

Critical Models, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations: <https://cominsitu.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/theodor-w-adorno-critical-models-interventions-and-catchwords.pdf>

b. Quotes:

- "dialectic means nothing other than insisting on the mediation of what appears to be immediate and on the reciprocity of immediacy and mediation as it unfolds at all levels. **Dialectic is not a third standpoint but rather the attempt, by means of an immanent critique, to develop philosophical standpoints beyond themselves and beyond the despotism of a thinking based on standpoints**" - Author (pg. 12)
 - "In the face of the naiveté of an autocratic consciousness that considers its own limitation—namely what is 'given' to it—to be unlimited, **philosophy should be the binding commitment to non-naiveté**. In a world that has been thoroughly permeated by the structures of the social order, a world that so overpowers every individual that scarcely any option remains but to accept it on its own terms, such naiveté reproduces itself incessantly and disastrously. What people have forced upon them by a boundless apparatus, which they themselves constitute and which they are locked into, virtually eliminates all natural elements and becomes 'nature' to them. Reified consciousness is perfectly naive and, as reification, also perfectly unnaive. **Philosophy must dissolve the semblance of the obvious as well as the semblance of the obscure.**" - Author (pg. 12)
 - "The critique of the current philosophies does not plead for the disappearance of philosophy nor for its replacement by separate disciplines such as social science. It intends both formally and materially to promote precisely that manner of intellectual freedom that has no place in the regnant philosophical movements. **A thinking that approaches its objects openly, rigorously, and on the basis of progressive knowledge, is also free toward its objects in the sense that it refuses to have rules prescribed to it by organized knowledge.** It turns the quintessence of the experience accumulated in it to the objects, rends the veil with which society conceals them, and perceives them anew" - Author (pg. 13)
- "All wisdom has degenerated into wizened prudence" - Author (pg. 16)
- "Addiction is immediately regression" - Author (pg. 53)
- "**A philosophy that makes impossible demands on itself in regard to praxis, to the point where it would like to force a complete identification of praxis and theory, is just as false as a decisionistic praxis that eliminates all theoretical reflection. Healthy common sense, which simplifies this in order to have something tangibly useful, threatens the life of truth itself.**" - Author (pg. 85)
 - **what's common is commonly misunderstood.*
- "**Authoritarian personalities are altogether misunderstood** when they are construed from the vantage point of a particular political-economic ideology...American studies have shown that this personality structure does not correlate so easily with political-economic criteria. **It must be defined in terms of character traits such as a thinking oriented along the dimensions of power and powerlessness, a rigidity and an inability to react, conventionality, the lack of self-reflection, and ultimately an overall inability to experience.** Authoritarian personalities identify themselves with real-existing power per se, prior to any particular contents. Basically, **they possess weak egos and therefore require the compensation** of identifying themselves with, and finding security in, great collectives" - Author (pg. 93)
 - "...in the psyche of people, National Socialism increased beyond measure the collective narcissism, simply put: national vanity. The individual's narcissistic instinctual drives, which are promised less and less satisfaction by a callous world and which nonetheless persist undiminished as long as civilization denies them so much, find substitute satisfaction in the identification with the whole" - Author (pg. 96)
 - **cf. H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism <http://acdc2007.free.fr/arendt1973.pdf>*
- "**The conviction that rationality is normality is false.**" - Author (pg. 116)
- "**The characteristic form of absurd opinion today is nationalism. With new virulence it infects the entire world...**" - Author (pg. 117)
 - "...self-praise and anything resembling it is suspect, because such expressions reveal all too much the predominance of narcissism. The more individuals are caught up in themselves and the more fatally they pursue particular interests— interests that are reflected in that narcissistic attitude, which in turn reinforces the rigid power of the interests—the more carefully this very principle must be concealed and misrepresented, so that, as the National Socialist slogan has it, "service before self." However, it is precisely this force of taboo on individual narcissism, its repression, that gives nationalism its pernicious power. The life of the collective has different ground rules than those at work in the relations between individuals" - Author (pg. 118)
 - "People would only need take the norms of bourgeois private life to heart and raise them to the level of society. But well-meaning recommendations in this vein overlook the fact that any transition of this kind is impossible under conditions that impose such privations on individuals, so constantly disappoint their individual narcissism, in reality damn them to such helplessness, that they are condemned to collective narcissism. As a compensation, collective narcissism then restores to them as individuals some of the self-esteem the same collective strips from them and that they hope to fully recover through their delusive identification with it. More than any other pathological prejudice, the belief in the nation is opinion as dire fate: the hypostasis of the group to which one just happens to belong, the place where one just happens to be, into an absolute good and superiority. It inflates into a moral maxim that abominable wisdom born of emergency situations, that we are all in the same boat. It is just as ideological to distinguish healthy national sentiment from pathological nationalism as it is to believe in normal opinion in contrast to pathogenic opinion. The dynamic that leads from the supposedly healthy national sentiment into its overvalued excess is unstoppable, because its untruth is rooted in the person's act of identifying himself with the irrational nexus of nature and society in which he by chance finds himself." - Author (pg. 118)
- "**One may risk the general definition that pathological opinion is hardened opinion, reified consciousness, the damaged capacity for full experience...Opinion, and certainly the pathological kind, is always also a lack of subjectivity and allies itself with this weakness**" - Author (pg. 120)
- "**We become free human beings not by each of us realizing ourselves as individuals, according to the hideous phrase, but rather in that we go out of ourselves, enter into relation with others, and in a certain sense relinquish ourselves to them. Only through this process do we determine ourselves as individuals, not by watering ourselves like plants in order to become well-rounded cultivated personalities.**" - Author (pg. 240)
- "**Whoever thinks, offers resistance; it is more comfortable to swim with the current, even when one declares oneself to be against the current.**" - Author (pg. 263)

c. General Notes:

- Reviewing Adorno: Public Opinion and Critique, by L. Goehr (pg. xiii)
 - "Adorno didn't think that every turn toward democracy is necessarily, or could be immediately, an advance in the concept of democracy. Democracy can go wrong. He worried that too fast a democratizing process would more suppress than transform the kind of public opinion that had enabled the dictatorship in the first place" (pg. xiv)
 - "**Democracy at best opened up an arena for individual expression; at worst, it administered undemocratic thought to a people under the false promise of freedom**" (pg. xv)
 - "He argued that intolerance, complicity, and relations of domination exist not in private opinions as such; they exist, rather, in the public structures and objective conditions that shape those private opinions. One cannot therefore just demand of a public that it change its mind. **The public structures mediate** what individuals take for granted or hold as self-evident in their ordinary, everyday lives." (pg. xiv)

- Adorno wrote about mass pathology or social psychology, about the unarticulated or suppressed thinking of the public sphere. He scrutinized what was not said, the kind of unpublicized or “not-so-public” thoughts that cannot be explained away by reference solely to privately held opinions. He was extremely interested in how the spell of the past remains in the present paradoxically through the suppression of guilt, forgetfulness, or the desire to “forgive and forget,” to put one’s past behind one and “get on with life.” When he wrote of coming to terms with the past, he rejected the idea of coming to terms, with its double meaning of reconciliation and receiving articulation” (pg. xv)
- “For Adorno democracy or enlightenment was far less a proclaimed achievement and much more a fragile demand for constant education and reform” (pg. xvi-xvii)
- “Adorno’s project in education was an enlightenment project in the expansion of reason. He pursued his interest in reason and democratic education in ways not dissimilar to John Dewey in New York, crossing boundaries between disciplines and media” (pg. xxii)
 - “The critics who disliked this interdisciplinary movement quickly developed a common mode of attack: they relegated or raised Adorno’s work to the level of “useless” or “abstract” philosophical speculation so that they could then conclude that on the level of philosophy dialectics might work even if as sociological analysis it fails.” (pg. xxii)
 - **which surely a good portion of his material is.*
 - “the philosopher-critics attacked his speculative or philosophical arguments directly to support the judgment that he was probably better a sociologist or musicologist than a philosopher” (pg. xxii)
- **“Adorno believed that there was more than one road to Rome, different disciplinary modes of language and expression that would lead to truth.”** (pg. xxiii)
 - “The only road he rejected was the middle road, by which he variously meant the safe or a priori road that guarantees arrival (for the journey is rendered redundant if its endpoint is already known), the compromising or conformist road of those who prefer to submit to authority, the synthetic road that leads to some sort of Hegelian achievement of absolute spirit, the reductive or positivistic road that gives to a single explanatory principle or language (usually a philosophical one) a supreme authority, or, finally, the Heideggerian road of primordially that provides one a resolute path, metaphorically a rural road, toward our knowing why or “for the sake of which” we do what we do.” (pg. xxiii)
 - “For Adorno there were genuinely different routes and all were indirect. This meant that none unfolded its meaning without the mediation or intervention of the others. He kept concepts, terms, and phenomena separated to show then the dynamic structures of historical mediation between them. He wanted to demonstrate the nonreductive movement, interaction, and change between the various disciplines, domains, and languages. Thus, as a thinker, he constantly moved between modes of the philosophical, aesthetic, and sociological, between the conceptual, expressive, and the critical-empirical” (pg. xxiii)
- “There were in fact many early romantic roots in Adorno and Benjamin’s shared concept of critique. Critique increasingly became in their work a mode of *Ideologiekritik* undertaken from the various perspectives of modern culture and society” (pg. xxiv)
- “Adorno argued that in modern times to have small insights is all one can have and to make small transitions is all one can do. No one can get “the whole” because the whole as a whole is now untrue; if truth is to show itself it will do so only in momentary flashes, indirectly via the mediation of the concrete, historical, and particular. To show the truth of the whole by revealing its overall untruth was how Adorno believed he could avoid conforming either to a totalizing system of thought or the totalizing social system altogether” (pg. xxvi)
- **Adorno described his critique as immanent: it was designed to subject to rigorous investigation the opinions of the present with the tools handed down by history. While thinking is utterly compromised by its own situation in time and place, it strives to be uncompromising, even to break out of its own conditioning. To break out of its own conditioning is to imagine that the world could be different from how it presently is. Thinking brings attention, again, to the unrest simmering beneath the seemingly happy present.**” (pg. xxvii-xxviii)
 - “The technique was negative in the sense of belonging to a particular form of dialectical critique, hence, Adorno’s own description of his thought as a negative dialectic. To break out of conditioned thought did not mean that one sought or reached a “safe and sound” place outside, say, in the positive place of the absolute, essential, or a priori. It meant only that one sought an epistemological vantage point from which to render explicit the concealed contradictions or antinomies within. Adorno was adamant that thinkers not try “to break out of the mirror,” that they rather concentrate on dismantling the forms of representation or appearance from within.” (pg. xxviii)
 - “He was more interested in revealing the false assumption implicit to the very idea of a “ready-made,” i.e., that anything ready-made is in fact ready made, especially when it comes to ready-made ways of thinking. He concluded that there were no ready-made categories into which his work either did or didn’t fit.” (pg. xxix)
- “Against his critics he argued that just as a society at its worst strives to appear as fully harmonious, perfectly ordered, gapless, seamless, without friction or fissures, so too does a perfect system of thought. When society or thought try so to appear, they assume the false or deceptive appearance of something approximating a *Gesamtkunstwerk*, where this term connotes more a totalized work than a multimedia production. For a total work of art attempts to have by its end no thread out of place, no sense anymore of threatening chaos or violent disorder. Analogously, **it is to the advantage of an authoritarian society, as it is to an authoritarian theory, to have its conflicts or contradictions hidden from view.** (Media, recall, at worst tends to hide the human labor and construction of performance and production from view.) By concealing the threatening disorder the viewers are given the illusion of absolute satisfaction and perfect happiness. They no longer see what’s going on before their eyes” (pg. xxx)
- “Adorno found in the language of philosophy, as in all other languages, the full range of seen and unseen dimensions.” (pg. xxxi)
 - “He rejected a purely instrumental view of language, replacing it with a view of how truth appears through language’s different uses. He sought new and deliberately antisystematic forms to show the silences in his speech, the “not-so-expressed” or sublimated dimension of his thinking about other people’s thought” (pg. xxxii)
- **Adorno criticized both sides, the directness of art and the indirectness of politics: the former for “degenerating” into an art of messages and the latter for declining into a politics of deceptive silence.** As such, both were more continuing than discontinuing the discourses of the recent catastrophic past, despite their claim to be utterly opposed.” (pg. xxxi)
- Adorno argued vehemently against the reduction of philosophy to “engagement” or “commitment,” of theory to immediate action” (pg. xxxiii)
 - “Adorno argued that no part of his thinking, however much based on empirical finding or on logical or internal coherence, would succeed in finding a place above the social fray that would protect it from the tendency toward rigidity, stasis, congealment, death. For thinking is a form of communicating, speaking to others, a public mode of address even when it appears to be written only for the most elite. Thinking matters and words matter in the deepest concrete and material sense” (pg. xxxiii)
 - “A philosophy, he argued, most dies its death when thinkers remain blind to the reasons why thinking has historically become impossible for them. He interpreted the blindness as a false form of security encouraged by those desperately clinging onto system.” (pg. xxxiv)
- “Adorno worried about false illusions of happiness...” (pg. xxxv)
- “Adorno moved between traditional academic disciplines to loosen their boundaries...” (pg. xxxvi)
- **“To be happy nowhere, to feel in a permanent state of exile, was a sign for Adorno of one’s refusal to adapt, to identify with the status quo, to keep alive the capacity for individual thought, to keep in doubt one’s comfort and satisfaction”** (pg. xli)
 - “...only thought is capable of resisting the temptation to fall into satisfaction or complacency with itself.” (pg. xlii)
 - “Critique alone provides a mode of thinking where thought never finds itself in agreement with itself, a mode therefore that refuses

- both identity and identification. Adorno took from the tradition of dialectical philosophy the principle that a thought always contains its own negation.**" (pg. xlii)
- "With civilization's decay in mind, Adorno rejected two modes of finality or two ideas that would give one "the final word": first, the *antihistoricist* idea that the way things are now are the way they always are, and, second, the *essentialist* idea that things move toward how they ultimately or essentially are, where the problem lies less in the commitment to essence than in the claims regarding the movement toward it" (pg. xlii)
 - "...he did not think that a thinker (or a reader) could any longer produce a whole system of thought, as Hegel purportedly produced a whole system, and especially not a system that is articulated in the form of a culminating Idea" (pg. xlv)
 - **"To turn to the subject was to recognize its objective mediation, the shaping of and by objective conditions, the inextricably private-public character of thought."** (pg. xlvi)
 - "In critical interpretation, by contrast, no leap is attempted: one traces instead the dialectical movement in the work by moving hermeneutically around and between the subject and the object, or the author and the work, as a way to "turn" to the critically thinking interpreter." (pg. xlvi)
 - **"Adorno's preoccupations [are] with society relation's to culture, democracy's relation to dictatorship, a people's relation to its media, philosophy's relation to truth, music's relation to suffering, a people's relation to prejudice, and a discipline's relation to system..."** (pg. lvi)
 - Part 1 - Interventions Nine Critical Models (pg. 1)
 - Chapter 1 - Introduction (pg. 3)
 - See text
 - Chapter 2 - Why Still Philosophy (pg. 5)
 - "...philosophy is no longer applicable to the techniques for mastering one's life..." (pg. 5)
 - "...philosophy no longer offers a medium of self-cultivation beyond these techniques, as was the case during the era of Hegel..." (pg. 6)
 - "Roughly since the death of Kant philosophy has made itself suspect because of its disparity with the positive sciences, especially the natural sciences, and it was the first discipline in public awareness to succumb to the crisis of the humanistic concept of culture, about which I need not say a great deal." (pg. 6)
 - **"...in the general tendency toward specialization, philosophy too has established itself as a specialized discipline, one purified of all specific content. In so doing, philosophy has denied its own constitutive concept: the intellectual freedom that does not obey the dictates of specialized knowledge.** At the same time, by abstaining from all definite content, whether as a formal logic and theory of science or as the legend of Being beyond all beings, philosophy declared its bankruptcy regarding concrete societal goals" (pg. 6)
 - "Philosophy has to protect itself from the chatter of culture and the abracadabra of worldviews. It also should not imagine that specialized work in epistemological theory, or whatever else prides itself on being research, is actually philosophy. Yet a philosophy forswearing all of that must in the end be irreconcilably at odds with the dominant consciousness. Nothing else raises it above the suspicion of apologetics. Philosophy that satisfies its own intention, and does not childishly skip behind its own history and the real one, has its lifeblood in the resistance against the common practices of today and what they serve, against the justification of what happens to be the case." (pg. 6)
 - "The state of philosophy in society, which philosophy itself should scrutinize rather than deny, corresponds to its own desperate state: the necessity of formulating what nowadays under the title of 'the absurd' is already being recuperated by the machinery. After everything, the only responsible philosophy is one that no longer imagines it had the Absolute at its command; indeed philosophy must forbid the thought of it in order not to betray that thought, and at the same time it must not bargain away anything of the emphatic concept of truth." (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "This contradiction is philosophy's element. It defines philosophy as negative." (pg. 7)
 - **"The more reified the world becomes, the thicker the veil cast upon nature, the more the thinking weaving that veil in its turn claims ideologically to be nature, primordial experience.** On the other hand, ever since the celebrated pre-Socratics, traditional philosophers have practiced critique" (pg. 7)
 - "Critique alone, as the unity of the problem and its arguments, not the adoption of received theses, has laid the foundation for what may be considered the productive unity of the history of philosophy" (pg. 8)
 - "The school of Heidegger, who, incidentally, since his publications following the so-called turn has become rather averse to the word "ontology," pursues the archaic theme farthest, whereas the French version, existentialism, modified the ontological approach with enlightenment motives and political engagement. **Positivism and ontology are anathema to one another;** Rudolf Carnap, one of positivism's foremost representatives, has attacked Heidegger's theory, indeed quite wrongly, for being meaningless. Conversely, for the ontologists of Heideggerian provenance positivist thinking is forgetful of Being, a profanation of the authentic question. **The ontologists are afraid of getting their hands dirty with the merely factually existent, which lies in the positivists' hands alone.**" (pg. 8)
 - "Both have chosen metaphysics as their common enemy. In positivism this goes without saying: because metaphysics essentially transcends that which is the case, it is not tolerated by positivism, whose very name indicates its adherence to the positive, the existent, the given. But Heidegger as well, schooled as he is in the metaphysical tradition, has tried emphatically to disassociate himself from it." (pg. 8-9)
 - ◆ "According to Heidegger, a thinking that analyzes and differentiates, destroys through reflection what the words themselves say..." (pg. 9)
 - **"In both positivism and Heidegger—at least in his later work—speculation is the target of attack.** In both cases the thought that autonomously raises itself above the facts through interpreting them and that cannot be reclaimed by them without leaving a surplus is condemned for being empty and vain concept-mongering; according to Heidegger, however, thinking, in the sense it has received in occidental history, profoundly misses the truth. For him that truth is an appearing in itself, a self-disclosing; legitimate thinking is nothing other than the ability to perceive this. Cryptically, philology becomes a philosophical authority." (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "Being, in whose name Heidegger's philosophy increasingly concentrates itself, is for him—as a pure self-presentation to passive consciousness—just as immediate, just as independent of the mediations of the subject as the facts and the sensory data are for the positivists. In both philosophical movements **thinking becomes a necessary evil and is broadly discredited. Thinking loses its element of independence. The autonomy of reason vanishes:** the part of reason that exceeds the subordinate reflection upon and adjustment to pre-given data. **With it, however, goes the conception of freedom and, potentially, the self-determination of human society"** (pg. 9)
 - ◇ "For Heidegger, however, thinking would be the reverentially conceptless, passive hearkening to a Being that always only speaks Being, without any right to critique and constrained to capitulate equally before everything that can appeal to the shimmering mightiness of Being. **Heidegger's falling in with the Führerstaat, Hitler's leader state, was no act of opportunism but rather a consequence of a philosophy that equated Being and Führer.**" (pg. 9-10)
 - **"If philosophy is still necessary, it is so only in the way it has been from time immemorial: as critique, as resistance to the expanding heteronomy, even if only as thought's powerless attempt to remain its own master** and to convict of untruth, by their own criteria, both a fabricated mythology and a conniving, resigned acquiescence on the other of untruth. **It is incumbent upon philosophy, as long as it is not**

- prohibited as it was in the christianized Athens of late antiquity, **to provide a refuge for freedom.**" (pg. 10)
- "Whatever takes place within the interior of the concept always reflects something of the movement of reality" (pg. 10)
 - **"The error in positivism** is that it takes as its standard of truth the contingently given division of labor, that between the sciences and social praxis as well as that within science itself, and allows no theory that could reveal the division of labor to be itself derivative and mediated and thus strip it of its false authority." (pg. 10)
 - "Philosophy resigns by equating itself with what should in fact first be illuminated by philosophy" (pg. 10)
 - **"Fundamental ontology, however, blinds itself to the mediation not of the factual but of the concept. It suppresses the knowledge that those essences**—or whatever it calls the results of progressive sublimation it opposes to the 'facts' of positivism—**are always also results of thinking,** subject, spirit. Precisely the existence of the subject and its conditionedness indicate a being that has not sprung whole out of Being: societalized individuals" (pg. 11)
 - "...the mere thought of identity requires nonidentity from which alone identity can be asserted..." (pg. 11)
 - **"Because being and concept remain artfully undifferentiated in the mythology of Being, this ambiguity presents Being as though it were beyond being as well as concept..."** (pg. 12)
 - ◆ **"Even the mythology of Being, by suppressing the human participation in the highest concepts and idolizing them, is reified consciousness."** (pg. 12)
 - "Ontology even makes a virtue out of its provincialism" (pg. 16)
 - **"But dialectic means nothing other than insisting on the mediation of what appears to be immediate and on the reciprocity of immediacy and mediation as it unfolds at all levels. Dialectic is not a third standpoint but rather the attempt, by means of an immanent critique, to develop philosophical standpoints beyond themselves and beyond the despotism of a thinking based on standpoints"** (pg. 12)
 - "The "to the things themselves" that philosophical phenomenology had dreamed of like a dreamer who dreams he's waking up can only come true for a philosophy that stops hoping to acquire knowledge with the magical stroke of eidetic intuition, and instead thinks through the subjective and objective mediations without, however, conforming to the latent primacy of organized method, which over and over again offers phenomenological movements only a series of fetishes, homemade concepts instead of their longed-for things" (pg. 13)
 - "Nonetheless it is completely uncertain whether philosophy, as a conceptual activity of the interpretive mind, is still the order of the day, whether it has fallen behind what it should conceptualize—the state of the world rushing toward catastrophe. It appears to be too late for contemplation. Whatever is manifestly absurd flies in the face of any idea of comprehending it. The abolition of philosophy was forecast more than a hundred years ago." (pg. 13)
 - ◆ "Anyone who still philosophizes can do so only by denying the Marxist thesis that reflection has become obsolete. **Marx believed that the possibility of changing the world from top to bottom was immediately present, here and now. But only stubbornness could still maintain this thesis as Marx formulated it**" (pg. 14)
 - ◇ "Philosophy, as at once both rigorous and free thought, now finds itself in an entirely different situation." (pg. 14)
 - ▶ "what is right for art is just as right for philosophy, whose truth content converges with that of art, by virtue of the technical procedures of art diverging from those of philosophy" (pg. 14)
 - **"Praxis, whose purpose is to produce a rational and politically mature humanity, remains under the spell of disaster unless it has a theory that can think the totality in its untruth.** It goes without saying that this theory should not be a warmed-over idealism but rather must incorporate societal and political reality and its dynamic." (pg. 14)
 - "In the last forty or fifty years philosophy has been claiming, most of the time spuriously, to oppose idealism. What was genuine in this was the opposition to decorative platitudes; to the intellectual hubris that makes spirit into an absolute; to the glorification of this world, as though it already were freedom. The anthropocentrism inherent in all idealistic conceptions cannot be saved..." (pg. 14)
 - **"Thought has been intimidated and no longer dares raise itself, not even in fundamental ontology's devotional submissiveness to Being.** In its opposition to such resignation, there is a moment of truth in idealism. The realization of materialism would mean today the end of materialism, of the blind and degrading dependence of human beings upon material conditions. Spirit is no more the absolute than it is entirely reducible to a concrete entity. It will come to know what it is only when it stops invalidating itself. **The force of such resistance is the sole criterion for philosophy today.**" (pg. 15)
 - "Philosophy desires peace with that Other, being, that the affirmative philosophies degrade by praising it and adapting themselves to it. For those philosophies everything becomes functional; even the conformity to what exists is for them a pretext for subjugating it intellectually. But what exists does not want to be deformed. **Anything that has a function is already spellbound within the functional world.**" (pg. 15)
 - **"Only a thinking that has no mental sanctuary, no illusion of an inner realm, and that acknowledges its lack of function and power can perhaps catch a glimpse of an order of the possible and the nonexistent,** where human beings and things each would be in their rightful place. Because philosophy is good for nothing, it is not yet obsolete; philosophy should not even invoke this point, lest it blindly repeat its wrong: self-justification by self-positing" (pg. 15)
 - "When today's philosophical archaism evades this requirement, which it surely perceives, by offering ancient truth as an alibi, and abuses progress, which it merely prevents by pretending to have already overcome it, then these are all just so many excuses. No dialectic of progress suffices to legitimate an intellectual condition that believes itself safe and sound only because its corner has not yet been infiltrated by the deployment of objectivity, with which even that spiritual condition itself is intertwined and which ensures that all appeals to what is safe and sound immediately reinforce the calamity. The self-righteous profundity that treats the progressive consciousness en canaille is flat. Reflections extending beyond **the magical incantations of the ontologists** as well as beyond the *vérités* de faits of the positivists are not trendy stupidities, as the ideology of the yellowed lampoons would have it, rather they are motivated by those very facts of the matter that ontologists as well as positivists pretend are the only things worthy of regard." (pg. 16)
 - **"Philosophy should not with foolish arrogance set about collecting information and then take a position; rather it must unrestrictedly, without recourse to some mental refuge, experience:** it must do exactly what is avoided by those who refuse to forsake the maxim that every philosophy must finally produce something positive" (pg. 17)
 - "History promises no salvation and offers the possibility of hope only to the concept whose movement follows history's path to the very extreme." (pg. 17)
 - Chapter 3 - Philosophy and Teachers (pg. 19)
 - "What I have observed over the last eleven years has made me more and more concerned that the meaning of the test is misunderstood and that the test fails its purpose" (pg. 19)
 - "It goes without saying that humanitarianism embraces goodwill and consideration..." (pg. 20)
 - "It would be childish to expect that everyone could or would want to become a professional philosopher. I fundamentally mistrust precisely that category" (pg. 21)
 - **"Philosophy fulfills itself only where it is more than a specialty"** (pg. 21)

- "whether someone is an intellectual or not is manifested above all in his relationship to his own work and to the societal totality of which it is a part. This relationship, not the work in specialized domains like epistemology, ethics, or even the history of philosophy, is what constitutes the essence of philosophy in the first place" (pg. 21-22)
 - "In truth, culture is not even about applied effort, but rather about having an open mind and the general ability to engage in intellectual matters, to take them up productively within one's own consciousness instead of merely learning something and, as the unbearable cliché says, "confronting" it" (pg. 28)
 - "...culture requires love: what is lacking is probably the ability to love." (pg. 28)
 - "The individual becomes mature only when he frees himself from the immediacy of conditions that are in no way natural but, on the contrary, the vestiges of a historic development that has been surpassed—something that is dead and does not even know it." (pg. 31)
 - "For that reason self-reflection and critical exertion have real potential. That potential would be the opposite of the blind and dogged diligence that the majority have once and for all decided upon. This diligence contradicts culture and philosophy because from the outset it is by definition the learning of what is already given and valorized, in which the subject, the person who is actually learning, his judgment, his experience, the substrate of freedom, are all absent." (pg. 32)
 - ◆ "Reified consciousness installs science as an apparatus between itself and living experience. The more the suspicion grows that the best has been forgotten, the more the operation of the apparatus itself serves as consolation" (pg. 32)
 - ◇ "One of the characteristics of reified consciousness is that it hunkers down within itself, stubbornly persists in its own weakness, and insists on being right no matter what the cost" (pg. 33)
 - "Intellectual activity may be more questionable today than in Schelling's age, and to preach idealism would be foolish, even if it still had its former philosophical relevance. But spirit itself, to the extent that it does not acquiesce to what is the case, carries within itself that momentum that is a subjective need. Every person who has chosen an intellectual profession has undertaken an obligation to entrust himself to its movement. That obligation should be no less honored than the expectation that the examination regulations will be followed. What I wanted to say, and perhaps have been unable to express with complete clarity, should not be brushed aside with an air of superiority that masks hard-boiled cynicism. It would be better if each person pursued the goals he has set for himself. It is not a question of drawing comfort from the thought that things just are that bad and nothing can be done about it; rather, each must reflect upon this fatality and upon its consequences for one's own work, including one's examination. This would be the beginning of that philosophy that closes itself only to those who blind themselves to the reasons why it remains closed to them." (pg. 35)
 - Chapter 4 - Note on Human Science and Culture (pg. 37)
 - "The function of the concept of science has become inverted. The often invoked methodological neatness, universal confirmation, the consensus of competent scholars, the verifiability of all assertions, even the logical rigor of the lines of reasoning, is not spirit: the criterion of watertight validity always also works against spirit. Where the conflict against the unregimented understanding is already decided, **dialectic and culture, the internal process between subject and object** as it was conceived in the age of Humboldt, cannot arise. Organized human science is a stock-taking and a reflective form of spirit rather than its proper life; it wants to come to know spirit as something dissimilar from itself and elevates that dissimilarity into a maxim. But if human science tries to usurp spirit's place, then spirit vanishes, even in science itself. This happens as soon as science is considered the only instrument of culture and the organization of society sanctions no other. The more profoundly science senses that it does not provide what it promises, the more it tends to manifest an intolerance toward the spirit that is unlike it, and the more science insists on its own privilege" (pg. 38)
 - "The disappointment of many students of the human sciences in the first semesters is due not only to their naiveté but also to the fact that **the human sciences have renounced that element of naiveté, of the immediate relation to the object without which spirit cannot live**; the human sciences' lack of self-reflection is no less naive. Even when their worldview opposes positivism, they have secretly fallen under the spell of the positivistic way of thinking, that of reified consciousness." (pg. 38)
 - ◆ "The reification of consciousness, the deployment of its ingrained conceptual apparatuses often preempts its objects and obstructs culture, which would be one with the resistance to reification. The network in which organized human science has enmeshed its objects tends to become a fetish; anything that is different becomes superfluous, and science has no place for it. The philosophically dubious cult of primordiality practiced by the Heideggerian school would hardly have so fascinated students in the human sciences if it did not address a genuine need. Every day they see that **scientific thinking, instead of elucidating the phenomena, readily makes do with the shape into which each phenomenon has already been deformed**. Yet because the very societal process that reifies thinking goes unrecognized, they in turn make primordiality itself into a field, into an allegedly radical and therefore specialized question. **What reified scientific consciousness desires in place of its subject matter is, however, something societal: to be protected by the institutionalized branch of science that such consciousness invokes as its sole authority as soon as anyone dares to remind it of what it has forgotten. This is the implicit conformism of human science.** Whereas it pretends to cultivate intellectual-spiritual people, it is rather precisely these people whom it breaks. They install within themselves a more or less voluntary self-censor. This leads them first of all not to say anything that lies outside the established rules of conduct in their science; gradually they lose the ability even to perceive such things. Even when confronted with spiritual creations, precisely those who are academically involved with them find it genuinely difficult to think of something different than what corresponds to a tacit and hence all the more powerful scientific ideal." (pg. 38-39)
 - ◇ "Culture is polarized between the elements of the methodological and the informational" (pg. 39)
 - Chapter 5 - Those Twenties (pg. 41)
 - "This is immediately evident in the products of **mass culture manipulated by a highly centralized economic power**. One has only to listen to the record albums that are now being revived as the hits, songs, and chansons from the twenties to be astonished at how little has changed in this whole sphere. As with fashion, the packaging changes; but the thing itself, a conventional language composed of signals to suit the conditioned reflexes of consumers, essentially remained the same..." (pg. 41-42)
 - "In fact, it is a paradox that anything at all changes within the sphere of **a culture rationalized to suit industrial ideals**; the principle of *ratio* itself, to the extent that it calculates cultural effects economically, remains the eternal invariant." (pg. 42)
 - "...**intellectual production no longer has any actual effect**. Even its most extravagant expressions are no longer safe from being integrated into industrialized culture. Because the world spirit no longer coincides with spirit, the latter's last days shine resplendently as though they had been the golden age that in fact they never were. What remains is more an echo of fascist authority than anything itself living: the cultural respect for received values, even if they are merely touted as being important. Better would be a consciousness that realized its own diminished potential: Beckett has it. It would no longer be a culture of renewed deception, but instead one that would express in its structure what denigrates spirit to the level of such deception. The only means by which culture can cure its curse of futility is by submitting that curse to interrogation." (pg. 44-45)
 - "Only what is free from cowardice and ego-weakness and advances without protection, refusing everything indicated in the German language of the post-Hitler epoch by that loathsome expression "guiding image," has a chance of creating something that is not

- superfluous" (pg. 45)
- "In every one of its elements **contemporary artistic production must bear in mind the crisis of meaning**: the meaning subjectively given a work of art as well as the meaningful conception of the world. Otherwise artistic creativity sells its services to legitimation. The only legitimately meaningful artworks today are those opposing the concept of meaning with the utmost recalcitrance" (pg. 45)
 - "What requires reflection is both the necessity of pursuing without compromise the process that was suspended internally and externally and the limits of a possible resumption" (pg. 46)
 - "Contemporary art must become conscious not only of its technical problems, but also of the conditions of its own existence..." (pg. 46)
 - "Art's social arena is no longer an advanced or perhaps even decayed liberalism, but rather a fully manipulated, calculated, and integrated society, the 'administered world.'" (pg. 46)
- Chapter 6 - Prologue to Television (pg. 49)
- "The social, technical, and artistic aspects of television cannot be treated in isolation. They are in large measure interdependent: artistic composition, for instance, depends upon an inhibiting consideration of the mass public, which only helpless naiveté dares disregard; the social effect depends upon the technical structure, also upon the novelty of the invention as such, which certainly was decisive during television's beginnings in America, but the social influence also depends upon the explicit and implicit messages television programs convey to their viewers. The medium itself, however, as a combination of film and radio, falls within the comprehensive schema of the culture industry and furthers its tendency to transform and capture the consciousness of the public from all sides. **Television is a means for approaching the goal of possessing the entire sensible world once again in a copy satisfying every sensory organ, the dreamless dream**; at the same time it holds the possibility of inconspicuously smuggling into this duplicate world whatever is thought to be advantageous for the real one. The gap between private existence and the culture industry, which had remained as long as the latter did not omnipresently dominate all dimensions of the visible, is now being plugged" (pg. 49-50)
 - "Freud taught that the repression of the instinctual drives never succeeds entirely or for long and that for this reason the unconscious psychic energy of the individual is ceaselessly squandered in retaining within the unconscious everything that should not enter into consciousness" (pg. 50)
 - "This Sisyphean labor of every individual's psychic economy of drives appears to be "socialized" today, brought into direct control by the institutions of the culture industry for their benefit as well as that of the powerful interests they conceal. Television, such as it is, makes its own contribution to this. **The more completely the world becomes appearance, the more imperviously the appearance becomes ideology.**" (pg. 50)
 - "Anything that is served up by the culture industry, simply by virtue of the function of advertising avowed in America, offers itself as a commodity, an art for consumption, probably in direct proportion to how aggressively it is forced upon the consumer through the centralization and standardization of the industry itself. The consumer is encouraged to do what he is already inclined to do anyway: not to experience the work as an entity in itself, to which he owes his attention, concentration, effort, and understanding, but rather as a favor rendered him, which he may then appreciate if he finds it favorable enough" (pg. 51-52)
 - "The border between reality and the work becomes blurred for consciousness. The artwork is perceived to be a part of reality, a kind of accessory for the apartment, something that came with the purchase of the television set, the very possession of which itself is already a symbol of prestige among children. It is hardly too farfetched to suppose that, inversely, reality is viewed through the filter of the television screen, that the meaning given quotidian life on the screen is reflected back upon everyday life itself" (pg. 52)
 - "notions to the effect that television as the culmination of mass culture is the authentic expression of the collective unconscious falsify the object by putting the emphasis in the wrong place. Certainly mass culture taps into the conscious and unconscious schemata, which it rightly assumes to be widespread among its consumers. This source consists primarily of the repressed, or simply unsatisfied, instinctual impulses of the masses, which are either directly or indirectly accommodated by cultural commodities..." (pg. 54)
 - "By awakening and representing in the form of images what slumbers preconceptually in people, it also shows them how they should behave. Whereas the images of film and television strive to evoke those that lie buried in the viewer and indeed resemble them, they also, by flashing up and slipping away, approach the effect of writing. They are grasped, but not contemplated. **The eye is carried along by the film as it is by the line of a text, and in the gentle jolt of a scene change a page is turned.** As image, the image-writing is a medium of regression in which producer and consumer meet; as writing, it makes the archaic images available to modernity." (pg. 54-55)
 - ◆ "Censorship and the inculcation of conformist behavior, which are conveyed by even the most anodyne gestures of any television program, not only have to reckon with people who have had drilled into them the schema of mass culture, which dates back to the beginnings of the English novel at the end of the seventeenth century and has in the meantime attained an air of nobility. On the contrary, these types of behavior had established themselves throughout the early modern period long before they were deployed in ideological manipulations, and so are now internalized as second nature. **The culture industry grins: become what you are, and its deceit consists precisely in confirming and consolidating by dint of repetition mere existence as such, what human beings have been made into by the way of the world.** The culture industry can insist all the more convincingly that it is not the murderer but the victim who is guilty: that it simply helps bring to light what lies within human beings anyway." (pg. 55)
 - ◇ "Instead of paying tribute to the unconscious by elevating it to consciousness and thereby simultaneously fulfilling its urge and pacifying its destructive force, **the culture industry, with television at the vanguard, reduces people to unconscious modes of behavior even more so than do the conditions of an existence that promises suffering to those who see through it and rewards to those who idolize it. The rigidity is not dissolved but hardened even more. The vocabulary of the image-writing is composed of stereotypes.** They are defended with technological imperatives, such as the need to produce in a minimal period of time a terrific quantity of material, or the necessity of presenting vividly and unmistakably to the viewer the name and character traits of the protagonists in the sketches, which most often are only a quarter-hour or half-hour long" (pg. 56)
 - "If art is to render justice to what is unconscious and pre-individual, then to that end it requires the utmost effort of consciousness and individuation; if instead of making this effort, one gratifies the unconscious by mechanically reproducing it, then the unconscious degenerates into mere ideology in the service of conscious objectives, no matter how stupid the aims may ultimately turn out to be. In an epoch where aesthetic differentiation and individuation have increased with such liberating energy as in the novelistic work of Proust, such individuation is being recanted in favor of a fetishized collectivism that has become an end in itself and a boon for a few profiteers: and this surely sanctions barbarism. During the last forty years there have been enough intellectuals who, whether out of masochism or material interests or both, have joined the heralds of this tendency" (pg. 56)

○ Chapter 7 - Television as Ideology (pg. 59)

 - "It is advisable to submit television scripts to content analysis because they can be read and studied repeatedly, whereas the performance itself flits by" (pg. 59)
 - "In order to show how these programs affect their viewers, one must recall the all too familiar notion of **the multilayered structure of aesthetic works**: the fact that no work of art on its own communicates its actual content unambiguously. Rather it is multilayered, cannot

be nailed down, and unfolds only within a historical process." (pg. 60-61)

- ◆ "The multilayered structure, or rather, its degraded form, is refunctionalized for the benefit of the producers. They accept the legacy of aesthetic complexity by presupposing in the viewer several superimposed psychological layers, while at the same time trying to penetrate those layers in pursuit of a homogeneous and—according to the concepts of those in control—rational goal: the reinforcement of conformism in the viewer and the consolidation of the status quo. They tirelessly assail the spectators with open and hidden "messages."" (pg. 61)
- Chapter 8 - Sexual Taboos and Law Today (pg. 71)
 - "The theorist who intervenes in practical controversies nowadays discovers on a regular basis and to his shame that **whatever ideas he might contribute were expressed long ago**—and usually better the first time around. Not only has the mass of writings and publications grown beyond measure: **society itself, despite all its tendencies to expand, in many cases seems to be regressing to earlier stages, even in its superstructure, in law and politics.** Embarrassingly enough, this means that time-honored arguments must once again be trotted out. Even critical thought risks becoming infected by what it criticizes. Critical thought must let itself be guided by the concrete forms of consciousness it opposes and must go over once again what they have forgotten. Thought is not purely for itself: especially practical thought, so closely tied to the historical moment that in this regressive age it would become abstract and false were it to continue to evolve from its own élan regardless of the regression. This alone is the bitter truth to the talk of "the thinker in indigent times": what he produces depends on the fact that in making it conscious he activates the moment of regression imposed upon him." (pg. 71)
 - "...**sexual liberation in contemporary society is mere illusion.** This illusion arose together with the phenomenon sociology elsewhere describes with its favorite expression, 'integration': the same way in which bourgeois society overcame the proletarian threat by incorporating the proletariat. **Rational society, which is founded upon the domination of inner and outer nature and disciplines the diffuse pleasure principle that is harmful to the work ethic and even the principle of domination itself, no longer needs the patriarchal commandment of abstinence, virginity, and chastity. On the contrary, sexuality, turned on and off, channeled and exploited in countless forms by the material and cultural industry, cooperates with this process of manipulation insofar as it is absorbed, institutionalized, and administered by society.**" (pg. 72)
 - "If in his attempt to describe what is specifically sexual Freud emphasized the element of indecency—and this means what is offensive to society— then on the one hand, this element has disappeared, and on the other hand only now is it truly loathed, rejected. This reveals nothing less than a desexualization of sexuality itself. Pleasure that is either kept cornered or accepted with smiling complaisance is no longer pleasure at all; psychoanalysts would be able to demonstrate without difficulty that in the entire sex industry—monopolistically controlled and standardized as it is, with its ready-made appliquéés of film stars—fore-pleasure and pleasure-substitutes have surpassed pleasure itself. The neutralization of sex, which has been traced in the disappearance of grand passion, blanches sex even where it is believed to be unabashedly satisfied." (pg. 73)
 - ◆ *cf. A. Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy* <https://psipp.itb-ad.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Anthony-Giddens-The-Transformation-of-Intimacy--Sexuality-Love-and-Eroticism-in-Modern-Societies-1992-Stanford-University-Press.pdf>
 - "...in truth the sexual taboos have not fallen away. Only a new, deeper form of repression has been reached, with all its destructive potential. Whereas sexuality has been integrated, that which cannot be integrated, the actual spiciness of sex, continues to be detested by society." (pg. 73)
 - ◆ "This repression may permanently feed into the reservoir of authoritarian personalities, who are ready to run behind totalitarian governments of whatever stripe" (pg. 73)
 - ◇ "One of the most palpable results of the *Authoritarian Personality* was that those people who had the specific character structure that predisposed them to become followers of totalitarianism were especially plagued by persecution fantasies against those whom they considered to be sexual deviants and, in general, by wild sexual notions they rejected in themselves and projected onto other groups" (pg. 73)
 - "In Freud's era everything stood under the sign of precapitalist or high-bourgeois forms of authority: the patriarchalism of the nuclear family, repression by the father and its consequences, the compulsive character together with the anal syndrome ascribed to it. Of course, the thesis that **the societal superstructure transforms itself more slowly than the base** has also been borne out psychologically in the relative constancy of the unconscious, which Freud emphasized. **In the face of the predominance of the real processes of society, the individual psyche is in fact secondary or, if you will, superstructure.** Among the collective powers that have replaced the individual authority of the father, the father imago lives on, as Freud had already ascertained in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*" (pg. 74)
 - <https://ia802907.us.archive.org/17/items/SigmundFreud/Sigmund%20Freud%20%5B1921%5D%20Group%20Psychology%20and%20the%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Ego%20%28James%20Strachey%20translation%2C%201949%29.pdf>
 - "Anthropological traits such as **young people's overvaluation of the concrete, the atrophy of the imagination, the passive accommodation to overpoweringly given conditions, represent an aspect that rather precisely corresponds to the new form of sexual taboos.**" (pg. 74)
 - "**A true, instinctually erotic life, the relations that generate pleasure, is by no means that healthy sex life that in the most advanced industrial countries today is encouraged by all sectors of the economy,** from the cosmetics industry to psychotherapy. Rather the partial libido lives on within the genitality into which it was fused. All happiness is aroused by the tension between the two. Just as the partial instincts remain thwarted to the extent that they are not fulfilled genitally, as though they were part of a stage that did not yet know pleasure, so too the genitality, purged of all the partial drives proscribed as perverse, is impoverished, impassive, as though shrunken to a point" (pg. 75)
 - ◆ "It's a nice bit of sexual utopia not to be yourself, and to love more in the beloved than only her: a negation of the ego-principle. It shakes that invariant of bourgeois society in the widest sense, which since time immemorial has always aimed at integration: the demand for identity. At first it had to be produced, ultimately it would be necessary to abolish it again. **What is merely identical with itself is without happiness**" (pg. 75)
 - "**The desexualization of sexuality is strengthened by the premium patriarchal society places upon the female character,** her passive docility, weaned from all personal affect, if possible from all aspiration to her own pleasure. Sexuality is confiscated by an ideal of the natural life and in a culture of healthy outdoor living is reduced as much as possible to pure genitality that rebels against every refinement" (pg. 75-76)
 - "**the taboos nowadays do not have any new content: they are rather the imitation of more ancient ones.**" (pg. 76)
 - "Lying deeply buried within the cultural imagination, these taboos can be exploited by manipulative powers. They are reawakened from above. Their imitative pallor serves social repression." (pg. 77)
 - ◆ "The taboos can be reawakened because social suffering—in psychological terms, that of the ego—is repressed and displaced onto sexuality, the age-old ache. In total contradiction to what takes place on the surface, **sexuality becomes the nerve center of society;** at present the sexual taboos are stronger than all others, even the political taboos, despite the virulence with which the latter are hammered home" (pg. 77)
 - ◇ "If one accepts the psychoanalytical theory that claims that homosexuality in many cases is neurotic, a manner of resolving childhood conflicts that prevents the so-called normal resolution of the Oedipal complex, then the social and legal pressure,

- even if indirectly, will perpetuate and reinforce the neuroses, according to the psychological law of analysis" (pg. 80)
- "The problem of freedom of the will probably cannot be resolved abstractly at all, that is, by using idealized constructions of the individual and its character as something existing purely for itself, but only with the consciousness of the dialectic of individual and society. **Freedom, even that of the will, must first be realized and should not be assumed as positively given**" (pg. 83-84)
 - **"the contradiction in which philosophy has entangled itself, that is, that humanity is inconceivable without the idea of freedom while in reality people are neither internally nor externally free, is not a failure of speculative metaphysics but the fault of the society that deprives people even of inner freedom. Society is the true determining factor, while at the same time its organization constitutes the potential for freedom"** (pg. 84-85)
 - "At the center of the controversies in moral and legal philosophy once again absolutism and relativism shadowbox each other. **The unmediated division between freedom and unfreedom is false**, although even this has its element of truth: a distorted expression of the real separation of subjects from one another and from society" (pg. 85)
 - "**Praxis is not tantamount to autarchic, immobilized thought**: the hypostasis of theory as well as that of praxis is itself an element of theoretical untruth. Anyone who helps a victim of persecution is theoretically more in the right than someone who persists in meditating on whether there is an eternal natural law or not although moral praxis requires all one's theoretical consciousness" (pg. 86)
 - **"A philosophy that makes impossible demands on itself in regard to praxis, to the point where it would like to force a complete identification of praxis and theory, is just as false as a decisionistic praxis that eliminates all theoretical reflection. Healthy common sense, which simplifies this in order to have something tangibly useful, threatens the life of truth itself.** Today philosophy is not to be transformed smoothly into legislation and juridical procedures. A certain modesty is proper to them, not only because they are not on a par with the complexity of philosophy but also for the sake of the theoretical state of knowledge. Instead of just up and cheerfully thinking away and betraying the question to a false profundity or a radical superficiality, jurisprudence must first of all catch up with the most advanced level of psychological and social knowledge. Science everywhere is occupying the field of naive consciousness, to the very point of paralyzing every unregimented thought..." (pg. 85)
- Chapter 9 - The Meaning of Working Through the Past (pg. 89)
 - "In this usage "working through the past" does not mean seriously working upon the past, that is, through a lucid consciousness breaking its power to fascinate. On the contrary, its intention is to close the books on the past and, if possible, even remove it from memory. The attitude that everything should be forgotten and forgiven, which would be proper for those who suffered injustice, is practiced by those party supporters who committed the injustice" (pg. 89)
 - **"the psychological mechanisms used to defend against painful and unpleasant memories serve highly realistic ends."** (pg. 91)
 - "t democracy has not become naturalized to the point where people truly experience it as their own and see themselves as subjects of the political process. Democracy is perceived as one system among others, as though one could choose from a menu between communism, democracy, fascism, and monarchy: but **democracy is not identified with the people themselves as the expression of their political maturity. It is appraised according to its success or setbacks, whereby special interests also play a role, rather than as a union of the individual and the collective interests, and the parliamentary representation of the popular will in modern mass democracies already makes that difficult enough**" (pg. 93)
 - **"They make an ideology out of their own immaturity, not unlike those adolescents who, when caught committing some violent act, talk their way out of it with the excuse that they are just teenagers.** The grotesque character of this mode of argumentation reveals a flagrant contradiction within consciousness. **The people who play up their own naiveté and political immaturity in such a disingenuous manner on the one hand already feel themselves to be political subjects who should set about determining their own destiny and establishing a free society.** On the other hand, they come up against the limits strictly imposed upon them by the existing circumstances. Because they are incapable of penetrating these limits with their own thought, they attribute this impossibility, which in truth is inflicted upon them, either to themselves, to the great figures of the world, or to others. It is as though they divide themselves yet once more into subject and object. Moreover, **the dominant ideology today dictates that the more individuals are delivered over to objective constellations, over which they have, or believe they have, no power, the more they subjectivize this powerlessness.** Starting from the phrase that everything depends on the person, they attribute to people everything that in fact is due to the external conditions, so that in turn the conditions remain undisturbed. Using the language of philosophy, one indeed could say that the people's alienation from democracy reflects the self-alienation of society" (pg. 93)
 - **"Authoritarian personalities are altogether misunderstood** when they are construed from the vantage point of a particular political-economic ideology...American studies have shown that this personality structure does not correlate so easily with political-economic criteria. **It must be defined in terms of character traits such as a thinking oriented along the dimensions of power and powerlessness, a rigidity and an inability to react, conventionality, the lack of self-reflection, and ultimately an overall inability to experience.** Authoritarian personalities identify themselves with real-existing power per se, prior to any particular contents. Basically, **they possess weak egos and therefore require the compensation** of identifying themselves with, and finding security in, great collectives" (pg. 93)
 - "...in the psyche of people, National Socialism increased beyond measure the collective narcissism, simply put: national vanity. The individual's narcissistic instinctual drives, which are promised less and less satisfaction by a callous world and which nonetheless persist undiminished as long as civilization denies them so much, find substitute satisfaction in the identification with the whole" (pg. 96)
 - ◆ "social-psychology adds the expectation that the damaged collective narcissism lies in wait of being repaired and seizes upon anything that brings the past into agreement with the narcissistic desires, first in consciousness, but that it also, whenever possible, construes reality itself as though the damage never occurred" (pg. 96)
 - Chapter 10 - Opinion Delusion Society (pg. 105)
 - "Despite its several meanings, the concept of public opinion is widely accepted in a positive sense. Derived from the philosophical tradition since Plato, the concept of opinion in general is neutral, value-free, in so far as opinions can be either right or wrong. Opposed to both these concepts of opinion is the notion of pathogenic, deviant, delusional opinions, often associated with the concept of prejudice. According to this simple dichotomy **there is, on the one hand, something like healthy, normal opinion and, on the other, opinion of an extreme, eccentric, bizarre nature.**" (pg. 105)
 - **"Not only is the assumption that the normal is true and the deviant is false itself extremely dubious but so is the very glorification of mere opinion,** namely, of the prevailing one that cannot conceive of the true as being anything other than what everyone thinks. Rather, so-called **pathological opinion, the deformations due to prejudice, superstition, rumor, and collective delusion that permeate history, particularly the history of mass movements, cannot at all be separated from the concept of opinion per se.** It would be difficult to decide a priori what to ascribe to one kind of opinion and what to the other; history also admits the possibility that in the course of time hopelessly isolated and impotent views may gain predominance, either by being verified as reasonable or in spite of their absurdity. Above and beyond that, however, **pathological opinion, the deformed and lunatic aspects within collective ideas, arises within the dynamic of the concept of opinion itself, in which inheres the real dynamic of society, a dynamic that produces such opinions, false consciousness,**

- necessarily. If resistance to that dynamic is not to be condemned at the outset to harmlessness and helplessness, then the tendency toward pathological opinion must be derived from normal opinion." (pg. 106)
- **"Opinion is the positing, no matter how qualified, of a subjective consciousness restricted in its truth content"** (pg. 106)
 - "By proclaiming his opinion—unsound, unsubstantiated by experience, conclusive without any deliberation—to be his own, though he may appear to qualify it, simply by relating the opinion to himself as subject he in fact lends it an authority: that of a profession of faith." (pg. 107)
 - ◆ "Things rarely remain at the level of such innocuous opinions as how many floors a new building might have" (pg. 107)
 - "Of course, the individual can reflect upon his opinion and guard against hypostatizing it. Yet the very category of opinion, as an objective state of mind, is shielded against such reflection. This is first of all due to simple facts of individual psychology" (pg. 107)
 - ◆ **"Whoever has an opinion about a question that is still relatively open and undecided, and likewise the answer to which cannot be as easily verified as the number of floors in a building, tends to cling to that opinion or, in the language of psychoanalysis, to invest it with affect.** It would be foolish for anyone to claim to be innocent of this tendency. The tendency is based on narcissism, that is, on the fact that human beings to this day are obliged to withhold a measure of their ability to love from, for instance, other loved ones, and instead to love themselves in a repressed, unacknowledged, and therefore insidious manner. **Personal opinion becomes, as one's possession, an integral component of one's person, and anything that weakens that opinion is registered by one's unconscious and preconscious as though it were a personal injury. Self-righteousness, the propensity to insist on defending ridiculous opinions even when their falsity has become obvious to reason, attests to the prevalence of this situation.** Solely in order to ward off the narcissistic injury he undergoes in exposing his opinion, the self-opinionated person develops an acumen that often far surpasses his intellectual means. The cleverness that is expended in the world for the purpose of defending narcissistic nonsense would probably be sufficient to change what is being defended. **Reason in the service of unreason—in Freud's language, "rationalization"—rushes to the aid of opinion and so hardens it that nothing more can affect it or reveal its absurdity"** (pg. 107-108)
 - **"The positing of an opinion, the mere statement that something is such and such, already implies the potential for fixation, reification, even before the psychological mechanisms come into play that bewitch the opinion into a fetish.** The logical form of a judgment, regardless of whether it is right or wrong, has in it something lordly, proprietary, that is then reflected in the insistence upon opinions as though they were property. **Having an opinion at all, judging, already to a certain extent seals itself off from experience and tends toward delusion, while on the other hand only the person capable of judging possesses reason. This is perhaps the most profound and irredeemable contradiction inherent in holding an opinion.**" (pg. 108)
 - **"All thinking is exaggeration,** in so far as every thought that is one at all goes beyond its confirmation by the given facts. Yet this difference between thought and its factual confirmation harbors the potential for delusion as well as for truth. Delusion can then really appeal to the fact that, in general, no thought can ever be given the guaranty that the expectation it contains will not be disappointed. There are no discretely conclusive, absolutely reliable, independent criteria; the decision is taken only through a structure of complex mediations. Husserl once pointed out that the individual must presume the validity of innumerable propositions he can neither reduce to their conditions nor completely verify" (pg. 108-109)
 - "The difference between opinion and reasoned insight, namely that insight should be verified opinion, as the usual epistemological theory holds, was mostly an empty promise only rarely fulfilled by empirical acts of knowledge; individually and collectively, human beings are also obliged to operate with opinions that are in principle beyond examination. Yet as the difference between opinion and insight itself thereby slips away from lived experience and hovers on the horizon as an abstract assertion, it forfeits its substance subjectively, in the consciousness of people. People have no means available to defend themselves readily against the suspicion that their opinions are in fact reasoned insights and their reasoned insights mere opinions. **If philosophers since Heraclitus have carped at the many for remaining captive to mere opinion instead of knowing the true essence of things, then their elitist thinking only put the blame on the underlying population for what properly lies with the institution of society. For the authority that relieves people of the decision between opinion and truth, deferred *ad kalendas Graecas*, is society. The communis opinio replaces truth, factually, ultimately indirectly even in many positivistic theories of epistemology. What is deemed true and what mere opinion—that is, chance and caprice—is not decided according to the evidence, as the ideology would have it, but rather by societal power, which denounces as mere caprice whatever does not agree with its own caprice. The border between healthy and pathogenic opinion is drawn in praxi by the prevailing authority, not by informed judgment" (pg. 109)

 - ◆ "The more blurred this border becomes, the more unrestrained and rampant opinion grows. Its corrective, that is, the means by which opinion can become knowledge, is the relation of thought to its object. **By satiating itself with its object, thought transforms and divests itself of the element of arbitrariness. Thinking is no mere subjective activity but, as philosophy at its height recognized, essentially the dialectical process between subject and object in which both poles first mutually determine each other.** The very organ of thinking, prudence, consists not only in the formal strength of the subjective faculty to form concepts, judgments, and conclusions correctly but at the same time in the ability to apply this faculty to what is unlike it. The moment called cathexis in psychology, thought's affective investment in the object, is not extrinsic to thought, not merely psychological, but rather the condition of its truth. Where cathexis atrophies, intelligence becomes stultified. A first indication of this is blindness to the difference between the essential and inessential. Something of this **stupidity triumphs whenever the mechanisms of thought run of their own accord,** like an engine idling, when they substitute their own formalisms and systemic definitions in place of the matter itself. Traces of this are contained in the opinion that, entrenched solely within itself, continues without meeting any resistance. **Opinion is above all consciousness that does not yet have its object.** Should such consciousness progress merely by dint of its own motor, without contact with what it intends and what it actually must begin by grasping, then it has an all too easy time of it. **Opinion, as *ratio* still separated from its object, obeys a kind of economy of forces, following the path of least resistance, when it abandons itself completely to simple logical consistency. Opinion sees logical consistency as a merit,** whereas in many ways such consistency is the lack of what Hegel called "freedom toward the object," that is, the freedom of thought to lose and transform itself in its encounter with the subject matter. Brecht very graphically contrasted such thought with the principle that he who says A must not say B. Mere opinion tends toward that inability to stop that may be called "pathological projection.'" (pg. 109-110)**
 - "For naive consciousness the opacity of the world is obviously increasing, whereas in so many aspects it is becoming more and more transparent. The predominance of this opacity, which prevents the thin façade from being penetrated, reinforces such naiveté rather than diminishing it, as the innocent faith in education would believe. Yet whatever eludes the grasp of sufficient knowledge is usurped by its imitation: opinion. Opinion deceptively removes the otherness between the epistemological subject and the reality that slips away from him, but that very alienation betrays itself in the inadequacy of mere opinion. Because the world is not our world, because it is heteronomous, it can express itself only distortedly in stubborn and inflexible opinions, and such delusion within opinions in turn ultimately tends to increase the predominance of alienation in totalitarian systems" (pg. 110)

- **"Mere opinion's vigorous powers of resistance can be explained by its psychological function. It proffers explanations through which contradictory reality can without great exertion be rendered free of contradiction. And there is the narcissistic satisfaction** that the facile opinion affords by reinforcing its adherents' belief that they themselves have always known it, and that consequently they belong to the ones in the know. The self-confidence of the unflinchingly opinionated feels immune to every divergent, contrary judgment. This psychological function, however, is much more readily fulfilled by pathological opinions than by the supposedly healthy ones." (pg. 111)
 - ◆ **"The weakness of the ego nowadays, which beyond its psychological dimension also registers the effects of each individual's real powerlessness in the face of the societalized apparatus, would be exposed to an unbearable degree of narcissistic injury if it did not seek a compensatory identification with the power and the glory of the collective. This is why pathological opinions are particularly useful, since they ceaselessly issue from the infantile narcissistic prejudice that only "I" am good and all else is inferior and bad."** (pg. 111)
- **"This idea of truth as an objective, unchanging, self-identical, unified being in itself, was the standard from which Plato derived the opposing concept of mere opinion, which he then criticized for being dubiously subjective."** (pg. 112)
 - **"The history of spirit, however, has not left unchallenged this rigid opposition separating ideas as the true essence from the mere existence to which feeble opinions are enthralled. Very early on Aristotle objected that idea and existence are not separated by an abyss but are interdependent.** The idea of autonomous truth in itself, which in Plato is opposed to opinion, doxa, has itself been increasingly criticized as mere opinion, and the question of objective truth has been turned back upon the subject who recognizes it—indeed who perhaps even produces such truth out of himself. At its height in Kant and Hegel, modern Western metaphysics tried to save the objectivity of truth by means of its subjectivization, finally equating truth's objectivity with the epitome of subjectivity, namely, mind. But this conception did not gain any acceptance with people, let alone in science. The natural sciences owe their most fascinating successes to their having abandoned the doctrine of the independence of truth, of pure forms, in favor of the unqualified reduction of what is true first and foremost to subjectively observed, and then processed, facts. Thus the doctrine of truth in itself was repaid with some of its own untruth by the arrogance of the subject that finally sets itself up as objectivity and truth and asserts an equality or reconciliation of subject and object that the contradictory nature of the world readily belies." (pg. 112)
- **"Of late the aporia of the concept of objective reason is suffering obscurantist exploitation. Since what is true and what is opinion cannot be ascertained immediately, absolutely, as though per administrative decree, their difference is simply denied, to the greater glory of opinion.** The fusion of skepticism and dogmatism, of which Kant was already aware and whose tradition could be traced back to the origins of bourgeois thinking, to Montaigne's defense of Sebond, returns with a vengeance in a society that must tremble in fear before its own reason because it is not yet reason. There is an established term for it: faith in reason. It holds that because every judgment first of all requires that the subject assume whatever is being judged to be the case, that is, that he believe in it, the difference between mere opinion or belief and well-grounded judgment is therefore rendered untenable in principle. Anyone who behaves rationally believes in *ratio* just as the irrational person believes in his dogma. For that reason, the profession of a dogmatic belief in a putatively revealed verity presumably has the same truth content as rational insight emancipated from dogma. The abstractness of the thesis conceals its duplicity. Belief is completely different in the one case and in the other: in dogma, belief attaches itself to statements that are contrary to or incompatible with reason, whereas for reason, belief constitutes nothing other than the commitment to an intellectual posture that neither arrests nor effaces itself but advances determinately in the negation of false opinion. Reason cannot be subsumed under any more general concept of belief or opinion. Reason finds its specific content in the critique of what falls within and aligns itself with these categories. The individual act of holding something to be true—which, by the way, a refined theology itself rejects as insufficient—is inessential to reason. **What interests reason is knowledge, not whatever knowledge considers itself to be. Reason's orientation leads the subject away from himself rather than reinforcing him in his ephemeral convictions.** Only by a high-handed abstraction can opinion and reasoned insight be reduced to the commonality of a subjective appropriation of the contents of the consciousness; rather this commonality, the subjective confiscation of the object, already is the transition to the false. In the kind of motivation underlying each individual proposition, no matter how erroneous it might be, the difference between opinion and reasoned insight emerges concretely" (pg. 112-113)
 - "One could add that **reason**, if in fact it does not want to subscribe to a second dogmatism, **must also reflect critically upon the concept of science** that Schnitzler still somewhat naively assumes. **Philosophy has its place in such reflection**; while philosophy still relied on itself, its science was nothing other than the achievement of such self-reflection, and the renunciation of this self-reflection is itself a symptom of the regression to mere opinions" (pg. 113)
- **"For in the meantime consciousness, weakened and ever more subservient to reality, is losing the ability to make the exertion of reflection required by a concept of truth that does not stand in abstract and reified contraposition to mere subjectivity but rather develops itself through critique, by means of the reciprocal mediation of subject and object.** And so in the name of a truth that liquidates the concept of truth as a chimera, a vestige of mythology, the distinction between truth and opinion itself becomes ever more precarious" (pg. 113-114)
 - **"Societal consciousness tacitly renounces a distinction between truth and opinion, a renunciation that does not leave the movement of spirit unaffected. Frequently truth becomes opinion to the consciousness that is wise to the world, as with that journalist. But opinion replaces truth with itself.** In place of the both problematical and binding idea of truth in itself there appears the more comfortable idea of truth for us, whether it be for everyone, or at least for many. "Thirteen million Americans can't be wrong," goes a popular advertising slogan, a more faithful echo of the spirit of the age than the isolated pride of those who consider themselves the cultural elite would care to admit. **The average opinion—along with the societal power concentrated in it—becomes a fetish, and the attributes of truth are displaced onto it.** It is incomparably easier to detect its meagerness, to become outraged or amused by it, than to confront it cogently. Even the strange, presumptuous claims made by the latest form of the dissolution of the concept of truth in many—not all—directions of logical positivism spring to mind; at the same time they can be refuted on their own terrain only with great difficulty. For any refutation presupposes precisely the very relationships of thought to the subject matter, the very experience that is thrown on the scrap heap in the name of the transformation of thought into a method that should be as independent as possible from the subject matter. More in keeping with the times is good old common sense that, **while priding itself on its own reasonableness, at the same time spitefully repudiates reason**, knowing that what matters in the world is not thought so much as property and power, a hierarchy it would have no other way" (pg. 114)
 - ◆ **"What parades as the incorruptible skepsis of someone who will have no dust thrown in his eyes is the citizen shrugging his shoulders, "What in God's name could there be on the horizon," as is said at one place in Beckett's Endgame, the complacent announcement of the subjective relativity of all knowledge. It amounts to the view that stubborn and blind subjective self-interest is and should remain the measure of all things."** (pg. 114-115)
 - ◇ "This may be studied, as though in a test tube, in the history of one of the most important concepts of social theory, that of ideology. In its full theoretical elaboration, **the concept of ideology was related to a doctrine of society that claimed to be objective, inquired into the objective rules of societal change, and conceived a correct society, one in which objective reason would be realized and the illogicality of history, its blind contradictions, would be resolved. According to this theory,**

- ideology signified a societally necessary false consciousness, that is, the antithesis to a true one, and was determinable only in this antithesis, but at the same time ideology could itself be derived from the objective societal laws, especially from the structure of the commodity form. Even in its untruth, as the expression of such necessity, ideology was also a fragment of truth. The later sociology of knowledge, particularly that of Pareto and Mannheim, took some pride in its scientifically purified concepts and its enlightened, dogma-free viewpoint, when it replaced the older concept of ideology with one that—not by coincidence—was called ‘total ideology’ and that fit in only all too well with blind, total domination. The theory holds that any consciousness is conditioned from the beginning by interests, that it is mere opinion. The idea of truth itself is attenuated into a perspective that is a composite of these opinions, vulnerable to the objection that it too is nothing but opinion: that of the free-floating intelligentsia. Such universal expansion empties the critical concept of ideology of its significance. Since, in honor of beloved truth, all truths are supposedly mere opinions, the idea of truth gives way to opinion. **Society is no longer critically analyzed by theory, rather it is confirmed as that which it in fact is increasingly becoming: a chaos of undirected, accidental ideas and forces, the blindness of which drives the social totality toward its downfall"** (pg. 115)
- **"There is also a false impartiality, where thought is cut short and entrusts itself without reflection to the isolated materials under examination"** (pg. 116)
 - "The immanence of pathological opinion within so-called normal opinion is demonstrated graphically by the fact that, in crass contradiction to the official misrepresentation of a reasonable society of reasonable people, groundless and absurd ideas of every stripe are by no means the exception and are by no means on the wane" (pg. 116)
 - **"The conviction that rationality is normality is false. Under the spell of the tenacious irrationality of the whole, the very irrationality of people is normal.** This irrationality and the instrumental reason of their practical activity diverge widely, yet irrationality is constantly poised, ready in political attitudes to overflow even this instrumental reason" (pg. 116-117)
 - ◆ "To equate public opinion with the very stratum of society that considers itself the elite would be irresponsible, because in such a group the actual expertise, and hence the possibility of a judgment that is worth more than mere opinion, is indissolubly entangled within particular interests that elite perceives as though they were universal. The moment when an elite knows and declares itself as such, it already makes itself into the opposite of what it claims to be and draws irrational domination from circumstances that could grant it a good deal of rational insight. One may be an elite, for heaven's sake, but one should never feel like one" (pg. 117)
 - **"...according to [Hegel], public opinion is to be both respected and disdained.** This paradox stems not from the wavering indecisiveness of those who must reflect on opinion but rather is immediately at one with the contradiction of reality toward which opinion is intended and from which opinion is produced. **There is no freedom without an opinion that diverges from reality, but such divergence endangers freedom.** The idea of the free expression of opinion, which indeed cannot be separated from the idea of a free society, necessarily becomes the right to propose, defend, and if possible successfully champion one's own opinion, even when it is false, mad, disastrous. Yet if for that reason one wanted to curb the right of free expression, then one would be heading explicitly for the kind of tyranny that lies implicitly within the logic of opinion itself. The antagonism within the concept of free expression boils down to the fact that the concept posits society as composed of free, equal, and emancipated people, whereas society's actual organization hinders all of that and produces and reproduces a condition of permanent regression among its subjects. The right to freely express one's opinion presumes an identity of the individual and his consciousness with the rational general interest, an identity that is hindered in the very world in which it is formally viewed as a given" (pg. 118-119)
 - **"Anyone who nowadays hopes to comprehend the pathogenic element of reality with the traditional categories of human understanding falls into the same irrationality he imagines himself to be protected from by his loyal adherence to healthy common sense."** (pg. 119)
 - **"One may risk the general definition that pathological opinion is hardened opinion, reified consciousness, the damaged capacity for full experience"** (pg. 120)
 - ◆ **"Opinion, and certainly the pathological kind, is always also a lack of subjectivity and allies itself with this weakness"** (pg. 120)
 - ◆ "When the subject no longer has the strength of rational synthesis, or desperately denies it in the face of overwhelming power, then opinion settles in." (pg. 120-121)
 - **"What the subject, in the name of opinion, takes for his personal prerogative is in every respect merely the reproduction of the objective relations in which he is entangled.** The supposed opinion of the individual repeats the congealed opinion of everyone. **To the subject, who has no genuine relation to the matter at hand, who recoils from its otherness and coldness, everything he says about it, both for the subject and in itself, becomes mere opinion,** something that is reproduced and registered and could just as easily be otherwise. The subjectivistic reduction to the contingency of individual consciousness submits itself perfectly to a servile respect for an objectivity that lets such a consciousness stand unchallenged and to which that consciousness still shows reverence in the assurance that whatever it thinks is not binding in view of the force of this objectivity: by its standard, reason is nothing at all. **The contingent nature of opinion reflects the rift between the object and reason.** The subject honors the elemental powers by degrading himself into his own contingency. For this reason the condition of pathological opinion can hardly be changed by mere consciousness. The reification of the consciousness that deserts and defects to the world of things, capitulates before that world and makes itself resemble it, the desperate conformity of the person who is unable to withstand the coldness and predominance of the world, except by outdoing it if possible, is grounded in the world that is reified, divested of the immediacy of human relations, dominated by the abstract principle of exchange. If there really is no correct life in the false life, then actually there can be no correct consciousness in it either. False opinion cannot be transcended through intellectual rectification alone but only concretely. A consciousness that here and now would completely renounce this hardening of opinion, which constitutes the pathological principle, would be just as problematic as the hardening itself. It would fall victim to the fleeting and unstructured alternation of ideas, that mollusk-like monstrosity that can be observed in many so-called sensitive people and that has not even attained the synthesis of rational insight that then freezes solid in reified consciousness. Such a, so to speak, paradisiacal consciousness would be a priori unequal to the reality it must come to know and which is the hardness itself. Every instruction for attaining correct consciousness would be in vain. In reality consciousness consists solely in the exertion of reflecting unceasingly upon itself and its aporias" (pg. 120)
 - **"Strong affects defend consciousness from being reminded of its own subjectivism,** from the fact that the position that one takes has no other source of legitimacy than what in the final analysis is immediately given to mere individuals, and hence ultimately, merely opinion" (pg. 121)
 - "Traditional German metaphysics, and the spirit that produced it and in which it lives on, latches onto the truth and tendentiously counterfeits it into an arbitrary opinion, an eternal pars pro toto. Positivism sabotages truth by reducing it to so-called mere opinion and, because nothing remains for it but opinion, sides with it. In both cases nothing helps but the unwavering exertion of critique. **Truth has no place other than the will to resist the lie of opinion.**" (pg. 121)
 - "The truth cannot be patched together from its pieces." (pg. 121)
 - **"Thought, and probably not just contemporary thought, proves itself in the liquidation of opinion: literally the dominant opinion.** This opinion is not due simply to people's inadequate knowledge but rather is imposed upon them by the overall structure of society and hence by relations of domination. How widespread these relations are provides an initial index of falsity: it shows how far the control of thought through

domination extends. Its signature is banality. The belief that the banal is something self-evident and hence unproblematic and that levels of more sophisticated differentiation rise above it is itself a part of opinion that must be liquidated. The banal cannot be true. **Whatever is universally accepted by people living under false social conditions already contains ideological monstrosity** prior to any particular content, because it reinforces the belief that these conditions are supposedly their own. A crust of reified opinions, banality shields the status quo and its law. To defend oneself against it is not yet the truth and may easily enough deteriorate into abstract negation, but it is the agent of the process without which there is no truth. **The force of thought, however, is measured by the extent to which, in its effort to liquidate opinion, thought does not gratify itself all too easily by sharpening only its outward edge.** It should resist as well the opinion within itself: namely, the **momentarily prevailing position or tendency**, and that, in the stage of total societalization, also includes anyone who passionately struggles against it. Societalization constitutes within thought this element of opinion thought must reflect about, whose limitedness it must explode. **Everything within thought that repeats a position without reflecting upon it, like those who from the very beginning share an author's opinion, is bad. In this attitude thought is brought to a standstill, degraded into the mere recital of what is accepted, and becomes untrue.** For the thought expresses something it has not permeated yet as though it had reached its own conclusion. There is no thought in which the remnants of opinion do not inhere. They are at once both necessary and extrinsic to it. **It is the nature of thought to remain loyal to itself by negating itself in these moments. That is the critical form of thought. Critical thought alone, not thought's complacent agreement with itself, may help bring about change.**" (pg. 121-122)

- Part 2 - Catchwords Critical Models 2 (pg. 123)
 - Introduction (pg. 125)
 - See text
 - Notes on Philosophical Thinking (pg. 127)
 - "According to [Hegel], the fissure between what is thought and how it is thought constitutes precisely the error, that bad abstraction it is the task of philosophy to correct by its own means. It is ironic that philosophy so easily arouses the fury of common sense by being mistaken for the very abstractness it struggles against. It is certainly better—as in pre-philosophical knowledge so in philosophy—not to proceed without a measure of autonomy of thought in relation to its subject matter. **The logical apparatus owes its immeasurable improvement beyond primitive consciousness to this autonomy.** It contains, intensified, at the level of content, the force of enlightenment that marks the historical development of philosophy. **Yet as it became autonomous and developed into an apparatus, thinking also became the prey of reification and congealed into a high-handed method"** (pg. 127)
 - "Should thinking subjects passionately transform themselves into the instruments of such formalization, then they virtually cease being subjects." (pg. 128)
 - ◆ **"Philosophical thinking begins as soon as it ceases to content itself with cognitions that are predictable and from which nothing more emerges than what had been placed there beforehand.** The humane significance of computers would be to unburden the thinking of living beings to the extent that thought would gain the freedom to attain a knowledge that is not already implicit." (pg. 128)
 - "In Kant thinking according to its narrow, subjective concept—that is, divorced from the objective rules of logical thought—appears under the name of spontaneity. According to him, thinking is first of all an activity..." (pg. 128)
 - "However, **Kant's greatness, his ability to subject even his own so-called fundamental positions to a tenacious critique**, proved true not least of all when, completely befitting the actual nature of thinking, he did not simply equate spontaneity, which for him is thinking, with conscious activity. The definitive, constitutive achievements of thinking were for him not the same as acts of thought within the already constituted world. Their fulfillment is hardly present to self-consciousness. The illusion of naive realism, the view that in experience one is dealing with things-in-themselves, is based, as one could read in Kant, also on the following: the acts through which consciousness in anticipation forms the sensible material are not yet conscious to it as acts: that is their "depth," thoroughly passive. This idea is characterized system-immanently by the fact that the "I think, which must be able to accompany all of my representations," the formula for defining spontaneity, signifies nothing more than that there exists a unity of subjective, indeed personal, consciousness; and thus that, with all the difficulties involved, it is "my" representation, which can be replaced by that of no other." (pg. 128)
 - ◆ **"Defined by its mere affiliation, the "I think" itself becomes a passive entity, completely distinct from the active reflection upon a "my." Kant thus captured the passive moment in the activity of thinking faithfully,** just as even in his most precarious propositions his impressive honesty constantly attends to what presents itself in the phenomena; the *Critique of Pure Reason* is already, in the sense in which Hegel later entitled his analysis of consciousness, a *Phenomenology of Spirit*." (pg. 128-129)
 - ◆ **"At the level Kant calls the transcendental, activity and passivity are by no means administratively separated from each other in the way suggested by the external architecture of the philosophical work.** This passive moment conceals the fact, which Kant did not mention, that **what is apparently independent—the originary apperception—is actually dependent upon the objective realm,** however undetermined it may be, and which in the Kantian system took refuge in the doctrine of the thing-in-itself situated beyond experience. **No objectivity of thinking as an act would be possible at all if thinking in itself, according to its own form, were not bound to what is not itself properly thinking: this is where one must seek and work out what is enigmatic in thinking"** (pg. 129)
 - **"Where thinking is truly productive, where it creates, it is also always a reacting. Passivity lies at the heart of the active moment, the ego models itself on the non-ego.** Something of this still affects the empirical form of philosophical thinking. In order to be productive, thinking must always be determined from its subject matter. This is thinking's passivity. Its efforts coincide with its capacity for such passivity. Psychology calls this 'object-relation' or 'object-cathexis.' However, it extends far beyond the psychological dimension of the thought process. Objectivity, the truth of thoughts, depends on their relation to the subject matter. From the subjective point of view, philosophical thinking is incessantly confronted with the necessity of proceeding via its own internal logical consistency and nevertheless also of accepting what is different from it and what is not a priori subject to its own lawfulness. **Thinking as a subjective act must initially surrender itself to the subject matter,** even when, as Kant and the Idealists taught, thinking constitutes or indeed even produces its subject matter. Thinking still depends on the subject matter even when the concept of a subject matter is problematic and thinking alleges that it first establishes it. **There is hardly a stronger argument for the fragile primacy of the object and for its being conceivable only in the reciprocal mediation of subject and object than that thinking must snuggle up to an object, even when it does not yet have such an object, even intends to produce it.** In Kant, such factuality of method finds its expression in the content. It is true that his thought is indeed directed toward the forms of the subject, yet it seeks its goal in the definition of objectivity. Despite the Copernican turn, and thanks to it, Kant inadvertently confirms the primacy of the object" (pg. 129)
 - "The act of thinking can no more be reduced to a psychological process than to a timelessly pure, formal logic. **Thinking is a mode of comportment, and its relation to the subject matter with which it comports itself is indispensable. The active moment of the thinking process is concentration.** It struggles against whatever might distract it from the matter at hand. Concentration mediates the exertions of the ego through what is opposed to it." (pg. 130)
 - "The concentration of thought bestows upon productive thinking a quality the cliché denies it. Not unlike so-called artistic inspiration, it **lets itself be directed,** to the extent that nothing distracts it from the matter at hand. **The subject matter opens up to patience, the virtue**

- of thinking." (pg. 130)
- ◆ "Thinking should not reduce itself to method; truth is not the residue that remains after the subject has been eradicated. Rather, it must incorporate all innervation and experience into the contemplation of the subject matter in order, according to its ideal, to vanish within it" (pg. 130)
 - ◇ "the malicious resentment against the person who sits and thinks has its detestable justification. Frequently such thinking behaves as if it had no material. It plunges into itself as though into a sphere of alleged purity. Hegel denounces this sphere as empty profundity. The chimera of a Being that is not commandeered or defiled by anything concrete is finally nothing other than the mirror reflection of a thinking in itself, completely indeterminate and formal. It condemns thinking to the parody of the wise man gazing at his navel; it falls prey to an archaism that by undertaking to save for philosophical thinking its specific object— which should not at any price be an object— forfeits the moment of the subject matter itself, the nonidentical" (pg. 130-131)
 - "Certainly **reflective thinking** has not been described accurately enough. Most likely it **should be called expansive concentration**. By gauging its subject matter, and it alone, thinking becomes aware of what within the matter extends beyond what was previously thought and thereby breaks open the fixed purview of the subject matter. For its part the subject matter can also be extremely abstract and mediated; its nature should not be prejudged by a surreptitiously introduced concept of concretion. The cliché that thinking is a purely logical and rigorous development from a single proposition fully warrants every reservation. Philosophical reflection must fracture the so-called train of thought that is unrefractedly expected from thinking. **Thoughts that are true must incessantly renew themselves in the experience of the subject matter, which nonetheless first determines itself in those thoughts. The strength to do that, and not the measuring-out and marking-off of conclusions, is the essence of philosophical rigor. Truth is a constantly evolving constellation, not something running continuously and automatically in which the subject's role would be rendered not only easier but, indeed, dispensable.** The fact that no philosophical thinking of quality allows of concise summary, that it does not accept the usual scientific distinction between process and result—Hegel, as is known, conceived truth as process and result in one—renders this experience palpably clear. Philosophical thoughts that can be reduced to their skeleton or their net profit are of no worth" (pg. 131)
 - "Where philosophical thought, even in important texts, falls behind the ideal of its constant renewal through the subject matter itself, it is defeated. **To think philosophically means as much as to think intermittences, to be interrupted by that which is not the thought itself.** In emphatic thinking the analytic judgments it unavoidably must use become false. The force of thinking, not to swim with its own current, is the strength of resistance to what has been previously thought. Emphatic thinking requires the courage to stand by one's convictions. The individual who thinks must take a risk, not exchange or buy anything on faith—that is the fundamental experience of the doctrine of autonomy. Without risk, without the imminent possibility of error, there is objectively no truth. Most stupidity in thinking takes shape where that courage, which is immanent to thinking and which perpetually stirs within it, is suppressed. Stupidity is nothing privative, not the simple absence of mental ability, but rather the scar of its mutilation" (pg. 131-132)
 - "In a certain sense, philosophical thinking continually attempts to express experiences; indeed, they are in no way adequately covered by the empirical concept of experience. Understanding philosophy means assuring oneself of this experience by reflecting on a problem autonomously and yet always remaining in the closest contact with the problem in its given configuration." (pg. 132)
 - "One may radically distrust the Heideggerian hyphen-philology and yet not disavow that reflective thinking, as opposed to thinking, linguistically refers to the idea of philosophical construction as one of reconstruction. In this lies at once also **the worst temptation, that of apologetics, of rationalization, of the justification of blindly professed convictions and opinions.** The *thema probandum* is just as much the truth and untruth of thinking. It relinquishes its untruth insofar as it attempts, through negation, to follow its experience. An adequate philosophical thinking is not only critical of the status quo and its reified replica in consciousness but is equally critical of itself. It does justice to the experience animating it not through compliant codification, but rather by means of objectification. Whoever thinks philosophically hardens intellectual experience by the same logical consistency whose antithesis he wields" (pg. 132-133)
 - ◆ "Only in this way does reflective thought become more than a repetitive presentation of what is experienced. Its rationality, as a critical one, transcends rationalization. Nonetheless, to him who observes it in itself, philosophical thinking seems to make possible the knowledge of what he wants to learn and only to the extent that he really knows what he wants to learn. This self-experience of thinking contradicts the Kantian limitation, his intention of using thought to lessen thought's power. It also answers the sinister question, how one could think what one thinks and yet live: precisely by thinking it. *Cogito, ergo sum*" (pg. 133)
 - "**Thinking begins in the labor upon a subject matter and its verbal formulation: they ensure its passive element. Put extremely: I do not think, and yet that itself is surely thinking"** (pg. 133)
 - "Thinking must desperately navigate between such intellectual technique and amateurish dilettantism. Amateurish is the thinking that completely ignores the intellectual division of labor, instead of respecting and transcending it. A naive, fresh beginning stultifies thought no less than does a fervid conformity to the division of labor. Philosophy that, to speak with Kant, would do justice to its cosmical concept, would raise itself above its conception as a specialized science— according to Kant its scholastic concept that a priori is incompatible with its proper concept—no less than above the prattle about worldviews that derives the illusion of its superiority from the pitiful meagerness of the leftovers from specialized knowledge out of which it makes its own specialty. **Resistance to the decline of reason would mean for philosophical thinking, without regard for established authority and especially that of the human sciences, that it immerse itself in the material contents in order to perceive in them, not beyond them, their truth content. That would be, today, the freedom of thinking. It would become true where it is freed from the curse of labor and comes to rest in its object"** (pg. 134)
 - Reason and Revelation (pg. 135)
 - "What counts in the endeavors of ontology today, its attempt to leap without mediation out of the ongoing nominalistic situation into realism, the world of ideas in themselves, which then for its part is rendered into a product of mere subjectivity, of so-called decision, namely an arbitrary act—all this is also in large measure valid for the closely related turn toward positive religion." (pg. 136)
 - "Certainly a **ratio that does not wantonly absolutize itself as a rigid means of domination requires self-reflection**, some of which is expressed in the need for religion today. But this self-reflection cannot stop at the mere negation of thought by thought itself, a kind of mythical sacrifice, and cannot realize itself through a "leap": that would all too closely resemble the politics of catastrophe. On the contrary, **reason must attempt to define rationality itself, not as an absolute, regardless of whether it is then posited or negated, but rather as a moment within the totality, though admittedly even this moment has become independent in relation to the totality. Rationality must become cognizant of its own natural essence.** Although not unknown to the great religions, precisely this theme requires "secularization" today if, isolated and inflated, it is not to further that very darkening of the world it wants to exorcise." (pg. 138)
 - "**The massive concentration of economic powers, and consequently of political and administrative ones as well, to a large extent reduces every individual into a mere functionary of the machinery. Individuals are probably much more connected today than in the era of high liberalism**, when they had not yet called for bonds. Their need for bonds is therefore increasingly a need for a spiritual and intellectual reduplication and justification of an authority that is nonetheless already present. The talk of transcendental homelessness, which once

expressed the distress of the individual within individualistic society, has become ideology, has become a pretext for bad collectivism that, as long as no authoritarian state is available, relies on other institutions with supra-individualist pretensions. The disparity between societal power and societal impotence, increasing beyond measure, extends into the weakening of the inner composition of the ego, so that finally the ego cannot endure without identifying itself with the very thing that condemns it to impotence. **Only weakness seeks bonds;** the urge for bonds, which exalts itself as though it had relinquished the restrictions of egoism, of mere individual interest, in truth is not oriented toward the humane; on the contrary, it capitulates before the inhumane. Certainly underlying this is the illusion society needs and reinforces with all its conceivable means: that the subject, that people are incapable of humanity—the desperate fetishization of presently existing relations" (pg. 138-139)

- **"The turn toward transcendence functions as a screen-image for immanent, societal hopelessness. Intrinsic to it is the willingness to leave the world as it is, because the world could not possibly be different.** The real determining model of this behavior is the division of the world into two colossal blocs that rigidly oppose and reciprocally threaten one another, and every individual, with destruction. The extreme innerworldly fear of this situation, because there is nothing discernible that might lead beyond it, is hypostatized as an existential or indeed a transcendental anxiety" (pg. 139)
- Progress (pg. 143)
 - "For a theoretical account of the category of progress it is necessary to scrutinize the category so closely that it loses its semblance of obviousness, both in its positive and its negative usage" (pg. 143)
 - "Even more than other concepts, **the concept of progress dissolves upon attempts to specify its exact meaning, for instance what progresses and what does not. Whoever wants to define the concept precisely easily destroys what he is aiming at**" (pg. 143)
 - "What at this time should be understood by the term 'progress' one knows vaguely, but precisely: for just this reason one cannot employ the concept roughly enough. To use the term pedantically merely cheats it out of what it promises: an answer to the doubt and the hope that things will finally get better, that people will at last be able to breathe a sigh of relief. For this reason alone one cannot say precisely what progress should mean to people, because the crisis of the situation is precisely that while everyone feels the crisis, the words bringing resolution are missing. Only those reflections about progress have truth that immerse themselves in progress and yet maintain distance, withdrawing from paralyzing facts and specialized meanings. Today reflections of this kind come to a point in the contemplation of whether humanity is capable of preventing catastrophe. The forms of humanity's own global societal constitution threaten its life, if a self-conscious global subject does not develop and intervene. The possibility of progress, of averting the most extreme, total disaster, has migrated to this global subject alone. Everything else involving progress must crystallize around it. Material needs, which long seemed to mock progress, have been potentially eliminated; thanks to the present state of the technical forces of production no one on the planet need suffer deprivation anymore. Whether there will be further want and oppression—which are the same thing—will be decided solely by the avoidance of catastrophe through the rational establishment of the whole society as humanity" (pg. 143-144)
 - "If humanity remains entrapped by the totality it itself fashions, then, as Kafka said, no progress has taken place at all, while mere totality nevertheless allows progress to be entertained in thought. This can be elucidated most simply by the definition of humanity as that which excludes absolutely nothing. If humanity were a totality that no longer held within it any limiting principle, then it would also be free of the coercion that subjects all its members to such a principle and thereby would no longer be a totality: no forced unity" (pg. 145)
 - "progress is not tantamount to society, is not identical with it; indeed, like society, progress is at times its own opposite. **Philosophy in general, as long as it was at all useful, was also a doctrine of society,** except that ever since it consigned itself without demur to societal power, philosophy must professedly isolate itself from society; the purity into which philosophy regressed is the bad conscience of its impurity, its complicity with the world. **The concept of progress is philosophical in that it articulates the movement of society while at the same time contradicting it.** Having arisen societally, the concept of progress requires critical confrontation with real society. The aspect of redemption, no matter how secularized, cannot be removed from the concept of progress" (pg. 148)
 - "Yet even the talk of power recalls the dialectic of progress itself. While the perpetual oppression that unleashed progress at the same time always arrested it, this oppression—as the emancipation of consciousness—first made the antagonism and the whole extent of the deception recognizable at all, the prerequisite for settling the antagonism. The progress, which the eternal invariant brought forth, is that finally progress can begin, at any moment." (pg. 150)
 - ◆ **"Progress means: to step out of the magic spell, even out of the spell of progress that is itself nature, in that humanity becomes aware of its own inbred nature and brings to a halt the domination it exacts upon nature and through which domination by nature continues. In this way it could be said that progress occurs where it ends."** (pg. 150)
 - "Decadence is the nerve center where the dialectic of progress becomes, as it were, bodily appropriated by consciousness. Whoever rails and rages against decadence inevitably takes up the standpoint of sexual taboo, the violation of which constitutes the antinomian ritual of decadence. In the insistence upon this taboo, for the sake of the unity of nature-dominating ego, there rumbles the voice of deceived, unreflective progress. Yet for that reason progress can be convicted of its own irrationality because it always bewitches the means it uses into the ends it truncates. Of course, the opposing position of decadence remains abstract, and not least of all because of this it incurred the curse of being ridiculous. **Decadence mistakes the particularity of happiness,** which it must insist upon, **for immediate utopia, for realized humanity, whereas decadence itself is disfigured by unfreedom, privilege, and class domination; it indeed owns up to all of these, but also glorifies them**" (pg. 151-152)
 - "The explosive tendency of progress is not merely the Other to the movement of a progressing domination of nature, not just its abstract negation; rather it requires the unfolding of reason through the very domination of nature. Only reason, the principle of societal domination inverted into the subject, would be capable of abolishing this domination. The possibility of wrestling free is effectuated by the pressure of negativity. On the other hand reason, which wants to escape nature, first of all shapes nature into what it must fear. **The concept of progress is dialectical in a strictly unmetaphorical sense, in that its organon, reason, is one; a nature-dominating level and a reconciling level do not exist separate and disjunct within reason, rather both share all its determinations. The one moment inverts into its other only in that it literally reflects itself, in that reason applies reason to itself and in its self-restriction emancipates itself from the demon of identity**" (pg. 152)
 - "A metaphysical interpretation of Kant should not impute a latent ontology to him but instead read the structure of his entire thought as a dialectic of enlightenment..." (pg. 152)
 - "Progress comprehends not merely, as in the Hegelian philosophy of history, the compass of what belongs to dialectic; rather it is dialectical in its own concept like the categories of the *Science of Logic*. **Absolute domination of nature is absolute submission to nature** and yet arches beyond this in self-reflection, myth that demythologizes myth" (pg. 152)
 - ◆ "The notion of the domination of pure reason as a being-in-itself, separated from praxis, subjugates even the subject, deforms it into an instrument to be used toward an end." (pg. 152-153)
 - "The nineteenth century came up against the limit of bourgeois society, which could not fulfill its own reason, its own ideals of freedom, justice, and humane immediacy, without running the risk of its order being abolished. This made it necessary for society to credit itself, untruthfully, with having achieved what it had failed. This falsity, with which the educated citizens then reproached the belief in progress held by the

- uneducated or reformist labor leaders, was an expression of bourgeois apologetics." (pg. 154)
- "Part of the dialectic of progress is that historical setbacks, which themselves are instigated by the principle of progress...also provide the condition needed for humanity to find the means to avert them in the future. The nexus of deception surrounding progress reaches beyond itself. It is mediated to that order in which the category of progress would first gain its justification, in that the devastation wrought by progress can be made good again, if at all, only by its own forces, never by the restoration of the preceding conditions that were its victim" (pg. 154)
 - "The idea that progress offers a way out is blocked today because the subjective aspects of spontaneity are beginning to atrophy in the historical process. To desperately posit an isolated, allegedly ontological concept of the subjectively spontaneous against the societal omnipotence, as the French existentialists do, is too optimistic, even as an expression of despair; one cannot conceive of a versatile spontaneity outside of its entwinement with society. It would be illusory and idealistic to hope that spontaneity would be enough here and now. One cherishes such hope solely in a historical hour in which no support for hope is in sight. Existentialist decisionism is merely the reflex reaction to the seamless totality of the world spirit. Nevertheless this totality itself is also semblance. The rigidified institutions, the relations of production, are not Being as such, but even in their omnipotence they are man-made and revocable. In their relationship to the subjects from which they originate and which they enclose, they remain thoroughly antagonistic" (pg. 155-156)
 - "Reality produces the semblance of developing upward and remains *au fond* what it was. Spirit that, to the extent that it is not a part of the apparatus, seeks innovation, in its hopelessly repeated attempts only knocks its head in, as when an insect flying toward the light collides with a windowpane. Spirit is not what it enthrones itself as, the Other, the transcendent in its purity, but rather is also a piece of natural history" (pg. 156)
 - "Philosophy lives in symbiosis with science and cannot break from it without turning into dogmatism and ultimately relapsing into mythology. Yet the content of philosophy should be to express what is neglected or excised by science, by the division of labor, by the forms of reflection entailed by the bustle of self-preservation. For this reason philosophy's progress simultaneously recedes from the necessary goal of its progress; the force of experience that philosophy registers is weakened the more it is honed down by the scientific apparatus. The movement philosophy as a whole performs is the pure self-sameness of its principle" (pg. 158)
 - "Philosophical progress is deceitful because, the tighter it connects arguments, the more airtight and unassailable its propositions become, the more it becomes identity-thinking. Philosophical progress weaves a net over its objects that, by plugging up the holes of what it is not, impudently thrusts itself in place of its object of inquiry. Indeed, finally it seems, in harmony with the actual retrogressive tendencies of society, that vengeance is exacted on the progress of philosophy for having hardly been progress at all. **To assume that there has been progress from Hegel to the logical positivists, who dismiss him as obscure or meaningless, is nothing but funny.** Even philosophy is not immune to falling prey to that kind of regression, whether into narrowminded scientification or into the denial of reason, which certainly is no better than the maliciously derided belief in progress" (pg. 158-159)
 - "In bourgeois society, which created the concept of total progress, the convergence of this concept with the negation of progress originates in this society's principle: exchange. Exchange is the rational form of mythical ever-sameness. In the like-for-like of every act of exchange, the one act revokes the other; the balance of accounts is null. If the exchange was just, then nothing should really have happened, and everything stays the same. At the same time the assertion of progress, which conflicts with this principle, is true to the extent that the doctrine of like-for-like is a lie. Since time immemorial, not just since the capitalist appropriation of surplus value in the commodity exchange of labor power for the cost of its reproduction, the societally more powerful contracting party receives more than the other. By means of this injustice something new occurs in the exchange: the process, which proclaims its own stasis, becomes dynamic. The truth of the expansion feeds on the lie of the equality. Societal acts are supposed to reciprocally sublimate themselves in the overall system and yet do not. Wherever bourgeois society satisfies the concept it cherishes as its own, it knows no progress; wherever it knows progress, it violates its own law in which this offense already lies, and by means of the inequality immortalizes the injustice progress is supposed to transcend. But this injustice is at once also the condition for possible justice. The fulfillment of the repeatedly broken exchange contract would converge with its abolition; exchange would disappear if truly equal things were exchanged; true progress would not be merely an Other in relation to exchange, but rather exchange that has been brought to itself" (pg. 159)
 - "The interlocking of the eversame and the new in the exchange relation manifests itself in the imagines of progress under bourgeois industrialism" (pg. 159)
 - ◆ "Dialectical images: these are the historically-objective archetypes of that antagonistic unity of standstill and movement that defines the most universal bourgeois concept of progress" (pg. 160)
 - "The fetishization of progress reinforces its particularity, its restrictedness to techniques. If progress were truly master of the whole, the concept of which bears the marks of its violence, then progress would no longer be totalitarian. **Progress is not a conclusive category.** It wants to cut short the triumph of radical evil, not to triumph as such itself. A situation is conceivable in which the category would lose its meaning, and yet which is not the situation of universal regression that allies itself with progress today. In this case, progress would transform itself into the resistance to the perpetual danger of relapse. **Progress is this resistance at all stages, not the surrender to their steady ascent."** (pg. 160)
- Gloss on Personality (pg. 161)
 - "According to Kant, personality is nothing other than "the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being subject to special laws, namely those pure practical laws given by its own reason, so that the person belonging to the world of sense is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world; for it is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own being in relation to his second and higher vocation with reverence, and the laws of this vocation with the deepest respect." Person and personality are not identical. Yet that respect and esteem personalities later arrogated to themselves was by no means intended for those people who are either really or supposedly prominent in the depraved sense of the term but for the general principle embodied in real existing persons. Kant faithfully respects the grammatical form of the word "personality." The suffix "-ity" indicates an abstraction, an idea, not particular individuals." (pg. 162)
 - "Yet, because this universality, moral freedom, indeed belongs to the intelligible, spiritual world and not to the sensible world of empirical individuals though manifesting itself only in them, this Kantian concept of personality declined with the rise of bourgeois individualism and attached itself to individual persons who, according to Kant's own distinction, define themselves more by their price than by their dignity. Gradually the individual, in the interest of some arbitrary external and internal qualities, was to become directly what in Kant's theory he was only indirectly by virtue of the principle of humanity within him. The honor accorded by Kant to the principle of humanity is smugly recuperated by the individual. **Instead of having personality in Kant's sense, one is a personality;** instead of the intelligible character—the better potential in each person—the empirical person, just as he happens to be, is posited and transformed into a fetish" (pg. 162)
 - ◆ "The criterion of personality in general is power and might: rule over people, whether possessing it in virtue of position or gaining it perhaps because of an especial lust for power, through one's behavior and one's so-called presence. The catchword "personality" tacitly implies a strong person, but strength understood as the ability to make others tractable should not at all be confused with the quality of a person. Because it is insinuated that strength is something ethical, language use and collective consciousness

capitulate to the bourgeois religion of success. At the same time the illusion is maintained that this quality, by being part of a person's pure essence, is still the moral quality that Kant's doctrine aimed at. This transition is already intimated in the concept of character, the securely integrated unity of an individual in itself, that has a great and not completely unambiguous function in Kant's ethics. Those who are glorified as personalities do not have to be important, rich in themselves, refined, productive, especially clever, or truly good. Those who are really something often lack the relationship to the domination of people that the concept of personality connotes. **Often strong personalities are just those who know how to take a hint; they are people with elbows who appropriate everything they possibly can, brutally and manipulatively.** In the ideal of personality nineteenth-century society praises its own false principle: a "real" person is someone who is society's equal, internally organized according to the same law that holds society together at its very core" (pg. 163)

◇ "This ideal of personality, in its traditional, high-liberal form, has become obsolete..." (pg. 163)

- **"Personality is now only a mask of itself"** (pg. 164)
 - "The aversion to the hollow pathos of personality serves, in the name of a supposedly ideology-free understanding of reality, to justify the universal conformity, as though it is not already triumphing everywhere without any need for justification." (pg. 164)
 - "Humboldt's concept of personality was by no means simply the cult of the individual, who like a plant must be watered in order to flourish. Thus in holding fast to **the Kantian idea "of the humanity in our person,"** at least he did not deny what his contemporaries Goethe and Hegel considered central to the doctrine of the individual. **For all these thinkers the subject does not come to itself through the narcissistically self-related cultivation of its being-for-itself but rather through externalization, by devotedly abandoning itself to what is not itself.** In the fragment, "Theory of the Self-Cultivation of Man," Humboldt writes: 'Merely because both his thought and his action are possible only by virtue of a third thing, only by virtue of the representation and elaboration of something, of which the authentic distinguishing trait is that it is not-man, i.e., is world, man tries to grasp as much world as possible and to join it with himself as closely as he can'" (pg. 164)
- "There is reason to suspect that what should no longer exist, because it did not evolve and supposedly cannot exist, conceals within itself the potential of something better. Devaluing personality by considering it obsolete promotes psychological regression. **The hindered formation of the ego, which more and more clearly represents the tendency of the fully forming society, is deemed a higher value, something worth promoting. What is sacrificed is the moment of autonomy, freedom, and resistance that once, no matter how adulterated by ideology, resonated in the ideal of personality. The concept of personality cannot be saved.** In the age of its liquidation, however, something in it should be preserved: the strength of the individual not to entrust himself to what blindly sweeps down upon him, likewise not to blindly make himself resemble it. Yet what is to be preserved should not be understood as some reserve of unformed nature in the midst of a society that has been thoroughly permeated with the structures of social order. Precisely society's excessive pressure brings forth unformed nature ever anew. The force of the 'I', which formerly was contained in the ideal of personality and was caricatured into autocracy and now threatens to vanish, is the force of consciousness, of rationality. It is essentially responsible for reality-testing. Within the individual it represents reality, the 'not-I', just as well as it represents the individual himself. **Only if the individual incorporates objectivity within himself and in a certain sense, namely consciously, adjusts to it, can he develop the resistance to it.** The organ of what was once unashamedly called personality has become critical consciousness. It permeates even that selfhood that had become congealed and rigidified in the concept of personality." (pg. 165)
 - "At least something negative can be said about the concept of the real person. He would be neither a mere function of a whole, which is inflicted upon him so thoroughly that he cannot distinguish himself from it anymore, nor would he simply retrench himself in his pure selfhood: precisely that is the form of a bad rootedness in nature that even now still lives on. Were he a real person, then he would no longer be a personality but also not less than one, no mere bundle of reflexes, but rather a third entity." (pg. 165)
- Free Time (pg. 167)
 - **"Free time is shackled to its contrary.** This opposition, the relationship within which free time appears, even shapes some of its essential characteristics" (pg. 167)
 - "Moreover, and far more importantly, **free time depends on the totality of societal conditions. That totality now as much as ever holds people under a spell. In reality, neither in their work nor in their consciousness are people freely in charge of themselves.** Even those conciliatory sociologies that apply the concept of 'role' like a master key acknowledge this fact to the extent that the concept, borrowed from the theater, hints that the existence imposed on people by society is not identical with what they are in themselves or what they could be. Certainly no simple division should be attempted between human beings as they are in themselves and their so-called social roles. The roles extend deep into the characteristics of people themselves, into their innermost composition. **In the age of truly unprecedented social integration it is difficult to discern anything at all in people that might be other than functionally determined.**" (pg. 167-168)
 - "Unfreedom is expanding within free time, and most of the unfree people are as unconscious of the process as they are of their own unfreedom." (pg. 168)
 - "I have no hobby. Not that I'm a workaholic who wouldn't know how to do anything else but get down to business and do what has to be done. But rather I take the activities with which I occupy myself beyond the bounds of my official profession, without exception, so seriously that I would be shocked by the idea that they had anything to do with hobbies—that is, activities I'm mindlessly infatuated with only in order to kill time—if my experience had not toughened me against manifestations of barbarism that have become self-evident and acceptable. Making music, listening to music, reading with concentration constitute an integral element of my existence; the word hobby would be a mockery of them. And conversely, my work, the production of philosophical and sociological studies and university teaching so far has been so pleasant to me that I am unable to express it within that opposition to free time that the current razor-sharp classification demands from people" (pg. 168)
 - "**If we assume with Marx that in bourgeois society labor has become a commodity and that labor consequently has become reified, then the expression hobby amounts to the paradox that this condition, which understands itself to be the opposite of reification, a sanctuary of immediate life within a completely mediated total system, is itself reified like the rigid demarcation between labor and free time. This border perpetuates the forms of societal life organized according to the system of profit.**" (pg. 169)
 - ◆ "Here one comes up against a behavioral pattern of the bourgeois character. On the one hand, one should concentrate when at work, not be distracted, not fool about; this used to form the basis for wage labor, the precepts of which have been internalized. On the other hand, free time should in no way whatsoever suggest work, presumably so that one can work that much more effectively afterward. This is the reason for the idiocy of many leisure time activities" (pg. 169)
 - "**Boredom is a function of life under the compulsion to work and under the rigorous division of labor. Boredom need not necessarily exist.** Whenever behavior in free time is truly autonomous, determined by free people for themselves, then boredom rarely sets in; boredom is just as unlikely when people successfully follow their own desire for happiness as when their free time activities are reasonable and meaningful in themselves. Even fooling about need not be inane and can be enjoyed blissfully as a dispensation from the mechanisms of self-control. **If people were able to make their own decisions about themselves and their lives, if they were not harnessed to the eternal sameness, then they would not have to be bored. Boredom is the reflex reaction to objective dullness"** (pg. 171)

Dialectic of Enlightenment. 9 Everywhere where it is mutilated, consciousness is reflected back upon the body and the sphere of the corporeal in an unfree form that tends toward violence. One need only observe how, with a certain type of uneducated person, his language—above all when he feels faulted or reproached—becomes threatening, as if the linguistic gestures bespoke a physical violence barely kept under control. Here one must surely also study the role of sport, which has been insufficiently investigated by a critical social psychology." (pg. 196)

- **"People who blindly slot themselves into the collective already make themselves into something like inert material, extinguish themselves as self-determined beings. With this comes the willingness to treat others as an amorphous mass.** I called those who behave in this way "the manipulative character" in the *Authoritarian Personality...*" (pg. 198)
<https://ia601506.us.archive.org/28/items/THEAUTHORITARIANPERSONALITY.Adorno/THE%20AUTHORITARIAN%20PERSONALITY.%20-Adorno.pdf>
- **"Sometimes social psychology and sociology are able to construct concepts that only later are empirically verified.** The manipulative character—as anyone can confirm in the sources available about those Nazi leaders—is distinguished by a rage for organization, by the inability to have any immediate human experiences at all, by a certain lack of emotion, by an overvalued realism. At any cost he wants to conduct supposed, even if delusional, *Realpolitik*. He does not for one second think or wish that the world were any different than it is, he is obsessed by the desire of doing things [*Dinge zu tun*], indifferent to the content of such action. He makes a cult of action, activity, of so-called efficiency as such, which reappears in the advertising image of the active person. If my observations do not deceive me and if several sociological investigations permit generalization, then this type has become much more prevalent today than one would think" (pg. 198)
 - "If I had to reduce this type of manipulative character to a formula—perhaps one should not do it, but it could also contribute to understanding—then I would call it the type of **reified consciousness**. **People of such a nature have, as it were, assimilated themselves to things. And then, when possible, they assimilate others to things**" (pg. 198-199)
- "One of the greatest impulses of Christianity, not immediately identical with its dogma, was to eradicate the coldness that permeates everything. But this attempt failed; surely because it did not reach into the societal order that produces and reproduces that coldness. Probably that warmth among people, which everyone longs for, has never been present at all, except during short periods and in very small groups, perhaps even among peaceful savages" (pg. 202)
 - "If anything can help against coldness as the condition for disaster, then it is the insight into the conditions that determine it and the attempt to combat those conditions, initially in the domain of the individual." (pg. 202)
 - ◆ **"Knowledge of these mechanisms is necessary, as is knowledge of the stereotypical defense mechanisms that block such a consciousness"** (pg. 202)
- **"the climate that most promotes such a resurrection is the revival of nationalism. It is so evil because, in the age of international communication and supranational blocs, nationalism cannot really believe in itself anymore and must exaggerate itself to the extreme in order to persuade itself and others that it is still substantial."** (pg. 203)
 - "So-called national revival movements in an age in which nationalism is obsolete are obviously especially susceptible to sadistic practices" (pg. 203)
 - "All political instruction finally should be centered upon the idea that Auschwitz should never happen again. This would be possible only when it devotes itself openly, without fear of offending any authorities, to this most important of problems. **To do this education must transform itself into sociology, that is, it must teach about the societal play of forces that operates beneath the surface of political forms.** One must submit to critical treatment—to provide just one model—such a respectable concept as that of "reason of state"; in placing the right of the state over that of its members, the horror is potentially already posited" (pg. 203)
- On the Question: "What is German?" (pg. 205)
 - See text
- Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America (pg. 215)
 - **"As much as I recognize that intellectual individuality itself can only develop through processes of adjustment and socialization, I also consider it the obligation and the proof of individuation that it transcends adjustment. By means of the mechanisms of identification with ego ideals, individuation must emancipate itself from this very identification.** This relation between autonomy and adjustment was recognized early on by Freud..." (pg. 215)
 - **"Reified consciousness** is certainly at home not only in America but rather **is fostered by the overall tendency of society**" (pg. 232)
 - *cf. T. Adorno, *Philosophic Elements of a Theory of Society* - "Society cannot be imagined without the concept of tendency, because it contains the decisive mediations between what is socially given and the concept thereof, the concept of a nature of society, of what society aims for and what it has stepped up to do" (pg. 20). Adorno continues, "Tendency exists only in so far as society is already the totality, the system that is presupposed as soon as one speaks of tendency. Tendency makes no sense in more or less unconnected groups or with markets that are only loosely connected. The underlying laws of society exist only to the extent that there is at least unity in the sector where such laws are alleged to apply" (pg. 22)
 - https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/uqd/d7b063_93ffaab36522489984457dce4d9ad973.pdf
 - **"We [Horkheimer and I] viewed social psychology as subjective mediation of the objective societal system, without whose mechanisms it would not have been possible to keep a hold on its subjects.** To this extent our views approached subjectively oriented research methods as a corrective to a rigid thinking imposed from above, in which invoking the supremacy of the system becomes a substitute for insight into the concrete connection between the system and those who, after all, compose it. On the other hand, the subjectively oriented analyses have their valid place only within an objective theory. In *The Authoritarian Personality* this is emphasized repeatedly. The work's focus on the subjective moments was interpreted, along the lines of the predominant tendency of the times, as though social psychology was used as a philosopher's stone, whereas, in Freud's famous turn of phrase, it was simply trying to add something new to what was already known." (pg. 231)
 - "In America I was liberated from a naive belief in culture, acquired the ability to see culture from the outside. To make this clearer: **in spite of all critique of society and all consciousness of the supremacy of the economy, the absolute importance of spirit was always natural and obvious to me**" (pg. 239)
 - "European intellectuals such as myself are inclined to view the concept of *adjustment* [Anpassung] merely negatively, as the extinction of spontaneity and the autonomy of the individual person. Yet it is an illusion sharply criticized by Goethe and Hegel that the process of humanization and cultivation necessarily and continually proceeds from the inside outward. It is accomplished also and precisely through "externalization," as Hegel called it. **We become free human beings not by each of us realizing ourselves as individuals, according to the hideous phrase, but rather in that we go out of ourselves, enter into relation with others, and in a certain sense relinquish ourselves to them. Only through this process do we determine ourselves as individuals, not by watering ourselves like plants in order to become well-rounded cultivated personalities.**" (pg. 240)
- Dialectical Epilegomena
 - On Subject and Object (pg. 245)

- "No concept of the subject can have the element of individual humanity—what Schelling called "egoity"—separated from it in thought; without any reference to it, subject would lose all significance. Conversely, the particular human individual, as soon as one reflects upon it under the guise of the universality of its concept, which does not signify merely some particular being *hic et nunc*, is already transformed into a universal, similar to what was expressed in the idealist concept of the subject; even the expression "particular person" requires the concept of species simply in order to be meaningful. The relation to that universal still inheres implicitly in proper names." (pg. 245)
 - ◆ "The concepts of subject and object, or rather what they refer to, have in a certain way priority over all definition. **Defining means as much as subjectively, by means of a rigidly applied concept, capturing something objective, no matter what it may be in itself. Hence the resistance of subject and object to the act of defining. The determination of their meanings requires reflection on the very thing the act of defining truncates for the sake of conceptual manageability.** Therefore it is advisable to start by taking up the words "subject" and "object" such as they are handed down by the well-honed philosophical language, as a historical sediment; not, of course, sticking to such conventionalism but continuing further with a critical analysis. One could begin with the allegedly naïve, though already mediated, view that a knowing subject, whatever kind it may be, stands confronting an object of knowledge, whatever kind it may be. The reflection, which in philosophical terminology goes by the name of *intentio obliqua*, is then a relating from that ambiguous concept of object back to a no less ambiguous concept of subject. A second reflection reflects the first, more closely determining the vagueness for the sake of the contents of the concepts of subject and object." (pg. 246)
- "The separation of subject and object is both real and semblance. True, because in the realm of cognition it lends expression to the real separation, the riveness of the human condition, the result of a coercive historical process; untrue, because the historical separation must not be hypostatized, not magically transformed into an invariant. This contradiction in the separation of subject and object is imparted to epistemology. **Although as separated they cannot be thought away, the [greek word] of the separation is manifested in their being mutually mediated, object by subject, and even more and differently, subject by object. As soon as it is fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology, its normal form.** Mind then arrogates to itself the status of being absolutely independent— which it is not: mind's claim to independence announces its claim to domination. Once radically separated from the object, subject reduces the object to itself; subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object itself." (pg. 246)
 - ◆ "Fate, the complicity of myth with nature, comes from the total political immaturity of society, from an age in which self-reflection had not yet opened its eyes, in which subject did not yet exist." (pg. 247)
 - ◆ "In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of subject and object would lie in a peace achieved between human beings as well as between them and their Other. **Peace is the state of differentiation without domination, with the differentiated participating in each other.**" (pg. 247)
- "In epistemology, 'subject' is usually understood to mean the transcendental subject. According to idealist doctrine, it either constructs the objective world out of an undifferentiated material as in Kant or, since Fichte, it engenders the world itself. The critique of idealism was not the first to discover that this transcendental subject, which constitutes all content of experience, is in turn abstracted from living individual human beings. It is evident that the abstract concept of the transcendental subject, that is, the forms of thought, their unity, and the originary productivity of consciousness, presupposes precisely what it promises to establish: actual, living individuals. The idealist philosophies were aware of this point." (pg. 247)
 - ◆ "The more individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the societal totality as they are connected up to the system, the more the person pure and simple, as a principle, is consoled and exalted with the attributes of creative power, absolute rule, and spirit." (pg. 248)
- "In a certain sense, although idealism would be the last to admit it, the transcendental subject is more real, that is, it far more determines the real conduct of people and society than do those psychological individuals from whom the transcendental subject was abstracted and who have little to say in the world; for their part they have turned into appendages of the social machinery, ultimately into ideology. The living individual person, such as he is constrained to act and for which he was even internally molded, is as homo *oeconomicus* incarnate closer to the transcendental subject than the living individual he must immediately take himself to be. To this extent idealist theory was realistic and need not feel embarrassed when reproached for idealism by its opponents. The doctrine of the transcendental subject faithfully discloses the precedence of the abstract, rational relations that are abstracted from individuals and their conditions and for which exchange is the model. If the standard structure of society is the exchange form, its rationality constitutes people: what they are for themselves, what they think they are, is secondary. They are deformed at the outset by the mechanism that was then philosophically transfigured into the transcendental." (pg. 248)
 - ◆ "The particular individual owes the possibility of his existence to the universal; proof of this is thought, which is itself a universal and to that extent a societal relation. Thought is given priority over the individual not only fetishistically. But idealism hypostatizes only one side, which is incomprehensible except in relation to the other." (pg. 249)
- "The primacy of the object means rather that subject for its part is object in a qualitatively different, more radical sense than object, because **object cannot be known except through consciousness, hence is also subject.** What is known through consciousness must be a something; mediation applies to something mediated. But subject, the epitome of mediation, is the 'How', and never, as contrasted to the object, the "What" that is postulated by every conceivable idea for a concept of subject. Potentially, though not actually, objectivity can be conceived without a subject; but not likewise object without subjectivity" (pg. 249)
 - ◆ "Object is also mediated; but, according to its own concept, it is not so thoroughly dependent upon subject as subject is dependent upon objectivity. Idealism ignored such a difference and thereby coarsened an intellectualization that functions as a disguise for abstraction." (pg. 250)
 - ◇ "If one wants to attain the object, however, then its subjective determinations or qualities are not to be eliminated: precisely that would be contrary to the primacy of the object. If subject has a core of object, then the subjective qualities in the object are all the more an objective moment. For object becomes something at all only through being determinate. In the determinations that seem merely to be affixed to it by the subject, the subject's own objectivity comes to the fore: they are all borrowed from the objectivity of the *intentio recta*" (pg. 250)
- "For society is immanent to experience...Only the societal self-reflection of knowledge obtains that epistemological objectivity that escapes knowledge so long as it obeys the societal coercions at work in it and does not think through them. **Critique of society is critique of knowledge, and vice versa"** (pg. 150)
- "Since the Copernican turn what goes by the name of phenomenalism— that nothing is known unless it goes through the knowing subject—has joined with the cult of the mind." (pg. 251)
 - ◆ "What transcendental philosophy praised in creative subjectivity is the subject's own self-concealed imprisonment within itself. The subject remains harnessed within everything objective it thinks, like an armored animal in its layers of carapace it vainly tries to shake loose; yet it never occurred to those animals to vaunt their captivity as freedom. It would be well to ask why human beings did so. Their mental captivity is exceedingly real. Their dependence as cognitive subjects upon space, time, and forms of thought marks

- their dependence on the species" (pg. 252)
- ◇ "Captivity was internalized: the individual is no less imprisoned within himself than he is within the universal, within society. Hence the interest in reinterpreting the captivity as freedom. The categorial captivity of individual consciousness repeats the real captivity of each individual. Even the view of consciousness that allows it to see through that captivity is determined by the forms it has implanted in the individual. Their individual self-captivity might make people cognizant of their societal captivity: the prevention of this was and remains a capital interest for the continuation of the status quo. For the sake of the status quo philosophy had to overstep its bounds, with hardly less necessity than that of the forms themselves. Idealism was this ideological even before it set about glorifying the world as absolute Idea. The original compensation already includes the presumption that reality, exalted into a product of the putatively free subject, in turn vindicates itself as free." (pg. 252)
 - **"Reified consciousness, which mistakenly takes itself for nature, is naive:** a historical formation and itself mediated through and through, it takes itself, to speak with Husserl, for an "ontological sphere of absolute origins" and takes the thing confronting it, which it itself has trussed up, for the coveted matter itself" (pg. 253)
 - **"Objectivity can be made out solely by reflecting,** at every historical and cognitive stage, both upon what at that time is presented as subject and object as well as upon their mediations." (pg. 253)
 - ◆ "The key position of the subject in cognition is experience, not form..." (pg. 254)
 - ◇ "The exertion of cognition is predominantly the destruction of its usual exertion, of its using violence against the object. Knowledge of the object is brought closer by the act of the subject rending the veil it weaves about the object. It can do this only when, passive, without anxiety, it entrusts itself to its own experience. In the places where subjective reason senses subjective contingency, the primacy of the object shimmers through: that in the object which is not a subjective addition. **Subject is the agent, not the constituent, of object; this has consequences for the relation between theory and practice as well.**" (pg. 254)
 - "Even after the second reflection of the Copernican turn, **there still remains some truth to Kant's most contestable thesis: the distinction between the transcendental thing-in-itself and the constituted, concretely objective thing.** For then object would finally be the nonidentical, liberated from the subjective spell and comprehensible through its own self-critique—if object is there at all and not rather what Kant outlined with the concept of idea. Such nonidentity would quite closely approach the Kantian thing-in-itself, although he insisted on the vanishing point of its coincidence with subject" (pg. 254)
 - ◆ **"Yet according to Kant, object is something "posited" by the subject, the weave of forms cast by the subject over the Something devoid of qualities,** finally the law that unites the appearances, which are disintegrated by their relation back to subject, into a concrete object" (pg. 254)
 - ◇ "That law, which according to Kant the subject prescribes to nature, the highest elevation of objectivity in his conception, is the perfect expression of subject as well as of its self-alienation: at the height of its formative pretension, the subject passes itself off as object." (pg. 254)
 - ◆ **"Kant's Copernican turn precisely expresses the objectification of the subject, the reality of reification.** Its truth content is by no means an ontological one but, on the contrary, the historically amassed block between subject and object. The subject erects that block when it claims supremacy over the object and thereby defrauds itself of it. As in truth nonidentical, the object distances itself farther from the subject the more the subject "constitutes" the object. The block against which the Kantian philosophy pounds its head is at the same time a product of that philosophy." (pg. 254-255)
 - **"The concept of what there is means nothing other than the concept of what exists, and as existent subject falls at once under the heading of object.** But as pure apperception subject should be the absolutely Other of all existents. Even here some truth appears in its negative guise: that the reification the sovereign subject has inflicted on everything, including itself, is semblance. It transposes into the abyss of itself what would be beyond reach of reification; with the absurd consequence, of course, that it thereby licenses all other reification. Idealism takes the idea of the correct life and wrongly projects it inward. The subject as productive imagination, pure apperception, ultimately as free action, enciphers that activity in which the life of people actually reproduces itself, and with good reason anticipates in it freedom. That is the reason why subject will hardly simply vanish into object or into anything else allegedly higher, into Being however it may be hypostatized. Subject in its self-positing is semblance and at the same time something historically exceedingly real. It contains the potential for the sublation of its own domination." (pg. 255-256)
 - "The difference between subject and object slices through subject as well as through object. It can no more be absolutized than it can be removed from thought. Actually everything that is in the subject can be attributed to the object; whatever in it is not object semantically bursts open the 'is.'" (pg. 256)
 - **"The idealist construction of the subject founders on its falsely taking subject to be objective in the sense of something existing in-itself, precisely what it is not:** measured against the standard of entities, the subject is condemned to nothingness. Subject is all the more the less it is, and all the less the more it believes itself to exist, to be for itself something objective. As an essential moment, however, it is ineradicable. Upon the elimination of the subjective moment the object would come apart diffusely like the fleeting stirrings and twinklings of subjective life." (pg. 257)
 - "the concept of the transcendental is a reminder that thinking, by virtue of its own immanent elements of universality, transcends its own inalienable individuation. The antithesis between universal and particular too is necessary as well as deceptive. **Neither one can exist without the other, the particular only as determined and thus universal, the universal only as the determination of a particular and thus itself particular. Both of them are and are not. This is one of the strongest motives of a nonidealist dialectics.**" (pg. 257)
- Marginalia to Theory and Praxis (pg. 259)
 - "A simple consideration of history demonstrates just how much the question of theory and praxis depends upon the question of subject and object." (pg. 259)
 - ◆ "Despite all its eager realism, pure practical reason is devoid of object to the same degree that the world for manufacturing and industry becomes material devoid of quality and ready for processing, which in turn finds its legitimation nowhere else but in the marketplace. Whereas praxis promises to lead people out of their self-isolation, praxis itself has always been isolated; for this reason practical people are unresponsive and the relation of praxis to its object is a priori undermined." (pg. 259)
 - ◆ **"Theory steals itself back from the system's immanence only where it shirks its pragmatic fetters,** no matter how modified they may be" (pg. 260)
 - ◇ "The subject, thrown back upon itself, divided from its Other by an abyss, is supposedly incapable of action" (pg. 260)
 - **"What since then has been called the problem of praxis and today culminates in the question of the relation between theory and praxis coincides with the loss of experience caused by the rationality of the eternally same.** Where experience is blocked or altogether absent, praxis is damaged and therefore longed for, distorted, and desperately overvalued. Thus **what is called the problem of praxis is interwoven with the problem of knowledge.** Abstract subjectivity, in which the process of rationalization terminates, strictly speaking can

- do just as little as the transcendental subject can conceivably have precisely what it is attested to have: spontaneity" (pg. 260)
- ◆ "A consciousness of theory and praxis must be produced that neither divides the two such that theory becomes powerless and praxis becomes arbitrary, nor refracts theory through the archbourgeois primacy of practical reason proclaimed by Kant and Fichte. **Thinking is a doing, theory a form of praxis**; already the ideology of the purity of thinking deceives about this. **Thinking has a double character: it is immanently determined and rigorous, and yet an inalienably real mode of behavior in the midst of reality. To the extent that subject, the thinking substance of philosophers, is object, to the extent that it falls within object, subject is already also practical. The irrationality of praxis that continually resurfaces however...unceasingly animates the illusion of the absolute division between subject and object. Where subject is inveigled into believing that object is something absolutely incommensurable, the communication between the two becomes the prey of blind fate" (pg. 261)

 - ◇ "It would be too coarse a generalization were one, for the sake of a historico-philosophical construction, to date the divergence between theory and praxis as late as the Renaissance." (pg. 261)
 - ▶ **"The crisis of praxis was experienced as: not knowing what should be done."** (pg. 261)**
 - "Whoever does not want to romanticize the Middle Ages must trace the divergence between theory and praxis back to the oldest division between physical and intellectual labor, probably as far back as prehistoric obscurity. **Praxis arose from labor. It attained its concept when labor no longer wanted to merely reproduce life directly but to produce its conditions: and this clashed with the already existing conditions.** Its descent from labor is a heavy burden for all praxis. To this day it carries the baggage of an element of unfreedom; the fact that once it was necessary to struggle against the pleasure principle for the sake of one's own self-preservation, although labor that has been reduced to a minimum no longer needs to be tied to self-denial. Contemporary actionism also represses the fact that the longing for freedom is closely related to the aversion to praxis. **Praxis was the reaction to deprivation**; this still disfigures praxis even when it wants to do away with deprivation. To this extent art is the critique of praxis as unfreedom; this is where its truth begins" (pg. 262)
 - ◆ "The lack of self-reflection derives not only from their psychology. It is the mark of a praxis that, having become its own fetish, becomes a barricade to its own goal. The dialectic is hopeless: that through praxis alone is it possible to escape the captivating spell praxis imposes on people, but that meanwhile as praxis it compulsively contributes to reinforcing the spell, obtuse, narrow-minded, at the farthest remove from spirit. The recent hostility toward theory, which animates this process, makes a program out of it" (pg. 262)
 - ◇ "Theory speaks for what is not narrow-minded. Despite all of its unfreedom, theory is the guarantor of freedom in the midst of unfreedom." (pg. 263)
 - ◆ **"Whoever thinks, offers resistance; it is more comfortable to swim with the current, even when one declares oneself to be against the current.** Moreover, by giving way to a regressive and distorted form of the pleasure principle, making things easier for oneself, letting oneself go, one can hope for a moral premium from those who are like-minded. In a crude reversal, the collective substitute superego demands what the old superego disapproved of: the very cession of oneself qualifies the willing adept as a better person." (pg. 263)
 - ◇ "Humaneness, which does not exist without individuation, is being virtually recanted by the latter's snotty-nosed, casual dismissal. But once the action of the individual, and therefore of all individuals, is made contemptible, then collective action is likewise paralyzed. Spontaneity appears to be trivial at the outset in the face of the factual supremacy of the objective conditions" (pg. 264)
 - ◆ "Kant's moral philosophy and Hegel's philosophy of right represent two dialectical stages of the bourgeois self-consciousness of praxis. Polarized according to the dichotomy of the particular and the universal that tears apart this consciousness, both philosophies are false. Each justifies itself against the other so long as a possible higher form of praxis does not reveal itself in reality; its revelation requires theoretical reflection. It is beyond doubt and controversy that a reasoned analysis of the situation is the precondition for political praxis at least: even in the military sphere, where the crude primacy of action holds sway, the procedure is the same. **An analysis of the situation is not tantamount to conformity to that situation. In reflecting upon the situation, analysis emphasizes the aspects that might be able to lead beyond the given constraints of the situation. This is of incalculable relevance for the relationship of theory to praxis. Through its difference from immediate, situation-specific action, i.e., through its autonomization, theory becomes a transformative and practical productive force.** If thinking bears on anything of importance, then it initiates a practical impulse, no matter how hidden that impulse may remain to thinking. **Those alone think who do not passively accept the already given:** from the primitive who contemplates how he can protect his small fire from the rain or where he can find shelter from the storm to the Enlightenment philosopher who construes how humanity can move beyond its self-incurred tutelage by means of its interest in self-preservation. Such motives continue to have an effect, and perhaps all the more so in cases where no practical grounds are immediately articulated. **There is no thought, insofar as it is more than the organization of facts and a bit of technique, that does not have its practical telos.** Every meditation upon freedom extends into the conception of its possible realization, so long as the meditation is not taken in hand by praxis and tailored to fit the results it enjoins. Just as the division of subject and object cannot be revoked immediately by a decree of thought, so too an immediate unity of theory and praxis is hardly possible: it would imitate the false identity of subject and object and would perpetuate the principle of domination that posits identity and that a true praxis must oppose" (pg. 264-265)
 - "The neediness of the object is mediated via the total societal system; for that reason it can be determined critically only by theory. **Praxis without theory, lagging behind the most advanced state of cognition, cannot but fail, and praxis, in keeping with its own concept, would like to succeed. False praxis is no praxis.** Desperation that, because it finds the exits blocked, blindly leaps into praxis, with the purest of intentions joins forces with catastrophe. The hostility to theory in the spirit of the times, the by no means coincidental withering away of theory, its banishment by an impatience that wants to change the world without having to interpret it while so far it has been chapter and verse that philosophers have merely interpreted—such hostility becomes praxis's weakness. **The requirement that theory should kowtow to praxis dissolves theory's truth content and condemns praxis to delusion**; in practical terms, it is high time to voice this. A modicum of madness furnishes collective movements—apparently for the time being regardless of their contents—with their sinister power of attraction. **Individuals cope with their own disintegration, with their private paranoia, by integrating themselves into the collective delusion, the collective paranoia,** as Ernst Simmel realized" (pg. 265-266)
 - ◆ "This sanctioned delusion exempts one from reality-testing, which necessarily generates unbearable antagonisms within the weakened consciousness like that of subjective need and objective refusal. **A fawning and malicious servant of the pleasure principle, the delusional element carries an infectious disease that mortally threatens the ego by giving it the illusion that it is protected.** Fear of this disease would be the simplest—and therefore likewise repressed—means of self-preservation: the unflinching refusal to cross the rapidly evaporating Rubicon that separates reason and delusion. **The transition to a praxis without theory is motivated by the objective impotence of theory and exponentially increases that impotence through the isolation and fetishization of the subjective element of historical movement, spontaneity.** The deformation of spontaneity should be seen as a

- reaction to the administered world. But by frantically closing its eyes to the totality and by behaving as though it stems immediately from people, spontaneity falls into line with the objective tendency of progressive dehumanization: even in its practices. Spontaneity, which would be animated by the neediness of the object, should attach itself to the vulnerable places of rigidified reality, where the ruptures caused by the pressure of rigidification appear externally; it should not thrash about indiscriminately, abstractly, without any consideration of the contents of what is often attacked merely for the sake of publicity." (pg. 266)
- "In his celebrated letter to Kugelmann, Marx warned of the threat of a relapse into barbarism, which already must have been foreseeable at that time" (pg. 267)
 - ◆ "The relapse has already occurred. To still expect it in the future, even after Auschwitz and Hiroshima, is to take pitiable consolation in the thought that the worst is possibly yet to come. Humanity, which commits and endures wrong, in so doing already ratifies the worst: it is enough merely to listen to the nonsense being peddled about the dangers of détente. The sole adequate praxis would be to put all energies toward working our way out of barbarism. With the supersonic acceleration of history, barbarism has reached the point where it infects everything that conflicts with it." (pg. 268)
 - "The error of the primacy of praxis as it is exercised today appears clearly in the privilege accorded to tactics over everything else. The means have become autonomous to the extreme. Serving the ends without reflection, they have alienated themselves from them" (pg. 268)
 - ◆ "Thus everywhere discussion is called for, certainly initially out of an anti-authoritarian impulse. But discussion, which by the way, like the public sphere, is an entirely bourgeois category, has been completely ruined by tactics. What discussions could possibly produce, namely, decisions reached from a greater objectivity to the extent that intentions and arguments interpenetrate, does not interest those who automatically, and in completely inappropriate situations, call for discussions. **Each of the hegemonic cliques has prepared in advance the results it desires.**" (pg. 268-269)
 - ◇ "Discussion serves manipulation. Every argument, untroubled by the question of whether it is sound, is geared to a purpose. Whatever the opponent says is hardly perceived and then only so that formulaic clichés can be served up in retort. **No one wants to learn, experience, insofar as experience is still possible at all.** The opponent in a discussion becomes a functional component of the current plan: reified by the reified consciousness *malgré lui-même*" (pg. 269)
 - ▶ "If the opponent does not concede, then he will be disqualified and accused of lacking the qualities presupposed by the discussion. The concept of discussion is cleverly twisted so that the opponent is supposed to let himself be convinced; this degrades the discussion into farce. **Behind this ploy lies an authoritarian principle: the dissenter must adopt the group's opinion.** The unresponsive ones project their own unresponsiveness upon whom ever will not let himself be terrorized. With all this, actionism acquiesces to the trend it intends or pretends to struggle against: the bourgeois instrumentalism that fetishizes means because its form of praxis cannot suffer reflection upon its ends" (pg. 269)
 - "Pseudo-activity, praxis that takes itself more seriously and insulates itself more diligently from theory and knowledge the more it loses contact with its object and a sense of proportion, is a product of objective societal conditions. It truly is conformist: to the situation of *huis clos*" (pg. 269)
 - ◆ "Pseudo-activity is provoked and at the same time condemned to being illusory by the current state of the technical forces of production. Just as personalization offers false consolation for the fact that within the anonymous apparatus the individual does not count anymore, so pseudoactivity deceives about the debilitation of a praxis presupposing a free and autonomous agent that no longer exists" (pg. 270)
 - ◇ "From pseudo-activity all the way to pseudo-revolution, the objective tendency of society coincides seamlessly with subjective regression. World history once again produces in parody the kind of people whom it in fact needs." (pg. 270)
 - "Without psychology, in which the objective constraints are continually internalized anew, it would be impossible to understand how people passively accept a state of unchanging destructive irrationality and, moreover, how they integrate themselves into movements that stand in rather obvious contradiction to their own interests." (pg. 271)
 - ◆ "**The more clever people realize the pointlessness of their activity, while others strenuously conceal it**" (pg. 271)
 - "Those who protest most vehemently are similar to authoritarian personalities in their aversion to introspection; when they do consider themselves, it happens without criticism, and unreflectedly, aggressively is directed outward. They overestimate their own relevance narcissistically, without a sufficient sense of proportion. They impose their needs immediately...as the criterion of praxis; so far there has been little room left for the dialectical category of externalization. They reify their own psychology and expect reified consciousness from those who face them. Actually they taboo experience and become allergic as soon as anything refers to it. Experience for them comes down to what they call "privilege of information" without noticing that the concepts of information and communication they exploit are imported from the monopolistic culture industry and the science calibrated to it. Objectively they contribute to the regressive transformation of what still remains intact of the subject into contact points for conditioned reflexes" (pg. 271-272)
 - "**Rationality cannot, any more than the subjective authority serving it, the ego, be simply split off from self-preservation...**" (pg. 272)
 - ◆ "*Ratio* came into being in the first place as an instrument of self-preservation, that of reality-testing" (pg. 272)
 - ◆ "The preservation of humanity is inexorably inscribed within the meaning of rationality: it has its end in a reasonable organization of society, otherwise it would bring its own movement to an authoritarian standstill. Humanity is organized rationally solely to the extent that it preserves its societalized subjects according to their unfettered potentialities" (pg. 272-273)
 - ◇ "Weber recognized, with an intensity of scrutiny matched only by his refusal to let it influence his conception, that the irrationality he both described and passed over in silence follows from the determination of ratio as means, its blindness to ends and to the critical consciousness of them. Weber's resigned rationality becomes irrational precisely in that, as Weber postulated in angry identification with the aggressor, the ends remain irrational to rationality's asceticism. **Without a hold on the determinateness of its objects, ratio runs away from itself;** its principle becomes one of bad infinity" (pg. 273)
 - ◆ "Ratio should not be anything less than self-preservation, namely that of the species, upon which the survival of each individual literally depends. Through self-preservation the species indeed gains the potential for that self-reflection that could finally transcend the self-preservation to which it was reduced by being restricted simply to a means." (pg. 273)
 - "**Actionism is regressive. Under the spell of the positivity that long ago became part of the armature of ego-weakness, it refuses to reflect upon its own impotence**" (pg. 273)
 - ◆ "Those who incessantly cry "too abstract!" strenuously cultivate concretism, an immediacy that is inferior to the available theoretical means. The pseudo-praxis profits from this" (pb. 273)
 - ◆ "The Archimedean point—how might a nonrepressive praxis be possible, how might one steer between the alternatives of spontaneity and organization—this point, if it exists at all, cannot be found other than through theory" (pg. 274)
 - ◆ "Weak and fearful people feel strong when they hold hands while running. This is the real turning point of dialectical reversal into irrationalism. Defended with a hundred sophisms, inculcated into adepts with a hundred techniques for exerting moral pressure, is

- the idea that by abandoning one's own reason and judgment one is blessed with a higher, that is, collective reason..." (pg. 276)
- "If theory and praxis are neither immediately one nor absolutely different, then their relation is one of discontinuity. No continuous path leads from praxis to theory—what has to be added is what is called the spontaneous moment. But theory is part of the nexus of society and at the same time is autonomous. Nevertheless praxis does not proceed independently of theory, nor theory independently of praxis" (pg. 276)
 - ◆ "The dogma of the unity of theory and praxis, contrary to the doctrine on which it is based, is undialectical: it underhandedly appropriates simple identity where contradiction alone has the chance of becoming productive. Whereas theory cannot be extracted from the entire societal process, it also maintains an independence within this process; it is not only a means of the totality but also a moment of it; otherwise it could not resist to any degree the captivating spell of that totality. **The relationship between theory and practice, after both have once distanced themselves from each other, is that of qualitative reversal, not transition, and surely not subordination. They stand in a polar relationship**" (pg. 277)
 - Part 3 - Critical Models 3 (pg. 279)
 - Critique (pg. 281)
 - "politics is not a self-enclosed, isolated sphere, as it manifests itself for instance in political institutions, processes, and procedural rules, but rather can be conceived only in its relationship to the societal play of forces making up the substance of everything political and veiled by political surface phenomena, so too the concept of critique cannot be restricted to a narrow political field. **Critique is essential to all democracy. Not only does democracy require the freedom to criticize and need critical impulses. Democracy is nothing less than defined by critique.** This can be recalled simply in the historical fact that the conception of the separation of powers, upon which every democracy is based, from Locke and Montesquieu and the American constitution up to today, has its lifeblood in critique. The *system of checks and balances*, the reciprocal overview of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, means as much as that each of these powers subjects the others to critique and thereby reduces the despotism that each power, without this critical element, gravitates to. **Critique and the prerequisite of democracy, political maturity, belong together. Politically mature is the person who speaks for himself, because he has thought for himself and is not merely repeating someone else; he stands free of any guardian. This is demonstrated in the power to resist established opinions and, one and the same, also to resist existing institutions, to resist everything that is merely posited, that justifies itself with its existence.** Such resistance, as the ability to distinguish between what is known and what is accepted merely by convention or under the constraint of authority, is one with critique, whose concept indeed comes from the Greek *krino*, "to decide." **He who equates the modern concept of reason with critique is scarcely exaggerating. The Enlightenment thinker Kant, who wanted to see society emancipated from its self-incurred immaturity and who taught autonomy, that is, judgment according to one's own insight in contrast to heteronomy, obedience to what is urged by others, named his three major works critiques.**" (pg. 281-282)
 - "Hegel, in whom the movement commencing with Kant culminates, and who in many passages equates thinking altogether with negativity and hence with critique, likewise has the opposite tendency: to bring critique to a halt. Whoever relies on the limited activity of one's own understanding Hegel calls, using a political epithet, *Raisonneur* [carper, arguer] and accuses of vanity because he does not reflect on his own finitude, is incapable of subordinating himself to something higher, the totality" (pg. 282)
 - ◆ "However, for Hegel this higher thing is the present conditions. Hegel's aversion to critique goes together with his thesis that the real is rational. According to **Hegel's authoritarian directive**, that person is truly in control of his reason who does not insist on reason's antithesis to what presently exists, but rather within given reality recognizes his own reason. The individual citizen is supposed to capitulate before reality. The renunciation of critique is twisted into a higher wisdom..." (pg. 282)
 - "Something of the contradiction between the modern emancipation of critical spirit and its simultaneous dampening is characteristic of the entire bourgeois period: from an early period onward the bourgeoisie must have feared that the logic of its own principles could lead beyond its own sphere of interest" (pg. 283)
 - "It is easily forgotten in Germany that **critique, as a central motif of spirit, is not very popular anywhere in the world**" (pg. 283)
 - ◆ "**Whoever criticizes violates the taboo of unity**, which tends toward totalitarian organization. The critic becomes a divisive influence and, with a totalitarian phrase, a subversive" (pg. 283)
 - "In military hierarchies the oppressive element of such an esprit de corps may be found everywhere..." (pg. 286)
 - Resignation (pg. 289)
 - "Pseudo-reality is conjoined with, as its subjective attitude, pseudo-activity: action that overdoes and aggravates itself for the sake of its own publicity, without admitting to itself to what extent it serves as a substitute satisfaction, elevating itself into an end in itself. People locked in desperately want to get out. In such situations one doesn't think anymore, or does so only under fictive premises. Within absolutized praxis only reaction is possible and therefore false. Only thinking could find an exit, and moreover a thinking whose results are not stipulated, as is so often the case in discussions in which it is already settled who should be right, discussions that therefore do not advance the cause but rather inevitably degenerate into tactics. If the doors are barricaded, then thought more than ever should not stop short. It should analyze the reasons and subsequently draw the conclusions. It is up to thought not to accept the situation as final. The situation can be changed, if at all, by undiminished insight. The leap into praxis does not cure thought of resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that that really isn't the right way to go. Pseudo-activity is generally the attempt to rescue enclaves of immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and rigidified society. Such attempts are rationalized by saying that the small change is one step in the long path toward the transformation of the whole" (pg. 291)
 - "**The administered world has the tendency to strangle all spontaneity, or at least to channel it into pseudo-activities**" (pg. 292)
 - "However, spontaneity should not be absolutized, just as little as it should be split off from the objective situation or idolized the way the administered world itself is" (pg. 292)
 - "The impatience with theory that manifests itself in its return does not advance thought beyond itself. By forgetting thought, the impatience falls back below it." (pg. 292)
 - "This is made easier for the individual by his capitulation to the collective with which he identifies himself. He is spared from recognizing his powerlessness; the few become the many in their own eyes. This act, not unwavering thought, is resignative. No transparent relationship obtains between the interests of the ego and the collective it surrenders itself to. The ego must abolish itself so that it may be blessed with the grace of being chosen by the collective." (pg. 292)
 - "The consolation that thinking improves in the context of collective action is deceptive: thinking, as a mere instrument of activist actions, atrophies like all instrumental reason. At this time no higher form of society is concretely visible: for that reason whatever acts as though it were in easy reach has something regressive about it." (pg. 292)
 - "By contrast **the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither signs over his consciousness nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give in. Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway. As long as it doesn't break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility. Its insatiable aspect, its aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish wisdom of resignation**" (pg. 292)

- **"Open thinking points beyond itself.** For its part a comportment, a form of praxis, it is more akin to transformative praxis than a comportment that is compliant for the sake of praxis. Prior to all particular content, **thinking is actually the force of resistance**, from which it has been alienated only with great effort. Such an emphatic concept of thinking admittedly is not secured, not by the existing conditions, nor by ends yet to be achieved, nor by any kind of battalions. Whatever has once been thought can be suppressed, forgotten, can vanish. But it cannot be denied that something of it survives. For **thinking has the element of the universal**. What once was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by others: this confidence accompanies even the most solitary and powerless thought. **Whoever thinks is not enraged in all his critique: thinking has sublimated the rage. Because the thinking person does not need to inflict rage upon himself, he does not wish to inflict it on others.** The happiness that dawns in the eye of the thinking person is the happiness of humanity. The universal tendency of oppression is opposed to thought as such. **Thought is happiness, even where it defines unhappiness: by enunciating it.** By this alone happiness reaches into the universal unhappiness. Whoever does not let it atrophy has not resigned." (pg. 293)
- Appendix 1: Discussion of Professor Adorno's Lecture "The Meaning of Working Through the Past" (pg. 295)
 - See text
- Appendix 2: Introduction to the Lecture "The Meaning of Working Through the Past" (pg. 307)
 - See text
- Publication Information (pg. 309)
 - See text

d. Further Readings:

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