affect, relational connection- these are all indistinguishable components of a unified experience. Gradually, over the first several years of life, language takes on a very, very different quality. The child slowly comes to understand the abstract, semantic significance of words; words have meanings, apart from the immediate sensory, affective context in which they appear. Language takes on an increasingly denotative significance, and language skills entail the ability to use words in a way that anyone, not just mother, can understand, words that have, in Sullivan's terms, a syntaxic, consensual validity. Thus Loewald suggests that, over the course of early development, language comes to function in a secondary-process mode rather than in a primary-process mode, facilitating an adaptive competence in dealing rationally with everyday reality" (pg. 9)
  - "On one hand, if linkage does not become abstracted, sufficiently broadened from its original primary-process context, the child remains entangled in a dysfunctional, incompletely differentiated autistic state. On the other hand, if language has been drawn too completely into secondary-process functions, if the original affective density of language has been almost completely severed, the result is a functionally competent but affectively dead and empty life" (pg. 9)
- "Does language in its adaptive, everyday (secondary-process) form resonate with its earlier sensory, affective, undifferentiated (primary-process) origin, or has a severing split the two realms from each other?" (pg. 9)
  - "Such a delinking becomes definitive of Loewald's reworking of Freud's concept of 'repression', no longer the denial of access to awareness for an impulse, fantasy, or memory, but a severing of developmentally earlier from later forms of experience and psychic organization" (pg. 10)
  - "**It is language that provides that life enriching link between past and present, body and world, fantasy and reality, and language is deeply embedded in its original relational context**" (pg. 10)
    - "The emotional relationship to the person from whom the word is learned plays a significant, in fact, crucial part in how alive the link between thing and word tums out to be" - Loewald (pg. 10)
- "Alongside differentiated, adaptive, secondary-process experience is an earlier primordial organization of experience of dedifferentiation, affective density, and fusion. <u>The key determinant of the quality of experience is the relation between these two realms</u> (sometimes Loewald talks of them as 'levels of organization'). **Repression severs the connections or links between them; language has the capacity to bridge them**. Language, Loewald suggests, 'in its most genuine and autonomous function <u>is a binding power.</u> It ties together human beings and self and object world, and it binds abstract thought with the bodily concreteness and power of life. In the word primary and secondary process are reconciled'" (pg. 11)
- "Loewald studies philosophy with Martin Heidegger for three years in Freiberg before he took up medicine. In many respects, Loewald's life's work might be regarded as a kind of Heideggerian reworking of Freud's basic concepts" (pg. 11-12)
- "The centrality of language in the psychoanalytic experience makes possible a reanimation of psychic life through the excavation and revitalization of words in their original dense, sensory context in the early years of the patient's life" (pg. 12)
- The Language of Psychoanalysis (pg. 12)
  - "Loewald, in contrast, introduced no new terminology of which I am aware. He liked the old words" (pg. 12)
    - "Sullivan…decided that traditional psychoanalytic terminology was of no use, because it carried too much baggage. So, he made up many new words" (pg. 12)
    - "Schafer…decided that the language of classical psychoanalysis was too saturated with misleading and erroneous meanings…" (pg. 13)
  - "Freud's language, the language of drive theory, is the archaic language of psychoanalysis. It contains within itself, and evokes, powerful affective resonances with both the early infantile, bodily experience it was designed to describe and the revolutionary break-throughs of Freud's genius" (pg. 13-14)
  - "[Loewald] noted that poetry (and obscenity) are modes of speaking in which the meanings of the words and the sounds of the words as spoken creates an interplay that generates experiences that are both cognitive and sensory - embodied understandings" (pg. 15)
  - "Traditional classical interpretations were regarded purely in semiotic terms, as a decoding, a translation of the manifest meanings of the patient's associations into latent unconscious meanings. <u>Sullivan, in contrast, regarded the analyst's language in the analytic setting as an investigative tool</u> for getting an increasingly clearer understanding of what actually happened in a particular interpersonal situation. Loewald's concern with regard to language is quite different from both of these approaches. <u>He suggests that we use language not only to convey meanings and to clarify situations, but to evoke states of mind, to generate and link domains of experience</u>" (pg. 15)
- Realities and Fantasy (pg. 17)
  - "<u>The conventional understanding of Freud's view of the relationship between ego and reality</u> (or, in a broader sense, between the individual psyche and reality) <u>is that they are fundamentally at odds with each other</u>. The id demands instant relief from the tensions of its drives; external reality, particularly in the social constraints of civilized life, is a dangerous place to seek instant gratification for sexual and aggressive drives. **Freud suggests that the ego grows like a membrane on the surface of the id because the id and its pleasure principle clash irreconcilably with external reality. Thus the ego serves what is primarily a compromising, defensive function, protecting the mind from a reality separate and inhospitable to it; the ego finds largely surreptitious, disguised gratifications for the id's drives as best it can**. 'This conception of the relationship between ego and reality', Loewald suggests, 'presupposes a fundamental antagonism that has to be bridged or overcome otherwise in order to make life in this reality possible'" (pg. 18)
    - "<u>Freud's vision of mind</u> and the relationship between instinctual fantasy and perceptions of reality <u>is sharply hierarchical</u>. Fantasy is a lower form of psychic organization, closer to primary process, and subjectivity is saturated with fantasy-based wishes. Accurate

perceptions of reality are associated with a higher form of psychic organization, the secondary process; objectivity, of which Freud's beloved science is the apogee, has been decontaminated of fantasy-based wishes. There is in this hierarchical ordering (an analogue of the verbal-preverbal distinction explored in the previous section) an embedded Darwinian metaphor. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny; **the individual psyche begins with lower life forms (the id) and, mirroring the evolution of species, generates higher life forms (the ego and the superego)**. Of course, Freud emphasizes repeatedly that human beings cannot simply cut themselves off (through repression) from their primitive motivational underpinnings without the inevitability of neurotic symptoms signaling the 'return of the repressed'. This is why sublimation, for those blessed with the constitutional talent for it, is such a gift, making possible the gratification of aim-inhibited versions of lower motivations within higher pursuits. The Freudian ego psychology of Loewald's days extended this hierarchicalization of value by adding the concept of drive "neutralization," through which lower sexual and aggressive drives could be cleansed of their instinctual qualities by the ego, which would then use their now decontaminated energies for higher ego functions" (pg. 18-19)

- ◆ "But Loewald suggests there is a second thread, a subtext to Freud's theorizing on these issues, in which **ego and reality are not two clashing realms but rather, in the beginning, an original unity**" (pg. 19)
    - ◊ "the relatedness between ego and reality, or objects, does not develop from an originally unrelated coexistence of two separate entities that come into contact with each other, but on the contrary form a unitary whole that differentiates into distinct parts. **Mother and baby do not get together and develop a relationship, but the baby is born, becomes detached from the mother,** and thus a relatedness between two parts that originally were one becomes possible" - Loewald, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, pg. 11 (pg. 19)
- ▪ "Loewald goes on to suggest not only that there is a developmentally early phase of unity between mother and baby (similar to Mahler's notion of a symbiotic phase), but that there is a mode of organizing experience that continues throughout life and in which later distinctions between self and other, internal and external, fantasy and perception are dissolved. It is crucial to grasp that **Loewald did not regard the experience of undifferentiation as illusory or less 'real'. It is just as real as the differentiating distinctions essential to living adaptively in conventional reality. These are not just developmental phases; they are coterminous modes of experience**" (pg. 19)
- ▪ "Winnicott throughout grants greater epistemological and ontological status to conventional reality. The good-enough mother does not challenge the illusory status the child grants to the transitional object. **The good-enough mother meets the child's 'spontaneous gesture', making possible the 'moment of illusion' in which the child believes she has created the breast herself.** Not so, Loewald argues; there is no illusion whatsoever. Winnicott characterizes experiences in these moments as illusions, unreal in reference to an objective, conventional reality in which he himself is anchored. Both children and patients need these illusions to grow with a sense of security (and artists also need these illusions to give free reign to their creativity), but, for Winnicott, they are illusions nonetheless. For Loewald, and this was very important to his whole vision of mind and experience, they are not" (pg. 20)
    - □ "At another point, Loewald challenged Winnicott's claim that the transitional realm, the 'intermediate area', takes place *between* inner and outer reality, which Winnicott designated as the province of illusion. 'But it is the separation into outer and inner reality', Loewald points out, 'that makes for the possibility of "reality" and "illusion". Prior to sorting out inner and outer reality there is no 'room' for an intermediate third area, no space in which to distinguish or oppose illusion and reality'" (pg. 20)
        - ◆ "there are two closely related but distinct concepts that Loewald is illustrating here. First, minds are very closely and complexly interrelated" (pg. 20)
        - ◆ "But Loewald is also making another, even more provocative point. In the baby's experience, and perhaps in some mothers' as well, **there is no differentiation between the cry and the response, the mouth and the breast. The nursing experience is one in which self and other are not clearly differentiated**. This is difficult to grasp as anything but an illusion, as unreal, because we are so accustomed to thinking of our everyday differentiation of self from other, internal from external, as the sole, incontrovertable reality" (pg. 21)
- ▪ "something outside of us has been stored inside of us" (pg. 22)
    - □ "Analytic theorists have come up with a wide array of terms to account precisely for this phenomena: **internalization, internal objects, introjection, incorporation, identification,** and so on. These terms are often clinically useful, accompanying explanations for the ways in which external becomes internal, the ways in what was done to people, or in the presence of people, become part of the person himself" (pg. 22)
        - ◆ "It seems much more persuasive to assume that such early experiences are not stored as images of a clearly delineated external other, but as kinaesthetic memories of experiences in which self and other are undifferentiated…It may be that many intense emotional experiences, not just in infancy but in later life as well, are organized not only in terms of secondary process, in which internal and external, self and other are clearly delineated, but also in terms of a primary process in which the participants are experienced as cocreating each other" (pg. 22)
            - ◊ "Recent depictions of the analytic situation in terms of the reciprocal cocreation of the analysand and analyst in the transference and the countertransference are describing precisely such a process. In Ogden's depiction of the 'analytic third', for example, there is no way to cleanly separate what the analyst and the analysand are each bringing to the interaction, because **each requires the emotional participation of the other** (although through different roles) **in order to become actualized in the analytic context**" (pg. 22-23)
- ▪ "[Melanie] Klein believed that the infant has elaborate introjective and projective phantasies of movements of substances and body parts back and forth across the boundary between inside and outside" (pg. 23)
    - □ "So when I find myself speaking in irritation to my daughter in precisely the words with which my father spoke to me, I am identifying a paternal introject that was established inside me for purposes of omnipotent control. In Loewald's vision, by way of contrast, my father's irritated words were not taken *into* me, they *are* me. I could probably tell you what was my father and what was me on a multiple-choice test designed to evaluate secondary process thought. Yet, **in those affectively laden moments when they originally happened and when they reappear decades later, the irritating child and the irritated parent are, on a primary process level, parts of a singular, undifferentiated experience**. Thus, one could use Loewald's suggestions on these issues to redefine the phantasies constituting Klein's 'internal object world' as not at all illusory and unreal, but as tapping into a developmental phase and an ongoing mode of experience in which the customary distinctions between internal and external, self and other, simply do not apply" (pg. 23)
- ▪ "In early childhood, Loewald suggested, fantasy and reality are not experienced as antithetical to, or even separable from, each other. Rather, they interpenetrate each other. **There is a sense of enchantment in early experience, and an inevitable disenchantment accompanies the child's growing adaptation to the consensual world of objective reality**. Loewald argued repeatedly that it is a fateful error, which has become a cultural norm, to equate the world of objectivity with the true, sole reality" (pg. 23)
    - □ "For Loewald, in contrast, an adult reality that has been wholly separated from infantile fantasy is a dessicated, meaningless, passionless world. The traditional Freudian ego psychology of Loewald's day regarded the progressive neutralization of drives and the triumph of the reality principle over the pleasure principle as the acme of mental health. Loewald regarded such a state as a culturally valued, normative pathology. **Health for Loewald is a state in which fantasy enchants objectivity, and the past enriches the**

present" (pg. 24)
            - ◆ "we lose the power to endow the external world with our dreams and so lose our sense of its significance" - Marion Milner, On Not Being Able to Paint, pg. 27) (pg. 24)
        - ☐ "Loewald…detailed the difference between a present that is haunted by the past and a present that is enriched by the past" (pg. 24)
            - ◆ **"in the neurotic, the past has been improperly buried"** (pg. 24)
    - ▪ "For Freud, transference operated as a resistance to the 'memory work' that was the heart of psychoanalysis, the sorting out and decontamination of the past from the present. <u>For Loewald, transference serves as a revitalization, a relinking of the past and the present, fantasy and reality, primary process and secondary process.</u> In Loewald's vision, the fantasy-saturated primary process of the unconscious and the secondary process of everyday reality need each other. 'The unconscious needs present-day external reality (objects) and present-day psychic reality (the preconscious) for its own continuity, lest it be condemned to live the shadow life of ghosts or to destroy life'. On the other hand, consciousness and its contemporary objects need links to the affective density of the unconscious, without which 'human life becomes sterile and an empty shell'. 'Our present, current experiences', Loewald suggests, 'have intensity and depth to the extent to which they are in communication (interplay) with the unconscious, infantile, experiences representing the indestructible matrix of all subsequent experiences'. In his quiet, undramatic fashion, **Loewald thereby transformed the basic values guiding the analytic process, substituting meaning for rationality, imagination for objectivity, vitalization for control**" (pg. 25)
    - ▪ "Customarily, fantasy and reality are understood as incompatible. Fantasy distorts reality; reality supplants fantasy. Reality testing is conventionally understood to entail an evaluation of ideas for their verdicality: Do they correspond directly to what actually exists? Are they contaminated by the skewing presence of fantasy? For Loewald, it works quite differently. As with other major dichotomies, like primary versus secondary process, internal versus external, and self versus other, <u>the distinction between fantasy and reality is important to adaptive functioning.</u> But separating fantasy and reality is only one way to construct and organize experience. **For life to be meaningful, vital, and robust, fantasy and reality cannot be too divorced from each other**. Fantasy cut adrift from reality becomes irrelevant and threatening. Reality cut adrift from fantasy becomes vapid and empty. **Meaning in human experience is generated in the mutual, dialectically enriching tension between fantasy and reality; each requires the other to come alive**. In the psychic universe of the individual mind, vitality and meaning require open channels between the developmentally earlier, but perpetually regenerated primal density and the clearly demarcated boundaries that make possible adaptive living. **For Loewald, only the enchanted life is a life worth living**" (pg. 29)
  - ▪ Chapter 2 - Drive and Objects (pg. 31)
    - ▪ "if the problems that gripped Loewald were Heideggerian, the conceptual world that he lived in and loved was Freudian" (pg. 31)
        - ☐ "Yet Loewald clearly felt that Freud's theories were not tidy, final explanations, that he had opened up a largely uncharted realm that was left to us to explore. And there were fundamental problems in Freudian theory, problems of being and time, that Loewald was gripped by and felt required attention. Loewald believed that Freud's own grasp of these issues was lacking, inevitably so, because of Freud's place in time and the history of ideas. It was always important to Freud to reaffirm the scientific status of psychoanalysis and the objectivity of his discoveries, and to systematize whatever his flashes of intuition had illuminated by making his metapsychological systems consistent with the biology and physics of his time. So Freud's metapsychology lumbered along, like a wagon train behind a scout, colonizing, according to the fashions of the day, newly opened territory" (pg. 31)
        - ☐ "Loewald reminds us repeatedly that in a genius as fecund as Freud's, there are always multiple meanings, contradictory positions, subtext, unexplored paths" (pg. 32)
    - ▪ "reading Loewald is tricky. The language is Freud's, but the meanings have often been changed, slowly, from one paper to the next" (pg. 32)
  - ○ Drives (pg. 33)
    - ▪ "First, Loewald believed that the central feature of Freud's contribution was his theory of drive- his uncovering of the instinctual, primitive, "lower" sources of human motivation. Second, Loewald believed that there was something fundamentally wrong with the way drive was understood, both by Freud and by mainstream psychoanalysis" (pg. 33)
        - ☐ "Despite the interest he shared in "higher" transformations of the human spirit, it was essential to Loewald never to forget the "lower" sources of motivation that Freud's revolution had uncovered, his unmasking of our intricate hypocrisies, and his revelation of the body-based underbelly of all our activities, the body in its full corporeality, in its surfaces, its parts, its excretions" (pg. 34)
    - ▪ "Freud said many, many different things about drives and instincts and early experience. But throughout, Freud felt that an appreciation of man's biological nature, our Darwinian bedrock, entailed granting the origination of experience to body-based instinctual impulses. The 'source' of drives, as he put it, is in a body part. <u>Drives emerge from the body and make a demand on the mind for work</u>. The locus of activity begins within the individual and pushes outward toward the world. <u>The id predates the ego, which grows like a membrane on its surface to shelter the id from externality and to mediate its interface with the outside world. The center of the individual, despite our thorough socialization over the course of development, is in the id</u>. 'The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure id, which has no direct communication with the external world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only through the medium of another agency' (Freud, 1940, p. 197). **Life for Freud is generated through the clash between the id and the external world**, and it is precisely because of that fundamental incompatibility that the id itself never directly meets the external, interpersonal world" (pg. 34-35)
        - ☐ "Despite its explanatory power and appeal, there was, for Loewald, something fundamentally wrong with this vision. Perhaps the central feature of Loewald's revisions of Freudian theory is his shifting the locus of experience, the point of origination, from the individual to the field within which the individual comes into consciousness, and this has been making its way into contemporary Freudian thought. In the beginning, Loewald says over and over, is not the impulse in…the field in which all individuals are embedded. **Experience does not proceed, as Freud believed, from inside outward, from the id's impulse, through the ego, into negotiation with the outside world. Experience initially moves from outside inward, from an increasingly differentiated unity of which the individual is a part to the development of the individual through an internalization of those external patterns**" (pg. 35)
    - ▪ "Freud responded by suggesting [in *Civilization and Its Discontents*] that life begins in an experience of boundarylessness: 'originally the ego includes everything', Freud states, 'later it separates off an external world from itself'" (pg. 35)
        - ☐ "If the ego arises on the surface of the id to mediate between the id and the external world, it is hard to imagine how the ego in the beginning could also include the external world. This is one of those points at which the richness of Freud's imagination exceeded his efforts at theoretical integration" (pg. 36)
            - ◆ "If experience begins in a boundaryless unity, Loewald reasoned, mind, at its fundamental levels, cannot be composed of body-based impulses emerging from the individual and clashing with the external world. The very experience of being an individual mind and an individual body distinct from other minds and bodies- all this is a secondary development, a reorganization" (pg. 36)
                - ◇ "In Loewald's view, Freud began to shift from his earlier energic-discharge notion of drive to a relational notion of drive in 1920 with the introduction of the concept of Eros in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'. This shift, however, was never complete, and Freud's relational model of drives remained a secondary, largely undeveloped avenue" (pg. 36)
                - ◇ "in Freud's drive model, the term 'cathexis' refers to an investment of energy. In Loewald's relational drive model, cathexis refers to organizing activity" (pg. 37)

- "Loewald…suggest[s] that **objects, in a psychological sense, do not exist independently of the subject. Objects are created by being invested with significance through organizational activity** out of the 'primary density' or primary process" (pg. 38)
  - "In object cathexis, one is drawing a boundary around a piece of experience, differentiating something out, and saying, 'This is you'. In narcissistic or identificatory cathexis, one is drawing a boundary around a piece of experience, differentiating something out, and saying, 'This is me'" (pg. 38)
    - *this is very similar to Sartre's 'presence through external negation' - cf. J. Salvan, To Be and Not To Be, pg. 51 - ""the 'this' always appears on a background, i.e., on a undifferentiated totality of being negated by consciousness…The 'this' stands out from its background because it is isolated by external negation, as not being the background"* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_31b9646d1d3441328208eecd9b81d0d2.pdf
  - "It should be apparent that through all these redefinitions the very sense of "drives" has been radically transformed. The id, the repository of drives, is no longer understood as the initiator of motivation and, as Freud put it repeatedly, cut off from the external world; for Loewald, the id and the drives are relational patterns through which experience is organized" (pg. 38)
    - "Loewald suggests that far from being a hedge against social forces pulling for adaptation, the id is itself created through mutually adaptive interactive processes. Like the remains of a buried city, the fragments may be unrelated to current social reality. But those fragments were hardly pushed up from the center of the earth. Like primary process, they are residues of a once richly interactive social life" (pg. 38)
- Object and Object-Relating (pg. 39)
  - "What is an object? For Freud, objects are other persons, or body parts, or things that have been discovered to be useful in reducing the tension of drives. For Klein, objects are a kind of teleological image wired into drives themselves, like Jungian a priori archetypes toward which desire is inherently directed, which then become psychically intermingled with real others and parts of others in the external world. For Fairbairn, reversing Klein, objects begin as real others in the external world toward which 'object-seeking' libido is directed, which may defensively and compensatorily become transformed into internal presences. In all these accounts, objects exist as either real external entities or prewired properties of experience" (pg. 39)
  - "Loewald's understanding of 'objects' is quite different from all these accounts. **For Loewald, experience begins in an undifferentiated state; there are no objects, no drives, no self, no others, no now, no then, no external, no internal**. Everything is experienced in terms of what Loewald calls a 'primal density'. All the distinctions and boundaries with which we are familiar are superimposed upon this primal density" (pg. 39)
    - "For Loewald, we *are* our objects, and our objects are us. The distinction between drives and objects is a developmentally later, secondary process superimposition upon the primal density in which self and other are not yet sorted out" (pg. 40)
      - "Objects are not givens. On the contrary, **a highly complex course of psychic development is required for environmental and body-surface stimuli to become organized and experienced as external, in contrast to internal**, and for such sources of stimulation, gratification, and frustration eventually to become objects" - Loewald, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, pg. 127 (pg. 40)
  - "We are all fundamentally conflicted about all the major issues of life: seeking versus regulating pleasure; expressing versus restraining aggression; spending versus conserving money; rededicating versus reopening commitments, and so on. We all contain intense feelings on both sides of all these issues" (pg. 40)
    - "Each [individual] creates his own subjectivity and creates his objects by superimposing on the rich, affective, conflictual density of experience a simplifying scheme, through sorting out and assigning different qualities to different participants. It is just this sort of layering process, Loewald is suggesting, through which secondary process is generated out of primary process" (pg. 41)
  - "In virtually all other psychoanalytic theory, **internalizations, projections, and identifications are discrete acts, generally understood as ego defenses.** The paradigm for this understanding was Freud's formula that identification follows abandoned object cathexes - identification and internalization are defenses against the pain of loss" (pg. 41)
    - "What is distinctive about Loewald's approach is that objects are not sought, or found, or taken inside, or expelled. In the beginning, there is no outside or inside. **We are one with our objects; objects and self emerge out of the material of dense, affectively laden experience**" (pg. 41)
      - "Picture yourself waking up in a room adjacent to various other rooms with other people and things. You go into one of those and bring that person back into your room, thereby "internalizing" him, or bring some things that were in other rooms back into yours, thereby 'internalizing' those properties that you now can claim as yours. This is the traditional model of objects and internalization. Now picture yourself in a large space with several other people and many things all jumbled together. No distinctions exist; everything is yours; there is only yours. Let's call this state of affairs 'primary process'. Later, you start creating boundaries and borders around some of the other people and things. Some you put in rooms of their own, separate from you. Others you keep in your space. Others are in in-between spaces with two-foot-high room dividers. Let's call this more complexly differentiated state 'secondary process'. Finally, let us assume that these room dividers are made of some sort of translucent material, so they are both there and not there; they can be felt in some sense modalities but also disappear in others. This is Loewald's model" (pg. 41-42)
        - *Internalization is an 'extension outward (i.e., reaching beyond yourself), clasping 'that there', drawing inward toward yourself'.*
      - "For Loewald, **internal objects and identifications begin as you; their sense of otherness is a product of secondary process differentiations and sorting. But primary process is operative not just in the earliest months of life; it is an ongoing organization of experience**" (pg. 42)
        - "Primary process, in its undifferentiated unity, operates as a level of organization, simultaneous and parallel to the secondary process that dominates our consciousness with its differentiated objects. 'It is this interplay between unconscious and consciousness', Loewald suggests, 'between past and present, between the intense density of undifferentiated, inarticulate experience and the lucidity of conscious articulate experience, that gives meaning to our life'" (pg. 42)
      - "In the traditional model, internal objects and identifications were created when you moved objects and things from other rooms into yours, and projections were created when you moved things from your room into others. **In Loewald's model, there was no moving around, only different patterns of organization. Self and other are created by selectively drawing boundaries around some features of experience and excluding others. The experience of self is generated in the identificatory process of creating internality; the experience of otherness is generated in the projective process of creating externality. Of course, this analogy can take us only so far**. The imaginary rooms are about the relationship between mine and not-mine. Psychoanalytic models of the psyche are about the relationship between me and not-me." (pg. 42)
  - "Thus, for Loewald, **the distinctions between self and other, internal and external, are psychological constructions**. The *inter*personal and the *inter*subjective are secondary constructions, developmental achievements, generated out of an underlying, undifferentiated psychic field, in which there are no persons and no subjects. And *internal* object are also secondary constructions. The 'other in oneself' as Loewald puts it, is 'only the end product of a complex differentiating - from another viewpoint, self-alienating - process that takes its start in the

primary unity of the infant-mother psychic matrix'" (pg. 42-43)
- □ "Mind for Loewald (1965) is like a viscous psychic medium, within which relational configurations, interactions with others, are suspended and continually assimilated into the self and alienated from the self. 'Internalization. is conceived as the basic way of functioning of the psyche, not as one of its functions'. Internalization (like sublimation in Loewald's later writings) is sharply contrasted with defensive processes. 'In internalization, in contrast (to repression, the ego opens itself up, loosens its current organization to allow for its own further growth'" (pg. 43)
- □ "On higher levels of organization, objects have a vivid sense of otherness, of externality. On more primary levels of organization, the divisions are thin and permeable. Over time, externality may dissolve altogether as object libido becomes narcissistic libido and others become self. Significant interactions with early caretakers transcend the dividers between internal-external, now and then. Thus, for Loewald, the distinctions between internal and external, self and other are not objective features of the way the world is, but constructions on a gradient of possible constructions. Objects, or rather our interactive experiences with objects, take on varying degrees of internalization and externalization" (pg. 43)
- ▪ "Loewald envisions mind as a latticework of interactive identifications, simultaneously in different degrees of assimilation on different levels, with a sense of self on one side and a sense of externality on the other" (pg. 44)
  - □ "Loewald's theory of object formation solves what for me was always one of the most interesting unsolved problems in psychoanalytic theorizing. Why are the residues of early object relations so persistent and resistant to change? It is just this feature of human psychology that makes our work so difficult, that necessitates such long stretches of time. Freud could describe it, but he couldn't really explain it. His metapsychological pleasure principle claims that we seek pleasure and avoid pain. Yet, **the durability of early traumatic experiences and relationships is probably the most widespread psychological cause of human suffering**. Polymorphously perverse libido, in all its plasticity, should be able to discard painful objects and find new ones. Yet the depth of our loyalty to painful early objects (which was the clinical basis for Fairbairn's redefinition of libido as not primarily pleasure-seeking but as object-seeking), which we encounter over and over in analysis and life in general, is staggering. Freud attributed this phenomenon to what he termed the 'adhesiveness' of the libido, but threw up his hands at a compelling explanation by attributing it to a mysterious Death Instinct. And Meltzer (1975) used this same word, which I have always found so experientially vivid, in describing 'adhesive identifications' in autistic states. What is so marvelous about Loewald's theory is that it dramatically reframes the whole problem. Primary identifications are so adhesive because there is a boundary between me and my objects only on a conscious, secondary process level of organization; on a primary process level, I am my objects, and my objects and I are always, necessarily, inseparable. They can never be expelled. This suggests that what can happen in psychoanalysis, what does happen, is not renunciation of exorcism of bad objects, but a transformation of them" (pg. 44)
- ○ Time and memory (pg. 45)
  - ▪ "self and objects are related to each other in Loewald's model of mind through interactions, and interactions are related to each other through time" (pg. 45)
  - ▪ "internal object relations, the internalized interactions with others that are the latticework of mind, are bound together in time. Time is the basic fabric of the psyche. And **memory, Loewald suggests, is that psychic activity that traverses those temporal fibers, making links, continually creating channels through which 'interactions with the world continue to reverberate'** in a way that makes self-reflective, personal experience possible. Memory, Loewald suggests, is 'the central, all-pervasive activity of the mind by which our world and our life gain breadth and depth and continuity in flux, and change in continuity, by which, in other words, our life and world acquire dimension and meaning, [making] memory virtually synonymous with mind itself'" (pg. 45)
    - □ *I would suggest that memory is more a 'channel' (i.e., means) rather than a 'place' (i.e., an end in the past).*
  - ▪ "Loewald believed that self-other and internal. external are secondary constructions upon a parallel organization in which self-other, inside-outside are undifferentiated. Similarly, he also believed that our experience of time as duration - past as distinct from present as distinct from future - is a secondary construction upon a parallel organization in which these temporal categories do not exist. It is only as boundaries between self and other are constructed that past and present are also distinguished…Yet, just as with the boundary between self and other, the boundary between present and past exists only on a secondary, not a primary process level. Thus, the present and the past, perception and memory always retain their Siamese relationship with each other, joined on one level and differentiated on another. Perception and memory, Loewald suggests, are bound together, necessarily, in a dialectic of reciprocal influence." (pg. 46)
    - □ "In our customary way of thinking about these things, past, present, am future are discrete categories reflecting the objective passage of time as a succession of moments, one after the other. **For Loewald, feelings of past, present and future are constructions that create a sense of before, now and after**…" (pg. 46)
      - ◆ "they imply each other, and create a subjective sense of connection, a narrative scaffolding for organizing experiences" (pg. 47)
  - ▪ "What we experience as our mind itself is the result of the continual regeneration of the links between past and present. Loewald states that 'interactions with the world continue to reverberate, are reproduced, and thus lay the foundations for the development of an internal world, in the form of memorial processes'. And, **as a true constructivist, Loewald suggests that mind is continually, actively reconstructed through linking.** 'That this linking activity is automatic and unconscious in most of our daily life', Loewald suggests, 'obscures the fact that it is an activity'" (pg. 47)
- ○ The Analytic Process (pg. 47)
  - ▪ "**Loewald views the human psyche in radically interactive terms**. Our minds are open systems embedded in an interactive matrix with other minds, and our sense of self is a function of the internalization and continual reproduction and memorialization of those relationships. **Loewald stresses repeatedly 'the role that interaction with environment plays in the formation, development, and continued integrity of the psychic apparatus'**" (pg. 48)
  - ▪ "Loewald makes it clear that it is the lived reality of the transference-countertransference experience and its interpretive understanding for both participants that makes deep change possible. The analyst's role is not one of 'detached spectatorship'"; Loewald stresses the importance of 'the analyst's capacity and skill of conveying to the patient how he, the analyst, uses his own emotional experience and resources for understanding the patient and for advancing the patient's access to his, the patient's inner resources'" (pg. 49)
- ▪ Chapter 3 - An Interactional Hierarchy (pg. 57)
  - ▪ "The basic features of Loewald's vision of mind are held in common, generally explicitly, sometimes implicitly, by other relational theories: **human minds are interactive phenomena; an individual human mind is an oxymoron; subjectivity always develops in the context of intersubjectivity; we continually process and organize the enormous complexity of ourselves and our world into recurring patterns**" (pg. 57)
    - □ "To say that an 'individual mind' is oxymoronic is to say that no individual human mind can arise *sui generis* and sustain itself totally independent of other minds. This does not belie the fact that individual minds do arise out of and through the internalization of interpersonal fields, and that having emerged in that fashion, individual minds develop what systems theorists call emergent properties and motives of their own" (pg. 57)
      - ◆ "Thus, in an earlier paper (1988) I distinguished between field-regulatory and self-regulatory processes. In the beginning, we might say, is the relational, social, linguistic matrix in which we discover ourselves, or, as Heidegger put it, into which we are

'thrown'. Within that matrix are formed, precipitated out, individual psyches with subjectively experienced interior spaces. Those subjective spaces begin as microcosms of the relational field, in which macrocosmic interpersonal relationships are **internalized and transformed** into a distinctly personal experience; and those personal experiences are, in turn, regulated and transformed, generating newly emergent properties, which in turn create new interpersonal forms that alter macrocosmic patterns of interaction. **Interpersonal relational processes generate intrapsychic relational processes which reshape interpersonal processes reshaping intrapsychic processes,** on and on in an endless Möbius strip in which internal and external are perpetually regenerating and transforming themselves and each other" (pg. 57)

- "our minds organize our experiences according to different principles, varying organizational structures. These organizational schemes emerge sequentially over the course of development, but they also operate simultaneously in adult experience on a continuum from consciousness to unconsciousness. Loewald most often contrasted primary process and secondary process "levels of organization," varying according to degrees of articulation of spatial boundaries between self and other, inside and outside, and temporal boundaries among past, present, and future" (pg. 58)
  - "Like Loewald, Ogden understands these modes as emerging sequentially in early development, but also as operating in dialectical tension with each other throughout the life cycle. One mode is in the conscious foreground of experience at any one time, but the others are also always processing experience in their own terms" (pg. 58)
- "The project of this chapter is to draw on these principles to introduce four different modes or categories for housing and comparing different perspectives on, and accounts of, relationality.' **I will propose four interactional dimensions, four basic modes through which relationality operates**...Mode 1 concerns what people actually *do* with each other - nonreflective, presymbolic behavior, the ways in which relational fields are organized around reciprocal influence and mutual regulation. Mode 2 is shared experience of intense affect across permeable boundaries. Mode 3 is experience organized into self-other configurations. Mode 4 is intersubjectivity, the mutual recognition of self-reflective, agentic persons" (pg. 58)
  - "The relational framework suggested in this chapter is offered as a heuristic device for locating, juxtaposing, and integrating different kinds of explorations of different dimensions of relationality" (pg. 59)
  - Model 1: Nonreflective Behavior (pg. 59)
    - "**People in recurrent relationships coconstruct behavioral patterns of interaction involving reciprocal influence.** In developing his interpersonal theory, Sullivan was particularly interested in this phenome-non: what people actually *do* with each other, who is doing what to whom" (pg. 59)
    - "in this relational methodology, intimate relationships are constructed in a complex choreography of behaviors in which participants cyclically cue and respond to each other in turn" (pg. 60)
      - *an 'in-the-moment' dancing with one-another.
    - "This mode of interaction has been dramatically demonstrated by contemporary infant researchers who have traced the complex gestural, behavioral cueing between mother and infant that comes to regulate the infant's sleep-wakefulness and feeding cycles. **Patterns of reciprocal influence are generally either preconscious** (out of awareness, but subject to being known) **or unconscious** (out of awareness and warded off, hence inaccessible). This organization has generally been characterized as presymbolic (Beebe et al., 1997) or prereflective (Sander, in press), in that actions and interactions function without an organized conceptualization of self and other" (pg. 60)
    - "The richness of recent dynamic systems approaches derives from its exploration of the **dialectics between complexity and unity, differences and continuity, change and recurrence.** In any dynamic system of the sort constituting a parent-child or analyst-analysand dyad there is a continual recurrence of patterning and also continual change. Analytic interpretations often reflect a reductionism that collapses the complex textures of experience to highlight the compulsion in the repetition compulsion" (pg. 61)
  - Mode 2: Affective Permeability (pg. 61)
    - "Affect is contagious, and, on the deepest level, affective states are often transpersonal. Intense affects like anxiety, sexual excitement, rage, depression, and euphoria tend to generate corresponding affects in others. Early in life, and on the deepest unconscious levels throughout life, affects are evoked interpersonally through dense resonances between people, without regard for who, specifically, is feeling what" (pg. 61)
    - "Mode 2 experiences, in which direct affect resonances emerge in interpersonal dyads, have been explored in the recent psychoanalytic literature, in the interpenetrability of transference-counter-transference experiences, in which the analyst's own affects are understood as a window into the deepest, often dissociated affective experiences of the patient" (pg. 62)
  - Model 3: Self-Other Configurations (pg. 62)
    - "Interpersonal experiences are organized into configurations entailing self in relation to others. Sullivan called them 'me-you patterns'; ego psychologists speak of 'self and other representations'; Kernberg's terms are 'self-other-affect configurations'. On this symbolic level of organization, coconstructed interactions are sorted out and tagged, consciously or unconsciously, according to the persons involved. Thus, I am in one sense my mother's son, and in another sense my father's son. In each of these relationships, I have both shaped myself in relation to my parents and internalized a sense of my parents in relation to me" (pg. 62)
    - "Fairbairn's theory of internal object relations played a central, generative role in opening up this approach to interaction; he introduced two invaluable principles that have been extensively developed in the recent literature. First, self-formation and other-object formation are inseparable. Because libido is 'object-seeking', it makes no sense psychologically to think of a self except in relation to an other. And because others become psychically relevant only when invested by the self, it makes no sense to think of objects outside of relationships with versions of the self. The second principle inherent in Fairbairn's vision, which has been made explicit and elaborated in contemporary theorizing with respect to the self, is that **we are multiplicitous, not a single self struggling with warded-off impulses, but discontinuous, multiple self-organizations packaged together by an illusory sense of continuity and coherence** that has both conscious and unconscious features. In contemporary relational theory, these multiplicitous organizations are much more than (cognitive) representations of self; rather, they are each versions, complete functional units with a belief system, affective organization, agentic intentionality, and developmental history" (pg. 63)
    - "In each of these three modes, others are not organized and experienced as independent subjects in their own right. In Mode 1, others participate in recurrent, often stabilizing patterns of interaction that are neither symbolized nor reflected upon; in Mode 2, others participate in affective connections, sometimes making certain kinds of affective experiences possible; in Mode 3, distinct others are symbolized, but play specific functional roles, like mirroring, exciting, satisfying, and so on. Only in Mode 4 are others organized as distinct subjects" (pg. 63)
  - Model 4: Intersubjectivity (pg. 64)
    - "Being fully human (in Western culture) entails being recognized as a *subject* by another human subject. **There is a deep, ongoing tension between our efforts to have our own way, as an expression of our own subjectivity, and our dependence on the other, as a subject in her own right, to grant us the recognition we require.** In Mode 3, experience is sorted out iconically in terms of persons; in Mode 4, the persons, both oneself and others, have become more complex agents, with self-reflective intentionality (thinking about and trying to do things) and dependency (upon other agents for completion)" (pg. 64)
    - "The tradition that has recently come to be known as Relational Psychoanalysis reflects a blending of these diverse currents into a broad,

multidimensional vision of human intersubjectivity. From the interpersonal tradition there came a humanity and a precious emphasis on personal involvement and authenticity that remained undertheorized and lacked both a developmental rationale and a rigorous framework of considerations for its constructive application. From the object relations traditions there came a textured developmental perspective and rationale for a constructive restraint, but the lack of a place for the more active forms of the analyst's personal engagement" (pg. 65)

- ○ The Embeddedness of Affect and Process (pg. 69)
  - ▪ "Among the most difficult features of the human experience is coming to terms with both our relational embeddedness with others (in the interpersonal field) and the embeddedness of others within our own minds (in the internal world). Because of the pervasive relationality of our emotional lives, we have much less control over our own affective experience than is generally comfortable for us. Our emotions and our behaviors have, to some degree, a messy life of their own, in the gaps, the spaces, between oneself and others" (pg. 69)
  - ▪ "In the framework I am proposing, traditional concepts (e.g., projective identification) are recontextualized as components of a more complex interactive field. Because they are like stop-frame, spotlighting manipulations of a fluid process, they become misleadingly reductive when applied as exclusive accounts. Thus, in my view, <u>projective identification is bidirectional, not a unidirectional process</u>, with affective, fantasy, and behavioral features. Affects are not substances residing inside minds, but rather transpersonal, interactive processes that are organized variably with behaviors, self and other experiential units, and, on higher levels of organization, folded into a subjective sense of agency. The interactional hierarchy I have been sketching out highlights the complex, textured two-person nature of emotional experience, in which there is a great deal happening at once: feelings, actions of varying complexities, shifting experiential configurations, and self-reflective agency. The distinctions among the modes is offered as a heuristic device for sorting out the strands" (pg. 69-70)
    - □ "<u>Analytic change is understood not simply as an intrapsychic event</u>: insight generated by the analyst's interpretations. Analytic change is now understood as beginning in changes in the interpersonal field between patient and analyst, as new relational patterns become interactively cocreated and subsequently internalized, generating new experiences, both with others and in solitude" (pg. 70)
- ○ The Analyst's Choices (pg. 75)
  - ▪ "**What the analyst provides is a deeply personal engagement with the patient out of which both new understandings and new interpersonal and intrapsychic experiences emerge**. Because of the relational density between analysand and analyst, there are many complex considerations that bear on how the analyst might most usefully proceed at any point in the process. Among the most important judgments the analyst has to make are those concerning what he says about what he *feels* and *does*" (pg. 76)
- ▪ Chapter 4 - Attachment Theory and Relationality (pg. 79)
  - ▪ "Psychoanalysis has been struggling with the problems involved in addressing and understanding human relationality since the middle decades of the 20th century. **The most important relational theorists were Harry Stack Sullivan, W. R. D. Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, John Bowlby, and Hans Loewald**. Because mainstream psychoanalysis was so solidly occupied, both ideologically and politically, by Freudian-Kleinian drive theory, each of these theorists was consigned to marginality during the years in which their major contributions were introduced and, in some cases, for their lifetimes" (pg. 79)
  - ○ Bowlby and the Psychoanalysis of His Day (pg. 80)
    - ▪ "[Bowlby believed,] '<u>Intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub around which a person's life revolves</u>, not only when he is an infant or a toddler or a school child but throughout his adolescence and his years of maturity as well, and on into old age'. It was amply apparent from the very beginning and throughout that Bowlby regarded his contributions as a direct challenge to some of the basic principles of Freudian theory, and he had data on children in the real world to back up the challenge" (pg. 81)
    - ▪ "The language of psychoanalysis is psychodynamics. <u>Freud early on defined psychodynamics, drawing as was his custom on the physics of his day, in terms of 'forces' in the mind, specifically instinctually based impulsive forces and mental defenses against them</u>. Just as physicists have changed greatly from Freud's day to ours in their understanding of material forces, so have the ways psychoanalysts understand and talk about psychodynamics. With the fading of drive metapsychology and the energic model, psychoanalysts today talk more about internal objects, self-states, representations, and internal relations among selves and objects. But the signature feature of psychoanalysis and its language remains its focus on internality, the description of conscious and unconscious subjective states" (pg. 81)
    - ▪ "Bowlby, like Sullivan, had a more behavioral sensibility. Neither was a behaviorist in the strict sense of the term, but both were much more interested than the typical psychoanalyst in what actually goes on between people in the real world. <u>The roots of this sensibility for Sullivan were in philosophical pragmatism, which dominated the American social science of his day. There is no use talking about what you can't see or measure operationally, Sullivan believed</u>" (pg. 81)
    - ▪ "Freud's Darwin was part of the first wave of reaction to the extraordinary implications of the theory of evolution; one of Freud's projects was to work out the implications for human psychology of Darwin's demonstration of the continuity between so-called lower and so-called higher forms of animal life. <u>Freud's fascination with primitivism has a recurrent thematic consistency throughout his writings.</u> Indeed, Freud's structural model of the psyche is a recreation, on a microcosmic level, of Darwin's sweeping macrocosmic account of the evolution of species: the lower level, primitive energy of the id is transformed by the reality-oriented ego into higher level, aim-inhibited resources for activities consistent with the cultural values of the superego. Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" (pg. 82)
      - □ "Freud's Darwin lent himself to the study of internality and unconscious, primitive states…" (pg. 82)
  - ○ Bowlby and the Psychoanalysis of Our Day (pg. 83)
    - ▪ "Before 1897, Freud believed that actual events, childhood sexual seductions, were the cause of neurosis. After 1897, Freud believed that actual abuse sometimes happened and was important, but that the core of neurosis lay in childhood sexual fantasies. Unconscious fantasy became the central concern of psychoanalysis ever since" (pg. 84)
    - ▪ "the psychoanalysis of Bowlby rejected privileged fantasy over actuality, deriving from Freud's own reversal, in 1897, of his original seduction theory" (pg. 83-84)
      - □ "Bowlby always seemed to regard the choice between privileging 'real events' versus 'fantasy' as a key fork in the road separating attachment theory from psychoanalysis. British psychoanalysis has been dominated by Kleinian theory, in which actual family interactions are regarded largely as the medium upon which the child's primitive fantasies are projected" (pg. 84)
        - ◆ "Thus, fantasy became a problem for Bowlby because in his day fantasy, in its link with drive theory, signified distorted, primal patterns that were imposed on real life. Bowlby, by contrast, had become increasingly convinced that actual life - real mothers and real events - had a determinative influence on development" (pg. 84)
    - ▪ "The distinction between fantasy and reality, however, is not drawn so sharply in current psychoanalytic theorizing. Some of the more innovative psychoanalytic authors do not link fantasy with drives, but with imagination. In this view…reality is encountered, inevitably, *through* imagination and fantasy. <u>Fantasy and actuality are not alternatives; they interpenetrate and potentially enrich one another</u>" (pg. 84)
    - ▪ "what has happened since Bowlby introduced his revolutionary attachment theory has been the introduction and elaboration of the other relational perspectives, centered around affect permeability, self and object configurations, and intersubjectivity, that we have located, along with attachment, within the interactional hierarchy. These developments suggest that this is a particularly timely moment to explore convergences" (pg. 86)
  - ○ Attachment and (Mode 4) Intersubjectivity (pg. 95)
    - ▪ "Among the most radical implications of Sullivan's concept of the interpersonal field was the notion that mind is not something each of us carries around inside our skulls, in control over how much to reveal or conceal of it to others, but that **mind is transpersonal and**

contextual. Mind emerges in interactions with other minds. No matter how much of an observer the analyst tries to be, Sullivan was suggesting, he is also inevitably a participant" (pg. 95)

- "The major relational authors have contributed in different ways to our clinical understanding of different facets and implications of human relationality and attachment. Loewald's innovative theorizing suggests that the apparent separation between the subject who attaches and the object of attachment overlays a primary process level of organization in which self and other exist in various degrees of undifferentiation from each other. Loewald suggests that **healthy object relations (and by implication, healthy attachments) consist not so much in a clear separation of self from others, but in a capacity to contain in dialectical tensions different mutually enriching forms of relatedness**. Fairbairn explored the psychodynamics of attachments to physically or emotionally absent parenting figures, and the ways in which they become established as internal presences, devotion to which draws one away from new relationships. Winnicott illuminated the subtle ways in which secure attachment facilitates the development of a personal sense of self and the ways in which the absence of such parental functions adaptively forecloses such development. And finally, Sullivan, contemporary interpersonalists, and theorists of intersubjectivity have contributed to our understanding of the ways in which the vicissitudes of early attachment experiences play themselves out in current relationships, including the transference-countertransference relationship with the analyst" (pg. 101)

- Chapter 5 - Fairbairn's Object-Seeking (pg. 103)
  - "One of the clearest lessons to be gleaned from the enormous body of Freud scholarship, which has become a field of intellectual history in its own right, is that major theoreticians can be read in many, many different ways. A second lesson is that it is probably a mistake to expect any great innovator to really grasp the revolution in which he or she is participating. Because they are standing in one worldview and struggling to give birth to another, they cannot possibly envision the full fruition of their efforts. Thus, Loewald (1980), Habermas (1968), and Lear (1990), each in his own way, argue that Freud only incompletely understood the revolution he himself was effecting. Ogden 1989) has argued that it is not only impossible to understand Melanie Klein's work without having read Freud, but that it is impossible to understand Freud without having first read Klein, because the work of Klein and others brought to life potentials that were only germinal in Freud's writings" (pg. 103)
  - "Fairbairn is important for our purposes because he provided an early radical account of relationality that has come to be increasingly radical account of relationality that has come to be increasingly influential in recent decades" (pg. 103)
  - Object-Seeking: Drive or Ground? (pg. 104)
    - "In Greenberg's (1991) thoughtful and challenging book Oedipus and Beyond, he argues that all psychoanalytic theories must contain a theory of drive, either explicitly or implicitly. He then goes on to claim that although Fairbairn presented his object relations theory as an alternative to traditional drive theory, a close reading reveals a hidden drive concept in Fairbairn's vision, a kind of crypto-drive theory. Greenberg believes that unless a theory espouses a complete and thoroughly naive environmentalism (Edgar Levenson is the only proponent he can find of such a viewpoint), a concept of drive is essential. Presuppositions about drive define what the individual brings to interaction with others. **Without drives, the individual would be merely passive putty, shaped by external, social influences**. In this view, theorists who eschew *Freud's* drive theory necessarily substitute an alternative theory of drive to account for that which draws the individual into interactions with others, and for the way in which the individual records and is shaped by those interactions. One might argue in response that Fairbairn's object-seeking is a kind of drive, in much the same way that Bowlby saw attachment as a drive" (pg. 104)
    - "**All psychoanalytic theories depict individuals as seeking objects.** The question is, What are they seeking objects for? For Freud, objects are sought for sexual and aggressive discharge. For Sullivan, objects are sought for the satisfaction of various integrating tendencies. In itself, as Greenberg reads it, object-seeking means nothing; it is an empty slogan, restating the obvious and making none of the specific motivational claims that make a theory interesting and useful, with all the attendant risks. So, why *do* babies and other people seek objects? What exactly makes an object an object? **An object, Greenberg asserts, can only become meaningful, psychologically speaking, because it serves some purpose, provides some sort of gratification, meets some need. Thus, any object relations theory presupposes some basic need that objects are sought to meet.** In Greenberg's reading, Fairbairn believes that objects are sought for the gratification of oral dependency. In this view, Fairbairn has substituted a simplistic one drive system for the complexity of Freud's dual-drive system" (pg. 105)
      - "To argue that we need a concept of drive to describe what the individual seeks in interactions with other people presumes that the individual qua individual is the most appropriate unit of study. It assumes that the individual, in his or her natural state, is essentially alone, and then is drawn into interaction for some purpose or need. I believe that **Fairbairn, like Sullivan (1953), was struggling toward a different way of understanding the nature of human beings, as fundamentally social, not as *drawn* into interaction, but as *embedded* in an interactive matrix with others as his or her natural state**" (pg. 105)
        - "it seems cumbersome and improbable to regard this gregariousness or object-seeking as expressive of a discretely experienced need, like hunger or sex, that emerges from time to time…" (pg. 105)
    - "Many animals are, by their very nature, social beings and can exist as a normal creature of their specific type only as part of the group. **Fairbairn, Sullivan, and other architects of the relational model were redefining the nature of the human psyche as fundamentally social and interactive**. Fairbairn was suggesting that **object-seeking, in its most radical form, is not the vehicle for the satisfaction of a specific need, but is the expression of our very nature, the form through which we become specifically *human* beings**" (pg. 106)
      - "To define humans as relational is quite different from specifying object-seeking as a specific drive. Human beings are oxygen-breathing organisms; we are not driven to seek oxygen (except if it is suddenly withdrawn). It is simply what we are built to do, and we do it without intentionality" (pg. 106)
      - "Human beings, starting as small babies, seek other human minds to interact with, not for the satisfaction of some discrete need, but because we are wired to respond visually to the human face, olfactorially to human smells, auditorially to the human voice, and semiotically to human signs (Muller, 1996). We are designed, in ways we are just beginning to appreciate, to be drawn into a wide array of reciprocally regulating (Mode 1) interactions and shared (Mode 2) affects with other human beings, and this mutual regulation and sharing is necessary for babies to be able to use their brains to become specifically human, language-generating creatures, with specifically human minds" (pg. 106)
        - *I don't like the word 'designed' / 'wired' - that has its own suppositions.*
    - "it was Fairbairn's most far-reaching contribution to be among the first to intuit that **the establishment and maintenance of relationships with others is as fundamental to the nature of the human organism as breathing oxygen**" (pg. 107)
      - *it is an indisputable fact that every Human yearns for meaningful connection - even one who keeps locked up in their basement a starving child to beat and have their way with does so out of want to connect (granted, in an extremely perverted and vile manner) with another human being. Now, how this individual registers / conceptualizes / understands "what does it mean to be 'human'?", or what is to be expected of one who 'is human', is an entirely separate matter – but, this does not detract in the least from what's prior.*
    - "A 'two-person' perspective, the common frame of reference Fairbairn and Sullivan shared, might be defined as follows: The best way to understand persons is not in isolation, but in the context of their relations with others, past and present, internal and external, actual and fantasized. It should be immediately apparent, although this is routinely missed, that such a perspective *includes* individual persons, but sets them in a particular context, which, it is argued, is the preferred context for understanding what is most interesting about them, psychoanalytically speaking" (pg. 107)
    - "**Fairbairn understood very well that human beings seek pleasure.** He was not disputing that. What he did suggest was that Freud

stopped his account, his understanding of pleasure-seeking, too soon. By making pleasure-seeking a fundamental motivational principle, *the* fundamental motivational principle of drive theory, Freud did not understand it in its proper context, the object-relational field. Why do people seek pleasure? **For Fairbairn, the best explanation is not that pleasure-seeking, as drive discharge, is a fundamental property of mind, but because pleasure-seeking, like all other dynamic processes, occurs in the context of object-seeking, because pleasure is a powerful medium for the establishment and maintenance of connections with others.** This reordering of priorities is precisely what makes Fairbairn's model such a powerful explanatory framework for just the sort of dynamics Freud's hedonic model foundered on: masochism, negative therapeutic reactions, the repetition compulsion. If pleasure-seeking is not available, people seek pain, because pain often provides the most direct, alternative channel to others" (pg. 108-109)

- Boundaries and Problems of Internalization (pg. 109)
  - "Fairbairn regarded people as most fundamentally reality-oriented, directed toward actual people in the interpersonal world…" (pg. 109)
  - "If something from outside is found inside (which is what we mean by 'internalization'), then we have to explain how it got there. Whereas Klein believed that boundary was regularly traversed through fantasy-driven expulsive-projective and incorporative-introjective processes, Fairbairn 1954) thought that internalization was explainable only in terms of specific acts of defense" (pg. 110)
  - "Intensely emotional experiences with others early in life and, on an unconscious level, throughout later life as well, might involve a diffusion of boundaries between self and other, so that it is not possible to know precisely who is who. I am suggesting that such intense emotional experiences, for example, ecstatic sexual intimacy, are being processed on different levels, or in different modes, simultaneously" (pg. 111)
  - "The emphasis Klein and Fairbairn placed on the boundedness of the individual vis-à-vis external objects was an important antidote to the earlier Freudian concept of objectless, primary narcissism. This movement toward a view of the baby as object-related from the start was linked to a view of the baby as separate from the objects he was seeking" (pg. 111)
    - **"we need to move toward a more sophisticated way of thinking about the dialectic between union and differentiation, in which they are regarded not as opposites, but as blended together in different forms on different levels"** (pg. 111-112)
- Impulses (pg. 112)
  - "Theorists and clinicians who value eclecticism in psychoanalytic ideas often point to the utility of drive theory in accounting for the peremptory in human experience, the sense of being 'driven' by powerful impulses and by guilt in relation to those impulses. It is compelling to regard impulses as the direct manifestation in the mind of impersonal sexual and aggressive drives, and to regard guilt as an internalized, socially derived reaction to those impulses. Of course, relatedness is important, this eclectic position grants; but body-based impulses are also important. A hybrid model seems the best framework for granting appropriate weight to both these fundamental dimensions. What is missed in this line of thought is the way in which Fairbairn's radical relationality provided an account, different from classical drive theory, not just of relationships, but of impulses and guilt as well. For Fairbairn, both impulses and guilt are relationships" (pg. 112)
    - "'adhesive attachments to impulses have often been described as 'addictive', which captures something of a phenomenology of these experiences" (pg. 114)

- Chapter 6 - Intersubjectivity (pg. 125)
  - "We live in a psychoanalytic age in which many of the basic underpinnings of the classical model of mind and theory of the analytic situation have become untenable" (pg. 125)
    - "The central, enormously impactful shift has been the realization that the analytic relationship is no longer usefully understood as the sterile operating theater Freud believed it could be. The analytic relationship is not as different from other human relationships as Freud wanted it to be. In fact, the intersubjective engagement between patient and analyst has become increasingly understood as the very fulcrum of and vehicle for the deep characterological change psychoanalysis facilitates. This has made it impossible to sustain the pragmatic dissociations that aided earlier generations of analysts in their management of the often intense feelings that are generated on both sides of the analytic relationship" (pg. 125)
  - "the analyst is not a blank screen; the analyst's feelings, including passionate feelings, are inevitably part of the process and, often, usefully so" (pg. 126)
- Affect and Intentionality (pg. 128)
  - "Because the analytic relationship is regarded as two-person, interactive, and mutual, love and hate appear in the analytic relationship in much the same fashion as they appear in other intimate relationships. The patient's love and hate, although drawing on past relationships and infantile passions, are also real reactions to real interpersonal exchanges with the analyst, and the latter need to be taken into account. The analyst's love and hate are inevitable, because patients are alternatively doing things that are unavoidably lovable and hateful, and also because the analyst, no matter how mature or well positioned in terms of his own personal life, inevitably and necessarily becomes deeply emotionally involved in the work with his patients" (pg. 128)
  - "but love and hate in long-term relationships, like the analytic relationship, do not just happen. They are shaped and cultivated within contexts that are constructed slowly, over time" (pg. 129)
    - "we all construct contexts and cultivate relationship in which certain kinds of loves and hates can develop and other are foreclosed" (pg. 129)
  - "one of the most important distinctions between the role of the analysand and the role of the analyst pertains to the claims on each to be responsible, and this makes their experiences of love and hate quite different. It is the analysand's job, in some very important ways, to be irresponsible. That is, we ask analysands to surrender to their experience, to show up and discover what they find themselves feeling and thinking. We ask analysands to renounce all other conscious intents. As we all know, this is not easy to do. Analysands start out trying to accomplish all sorts of other goals: getting 'better' quickly, avoiding trouble, taking care of the analyst, and so on. So, we work with them on articulating their conscious intentions and discovering what would make it safe enough not to pursue them. We are trying to create a context in which the absence of conscious intentions will allow feelings to emerge, feelings like love and hate. These transferential feelings, as I have been suggesting, do not lack intentionality, but their intentions, the most analytically interesting intentions, tend to be unconscious. So we are trying to help make it possible for analysands to surrender themselves to their passions, outside and within the analytic relationship, partially so that they may learn more about those unconscious intentions. We are trying to cultivate in the analysand a kind of analytically constructive irresponsibility. The analyst's job is similar in some respects and quite different in others. In contemporary analytic thought, in contrast to earlier theory of technique, we also regard the *analyst's* feelings, both outside and within the analytic relationship, as very important. It is important for the analyst to be aware of and to cultivate his feelings, associations, and reveries. But a crucial part of what keeps the analytic situation analytic, what distinguishes the analytic relationship from all other relationships, is precisely that one of the participants, the analyst, is responsible for *keeping* it analytic, always, at all moments" (pg. 130-131)
    - "the most important point is that the analyst is always *trying* to be responsibly analytic, trying to do the 'right thing'" (pg. 131)
- Caring and Empathy (pg. 134)
  - "As we become more deeply involved with a person, as we become fond of him and identify increasingly with him, we *care* more and more about what happens to that person, we take pleasure in his successes and suffer pain at his defeats" (pg. 134)
  - "Empathy, for Kohut, was a methodology, a way of thinking that employs feelings that make possible what he termed 'vicarious introspection', imagining what a situation feels like for someone else. The term 'empathy' is often used to refer to caring, but I think it is

important to distinguish sharply between the two" (pg. 134)

- "I would like to conclude by stressing that we are at the point in thinking about complex emotions in the analytic relationship where we can move beyond polarized positions about analytic love as either real or unreal, and analytic feelings as to be either carefully restrained or loosely expressed. Love and hate within the analytic relationship are very real, but are also contextual. The asymmetrical structure of the analytic situation is a powerful shaper of the feelings that emerge within it, making certain kinds of feelings possible and precluding others. It is precisely because these feelings, as real as they are, are so context-dependent that they are not easily translatable into extra- or post-analysis relationships. And neither restraint nor expressiveness, in themselves, are useful as guides to the management of analytic feelings. Both restraint and spontaneity can be either thoughtful or thoughtless. It is a central feature of the analyst's craft to struggle with these distinctions, to make what seems to be the best choices at the time, and continually to reconsider past judgments and their sequelae, in order to expand and enrich the context in which current choices are made" (pg. 146)

d. Further Readings:
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