

Negative Dialectics, by T. Adorno

a. People / Organizations: https://platypus1917.org/wp-content/uploads/adorno_negativedialectics.pdf

b. Quotes:

- **"A philosophy that lets us know this, that extinguishes the autarky of the concept, strips the blindfold from our eyes.** That the concept is a concept even when dealing with things in being does not change the fact that on its part it is entwined with a nonconceptual whole. Its only insulation from that whole is its reification—that which establishes it as a concept. The concept is an element in dialectical logic, like any other. What survives in it is the fact that nonconceptuality has conveyed it by way of its meaning, which in turn establishes its conceptuality...To change this direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn toward nonidentity, is the hinge of negative dialectics. Insight into the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept would end the compulsive identification which the concept brings unless halted by such reflection. Reflection upon its own meaning is the way out of the concept's seeming being-in-itself as a unit of meaning" - Author (pg. 12)
- **"Ideology lies in wait for the mind which delights in itself...for the mind which all but irresistibly becomes an absolute to itself.** Theory prevents this. It corrects the naïve self-confidence of the mind without obliging it to sacrifice its spontaneity, at which theory aims in its turn." - Author (pg. 30-31)
 - "In the unreconciled condition, nonidentity is experienced as negativity. From the negative, the subject withdraws to itself, and to the abundance of its ways to react. Critical self-reflection alone will keep it from a constriction of this abundance, from building walls between itself and the object, from the supposition that its being-for-itself is an in-and-for-itself. The less identity can be assumed between subject and object, the more contradictory are the demands made upon the cognitive subject, upon its unfettered strength and candid self-reflection" - Author (pg. 31)
 - **"Theory and mental experience need to interact. Theory does not contain answers to everything; it reacts to the world, which is faulty to the core.** What would be free from the spell of the world is not under theory's jurisdiction. Mobility is of the essence of consciousness; it is no accidental feature. It means a doubled mode of conduct: an inner one, the immanent process which is the properly dialectical one, and a free, unbound one like a stepping out of dialectics. Yet the two are not merely disparate. The unregimented thought has an elective affinity to dialectics, which as criticism of the system recalls what would be outside the system; and the force that liberates the dialectical movement in cognition is the very same that rebels against the system. Both attitudes of consciousness are linked by criticizing one another, not by compromising." - Author (pg. 31)
 - "the bureaucratic way of thinking has become the secret model for a thought allegedly still free" - Author (pg. 32)
 - "Without concepts...experience would lack continuity." - Author (pg. 46)
 - "What tradition tells, tradition wanted." - Author (pg. 47)
 - "Society's own concept says that men want their relations to be freely established; but no freedom has been realized in their relations to this day, and **society remains as rigid as it is defective.**" - Author (pg. 88)
 - "That freedom has largely remained an ideology; that men are powerless against the system, cannot rationally determine their lives and the life of the whole, cannot even think of such a determination without adding to their torment—this is what forces their rebellion into the wrong, invidious form of preferring the bad to a semblance of the better" - Author (pg. 89)
 - **"Their posturing as metaphysically homeless and nothingness-bound is ideology, an attempt to justify the very order that drives men to despair and threatens them with physical extinction.** The resonance of the resurrected metaphysics is anticipatory consent to an oppression whose potential triumph is inherent in Western society, and which has long triumphed in the East, where the thought of having gained freedom is twisted into unfreedom. **Heidegger promotes slave thinking.** With the standard gesture against the marketplace of public opinion he spurns the word "humanism," taking his place in the united front of thunderers against all "isms." The current talk of humanism is awful enough, but one may well ask whether Heidegger would not end the talk solely because his doctrine would end the matter." - Author (pg. 89)
 - "Philosophy will not dispense with truth, however, but will illuminate the narrowness of scientific truth...**Philosophy seeks stringency in that which it is not, in its opposite, and in the reflection on what, with a poor sort of naïveté, is viewed as binding by positive cognition**" - Author (pg. 109)
 - **"Dialectics as a philosophical mode of proceeding is the attempt to untie the knot of paradoxicality by the oldest means of enlightenment: the ruse...Dialectical reason follows the impulse to transcend the natural context and its delusion** (a delusion continued in the subjective compulsion of the rules of logic) without forcing its own rule upon this context— in other words, without sacrifice and without vengeance" - Author (pg. 141)
 - "The only way out of the dialectical context of immanence is by that context itself. **Dialectics is critical reflection upon that context. It reflects its own motion...**" - Author (pg. 141)
 - **"Such dialectics is negative"** - Author (pg. 141)
 - "In fact, **dialectics is neither a pure method nor a reality in the naïve sense of the word. It is not a method, for the unreconciled matter—lacking precisely the identity surrogated by the thought—is contradictory and resists any attempt at unanimous interpretation. It is the matter, not the organizing drive of thought, that brings us to dialectics. Nor is dialectics a simple reality, for contradictoriness is a category of reflection, the cogitative confrontation of concept and thing. To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions,** for the sake of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction. A contradiction in reality, it is a contradiction against reality. But such dialectics is no longer reconcilable with Hegel. **Its motion does not tend to the identity in the difference between each object and its concept; instead, it is suspicious of all identity. Its logic is one of disintegration: of a disintegration of the prepared and objectified form of the concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly. Their identity with the subject is untruth.**" - Author (pg. 144-145)
 - **"As a sense of nonidentity through identity, dialectics is not only an advancing process but a retrograde one at the same time. To this extent, the picture of the circle describes it correctly. The concept's unfoldment is also a reaching back...**Dialectics is not ashamed to recall the famous procession of Echernach: one jump forward, two jumps back." - Author (pg. 157)
 - *cf. D. Binseel, A Phenomenology of "That!"
https://www.binseelnotes.com/files/uqd/d7b063_e2d1d668cc5e4d0f94bd3caab904cb72.pdf
 - **"it is not the purpose of critical thought to place the object on the orphaned royal throne once occupied by the subject. On that throne the object would be nothing but an idol. The purpose of critical thought is to abolish the hierarchy"** - Author (pg. 180)

c. General Notes:

- Preface (pg. xix)
 - "As early as Plato, dialectics meant to achieve something positive by means of negation; the thought figure of a "negation of negation" later became the succinct term. **This book seeks to free dialectics from such affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy.** The unfoldment of the paradoxical title is one of its aims." (pg. xix)
 - "A methodology of the author's material works is not all there is to this book; no continuum exists between those works and it, according to the theory of negative dialectics" (pg. xix)
 - "To the best of his ability the author means to put his cards on the table—which is by no means the same as playing the game" (pg. xix)

- "this largely abstract text seeks no less to serve authentic concretion than to explain the author's concrete procedure" (pg. xix)
- "[The book] attempts by means of logical consistency to substitute for the unity principle, and for the paramountcy of the supraordinated concept, the idea of what would be outside the sway of such unity. To use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity—this is what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust his own mental impulses..." (pg. xx)
 - "The models are to make plain what negative dialectics is and to bring it into the realm of reality, in line with its own concept." (pg. xx)
- Introduction (pg. 3)
 - The Possibility of Philosophy (pg. 3)
 - "Theory cannot prolong the moment its critique depended on. A practice indefinitely delayed is no longer the forum for appeals against self-satisfied speculation; it is mostly the pretext used by executive authorities to choke, as vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical change would require." (pg. 3)
 - "...**philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticize itself.** Once upon a time, compared with sense perception and every kind of external experience, **it was felt to be the very opposite of naïveté; now it has objectively grown as naïve** in its turn as the seedy scholars feasting on subjective speculation seemed to Goethe, one hundred and fifty years ago" (pg. 3)
 - "Whenever philosophers mistake that for the world concept, their pretensions grow ridiculous." (pg. 4)
 - ◆ "Hege, despite his doctrine of the absolute spirit in which he included philosophy, knew philosophy as a mere element of reality, an activity in the division of labor, and thus restricted it. This has since led to **the narrowness of philosophy**, to a disproportionateness to reality that became the more marked the more thoroughly philosophers forgot about the restriction—the more they disdained, as alien, any thought of their position in a whole which they monopolized as their object, instead of recognizing how much they depended on it all the way to the internal composition of their philosophy, to its immanent truth." (pg. 4)
 - "**To be worth another thought, philosophy must rid itself of such naïveté. But its critical self-reflection must not halt** before the highest peaks of its history. Its task would be to inquire whether and how there can still be a philosophy at all, now that Hegel's has fallen, just as Kant inquired into the possibility of metaphysics after the critique of rationalism. If Hegel's dialectics constituted the unsuccessful attempt to use philosophical concepts for coping with all that is heterogeneous to those concepts, the relationship to dialectics is due for an accounting insofar as his attempt failed." (pg. 4)
 - Dialectics Not a Standpoint (pg. 4)
 - "**No theory today escapes the marketplace.** Each one is offered as a possibility among competing opinions; all are put up for choice; all are swallowed." (pg. 4)
 - ◆ **Please see the author's rhetoric - albeit a misuse of language in the demonstration of a concept. Such could have been written as: 'No theory today escapes [circumstance]. Each one is offered as a possibility among [varying] opinions; all are put up for [consideration]; all are [considered]'.*
 - "There are no blinders for thought to don against this, and the self-righteous conviction that my own theory is spared that fate will surely deteriorate into self-advertising." (pg. 4)
 - "**The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder**, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction is not what Hegel's absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it into: it is not of the essence in a Heraclitean sense. **It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.**" (pg. 5)
 - "Yet **the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to identify.** Conceptual order is content to screen what thinking seeks to comprehend. The semblance and the truth of thought entwine. The semblance cannot be decreed away, as by avowal of a being-in-itself outside the totality of cogitative definitions." (pg. 5)
 - ◆ "Aware that the **conceptual totality is mere appearance**, I have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total identity. Since that totality is structured to accord with logic, however, whose core is the principle of the excluded middle, **whatever will not fit this principle, whatever differs in quality, comes to be designated as a contradiction. Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity;** the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it exceeds itself" (pg. 5)
 - "**Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my guilt of what I am thinking**" (pg. 5)
 - "What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity: as long as its demand for totality will be its measure for whatever is not identical with it. This is what dialectics holds up to our consciousness as a contradiction. **Because of the immanent nature of consciousness**, contradictoriness itself has an inescapably and fatefully legal character. **Identity and contradiction of thought are welded together. Total contradiction is nothing but the manifested untruth of total identification.** Contradiction is nonidentity under the rule of a law that affects the nonidentical as well." (pg. 5-6)
 - Reality and Dialectics (pg. 6)
 - "**This law is not a cogitative law, however. It is real.**" (pg. 6)
 - "**[Dialectics] can be achieved only negatively**" (pg. 6)
 - "**Dialectics unfolds the difference between the particular and the universal, dictated by the universal.** As the subject-object dichotomy is brought to mind it becomes inescapable for the subject, furrowing whatever the subject thinks, even objectively—but it would come to an end in reconciliation. Reconciliation would release the nonidentical, would rid it of coercion, including spiritualized coercion; it would open the road to the multiplicity of different things and strip dialectics of its power over them. Reconciliation would be the thought of the many as no longer inimical, a thought that is anathema to subjective reason" (pg. 6)
 - ◆ **reconciliation is the flight toward unity.*
 - "**Dialectics serves the end of reconciliation.** It dismantles the coercive logical character of its own course..." (pg. 6)
 - "Subjective primacy was not only supplanted by the impotence of the weakening thought, which the world's overpowering course deters from construing it; but none of the reconciliements claimed by absolute idealism—and no other kind remained consistent— has stood up, whether in logic or in politics and history. The inability of consistent idealism to constitute itself as anything but the epitome of contradiction is as much the logical consequence of its truth as it is the punishment incurred by its *logicity qua logicity*; it is appearance as much as necessity." (pg. 7)
 - "Through Hegel, philosophy had regained the right and the capacity to think substantively instead of being put off with the analysis of cognitive forms that were empty and, in an emphatic sense, null and void. Where present philosophy deals with anything substantive at all, it lapses either into the randomness of a weltanschauung or into that formalism, that "matter of indifference," against which Hegel had risen." (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "The fundament and result of Hegel's substantive philosophizing was the primacy of the subject, or—in the famous phrase from the Introduction to his Logic—the "identity of identity and nonidentity."⁴ He held the definite particular to be definable by the mind because its immanent definition was to be nothing but the mind. Without this supposition, according to Hegel, philosophy would be

- incapable of knowing anything substantive or essential." (pg. 7)
- The Concern of Philosophy (pg. 8)
 - **"The matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are those in which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his disinterest. They are nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity..."** (pg. 8)
 - "Every cognition including Bergson's own needs the rationality he scorns, and needs it precisely at the moment of concretion" (pg. 9)
 - "The plain contradictoriness of this challenge is that of philosophy itself, which is thereby qualified as dialectics before getting entangled in its individual contradictions. The work of philosophical self-reflection consists in unraveling that paradox. Everything else is signification, secondhand construction, pre-philosophical activity, today as in Hegel's time." (pg. 9)
 - "whatever truth the concepts cover beyond their abstract range can have no other stage than what the concepts suppress, disparage, and discard. **The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts to unseal the nonconceptual with concepts,** without making it their equal" (pg. 9-10)
 - The Antagonistic Entirety (pg. 10)
 - "The mind which ceaselessly reflects on contradiction in the thing itself, we hear, must be the thing itself if it is to be organized in the form of contradiction; the truth which in idealistic dialectics drives beyond every particular, as onesided and wrong, is the truth of the whole, and if that were not preconceived, the dialectical steps would lack motivation and direction. We have to answer that the object of a mental experience is an antagonistic system in itself—antagonistic in reality, not just in its conveyance to the knowing subject that rediscovers itself therein. **The coercive state of reality, which idealism had projected into the region of the subject and the mind, must be retranslated from that region. What remains of idealism is that society, the objective determinant of the mind, is as much an epitome of subjects as it is their negation.** In society the subjects are unknowable and incapacitated; hence its desperate objectivity and conceptuality, which idealism mistakes for something positive" (pg.10)
 - "The system is not one of the absolute spirit; it is one of the most conditioned spirit of those who have it and cannot even know how much it is their own. The subjective preconception of the material production process in society—basically different from its theoretical constitution—is the unresolved part, the part unreconciled with the subjects. Their own reason, unconscious like the transcendental subject and establishing identity by barter, remains incommensurable with the subjects it reduces to the same denominator: the subject as the subject's foe. The preceding generality is both true and untrue: true, because it forms that "ether" which Hegel calls spirit; untrue, because its reason is no reason yet, because its universality is the product of particular interests. This is why a **philosophical critique of identity transcends philosophy**" (pg. 10-11)
 - "Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, **dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state of things. The right state of things would be free of it: neither a system nor a contradiction.**" (pg. 11)
 - Disenchantment of the Concept (pg. 11)
 - "In truth, **all concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to nonconceptualities, because concepts on their part are moments of the reality that requires their formation, primarily for the control of nature.** What conceptualization appears to be from within, to one engaged in it—the predominance of its sphere, without which nothing is known—must not be mistaken for what it is in itself. Such a semblance of being-in-itself is conferred upon it by the motion that exempts it from reality, to which it is harnessed in turn" (pg. 11)
 - "Necessity compels philosophy to operate with concepts, but this necessity must not be turned into the virtue of their priority..." (pg. 11)
 - "Philosophical reflection makes sure of the nonconceptual in the concept. " (pg. 12)
 - **"A philosophy that lets us know this, that extinguishes the autarky of the concept, strips the blindfold from our eyes.** That the concept is a concept even when dealing with things in being does not change the fact that on its part it is entwined with a nonconceptual whole. Its only insulation from that whole is its reification—that which establishes it as a concept. The concept is an element in dialectical logic, like any other. What survives in it is the fact that nonconceptuality has conveyed it by way of its meaning, which in turn establishes its conceptuality" (pg. 12)
 - ◆ "...every definition of concepts requires nonconceptual, deictic elements..." (pg. 12)
 - **"To change this direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn toward nonidentity, is the hinge of negative dialectics. Insight into the constitutive character of the nonconceptual in the concept** would end the compulsive identification which the concept brings unless halted by such reflection. Reflection upon its own meaning is the way out of the concept's seeming being-in-itself as a unit of meaning" (pg. 12)
 - "Infinity" (pg. 13)
 - **"Disenchantment of the concept is the antidote of philosophy. It keeps it from growing rampant and becoming an absolute to itself"** (pg. 13)
 - "Philosophical contents can only be grasped where philosophy does not impose them. The illusion that it might confine the essence in its finite definitions will have to be given up." (pg. 13)
 - ◆ **"Traditional philosophy thinks of itself as possessing an infinite object, and in that belief it becomes a finite,** conclusive philosophy. A changed philosophy would have to cancel that claim, to cease persuading others and itself that it has the infinite at its disposal. Instead, if it were delicately understood, **the changed philosophy itself would be infinite in the sense of scoring solidification in a body of enumerable theorems. Its substance would lie in the diversity of objects** that impinge upon it and of the objects it seeks, a diversity not wrought by any schema; to those objects, philosophy would truly give itself rather than use them as a mirror in which to reread itself, mistaking its own image for concretion." (pg. 13)
 - **"No object is wholly known; knowledge is not supposed to prepare the phantasm of a whole.** Thus the goal of a philosophical interpretation of works of art cannot be their identification with the concept, their absorption in the concept; yet it is through such interpretation that the truth of the work unfolds." (pg. 14)
 - "In principle, philosophy can always go astray, which is the sole reason why it can go forward." (pg. 14)
 - "As a corrective to the total rule of method, **philosophy contains a playful element** which the traditional view of it as a science would like to exorcise" (pg. 14)
 - "The un-naïve thinker knows how far he remains from the object of his thinking, and yet he must always talk as if he had it entirely. This brings him to the point of clowning" (pg. 14)
 - **"Philosophy is the most serious of things, but then again it is not all that serious.** A thing that aims at what it is not a priori and is not authorized to control—such a thing, according to its own concept, is simultaneously part of a sphere beyond control, a sphere tabooed by conceptuality" (pg. 14)
 - **"Cogency and play are the two poles of philosophy"** (pg. 15)
 - **"thought is no protector of springs whose freshness might deliver us from thinking"** (pg. 15)
 - "What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that animates the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfillment shuns the immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept—the organon of thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and the thought—negates that yearning. **Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor submit to it. It must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept.**" (pg. 15)

- The Speculative Moment (pg. 15)
 - **"Even after breaking with idealism, philosophy cannot do without speculation**, which was exalted by idealism and tabooed with it..." (pg. 15)
 - "Philosophy is not to be put off with theorems that would talk it out of its essential concern instead of satisfying that concern, albeit with a No." (pg. 16)
 - "The resistance of philosophy needs to unfold, however" (pg. 16)
 - "To ask philosophy to deal with the question of being, or with other cardinal themes of Western metaphysics, shows a primitive topical faith." (pg. 16-17)
 - **somewhat an attack of Heidegger.*
 - **"We must be so wary of the beaten tracks of philosophical reflection that our emphatic interest will seek refuge in ephemeral objects not yet overdetermined by intentions. Though chained to the questions of traditional philosophical problematics, we certainly must negate that problematics.** A world that is objectively set for totality will not release the human consciousness, will ceaselessly fasten it to points it wants to get away from; but a thinking that blithely begins afresh, heedless of the historic form of its problems, will so much more be their prey." (pg. 17)
 - "The power of the status quo puts up the façades into which our consciousness crashes. It must seek to crash through them. This alone would free the postulate of depth from ideology. Surviving in such resistance is the speculative moment: what will not have its law prescribed for it by given facts transcends them even in the closest contact with the objects, and in repudiating a sacrosanct transcendence. **Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance—there is its freedom.** Freedom follows the subject's urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively conveyed" (pg. 17-18)
- Presentation (pg. 18)
 - "The freedom of philosophy is nothing but the capacity to lend a voice to its unfreedom" (pg. 18)
 - **"To philosophy, expression and stringency are not two dichotomous possibilities. They need each other;** neither one can be without the other. Expression is relieved of its accidental character by thought, on which it toils as thought toils on expression. Only an expressed thought is succinct, rendered succinct by its presentation in language; **what is vaguely put is poorly thought"** (pg. 18)
 - **yet, most of Adorno's writing are excessively vague.*
 - "Thought as such, before all particular contents, is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is forced upon it; this is what thought has inherited from its archetype, the relation between labor and material. Today, when ideologues tend more than ever to encourage thought to be positive, they cleverly note that positivity runs precisely counter to thought and that it takes friendly persuasion by social authority to accustom thought to positivity. **The effort implied in the concept of thought itself, as the counterpart of passive contemplation, is negative already—a revolt against being importuned to bow to every immediate thing"** (pg. 19)
 - **"Thought forms tend beyond that which merely exists, is merely "given."** The point which thinking aims at its material is not solely a spiritualized control of nature. While doing violence to the object of its syntheses, our thinking heeds a potential that waits in the object, and it unconsciously obeys the idea of making amends to the pieces for what it has done. In philosophy, this unconscious tendency becomes conscious. Accompanying irreconcilable thoughts is the hope for reconciliation, because the resistance of thought to mere things in being, the commanding freedom of the subject, intends in the object even that of which the object was deprived by objectification" (pg. 19)
- Attitude Toward Systems (pg. 20)
 - **"Traditional speculation has developed the synthesis of diversity—** which it conceived as chaotic, on Kantian grounds—and its ultimate aim was to divest itself of any kind of content. By contrast, the *telos* of philosophy, its open and unshielded part, is as anti-systematic as its freedom to interpret the phenomena with which it joins unarmed issue. **Philosophy retains respect for systems to the extent to which things heterogeneous to it face it in the form of a system. The administered world moves in this direction. It is the negative objectivity that is a system, not the positive subject.**" (pg. 20)
 - "When we contemplate philosophical history, the virtue of partisanship must not keep us from perceiving how superior the system, whether rationalistic or idealistic, has been to its opponents for more than two centuries. Compared with the systems, the opposition seems trivial. Systems elaborate things; they interpret the world while the others really keep protesting only that it can't be done. The others display resignation, denial, failure—if they had more truth in the end, it would indicate the transience of philosophy. In any case, it would be up to philosophy to elevate such truth from its subaltern state and to champion it against the philosophies which not only boast of their "higher" rank..." (pg. 20)
 - ◆ "According to Nietzsche's critique, systems no longer documented anything but the finickiness of scholars compensating themselves for political impotence by conceptually construing their, so to speak, administrative authority over things in being." (pg. 20)
 - "Out of itself, the bourgeois ratio undertook to produce the order it had negated outside itself. Once produced, however, that order ceased to be an order and was therefore insatiable. Every system was such an order, such an absurdly rational product: a posited thing posing as being-in-itself. Its origin had to be placed into formal thought divorced from content; nothing else would let it control the material. The philosophical systems were antinomical from the outset." (pg. 21)
 - "To prevail as a system, the *ratio* eliminated virtually all qualitative definitions it referred to, thus coming into an irreconcilable conflict with the objectivity it violated by pretending to grasp it. The ratio came to be removed from objectivity—the farther removed, the more completely objectivity was subjected to its axioms, and finally to the one axiom of identity. The pedantries of all systems, down to the architectonic complexities of Kant—and even of Hegel, despite the latter's program—are the marks of an a priori inescapable failure, noted with incomparable honesty in the fractures of the Kantian system..." (pg. 21-22)
 - "Great philosophy was accompanied by a paranoid zeal to tolerate nothing else, and to pursue everything else with all the cunning of reason, while the other kept retreating farther and farther from the pursuit. The slightest remnant of nonidentity sufficed to deny an identity conceived as total." (pg. 22)
- Idealism as Rage (pg. 22)
 - "The system in which the sovereign mind imagined itself transfigured, has its primal history in the pre-mental, the animal life of the species." (pg. 22)
 - "Predators get hungry, but pouncing on their prey is difficult and often dangerous; additional impulses may be needed for the beast to dare it. These impulses and the unpleasantness of hunger fuse into rage at the victim, a rage whose expression in turn serves the end of frightening and paralyzing the victim. In the advance to humanity this is rationalized by projection. The "rational animal" with an appetite for his opponent is already fortunate enough to have a superego and must find a reason. The more completely his actions follow the law of self-preservation, the less can he admit the primacy of that law to himself and to others..." (pg. 22)
 - ◆ **"Idealism—most explicitly Fichte—gives unconscious sway to the ideology that the not-I, l'autrui, and finally all that reminds us of nature is inferior,** so the unity of the self-preserving thought may devour it without misgivings. This justifies the principle of the thought as much as it increases the appetite." (pg. 22-23)

- "Reality is no longer to be construed, because it would be all too thoroughly construable. Pretexts are furnished by its irrationality, intensifying under **the pressure of particular rationality: there is disintegration by way of integration**. If society could be seen through as a closed system, a system accordingly unreconciled to the subjects, it would become too embarrassing for the subjects as long as they remain subjects in any sense." (pg. 23-24)
 - **"Angst, that supposed "existential," is the claustrophobia of a systematized society.** Its system character, yesterday still a shibboleth of academic philosophy, is strenuously denied by initiates of that philosophy; they may, with impunity, pose as spokesmen for free, for original, indeed, for unacademic thinking. Criticism of the systems is not vitiated by such abuse. A proposition common to all emphatic philosophy—as opposed to the skeptical one, which refrained from emphasis—was that only as a system could philosophy be pursued; this proposition has done hardly less to cripple philosophy than have the empiricisms. **The things philosophy has yet to judge are postulated before it begins. The system, the form of presenting a totality to which nothing remains extraneous, absolutizes the thought against each of its contents and evaporates the content in thoughts. It proceeds idealistically before advancing any arguments for idealism.**" (pg. 24)
- The Twofold Character of the System (pg. 24)
 - "The form of the system is adequate to the world, whose substance eludes the hegemony of the human thought; but **unity and unanimity are at the same time an oblique projection of pacified, no longer antagonistic conditions upon the coordinates of supremacist, oppressive thinking**. The double meaning of philosophical systematics leaves no choice but to transpose the power of thought, once delivered from the systems, into the open realm of definition by individual moments." (pg. 24-25)
 - **"The microanalysis of individual categories, which simultaneously appears as their objective self-reflection, was to let each concept pass into its otherness without regard to an overlay from above; to Hegel, the totality of this movement meant the system. There is contradiction as well as kinship between this concept of the system—a concept that concludes, and thus brings to a standstill—and the concept of dynamism, of pure, autarkic, subjective generation, which constitutes all philosophical systematics.** Hegel could adjust the tension between statics and dynamics only by construing his unitarian principle, the spirit, as a simultaneous being-in-itself and pure becoming, a resumption of the Aristotelian scholastic *actus purus*; and that the implausibility of this construction—in which subjective generation and ontology, nominalism and realism, are syncopated at the Archimedean point—will prevent the resolution of that tension is also immanent in the system." (pg. 25)
 - ◆ **"To comprehend a thing itself, not just to fit and register it in its system of reference, is nothing but to perceive the individual moment in its immanent connection with others. Such anti-subjectivism lies under the crackling shell of absolute idealism; it stirs in the tendency to unseal current issues by resorting to the way they came to be. What the conception of the system recalls, in reverse, is the coherence of the nonidentical, the very thing infringed by deductive systematics. Criticism of systems and asystematic thought are superficial as long as they cannot release the cohesive force which the idealistic systems had signed over to the transcendental subject"** (pg. 25-26)
 - The Antinomical Character of Systems (pg. 26)
 - **"The ego principle that founds the system, the pure method before any content, has always been the ratio.** It is not confined by anything outside it, not even by a so-called mental order. Idealism, attesting the positive infinity of its principle at every one of its stages, turns the character of thought, the historic evolution of its independence, into metaphysics. It eliminates all heterogeneous being. This defines the system as pure becoming, a pure process, and eventually as that absolute engendering which Fichte—in this respect the authentic systematizer of philosophy—declared thinking to be. Kant had already held that the emancipated ratio, the *progressus ad infinitum*, is halted solely by recognizing nonidentities in form, at least. **The antinomy of totality and infinity—for the restless ad infinitum explodes the self-contained system, for all its being owed to infinity alone—is of the essence of idealism.**" (pg. 26)
 - **"It imitates a central antinomy of bourgeois society. To preserve itself, to remain the same, to "be," that society too must constantly expand, progress, advance its frontiers, not respect any limit, not remain the same.** It has been demonstrated to bourgeois society that it would no sooner reach a ceiling, would no sooner cease to have noncapitalist areas available outside itself, than its own concept would force its self-liquidation. This makes clear why, Aristotle notwithstanding, the modern concept of dynamics was inappropriate to Antiquity, as was the concept of the system." (pg. 26)
 - ◆ **"...systematics is so deeply ingrained in the modern consciousness that even Husserl's anti-systematic efforts—which began under the name of ontology, and from which "fundamental ontology" branched off later—reverted irresistibly to a system, at the price of formalization"** (pg. 27)
 - **"Thus intertwined, the system's static and dynamic characters keep clashing. No matter how dynamically a system may be conceived, if it is in fact to be a closed system, to tolerate nothing outside its domain, it will become a positive infinity—in other words, finite and static.** The fact that it sustains itself in this manner, for which Hegel praised his own system, brings it to a standstill. Bluntly put, **closed systems are bound to be finished.**" (pg. 27)
 - "By negating the concept of the limit and theoretically assuring itself that there always remains something outside, dynamics also tends to disavow its own product, the system" (pg. 27)
 - **"An aspect under which it might well be fruitful to treat the history of modern philosophy is how it managed to cope with the antagonism of statics and dynamics in its systems. The Hegelian system in itself was not a true becoming; implicitly, each single definition in it was already preconceived. Such safeguards condemn it to untruth.** Unconsciously, so to speak, **consciousness would have to immerse itself in the phenomena on which it takes a stand. This would, of course, effect a qualitative change in dialectics. Systematic unanimity would crumble.** The phenomenon would not remain a case of its concept, as it does to Hegel, despite all pronouncements to the contrary. The thought would be burdened with more toil and trouble than Hegel defines as such, because the thought he discusses always extracts from its objects only that which is a thought already. Despite the program of self-yielding, the Hegelian thought finds satisfaction in itself; it goes rolling along, however often it may urge the contrary. If the thought really yielded to the object, if its attention were on the object, not on its category, the very objects would start talking under the lingering eye." (pg. 27-28)
 - **"the speculative power to break down the gates of the insoluble is the power of negation. The systematic trend lives on in negation alone.** The categories of a critique of systems are at the same time the categories in which the particular is understood. What has once legitimately transcended particularity in the system has its place outside the system. The interpretive eye which sees more in a phenomenon than it is—and solely because of what it is—secularizes metaphysics. Only a philosophy in fragment form would give their proper place to the monads, those illusory idealistic drafts. They would be conceptions, in the particular, of the totality that is inconceivable as such." (pg. 28)
 - Argument and Experience (pg. 28)
 - **"An aspect of immersion in particularity, that extreme enhancement of dialectical immanence, must also be the freedom to step out of the object, a freedom which the identity claim cuts short.** Hegel would have censured that freedom; he relied upon complete mediation by the objects." (pg. 28)
 - **"A model covers the specific, and more than the specific, without letting it evaporate in its more general super-concept. Philosophical**

- thinking is the same as thinking in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of analyses of models.** Philosophy would be debasing itself all over again, into a kind of affirmative solace, if it were to fool itself and others about the fact that it must, from without, imbue its objects with whatever moves them within it. What is waiting in the objects themselves needs such intervention to come to speak, with the perspective that the forces mobilized outside, and ultimately every theory that is brought to bear on the phenomena, should come to rest in the phenomena. In that sense, too, philosophical theory means that its own end lies in its realization." (pg. 29)
- "The French Enlightenment got a formally systematic touch from its supreme concept, that of reason; yet the constitutive entanglement of its idea of reason with that of an objectively rational arrangement of society deprived the idea of a pathos which it was not to recover until the realization of reason as an idea was renounced, until it was absolutized into the spirit. Encyclopedic thinking—rationally organized and yet discontinuous, unsystematic, loose—expressed the self-critical spirit of reason. That spirit represented something which later departed from philosophy, due as much to its increasing distance from practical life as to its absorption in the academic bustle: it represented mundane experience, that eye for reality of which thought, too, is a part" (pg. 29)
 - "At a distance, **dialectics might be characterized as the elevation to self-consciousness of the effort to be saturated with dialectics.**" (pg. 29)
 - "The immanently argumentative element is legitimate where the reality that has been integrated in a system is received in order to oppose it with its own strength. The free part of thought, on the other hand, represents the authority which already knows about the emphatic untruth of that real-systematic context. Without this knowledge there would be no eruption; without adopting the power of the system, the outbreak would fail. That the two elements will not merge without a rift is due to the real power of the system, which includes even what potentially excels it. The untruth of the immanent context itself, however, shows in the overwhelming experience that the world—though organized as systematically as if it were Hegel's glorified realization of reason— will at the same time, in its old unreason, perpetuate the impotence of the seemingly almighty spirit. The immanent critic of idealism defends idealism by showing how much it is defrauded of its own self—how much the first cause, which according to idealism is always the spirit, is in league with the blind predominance of merely existing things. The doctrine of the absolute spirit immediately aids that predominance" (pg. 30)
 - "A scientific consensus tends to admit that experience also implies theory. It holds, however, that experience is a "standpoint," hypothetically at best." (pg. 30)
 - "Experience lives by consuming the standpoint; not until the standpoint is submerged in it would there be philosophy" (pg. 30)
 - Vertiginousness (pg. 31)
 - "**A dialectics no longer "glued" to identity will provoke either the charge that it is bottomless—one that ye shall know by its fascist fruits—or the objection that it is dizzying.**" (pg. 31)
 - "essentials is falsified by a résumé of essentials." (pg. 32)
 - "a cognition that is to bear fruit will throw itself to the objects *à fond perdu*. The vertigo which this causes is an *index veri*; the shock of inconclusiveness, the negative as which it cannot help appearing in the frame-covered, never-changing realm, is true for untruth only" (pg. 33)
 - Fragility of Truth (pg. 33)
 - "By dissociating thought from primacy and solidity, however, we do not absolutize it as in free suspense. The very dissociation fastens it to that which it is not. It removes the illusion of the autarky of thought. The falsehood of an unleashed rationality running away from itself, the recoil of enlightenment into mythology, is rationally definable. To think means to think something. By itself, the logically abstract form of "something," something that is meant or judged, does not claim to posit a being; and yet, surviving in it—indelible for a thinking that would delete it—is that which is not identical with thinking, which is not thinking at all. The ratio becomes irrational where it forgets this, where it runs counter to the meaning of thought by hypositizing its products, the abstractions. The commandment of its autarky condemns thinking to emptiness, and finally to stupidity and primitivity. The charge of bottomlessness should be lodged against the self-preserving mental principle as the sphere of absolute origins; but where ontology, Heidegger in the lead, hits upon bottomlessness—there is the place of truth." (pg. 34)
 - "Truth is suspended and frail, due to its temporal substance..." (pg. 34)
 - "**Philosophy must do without the consolation that truth cannot be lost.** A truth that cannot plunge into the abyss which the metaphysical fundamentalists prate about—it is not the abyss of agile sophistry, but that of madness—will at the bidding of its certainty principle turn analytical, a potential tautology. Only thoughts that go the limit are facing up to the omnipotent impotence of certain accord..." (pg. 34)
 - "**The open thought has no protection against the risk of decline into randomness;** nothing assures it of a saturation with the matter that will suffice to surmount that risk. But the consistency of its performance, the density of its texture, helps the thought to hit the mark. There has been an about-face in the function of the concept of certainty in philosophy. What was once to surpass dogmas and the tutelage of self-certainty has become the social insurance of a cognition that is to be proof against any untoward happening. And indeed, to the unobjectionable nothing happens." (pg. 35)
 - Against Relativism (pg. 35)
 - "In the history of philosophy we repeatedly find epistemological categories turned into moral ones..." (pg. 35)
 - "To fundamental ontologists, relativism is the offense of bottomless thinking. **Dialectics is as strictly opposed to that as to absolutism, but it does not seek a middle ground between the two; it opposes them through the extremes themselves, convicts them of untruth by their own ideas**" (pg. 35)
 - "More fruitful might be the recognition of relativism as a limited form of consciousness. It began as that of bourgeois individualism, in which the individual consciousness is taken for the ultimate and all individual opinions are accorded equal rights, as if there were no criterion of their truth. Proponents of the abstract thesis that every man's thought is conditioned should be most concretely reminded that so is their own, that it is blind to the supra-individual element which alone turns individual consciousness into thought. The attitude behind that thesis is one of disdain for the mind and respecting the predominance of material conditions, considered the only thing that counts. A father's retort to his son's decidedly uncomfortable views is that all things are relative, that money makes the man, as in the Greek proverb. **Relativism is a popularized materialism;** thought gets in the way of money-making" (pg. 36)
 - "Relativism is nugatory for another reason: the things it considers random and accidental, on the one hand, and irreducible on the other—those things themselves are brought forth by an objectivity, by an objective individualist society, and can be deduced from it as socially necessary phenomena. The reactive modes which relativistic doctrine holds to be peculiar to each individual are pre-established; they are never far from the bleating of sheep, the stereotype of relativity in particular" (pg. 36)
 - "**the law that governs the divergent perspectives is the structure of the social process as a preordained whole. Knowledge of the whole makes the perspectives binding.**" (pg. 37)
 - "Bourgeois skepticism, of which relativism is the doctrinal embodiment, is obtuse." (pg. 37)
 - ◆ "...under the existing conditions of production the concept of reason, once emancipated, must fear that its consistent pursuit will explode those conditions. This is why reason limits itself; throughout the bourgeois era, the spirit's accompanying reaction to the idea of its autonomy has been to despise itself. The spirit cannot forgive itself for being barred, by the constitution of the existence it guides, from unfolding the freedom inherent in its concept. The philosophical term for this prohibition is relativism. No dogmatic absolutism need be summoned against it; it is crushed by being proved narrow" (pg. 37)

- Dialectics and Solidity (pg. 37)
 - "what does not think, what surrenders to visibility, is inclined toward the badly positive by that passive nature which in the critique of reason marks the sensory source of the rights of knowledge. To receive something as it is offered at a time, dispensing with reflection, is potentially always tantamount to recognizing it the way it is; **virtually all thoughts**, on the other hand, **cause a negative motion**" (pg. 38)
 - "...consciousness is at the same time the universal medium and cannot jump across its shadow..." (pg. 40)
 - "Truth has coalesced with substance, which will change; **immutability of truth is the delusion of *prima philosophia***" (pg. 40)
 - "Ideology lies in the substruction of something primary, the content of which hardly matters; it lies in the implicit identity of concept and thing, an identity justified by the world even when a doctrine summarily teaches that consciousness depends on being" (pg. 40)
- The Privilege of Experience (pg. 40)
 - "the objectivity of dialectical cognition needs not less subjectivity, but more. Philosophical experience withers otherwise" (pg. 40)
 - "...compared with the virtually subjectless rationality of a scientific ideal that regards all men as interchangeable, the subjective share in philosophy retains an irrational adjunct. It is not a quality of nature. While the argument pretends to be democratic, it ignores what the administered world makes of its compulsory members. **Only a mind which it has not entirely molded can withstand it. Criticizing privilege becomes a privilege—the world's course is as dialectical as that. Under social conditions—educational ones, in particular—which prune and often cripple the forces of mental productivity, and considering the prevailing dearth of images and the pathogenic processes in early childhood which psychoanalysis diagnoses but cannot really change, it would be fictitious to assume that all men might understand, or even perceive, all things.** To expect this would be to make cognition accord with the pathetic features of a mankind stripped of its capacity for experience—if it ever had this capacity— and by a law of perpetual sameness" (pg. 41)
 - "**Direct communicability to everyone is not a criterion of truth. We must resist the all but universal compulsion to confuse the communication of knowledge with knowledge itself**, and to rate it higher, if possible—whereas at present each communicative step is falsifying truth and selling it out." (pg. 41)
 - "**Truth is objective**, not plausible. It falls into no man's lap; it does take objective conveyance..." (pg. 41)
 - "Hegel's doctrine of the self-reflecting object survives its idealistic version because in a changed dialectics the subject's divestment of sovereignty turns it even more into a reflexive form of its object." (pg. 42)
 - "The less definitive and all-encompassing a theory is claimed to be, the less of an object will it become to the thinker. As the compulsion of the system evaporates, he will be free to rely more frankly on his own consciousness and experience than was permitted by the pathos-filled conception of a subjectivity whose abstract triumph would exact the price of renouncing its specific substance. This price was in line with the emancipation of individuality that occurred between the great age of idealism and the present..." (pg. 42)
 - "**Nineteenth century individualism has indeed weakened the objectifying power of the mind, its capacity for insight into objectivity and for its construction**; but it has also equipped the mind with a discriminating sense that strengthened its experience of the object." (pg. 42)
- Qualitative Moment of Rationality (pg. 43)
 - "**To yield to the object means to do justice to the object's qualitative moments**" (pg. 43)
 - "*yield*", "*let*", "*surrender*", "*submit*"...*all use of rhetoric - each, at base, says the same thing; yet, Adorno would criticize Heidegger who uses the word "let"*.
 - "Scientific objectification, in line with the quantifying tendency of all science since Descartes, tends to eliminate qualities and to transform them into measurable definitions. Increasingly, rationality itself is equated more *mathematico* with the faculty of quantification." (pg. 43)
 - "...[*ratio*] calls just as much for an ability to discriminate" (pg. 43)
 - ◆ "Without this, **the synthetic function of thought—abstract unification**— would not be possible: **to aggregate what is alike means necessarily to segregate it from what is different. But what is different is the qualitative; a thinking in which we do not think qualitatively is already emasculated and at odds with itself**" (pg. 43)
 - ◇ "qualitative distinction is not only incorporated in Plato's dialectics, in his doctrine of thought, but interpreted as a corrective for the violence of unleashed quantification" (pg. 43)
 - ▶ "The qualitative moment is preserved in all quantification, as the substrate of that which is to be quantified. This is what Plato cautions us not to destroy, lest the *ratio*, impairing the object it should attain, recoil into unreason" (pg. 43-44)
 - "Even in statistics the cognitive goal is qualitative; quantification is nothing but the means" (pg. 44)
 - Quality and Individual (pg. 44)
 - "Corresponding to the quantifying tendency on the subjective side was the reduction of the knower to a purely logical universal without qualities. True, the qualities would be free only at an objective stage no longer limited to quantification, no longer having quantification drilled into the man who must make a mental adjustment. But quantification is not the timeless being it is made to seem by mathematics, its instrument." (pg. 44)
 - "The ideal of discrimination, of the nuance...refers not only to an individual faculty which objectivity can do without. A discriminating man is one who in the matter and its concept can distinguish even the infinitesimal, that which escapes the concept; discrimination alone gets down to the infinitesimal. Its postulate of a capacity to experience the object—and discrimination is the experience of the object turned into a form of subjective reaction—**provides a haven for the mimetic element of knowledge**, for the element of elective affinity between the knower and the known." (pg. 44-45)
 - "If this moment were extinguished altogether, it would be flatly incomprehensible that a subject can know an object; the unleashed rationality would be irrational. In being secularized, however, the mimetic element in turn blends with the rational one. The word for this process is **discrimination**. It **contains the faculty of mimetic reaction as well as the logical organ for the relation of genus, species, and differentia specifica**. In the process, the differentiating faculty keeps as accidental a character as does any undiminished individuality compared with the universal of its reason." (pg. 45)
 - "Without concepts...experience would lack continuity." (pg. 46)
 - "Because it is general in itself, and to the extent to which it is general, individual experience goes as far as the universal. Even in epistemological reflection, logical universality and the unity of the individual consciousness are mutually interdependent. Yet this does not only refer to the subjective-formal side of individuality: **every content of individual consciousness is brought to it by its carrier for the sake of his self-preservation, and is reproduced along with that self-preservation.**" (pg. 46)
 - ◆ "**Self-reflection may free the individual consciousness from that dependence and expand it.** Spurring that expansion is the agonizing fact that logical universality tends to predominate in individual experience. As the "test of reality," experience does not simply double the individual's wishes and whims; it also denies them for the sake of his survival. The subject has no way at all to grasp universals other than in the motion of individual human consciousness." (pg. 46)
 - ◇ "The party, even if deluded or terrorized, is deemed a priori superior in judgment to each individual because of the number of its members. Yet the isolated individual unhampered by any ukase may at times perceive objectivities more clearly than the collective, which is no more than the ideology of its functionaries, anyway" (pg. 46)

- Substantiality and Method (pg. 47)
 - "What tradition tells, tradition wanted." (pg. 47)
 - "Yet this does not relieve us of methodical reflection on the relative positions of substantial individual analysis and dialectical theory. The idealistic-identitarian avowals that the first absorbs the second are unconvincing; but objectively—not just through the knowing subject—the whole which theory expresses is contained in the individual object to be analyzed. What links the two is a matter of substance: the social totality." (pg. 47)
 - "The concept is fused with untruth, with the oppressive principle..." (pg. 48)
 - "The negativity of the universal in turn welds cognition to the particular as that which is to be saved." (pg. 48)
 - ◆ "**All philosophy, even that which intends freedom, carries in its inalienably general elements the unfreedom in which society prolongs its existence. Coercion is inherent in philosophy, yet coercion alone protects it from regressing into license.** The coercive character that is immanent in our thinking can be critically known; the coercion of thought is the medium of its deliverance." (pg. 48)
 - ◇ "Hegel's "freedom to the object," the net result of which was the subject's incapacitation, has yet to be achieved. Until then, the divergence between dialectics as a method and substantial dialectics will go on. The principle of dominion, which antagonistically rends human society, is the same principle which, spiritualized, causes the difference between the concept and its subject matter; and that difference assumes the logical form of contradiction because, measured by the principle of dominion, whatever does not bow to its unity will not appear as something different from and indifferent to the principle, but as a violation of logic" (pg. 48)
- Existentialism (pg. 49)
 - "The most recent attempt to break out of conceptual fetishism— out of academic philosophy, without relinquishing the demand for commitment—went by the name of Existentialism. Like fundamental ontology, from which it split off by entering into political commitments, Existentialism remained in idealistic bonds; besides, compared with the philosophical structure, it retained an accidental touch replaceable by politics to the contrary, provided only the politics satisfied the Existentialist *characteristica formalis*." (pg. 49)
 - "As social critics, Sartre and his friends were unwilling to limit themselves to theoretical criticisms, and it did not escape them that wherever communism had seized power it was digging in as a bureaucracy. The institution of a centralized state party makes a mockery of all past thinking about men's relation to the state. Hence Sartre's total stress upon the moment which the reigning practice will no longer tolerate— on spontaneity, philosophically speaking. He would urge Kierkegaard's category of decision the more exclusively, the smaller the objective chances left to it by the distribution of social power. Kierkegaard drew the meaning of the category from Christology, its *terminus ad quem*; Sartre made it the absolute it was to serve." (pg. 49)
 - ◆ "**Despite his extreme nominalism, Sartre's philosophy in its most effective phase was organized according to the old idealistic category of the free act of the subject.** To Existentialism as to Fichte, any objectivity is a matter of indifference. Consequently, social conditions came in Sartre's plays to be topical adjuncts, at best; structurally, they do hardly more than provide an occasion for the action" (pg. 49-50)
 - ◇ "**The notion of absolute freedom of choice is as illusory as that of the absolute I as the world's source has ever been.**" (pg. 50)
 - "**There is, however, a philosophical reason for the follies of political Existentialism,** as there is for the phraseology of the nonpolitical German one. Existentialism raises the inevitable, the sheer existence of men, to the status of a mentality which the individual is to choose, without his choice being determined by any reason, and without there really being another choice. Whenever they go beyond such a tautology, Existentialist teachings join hands with subjectivity as a being-for-itself, and as the sole substantial being." (pg. 50-51)
 - "A thinking purged of substantialities is not superior to a special science stripped of concepts; all versions of such thinking will relapse into the very formalism they combat for the sake of philosophy's vital concern." (pg. 51)
 - ◆ "**The dichotomy of subject and object is not to be voided by a reduction to the human person, not even to the absolutely isolated person. The question of man,** a question whose present popularity extends all the way to Marxism of the Lukács persuasion, is ideological because its pure form dictates the invariant of the possible answer, even if that invariant is historicity itself." (pg. 51)
 - "What man ought to be as such is never more than what he has been: he is chained to the rock of his past. He is not only what he was and is, however, but equally what he can come to be, and to anticipate that, no definition suffices. **The schools grouped around Existenz, even the utterly nominalistic ones, are incapable of the self-relinquishment they long for in their recourse to the individual human Existenz; and they confess that incapacity by philosophizing in general concepts about things not absorbed in their concepts, things running counter to their concepts—instead of thinking them through.** They illustrate Existenz, the concept, by Existenz, the condition." (pg. 51)
- Thing, Language, History (pg. 52)
 - "In undiminished cognition we want what we have been drilled to resign ourselves to, what the names that come too close will blind us to— **resignation and delusion are ideological complements.**" (pg. 52)
 - "**It is from a negative that philosophy draws whatever legitimacy it still retains: from the fact that, in being so and not otherwise,** those insolubles which forced philosophy to capitulate and from which idealism declines are another fetish—the fetish of the irrevocability of things in being. What dissolves the fetish is the insight that things are not simply so and not otherwise, that they have come to be under certain conditions. Their becoming fades and dwells within the things; it can no more be stabilized in their concepts than it can be split off from its own results and forgotten. Similar to this becoming is temporal experience. It is when things in being are read as a text of their becoming that idealistic and materialistic dialects touch. But while idealism sees in the inner history of immediacy its vindication as a stage of the concept, materialism makes that inner history the measure, not just of the untruth of concepts, but even more of the immediacy in being" (pg. 52)
 - "**The means employed in negative dialectics for the penetration of its hardened objects is possibility**—the possibility of which their reality has cheated the objects and which is nonetheless visible in each one." (pg. 52)
 - "**no matter how hard we try for linguistic expression of such a history congealed in things, the words we use will remain concepts.** Their precision substitutes for the thing itself, without quite bringing its selfhood to mind; **there is a gap between words and the thing they conjure.** Hence, the residue of arbitrariness and relativity in the choice of words as well as in the presentation as a whole." (pg. 52-53)
 - "**The claim of immediate truth for which it chides the words is almost always the ideology of a positive, existent identity of word and thing.** Insistence upon a single word and concept as the iron gate to be unlocked is also a mere moment, though an inalienable one. **To be known, the inwardness to which cognition clings in expression always needs its own outwardness as well.**" (pg. 53)
- Tradition and Knowledge (pg. 53)
 - "The hitherto dominant philosophy of the modern age wants to eliminate the traditional moments of thinking." (pg. 53)
 - "Ever since the fundament of knowledge came to be sought in supposedly immediate subjective data, **men have been enthralled by the idol of a pure present. They would endeavor to strip thought of its historic dimension.** The fictitious, one-dimensional Now became the cognitive ground of all inner meaning" (pg. 53)
 - "What is historic in thought, instead of heeding the timelessness of an objectified logic, was equated with superstition—and to cite

- eclesiastically institutional traditions against inquiring thought was indeed superstition. Men had every reason to criticize authority. **But their critique misconceived that tradition is immanent in knowledge itself, that it serves to mediate between known objects. Knowledge no sooner starts from scratch, by way of a stabilizing objectification, than it will distort the objects.** Knowledge as such, even in a form detached from substance, takes part in tradition as unconscious remembrance; there is no question which we might simply ask, without knowing of past things that are preserved in the question and spur it." (pg. 53-54)
- "From the outset, thinking as an intratemporal, motivated, progressive motion is the microcosmic equivalent of the macrocosmic motion of history that was internalized in the structure of thinking." (pg. 54)
 - **"Philosophy rests on the texts it criticizes.** They are brought to it by the tradition they embody, and it is in dealing with them that the conduct of philosophy becomes commensurable with tradition. This justifies the move from philosophy to exegesis, which exalts neither the interpretation nor the symbol into an absolute but seeks the truth where thinking secularizes the irretrievable archetype of sacred texts" (pg. 55)
- Rhetoric (pg. 55)
 - "Severed and degraded into a means to achieve effects, it became the carrier of the lie in philosophy (pg. 55)
 - **"In philosophy, rhetoric represents that which cannot be thought except in language.** It holds a place among the postulates of contents already known and fixed. Rhetoric is in jeopardy, like any substitute, because it may easily come to usurp what the thought cannot obtain directly from the presentation. It is incessantly corrupted by persuasive purposes—without which, on the other hand, the thought act would no longer have a practical relation" (pg. 55)
 - "The fact that **all approved traditional philosophy from Plato down to the semanticists has been allergic to expression, this fact accords with a propensity of all Enlightenment: to punish undisciplined gestures.** It is a trait extending all the way to logic, a defense mechanism of the materialized consciousness." (pg. 55-56)
 - "Dialectics—literally: language as the organon of thought— would mean to attempt a critical rescue of the rhetorical element, a mutual approximation of thing and expression, to the point where the difference fades. Dialectics appropriates for the power of thought what historically seemed to be a flaw in thinking: its link with language, which nothing can wholly break. It was this link that inspired phenomenology to try—naïvely, as always—to make sure of truth by analyzing words. It is in the rhetorical quality that culture, society, and tradition animate the thought; a stern hostility to it is leagued with barbarism, in which bourgeois thinking ends" (pg. 56)
 - "In dialectics, contrary to popular opinion, the rhetorical element is on the side of content. Dialectics seeks to mediate between random views and unessential accuracy, to master this dilemma by way of the formal, logical dilemma. But dialectics inclines to content because the content is not closed, not predetermined by a skeleton; it is a protest against mythology. **Mythical is that which never changes, ultimately diluted to a formal legality of thought.** To want substance in cognition is to want a utopia. It is this consciousness of possibility that sticks to the concrete, the undisfigured. Utopia is blocked off by possibility, never by immediate reality; this is why it seems abstract in the midst of extant things. The inextinguishable color comes from nonbeing. Thought is its servant, a piece of existence extending—however negatively—to that which is not. The utmost distance alone would be proximity; philosophy is the prism in which its color is caught." (pg. 56-57)
 - Part 1: Relation to Ontology
 - Chapter 1 - The Ontological Need (pg. 61)
 - Question and Answer (pg. 61)
 - "The ontologies in Germany, Heidegger's in particular, remain effective to this day. Traces of the political past are no deterrent. Tacitly, ontology is understood as readiness to sanction a heteronomous order that need not be consciously justified, and that such interpretations are denied in higher places—as misconceptions, declines to the ontical sphere, deficient radicalism in formulating the question—serves but to enhance the dignity of their appeal." (pg. 61)
 - ◆ **"...ontology is apologetical."** (pg. 61)
 - ◇ "Yet its effect would be unintelligible if it did not meet an emphatic need, a sign of something missed, a longing that Kant's verdict on a knowledge of the Absolute should not be the end of the matter" (pg. 61)
 - ▶ "The categorial structure that had been uncritically accepted as such, as the skeleton of extant conditions, was confirmed as absolute, and the unreflective immediacy of the method lent itself to any kind of license" (pg. 62)
 - ◆ "...ontology has become shrouded in vapors." (pg. 63)
 - "what the present ontologies have done under this aspect is not simply to adopt the antiacademic philosophical tradition by asking, as Paul Tillich phrased it once, about that which concerns one absolutely. They have taken the nonacademic pathos and established it academically" (pg. 62-63)
 - **"in philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always include its answer. Unlike science, philosophy knows no fixed sequence of question and answer.** Its question must be shaped by its experience, so as to catch up with the experience. Its answers are not given, not made, not generated: they are the recoil of the unfolded, transparent question" (pg. 63)
 - ◆ **"thought does not preserve itself as an origin**, and it ought not to hide the fact that it does not generate—that it merely returns what it already has as experience" (pg. 63)
 - "While Hegel's critique of analytical judgments is exacerbated to the thesis of their "falseness," everything is to him an analytical judgment, a turning to and fro of the thought without citation of anything extraneous to it. It is a moment of dialectics that the new is the old, and otherness is familiarity. The connection of that moment with the identity thesis is evident, but it is not circumscribed by the thesis. **Paradoxically, the more a philosophical thought yields to its experience, the closer its approach to an analytical judgment.**" (pg. 64)
 - Affirmative Character (pg. 65)
 - "the cult of Being, or at least the attraction of the word as of something superior, lives by the fact that in reality, as once upon a time in epistemology, concepts denoting function have more and more replaced the concepts denoting substance. Society has become the total functional context which liberalism used to think it was: to be is to be relative to other persons and things, and to be irrelevant in oneself. This frightening fact, this dawning awareness that it may be losing its substantiality, prepares the subject to listen to avowals that its unarticulated being—equated with that substantiality— cannot be lost, that it will survive the functional context" (pg. 65)
 - Incapacitation of the Subject (pg. 66)
 - "The ground of philosophical idealism [is] the control of nature..." (pg. 67)
 - ◆ "There is a universal feeling, a universal fear, that our progress in controlling nature may increasingly help to weave the very calamity it is supposed to protect us from, that it may be weaving that second nature into which society has rankly grown" (pg. 67)
 - ◇ **"Ontology and the philosophy of Being are modes of reaction in which**—along with other and cruder modes—**consciousness hopes to escape from that entanglement. But they contain a fatal dialectics.** The truth that expels man from the center of creation and reminds him of his impotence—this same truth will, as a subjective mode of conduct, confirm the sense of impotence, cause men to identify with it, and thus reinforce the spell of the second nature. Faith in Being, a dim

- weltanschauung derived from critical premonitions, really degenerates into a bondage to Being, as Heidegger incautiously defined it once. Feeling face to face with the cosmos, the believer clings without much ado to any kind of particular, if only it is forceful enough in convicting the subject of its weakness. The subjects' readiness to cringe before the calamity that springs from the subjective context itself is the punishment for their futile wish to fly the prison of their subjectivity. The philosophical leap, the primal gesture of Kierkegaard, is the very license from which the subject dreams it may escape by its submission to Being" (pg. 68)
- "Restricting the mind to thoughts open and attainable at the historical stage of its experience is an element of freedom; non-conceptual vagary represents the opposite of freedom. Doctrines which heedlessly run off from the subject to the universe, along with the philosophy of Being, are more easily brought into accord with the world's hardened condition and with the chances of success in it than is the tiniest bit of self-reflection by a subject pondering upon itself and its real captivity." (pg. 68)
 - Being, Subject, Object (pg. 69)
 - "The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion..." (pg. 69)
 - ◆ "[to Heidegger,] Being is the supreme concept—for on the lips of him who says "Being" is the word, not Being itself—and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word "Being" and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust." (pg. 69)
 - ◇ "Presupposed by the talk of Being—though no longer referred to by the mature Heidegger, at least—is Husserl's doctrine of categorial visuality or essence perception. It is solely by such perception that the structure which Heidegger's philosophy ascribes to Being could, in the terminology of the school, be "unsealed" or "unveiled"; Heidegger's emphatic Being would be the ideal of what yields to ideation. The critique that lies in Husserl's doctrine—of a classifying logic as the significative unity of whatever the concept covers—remains in force" (pg. 69)
 - ▶ "What [Husserl] explicitly propounded method sought to do to classifying concepts, by the mode of their cognitive ascertainment, was to imbue them with that which as classification, as the mere arrangement of given things, they cannot have—to imbue them with what they would have only by grasping the thing itself, which in Husserl's case oscillates between an intramental thing and one contrary to the immanence of consciousness. Husserl cannot, as was customary in his lifetime, be accused of irrationalism on the ground that his categorial vision is unscientific; his work as a whole is a stand against irrationalism. But what can be held against his work is its contamination with science" (pg. 69-70)
 - ◆ "Heidegger noticed this and took the step Husserl shrank from. However, in doing so he discarded the rational moment which Husserl preserved, and—more like Bergson in this respect—he tacitly followed a procedure in which the relation to the discursive concept, an inalienable element of thought, was sacrificed. At the same time he covered Bergson's weakness, his juxtaposition of two disconnected, disparate modes of cognition: Heidegger, mobilizing the alleged higher dignity of the part of categorial vision, removes the epistemological-critical question as pre-ontological, along with the question whether that part is legitimate. Discontent with the preliminary epistemological question comes to justify its outright elimination; dogmatics simply turns into a higher truth, as against the traditional critique of dogmatics. This is the root of Heidegger's archaicism. **The ambiguity of the Greek words for "being"—an ambiguity that dates back to the Ionians' failure to distinguish between materials, principles, and the pure essence—is not listed as a defect but as original superiority. Its mission is to heal the concept "Being" of the wound of its conceptuality, of the split between thoughts and their content.**" (pg. 70)
 - Ontological Objectivism (pg. 70)
 - "A self-denying subjectivity recoils into objectivism." (pg. 70)
 - ◆ "What is meant by Being is stripped as much of all individuated existence as of all traces of rational abstraction. **This Being ends up in a tautology from which the subject has been evicted:** 'But Being—what is Being? It is Itself'" (pg. 70)
 - "Intentionally or not, every judgment—even an analytical one, as shown by Hegel—carries with it the claim to predicate something that is not simply identical with the mere concept of the subject. If it ignores this requirement, the judgment breaks the contract it has previously signed by its form. But the concept of Being as handled by the new ontology cannot help breaking that contract. **In this ontology, Being must be defined by itself alone because it is held to be neither comprehensible in concepts—in other words, neither "transmitted"—nor immediately demonstrable** after the model of sensory ascertainment. In lieu of any critical authority for Being we get a reiteration of the mere name." (pg. 71)
 - ◆ "As Heidegger once pointed out against Sartre, a philosophy's denial that it is metaphysics does not settle the question whether or not it is, but it does justify the suspicion that untruth may hide in the refusal to admit its metaphysical content." (pg. 71)
 - ◇ "The will not to accept evasions, the will to learn essential things from philosophy, is deformed by answers tailored to the need, by answers that lie in twilight between the legitimate duty to provide bread, not stones, and the illegitimate conviction that there must be bread because it must be" (pg. 72)
 - The Disappointed Need (pg. 72)
 - "Not to be underestimated among the many functions of Being is that, while flaunting its higher worth against entity, it simultaneously carries with it the memory of the entity from which it wants to be set off, as a memory of something precedent to differentiation and antagonism. **The lure of Being is as eloquent as the rustle of leaves in the wind of bad poems.** But what that rustle praises will slide out of reach rather harmlessly, while in philosophy it is insisted on like a possession over which the thought that thinks it has no power. Dialectics—in which pure particularization and pure generality pass into each other, both equally indistinct—is shrouded in silence and exploited in the doctrine of Being. Indistinctness makes a mythical cuirass." (pg. 75-76)
 - "Deficiency=Profit" (pg. 76)
 - "Heidegger's philosophy is like a highly developed credit system: one concept borrows from the other" (pg. 76)
 - ◆ "That Being is neither a fact nor a concept exempts it from criticism. Whatever a critic would pick on can be dismissed as a misconception." (pg. 76)
 - ◆ "And yet, this Being which is supposed to be no concept at all, or at least a very special concept, is the aporetic concept pure and simple. It transforms that which is more abstract into that which is more concrete and thus more true." (pg. 77)
 - No Man's Land (pg. 77)
 - "Since Schelling, substantive philosophizing has been based on the thesis of identity." (pg. 77)
 - ◆ "Husserl expressly described his doctrine as nonepistemological, as Heidegger later called his own doctrine nonmetaphysical..." (pg. 78)
 - ◇ "Heidegger extends the proscription even to Husserl's, those supreme, fact-free, conceptual units of a factuality with which traces of subject-matter are commingled. Being is the contraction of essences. Ontology's own consistency takes it to a no man's land. It must eliminate each a posteriori; it is not supposed to be logic either, in the sense of a doctrine of thought and a

- particular discipline; each thinking step would necessarily take ontology beyond the only point where it may hope to be sufficient unto itself. In the end, there is hardly anything it would dare aver any longer, not even about Being. **What shows in this ontology is not so much mystical meditation as the distress of a thinking that seeks its otherness and cannot make a move without fearing to lose what it claims.** Tendentially, philosophy becomes a ritualistic posture. Yet there is a truth stirring in that posture as well: the truth of philosophy falling silent" (pg. 78)
- Unsuccessful Realism (pg. 78)
 - "Realism seeks to breach the walls which thought has built around itself, to pierce the interjected layer of subjective positions that have become a second nature." (pg. 78-79)
 - ◆ "In this respect **fundamental ontology remains, like phenomenology, an involuntary heir to positivism**. Heidegger's realism turns a somersault: his aim is to philosophize formlessly, so to speak, purely on the ground of things, with the result that things evaporate for him. Weary of the subjective jail of cognition, he becomes convinced that what is transcendent to subjectivity is immediate for subjectivity, without being conceptually stained by subjectivity" (pg. 79)
 - ◇ "fundamental ontology mistakes its protest against the confining and dimming subjective element for anti-romanticism; it wants to conquer subjectivity by belligerent speech, from which Heidegger does not shrink either" (pg. 79)
 - ◇ "When we believe we are, so to speak, subjectlessly clinging to the phenomenality of things, are original and neo-realistic and at the same time doing justice to the material, we are in fact eliminating all definitions from OUT thought..." (pg. 79)
 - "In the inevitability of aporetic concept formation the philosophy of Being becomes the unwilling victim of Hegel's judgment about **Being: it is indistinguishably one with nothingness**. Heidegger did not deceive himself about this. But what should be held against existential ontology is not the nihilism which the left-wing Existentialists later interpreted into it, to its own horror; **to be held against that ontology is its positive presentation of the downright nihility of its supreme word.**" (pg. 80)
 - On Categorical Vision (pg. 80)
 - "Inseparably therefrom, spontaneous thoughts are phenomena. Heidegger's stress on their phenomenal aspect against its total reduction to thought would be a salutary corrective of idealism. But his procedure is to isolate the factual moment, to conceive it in Hegel's terminology, as abstractly as idealism conceives the synthetic moment. Hypostatized, it ceases to be a moment and comes to be what ontology in its protest against the split between concept and entity would least like it to be: it becomes a thing." (pg. 80-81)
 - "the phenomenological thesis to which the entire school owed its effect broke down: that phenomenology is exploring and describing things rather than thinking them up; that it is not epistemology; in short, that it does not bear the stigma of a reflecting intelligence. Yet Being, the arcanum of fundamental ontology, is nothing but the categorical fact, offered in alleged purity and raised to the supreme formula." (pg. 81)
 - "**What the philosophy of Being boasts about, as if it were the organ of positivity pure and simple, has its truth in negativity**" (pg. 83)
 - ◆ "Heidegger's stress on Being, which is not to be a mere concept, can be based upon the indissoluble content in judgments, as Husserl previously based himself on the ideal unity of the species" (pg. 83)
 - Being (pg. 83)
 - "It is asserted that Being, precedent to each abstraction, is no concept, or at most a qualitatively eminent concept" (pg. 83)
 - ◆ "Ignored in this assertion is the fact that no immediacy...is the whole of cognition. Each immediacy is a moment. No ontological draft can do without absolutizing single culled-out moments." (pg. 83-84)
 - "that **the philosophy of Being turns the unworkability into untouchability**, that it **turns the exemption from the rational process into a transcendence of the reflecting intellect—this is an act of violence as desperate as it is prudent**. More resolute than phenomenology, which stops halfway, Heidegger wants to break out of the immanence of consciousness. But his outbreak is an outbreak into the mirror. Blinded to the moment of synthesis in the substrate, he ignores the fact that the mind—which in Heidegger's adored Eleatic philosophy of Being confessed to identity with Being—is already implied in the meaning of what it presents as the pure selfhood it would be confronting. Objectively, Heidegger's critique of philosophical tradition comes to run counter to its own promise. This critique tacitly ignores the subjective mind and thus necessarily the material, the factuality which any synthesis acts upon; it feigns a unity and absoluteness of what is articulated in it along these lines; and so it turns into the reverse of "destruction"—of the challenge to disenchant the manmade concepts" (pg. 84)
 - "A sign of irrationality would not by itself be the same as philosophical irrationalism. Irrationality is the scar which the irremovable nonidentity of subject and object leaves on cognition— whose mere form of predicative judgment postulates identity; it is also the hope of withstanding the omnipotence of the subjective concept. Like the concept, however, irrationality itself remains a function of the *ratio* and an object of its self-criticism: what slips through the net is filtered by the net. The philosophemes of irrationalism too depend on concepts, and thus on a rational element incompatible with them. **One of the motives of dialectics is to cope with that which Heidegger evades by usurping a standpoint beyond the difference of subject and object**—the difference that shows how inadequate the *ratio* is to thought. By means of reason, however, such a leap will fail. **We cannot, by thinking, assume any position in which that separation of subject and object will directly vanish, for the separation is inherent in each thought; it is inherent in thinking itself. This is why Heidegger's moment of truth levels off into an irrationalist *weltanschauung***. Today as in Kant's time, philosophy demands a rational critique of reason, not its banishment or abolition." (pg. 85)
 - "Sense of Being" (pg. 85)
 - "**When men are forbidden to think, their thinking sanctions what simply exists. The genuinely critical need of thought to awaken from the cultural phantasmagoria is trapped, channeled, steered into the wrong consciousness**. The culture of its environment has broken thought of the habit to ask what all this may be, and to what end; it has enfeebled the question what it all means—a question growing in urgency as fewer people find some such sense self-evident, as it yields more and more to cultural bustle. Enthroned instead is the being-thus-and-not-otherwise of whatever may, as culture, claim to make sense. The weight of existing culture ends all insistence on the reality of its asserted meaning, or on the legitimacy of that meaning. On the other hand, **fundamental ontology makes its appearance as spokesman for the pilfered interest, for all that has been "forgotten."** This is not the least of its reasons for being averse to epistemology, which tends to list that interest among the prejudices" (pg. 85-86)
 - "Even so, fundamental ontology cannot annul epistemology at will. The doctrine of Dasein—of subjectivity—as the royal road to ontology resurrects the old subjective inquiry that had been humbled by ontological pathos" (pg. 86)
 - ◆ "Phenomenology is the source of a turn in the question what Being means, or in its traditional variant: 'Why is there anything at all? Why not nothing?'" (pg. 86)
 - "...the philosophy of Being does indeed rebuke positivism for the folly of its reason..." (pg. 87)
 - "**It is a fact that if concepts are to be concepts at all they must mean something**, and this fact serves as a vehicle for the thesis that their, Being itself, must be meaningful because it is not given otherwise than as a concept, a linguistic meaning. That this concept is not to be a concept, that it is supposed to be immediate, rather, shrouds the semantic sense in ontological dignity" (pg. 87)

- Ontology Prescribed (pg. 87)
 - "Out of the human mind, **ontology wants to restore the order shattered by the mind, along with the authority of that order**" (pg. 87)
 - ◆ **"The self-stylization of Being as a Beyond, a thing beyond the critical concept**, is supposed, after all, to give the myth the legal title which heteronomy requires as long as a residue of the Enlightenment survives" (pg. 88)
- Protest Against Reification (pg. 89)
 - "...Husserl's *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*...established logical absolutism..." (pg. 90)
 - "relativism has gone somewhat out of style. You do not hear so much twaddle about it either" (pg. 90)
 - "**Heidegger is anti-thing and anti-functional in one. Under no circumstances is Being to be a thing, and yet, as the metaphors keep indicating, it is to be the "ground" and something solid.**" (pg. 90)
- The Wrong Need (pg. 92)
 - "**Needs are not invariant and undeducible, and neither do they guarantee their satisfaction. The semblance and the illusion that they must be met wherever they appear can be traced back to the same faulty consciousness.** Be they ever so tangible, needs that are heteronomously produced participate in ideology." (pg. 92)
 - ◆ "**Material needs should be respected even in their wrong form, the form caused by overproduction.** The ontological need too has its real moment in a state in which men can neither recognize nor admit the rationality, the sense, of the necessity that rules their conduct. The faulty consciousness of their needs aims at things not needed by subjects, human beings who have come of age, and thus it compromises every possible fulfillment" (pg. 92)
 - "**A thought without a need, a thought that wished for nothing, would be like nothing; but a thought based on a need becomes confused if our conception of the need is purely subjective. Needs are conglomerates of truth and falsehood;** what would be true is the thought that wants the right thing. If there is any truth to the doctrine that human needs cannot be told by a state of nature, only by the so-called cultural standard, the conditions of social production along with their bad irrationality are also part of that standard. Its irrationality must be ruthlessly criticized against the needs of the mind, the substitute for all that has been withheld." (pg. 93)
 - "Its [e.g., the new ontology's] most urgent need today appears to be the need for something solid." (pg. 93)
- Weakness and Support (pg. 94)
 - "**Institutions are more powerful than ever;** they have long since produced something like the neon-lit style of the culture industry, a style that covers the world as the turn to the baroque did once upon a time." (pg. 94)
 - "**What appears as the formlessness of a Dasein modeled solely after subjective reason is in fact that which enslaves the subjects:** the pure principle of being-for-something-else, of being merchandise. For the sake of universal equivalence and comparability this principle depreciates qualitative definitions everywhere; **its tendency is to bring all things down to one level!**" (pg. 94)
 - "**The reified consciousness is a moment in the totality of the reified world. The ontological need is the metaphysics of that consciousness** even when its doctrinal content leads it to exploit the critique of reification that has nowadays become so cheap. The form of invariance as such is the projection of what has congealed in the reified consciousness. Incapable of experiencing things not already contained in the repertory of eversameness, that consciousness recoins immutability into the idea of something eternal—of transcendence." (pg. 95)
 - "**In a state of unfreedom no one, of course, has a liberated consciousness.** But such a consciousness which would have power over itself, which would really be as autonomous as it so far always only pretended to be, would not need to be continually afraid of losing itself to something else—secretly, to the powers that rule it. **The need for support, for a supposed substantiality, is not so substantial as its self-righteousness would have it be. It is a sign of the weakness of the I,** rather, known to psychologists as a presently typical human impairment. **A man no longer oppressed from without and within himself would not be looking for support, perhaps not even for himself.** Subjects who managed to save some of their freedom even under heteronomous conditions suffer less of a lack of support than do the unfree, who are only too glad to charge that lack to freedom, as freedom's fault. **If men no longer had to equate themselves with things, they would need neither a superstructure of things nor an invariant picture of themselves, after the model of thing**" (pg. 95-96)
 - ◆ "The doctrine of invariants perpetuates how little has changed; its positivity perpetuates what is bad about it. This is why the ontological need is wrong" (pg. 96)
- Chapter 2 - Being and Existence
 - Immanent Critique of Ontology (pg. 97)
 - "**Our critique of the ontological need brings us to an immanent critique of ontology itself.** We have no power over the philosophy of Being if we reject it generally, from outside, instead of taking it on in its own structure—turning its own force against it, in line with Hegel's desideratum. The motivations and results of Heidegger's thought movements can be construed even where they are not uttered; **there is hardly a sentence of his without its positional value in the functional context of the whole.** In that sense he is a successor to the deductive systems. Their history is already full of concepts spawned by cogitative progress, even if we cannot put a finger on the corresponding facts; the need to form these concepts is the source of philosophy's speculative element. **The thought movement that congealed in them must be reliquified, its validity traced, so to speak, in repetition**" (pg. 97)
 - ◆ "Heidegger's approach is true insofar as he accepts that and denies traditional metaphysics; he becomes untrue where—not unlike Hegel—he talks as if the contents we want to rescue were thus directly in our minds. **The philosophy of Being fails as soon as it claims a sense in Being...**" (pg. 98)
 - "**The true philosophical task, according to Heidegger, would be to conceive Being, yet Being resists any cogitative definition. This makes the appeal to conceive it a hollow one.**" (pg. 98)
 - ◆ "**Heidegger's cult of Being,** his polemics against the idealistic cult of the mind, does of course presuppose a critique of the deification of Being. But **Heidegger's Being, all but indistinguishable from its antipode, the mind, is no less repressive than the mind. It is only less transparent than the mind, whose principle was transparency, and therefore even less capable of critical self-reflection** on the nature of dominion than the philosophies of the mind had ever been. The electric charge of Heidegger's word Being goes well with the praise which a neutralized culture bestows upon the devout or faithful as such— as if their devotions and beliefs were merits in themselves, regardless of the truth of what they believe. This neutralization comes into its own in Heidegger: faith in Being strikes out all the substance that had been noncommittally dragged along in the half or fully secularized religions. **Heidegger drills in religious customs, but all that he retains of them is the general confirmation of dependence and submissiveness as surrogates of the objective formal laws of thought**" (pg. 98-99)
 - ◇ "**The expression of Being is nothing but the feeling of this aura. It is an aura without a light-giving star, of course, one in which the indirect element becomes isolated and thus direct.** But indirectness can no more be hypostatized than can the poles of subject and object; it is valid only in their constellation. Transmission is transmitted by what it transmits. Heidegger overstretchs it into a sort of nonobjective objectivity" (pg. 99)
 - "**...Heidegger transposes the empirical superiority of the way things are into the realm of essence.**" (pg. 100)

- Copula (pg. 100)
 - "The cult of Being lives by the age-old ideology of the *idola fori*, by that which thrives in the darkness of the word "being" and of the forms derived from it. "Is" establishes a context of existential judgment between the grammatical subject and the predicate, thus suggesting something ontical. Taken purely by itself, however, as a copula, it means at the same time the general, categorical fact of a synthesis, without representing anything ontical." (pg. 100)
 - ◆ "From the logicity of the copula, Heidegger gets the ontological purity that suits his allergy to all things factual, and from existential judgment he gets the memory of things ontical—which will permit the categorial achievement of the synthesis to be hypostatized, then, as given." (pg. 100-101)
 - ◇ "Even the word "is," of course, has a "state of facts" corresponding to it. In every predicative judgment, "is" has its meaning, as have the subject and the predicate. But the "state of facts" is a matter of intentionality, not of being. **The copula, by definition, is fulfilled only in the relation between subject and predicate. It is not independent.** Heidegger, in misplacing it beyond the sole source of its meaning, succumbs to that reified thought to which he took exception. **His definition of that which is meant by "is" as the absolute, ideal "in itself"—in other words, as Being—** would give the same right to the things represented by the judgment's subject and predicate, once detached from the copula. To both, synthesis by the copula would happen as a mere external occurrence; this was precisely what the concept of Being was thought up against. Once again, as in an obsolete logic, subject, copula, and predicate would be conclusive, completed details after the model of things." (pg. 101)
 - ▶ "This extrapolation rests on a confusion in the theory of meanings: the general meaning of the copula "is," the constant grammatical token for the synthesis of the judgment, is confused with the specific meaning acquired by "is" in every judgment. The two coincide by no means." (pg. 101)
 - ▶ "Heidegger ignores the difference. As a result, the particular job of "is" comes to be merely something like a **phenomenal mode of the generality**. The difference between the category and the substance of the existential judgment is blurred. The substitution of the general grammatical form for the apophantic content transforms the ontical task of "is" into an ontological one, a way of Being to be" (pg. 101-102)
 - "The word Being has an overtone that can be missed in arbitrary definition only; it is what lends Heidegger's philosophy its timbre. **Every entity is more than it is—as we are reminded by Being, in contrast to entity. There is no entity whose determination and self-determination does not require something else, something which the entity itself is not;** for by itself alone it would not be definable. It therefore points beyond itself. "Transmission" is simply another word for this. Yet Heidegger seeks to hold on to that which points beyond itself, and to leave behind, as rubble, that beyond which it points. To him, entwinement turns into its absolute opposite, into the . In the word "Being," the totality of that which is, the copula has become an object." (pg. 102)
 - ◆ **this, here, seems the entrance of Adorno's 'negative' dialectics - i.e., utilizing the 'that beyond'.*
 - "We could, of course, not talk of an "is" without Being any more than we can talk of Being without an "is." (pg. 102)
 - ◆ "**Heidegger gets as far as the borderline of dialectical insight into the nonidentity in identity. But he does not carry through the contradiction in the concept of Being. He suppresses it.** What can somehow be conceived as Being mocks the notion of an identity between the concept and that which it means; but Heidegger treats it as an identity, as pure Being itself, devoid of its otherness. The nonidentity in absolute identity is covered up like a skeleton in the family closet. **Because "is" is neither a merely subjective function nor a thing, an entity—because of our traditional way of thinking it is no objectivity—Heidegger calls it "Being," that nonsubjective, nonobjective third.** The transition ignores the intent of the term as whose humble interpreter Heidegger regards himself. The insight that "is" can be called neither a mere thought nor a mere entity does not permit its transfiguration into something transcendent in relation to those two definitions. Every attempt to conceive the "is" at all, even in the palest generality, leads to entities on the one side and to concepts on the other. The constellation of moments is not to be reduced to a singular essence; what is inherent in that constellation is not an essence. The unity promised by the word "Being" lasts only so long as it is not conceived, as its meaning is not analyzed in line with Heidegger's own method; any such analysis will bring to light what disappeared in the abyss of Being. But if the analysis becomes taboo, aporia turns into subreption. **We are to conceive Being as the absolute, but it is to be the absolute only because we cannot conceive it. It shines beyond the moments only because it magically blinds our cognition of moments.** A rationality that cannot do its best strikes itself as the worst" (pg. 104)
 - No Transcendence of Being (pg. 105)
 - "Judgments are not a mere synthesis of concepts, for without judgment there is no concept—a fact which Heidegger overlooks..." (pg. 105)
 - ◆ "Every analysis of a judgment takes us to a subject and an object, but this fact does not create a region beyond those moments, a region that would be "in itself." The analysis results in the constellation of those moments, not in a third that would be superior, or at least more general" (pg. 105)
 - "...**we cannot conceive such a supposedly pure substrate of "is."** Every attempt to do so runs into transmissions of which the **hypostatized Being would be relieved. To Heidegger, however, its very inconceivability yields a profit, an addition to the metaphysical dignity of Being. Its refusal to submit to human thought is said to make it the Absolute.** Because, in the best Hegelian manner, it cannot be reduced to either a subject or an object without leaving a remainder, it is regarded as beyond subject and object—although, independently of them, it would indeed not be at all. In the end, human reason, which cannot conceive Being, is itself disparaged—as if there were any way to separate thought from reason" (pg. 105)
 - ◆ "Undeniably, Being is not simply the totality of all there is, of all that is the case." (pg. 106)
 - "what echoes in the word "Being" as opposed to —that everything is more than it is—means entwinement, not something transcendent to entwinement. This is what Heidegger makes of it: something added to the individual entity. **He pursues dialectics to the point of saying that neither the subject nor the object are immediate and ultimate; but he deserts dialectics in reaching for something immediate and primary beyond subject and object.**" (pg. 106)
 - ◆ "Heidegger reacts to the loss of the aura1 by arranging its function, turning the fact that things point beyond themselves into a substrate, and thus making that fact itself like a thing." (pg. 106)
 - ◇ "Secretly, Heidegger obeys the law that the advancing rationality of their constantly irrational society makes men reach farther and farther into the past" (pg. 106)
 - "Heidegger's transcendence is an absolutized immanence, obdurate against its own immanent character" (pg. 106-107)
 - Expressing the Inexpressible (pg. 108)
 - "We fail to do justice to the concept of Being, however, until we also grasp the genuine experience that effects its instauration: **the philosophical urge to express the inexpressible.** The more anxiously a philosophy resists that urge, which is its peculiarity, the greater the temptation to tackle the inexpressible directly, without the labor of Sisyphus—which, by the way, would not be the worst definition of philosophy and does so much to bring ridicule upon it. Philosophy itself, as a form of the mind, contains a moment deeply akin to the state

- of suspense which Heidegger assigns to the topic of meditation—and which prevents meditation." (pg. 108)
- "Philosophy will not dispense with truth, however, but will illuminate the narrowness of scientific truth...**Philosophy seeks stringency in that which it is not, in its opposite, and in the reflection on what, with a poor sort of naïveté, is viewed as binding by positive cognition**" (pg. 109)
 - ◆ "Philosophy is neither a science nor the "cogitative poetry" to which positivists would degrade it in a stupid oxymoron. It is a form transmitted to those which differ from it as well as distinguished from them. Its suspended state is nothing but the expression of its inexpressibility. In this respect it is a true sister of music" (pg. 109)
 - "...Heidegger wants to shake off, the inexpressible becomes explicit and compact in the word "Being," while the protest against reification becomes reified, divorced from thinking, and irrational. By treating the inexpressible side of philosophy as his immediate theme, Heidegger dams up philosophy all the way back to a revocation of consciousness" (pg. 110)
 - The Child's Question (pg. 110)
 - "[Heidegger] treats the historic languages as if they were those of Being, as romantically as any violent anti-romanticist." (pg. 112)
 - The Question of Being (pg. 112)
 - **"The fundament beneath Heidegger's emphatic expression of the word "Being" is an old category of his, one which later on goes all but unmentioned: authenticity.** The transcendence of Being, as opposed to concept and entity, is to redeem the desideratum of authenticity as that which is not illusory, neither artificial nor moot." (pg. 112)
 - ◆ "the authenticity he misses will promptly recoil into positivity, into authenticity as a posture of consciousness..." (pg. 113)
 - "...the so-called question of Being condenses into a zero-dimensional point: into what it admits as the sole true-born meaning of Being. It turns into a ban on any step beyond this, and finally into a ban on any step beyond the tautology whose manifestation in Heidegger's prose is that time and again the self-uncovering Being says nothing else but "Being."" (pg. 114)
 - Looping the Loop (pg. 115)
 - **"The dialectics of Being and entity—that no Being can be conceived without an entity, and no entity without transmission—is suppressed by Heidegger.** Moments that are not without one transmitting the other are to him directly one, and this one is positive Being." (pg. 115)
 - ◆ "Heidegger copes with this in a strategic masterpiece that is the matrix of his thinking as a whole. The term "ontological difference" permits his philosophy to lay hands even on the insoluble moment of entity" (pg. 115)
 - "The breath of this philosophy turns entity into an ontological state of facts, a dimmed and hypostatized expression of the impossibility to conceive Being without entity—just as entity, according to Heidegger's basic thesis, cannot be conceived without Being. This is how he loops the loop. The exigency that ontology cannot do without its opposite, the ontical—the ontological principle's dependence on its counterpart, the inalienable skandalon of ontology—becomes an element of ontology. The ontologization of the ontical is Heidegger's triumph over the other, less artful ontologists. **The fact that there is no Being without entity is brought into the form that the being of entity is of the essence of Being. Thus a truth becomes an untruth, entity turns into essence. Being takes over what in the dimension of its being-in-itself it would not wish to be; it takes possession of entity, whose conceptual unity is always a connotation in the literal sense of Being"** (pg. 116)
 - ◆ "Heidegger's doctrine of the distinction of Dasein as ontical and ontological at the same time—of the 'presence-at-hand' of Being—hypostatizes Being from the start." (pg. 116 notes)
 - "The ontological difference is removed by means of a conceptualization of the nonconceptual into nonconceptuality" (pg. 117)
 - Mythology of Being (pg. 117)
 - "Heidegger, his assurances to the contrary notwithstanding, puts the alleged antecedent of the ontological difference on the side of essence: as the difference expressed in the concept of entity is denied, the concept is exalted by the nonconceptuality said to be beneath it" (pg. 117)
 - "Demythologization is division; the myth is the deceptive unity of the undivided" (pg. 118)
 - **"As far back as we can trace it, the history of thought has been a dialectic of enlightenment."** (pg. 118)
 - "Showing up, along with Heidegger's concept of Being, is the mythical concept of fate..." (pg. 118)
 - "The eulogized undividedness of existence and essence in Being is thus called by name as what it is: the blind context of nature; the doom of concatenation; the absolute negation of the transcendence whose tremolo notes quiver in the talk of Being. The illusion in the concept of Being is this transcendence; but the reason for it is that Heidegger's definitions—deducted from Dasein, from the miseries of real human history to this day—dispense with the memory of those miseries. His definitions turn into moments of Being itself, and thus into things superior to that existence." (pg. 119)
 - Ontologization of the Ontical (pg. 119)
 - "Hegel anticipated the special ontological position of Dasein by means of the idealistic thesis that the subject takes precedence. He exploited the fact that the nonidentical on its part can be defined only as a concept. To him it was thereby removed from dialectics and brought to identity: the ontical was ontologized." (pg. 119)
 - Function of the Concept of Existence (pg. 122)
 - **"The ontologization of the ontical is the primary goal of the doctrine of existence.** According to the age-old argument, existence cannot be deduced from essence; hence it is said to be essential in itself." (pg. 122)
 - ◆ "...Jaspers' own existentialism was understood from the outset as a 'search for Being'" (pg. 122)
 - "What is true in the concept of existence is the protest against a condition of society and scientific thought that would expel unregimented experience—a condition that would virtually expel the subject as a moment of cognition." (pg. 123)
 - **"We cannot say what man is. Man today is a function, unfree,** regressing behind whatever is ascribed to him as invariant—except perhaps for the defenselessness and neediness in which some anthropologies wallow. He drags along with him as his social heritage the mutilations inflicted upon him over thousands of years. To decipher the human essence by the way it is now would sabotage its possibility" (pg. 124)
 - **"Existence is a moment. It is not the whole it was conceived against,** the whole from which, severed, it seized the unfulfillable pretension of entirety as soon as it styled itself philosophy" (pg. 124)
 - "Dasein in Itself Ontological" (pg. 124)
 - See text
 - The Nominalistic Aspect (pg. 126)
 - "Nominalism, one of the roots of the existential philosophy of the Protestant Kierkegaard, gave Heidegger's ontology the attractiveness of the nonspeculative. Just as the concept of existence is a false conceptualization of existing things, the complementary precedence which these things are given over the concept allows the ontological concept of existence to profit in turn." (pg. 126)
 - ◆ "where consistent enlighteners absolutize nominalism—instead of dialectically penetrating the nominalist thesis too—they recoil

into mythology. Their philosophy becomes mythology at the point where, **believing in some ultimate datum, they cut reflection short. To break off reflection, to take a positivist's pride in his own naïveté, is nothing else but thoughtless, stubbornly conceptualized self-preservation.**" (pg. 126-127)

- Existence Authoritarian (pg. 127)
 - "The concept of "existential" things—Heidegger prefers the already ontologized noun existentialia (Dasein qua Being)—is governed by the idea that the measure of truth is not its objectivity, of whichever kind, but the pure being-that-way and acting-that-way of the thinker." (pg. 127)
 - ◆ "...the objectivist Heidegger would scarcely subscribe to the proposition that subjectivity is truth..." (pg. 127)
 - "**truth, the constellation of subject and object in which both penetrate each other**, can no more be reduced to subjectivity than to that Being whose dialectical relation to subjectivity Heidegger tends to blur" (pg. 127)
 - ◆ "**What is true in the subject unfolds in relation to that which it is not...**" (pg. 127)
 - "If truth were indeed subjectivity, if a thought were nothing but a repetition of the subject, the thought would be null and void. The existential exaltation of the subject eliminates, for the subject's sake, what might become clear to the subject. It thus falls prey to the relativism to which it is deemed superior, and it brings the subject down to an opaque accidentality. The exponent of such an irrational existentialism will throw out his chest and agitate against the intellectuals by confessing that he is one, too..." (pg. 127-128)
 - "Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its mere decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. **The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill what thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified.** In the ring of the old-fashioned word "personality" all this was heard already. Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes a tautology, a regressive form of consciousness" (pg. 128)
 - ◆ "The utopian potential of thought would be, rather, to be conveyed by reason as embodied in the individual subjects, and to break through the narrowness of that other thinking. The best energy of thought is to outstrip the feeble and fallible thinker." (pg. 128)
- "Historicality" (pg. 128)
 - "Ontology has long cashiered the resistance to idealism which the concept of existence used to offer. Entity, once called upon to bear witness against the sanctity of the man-made idea, has been equipped with the far more ambitious sanctity of Being itself. This ether ennobles it from the outset..." (pg. 128-129)
 - "The ambivalence of the doctrine of Being, the fact that it deals with entity and at the same time ontologizes it—in other words, deprives it of all its nonconceptuality by resorting to its *characteristica formalis*—this ambivalence also determines the doctrine's relation to history" (pg. 129)
- Part 2: Negative Dialectics. Concept and Categories
 - The Indissoluble "Something" (pg. 135)
 - "There is no Being without entities. "Something"—as a cogitatively indispensable substrate of any concept, including the concept of Being—is the utmost abstraction of the subject-matter that is not identical with thinking, an abstraction not to be abolished by any further thought process. Without "something" there is no thinkable formal logic, and there is no way to cleanse this logic of its metalogical rudiment. **The supposition of an absolute form, of "something at large" that might enable our thinking to shake off that subject-matter, is illusionary**" (pg. 135)
 - "Idealism's [**Greek word*] ever since Fichte was that the movement of abstraction allows us to get rid of that from which we abstract. It is eliminated from our thought, banished from the realm where the thought is at home, but not annihilated in itself; the faith in it is magical" (pg. 135)
 - "Without specific thoughts, thinking would contravene its very concept, and these thoughts instantly point to entities—entities which absolute thinking in turn has yet to posit" (pg. 136)
 - "...dialectics alone can grasp it in the self-critique of the concept. This critique is objectively caused by epistemology, by the substance of what we discuss in the critique of reason, and it therefore survives the downfall of idealism, which culminated in it." (pg. 136)
 - "**The Kantian conception still allowed dichotomies such as the ones of form and substance, of subject and object, without being put off by the fact that the antithetical pairs transmit each other; the dialectical nature of that conception, the contradiction implied in its own meaning, went unnoticed.** It took Heidegger's teacher Husserl so to sharpen the idea of apriority that—contrary to both his and Heidegger's intention—the dialectics of the could be derived from their own claim" (pg. 136)
 - "**Once dialectics has become inescapable, however, it cannot stick to its principle like ontology and transcendental philosophy. It cannot be maintained as a structure that will stay basic no matter how it is modified.** In criticizing ontology we do not aim at another ontology..." (pg. 136)
 - ◆ "If that were our purpose we would be merely positing another downright "first"—not absolute identity, this time, not the concept, not Being, but nonidentity, facticity, entity. We would be hypostatizing the concept of nonconceptuality and thus acting counter to its meaning." (pg. 136)
 - "A basic philosophy [**Greek word*] necessarily carries with it the primacy of the concept; whatever withholds itself from the concept is departing from the form of allegedly basic philosophizing. The thoughts of transcendental apperception or of Being could satisfy philosophers as long as they found those concepts identical with their own thoughts. Once we dismiss such identity in principle, the peace of the concept as an Ultimate will be engulfed in the fall of the identity. Since **the basic character of every general concept dissolves in the face of distinct entity**, a total philosophy is no longer to be hoped for" (pg. 136)
 - Compulsory Sustainiveness (pg. 137)
 - "**sensation holds no higher cognitive rank than any other real entity.** Its "my"—accidental to transcendental analysis and tied to ontical conditions—is mistaken for a legal title by experience, which is nearest to itself and the captive of its own reflective hierarchy. It is as if that which some individual human consciousness takes for the ultimate were an Ultimate in itself, as if every other human consciousness, individual and confined to itself, were not entitled to claim the same privilege for its own sensations" (pg. 137)
 - "...sensations have the character of transiency. Nonconceptuality, inalienable from the concept, disavows the concept's being-in-itself. It changes the concept. The concept of nonconceptuality cannot stay with itself, with epistemology; epistemology obliges philosophy to be substantive" (pg. 137)
 - "A philosophy that fears too late for its purity is not only turning away from all that used to be its substance. Rather, what the philosophical analysis encounters immanently, in the interior of supposedly pure concepts and of their truth content, is that ontical element at which the purity claimants shudder, the element which, trembling with hauteur, they cede to the special sciences. The smallest ontical residue in the concepts that are vainly agitated by the regular philosophy compels that philosophy to include existing things in its own reflection, instead of making do with their mere concepts and feeling sheltered there from what the concept means." (pg. 138)
 - "Philosophical thinking crystallizes in the particular, in that which is defined in space and time. **The concept of entity pure and simple is**

- the mere shadow of the false concept of Being" (pg. 138)**
- "Peephole Metaphysics" (pg. 138)
 - **"Wherever a doctrine of some absolute "first" is taught there will be talk of something inferior to it**, of something absolutely heterogeneous to it, as its logical correlate." (pg. 138)
 - "The absolute First remains necessarily as undefined as that which confronts it; no inquiry into something concrete and precedent will reveal the unity of abstract antithesis. Instead, the rigidly dichotomical structure disintegrates by virtue of either pole's definition as a moment of its own opposite. To philosophical thought, dualism is given and as inescapable as the continued course of thinking makes it false. Transmission—"mediation"—is simply the most general and inadequate way to express this." (pg. 139)
 - **"Yet if we cancel the subject's claim to be first—the claim which surreptitiously keeps inspiring ontology—that which the schema of traditional philosophy calls secondary is no longer secondary either.** It is no longer subordinate in a twofold sense." (pg. 139)
 - "...all Western metaphysics has been peephole metaphysics" (pg. 139)
 - "The subject—a mere limited moment—was locked up in its own self by that metaphysics, imprisoned for all eternity to punish it for its deification" (pg. 139)
 - ◆ "...the subject gazes upon a black sky in which the star of the idea, or of Being, is said to rise. And yet it is the very wall around the subject that casts its shadow on whatever the subject conjures: the shadow of reification, which a subjective philosophy will then helplessly fight again" (pg. 139-140)
 - Noncontradictoriness Not to be Hypostatized (pg. 140)
 - "Subjectivity, thinking itself, is called explicable not by itself but by facts, especially by social facts; but the objectivity of cognition in turn is said not to exist without thinking, without subjectivity. Such paradoxicality springs from the Cartesian norm of explication: reasons for what follows—for what follows logically, at least—have to be found in what goes before. This norm is no longer compulsory" (pg. 140)
 - **"In a sense, dialectical logic is more positivistic than the positivism that outlaws it. As thinking, dialectical logic respects that which is to be thought—the object—even where the object does not heed the rules of thinking. The analysis of the object is tangential to the rules of thinking. Thought need not be content with its own legality; without abandoning it, we can think against our thought, and if it were possible to define dialectics, this would be a definition worth suggesting.** The thinker's equipment need not remain ingrown in his thinking; it goes far enough to let him recognize the very totality of its logical claim as a delusion. The seemingly unbearable thesis that subjectivity presupposes facts while objectivity presupposes the subject—this thesis is unbearable only to one so deluded, to one who hypostatizes the relation of cause and effect, the subjective principle to which the experience of the object fails to bow" (pg. 141)
 - **"Dialectics as a philosophical mode of proceeding is the attempt to untie the knot of paradoxicality by the oldest means of enlightenment: the ruse."** (pg. 141)
 - ◆ **"Dialectical reason follows the impulse to transcend the natural context and its delusion** (a delusion continued in the subjective compulsion of the rules of logic) **without forcing its own rule upon this context—** in other words, without sacrifice and without vengeance. Dialectical reason's own essence has come to be and will pass, like antagonistic society" (pg. 141)
 - "The only way out of the dialectical context of immanence is by that context itself. **Dialectics is critical reflection upon that context. It reflects its own motion...**" (pg. 141)
 - ◆ **"Such dialectics is negative"** (pg. 141)
 - "The philosophy of the absolute and total subject is a particular one." (pg. 142)
 - "What tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the reconciliation for which it mistakes itself. The violence of equality-mongering reproduces the contradiction it eliminates." (pg. 142-143)
 - Relation to Left-wing Hegelianism (pg. 143)
 - **"The call for unity of theory and practice has irresistibly degraded theory to a servant's role**, removing the very traits it should have brought to that unity." (pg. 143)
 - "The liquidation of theory by dogmatization and thought taboos contributed to the bad practice; **the recovery of theory's independence lies in the interest of practice itself.** The interrelation of both moments is not settled once for all but fluctuates historically." (pg. 143)
 - ◆ **"...without [theory], there would be no changing the practice that constantly calls for change"** (pg. 143)
 - "Logic of Disintegration" (pg. 144)
 - "In fact, **dialectics is neither a pure method nor a reality in the naïve sense of the word. It is not a method, for the unreconciled matter—lacking precisely the identity surrogated by the thought—is contradictory and resists any attempt at unanimous interpretation. It is the matter, not the organizing drive of thought, that brings us to dialectics. Nor is dialectics a simple reality, for contradictoriness is a category of reflection, the cogitative confrontation of concept and thing. To proceed dialectically means to think in contradictions**, for the sake of the contradiction once experienced in the thing, and against that contradiction. A contradiction in reality, it is a contradiction against reality" (pg. 144-145)
 - "But such dialectics is no longer reconcilable with Hegel. **Its motion does not tend to the identity in the difference between each object and its concept; instead, it is suspicious of all identity. Its logic is one of disintegration: of a disintegration of the prepared and objectified form of the concepts which the cognitive subject faces, primarily and directly. Their identity with the subject is untruth.** With this untruth, the subjective pre-formation of the phenomenon moves in front of the nonidentical in the phenomenon, in front of the individuum ineffabile. The totality of identical definitions would correspond to the wish-fulfillment picture of traditional philosophy: to the a priori structure and to its archaic late form, ontology. Yet before any specific content, this structure—as abstractly maintained—is negative in the simplest sense: it is spiritualized coercion. The power of that negativity holds real sway to this day. What would be different has not begun as yet." (pg. 145)
 - ◆ "This affects all individual definitions. **Every definition that appears noncontradictory turns out to be as contradictory as the ontological models of "Being" and "Existenz."** From philosophy we can obtain nothing positive that would be identical with its construction. In the process of demythologization, positivity must be denied all the way down to the reason that is the instrument of demythologization. The idea of reconciliation forbids the positive positing of reconciliation as a concept" (pg. 145)
 - ◇ "The idealistic magic circle can be transcended only in thoughts still circumscribed by its figure, in thoughts that follow its own deductive procedure, call it by name, and demonstrate the disjointness, the untruth, of totality by unfolding its epitome. Pure identity is that which the subject posits and thus brings up from outside. Therefore, paradoxically enough, to criticize it immanently means to criticize it from outside as well. The subject must make up for what it has done to nonidentity. This is precisely what liberates it from **the semblance of its absolute being-for-itself.** That semblance in turn **is a product of identifying thought—**of the thought which depreciates a thing to a mere sample of its kind or species only to convince us that we have the thing as such, without subjective addition." (pg. 145-146)
 - On the Dialectics of Identity (pg. 146)
 - "As the thinker immerses himself in what faces him to begin with, in the concept, and as he perceives its immanently antinomical character, he

- clings to the idea of something beyond contradiction. The antithesis of thought to whatever is heterogeneous to thought is reproduced in thought itself, as its immanent contradiction. Reciprocal criticism of the universal and of the particular; identifying acts of judgment whether the concept does justice to what it covers, and whether the particular fulfills its concept— these constitute the medium of thinking about the nonidentity of particular and concept" (pg. 146)
- "The barter principle, the reduction of human labor to the abstract universal concept of average working hours, is fundamentally akin to the principle of identification. Barter is the social model of the principle, and without the principle there would be no barter; it is through barter that nonidentical individuals and performances become commensurable and identical. The spread of the principle imposes on the whole world an obligation to become identical, to become total" (pg. 146)
 - "Once critical theory has shown it up for what it is—an exchange of things that are equal and yet unequal—our critique of the inequality within equality aims at equality too, for all our skepticism of the rancor involved in the bourgeois egalitarian ideal that tolerates no qualitative difference. If no man had part of his labor withheld from him anymore, rational identity would be a fact, and society would have transcended the identifying mode of thinking." (pg. 147)
 - "Totality is to be opposed by convicting it of nonidentity with itself—of the nonidentity it denies, according to its own concept. Negative dialectics is thus tied to the supreme categories of identitarian philosophy as its point of departure." (pg. 147)
 - **"Identity is the primal form of ideology.** We relish it as adequacy to the thing it suppresses; adequacy has always been subjection to dominant purposes and, in that sense, its own contradiction." (pg. 148)
 - "Ideology's power of resistance to enlightenment is owed to its complicity with identifying thought, or indeed with thought at large. The ideological side of thinking shows in its permanent failure to make good on the claim that the non-I is finally the I: the more the I thinks, the more perfectly will it find itself debased into an object. Identity becomes the authority for a doctrine of adjustment, in which the object—which the subject is supposed to go by—repays the subject for what the subject has done to it." (pg. 148)
 - **"The critique of ideology** is thus not something peripheral and intra-scientific, not something limited to the objective mind and to the products of the subjective mind. **Philosophically, it is central: it is a critique of the constitutive consciousness itself.**" (pg. 148)
 - Cogitative Self-reflection (pg. 148)
 - "The force of consciousness extends to the delusion of consciousness. It is rationally knowable where an unleashed, self-escaping rationality goes wrong, where it becomes true mythology. The ratio recoils into irrationality as soon as in its necessary course it fails to grasp that the disappearance of its substrate—however diluted—is its own work, the product of its own abstraction. When thinking follows its law of motion unconsciously, it turns against its own sense, against what has been thought, against that which calls a halt to the flight of subjective intentions. The dictates of its autarky condemn our thinking to emptiness; in the end, subjectively, the emptiness becomes stupidity and primitivity. Regression of consciousness is a product of its lack of self-reflection. We can see through the identity principle, but we cannot think without identifying. Any definition is identification" (pg. 148-149)
 - "But definition also approaches that which the object itself is as nonidentical: in placing its mark on the object, definition seeks to be marked by the object. Nonidentity is the secret telos of identification. It is the part that can be salvaged; the mistake in traditional thinking is that identity is taken for the goal. The force that shatters the appearance of identity is the force of thinking: the use of "it is" undermines the form of that appearance, which remains inalienable just the same. **Dialectically, cognition of nonidentity lies also in the fact that this very cognition identifies— that it identifies to a greater extent, and in other ways, than identitarian thinking.** This cognition seeks to say what something is, while identitarian thinking says what something comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and what, accordingly, it is not itself. The more relentlessly our identitarian thinking besets its object, the farther will it take us from the identity of the object. Under its critique, identity does not vanish but undergoes a qualitative change. Elements of affinity—of the object itself to the thought of it—come to live in identity" (pg. 149)
 - "Living in the rebuke that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept's longing to become identical with the thing. This is how **the sense of nonidentity contains identity**. The supposition of identity is indeed the ideological element of pure thought, all the way down to formal logic; but hidden in it is also the truth moment of ideology, the pledge that there should be no contradiction, no antagonism" (pg. 149)
 - Objectivity of Contradiction (pg. 151)
 - "The task of dialectical cognition is not, as its adversaries like to charge, to construe contradictions from above and to progress by resolving them—although Hegel's logic, now and then, proceeds in this fashion. Instead, **it is up to dialectical cognition to pursue the inadequacy of thought and thing**, to experience it in the thing. Dialectics need not fear the charge of being obsessed with the fixed idea of objective conflict in a thing already pacified; no single thing is at peace in the unpacified whole" (pg. 153)
 - "Dialectical contradiction "is" not simply: it means—it has the subjective significance—that it cannot be talked out of this. In this meaning, this intention, dialectics aims at what is different. It is as philosophy's self-criticism that the dialectical motion stays philosophical." (pg. 153)
 - Starting Out from the Concept (pg. 153)
 - **"Because entity is not immediate, because it is only through the concept, we should begin with the concept, not with the mere datum.** The concept's own concept has become a problem" (pg. 153)
 - "Dialectics is a protest lodged by our thinking against the archaicisms of its conceptuality. The concept in itself, previous to any content, hypostatizes its own form against the content. With that, however, it is already hypostatizing the identity principle: that what our thinking practice merely postulates is a fact in itself, solid and enduring. Identifying thought objectifies by the logical identity of the concept." (pg. 153-154)
 - "On its subjective side, **dialectics amounts to thinking so that the thought form will no longer turn its objects into immutable ones, into objects that remain the same.** Experience shows that they do not remain the same." (pg. 154)
 - Synthesis (pg. 156)
 - **"Idealistic dialectics also was an "origins' philosophy."** Hegel compared it to a circle. **By its return to the starting point of the motion, the result is fatally annulled; this was supposed to bring about a continuous identity of subject and object. The epistemological instrument of this dialectics was called synthesis.** Its critique is not one of the individual act of thought which unites separate moments into their relation; it is a critique of synthesis as a guiding and supreme idea." (pg. 156)
 - "...the concept of synthesis [was that] of construction as against decomposition..." (pg. 156)
 - **"Objectively, dialectics means to break the compulsion to achieve identity,** and to break it by means of the energy stored up in that compulsion and congealed in its objectifications" (pg. 157)
 - **"As a sense of nonidentity through identity, dialectics is not only an advancing process but a retrograde one at the same time. To this extent, the picture of the circle describes it correctly. The concept's unfoldment is also a reaching back,** and synthesis is the definition of the difference that perished, "vanished," in the concept..." (pg. 157)
 - "The self-reflection of enlightenment is not its revocation; it is corrupted into revocation only for the sake of today's status quo. Even the self-critical turn of unitarian thinking depends on concepts, on congealed syntheses. The tendency of synthesizing acts is reversible by reflection

- upon what they do to the Many. Unity alone transcends unity." (pg. 158)
- Critique of Positive Negation (pg. 158)
 - **"The nonidentical is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it obtainable by a negation of the negative.** This negation is not an affirmation itself, as it is to Hegel." (pg. 158)
 - "To equate the negation of negation with positivity is the quintessence of identification; it is the formal principle in its purest form. What thus wins out in the inmost core of dialectics is the anti-dialectical principle: that traditional logic which, *more arithmetico*, takes minus times minus for a plus" (pg. 158)
 - ◆ "The thesis that the negation of a negation is something positive can only be upheld by one who presupposes positivity—as all-conceptuality—from the beginning" (pg. 160)
 - ◆ "The negation of negation would be another identity, a new delusion, a projection of consequential logic—and ultimately of the principle of subjectivity—upon the absolute" (pg. 160)
 - **"To negate a negation does not bring about its reversal; it proves, rather, that the negation was not negative enough."** (pg. 159-160)
 - "The structure of [Hegel's] system would unquestionably fall without the principle that to negate negation is positive, but the empirical substance of dialectics is not the principle but the resistance which otherness offers to identity. Hence the power of dialectics." (pg. 160-161)
 - "If we attribute dialectics to the subject alone, removing contradiction by contradiction, so to speak, we also remove dialectics by broadening it into a totality. The system was the source of Hegel's dialectics, not its measure" (pg. 161)
 - Individuality Not the Ultimate Either (pg. 161)
 - "Confusion about identity tends to make thinking capitulate to the indissoluble. Such thinking turns the object's indissolubility into a taboo for the subject. The subject is to resign itself, irrationalistically or scientifically, and not to touch whatever is unlike it. It is to surrender, even to pay homage, to the current cognitive ideal." (pg. 161)
 - **here, we see a bit of hypocrisy. Refer to pg. 43 - "To yield to the object means to do justice to the object's qualitative moments".*
 - "What is, is more than it is. This "more" is not imposed upon it but remains immanent to it, as that which has been pushed out of it. In that sense, the nonidentical would be the thing's own identity against its identifications. The innermost core of the object proves to be simultaneously extraneous to it, the phenomenon of its seclusion, the reflex of an identifying, stabilizing procedure. This is where insistent thinking leads us in regard to the individual: to his essence rather than to the universal he is said to represent." (pg. 161)
 - Constellation (pg. 162)
 - "The unifying moment survives without a negation of negation, but also without delivering itself to abstraction as a supreme principle. It survives because there is no step-by-step progression from the concepts to a more general cover concept. Instead, the concepts enter into a constellation. The constellation illuminates the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden." (pg. 162)
 - "[language] lends objectivity to them by the relation into which it puts the concepts, centered about a thing. Language thus serves the intention of the concept to express completely what it means. By themselves, constellations represent from without what the concept has cut away within: the "more" which the concept is equally desirous and incapable of being. By gathering around the object of cognition, the concepts potentially determine the object's interior. They attain, in thinking, what was necessarily excised from thinking" (pg. 162)
 - **"Hegelian dialectics was a dialectics without language, while the most literal sense of the word "dialectics" postulates language..."** (pg. 163)
 - "what is indissoluble in any previous thought context transcends its seclusion in its own, as nonidentical. It communicates with that from which it was separated by the concept. It is opaque only for identity's claim to be total; it resists the pressure of that claim. But as such it seeks to be audible. **Whatever part of nonidentity defies definition in its concept goes beyond its individual existence; it is only in polarity with the concept, in staring at the concept, that it will contract into that existence. The inside of nonidentity is its relation to that which it is not, and which its managed, frozen self-identity withholds from it.** It only comes to in relinquishing itself, not in hardening—this we can still learn from Hegel, without conceding anything to the repressive moments of his relinquishment doctrine" (pg. 163)
 - "The object opens itself to a monadological insistence, to a sense of the constellation in which it stands; the possibility of internal immersion requires that externality. But such an immanent generality of something individual is objective as sedimented history. This history is in the individual thing and outside it; it is something encompassing in which the individual has its place. Becoming aware of the constellation in which a thing stands is tantamount to deciphering the constellation which, having come to be, it bears within it." (pg. 163)
 - ◆ "The history locked in the object can only be delivered by a knowledge mindful of the historic positional value of the object in its relation to other objects—by the actualization and concentration of something which is already known and is transformed by that knowledge. Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object. As a constellation, theoretical thought circles the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in response, not to a single key or a single number, but to a combination of numbers" (pg. 163)
 - Constellation in Science (pg. 164)
 - **"Definitions are not the be-all and end-all of cognition, as popular scientivism holds; but neither are they to be banished."** (pg. 165)
 - "A thinking whose course made us incapable of definition, unable even for moments to have a succinct language represent the thing, would be as sterile, probably, as a thinking gorged with verbal definitions." (pg. 165)
 - "by gathering concepts round the central one that is sought, they attempt to express what that concept aims at, not to circumscribe it to operative ends" (pg. 165-166)
 - Essence and Appearance (pg. 166)
 - "When a category changes, as those of identity and totality do in negative dialectics, a change occurs in the constellation of all categories, and thus again in each one. Paradigmatic for this phenomenon are **the concepts of essence and appearance.** They come from philosophical tradition and are maintained in negative dialectics, but their directional tendency is reversed. Essence can no longer be hypostatized as the pure, spiritual being-in-itself. Rather, essence passes into that which lies concealed beneath the façade of immediacy, of the supposed facts, and which makes the facts what they are." (pg. 166-167)
 - **"Such essence, to begin with, is the fatal mischief of a world arranged so as to degrade men to means of their *sese conservare*, a world that curtails and threatens their life by reproducing it and making them believe that it has this character so as to satisfy their needs."** (pg. 167)
 - ◆ "True, vis-à-vis the alleged facts this essence also is conceptual rather than immediate, but such conceptuality is no mere [**greek word*], no mere product of the cognitive subject, in which the subject ultimately finds itself confirmed. Instead, the conceptuality expresses the fact that, no matter how much blame may attach to the subject's contribution, the conceived world is not its own but a world hostile to the subject." (pg. 167)
 - "Hegel's doctrine of the objectivity of essence postulates that Being is the mind that has not yet come to itself. Essence recalls the nonidentity in the concept of that which, by the subject, is not posited but followed." (pg. 168)

- "Carried through, **the critique of identity is a groping for the preponderance of the object.** Identitarian thinking is subjectivistic even when it denies being so. To revise that kind of thinking, to debit identity with untruth, does not bring subject and object into a balance, nor does it raise the concept of function to an exclusively dominant role in cognition; even when we merely limit the subject, we put an end to its power. Its own absoluteness is the measure by which the least surplus of nonidentity feels to the subject like an absolute threat. A minimum will do to spoil it as a whole, because it pretends to be the whole" (pg. 183)
- "**Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject enters into the object altogether differently from the way the object enters into the subject. An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset an object as well.** Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject" (pg. 183)
 - *"I'm very curious as to how Adorno is defining/understanding 'subject' - specifically, through what qualities as compared to an 'object'. This statement seems to engrain 'subject' with consciousness, where 'object' is without such. But, that would be very incorrect to do. So, I'm curious. I would like to know why he delineates his last remark the way he does - why the current works one way and not the other & how that movement maintains 'dialectic'.*
- "To grant precedence to the object means to make progressive qualitative distinctions between things which in themselves are indirect; it means a moment in dialectics—not beyond dialectics, but articulated in dialectics." (pg. 184)
- "**The construction of transcendental subjectivity was a magnificently paradoxical and fallible effort to master the object in its opposite pole;** but in this respect too, the accomplishment of what was merely proclaimed in positive, idealistic dialectics requires a critique of that construction. An ontological moment is needed in so far as ontology will critically strip the subject of its cogently constitutive role without substituting it through the object, in a kind of second immediacy. The object's preponderance is solely attainable for subjective reflection, and for reflection on the subject." (pg. 184-185)
 - "**Every statement to the effect that subjectivity "is," no matter what or how, includes an objectivity** which the subject, by means of its absolute being, claims to have yet to establish. **Only because the subject in turn is indirect— because it is not the radical otherness required to legitimize the object—is it capable of grasping objectivity at all.** Rather than constitutive for objectivity, the subjective mediation is a block to objectivity; it fails to absorb entity, which objectivity is in essence" (pg. 185)
 - ◆ "Consciousness is a function of the living subject, and no exorcism will expel this from the concept's meaning." (pg. 185)
 - ◇ "**Mediation of the object means that it must not be statically, dogmatically hypostatized but can be known only as it entwines with subjectivity; mediation of the subject means that without the moment of objectivity it would be literally nil.** An index of the object's preponderance is the impotence of the mind—in all its judgments as well as, to this day, in the organization of reality. The negative fact that the mind, failing in identification, has also failed in reconciliation, that its supremacy has miscarried, becomes the motor of its disenchantment." (pg. 186)
 - "**The human mind is both true and a mirage: it is true because nothing is exempt from the dominance which it has brought into pure form; it is untrue because, interlocked with dominance, it is anything but the mind it believes and claims to be.** Enlightenment thus transcends its traditional self-understanding: it is demythologization—no longer merely as a *reductio ad hominem*, but the other way round, as a *reductio hominis*, an insight into the delusion of the subject that will style itself an absolute. The subject is the late form of the myth, and yet the equal of its oldest form" (pg. 186)
- The Object Not a Datum (pg. 186)
 - "**That the object takes precedence even though indirect itself does not cut off the subject-object dialectics. Immediacy is no more beyond dialectics than is mediation.** Epistemological tradition places anything immediate on the subject's side, but as the subject's datum or affection. The subject is said to have power to shape immediacy insofar as it is autonomous and spontaneous; but to be powerless in so far as the directly given thing flatly exists. The direct datum is as much the basic fact on which the doctrine of subjectivity rested—the doctrine of "mine," of the subject's substance as its possession—and it is the form of a kind of objective resistance, the *Mene Tekel*, as it were, of objectivity within the subject." (pg. 186)
 - "This is why Hume, in the name of immediacy, criticized identity the principle of the I that would like to maintain itself as autochthonous in the face of immediacy. Yet immediacy cannot be fixed so as to please an epistemology gauged to standards of conclusiveness. In immediacy, the direct datum and the equally directly given forms are tailored so as to complement each other. **Immediacy does call a halt to the idolatry of derivation, but it is also something abstracted from the object, a raw material for the subjective process of production that served as a model for epistemology.** What is given in poor and blind form is not objectivity; it is merely the borderline value which the subject, having confiscated the concrete object, cannot fully master in its own domain" (pg. 186-187)
 - ◆ "...from Locke onward, empiricists would insist that there is no content of consciousness other than that which comes from the senses, is 'given'" (pg. 187)
 - "**Because the subject does not make the object, it can really only "look on,"** and the cognitive maxim is to assist in that process. The measure of the subject's postulated passivity is the object's objective determination." (pg. 188)
 - "What we may call **the thing itself is not positively and immediately at hand.** He who wants to know it must think more, not less, than the point of reference of the synthesis of diversity, which is the same, at bottom, as not to think at all. And yet **the thing itself is by no means a thought product. It is nonidentity through identity. Such nonidentity is not an "idea," but it is an adjunct.** The experiencing subject strives to disappear in it. The truth would be its demise—a demise merely feigned, to the greater glory of the subject objectified in a scientific method, by the subtraction of all specific subjectivity in that method." (pg. 189)
- Objectivity and Reification (pg. 189)
 - "philosophical subjectivism is the ideological accompaniment of the emancipation of the bourgeois" (pg. 189)
 - "In relativizing or liquefying that thingness, philosophy believes to be above the supremacy of goods, and above the form of subjective reflection on that supremacy, the reified consciousness. In Fichte, that impulse is as unmistakable as the urge to universal rule." (pg. 189)
 - "We can no more reduce dialectics to reification than we can reduce it to any other isolated category, however polemical. The cause of human suffering, meanwhile, will be glossed over rather than denounced in the lament about reification. **The trouble is with the conditions that condemn mankind to impotence and apathy and would yet be changeable by human action;** it is not primarily with people and with the way conditions appear to people. Considering the possibility of total disaster, reification is an epiphenomenon, and even more so is the alienation coupled with reification, the subjective state of consciousness that corresponds to it. Alienation is reproduced by anxiety; consciousness—reified in the already constituted society—is not the *constituens* of anxiety. If a man looks upon thingness as radical evil, if he would like to dynamize all entity into pure actuality, he tends to be hostile to otherness, to the alien thing that has lent its name to alienation, and not in vain. He tends to that nonidentity which would be the deliverance, not of consciousness alone, but of reconciled mankind. Absolute dynamics, on the other hand, would be that absolute action whose violent satisfaction lies in itself, the action in which nonidentity is abused as a mere occasion." (pg. 190-191)

- "Unbroken and all too human slogans lend themselves to new equations between the subject and what is not its like. Things congeal as fragments of that which was subjugated; to rescue it means to love things. We cannot eliminate from the dialectics of the extant what is experienced in consciousness as an alien thing: negatively, coercion and heteronomy, but also the marred figure of what we should love, and what the spell, the endogamy of consciousness, does not permit us to love. The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien. Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one's own" (pg. 191)
 - "The tireless charge of reification resists that dialectics..." (pg. 191)
 - "Contemporary representations of medieval towns usually look as if an execution were just taking place to cheer the populace. If any harmony of subject and object should have prevailed in those days, it was a harmony like the most recent one: pressure-born and brittle. The transfiguration of past conditions serves the purpose of a late, superfluous denial that is experienced as a no-exit situation; only as lost conditions do they become glamorous. Their cult, the cult of pre-subjective phases, arose in horror, in the age of individual disintegration and collective regression. With the delivery of the natural sciences, reification and reified consciousness also brought about the possibility of worldwide freedom from want. Even earlier, humanity was conditioned by dehumanized things; at least it went hand in hand with reified forms of consciousness, while indifference to things, appraising them as mere means and reducing them to the subject, helped to tear down humanity. In the realm of things there is an intermingling of both the object's unidentical side and the submission of men to prevailing conditions of production, to their own functional context which they cannot know. The mature Marx, in his few remarks on the character of a liberated society, changed his position on the cause of reification, the division of labor. He now distinguished the state of freedom from original immediacy" (pg. 191-192)
 - "But that there could be no dialectics without the element of solid things, that without such things it would level off into a harmless doctrine of change—this was attributable neither to philosophical habit nor solely to the social compulsion of which consciousness receives such solid knowledge. **It is up to philosophy to think the things which differ from the thought and yet make it a thought, exclusively, while their demon seeks to persuade the thought that it ought not to be**" (pg. 192)
- Passage to Materialism (pg. 192)
 - **"It is by passing to the object's preponderance that dialectics is rendered materialistic. The object, the positive expression of nonidentity, is a terminological mask."** (pg. 192)
 - "Viewed from outside, that which in reflecting upon the mind appears specifically as not mental, as an object, is material. The category of nonidentity still obeys the measure of identity. Emancipated from that measure, the nonidentical moments show up as matter, or as inseparably fused with material things. Sensation, the crux of all epistemology, needs epistemology to reinterpret it into a fact of consciousness, in contradiction to its own full character—which, after all, is to serve as authority for its cognition" (pg. 193)
 - **"To the subjectively immanent reconstruction of the world of things, sensation is the basis of its hierarchy,** but it would not have that basis without the physis which an autarkic epistemology wants to build later, on top of it" (pg. 193)
 - ◆ "The somatic moment as the not purely cognitive part of cognition is irreducible, and thus the subjective claim collapses at the very point where radical empiricism had conserved it. The fact that the subject's cognitive achievements are somatic in accordance with their own meaning affects not only the basic relation of subject and object but the dignity of physicality. Physicality emerges at the ontical pole of subjective cognition, as the core of that cognition. This dethrones the guiding idea of epistemology: to constitute the body as the law governing the link between sensations and acts—in other words, to constitute it mentally. Sensations are already, in themselves, what the system would like to set forth as their formation by consciousness." (pg. 193-194)
- Materialism and Immediacy (pg. 194)
 - "Materialism is not the dogma indicted by clever opponents, but a dissolution of things understood as dogmatic; hence its right to a place in critical philosophy" (pg. 196)
- Dialectics Not a Sociology of Knowledge (pg. 197)
 - **"A dialectical theory is bound—like Marx's, largely—to be immanent even if in the end it negates the whole sphere it moves in. This contrasts it with a sociology of knowledge** that has been merely brought up from outside and is powerless against philosophy, as philosophy was quick to discover. A sociology of knowledge fails before philosophy: for the truth content of philosophy it substitutes its social function and its conditioning by interests, while refraining from a critique of that content itself, remaining indifferent toward it. It fails equally before the concept of ideology, which it will stir into its broad beggarly broth; for the concept of ideology makes sense only in relation to the truth or untruth of what it refers to. There can be no talk of socially necessary delusions except in regard to what would not be a delusion—although, of course, delusion is its index" (pg. 197)
 - **"The task of criticizing ideology is to judge the subjective and objective shares and their dynamics. It is to deny the false objectivity of concept fetishism by reducing it to the social subject, and to deny false subjectivity, the sometimes unrecognizably veiled claim that all being lies in the mind, by showing it up as a fraud, a parasitical nonentity, as well as demonstrating its immanent hostility to the mind.** The "all" of the indiscriminately total concept of ideology, however, terminates in nothingness. Once it has ceased to differ from any true consciousness it is no longer fit to criticize a false one. In the idea of objective truth, materialist dialectics necessarily turns philosophical—despite, and because of, all its criticisms of philosophy" (pg. 197-198)
 - "A sociology of knowledge, on the other hand, denies not only the objective structure of society but the idea of objective truth and its cognition. To this sociology—as to the type of positivist economics to which its founder Pareto belonged—society is nothing but the average value of individual reactive modes. The doctrine of ideology turns back into a doctrine of subjective idols..." (pg. 198)
 - **"Such a reduction of so-called "forms of consciousness" goes perfectly with philosophical apologetics."** (pg. 198)
 - ◆ **"The only way to pass philosophically into social categories is to decipher the truth content of philosophical categories"** (pg. 198)
- The Concept of Mind (pg. 198)
 - "Hegel hypostatizes the mind..." (pg. 198)
 - **"A mind that is to be a totality is nonsense. It resembles the political parties in the singular which made their appearance in the twentieth century, tolerating no other party beside them..."** (pg. 199)
 - The doctrine of Being turns ideological as it imperceptibly spiritualizes the materialist moment in thought by transposing it into pure functionality beyond all entity—as it removes by magic whatever critique of a false consciousness resides in the materialist concept of Being. The word that was to name truth against ideology comes to be the most untrue: the denial of ideality becomes the proclamation of an ideal sphere" (pg. 200)
- Pure Activity and Genesis (pg. 200)
 - **"No ontological abyss yawns between the moment** of reality in that function and the activity of real subjects, and neither, therefore, does one yawn between the mind and labor. It is true that labor, the production of something that was a conception but not yet a fact, is not exhausted in existence; the mind can no more be leveled down to existence than existence can be leveled down to the mind. But the mind's nonbeing moment is so intertwined with existence that to pick it out neatly would be the same as to objectify and falsify it." (pg. 200-201)

- Suffering Physical (pg. 202)
 - **"All pain and all negativity [are] the moving forces of dialectical thinking..."** (pg. 202)
 - "All activities of the species point to its continued physical existence, although they may be misconceptions of it, independent organizations whose business is done only by the way. Even the steps which society takes to exterminate itself are at the same time absurd acts of unleashed self-preservation. They are forms of unconscious social action against suffering even though an obtuse view of society's own interest turns their total particularity against that interest. Confronted with such steps, their purpose—and this alone makes society a society—calls for it to be so organized as the productive forces would directly permit it here and now, and as the conditions of production on either side relentlessly prevent it" (pg. 203)
- Materialism Imageless (pg. 204)
 - See text
- Part 3: Models ***DON'T BOTHER READING**
 - Chapter 1 - Freedom
 - On The Metacritique of Practical Reason
 - "Pseudoproblems" (pg. 211)
 - "The talk of "pseudoproblems" comes from the Age of Enlightenment, when its point was to keep an unquestioned dogmatic authority from leading to considerations held to be impossible to decide for the very thought they were submitted to" (pg. 211)
 - ◆ "But pseudoproblems have long ceased to be regarded as those that defy rational judgment and mock the rational interest. Instead, they are viewed as the problems in which the concepts used are unclearly defined." (pg. 211)
 - **"...what lends the immanently philosophical definition of those concepts ["will" and "freedom"] its elegance and its autarky is an abstraction"** (pg. 213)
 - ◆ "the attempt to localize the question of free will in the empirical subject must fail. In that attempt, the line between the intelligible and the empirical realm is drawn in the midst of empiricism." (pg. 213)
 - ◇ "As soon as we ask about free will by asking about each individual decision, as soon as our question detaches these decisions from their context and the individual from society, the question will yield to the fallacy of absolute, pure being-in-itself: a limited subjective experience will usurp the dignity of the most certain of things. There is something fictitious about the substrate of the alternative." (pg. 213)
 - ▶ "The transmission makes it what in its sense of freedom it does not want to be: it becomes heteronomous. **Even where unfreedom is positively assumed, the conditions of unfreedom, as those of an immanently conclusive psychological causality, are sought in the isolated individual—which essentially is not so isolated. Not even the individual can find the fact of freedom in himself**, and neither can the naïve sense of acting arbitrarily be simply extinguished post festum by the theorem of determination" (pg. 213)
 - A Split in the Concern with Freedom (pg. 214)
 - "Ever since the seventeenth century, freedom had been defined as all great philosophy's most private concern. Philosophy had an unexpressed mandate from the bourgeoisie to find transparent grounds for freedom. But that concern is antagonistic in itself. It goes against the old oppression and promotes the new one, the one that hides in the principle of rationality itself. One seeks a common formula for freedom and oppression, ceding freedom to the rationality that restricts it, and removing it from empiricism in which one does not even want to see it realized. The dichotomy also refers to progressive scientification. The bourgeois class is in league with this insofar as it promotes production, but it must fear scientific progress as soon as that progress interferes with the belief that its freedom—already resigned to internality—is existent. This is the real background of the doctrine of antinomies" (pg. 214)
 - ◆ **"The antinomies of freedom is an essential moment of Kant's philosophy, as the dialectics of freedom is an essential moment of Hegel's"** (pg. 214-215)
 - "Where science finds problems insoluble and looks to philosophy for a decision, philosophy extends no more than the solace of a *weltanschauung*." (pg. 215)
 - ◆ "It is from this, then, that the scientists take their bearings— according to taste and, one must fear, according to the structure of their own psychological drives. **The relation to the complex of freedom and determinism is laid into the hands of an arbitrary irrationality that wavers between dogmatic generalities and inconclusive, more or less empirical single determinations. In the end, one's position regarding that complex comes to depend upon his political creed, or upon the power he happens to recognize at the moment.**" (pg. 215)
 - Freedom, Determinism, Identity (pg. 216)
 - **"Indifference to freedom, to the concept and to the thing itself, is caused by the integration of society..."** (pg. 216)
 - ◆ **"Their interest in being provided for has paralyzed the interest in a freedom which they fear would leave them unprotected."** (pg. 216)
 - ◇ "This is what an intransigent nominalism adjusts to. Its relegation, by a logical canon, of objective antinomies to the realm of pseudoproblems has a social function: it serves to conceal contradictions by their denial. By holding on to data, or to their contemporary legates, the protocol statements, one relieves the human consciousness of what runs counter to its outward situation." (pg. 216)
 - ▶ "The equality of their quantifying method leaves no more room for the evolving otherness than does the spell of fate. But **what has been objectified in men, from their reflexes and against their reflexes**—their character or their will, the potential organ of their freedom—**this undermines freedom too. For it embodies the principle of dominion, to which men progressively submit**. The identity of the self and its alienation are companions from the beginning; this is why the concept of self-alienation is poorly romanticist. Identity, the condition of freedom, is immediately and simultaneously the principle of determinism. There is a will insofar as a man objectified himself into a character. Toward himself—whatever that may be—he thus becomes something external, after the model of the outward world of things that is subjected to causality." (pg. 216-217)
 - **"The strengthening moment is the self of self-preservation**; it is to this that freedom opens as the difference that has evolved between the self and the reflexes." (pg. 217)
 - Freedom and Organized Society (pg. 217)
 - "Without any thought of freedom, theoretical reasons for an organized society would be hard to find. Society in its turn will then curtail freedom" (pg. 217)
 - ◆ "...if all men were equally predetermined and blind, every criterion of actions would fall by the wayside." (pg. 217)
 - **"Freedom is a moment, rather, in a twofold sense**: it is entwined, not to be isolated; and for the time being it is never more than an instant of spontaneity, a historical node, the road to which is blocked under present conditions." (pg. 219)

- "The individual's independence, inappropriately stressed by liberal ideology, does not prevail; nor is there any denying his extremely real separation from society, which that ideology misinterprets. At times the individual would oppose himself to society as an independent being, though a particular one—a being capable of rationally pursuing its own interest. In that phase, and beyond it, **the question of freedom was the genuine question whether society permits the individual to be as free as it promises**; and thus it was also the question whether society itself is as free as it promises. Temporarily, the individual looms above the blind social context, but in his windowless isolation he only helps so much more to reproduce that context." (pg. 219)
 - ◆ "No less indicative of the historic experience that inside and outside are unreconciled is the thesis of unfreedom. Men are unfree because they are beholden to externality, and this externality in turn consists also of men themselves." (pg. 219)
 - "The thought, by means of its freedom, turns back to itself as to its subject, and its sovereignty also leads to the concept of unfreedom. **The two concepts are not a simple antithesis; they are interwoven.** No theoretical curiosity can make us aware of this; it is the nature-controlling sovereignty and its social form, dominion over people, that suggest the opposite to our consciousness: the idea of freedom. Its historical archetype was he who is topmost in hierarchies, the man who is not visibly dependent" (pg. 220)
 - ◆ "In the abstract universal concept of things "beyond nature," freedom is spiritualized into freedom from the realm of causality. With that, however, it becomes a self-deception. Psychologically speaking, the subject's interest in the thesis that it is free would be narcissistic, as immoderate as anything of the kind." (pg. 220)
 - "**What makes the subjects aware of the bounds of their freedom is that they are part of nature, and finally, that they are powerless against society, which has become independent of them.** Yet the universality of the concept of freedom—a concept shared by the oppressed as well—recoils against dominion as freedom's model. Reacting to this recoil, those who have the privilege of freedom delight in finding others not yet ripe for freedom. They rationalize this persuasively by way of natural causality" (pg. 221)
- The Impulse Before the Ego (pg. 221)
 - "Without an anamnesis of the untamed impulse that precedes the ego—an impulse later banished to the zone of unfree bondage to nature—it would be impossible to derive the idea of freedom, although that idea in turn ends up reinforcing the ego. In spontaneity, the philosophical concept that does most to exalt freedom as a mode of conduct above empirical existence, there resounds the echo of that by whose control and ultimate destruction the I of idealistic philosophy means to prove its freedom. **Through an apologia for its perverted form, society encourages the individuals to hypostatize their individuality and thus their freedom**" (pg. 221-222)
 - ◆ "As far as such a stubborn delusion extends, it is solely in pathogenous states that a consciousness learns about its unfree side—in compulsion neuroses, for instance." (pg. 222)
 - ◇ "**Neuroses are true in so far as they demonstrate the ego's unfreedom precisely where its rule over its inner nature fails.**" (pg. 222)
 - "The progress of self-experience makes freedom as a datum problematical for this experience, and since the subject's interest in freedom will not dwindle, it sublimates freedom into an idea. Metapsychologically, this is verified by the psychoanalytical theory of repression. According to that theory—and dialectically enough—the repressing agent, the compulsive mechanism, is one with the I, the organon of freedom. In ourselves, by introspection, we discover neither a positive freedom nor a positive unfreedom. We conceive both in their relation to extramental things: freedom as a polemical counter-image to the suffering brought on by social coercion; unfreedom as that coercion's image. This is how little the subject is the "sphere of absolute origins," as it will be philosophizingly called; the very definitions that uphold its claim to sovereignty always need also what is said to need nothing but them, as those definitions are understood. What is decisive in the ego, its independence and autonomy, can be judged only in relation to its otherness, to the nonego. Whether or not there is autonomy depends upon its adversary and antithesis, on the object which either grants or denies autonomy to the subject. Detached from the object, autonomy is fictitious" (pg. 223)
- Experimenta crucis (pg. 223)
 - "Consciousness cannot learn much about freedom from its self-experience, as witness the *experimenta crucis* of introspection." (pg. 223)
- The Addendum (pg. 226)
 - "**Consciousness, rational insight, is not simply the same as a free act. We cannot flatly equate it with the will.** Yet this precisely is what happens in Kant's thinking. To him, the will is the epitome of freedom, the "power" to act freely, the unifying characteristic of all acts conceived as free." (pg. 227)
- The Fiction of Positive Freedom (pg. 231)
 - "**Freedom can be defined in negation only**, corresponding to the concrete form of a specific unfreedom." (pg. 231)
 - ◆ "[Kant's] idea of freedom turns into a paradox: it comes to be incorporated in the causality of the phenomenal world that is incompatible with the Kantian concept of freedom." (pg. 231)
- Unfreedom of Thought (pg. 233)
 - "Since idealist doctrine takes all things there are for thoughts— thoughts of the Absolute—there is nothing that is not supposed to be free. But this notion would merely placate our sense of **the fact that thoughts are anything but free.** Before all social control, before all adjustment to conditions of dominion, the mere form of thoughts, the form of logical stringency, can be convicted of unfreedom. It can be shown that **there is coercion both of what is being thought and of the thinker**, who must extract the thought from himself by concentration. Whatever does not fit a judgment will be choked off; from the outset, thinking exerts that power which philosophy reflected in the concept of necessity. By way of identification, philosophy and society are interrelated in philosophy's inmost core. The presently universal regimentation of scientific thought externalizes this age-old relationship in modes of conduct and forms of organization." (pg. 233)
 - ◆ "**without a coercive moment there could be no thinking.** The antithesis of freedom and thought is no more removable by thinking than it is removable for thinking; it calls, rather, for self-reflection in thinking." (pg. 233)
 - "Causality hypostatizes the form, as binding upon a content which on its own would not assume that form" (pg. 234)
 - "**Kant's entire philosophy stands in the sign of unity. This lends to it the character of a system...**" (pg. 234)
 - ◆ "The governing unity is the concept of reason itself..." (pg. 234)
- "Formalism" (pg. 235)
 - "An objection to Kant that may not weigh too heavily is immanent in his system: that the subdivision of reason by objects makes it depend, contrary to the doctrine of autonomy, on the extrarational it is supposed not to be. What comes to the fore in this discrepancy, despite Kant's intention, is the very thing he dispelled: reason's inner dependence upon what is not identical with it" (pg. 235)
 - ◆ **this is the foundation to Adorno's insight of 'negative' dialectics.*
- The Will as a Thing (pg. 237)
 - See text
- Objectivity in the Antinomy (pg. 239)
 - See text

- Dialectical Definition of the Will (pg. 241)
 - "A will without physical impulses, impulses that survive, weakened, in imagination, would not be a will. At the same time, however, the will settles down as the centralizing unit of impulses, as the authority that tames them and potentially negates them. This necessitates a dialectical definition of the will. It is the force that enables consciousness to leave its own domain and so to change what merely exists; its recoil is resistance" (pg. 241)
 - "There is no moral certainty. Its mere assumption would be immoral, would falsely relieve the individual of anything that might be called morality. The more mercilessly an objective-antagonistic society will comport itself in every situation, the less can any single moral decision be warranted as the right one. Whatever an individual or a group may undertake against the totality they are part of is infected by the evil of that totality; and no less infected is he who does nothing at all. This is how original sin has been secularized." (pg. 242-243)
- Contemplation (pg. 244)
 - "Marx received the thesis of the primacy of practical reason from Kant and the German idealists, and he sharpened it into a challenge to change the world instead of merely interpreting it. He thus underwrote something as arch-bourgeois as the program of an absolute control of nature" (pg. 244)
 - ◆ "It would be possible to have contemplation without inhumanity as soon as the productive forces are freed to the point where men will no longer be engulfed in a practice that want exacts from them, in a practice which then becomes automatic in them. To this day, the trouble with contemplation—with the contemplation that contents itself this side of practice, as Aristotle was the first to develop it as summum bonum—has been that its very indifference to the task of changing the world made it a piece of obtuse practice, a method and an instrumentality." (pg. 244)
 - "Without a practical visa, **thought should go as much against the façade as possible, should move as far as it is capable of moving**. A reality that insulates itself against traditional theory, even against that which has so far been the best, wants to do so for the sake of the spell that binds it; the eyes it casts upon the subject are so strange that the subject, mindful of its own failure, must not spare the effort of a reply" (pg. 245)
- Structure of the Third Antinomy (pg. 246)
 - See text
- Kant's Concept of Causality (pg. 247)
 - "The simplest meaning of the phrase that "something is the cause of something else" is ignored. A causality rigorously insulated against the interior of objects is no more than its own shell" (pg. 248)
- The Plea for Order (pg. 249)
 - See text
- The Antithetical Argument (pg. 252)
 - "Kant's cognitive critique does not permit him to summon freedom into existence; he helps himself by conjuring a sphere of existence that would indeed be exempt from that critique, but also from any judgment as to what it might be. His attempt to give a concrete form to the doctrine of freedom, to ascribe freedom to living subjects, traps him in paradoxical assertions..." (pg. 254-255)
- Ontical and Ideal Moments (pg. 255)
 - "Kant's every concretion of morality bears repressive features. Its abstractness is a matter of substance, eliminating from the subject whatever does not conform with its pure concept. Hence the Kantian rigorism." (pg. 256)
- Repressive Character of the Doctrine of Freedom (pg. 260)
 - See text
- Self-experience of Freedom and Unfreedom (pg. 261)
 - "The individual feels free in so far as he has opposed himself to society and can do something—though incomparably less than he believes—against society and other individuals. His freedom is primarily that of a man pursuing his own ends, ends that are not directly and totally exhausted by social ends. In this sense, freedom coincides with the principle of individuation. A freedom of this type has broken loose from primitive society; within an increasingly rational one, it has achieved a measure of reality. At the same time, in the midst of bourgeois society, freedom remains no less delusive than individuality itself." (pg. 261-262)
 - ◆ "A critique of free will as well as of determinism means a critique of this delusion" (pg. 262)
 - "Each drastic thesis is false. **In their inmost core, the theses of determinism and of freedom coincide. Both proclaim identity.**" (pg. 264)
 - ◆ "The antinomy between the determination of the individual and the social responsibility that contradicts this determination is not due to a misuse of concepts. It is a reality, the moral indication that the universal and the particular are unreconciled." (pg. 264)
 - "Humanity comes to the individual only when the entire sphere of individuation, its moral aspect included, is seen through as an epiphenomenon. At times it is society as a whole which in despair about its situation stands for freedom—against the individuals, and for the freedom promised in a note which the unfreedom of the individuals dishonors. On the other hand, in this age of universal social repression, the picture of freedom against society lives in the crushed, abused individual's features alone. Where that freedom will hide out at any moment in history cannot be decreed once for all. Freedom turns concrete in the changing forms of repression, as resistance to repression. There has been as much free will as there were men with the will to be free" (pg. 265)
 - ◆ "**freedom itself and unfreedom are so entangled that unfreedom is not just an impediment to freedom but a premise of its concept**. This can no more be culled out as an absolute than any other single concept. Without the unity and the compulsion of reason, nothing similar to freedom would ever have come to mind, much less into being; this is documented in philosophy. There is no available model of freedom save one: that consciousness, as it intervenes in the total social constitution, will through that constitution intervene in the complexion of the individual. This notion is not utterly chimerical, because consciousness is a ramification of the energy of drives; it is part impulse itself, and also a moment of that which it intervenes in" (pg. 265)
- The Crisis of Causality (pg. 265)
 - "Every state of things is horizontally and vertically tied to all others, touches upon all others, is touched by all others." (pg. 267)
 - ◆ "The latest doctrine in which enlightenment used causality as a decisive political weapon is the Marxist one of superstructure and infrastructure..." (pg. 267)
- Causality as a Spell (pg. 269)
 - "Causality can teach us what identity has done to nonidentity." (pg. 269)
 - ◆ "**Objectively and subjectively, causality is the spell of dominated nature. It has its fundamentum in re in identity**, which as a mental principle simply mirrors the real control of nature. In reflecting upon causality, reason—which finds causality in nature wherever it controls nature—also grows aware of its own natural origin as the spellbinding principle. It is in such self-consciousness that a progressively enlightened mind parts company with the relapse into mythology to which it subscribed before reflecting." (pg. 269)
 - ◇ "**Causality, however, is nothing but man's natural origin, which he continues as control of nature**. Once man, the subject,

- knows the moment of his own equality with nature, he will desist from merely equalizing nature with himself." (pg. 269)
- "Affinity is the point of a dialectics of enlightenment. It no sooner cuts completely through the affinity than it will recoil into delusion, into a conceptless execution from outside. Without affinity there is no truth; this is what idealism caricatured in the philosophy of identity. Consciousness knows as much about its otherness as it resembles that otherness; it does not know by striking out itself along with the resemblance. To define objectivity as the residue after the subject has been deducted is aping. Objectivity is the self-unconscious schema under which the subject brings its otherness. The less affinity to things it tolerates, the more ruthlessly will it identify." (pg. 270)
 - Reason, Ego, Super-ego (pg. 270)
 - See text
 - Potential of Freedom (pg. 274)
 - See text
 - Against Personalism (pg. 276)
 - "The ideological mischief of the person can be criticized immanently. According to that ideology it is substantiality that dignifies the person; but this substantiality does not exist. Without exception, men have yet to become themselves. By the concept of the self we should properly mean their potential, and this potential stands in polemical opposition to the reality of the self. This is the main reason why the talk of "self-alienation" is untenable." (pg. 278)
 - ◆ "Despite—or perhaps on account of—the better days it has seen under Hegel and Marx, that talk has become the stock in trade of apologists who will suggest in paternal tones that man has apostatized, that he has lapsed from a being-in-itself which he had always been. Whereas, in fact, **he never was that being-in-itself...**" (pg. 278)
 - "The concept of the role sanctions the bad, perverted depersonalization of today: unfreedom, which simply for a perfect adjustment's sake replaces the autonomy that was won laboriously and as if subject to recall, is less than freedom, not more. The hardships of the division of labor are hypostatized as virtues in the concept of the role. With this concept, the ego once again prescribes that which society condemns it to be: itself. The liberated ego, no longer locked up in its identity, would no longer be condemned to play roles either" (pg. 278)
 - "If identity is ever to pass into its otherness, it must not be denied abstractly even in the moral field, but must be preserved in resistance. The present condition is destructive: a loss of identity for the sake of abstract identity, of naked self-preservation." (pg. 279)
 - Depersonalization and Existential Ontology (pg. 279)
 - "in Heidegger's interpretation of subjectivity as a mode of being, a mode superior to thought, personalism was already turning into its opposite" (pg. 279)
 - ◆ "Depersonalization, the bourgeois devaluation of the individual whom one glorified in the same breath, was already the basis of the difference between subjectivity as the general principle of the individualized ego—between "egoity," in Schelling's language—and the individualized ego itself. The essence of subjectivity qua existence, a main theme of *Being and Time*, is like the remainder that is left of the person when it is no longer a person." (pg. 279)
 - ◇ "What is commensurable to the person's general conceptual extent, its individual consciousness, is always phenomenal as well, entwined in that transsubjective objectivity whose ground, according to both idealist doctrine and ontological doctrine, lies in the pure subject. Whatever an I can introspectively experience as "I" is also "not-I." Absolute egoity defies experience. Hence the difficulty (found by Schopenhauer) of becoming aware of oneself" (pg. 279-280)
 - ◆ "The ultimate is not an ultimate. Hegel recognized this in the objective turn he gave to his absolute idealism, the equivalent of absolute subjectivity. But the more thorough the individual's loss of what used to be called his self-consciousness, the higher the rise of depersonalization. That **to Heidegger, death came to be the essence of existence codifies the nullity of mere being-for-onself.** In the sinister decision to depersonalize, however, we bow regressively to a doom we feel to be inescapable, instead of using the idea to point beyond the person, so that it may come into its own." (pg. 280)
 - ◇ "Heidegger's apersonality is a linguistic arrangement and won too easily, by simply leaving out what makes the subject a subject. He thinks past the knot of the subject." (pg. 280)
 - ▶ "The micro-analysis of persons is unbearable to an authoritarian way of thinking; in selfhood it would strike at the principle of all dominion. Existence generally, on the other hand, is apersonal and can be unhesitatingly treated as if it were superhuman and yet human" (pg. 280)
 - ◇ "To Heidegger, ontological apersonality always remains the ontologization of the person without actually reaching the person. There is a retroactive force in the cognition of what became of consciousness when its live side was abandoned: **egoity has always been so thinglike. Dwelling in the core of the subject are the objective conditions it must deny for the sake of its unconditional rule.** They are the conditions of that rule, and they are what the subject would have to get rid of. The premise of its identity is the end of compulsory identity. In existential ontology this appears in distortion only" (pg. 280-281)
 - "The things which Freud, the anti-metaphysician, taught about the id come closer to a metaphysical critique of the subject than Heidegger's metaphysics, which he does not want to be metaphysics" (pg. 281)
 - Universal and Individual in the Philosophy of Morals (pg. 281)
 - "In revealing the super-ego as an internalized social norm, psychology breaks through its own monadological barriers. These in turn are social products. The objectivity of conscience vis-à-vis mankind is drawn from the objectivity of society, from the objectivity in and by which men live and which extends to the core of their individualization. Undividedly entwined in such objectivity are the antagonistic moments: heteronomous coercion and the idea of a solidarity transcending the divergent individual interests. The part of conscience that reproduces the tenaciously persisting repressive mischief of society is the opposite of freedom; it is to be disenchanting by evidence of its own determination. The universal norm which conscience unconsciously appropriates, on the other hand, bears witness to whichever part of society points beyond particularity as the principle of its totals. This is its element of truth. The question of right or wrong in conscience cannot be answered succinctly because right and wrong lie in conscience itself and could not be separated by any abstract judgment: it takes the repressive form of conscience to develop the form of solidarity, in which the repressive one will be voided. To the philosophy of morals it is essential that the individual and society should be neither reconciled nor divided by a simple difference." (pg. 282)
 - "The question of freedom does not call for a Yes or No; it calls for theory to rise above the individuality that exists as well as above the society that exists. Instead of sanctioning the internalized and hardened authority of the super-ego, **theory should carry out the dialectics of individual and species.** The rigorism of the super-ego is nothing but the reflex response to the prevention of that dialectics by the antagonistic condition. **The subject would be liberated only as an I reconciled with the not-I, and thus it would be also above freedom insofar as freedom is leagued with its counterpart, repression.** How much aggression is so far inherent in freedom can be seen whenever, in the midst of general unfreedom, men act as if they were free." (pg. 283)
 - ◆ "The idea that a union of free men would constantly require them to flock together belongs to the conceptual circle of parades, of marching, flag-waving, and leaders' orations. These methods thrive for so long as society irrationally seeks to glue its compulsory

- members together; objectively they are not needed." (pg. 284)
 - ◇ "Collectivism and individualism complement each other in the wrong direction." (pg. 284)
- "Nowhere on earth is today's society "open," as apologists of scientivism certify it to be; but it is not de-formed anywhere either. The belief that forms have been lost arose from the devastation of cities and landscapes by planlessly expanding industry; it originated in a lack of rationality, not in its excess. Anyone who traces de-formation to metaphysical processes rather than to the conditions of material production is a purveyor of ideologies." (pg. 284)
- On the State of Freedom (pg. 285)
 - See text
- Kant's "Intelligible Character" (pg. 287)
 - See text
- Intelligibility and the Unity of Consciousness (pg. 292)
 - "The backstage expectation of the Kantian system is that the supreme concept of practical philosophy will coincide with the supreme concept of theoretical philosophy: with the ego principle that makes for theoretical unity and tames and integrates the human drives in practice. The unity of the person is the stage of the doctrine of intelligibility" (pg. 292)
 - **"Great philosophy is set against the idea of a man not modeled after the reality principle, a man not set in himself."** (pg. 294)
 - "Freedom is really delimited by society, not only from outside but in itself. We no sooner put it to use than we increase our unfreedom; the deputy of better things is always also an accomplice of worse ones. Even where men are most likely to feel free from society, in the strength of their ego, they are society's agents at the same time. The ego principle is implanted in them by society, and society rewards that principle although it curbs it. Kant's ethics was not yet aware of this dilemma, or else he was passing it by." (pg. 297)
- Truth Content of the Doctrine of Intelligibility (pg. 297)
 - "Neuroses are pillars of society; they thwart the better potential of men, and thus the objectively better condition which men might bring about. There are instincts spurring men beyond the false condition; but the neuroses tend to dam up those instincts, to push them back toward narcissistic self-gratification in the false condition. Weakness that will mistake itself for strength, if possible, is a hinge in the machinery of evil." (pg. 298)
 - **"Like freedom, the intelligible character as a subjective possibility is a thing that comes to be, not a thing that is."** (pg. 298)
- Chapter 2 - World Spirit and Natural History: An Excursion to Hegel
 - Trend and Facts (pg. 300)
 - **"Most sensitively resisted by human "common sense," by the sound mind whose soundness is what ails it, is the preponderance of anything objective over the individuals, in their consciousness as well as in their coexistence. The preponderance can be experienced crassly day after day. One represses it as an unfounded speculation,** so the individuals may continue to flatter themselves that their standardized notions are twice unconditional truths—so their delusions may be preserved from the suspicion of not being so and of their lives being doomed. Ours is an epoch that has been as relieved to shed the system of objective idealism as to discard the economic doctrine of objective values; and the theorems that are particularly topical in such an epoch are the ones said to be of no use to a spirit that seeks its own security and the security of cognition in the extant, in social institutions as the well-organized sums of immediate individual facts, or in the subjective character of their members. The objective and ultimately absolute Hegelian spirit; the Marxist law of value that comes into force without men being conscious of it—to an unleashed experience these are more evident than the prepared facts of a positivistic scientific bustle which today extends to the native prescientific consciousness. Only, to the greater glory of objective cognition, that activity breaks men of the habit of experiencing the real objectivity to which they are subjected in themselves as well. If thinking people were capable of such experience and prepared for it, it would have to undermine their belief in facticity itself; it would have to make them go so far beyond the facts that the facts would lose their unreflected primacy over the universals which triumphant nominalism holds for nothing, for a subtractable adjunct tacked on by the classifying scientist." (pg. 300-301)
 - **"The occasions are immediate; the so-called deeper causes are what mediates, what encompasses, what incorporates the details"** (pg. 302)
 - Construction of the World Spirit (pg. 303)
 - See text
 - "Harmonizing with the World Spirit" (pg. 305)
 - See text
 - The Unleashing of Productive Forces (pg. 306)
 - See text
 - Group Spirit and Dominion (pg. 307)
 - See text
 - The Legal Sphere (pg. 309)
 - "Hegel furnished the ideology of positive law because in a society that was already visibly antagonistic the need for that ideology was most pressing. **Law is the primal phenomenon of irrational rationality. In law the formal principle of equivalence becomes the norm; everyone is treated alike. An equality in which differences perish secretly serves to promote inequality;** it becomes the myth that survives amidst an only seemingly demythologized mankind." (pg. 309)
 - ◆ "The total legal realm is one of definitions. **Its systematic forbids the admission of anything that eludes their closed circle,** of anything *quod non est in actis*. **These bounds, ideological in themselves, turn into real violence** as they are sanctioned by law as the socially controlling authority, in the administered world in particular. In the dictatorships they become direct violence; indirectly, violence has always lurked behind them." (pg. 309)
 - Law and Equity (pg. 310)
 - **"Every positive, substantially elaborated doctrine of natural law leads to antinomies, and yet it is the idea of natural law which critically maintains the untruth of positive law.** Today it is the reified consciousness that has been retranslated into reality and there augments domination. Even in its pure form, previous to class content and class justice, that consciousness expresses domination, the gaping difference between individual interests and the whole that is their abstract aggregate. From the outset, by subsumption of everything individual under the category, the system of self-made concepts that serve a mature jurisprudence to cover up the living process of society is opting in favor of the order imitated by the system of classification. Aristotle's imperishable glory is to have proclaimed this, against the abstract legal norm, in his doctrine of [**Greek word*], of equity." (pg. 310-311)
 - "Expressed in the individuals themselves is the fact that **the whole, the individuals included, maintains itself only through antagonism.** There are innumerable times when unavoidable motives of self-preservation force people, even conscious people capable of criticizing the whole, to do things and to take attitudes which blindly help maintain the universal even though their consciousness is opposed to it. It is only because, to survive, they have to make an alien cause their own that there arises that appearance of reconciliation—an appearance

which Hegelian philosophy, incorruptible in its recognition of the predominance of the universal, corruptibly transfigures into an idea. What shines as though it were above antagonisms is as one with the universal entanglement. **The universal makes sure that the particular under its domination is not better than itself. That is the core of all the identity brought about to this day.**" (pg. 311-312)

- Individualistic Veil (pg. 312)
 - "A candid look at the predominance of the universal does all but unbearable psychological harm to the narcissism of all individuals and to that of a democratically organized society. **To see through selfhood as nonexistent, as an illusion, would easily turn all men's objective despair into a subjective one. It would rob them of the faith implanted in them by individualistic society: that they, the individuals, are the substance.**" (pg. 312)
 - ◆ "Such subjective illusions are objectively caused: it is only through the principle of individual self-preservation, for all its narrowmindedness, that the whole will function. It makes every individual look solely upon himself and impairs his insight into objectivity; objectively, therefore, it works only so much more evil. The nominalistic consciousness reflects a whole that continues by virtue of obdurate particularity. Literally it is ideology; socially, it is a necessary semblance." (pg. 213)
 - "The general principle is that of isolation. To the isolated, isolation seems an indubitable certainty; they are bewitched, on pain of losing their existence, not to perceive how mediated their isolation is. Hence the widespread popularity of philosophical nominalism. Each individual existence is to take precedence over its concept; the spirit, the consciousness of individuals, is to reside in individuals only and not to be just as much the supra-individual element synthesized in them, the element by which alone they are thinking. **Stubbornly the monads balk at their real dependence as a species as well as at the collective aspect of all forms and contents of their consciousness...**" (pg. 312)
- Dynamics of Universal and Particular (pg. 313)
 - "What nominalism clings to as its most assured possession is utopian; hence its hatred of utopian thinking, the thinking that conceives the difference from what exists" (pg. 313)
 - "The positivistic cognitive ideal of inwardly unanimous, noncontradictory, logically unimpeachable models is untenable due to the contradiction immanent in what is to become known—due to the antagonisms of the object. They are the antagonisms of the universal and particular in society, and the method denies them in advance of any content." (pg. 314)
- Spirit as a Social Totality (pg. 314)
 - "To experience that objectivity, which ranks ahead of the individual and his consciousness, is to experience the unity of a totally socialized society." (pg. 314)
- Historical Reason Antagonistic (pg. 317)
 - "**What tolerates nothing particular is thus revealing itself as particularly dominant. The general reason that comes to prevail is already a restricted reason.** It is not just unity within diversity, but as an attitude to reality it is imposed, a unity over something—and thus, as a matter of pure form, it is antagonistic in itself. Unity is division. The irrationality of the particularly realized ratio within the social totality is not extraneous to the *ratio*, not solely due to its application. Rather, it is immanent to it. Measured by complete reason, the prevailing one unveils itself as being polarized and thus irrational even in itself, according to its principle. Enlightenment is truly subject to dialectics: there is a dialectic taking place in its own concept." (pg. 317)
 - ◆ "*Ratio* is no more to be hypostatized than any other category. The transfer of the self-preserving interest from individuals to the species is spiritually coagulated with the form of the ratio, a form that is general and antagonistic at the same time." (pg. 317-318)
 - ◇ "The universality of the ratio ratifies the needfulness of everything particular, its dependency upon the whole, and what unfolds in that universality, due to the process of abstraction on which it rests, is its contradiction to the particular. **All-governing reason, in installing itself above something else, necessarily constricts itself**" (pg. 318)
 - "**The principle of absolute identity is self-contradictory. It perpetuates nonidentity in suppressed and damaged form**" (pg. 318)
 - ◆ "A trace of this entered into Hegel's effort to have nonidentity absorbed by the philosophy of identity, indeed to define identity by nonidentity. Yet Hegel is distorting the state of facts by affirming identity, admitting nonidentity as a negative—albeit a necessary one—and misconceiving the negativity of the universal. He lacks sympathy with the utopian particular that has been buried underneath the universal—with that nonidentity which would not come into being until realized reason has left the particular reason of the universal behind." (pg. 318)
- Universal History (pg. 319)
 - "Hegel himself had conceived universal history as unified merely on account of its contradictions." (pg. 319)
 - ◆ "Yet discontinuity and universal history must be conceived together" (pg. 319)
 - "Universal history must be construed and denied." (pg. 320)
 - ◆ "After the catastrophes that have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history—the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over men's inner nature. **No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.** It ends in the total menace which organized mankind poses to organized men, in the epitome of discontinuity" (pg. 320)
 - "**History is the unity of continuity and discontinuity. Society stays alive, not despite its antagonism, but by means of it;** the profit interest and thus the class relationship make up the objective motor of the production process which the life of all men hangs by, and the primacy of which has its vanishing point in the death of all. This also implies the reconciling side of the irreconcilable; since nothing else permits men to live, not even a changed life would be possible without it. What historically made this possibility may as well destroy it. The world spirit, a worthy object of definition, would have to be defined as permanent catastrophe. Under the all-subjugating identity principle, whatever does not enter into identity, whatever eludes rational planning in the realm of means, turns into frightening retribution for the calamity which identity brought on the nonidentical. There is hardly another way to interpret history philosophically without enchanting it into an idea" (pg. 320)
- Antagonism Contingent? (pg. 321)
 - "The revolution desired by him and Marx was one of economic conditions in society as a whole, in the basic stratum of its self-preservation; it was not revolution as a change in society's political form, in the rules of the game of dominion. Their point was directed against the anarchists. When Marx and Engels decided to translate even mankind's primal history, its original sin, so to speak, into political economy—although the concept of that very discipline, chained to the totality of the barter relationship, is a late phenomenon—the motive that swayed them was the expectation of revolution as directly imminent. They wanted the revolution to come next day..." (pg. 322)
- The Supramundane Character of the Hegelian World Spirit (pg. 323)
 - See text

- Hegel Siding with the Universal (pg. 326)
 - "This much should be granted to Hegel; not only particularity but **the particular itself is unthinkable without the moment of the universal which differentiates the particular**, puts its imprint on it and in a sense is needed to make a particular of it" (pg. 328)
 - ◆ "Of a particular, nothing can be predicated without definition and thus without universality, and yet this does not submerge the moment of something particular, something opaque, which that prediction refers to and is based upon. It is maintained within the constellation, else dialectics would end up hypostatizing mediation without preserving the moments of immediacy, as Hegel prudently wished to do everywhere else." (pg. 328-329)
- Relapse into Platonism (pg. 329)
 - "The immanent critique of dialectics explodes Hegelian idealism. Cognition aims at the particular, not at the universal. It seeks its true object in the possible determination of the difference of that particular—even from the universal, which it criticizes as nonetheless inalienable. But if the mediation of the universal by the particular and of the particular by the universal is reduced to the abstract normal form of mediation as such, the particular has to pay the price, down to its authoritarian dismissal in the material parts of the Hegelian system" (pg. 329)
 - ◆ "If Hegel had carried the doctrine of the identity of universal and particular farther, to a dialectic in the particular itself, the particular—which according to him is simply the mediated universal—would have been granted the same right as the universal..." (pg. 329)
 - ◇ "Idealistically, there is no carrying out the dialectic of the particular which he envisions." (pg. 329)
 - "Contrary to the Kantian *chorismos*, **philosophy is not supposed to make itself at home in the universal as a doctrine of forms; it is to penetrate the content itself**, rather, and this is why, in a grandiosely *fatal petitio principii*, reality is so arranged by philosophy that it will yield to the repressive identification with philosophy." (pg. 329-330)
 - ◆ "What is most true in Hegelian thinking, the sense of the particular without whose weight the concept of reality decays into a farce, leads to that which is most false. It removes the particular for which Hegel's philosophy is groping." (pg. 330)
- Detemporalization of Time (pg. 331)
 - "To agree to the perpetuation of the status quo is to discredit the protesting thought as ephemeral." (pg. 331)
 - "As his version of dialectics extends to time itself, time is **ontologized, turned from a subjective form into a structure of being as such, itself eternal.**" (pg. 331)
 - "Dialectics carries this reciprocity into the most formal realm: of the moments essential to that realm, and opposed to each other, **not one is without the other**. Yet the reciprocity is not motivated by the pure form in itself that served to reveal it. A relationship of form and content has become the form itself." (pg. 331-332)
 - ◆ "what Hegel calls synthesis is not simply the downright new quality leaping forth from definite negation; it is the return of what has been negated. Dialectical progress is always a recourse as well, to that which fell victim to the progressing concept; the concept's progressive concretion is its self-correction." (pg. 333)
- Dialectics Cut Short by Hegel (pg. 334)
 - "Brutality is reproduced by men against whom it is practiced; the abused are not educated but repressed, rebarbarized. An insight of psychoanalysis—that civilization's repressive mechanisms transform the libido into aggression against civilization—cannot be extinguished any more. The man who has been educated by force will channel his aggressions by identifying with force, to pass it on and get rid of it; it is thus that subject and object are really identified according to the educational ideal of Hegel's philosophy of law. If a culture is no culture, it does not even want the people who are caught in its mill to be cultured" (pg. 337)
 - "[Hegel] does not put his trust in dialectics, does not look upon it as the force to cure itself, and disavows his own assurance that identity will produce itself in dialectics." (pg. 337-338)
- The Role of the Popular Spirit (pg. 338)
 - "[Hegel] made an effort at mediation. His mediating category, the popular spirit, extends into empirical history" (pg. 338)
 - ◆ "The more abundantly a universal is equipped with the insignia of the collective subject, the more completely will the subjects disappear in it. Yet that mediating category—which is not called mediation in so many words, by the way, but merely fulfills that function—lags behind Hegel's own concept of mediation. It does not hold sway in the matter itself, does not immanently determine its otherness; rather, it functions as a bridging concept, a hypostatized intermediary between the world spirit and the individuals" (pg. 338)
- Popular Spirit Obsolete (pg. 340)
 - See text.
- Individuality and History (pg. 342)
 - "Hegel rates individuality both too high and too low" (pg. 342)
- The Spell (pg. 344)
 - "Human beings, individual subjects, are under a spell now as ever. The spell is the subjective form of the world spirit, the internal reinforcement of its primacy over the external process of life. Men become that which negates them, that with which they cannot cope. They do not even have to cultivate a taste for it any more, as for the higher thing which indeed it is, compared with them in the hierarchy of grades of universality. On their own, a priori, so to speak, they act in line with the inevitable" (pg. 344)
- Regression Under the Spell (pg. 347)
 - "With society, ideology has so advanced that it no longer evolves into a socially required semblance and thus to an independent form, however brittle. All that it turns into is a kind of glue: the false identity of subject and object." (pg. 348)
 - ◆ "Spell and ideology are one and the same. The fatal part of ideology is that it dates back to biology. Self-preservation, the Spinozist *sese conservare*, is truly a law of nature for all living things. Its content is the tautology of identity: what ought to be is what is anyway; the will turns back upon the willing; as a mere means of itself it becomes an end. This turn is already a turn to the false consciousness. If the lion had a consciousness, his rage at the antelope he wants to eat would be ideology." (pg. 349)
- Subject and Individual (pg. 349)
 - "Even to Hegel, after all, subjectivity is the universal and the total identity. He deifies it. But he accomplishes the opposite as well: an insight into the subject as a self-manifesting objectivity. There is an abysmal duality in his construction of the subje-ctobject. He not only falsifies the object ideologically, calling it a free act of the absolute subject; he also recognizes in the subject a self-representing objectivity, thus anti-ideologically restricting the subject. Subjectivity as an existing reality of substance did claim precedence, but as an "existing," alienated subject it would be both objective and phenomenal. Yet this could not but affect the relation of subjectivity to concrete individuals as well. If objectivity is immanent to them and active in them, if it truly appears in them, an individuality which thus relates to the essence is far more substantial than one merely subordinated to the essence." (pg. 349)
- Dialectics and Psychology (pg. 351)

- "[Hegel] is being unjust to his own dialectic" (pg. 351)
 - ◆ "That the universal is not just a hood pulled over individuality, that it is its inner substance, this cannot be reduced to the platitude that prevailing human morals are encompassing." (pg. 351)
 - "Natural History" (pg. 354)
 - See text
 - History and Metaphysics (pg. 358)
 - "When history becomes the basic ontological structure of things in being, if not indeed the *qualitas occulta* of being itself, it is mutation as immutability, copied from the religion of inescapable nature. This allows us to transpose historic specifics into invariance at will, and to wrap a philosophical cloak around the vulgar view in which historic situations seem as natural in modern times as they once seemed divinely willed. This is one of the temptations to essentialize entity. The ontological claim to be beyond the divergence of nature and history is surreptitious" (pg. 358)
- Chapter 3 - Meditations on Metaphysics
 - After Auschwitz (pg. 361)
 - **"We cannot say any more that the immutable is truth, and that the mobile, transitory is appearance"** (pg. 361)
 - "The only trouble with self-preservation is that we cannot help suspecting the life to which it attaches us of turning into something that makes us shudder: into a specter, a piece of the world of ghosts, which our waking consciousness perceives to be nonexistent" (pg. 364)
 - ◆ **"This, nothing else, is what compels us to philosophize. And in philosophy we experience a shock: the deeper, the more vigorous its penetration, the greater our suspicion that philosophy removes us from things as they are**—that an unveiling of the essence might enable the most superficial and trivial views to prevail over the views that aim at the essence. This throws a glaring light on truth itself. In speculation we feel a certain duty to grant the position of a corrective to common sense, the opponent of speculation. Life feeds the horror of a premonition: what must come to be known may resemble the down-to-earth more than it resembles the sublime; it might be that this premonition will be confirmed even beyond the pedestrian realm, although the happiness of thought, the promise of its truth, lies in sublimity alone" (pg. 364)
 - "If **negative dialectics calls for the self-reflection of thinking**, the tangible implication is that if thinking is to be true—if it is to be true today, in any case— it must also be a thinking against itself. If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the screams of its victims." (pg. 365)
 - Metaphysics and Culture (pg. 365)
 - See text
 - Dying Today (pg. 368)
 - "...Heidegger was making destruction respectable as a means to penetrate Being." (pg. 368)
 - ◆ "Metaphysical reflections that seek to get rid of their cultural, indirect elements deny the relation of their allegedly pure categories to their social substance. They disregard society, but encourage its continuation in existing forms, in the forms which in turn block both the cognition of truth and its realization. The idol of pure original experience is no less of a hoax than that which has been culturally processed, the obsolete categorial stock of what is. The only possible escape route would be to define both by their indirectness: culture as the lid on the trash; and nature, even where it takes itself for the bedrock of Being, as the projection of the wretched cultural wish that in all change things must stay the same." (pg. 368)
 - ◇ "The reflections that give death a meaning are as helpless as the tautological ones." (pg. 369)
 - Happiness and Idle Waiting (pg. 373)
 - See text
 - "Nihilism" (pg. 376)
 - "Metaphysics deals with an objectivity without being free to dispense with subjective reflection. The subjects are embedded in themselves, in their "constitution": what metaphysics has to ponder is the extent to which they are nonetheless able to see beyond themselves." (pg. 376)
 - "Schopenhauer was an idealist *malgré lui-même*, a spokesman of the spell (pg. 377)
 - Kant's Resignation (pg. 381)
 - See text
 - Rescuing Urge and Block (pg. 384)
 - **"To be incapable of [any] change is to be incapable of experience."** (pg. 388)
 - Mundus intelligibilis (pg. 390)
 - "If in our thinking we mistake thoughts for realities...our thinking is void" (pg. 393)
 - Neutralization (pg. 393)
 - See text
 - "Only a Parable" (pg. 399)
 - "All metaphysical speculations are fatally thrust into the apocryphal, however. The ideological untruth in the conception of transcendence is the separation of body and soul, a reflex of the division of labor" (pg. 400)
 - The Semblance of Otherness (pg. 402)
 - See text
 - Self-Reflection of Dialectics (pg. 405)
 - **"Dialectics, the epitome of negative knowledge, will have nothing beside it;** even a negative dialectics drags along the commandment of exclusiveness from the positive one, from the system. Such reasoning would require a nondialectical consciousness to be negated as finite and fallible. In all its historical forms, dialectics prohibited stepping out of it. Willy-nilly, it played the part of a conceptual mediator between the unconditional spirit and the finite one; this is what intermittently kept making theology its enemy. Although dialectics allows us to think the absolute, the absolute as transmitted by dialectics remains in bondage to conditioned thinking" (pg. 405)
 - "But if our thought, fully aware of what it is doing, gropes beyond itself—if in otherness it recognizes something which is downright incommensurable with it, but which it thinks anyway—then the only shelter it will find lies in the dogmatic tradition. In such thoughts our thinking is estranged from its content, unreconciled, and newly condemned to two kinds of truth..." (pg. 405)
 - ◆ "...being at once the impression and the critique of the universal delusive context, [dialectics] must now turn even against itself" (pg. 406)
 - ◇ "The critique of every self-absolutizing particular is a critique of the shadow which absoluteness casts upon the critique; it is a critique of the fact that critique itself, contrary to its own tendency, must remain within the medium of the concept. It destroys the claim of identity by testing and honoring it; therefore, it can reach no farther than that claim. The claim is a magic circle that stamps critique with the appearance of absolute knowledge. It is up to the self-reflection of critique to extinguish

- that claim, to extinguish it" (pg. 406)
- "Dialectics is the self-consciousness of the objective context of delusion; it does not mean to have escaped from that context. Its objective goal is to break out of the context from within." (pg. 406)
 - "Denying the mystery by identification, by ripping more and more scraps put of it, does not resolve it. Rather, as though in play, the mystery belies our control of nature by reminding us of the impotence of our power" (pg. 407)
 - "thinking, itself a mode of conduct, contains the need—the vital need, at the outset—in itself. The need is what we think from, even where we disdain wishful thinking. The motor of the need is the effort that involves thought as action. The object of critique is not the need in thinking, but the relationship between the two. Yet the need in thinking is what makes us think. It asks to be negated by thinking; it must disappear in thought if it is to be really satisfied; and in this negation it survives. Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike thought. The smallest intramundane traits would be of relevance to the absolute, for the micrological view cracks the shells of what, measured by the subsuming cover concept, is helplessly isolated and explodes its identity, the delusion that it is but a specimen. There is solidarity between such thinking and metaphysics at the time of its fall." (pg. 408)

d. Further Readings:

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