

Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre's Early Philosophy, by R. E. Santoni

a. People / Organizations:

b. Quotes:

- "ethics is the triumph of freedom over facticity" - S. de Beauvoir (pg. xxxv)
- "the primitive project of bad faith sets weak evidential requirements for persuasion" - Author (pg. 42)
 - "given again his view of the primitive project of bad faith, there is no question that the modified sense of 'lying to oneself' involves a deliberate intention to accept as persuasive what is not fully persuasive, and to 'believe' what one consciously does not fully believe. This suggests a cynical element in Sartre's modified sense of bad faith" - Author (pg. 45)
- "[Here is] the heart of Sartre's theory of consciousness and of belief. Consciousness is an 'elsewhereness' of being; it is always at a distance from itself; is metastable, mercurial, abruptly transitional, evanescent, always elsewhere, never one with itself. Unlike certainty, which is characterized by 'the intuitive possession of the object', belief is the 'adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given indistinctly'" - Author (pg. 72)
 - "bad faith abuses faith and allows for 'impossible' belief: it adopts a deceptive attitude toward the ambiguity and self-destructiveness of belief" - Author (pg. 75)
- "The for-itself 'lacks', and what it lacks is in-itself. Human reality or consciousness is free 'because it is not enough'; it wants an essence; it is 'haunted' by this value, this ideal. This 'in-itself-for-itself; becomes the 'fundamental value' which the for-itself posits. The consciousness that projects good faith cannot escape this value, this unreflective passion for completion or oneness. The for-itself as lack spontaneously and unreflectively seeks self-coincidence; it wants to be for-itself-in-itself" - Author (pg. 84)
 - "consciousness can, in good faith, recognize its freedom and incompleteness and take responsibility for its free acts and creations" - Author (pg. 84)
 - "If good faith is nothing else, it is the basic attitude of accepting ourselves - without regret, remorse, despair, or excuse - as anguished 'freedom' and of taking responsibility for our choices, projects, attitudes. Good faith, as an ontological attitude, is, we might say, the 'acceptance of our abandonment to both freedom and responsibility'" - Author (pg. 87)

c. General Notes:

- Introduction (pg. xv)
 - "the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre is one to which too many philosophers, academics, and laypersons allude, but too few read - at least seriously" (pg. xv)
 - "Sartre himself devotes only two or three analytic pages to ['good faith'] and does so in the context of a detailed discussion of bad faith" (pg. xvi)
 - "Sartre's baffling counterintuitive claim [is] that good faith (or, 'sincerity', for that matter) shares the project and goal of bad faith" (pg. xvi-xvii)
 - "when writers on Sartre have referred to good faith only in passing, they have, more often than not, shown little sensitivity to what I believe is a much-needed distinction between good faith and authenticity in Sartre. They frequently use the term *good faith* as if it were interchangeable with *authenticity* and constituted the constructive antithesis to, and way out of, bad faith" (pg. xvii)
 - "although Sartre's notion of bad faith has engaged the interest of academics and laypersons alike...it has hardly been free of conceptual confusion, controversy, and lack of detailed understanding" (pg. xviii)
 - "reflection (in Sartre's sense), radical conversion, and moral agency are, together, the three characteristics that differentiate authenticity from the (reconceived) 'immediate attitude' of good faith and provide the structure for understanding what *Being and Nothingness* failed to afford; namely, Sartre's way of salvation and deliverance" (pg. xxx)
 - "Sartre perceives good faith as one of the two immediate attitudes we can adopt in relation to our being as freedom. At most, the reflective awareness of the possibility of good faith 'lays the foundation' —as Catalano would say—for the possibility of a radical change in our fundamental project: that is, of conversion to an authentic way of living. But it is clear, on analysis, that conversion, for Sartre, is a function of will, and willing is part of a reflective consciousness - a consciousness directing itself on consciousness - which, in its pure form, is trying to 'recover' itself as nothingness, and as a 'spontaneous project', rather than continue its pre-reflective project of fleeing freedom in the direction of the in-itself. In other words, reflection, I contend, is the means by which conversion to authenticity, not to good faith, takes place" (pg. xxxi)
 - "the acceptance or rejection of freedom and responsibility, even at the alleged pre-reflective level, does not appear devoid of moral content or implication" (pg. xxxi)
 - "my contention [is] that authenticity is intended by Sartre as the way out of bad faith as a corrupted consciousness" (pg. xxxiii)
 - "in spite of the occasional looseness and unpredictability of Sartre's language, the emphasis of his overall intentions is...quite clear and discernable" (pg. xxxvii)
 - "the way out of Sartrean hell is authenticity - that is to say, living 'in accord' with one as unjustifiable freedom and taking responsibility for it" (pg. xxxix)
- Chapter 1 - Bad Faith and Sincerity: Does Sartre's Analysis Rest on a Mistake? (pg. 1)
 - "I want to focus on Sartre's view of 'sincerity' as it is developed in *Being and Nothingness* - in particular, on his contention that sincerity is a 'phenomenon of bad faith'. Sartre's argument that the phenomenological structure and goals of sincerity parallel those of bad faith is to me problematic and highly misleading" (pg. 1)
 - General Background (pg. 2)
 - "it must be remembered that Sartre adopts Husserl's view that all consciousness is consciousness of something. This is an indirect endorsement of Brentano's earlier contention that intentionality is an essential feature of consciousness" (pg. 2)
 - "It is precisely this view of the intentionality or transcendence of consciousness that pushes Sartre to make his fundamental distinction between two types of being: on the one hand, being for-itself (*l'être pour-soi*), or the being of consciousness, and on the other hand, being in-itself (*l'être en-soi*), or the being that transcends consciousness, the being that consciousness 'intends', or, to paraphrase Spiegelberg, the being to which being for-itself refers by virtue of its intentionality. Hence, in its innermost nature, *pour-soi*, seen in terms of intending consciousness, may be said to relate to and imply a being other than itself (*en-soi*), which is at once both a transcendent and a transphenomenal being" (pg. 3)
 - "Sartre sees the human being distinctively in terms of freedom and maintains that this freedom is revealed to us in anguish" (pg. 4)
 - "In a sense...we *are* anguish, yet in the human condition, we wish to flee this anguish. And the way we flee anguish is by trying 'to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a *thing*', in other words, as being in-itself (*l'être en-soi*). So, for Sartre, I can become involved in bad faith while in the very process of apprehending myself as anguish" (pg. 4)
 - "to think that I can hide, or indeed attempt to hide, my anguish is *bad faith*" (pg. 4)
 - ◆ "it is an attempt to turn what I am as a human reality, as a *pour-soi*, as 'a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is',

into the mode of being of en-soi, into an object into a 'thing'. But, to use Sartre's words once again, it is at the price of bad faith that 'we are anguish-in-order-to-flee-anguish within the unity of a single consciousness'" (pg. 4)

- 'Bad Faith' and 'The Problem of Sincerity' (pg. 5)
 - "Sartre comes to grips with the nature of 'bad faith' by first contrasting it with 'falsehood' or 'lying in general'. He is quite willing to allow that bad faith is essentially a 'lie to oneself, providing one makes the crucial distinction between lying to oneself and 'lying in general'. 'The essence of the lie', says Sartre, 'implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete possession of the truth which he is hiding'. **Through the lie, consciousness affirms its existence as "hidden from the Other", and for its own gain exploits the ontological duality between myself and myself as viewed by the Other.** Although bad faith may be regarded as a lie to oneself, and although it does share in appearance the structure of falsehood, it cannot maintain the ontological duality of deceiver and deceived. For **bad faith differs essentially from 'lying in general' or falsehood in that it involves one's hiding the truth from oneself.**" (pg. 5)
 - "Bad faith entails 'the unity of a *single* consciousness', for the one who is lying and the one to whom the lie is told are one and the same person. And this means also that bad faith is not thrust upon one; it is not an intruder on human consciousness; an individual is not infected with it. Rather, **bad faith is an individual project; consciousness affects itself with it. I am the originator of my lie, and I have a pre-reflective awareness of the deception of which I am attempting to persuade myself**" (pg. 5-6)
 - "the first act of bad faith is, indeed, 'to flee what it cannot flee, to flee what it is'. We observe also that this flight involves a kind of breakdown at the very heart of being; for human reality, in bad faith, refuses to acknowledge itself as what it is" (pg. 6)
 - "**The human being for Sartre is both a *facticity* (a 'given' or a 'what is') and a *transcendence* (the possible projects of its freedom, or the possibilities associated with 'what it is not').** What bad faith does is 'to affirm their identity while preserving their differences'; it 'affirms facticity as *being* transcendence and transcendence as *being* facticity'. In bad faith, I am caught up in the ambiguity of affirming my transcendence in the mode of being of *en-soi* or a thing, and vice versa. Maintaining this ambiguity may allow me to feel that I can escape all reproaches, but in fact I can do so only by fleeing my responsibilities as being for-itself (*l'être pour-soi*), by regarding myself as a thing, and by violating what I am as a human consciousness" (pg. 6-7)
 - "By so doing it is involved in the **self-destroying enterprise of trying to transform the transcendence of *pour-soi* into facticity, making being for-itself exist in the mode of in-itself.** Human consciousness is not simply *what it is*, says Sartre, and the human being is not simply *what he or she is*. Out of this consideration 'the problem of sincerity' develops for Sartre" (pg. 7)
 - ◆ *cf. D. Binseel, *A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity*, pg. 4 - "*father protect me...father correct me*" https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_795d5e35faaf49c6a197e1dd2fe00fc5.pdf
 - "Sartre...[suggests] that the project of sincerity sets for itself an ideal or task that is impossible to fulfill" (pg. 8)
 - "He contends that the essential structure of sincerity is the same as that of bad faith and that its goal scarcely differs. As we have seen, **the goal of bad faith is to flee from oneself, to put oneself out of reach**; or, to use another terminology, its end is 'to cause me to be what I am, in the mode of "not being what one is", or not to be what I am in the mode of "being what one is"'. Similarly, **the goal of sincerity is 'to bring me to confess to myself what I am in order that I may finally coincide with my being**; in a word, to cause myself to be, in the mode of the in-itself, what I am in the mode of 'not being what I am'" (pg. 8-9)
 - "for Sartre, **this is all the same 'game of mirrors'**" (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "so being sincere is one of the ways of falling into bad faith" (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "Sartre asserts unambiguously that, *if bad faith is to be possible at all*, sincerity itself *has to be* in bad faith. 'The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the infrastructure of the prereflective *cogito*, must be what it is not and not be what it is'. Put another way, **bad faith is rooted in being for-itself's ontological ambiguity of facticity and transcendence**, in its 'double property' of 'thatness' and 'becoming', of 'what is' and 'what is not'. And sincerity is not only the same, in 'its essential structure' and goal, as bad faith but is also a necessary condition of the very possibility of bad faith" (pg. 9)
 - ◇ "**I find this contention disturbing and misleading, and I believe it to be based on a faulty analysis**" (pg. 9)
 - The Root Defects of Sartre's Analysis (pg. 10)
 - "I submit that *equivocation* lies at the root of Sartre's analysis of sincerity and of what I take to be his erroneous depiction of sincerity as bad faith" (pg. 10)
 - "As we have seen, there is no question that Sartre identifies being sincere with 'being what one is' and that he regards sincerity as an impossible ideal, the very meaning of which contradicts the nature of consciousness. But there is much to question about the way in which, in this context, Sartre reads or interprets 'being what one is' or 'to be what one is'" (pg. 10)
 - "he seems to be juxtaposing an ordinary-language formulation of sincerity with his own idiosyncratic philosophical view of human reality as consciousness" (pg. 10)
 - ◆ "what is less understandable, and indeed seems unjustified, is his ready movement from the level of discourse of everyday, common language to the level of discourse of technical and systematic philosophy. This kind of maneuver appears to involve a confounding of universes or categories of discourse" (pg. 11)
 - "although, as a characterization of sincerity, 'being what one is' emerges from an ordinary-language context, Sartre without hesitation places it in his ontological system and allows it to take on the basis of en-soi ('in-itself') and the objectifying characteristic of identity" (pg. 11)
 - ◆ "If, as Sartre states, the project and goal of sincerity is 'to be what one is', and if 'to be what one is' means what Sartre defines it to mean in his characterization of being in-itself (or en-soi), then it does seem to follow that consciousness, in seeking 'absolute equivalence' and 'self-coincidence', is trying to put itself 'out of reach', is attempting to escape its freedom in order to constitute itself as *thing*, and thus, in bad faith, is violating human reality" (pg. 11-12)
 - ◇ "my contention is precisely that Sartre's crucial step is philosophically illegitimate. It is based on an equivocation. The meaning of 'to be what one is' as intended by ordinary language cannot be identified with the meaning of that expression when it is used by Sartre technically either to define the 'in-itself' or to characterize human reality's bad-faith goal to tie down or objectify consciousness. But Sartre appears either to ignore or to exploit this ambiguity" (pg. 12)
 - ▶ "left as is, his procedure seems to be arbitrary, unwarranted, and indifferent to the meaning differences of the different language contexts" (pg. 12)
 - ▶ "I submit that this disturbing conclusion is rooted in **Sartre's failure to distinguish between the meaning of 'being what one is' as used in ordinary language and the meaning of the expression when it is read into his philosophical system.** Once Sartre's 'move' is allowed, once 'being what one is' is shifted out of its ordinary-language context into his system of philosophical meanings, Sartre's line of reasoning makes sense, for it is systemic. **But I urge that his initial move should not be allowed, for it is built on equivocation**" (pg. 13)
 - "Sartre seems to be suggesting that, although consciousness is a being that posits its own essence, it is never just this essence, it is never just the 'what it is' of essence, never just its past, for it is also 'what it is not' but could be; that is, its possibilities, its future. This seems to be Sartre's phenomenological description of the ontological structure of consciousness" (pg. 14)
 - "Sartre sees the goal of sincerity as 'contradicting' the very structure of consciousness" (pg. 15)
 - "Sartre's fundamental argument has been that sincerity is in bad faith and does share its essential structure" (pg. 15)

- "[all this] appears - given its consequences - to add evidence against the soundness of Sartre's analysis of sincerity and bad faith" (pg. 15)
- "I hope also that my argument may serve to alert readers of Sartre to the ambiguity that sometimes surrounds his use of language, and encourage them to **proceed cautiously and reflectively when considering Sartre's unsettling discussion of basic existential attitudes**" (pg. 15)
- A Suggestion for Reconstruction (pg. 16)
 - "I submit that to aim to be what I am or to express myself honestly as the person I am does not necessarily entail, even on Sartre's terms, constituting myself in the mode of *en-soi* or of a kind of fixed 'thing'" (pg. 16)
 - **"Sartre appears either inattentive to this possibility or so immersed in his own system of philosophical meanings that he is unable to view 'what one is' except as a violation of human reality, or as an objectification of free human consciousness"** (pg. 17)
 - "I submit that 'being what one is' ('being sincere') may involve being or living or existing in a mode in which one recognizes and accepts that 'one is not what one is and is what one is not'. That is to say, sincerity is often intended to mean that one is 'what one is' in the mode of being of self-consciousness, not in the mode of the objectification or thingification of consciousness, or of fleeing one's freedom. Following this line of development, I suggest that to be or to live in such a mode may well be, for Sartre, to live self-consciously. To say the least, it is within the range of my possibility to face and recognize myself lucidly and honestly and to live as 'freedom', as 'consciousness', as the 'foundation of my values', as a 'being which is what it is not and which is not what it is'. Although this possibility may be linguistically problematic for Sartre, there is no a priori basis for ruling it out. In fact, as I shall make evident in subsequent chapters, **living in accord with the freedom one is may well be the key to Sartre's conception of 'authenticity'.**" (pg. 17)
 - **this is all to say that Sartre mistakenly "went too far" in his radicalized interpretation of fundamental aspects of human reality. Cf. (ed.) S. Churchill & J. Reynolds, Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts - remarks on pg. 1*
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_1a2ae3baaee448dfa0303baa616db8f9.pdf
 - "put more generally, sincerity then becomes the life of authentic self-consciousness or the life of honest self-awareness" (pg. 17)
- Chapter 2 - Bad Faith and Lying to Oneself (pg. 28)
 - Lying in General and Lying to Oneself (pg. 29)
 - "Sartre, in a preliminary move which remains to tantalize the rest of his discussion, allows that bad faith is a 'lie to oneself'. He does this with one proviso; namely, that lying to oneself be distinguished from 'lying in general', or falsehood. **The essence of the lie, as we have seen, entails that the liar is actually and completely in 'possession of the truth which he is hiding': 'a man does not lie about what he is ignorant of'**. Moreover, the liar intends to deceive and does not try either to hide this intention from himself or to disguise the translucency of consciousness. Through the lie, consciousness affirms its existence as hidden from the Other and exploits for its own ends the ontological duality between myself and myself viewed from the eyes of the Other" (pg. 29)
 - "but the situation cannot be the same for bad faith. As lying to oneself, bad faith, of course, hides or misrepresents truth" (pg. 29)
 - "As we saw in the preceding chapter, 'what changes everything is that in bad faith it is from myself that I conceal the truth'. Here there is no ontological duality between deceiver and deceived. On the contrary, bad faith entails 'the unity of a single consciousness'. The one who lies and the one to whom the lie is told are one and the same. Consciousness 'affects itself' with bad faith. Hence, it must have both an intention and a project of bad faith" (pg. 29-30)
 - Is Lying to Oneself Possible? (pg. 30) **I would tentatively say the predominate way in which we 'deceive' or 'lie to' ourselves is through our own idealizations (either of ourselves or the world around us) - i.e., in positing to ourselves a 'less realistic' / 'more romanticized' (that is, witnessed by the movement away from 'reality') vision of what's 'now' and 'then'.*
 - "Sartre acknowledges the problem and appears to have a clear awareness of it. It seems obvious that he is right in inferring that, if the would-be liar 'knows' (or 'is in possession of') the truth she is trying to disguise, then any conscious effort to hide that truth from herself would be in vain. Yet this acknowledgment, even of the failure or inevitable self-destructiveness of any deliberate attempt to lie to oneself, does not lead Sartre to abrogate his preliminary conception of bad faith. What we discover here, Sartre tells us, is the 'evanescence' of bad faith" (pg. 31)
 - "at this point he claims neither to reject nor to understand it. Although he acknowledges its 'very precarious' existence..." (pg. 31)
 - "Sartre realizes that the problem he faces has led many to take recourse in a theory of the unconscious. For reasons that are generally consistent with his view of the translucency of consciousness, but which others have analyzed and found wanting, Sartre rejects the Freudian psychoanalytic theory" (pg. 32)
 - "As two aspects of human reality, facticity and transcendence should be susceptible to what Sartre calls a 'valid coordination'. But bad faith wants neither to coordinate them nor to overcome them in a synthesis. Rather, 'bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their differences'" (pg. 33)
 - "Although this point serves to illuminate what Sartre 'intends' by bad faith, it does not eliminate his dilemmas concerning it. For, even given the facticity-transcendence character of human reality, consciousness, it must be recalled, 'affects itself with bad faith'. And, as a consequence of its prereflective nature, consciousness, for Sartre, must be aware of its intention of hiding the truth from itself-in this case, of its deceptive project of 'sliding back and forth' from facticity to transcendence" (pg. 34)
 - **"bad faith is belief, and the fundamental problem of bad faith is a problem of belief"** (pg. 38)
 - "at this point, so much depends on the nature of 'faith', the relation of belief to evidence..." (pg. 38)
 - ◆ "Sartre now tells us that, in its original project and in its coming 'into the world', bad faith makes a conscious decision regarding the precise nature of its requirements. For it realizes that 'faith is decision and that after each intuition, it must decide and will what it is'. It thus stands forth 'in the firm resolution not to demand too much, to count itself satisfied when it is barely persuaded, to force itself in decisions to adhere to uncertain truths'. This means that, **although bad faith perceives evidence, it resigns itself in advance to not being 'fulfilled' by the evidence. In other words, it commits itself ahead of time to a 'non-persuasive evidence' which it designs as non-persuasive. Prima facie, this bears resemblance to the common lies of 'half-persuasion' which Sartre has earlier dismissed as 'degenerate aspects of the lie' and has distinguished from bad faith**" (pg. 38)
 - "because faith is not certainty, the consciousness of bad faith decides to be content with an insufficiency of evidence; to determine arbitrarily the amount of evidence by which it will be persuaded, while 'knowing' that the amount it requires is not sufficient to persuade *fully*" (pg. 39)
 - ◆ "What we see, then, is that from its very inception **bad faith is aware of its structure and attempts to exploit the mercurial 'nature' of consciousness and faith by setting up weak requirements for the acceptance of non-persuasive evidence**" (pg. 39)
 - ◆ "By exploiting the identityless nature of consciousness, by including its negation in its primitive project, bad faith disarms in advance all beliefs both those it would like to grasp and those that it wishes to flee" (pg. 41)
 - "given the totally translucent nature of consciousness and the troubled nature of belief, we must still say that, in the strict sense of successfully and completely hiding a truth from oneself, within the unity of a single consciousness, lying to oneself is not possible for Sartre. The consciousness (of) belief cannot miss questioning its own belief; the bad-faith consciousness cannot escape an awareness of its own self-destroying and disarming project; the consciousness (of) belief or dis-belief, cannot be ignorant of its believing so as not to

- believe...consciousness cannot flee an awareness of what it is trying to hide, flee, or negate. If consciousness is self-conscious, if it involves a pre-reflective awareness of itself, it cannot alter or hide anything from itself" (pg. 42)
- "We have seen much evidence for this. In its original project, 'bad faith' structures itself to accept non-persuasive evidence, to count itself satisfied when it has met only minimal requirements for persuasion, to regard itself as persuaded when it is only partially or half-persuaded. It constructs 'two-faced', ambiguous concepts (of persuasion, belief) by which this can be done. Bad faith decides that nonpersuasion is constitutive of all convictions. It exploits the nature of belief (belief always 'falls short' of belief; 'to believe is not to believe', given the instability and elusiveness of consciousness) by accepting to believe what it cannot fully persuade itself to believe, given the translucency of consciousness. And to repeat: 'it is precisely as the acceptance of not believing what it believes that it is bad faith'" (pg. 42-43)
 - "bad faith does not fully succeed in believing what it wishes to believe or not believe. In attaching itself to the phenomenon of 'not-believing-what-one-believes', it testifies anew to the 'distance' that exists at the core of the being of consciousness..." (pg. 44)
- Chapter 3 - The Cynicism of Sartre's 'Bad Faith' (pg. 47)
 - "Sartre does not regard bad faith as cynical" (pg. 47)
 - "In the present chapter, I wish to show that, in spite of his insistence to the contrary, the deceptive consciousness that Sartre characterizes as bad faith is a cynical consciousness; that the project of bad faith is a cynical project; and that bad faith, though not an 'ideal' lie, is a form of cynical 'lying'" (pg. 48)
 - Sartre's Use of Cynical (pg. 49)
 - "the liar, still translucently conscious of the truth he is trying to conceal, and not trying to hide the deceptive intent from himself, also denies to himself the deceptive falsity that he is trying to convey to the Other. Yet that does not stop him from telling the lie to the Other. His consciousness is cynical: it continues to reflect a blatant disregard for the truth" (pg. 49-50)
 - "As Joseph Catalano has pointed out, the whole structure of the lie can be called a 'phenomenon of transcendence' in Sartre because it is shaped toward persuading the Other to accept an untruth as a truth" (pg. 50)
 - "Perhaps Sartre has misjudged the nature of the cynical consciousness. Perhaps he has failed to see part of the negative attitude that a bad-faith consciousness 'self-consciously' adopts toward truth (and falsity). Whatever the case, I intend to show that the attitude of self-negation in which bad faith is said to consist is, without question, cynical. That it may not be cynical in exactly the same manner that a strict lie or falsehood is cynical does not save it from cynicism" (pg. 51)
 - "the liar's consciousness is, as we have seen, doubly negative: it doubly denies the truth of which the liar is conscious and attempts to hide from the Other. In *expressing* to the Other the opposite, or a deceptive variation, of what he believes, he manifests a callous disregard for what he takes to be the truth. His pretended assurances to the Other - which he recognizes as untruth and denies to himself - that he is telling the truth show again a dismissal of and a lack of concern for truth (and goodness). All this he does 'in entire lucidity' and with full understanding of the truth he is masking or altering. **The liar deliberately exploits**, for his own deceitful ends, the ontological duality of myself and the Other, of myself and myself for the Other. His project of intentionally misrepresenting the truth of which he is aware is unambiguously cynical. Although the negations that constitute this consciousness are transcendent in the sense of aiming outside consciousness, they nonetheless betray the taking of a negative attitude toward one's consciousness, toward 'oneself', so to say" (pg. 51-52)
 - Why, for Sartre, Bad Faith is not Cynical (pg. 52)
 - "In my preceding chapter on Sartre's analysis of bad faith, I tried to make clear Sartre's distinction between 'lying in general' and 'lying to oneself', between the 'strict lie', for example, and the lying that takes place in bad faith. I pointed out that 'what changes everything' for Sartre is that, in bad faith (as 'lying to oneself'), it is from myself that I (try to) conceal the truth, that the ontological duality between the one who deceives and the one who is deceived disappears. Because of this, Sartre initially views the possibility of lying to oneself as severely problematic" (pg. 52)
 - "a bad-faith consciousness is incapable of the deliberate distortion of truth, of the cynical self-negation, that takes place in the 'ideal lie', in lying to the Other. The unity of a single consciousness precludes and prohibits such a possibility" (pg. 54)
 - "But I want to argue that Sartre is wrong in this inference. What Sartre has done is this he has reasoned that, because bad faith, as lying to oneself, must be distinguished from lying in general (and from the strict lie in particular), and because, unlike the 'ideal' lie, lying to oneself precludes the possibility of completely concealing the truth from the one whom one is trying to deceive (specifically, oneself) therefore the bad-faith consciousness cannot be cynical. Sartre seems to have made the possibility for complete success of the project of lying (for completely concealing the truth) a decisive condition for its being cynical. I urge that Sartre is justified in concluding only that bad faith cannot be cynical in exactly the same way that lying in general is cynical, or that a 'strict' lying (to the Other) consciousness is a cynical consciousness. It is one thing, and understandable, for Sartre to contend, prior to his analysis of bad faith and on the basis of a preliminary awareness of bad faith as 'lying to oneself', that bad faith cannot be cynical. It is quite another - and certainly less understandable - for him to maintain the same after he has differentiated more carefully the deceptive structure of bad faith's lying from that of the "ideal" lie. In focusing on the single and unified consciousness of lying to oneself, while inadvertently allowing the duality of consciousness to become a necessary condition for both lying in general and cynicism, **Sartre has failed to acknowledge the blatantly cynical aspects of the kind of lying that, by his own admission, goes on in bad faith or self-deception**" (pg. 54)
 - The Cynicism of Bad Faith (pg. 55)
 - "I propose to show that Sartre's analysis of the project and structure of bad faith betrays cynicism in the common usage sense to which I have been alluding" (pg. 55)
 - "we 'put ourselves' in bad faith as we put ourselves to sleep, so to say" (pg. 55)
 - "I set up instruments by which I can persuade myself to 'believe', on the basis of limited and selective data, even when I do not believe. And I am not dispirited by my unbelief, for I have told myself, in preparation for my 'belief', for my 'persuasion', that one can never believe enough, that all belief 'comes short' of belief, that good faith is an 'impossible belief'" (pg. 56)
 - "[it's] clear, beyond reasonable doubt, that the bad-faith consciousness must be called 'cynical' in the common usage sense I have invoked above. If consciousness 'affects itself' with bad faith in the translucency of consciousness, it is surely responsible for the consciousness with which it has affected itself. And if the very project of bad-faith consciousness is itself in bad faith; that is, **if it structures itself in advance to accept as 'persuasive' that which it 'knows' is not fully persuasive and if it (consciously) sets for itself the mechanism by which to 'lie to itself', then it cannot escape the charge of having an indifference to or disregard for truth.** Despite Sartre's assurance to the contrary, the bad-faith consciousness does make 'knowing preparations' for 'deceitful concepts' and for its own deception. It connives to hide the truth, to disregard it, to provide itself with a phony rationale for not asking itself to be fully persuaded, for believing what is transparently not fully believable. By exploiting the perpetual self-destruction of consciousness, it disarms in advance all beliefs, including all those that are opposed to it...Although, as I have tried to show, bad-faith consciousness does not succeed in believing completely what it wishes to believe, it goes on believing nonetheless" (pg. 56-57)
 - "by choosing the 'distracted' consciousness, [one] 'disarms' in advance any counterbeliefs..." (pg. 58)
 - ◆ **cf. (ed.)S. Churchill & J. Reynolds, Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, pg. 122 "an effective method of deception is to employ ambiguity and vagueness, coupled with an appeal to the intended audience's interests and prejudices, so as to suggest a message that would not be received so uncritically if it were stated clearly" D. Detmer.*

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- ◆ *Meaning, we distract ourselves (in order to) deceive ourselves about something we already have some inclination about. For instance, everyone exists in the world. Each sees the world as not a kind place for all. We know differences of color and religion divide us. Knowing all this, we turn away from the evidence which might point toward there not being any god to focus more intently upon the 'facts' of the counterargument (i.e., that there 'is' a god). But, in doing this, we now put ourselves on a track to seek out the fact which will confirm our pre-conception of (or, at the least, desire for). 'Turning-from' to 'fixate upon' (the whole of this 'movement) is a key aspect of this process of 'lying to oneself'.*
- **"bad faith, as a modified form of lying (to oneself), involves the adoption of a negative attitude toward oneself"** (pg. 60)
 - "By contrived criteria and the choice of selective evidence, the bad-faith consciousness decides that it is 'persuaded' even when it is not. The cynical motive is there..." (pg. 61)
- "I suggest that the person in bad faith, like the 'liar to the Other', does attempt to reassure himself; to tell himself as he draws self-deceptive conclusions - based on ambiguous and selected data - that he is an honest man, that, of course, he is not that other 'kind' of man - a liar, a deceiver, a flirt, a seducer, or what have you. **These reassurances are important reinforcement for his holding fast to the criteria of half-persuasion which he sets up in advance to 'persuade' himself**, to bring himself to accept 'believing what he does not believe'. He can reassure himself in this way - despite his translucent awareness of the truth that he is trying to hide - because of the double-property, the 'facticity-transcendence', of human reality. Just as I, in the basic movement of bad faith, can play seesaw with these two aspects of human reality or consciousness and can exploit the metastable 'nature' of all belief, so can I, in spite of the unity and translucency of consciousness, accept these reassurances as 'believable' even though I do not fully believe them. I can accept 'believing' the reassurance that I do not (fully) believe because the evanescent, identityless makeup of consciousness allows me to tell myself that all believing is "not believing enough." So - as we've seen - I count myself satisfied even when I'm not 'fulfilled' by the evidence" (pg. 62)
 - "the project of bad faith and the instrument of 'half-persuasions' allow [one] to accept [their] self-reassurance" (pg. 62)
 - ◆ "as long as I abide by my criterion of half-persuasion, I can continue with my self-deception" (pg. 63)
 - ◇ **half' is easier to surmount than 'full' evidence to the contrary. In fact, in our appraising, we measure the half as half-empty of the truth (i.e., we set for ourselves the expectation that all and any truth must be 'absolute' / 'full' before such is accepted as such, so that anything short of 'full' or 'absolute' fails completely and is taken as 'little-to-enough'), therein making for ourselves reason-enough to deny and escape, turning-from to focus upon that otherwise.*
- "to be sure, I cannot persuade myself completely, as I can persuade the Other completely; I cannot take the 'lie to myself' for 'truth', as the Other can take my lie. Nor can I take my adopted feigned character as my 'true' character in the manner in which the Other can" (pg. 64-65)
- "Again, the métastable, fluid structure of consciousness allows this, for consciousness is always at a 'distance from itself' and is 'evanescent', so to speak. Thus, as we have seen, **the person in bad faith can 'pretend' to believe, ground assurances of truth telling on this pretense, and yet, because of his translucent awareness of the truth he is hiding, negate the deception he is affirming**. The strategy of bad faith and the elusive, seesaw nature of human reality permit the self-deceiver's failure to 'recognize' his deceitful reassurance of truth telling. Hence, even this secondary, rather technical detail of Sartre's cynical consciousness (as incorporated in the "ideal lie") turns out to be structurally compatible with bad faith" (pg. 66)
- Chapter 4 - Good Faith: Can It Be Salvaged? (pg. 68)
 - [Sartre's] discussion of good faith...is so skeletal that it leaves the reader bewildered by implications which, on first reading, appear to conflict" (pg. 68)
 - "in the next chapters, I wish to complete my study of Sartre's fundamental 'attitudes'. I plan to do so by exploring the relation, in Sartre's early works, between Sartre's concepts of good faith and authenticity, particularly as they relate to bad faith. **My intention is to help reconstruct good faith and to elucidate authenticity in a way that will make them recoverable fundamental 'attitudes' toward human reality; that is to say, possible, alternate modes of human existing - or of 'existing' our freedom - to bad faith**. In doing so, I shall attempt to differentiate authenticity from good faith and to make evident why, though they are often treated as synonymous (sometimes even by Sartre), the two concepts should not be identified in Sartre. In short, I shall aim to show the marks of their differentiation. And, in passing, I shall also hope to show, as a subsidiary consideration, the grounds on which we can be said to be responsible for our attitudes of bad and good faith, and for the authenticity or inauthenticity of our fundamental existential 'orientation' or 'attitude'" (pg. 68-69)
 - "Although I have learned considerably from Catalano's studies - and have delighted in professional exchanges with him - I am not persuaded that he has offered the last word on these topics. Though his efforts to clarify these concepts are admirable, his articles continue to exhibit, in places, a common tendency to conflate good faith and authenticity. In the exploration that follows, I hope to go beyond Catalano's interpretation and to set in clearer focus the relationship between good faith and authenticity" (pg. 70)
 - 'Good Faith' in *Being and Nothingness* (pg. 70)
 - "Bad faith [says Sartre] 'does not hold the norms and criteria of truths as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith'" (pg. 71)
 - "So Sartre's suggestion, from the start, is that whereas bad faith is unwilling to be persuaded by critical evidence, good faith is willing; that, **whereas...bad faith...is a closed, uncritical attitude toward available evidence, the fundamental attitude or original determination of being in good faith is an open, critical attitude toward evidence**" (pg. 71)
 - ◆ **see comments on pg. 63*
 - "[Here is] the heart of Sartre's theory of consciousness and of belief. **Consciousness is an 'elsewhereness' of being; it is always at a distance from itself**; is metastable, mercurial, abruptly transitional, evanescent, always elsewhere, never one with itself. Unlike certainty, which is characterized by 'the intuitive possession of the object', **belief is the 'adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given indistinctly'**" (pg. 72)
 - "I have tried to show how the bad-faith consciousness attempts to exploit the autodestructiveness of 'the fact of consciousness', the 'elsewhereness' of consciousness, and the corollary fact that 'every belief falls short of belief'" (pg. 73)
 - Two Types of 'Faith' (pg. 73)
 - "Sartre is using the expression 'good faith' in two different senses. On the one hand... good faith...connotes an openness to critical evidence, an openness to being persuaded, whatever the evidence" (pg. 73-74)
 - **one could say such is 'letting'. Cf. M. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pg. 24 - "to know means to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the openness of beings. To know is accordingly to be able to stand in the openness of beings, to stand up to it. Merely to have information, however wide-ranging it may be, is not to know" & "the man who truly knows is not the one who blindly runs after a truth, but only the one who constantly knows all three ways, that of Being, that of not-Being, and that of seeming"* (pg. 125)
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_90a3aa2168f645f09f2aea1a4380fa1d.pdf
 - "bad faith - viewed epistemologically - takes advantage of, exploits, the 'unstable', metastable, fluid nature of belief or faith" (pg. 75)
 - "In bad faith, I tell myself that because all belief 'falls short', 'non-persuasion is the structure of all convictions', and thus I can continue to 'believe' I am courageous even when I am aware of counterevidence and am not persuaded that I am courageous" (pg. 75)
 - "While bypassing critical evidence, I can allow myself to be persuaded by uncritical evidence. I cannot know that I am courageous but - never mind - the intuition of certainty does not accompany any belief, so let me be content with faith's insufficient or only

- 'selective' evidence, so to say" (pg. 75)
 - **"bad faith abuses faith and allows for 'impossible' belief: it adopts a deceptive attitude toward the ambiguity and self-destructiveness of belief"** (pg. 75)
 - "it should be noted that Sartre - insofar as he is likening good faith to sincerity - is referring here to the ideal of good faith and sincerity, not to a 'good-faith' or a 'sincerity' consciousness. Second, we should observe - as I have already noted - that, for Sartre, bad faith is a 'bad', 'deceptive' decision about the nature of faith, and good faith, as a form of 'simple faith', may be presumed to involve a 'good', though possibly mistaken, 'decision' about the 'nature of faith'. In bad faith, we have seen, we adopt a deceptive project by telling ourselves that the 'total annihilation' of bad faith 'exists at the basis of all faith'" (pg. 76-77)
 - "To begin, let us note that both bad faith and good faith are *faith*, and each type of faith, though aware of its metastable structure, aspires to an 'unwavering firmness of belief'. Ontologically considered, this is because free human reality is congenitally and permanently inclined to fill the 'hole in Being' - a disposition which, in his *Cahiers*, Sartre refers to as the 'hell' of the 'pursuit of Being', for 'every attempt of the For-itself to be In-itself is by definition doomed to fail'. And although both types of faith, as 'projects' of consciousness, are aware of the impossibility of self-coincidence of consciousness, they do not employ that awareness, or - now, to borrow Catalano's words - do not 'face and use the impossible ideal of faith' in the same way. To put the matter another way, good-faith consciousness and bad-faith consciousness do not confront or respond to faith - or to our freedom - in the same manner...bad faith exploits [the] impossibility of belief, assumes that good faith is impossible, decides on requirements that will allow it to count itself 'persuaded' when it is not persuaded, and thus 'forces itself in decisions to adhere to uncertain truths'. As Catalano would likely put it, bad faith assumes that the ideal of good faith is impossible and uses that as an excuse for accepting 'unjustified belief'" (pg. 77)
 - Reading Between the Lines: Agreeing and Disagreeing with Catalano (pg. 78)
 - "I believe...that **we must acknowledge that the ideal of good faith, like that of all faith, is a simple, perfect, though impossible, faith.** But the difference is that good faith, now viewed *epistemologically* as faith, does not, as does bad faith, attempt to exploit this impossibility, or set up mechanisms ("forge" instruments) by which to excuse, bypass, or ignore critical evidence. Good-faith consciousness does not try to put itself 'beyond reproach' or 'ruin all belief'. In spite of sharing with bad faith an ideal of *being* ('of unwavering firmness of belief'), it remains open to its freedom, to criticism, to its distance from itself, without trying to ignore or destroy it or put itself out of reach. In short, unlike bad faith, **the project of good faith is not in bad faith.** It does not, as does bad faith, will the 'self-destruction of belief'. Good faith does not try to take refuge in not-believing-what-one believes, and thus permit itself to believe what it does not fully believe on the grounds that it is only 'belief'. Good faith is a distinctly different 'immediate attitude' that we take 'in the face of our being' or free consciousness. Good faith, in spite of faith's ideal of 'unwavering firmness of belief', accepts its metastable consciousness (its freedom) without making 'impossible belief' an excuse for accepting insufficient evidence for its belief, without constructing 'two-faced concepts' to persuade itself that it is what it is not (for example, courageous) or is not what it is (for example, cowardly)" (pg. 79)
 - "I agree entirely with Catalano when he says that 'good faith does not accept the *ideal* of faith as the goal of faith'. This is an important distinction: for though good faith initially believes what it wants to believe, it prereflectively accepts itself as 'in question' and is unwilling to violate its metastable being. Catalano is, I think, right in saying that 'the project of good faith carries within it the critical awareness that the ideal of faith is in bad faith'" (pg. 79)
 - "In short, good faith prereflectively accepts the ambiguity of consciousness. While bad faith views good faith as impossible by identifying the goal of good faith (the 'unwavering firmness' of belief) with the unwavering ideal of faith, good faith, in spite of its ideal, recognizes and accepts the fact of its freedom. To put it in somewhat different Sartrean terms, good-faith consciousness accepts itself as 'troubled', as inescapably 'unhappy'. While bad faith uses its comprehension of the (impossible) ideal of good faith as a basis for lying to itself and fleeing what it is ('If every belief in good faith is an impossible belief, then there is no place for every impossible belief'), **good faith accepts the anguish associated with its freedom** - with the impossibility of its self-coincidence and **assumes responsibility for the authorship of its beliefs and actions**" (pg. 80)
 - ◆ "For good faith, the fact that consciousness is always in flight or is never at one with itself does not become an excuse for accepting 'unjustified beliefs' as acceptable, or for accepting 'believing what it does not believe', or for regarding all beliefs as equivalent, or for trying to escape one's freedom or responsibility. While the attitude of bad faith (and sincerity) is to 'miss itself and its chosen intent, the attitude of good faith is to confront itself, not miss itself and its choices. While the attitude of bad faith is to flee its freedom and its anguish, **the attitude of good faith is to face its freedom of consciousness; that is, the autonomy and responsibility to which consciousness is condemned.** While bad faith both exploits and pursues the impossible goal of attaining oneness with one's beliefs - of attaining coincidence with consciousness - **good faith, aware of the impossibility of faith's ideal, confronts its freedom, accepts the 'interrogation' or 'distance' within all consciousness, refuses to pursue faith's impossible ideal, and accepts responsibility for the choices it makes towards its own non-coincidence.** Far from trying to reach the ideal of in-itself, or to bypass critical evidence, or to put itself 'out of reach', or to tie itself down, or to justify its belief by distorting the impossibility of a 'perfect' faith, or to flee freedom, good faith faces its evidence, its mercurial, unstable, consciousness, its freedom, and takes responsibility for the attitude it adopts toward that freedom" (pg. 80-81)
 - ◇ "I do not divorce the ideal of good faith so emphatically from good faith. In my judgement, Sartre's text does not allow it" (pg. 82)
 - ◇ "good faith, I repeat, like all belief, aspires initially to 'glue itself down': like all consciousness, it is 'unhappy' and prereflectively desires completion in (and of) Being" (pg. 83)
 - ▶ "The *initial ideal of good faith* may well be an ideal of Being-an ideal of self-coincidence or substantiality-and thus an impossible ideal. But this does not turn it into solely a bad-faith conception of good faith. Good faith, like all faith, initially has an ideal which, if *pursued* as a project, would lead to bad faith. But, as I have insisted above, good faith does not, as does the project of sincerity, pursue this ideal or try to 'bring it into being'" (pg. 83)
 - ▶ "Catalano's interpretation disowns any *ideal* of good faith for good faith. The *ideal* of good faith is for him the impossible ideal which bad faith attributes to good faith and exploits for its own purposes. But I urge that, because any ideal of faith - insofar as it aspires to self-coincidence and desires to flee from the freedom of consciousness - might be said to be a bad-faith ideal, it does not follow that the ideal of good faith can only be a bad-faith version of good faith, a version which Sartre contrasts with good faith as an attitude of accepting one's freedom (and responsibility)" (pg. 83)
 - Good Faith: Epistemological and Ontological (pg. 85)
 - "we have seen that good faith is an epistemological attitude which, though disposed to believe what it believes and to be 'unwavering', does not 'accept' 'non-persuasive evidence' as persuasive and refuses to allow the 'freedom' of belief - the non-coincidence and evanescence of belief - to become an excuse for pursuing and accepting 'unwavering belief' in the mode of being in-itself. And, in marked contrast to bad faith, good faith, as an *epistemological* attitude, accepts itself as faith and not certainty, retains a critical perspective on evidence, and refuses to construct two-faced concepts by which to exploit the 'self-distancing' of consciousness and to 'persuade' itself of its deceptive beliefs. That is to say, it is an open and critical - not a deceptive - attitude. Good faith does not allow the impossibility of the self-coincidence of belief to become a reason for suspending critical criteria related to persuasion" (pg. 85)

- Chapter 6 - Authenticity and Good Faith: An Analytic Differentiation (pg. 110)
 - "I have argued that Sartre's analysis allows a positive sense of 'good faith' at both an epistemological and an ontological level. At the epistemological level, I have contended that good faith is an attitude that is open to the metastability of consciousness, to the ambiguity and incompleteness of all belief, to critical evidence. In respect to the ontological level, I have suggested that good faith may be viewed as an attitude that confronts and affirms, rather than flees from, the freedom and responsibility to which (for Sartre) we have been abandoned. And I have also contended that, in spite of human reality's desire for Being, it can affirm its freedom, its nothingness, its *lack* of being, without making that affirmation a bad-faith project" (pg. 110)
 - 'Reflection' as a Mark of Differentiation (pg. 114)
 - "Sartre distinguishes between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, and to be sure, he relates these forms of consciousness to good and bad faith. As early as *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre distinguished between an **unreflective consciousness, which is directed outside of ourselves and our (conscious) acts, and a reflective consciousness (or 'reflection'), which 'takes consciousness as an object' and directs its attention onto itself.** As such, reflection is a 'second-order' and distinctly human activity, while unreflective consciousness, though also conscious (of) itself, is first order" (pg. 115)
 - "the voluntary exists at a reflective level, that the involuntary exists at a pre-reflective, and that, at a pre-reflective level, our fundamental freedom cannot exist as 'will'" (pg. 119)
 - "**pure reflection is an effort on the part of for-itself to 'recover' itself as 'nothingness', to recognize and affirm its elsewhere-ness or non-coincidence of being**" (pg. 121)
 - "**reflection is necessary for the *conversion* from the bad-faith pursuit of necessary being (the desire to be God or in-itself-for-itself) to the authentic choosing and recognizing of oneself as a 'break in being', as elusive, gratuitous, ambiguous being. Although *reflection* on my pre-reflective awareness of my bad faith can exhibit an awareness of the possibility of good faith, and even prompt me to modify my fundamental project radically, my 'willed' radical conversion to the project of affirming and living my free, ambiguous, evanescent being, constitutes a 'deliverance' and 'self-recovery' which Sartre generally labels 'authenticity'**" (pg. 121-122)
 - "**good and bad faith, viewed ontologically, represent the fundamental and original ways in which freedom approaches itself pre-reflectively: either by confronting the angst of freedom or by fleeing from it.** And this project of being is the context for all our reflections and deliberations" (pg. 122)
 - "**this reflective (and radical) conversion, this deliverance from bad faith, is precisely what Sartre means by authenticity, not good faith**" (pg. 122)
 - "the reflective consciousness that is necessary to any radical transformation of one's fundamental project, to any choice of radically altering one's *bad faith* way of being-in-the-world, represents the *second* basic feature that differentiates authenticity from the closely related fundamental but - Sartre seems to want to say - pre-reflective and non-thetic ontological attitude of good faith" (pg. 122-123)
 - "I have tried to make clear that whereas **good faith, at the ontological level, is to be viewed as one's unreflective 'choice' of, or attitude toward, one's freedom, authenticity, as a lucid recognition, acceptance, and living of one's ontological freedom (and responsibility), requires, as prerequisite, a reflective radical choice to convert from the bad faith to which one is 'naturally' inclined and in which one is living**" (pg. 123)
 - "it is only by a 'willed conversion', by a reflective act of radically changing my fundamental project, by consciousness 'operating' on and redirecting consciousness, that I can 'recover' myself as freedom and (rather than try to flee from it) take full responsibility for it and begin to 'live' its ambiguity and non-coincidence" (pg. 123)
 - "for Sartre... it is this new attitude, this reflective passage from bad faith to taking hold of one's freedom, that begins the project of authenticity and constitutes a 'radical escape', a 'salvation', from bad faith or 'corrupted being'" (pg. 123-124)
 - ◆ "**it is the *post-conversion* authentic life that marks for Sartre the mode of being that is opposite (or antithetical) to living in bad faith**" (pg. 124)
 - ◇ "Sartre contends... that the unreflective consciousness 'is a spontaneous self-projection towards its possibilities'" (pg. 125)
 - ▶ "although this statement allows Sartre to maintain that bad faith, as unreflective, is not cynical, it fails to cohere with Sartre's overall reference to and analysis of widespread self-deception" (pg. 126)
 - The Advent of the Moral Dimension (pg. 127)
 - "in a number of places in Being and Nothingness - footnote in particular - Sartre... states that the radical conversion of which we have spoken is a prerequisite for the 'self-recovery', for the 'authenticity', that is required for an 'ethics of deliverance and salvation'" (pg. 128)
 - "in good faith, the for-itself accepts responsibility; in bad faith the for-itself flees it" (pg. 129)
 - "we have no difficulty in concluding that authenticity and inauthenticity are moral categories and represent ethical 'dimensions' of being in Sartre" (pg. 131)
 - ◆ "authenticity clearly involves the human being's moral making of herself by choosing to accept and recover herself as freedom, as ambiguous being" (pg. 131)
 - Roots in 'The Transcendence of the Ego' (pg. 133)
 - "as Thomas Busch has forcefully shown... *The Transcendence of the Ego* exhibits many of the roots of Sartre's thinking concerning the need to move from a 'bad faith' or 'alienated' consciousness to a consciousness that affirms its own spontaneity" (pg. 133-134)
 - "So, as early as in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre shows, while rejecting a 'transcendental ego', that radically free consciousness 'alienates' itself by its 'natural attitude' 'of flight', by its attempt - we may now say - in 'bad faith' to escape from its radical freedom by tying itself down to a constituted 'ego' and 'object'" (pg. 134)
 - "Sartre regards as the 'pre-conversion' natural attitude of bad faith to a 'new way of being ... for oneself; that is, to a 'new attitude' of accepting and affirming one's contingency and finitude, one's ambiguity of being, one's freedom. This move from the 'natural attitude' amounts to a 'self-recovery' of for-itself as freedom in which human reality affirms itself in its 'existential dimension of choice'. And this possibility of 'recovery' in terms of self-affirmation of one's distinctive freedom is surely one of the most persistent emphases and challenges of Sartre's entire philosophy" (pg. 138)
 - Chapter 7 - The 'Unveiling' of Authentic Existence: Corroborating My Differentiation Through Sartre's Notebooks (pg. 139)
 - "in virtually no other place [than his *Notebooks for an Ethics*] does Sartre focus more on or bring greater clarity to the passage from bad faith to authentic existence, or the meaning of my conversion from my natural attitude of fleeing from my freedom to my adopting freedom as my own" (pg. 140)
 - Conversion and the 'Unveiling' of Authenticity (pg. 144) ***
 - "It is in the last hundred pages of *Notebooks for an Ethics* that Sartre gives his most focused attention to the relationship among conversion, authenticity, and reflection and, perhaps for the first time in his philosophical writing, reformulates his analysis in terms of a new guiding concept - specifically, that of 'unveiling'. 'Authenticity', he tells us early in those pages, 'lies in unveiling being through the mode of non-being'. 'Originally', he adds, 'authenticity consists in refusing any quest for being, because I am always *nothing*'. And, in refusing being, the authentic for-itself *unveils* itself to itself both in the immediacy of its perpetual calling into question (*Erlebnis*) and in the *reflective* description of its concrete understanding.' For Sartre, here, reflection becomes an 'unveiling of freedom'. Moreover, a reflective reprise - which assumes gratuity at the core of the human project - is now said to give the human project 'authentic existence', and we arrive at the

- 'type of intuition' that *unveils* authentic existing: 'it is me, [whom] nothing justifies, who justifies myself inwardly'; I am an 'absolute contingency' which has only myself to justify myself by *assuming* myself. The reflective assuming of myself as mine - that is, of my gratuity - constitutes a *conversion* which renounces the 'category of appropriation' and *unveils* the 'unappropriable aspect' of the 'reflected-upon' *Erlebnis*. The connection between authenticity, conversion, and unveiling in these pages is emphatic, repeated, and pervasive" (pg. 144)
- "in grasping my freedom, in grasping myself as unjustifiable (in conversion), I unveil my freedom, unveil Being 'in and through my project of *creating Being*'" (pg. 145)
 - ◆ "Sartre [in *Truth and Essence*] makes it clear that any human project 'unveils'; that all unveiling 'results from a project'; and that at the center of all unveiling is freedom" (pg. 145)
 - ◇ "[we see] that freedom or the for-itself is at the heart of all 'unveiling' of Being and that Sartre, generally speaking, uses unveiling of being interchangeably with 'illuminating' and 'revealing' being. What *is* is illuminated by what is not; this is 'the structure of truth'" (pg. 145-146)
 - ▶ "it is consciousness that 'lights up' all being and reveals everything as it is through its nihilating activity" (pg. 146)
 - *"I have strong trouble with "as it is..."*
 - ▶ "consciousness lights up 'this' against an undifferentiated background which it must negate in order for 'this' to be revealed - and to be differentiated - as it is" (pg. 146)
 - "it is through freedom or conscious being ('being of consciousness') that both unveiling and 'the veil' 'come to being'" (pg. 146)
 - "we come to readily see that the free for-itself exists as unveiling being, and what it unveils, illuminates, discloses, reveals, is the being to which it alone gives meaning" (pg. 146)
 - "authenticity demands a passage, a conversion, *from the project 'to-be-for-itself-in-itself', to attain identification or to appropriate being (or what Sartre also calls the project to be God), to a project of renouncing the quest for being or self-coincidence and assuming or affirming one's gratuitous freedom. It is in respect to the latter project - and process - that Sartre now links the concept of unveiling and authenticity*" (pg. 147)
 - "as a for-itself aspiring to be an -in-itself, human reality seeks an impossible synthesis" (pg. 148)
 - ◆ "as Heidegger has also pointed out, all of human reality's attempt to make itself into its own foundation are condemned to failure" (pg. 148)
 - "for Sartre, the 'authentic consciousness grasps itself in its deepest structure as creative'..." (pg. 149)
 - "*Causa Sui* is consciousness's inauthentic and impossible project of being its own foundation" (pg. 149)
 - "for-itself...can accept the fact of its contingency, the facticity of its foundationless or gratuitous being, and through this reflective unveiling convert to authenticity" (pg. 150)
- Reflection (pg. 150)
- "time and again in the *Notebooks*, Sartre insists that reflection 'is not contemplative', 'is not contemplation', but is a project and a 'form of willing'" (pg. 151)
 - "Through reflection it unveils itself as freedom, assumes, or wills, this gratuitousness, and by so doing, 'transforms' gratuitousness into freedom, contingency into a passion. Although reflection, as a project of reflecting on, wills being, wills the reflected upon, it wills it 'not as upholding the for-itself but as upheld by it', as unveiled and continued by it. This transformation, marked by consciousness's assuming of itself as gratuitous, of nihilating itself as Ego, and willing and recapturing itself as "in question" and autonomous, constitutes human reality's passage and conversion to a 'new type' of existence - namely, authentic existence" (pg. 154)
- Conversion (pg. 155)
- "The passage from complicity with the 'natural', original, bad-faith attitude to pure, non-accessory reflection, must, says Sartre, 'provoke a transformation'. The purifying, non-accessory reflection, he maintains, *is 'conversion'*" (pg. 155)
 - "pure or non-accessory reflection breaks with this project [to be God - i.e., serve as its own foundation], wills *not* to comply with it, but to accept and affirm itself as unjustifiable and without foundation. This affirmation becomes the 'project of a reflection that refuses to look for being'. In other words, this resolution is the break with self-alienation, the 'radical decision for autonomy', the assuming of the project of authenticity. In short, this constitutes consciousness's decisive, reflective act of conversion to a new way of 'being oneself and for oneself' in which, having recognized its 'original sin', its running away from itself - its 'guilt', as Heidegger would say - **the for-itself thematically grasps the freedom that it is, takes up gratuity as its own, and embarks on a project of living in accord with, not alienated from, the nothingness (freedom) of its subjectivity**" (pg. 156)
 - "To use Sartre's expression, in conversion human reality, initially predisposed to bad faith, now 'unveils' itself to itself, takes up its mode of being as 'diasporic being', consents to be human, and takes on a new, nonappropriative relation to itself, the world, its body, and other people. Moreover, as we have seen, in conversion human reality, by renouncing the impossible and bad-faith project to be 'god' (in-itself-for-itself), unveils the 'unappropriable', existential dimension of human living, and decides, radically, to live 'in accord with' itself; that is, consistently with its being an unstable, evanescent freedom on which all meaning and values depend" (pg. 156)
 - "conversion involves a willed renunciation of appropriation (which governs only human reality's relationship with things), a reflective refusal to define myself as a what, a thing, or an Ego (alienation) in favor of my acceptance of myself as gratuitous and unjustifiable freedom, and my radical decision to make the freedom to which I am condemned my life's project. **Conversion constitutes a radical choice to affirm and live the ambiguity, gratuity, tension, non-coincidence, and interrogation of 'detotalized' human reality.** Though human reality pre-reflectively opts for being (in-itself), for thingness, and though, through impure reflection, it is disposed to continue its pursuit of being, in conversion it radically decides, through pure reflection, to break with this project in favor of the project of autonomy - the affirmation of freedom 'that takes itself as its end' and takes responsibility for itself. This rejection of alienation, this modification of one's bad faith project - what in *Being and Nothingness* he calls 'an abrupt metamorphosis of [one's] initial project' - constitutes for Sartre, consciousness's radical conversion from the natural attitude to a 'new "authentic" way' of existing. To join this with our analyses above, we may now say that the pure reflection that unveils my freedom and reclaims it as mine (conversion) unveils authentic existence to me and delivers me from bad faith. Conversion to revisit the language of the preceding chapters leads me to my 'genuine self-recovery' and (yes, even Sartre uses the word!) to 'salvation'" (pg. 157)
 - "Sartre's analysis of conversion is not...entirely unlike Heidegger's views on 'resoluteness' in relation to authenticity" (pg. 157-158)
 - ◆ "Realizing our freedom, our 'responsibility', and our 'guilt' - in other words, the inadequacy of authorship or self-constitution - **conscience for Heidegger calls us back to who we are (*zurückgeholt*)** and demands resoluteness - that is, *Dasein's* (human reality's) affirmation of itself in its entirety, even in its failure and guilt. In fact, for Heidegger resoluteness is... 'inseparable from an acknowledgment of guilt'. The role of pure reflection for Sartre in human reality's conversion to authenticity is reminiscent of the role of **Heidegger's 'resolve' or 'resoluteness' as *Dasein's* authentic response to the 'silent call of conscience** (to authenticity). As resoluteness in Heidegger appears to be an affirmation of 'an openness to the clearing in Being', a resolve to be amenable to the continued self-questioning of one's being, and a decision to be open 'to the groundlessness of our existence', so 'purifying reflection' in conversion, for Sartre, is a resolve, decision, will, on the part of human reality **to be open to its own**

freedom and groundlessness, and to assume and affirm itself as 'in question', gratuitous and yet totally responsible for (completely the author of) its way of being. Just as in Heidegger 'resoluteness' represents a particular - and, I assume, reflective - decision to accept one's guilt, one's lack (of which *Dasein* is the author), one's 'being-towards-death' (*Being and Time*), and involves the willing of 'one's ever guilty self', so purifying reflection in Sartre has been shown to be **the (willed) resolve to accept oneself as the free and responsible being that one 'essentially' is (lack) and to renounce the 'natural' pursuit of being or ground**. Although Sartre does not speak the language of 'guilt' and 'being toward-death', he clearly shares with Heidegger the view that a resolute ontological 'self-acceptance within the facticity of the human condition' - be it called 'resoluteness' or 'reflective conversion' - is a necessary step in the human being's passage to authenticity. Sartre's 'pure reflection' or purifying will, like Heidegger's 'resoluteness' and perhaps Kierkegaard's 'purity of heart', may be said - to use Heidegger's words - to 'harbor in itself... the possible existential modality of its own authenticity'. In each case, one might say, a resolute conversion, away from domination by the 'natural' and the 'impurities of "everydayness"', becomes a necessary condition for authenticity" (pg. 158-159)

- "in the *Notebooks* and elsewhere, one thing is sure: Sartre does not intend his freedom to be abstract. Rather, freedom - always situated - becomes a primary value, always practiced in 'concrete circumstances'" (pg. 159-160)
- Is Authenticity 'Moral'? (pg. 160)
 - "the 'non-accessory' reflection that marks 'conversion' in these *Notebooks* is... 'purifying'. And this purification involves... deliverance from the 'corruption' of reflective consciousness's domination by the pursuit of being; from the hellish failure of being for-itself to recover itself as Being-in-itself. Although authenticity refuses the pursuit of being, it cannot, by way of conversion... suppress that quest" (pg. 161)
 - "the **deliverance or salvation is not from the ambiguity, or freedom, or tension, of human reality, but to it**" (pg. 162)
 - ◆ "Conversion to authenticity appears to be consciousness's willed resolve to accept and value itself as gratuitous freedom - in other words, to be freedom's (human reality's) liberating or saving itself from the 'corruption' (bad faith) of consciousness by freeing itself from all the values that its quest for identity and self-coincidence (the 'spirit of seriousness') has produced. Freedom's converted project of 'taking itself as an end', of valorizing itself, of affirming itself as autonomous - or as the only value - and of maintaining itself at a distance, appears to be precisely the project to which, on the last page of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre refers to as carrying us to 'the ethical plane'" (pg. 162)
 - "if conversion is, as we have seen, the 'rejection of alienation', and if alienation is 'original sin', then clearly **the purification that takes place involves, at a minimum, a personal value transformation a life reorientation of what we value, a redirection of our attitude toward our ontological freedom (toward ourselves) and, in turn, toward being, toward others, and toward the 'world'** (the meaning of which I have created). This is likely what Simone de Beauvoir has in mind when, using Sartre's ontological framework, she says, 'Ethics is the triumph of freedom over facticity'" (pg. 162-163)
 - "[Sartre] views the pure reflection that converts as moral in its intent" (pg. 163)
 - ◆ "he goes on to assure us both that all ethics is 'situated' (by the human being) and that there would be no ethic if man was not a question in his being, that is, 'if existence did not precede essence'" (pg. 163)
 - ◇ "[Sartre holds,] 'ethics is not possible unless' others are 'ethical'. And, specifically, **he refers... to 'Ethics' as 'liberating the for-itself from alienation'**" (pg. 163)
 - ▶ **cf. pg. 155 for more explanation of 'alienation'*
 - "The pure reflection by which I suspend (not suppress!) my project of being and convert to an authentic mode of autonomous existing is a 'waking up' to my 'pure autonomy' and involves my placing the 'world's significations' in parentheses in favor of my own value 'creations', my own creativity" (pg. 164)
 - ◆ "I claim responsibility, I take responsibility for my being-in-situation whatever that situation may be, and I am 'without excuse'" (pg. 164)
 - ◇ "my 'taking on' the facticity or contingency of my freedom is, simultaneously, a taking on of the facticity or contingency of my responsibility" (pg. 164-165)
 - "freedom... replaces 'god' as the fundamental value, and Sartre clearly sees it as belonging to the 'moral' realm" (pg. 169)
 - "Unlike *Being and Nothingness*, in which the described 'concrete relations with others' were all pre-conversion relations, the *Notebooks* prefigures a moral 'ought' in respect to the willing of one's own freedom and the freedom and ends of the Other through what Sartre calls a 'deeper recognition and comprehension of freedoms'. **Each person ought to will and promote the freedom of every subject through 'conversion' and what Sartre calls 'comprehension' - an empathetic understanding of and openness to the freedom of the Other**. Genuine intersubjectivity, generosity, and love are now among human possibilities and 'goods'. Thus, 'pure reflection' or the purifying will of conversion, by recognizing and affirming freedom as the primary value and unique source of all values, 'outlines' a general criterion by which 'good' and 'bad' may be distinguished and an 'ethical' city of ends can come into being" (pg. 170-171)
 - "in short, the conversion through 'purifying reflection' from corrupted consciousness to lucid recognition and acceptance of freedom constitutes for Sartre... the 'moralization' of human consciousness; that is, the advent of authenticity and individual morality" (pg. 173)
 - "the *Notebooks* appear to 'establish' moral obligation and the morality of authenticity for Sartre" (pg. 174)

d. Further Readings:

- Anti-Semite and Jew, by J. Sartre
https://abahlali.org/files/Jean-Paul_Sartre_Anti-Semite_and_Jew_An_Exploration_of_the_Etiology_of_Hate_1995.pdf