

Psychoanalytic Thinking: A Dialectical Critique of Contemporary Theory and Practice, by D. Carveth

a. People / Organizations:

b. Quotes:

- "Freud himself was an hysteric" - Author (pg. 12)
- "it is the analysand's business, not the analyst's, to find a way to *be* and then construct a life-and-death in **the clearing opened up through deconstruction of the fixations, delusions, illusions, idols and inhibitions** that have hitherto kept both the analysand and his or her analyst in thrall" - Author (pg. 18)
 - *J. Collins, in The Existentialists: A Critical Study, in discussing Heidegger's philosophy, remarks "A clearing must be made for being, however, so that its presence in the midst of that-which-is may be recognized and revered. **Only when this clearing is made, is being rendered accessible to man. Human existence is the place that is cleared for the advent of being, and yet being itself is the clearing. Being is essentially broader than any instance of that-which-is, including human existence, and clears a place for itself in man"** (pg. 193).*
- "society remembers less and less, faster and faster [and] the sign of the times is thought that has succumbed to fashion" - R. Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (pg. 34)
- "a narcissist's unawareness of - that is, his refusal to face - his guilt doesn't mean he doesn't have any, only that he works hard to keep it unconscious. But the repressed returns in a myriad of disguised self-sabotaging and self-tormenting ways" - Author (pg. 34)
 - "the last thing a narcissist wants to face is his guilt" - Author (pg. 42)
- "neurotic sufferers are self-tormentors, even when their self-torture has its roots in trauma and the more or less unconscious rage arising from it" - Author (pg. 36)
- "if Karl Marx is the conflict theorist of society, Sigmund Freud is the conflict theorist of the mind" - Author (pg. 43)
- "the voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing" - S. Freud (pg. 60)
 - "regrettable, like the voice of reason, the still small voice of conscience frequently goes unheard owing to a range of defenses against it" - Author (pg. 60)
- "nihilism is still an 'ism', a belief system, as much in need of deconstruction as any other" - Author (pg. 76)
 - "if, for the disillusionist, it is important not to believe in anything, it is even more important not to believe in nothing" - Author (pg. 76)
- "**psychoanalysis helps people not only by assisting them to become more attuned to their subjective, especially their affective, experience, but also by enabling them to, in a sense, step outside their subjectivity and view themselves as objects from the standpoint of another**" - Author (pg. 111)
 - **it is in this way that psychoanalysis is the right-hand of existentialism.*
 - "with the help of our analysts we are enabled to escape subjective self-enclosure to some degree and acquire some approximate knowledge of the sort of objects we may be. Being enabled in this way to see ourselves more objectively, for better and for worse, is an essential element of how analysis works..." (pg. 111-112)
- "[R. D.] Laing was a follower of Jean-Paul Sartre..." - Author (pg. 207)

c. General Notes:

- Introduction: On Critique (pg. 1)
 - "for me, the original appeal of both the academic and psychoanalytic professions had to do with their avowed commitment to truth values" (pg. 1)
 - "I came to conceive of the systematic and rigorous (logical and empirical) interrogation of theoretical claims and systems, as central to the scholarly pursuit of truth, of equal importance to (and really inseparable from) empirical research and theory creation" (pg. 1)
 - "critique [is] the careful scrutiny of theory for internal incoherence or contradictions and inconsistency with established bodies of fact..." (pg. 1)
- The Decline of Critique (pg. 1)
 - "the emerging anti-foundationalism of post-structural and postmodern theory, the rejection of the very idea of fundamental and unitary truth, had a sweeping cross-disciplinary impact that undermined efforts to arrive at it and to offer critique of inadequate, one-sided or erroneous approaches to it. When the existence of truth is in doubt, its continued pursuit appears quixotic or presumptuous and critique begins to seem intolerant, impolite and even rude. In a world where there are multiple 'truths' but no truth, multiple 'narrative truths' but no 'historical truth' (Spence, 1984), the nature of intellectual virtue shifts from skepticism to tolerance, from rigorous narrative to relaxed and playful enjoyment of multiplicity— or, more often, to ideological insularity and either benign neglect of those who think differently, or malign, intolerant and moralistic attacks rather than intellectually probing and sophisticated critique" (pg. 2)
 - "writing about the state of scholarship in North American universities in recent years, Paglia (2016) has pointed out that neglect of crucial training in 'the methodology of research...based in logic and reasoning and the rigorous testing of conclusions based on evidence' has meant: **'too many college teachers...lack even the most superficial awareness of their own assumptions and biases. Working on campus only with the like-minded, they treat dissent as a mortal offence that must be suppressed, because it threatens their entire career history and world-view'**" (pg. 2)
 - ◇ "a tragic result in the era of identity politics in the humanities", she concludes, 'has been the collapse of rigorous scholarly standards...' (pg. 2)
 - "in both academia and the institutions of psychoanalysis, as everywhere else, devotion to the truth is often compromised by a range of competing values. As sociologists understand [it], the institutions established in pursuit of various goals and ideals often take on a life of their own such that the survival and traditions of the organizations often displace their original mission" (pg. 3)
 - "whereas widespread perversion of the original ideals and goals of the university as a community of scholars became evident in recent decades due to its increasing corporatization and domination both by government and the private sector under the hegemony of neoliberalism, the displacement of truth values in psychoanalysis in favor of established ideologies and the interests of psychoanalytic societies, institutes and associations has been a factor almost from the beginning" (pg. 3-4)
 - "**genuine critique has not often been welcomed in psychoanalytic circles...**" (pg. 4)
 - "the academic pursuit of truth and its practice of critique have always been vulnerable to many influences stemming from careerism, favored ideologies, fashion, external pressures, etc..." (pg. 5)
 - "professional psychoanalysts are not primarily researchers and writers, but practitioners..." (pg. 5)
 - "the work of Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) [*Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory*] clearly aimed in the right direction, although it was seriously hampered both in their relational bias and their undialectical insistence that psychoanalytic theories must adhere to what they saw as either the 'drive-structure' or the 'relational-structure' models" (pg. 6)
 - "their denial of the validity or coherence of what they dismissed as 'mixed-model' theories [i.e., dualistic or integrated models] rendered them unable to deal adequately with Kleinian theory and the work of Kernberg that was so heavily influenced by it, for in

- these approaches 'drive' had already been implicitly or explicitly redefined in relational terms" (pg. 6)
- "There is no doubt that, today, in addition to the ideological Freudians, Kleinians, Lacanians, Kohutians and assorted relationalists and inter-subjectivists, there exists a broad group of liberal-minded psychoanalysts who seek to be familiar with and to integrate, in practice if not in theory, most of the major current paradigms and to flexibly utilize them as they seem relevant and useful in differing clinical situations. **This, in my opinion, is what a responsible psychoanalytic clinician ought to do and how he or she ought to be trained.** The popularity of the works of Nancy Mc Williams (1994, 2004) suggests that many colleagues may be operating in this non-ideological and pragmatic way. On one level, this is all to the good, but such pragmatic integration calls for the critical evaluation of competing theories and practices to determine which (or which parts of which) merit our continuing attention and which should simply be discarded" (pg. 6)
 - "Among the latter are, for example, literal versions of Freudian drive theory that see our love and hate as bubbling up from the somatic sources that Freud was honest enough to admit he could not, especially in the case of aggression, identify; and the theory of primary narcissism, undifferentiation or oneness at the beginning, an idea never accepted by Melanie Klein 1952) and now empirically invalidated by infant research (Stern, 1985)" (pg. 6)
 - What is Psychoanalysis? (pg. 7)
 - "in my view, psychoanalysis as its best involves a dialectical relationship in which theory and practice are mutually determining, theory both informing practice and being re-informed by it" (pg. 7)
 - "psychoanalysis is not reducible to science in any simple sense" (pg. 7)
 - "while in no way to be identified with the religious and philosophical discourses from which modern science separated itself, psychoanalysis is irreducible to science in any ordinary sense: it is a peculiar discipline and praxis that desires less the truth *about* a subject than the subject's recognition of the hitherto occluded truth of its desire" (pg. 7)
 - "the myths, sacred texts and literature we consider classic are celebrated over lesser forms not merely because they are ore aesthetically pleasing but because they are at the same time felt to be truer in important ways" (pg. 9)
 - "however we conceive the essence of psychoanalysis, hopefully the analyst's approach is informed by her familiarity with a wide range of psychoanalytic theories and models of the mind..." (pg. 9)
 - "In psychoanalytic circles there is the widespread illusion that virtually anyone, provided the right training, can become a 'good enough' analyst, when the truth is that good analysts, if not 'born rather than made', are people who have a psychological gift that, if they are lucky, will manage to survive disruption by training and occasionally be enhanced by it. **In my view, a major part of that gift is what I call *conscience***, something that is quite distinct from the superego (Carveth, 2013, 2016a, 2016b, and Chapter 2 here), and that no amount of training can provide. **Conscience is grounded in the true self distinct from the false self** (Winnicott, 1960a). In order to be a true analyst one must be, to some degree, despite our brokenness and fallenness, a true self" (pg. 9)
 - The Illness Metaphor (pg. 10)
 - "Whatever scientific and technical dimensions it may possess, **psychoanalysis is also, and not peripherally but centrally, an ethical enterprise**, valuing life over death, love over hate, kindness over cruelty, gratitude over envy and consciousness over unconsciousness (Carveth, 2013, chapter one). For this reason it cannot be reduced to an exclusively or primarily scientific or technical process, or even to an entirely rational one, since the 'oughts' or values that underlie it cannot be derived from any 'is' or empirical description" (pg. 10)
 - "like many evolutionary psychologists today, neither Freud nor such followers as Heinz Hartmann understood that as creatures who, while certainly remaining animals, have significantly transcended our animality through our attainment of symbolic functioning, human beings are no longer exclusively guided by the biological values of life and health, but consider many things more important than mere adaptation and survival" (pg. 10-11)
 - "As Szasz recognized, although mental illness is a myth, the psychological and emotional conflict and suffering of human beings is all too real and irreducible to supposed (albeit unproven) organic causes. Due to our relative freedom from biological determination...conflict, anxiety and guilt are unavoidable features of our existence" (pg. 13-14)
 - **much like Sartre's 'condemned to be free'*
 - "while it is important to distinguish existential from neurotic anxiety, authentic guilt from mere 'guilt-feelings', and persecutory from reparative guilt, these are all conditions of the human psyche..." (pg. 14)
 - "**in psychoanalysis, we are interested in facilitating both conscious reflection about what has hitherto been pre-reflective and promoting growing awareness of what has been dynamically suppressed**" (pg. 14)
 - **in reference to 'growing awareness', this is exactly what existentialism seek to do. J. Collins, in The Existentialists: A Critical Study, remarks "philosophizing is not only the work of the individual but also takes its point of departure in awareness of individual selfhood. This is the proper basis of an existentialist philosophy which locates the act of existing primarily in the individual's free moral orientation." (pg. 218). He continues, "The only way to pass from everyday, deceitful living to authentic human existence is to become aware of man's proper situation. This awareness is not a mere theoretical ascertainment and generalization but arises from a moral transformation of the individual's dynamic direction of will" (pg. 219).*
 - Dialectical Deconstruction (pg. 18)
 - "one hopes that out of the negativity of critique something positive may emerge" (pg. 18)
 - "the image of the Roman god Janus was chosen for the cover of this book because it suggests the need to bear tension of the opposites, not privileging one pole over the other, in order to move dialectically beyond them" (pg. 18)
 - Chapter 1 - Civilization and Its Discontents: A Kleinian Re-View (pg. 26)
 - "Freud was preoccupied with what he saw as the conflict between socialization pressures and our sexuality and aggression" (pg. 26)
 - "two decades later, in *Civilization and Its Discontent*, the aging Freud...switched sides. Now civilization is a 'thin veneer' protecting us from our own and others' barbarous drives. While a few people of exceptional strength of character may be able to inhibit their antisocial drives without deceiving themselves about them, and a few may have the talent to redirect or 'sublimate' them in prosocial directions, the majority are forced to resort to repression, setting up the inevitable disguised return of the repressed in neurosis, the price of civilized order" (pg. 26)
 - "civilization, Freud concluded, requires inhibition, especially of what he had come to view as our innate aggressive drive, which though exacerbated by frustration was, for him, ultimately a biologically-given, asocial or antisocial element of our human nature" (pg. 26)
 - "in the face of the devastation of Europe brought about by the First World War, together with the masochistic self-destructiveness he had come to recognize in so many patients, Freud finally overcame his longstanding resistance to acknowledging aggression as an equally fundamental part of human nature as sexuality and announced his final dual-drive theory of *Eros* and *Thanatos*" (pg. 27)
 - "unlike Freud, however, the Bible does not naturalize or biologize human destructiveness, instead recognizing it as a misuse of our uniquely human freedom and self-awareness - that is, it maintains an essentially existentialist, rather than a biologically and/or environmentally determinist view" (pg. 28)
 - "naturally, I am in no way disrupting the fact of the human aggressiveness, destructiveness and sadism to which Freud calls our attention, only his characterization of it as bestial or animalistic. Like Freud, we commonly project onto animals the dark, uniquely human traits we do not wish to acknowledge in ourselves" (pg. 28)
 - "**We seem reluctant to recognize the uniqueness of our destructiveness**. We like to think of it as 'inhuman' when, regrettably, it is

one of the things most human about us. We engage in massive projection of this uniquely human destructiveness on to animals that, unlike us, mostly fight and kill to survive and protect their young, not to impose their favored abstract ideologies upon one another, nor to amass great wealth while impoverishing others, nor to enjoy sadistic pleasure. The latter requires the uniquely human capacity for empathy, by which I do not mean sympathy, but the purely cognitive capacity for what George Mead (1934) called 'taking the role of the other' - imagining oneself in the other's shoes, as it were. Without this capacity the sadist would be unable to enjoy the other's pain or humiliation, or the con man to find the words needed to manipulate his mark. Empathy and sympathy are two quite different things. Empathy informs me you are in pain; sympathy enable me to care and wish to help" (pg. 28-29)

- ◆ **as to the notion of 'inhuman' - this illustrates our tendency to posit for-ourselves an imaginary (i.e., something which is other than human) for the purpose of redirecting our attention away from ourself. We aim for what we dislike 'here' (in) ourselves to be 'there' (outside) ourselves; therefore, 'beyond' ourselves, where, as 'beyond' ourselves, such can no longer constitute as being (of) ourselves. We create a fake to stand beside who we are (i.e., a shadow of ourselves) to blame for all that we don't like about ourselves.*
- ◆ **as for 'empathy', Husserl leverages this notion in the course of his ontology.*
- "only human beings capable of empathy can invent diabolical forms of torment" (pg. 29)
- "As Erikson (1950) pointed out, Freud offers us a 'centaur model of man' that conceives our fundamental conflict as between mind and body, culture and nature, the uniquely human vs. the animal in man. While body, nature and animal are conceived as the source of our antisocial inclinations (id), reason (ego) and culture (superego) are viewed as pro-social. Freud viewed human sexuality and aggression as arising from biological, somatic sources, by which he did not mean the brain, but bodily zones. He resorted to a biological rather than a psychological or existential conception of human passion. It is true he chose not to use the German term *instinkt* referring to animal instinct, but the term *triebe* referring to human drives, which differ from animal instincts in being far more open to learning and social influences in their aims and objects, which can be displaced, reversed, etc., and are to a considerable extent acquired rather than biologically fixed or pre-programmed. It is true that the conception of Freud as a biologically reductionist instinct theorist was made worse by James Strachey's mistranslation of *triebe* as instinct instead of drive" (pg. 30)
 - "while the image is vivid and evocative of our profound sense of conflict, it is ultimately misleading. For our sexual and aggressive passions do not in fact 'bubble up' from our animal bodies but 'trickle down' from our uniquely human minds" (pg. 31)
- "Freud began to recognize the inadequacy of his drive theory when, after the devastation of the First World War, he finally broke with Darwin and re-situated psychoanalytic theory on the basis of a new Greek dualism that echoed the work of his pre-Socratic precursor Empedocles for whom all of reality reflects the struggle between *philia* (love) and *neikos* (strife)" (pg. 31)
 - "while biological reductionism was not transcended, for he insisted the death drive had an organic foundation, his thinking was clearly tending in a more psychological, philosophical and existential direction" (pg. 31)
- "In recent decades it has become clear that in blaming the alleged animal in man and valorizing reason and culture, Freud got it backward: that much or most of the evil humans do their racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, etc. — is learned or acquired from culture (superego), while our prosocial inclinations appear to have a biological basis. In associating the id with our allegedly natural destructiveness we have been blinded to the loving, caring and sympathetic inclinations grounded in the innate, unlearned attachment systems we share with other primates. At the same time, through a series of ingenious experiments, recent infant research shows that children as young as three months of age distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, and prefer the former (Bloom, 2010, 2013). This is not evidence of an entirely 'innate' morality, for even three-month-old infants have had considerable opportunity to identify with the loving nurturance of their caretakers. However it does demonstrate that the roots of conscience arise in early attachment, long before the internalizations of cultural ideology at five or six years of age that Freud described as forming the superego. It is high time that psychoanalysts deconstruct the false equations of the id with immoral nature (when much of what is truly moral in us stems from innate attachment tendencies and early identifications with the nurturer), and the superego with moral nurture when a great deal of our immorality is culturally acquired" (pg. 32)
 - **cf. D. Winnicott, The Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment <https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Winnicott-D.W.-1965.-The-maturational-processes-and-the-facilitating-environment.pdf>*
 - **cf. A. Freud, The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Children <https://ia600709.us.archive.org/18/items/psychoanalytical011535mbp/psychoanalytical011535mbp.pdf>*
 - **cf. M. Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children <https://ia600206.us.archive.org/33/items/psychoanalysisof007950mbp/psychoanalysisof007950mbp.pdf>*
- "[Freud's] view of the superego as the source of law and order and a bulwark against barbarism formed a central element of his increasingly reactionary sociopolitical vision - a perspective that may well have inclined readers such as Henry Kissinger (Pound, 2014) to view Western or, more accurately, American power as the superego defending civilization against the unruly, primitive id forces threatening from the East" (pg. 33)
 - "The valorization of the superego as the preserver of law and order never sat well with Freud's clinical insight into its destructiveness and its central role in psychopathology. The superego, he explained, is formed by repressing aggression and turning it back against the ego through the process Anna Freud (1936) described as 'identification with the aggressor'. Instead of attacking hated others, we identify with them and aggress against or punish ourselves. It is easy to forget that suicides are self-murderers. Among Freud's greatest and enduring contributions is his discovery of the unconscious need for punishment in a wide range of conditions that, on the surface, appear to have nothing whatever to do with moral issues - with wrongdoing, sin, guilt, the need to be punished or to punish oneself" (pg. 33)
 - "In his classic text, *Man Against Himself*, Karl Menninger (1938) describes in thorough detail how the operations of the unconscious hanging judge, the super-ego, underlie not only depression, masochism and suicide, but a whole range of 'guilt-substitutes' - self-sabotaging, self-limiting and self-tormenting conditions" (pg. 34)
- "as cultural historian Christopher Lasch explained, since the 1960's we have been living in the 'culture of narcissism' created by advanced consumer capitalism, a culture characterized by what Herbert Marcuse called 'repressive de-sublimation' in which self-indulgent consumption rather than self-regulation is encouraged, a culture hostile to rules, regulators and whistle-blowers" (pg. 34)
- "As probing as are his insights into unconscious guilt, Freud's analysis of this phenomenon is flawed by his failure to distinguish the two fundamentally different types of guilt subsequently differentiated by Melanie Klein and her co-workers (Klein, 1948; Grinberg, 1964): the punitive or persecutory guilt inflicted by both Freud's post-oedipal and Klein's pre-genital superego on the one hand, and on the other the reparative guilt that stems from what I recognize as a conscience quite distinct from the super-ego. As I elaborate in Chapter 2, Freud's (1923) merging of both conscience and the ego-ideal into the superego is regrettable: whereas the superego is about punishment fueled by aggression - mostly turned on the self, though often self-righteously displaced onto scapegoats - conscience is about caring, both for others and one's true self, caring fueled by attachment and love. Whereas persecutory or punitive guilt is generated by the superego, reparative guilt is generated by conscience. The superego wants to beat, the conscience to heal. If I injure someone and while he bleeds I self-flagellate, that is punitive guilt; but if I put down my cat-o'-nine tails and reach for my first-aid kit and start bandaging, that is reparative guilt. Those naive psychologists who think guilt is something we need to rid ourselves of have only persecutory guilt in mind. But a good deal of our confusion in this area is due to the pseudo-moral superego's need to masquerade as the conscience" (pg. 35)
 - "the fruits of the superego are humiliation and pain, while those of conscience are forgiveness and reparative love" (pg. 35)
 - "Freud himself was not alert to this distinction and failed to see that while we need less persecutory guilt in civilization we need a great deal more reparative guilt. In other words, we need less superego and more conscience" (pg. 35)

- "whereas conscience is grounded in our primate heritage, our innate attachment tendencies and capacities, and in our earliest nurturing experiences and identifications, the superego, as [Melanie] Klein understood, is grounded in pregenital introjection of the persecutory part-object (the so-called bad breast), together with later turning of aggression away from the oedipal rivals back against to ego, to which is then added internalization of (often immoral) cultural values via the parents' superegos" (pg. 35)
 - "while the superego plays a central role in the cycle of violence...the conscience represents our only hope of transcending it" (pg. 36)
 - **thus, there seems to exist a never-ending tension.*
- "In order to understand how victims come to victimize themselves and others the concept of the superego is essential. Trauma generates rage that for a variety of reasons is turned on the self in the form of the super-ego. As we have seen, **the superego is formed through identification** with the aggressors; **instead of retaliating against them I identify with them and turn my aggression against myself.** Later, as a defense against self-victimization, I may identify with my persecutory superego and victimize (scapegoat) others in my place. Through projection these others come to embody my own aggression, a projection aided by evidence of their aggression, including that which mine has provoked in them. In this way the cycle of violence is perpetuated. **It is essential for victims to recognize the aggressor in themselves** and to seek to disarm and make peace with the enemy inside, rather than continuing to project, provoke and find it in the other and thus, perpetuate rather than breach the vicious cycle. While Freud was right to point out the neurotic consequences of the build-up of punitive guilt due to the repression of aggression and its turning against the self (superego), he failed to understand that **authentic morality (conscience) is not something we learn from society, but something that derives from our primate heritage and our earliest experiences of life-giving nurturance, experiences that elicit hope and gratitude and kindle our need to nurture others"** (pg. 37)
 - "conscience not only calls us to reject the immoral superego and the false societal values comprising it; it requires us to recognize that **'the enemy is us'**" (pg. 37)
 - "persecutory guilt [results] from my turning of reactive aggression on myself..." (pg. 37)
- "While it is important to recognize and overcome the inner sadist instead of projecting it outwards onto others, it is equally crucial to discern how much of the guilt I experience is really mine, and how much has been induced or projected into me by others. Some of the guilt and inferiority that cripples people is not necessarily grounded in their own aggression, but results from projective identification or induction by hostile others" (pg. 38)
 - "the hostile superego thrives upon my own aggression turned inwards, plus the poisonous messages about me that I have incorporated from others" (pg. 38)
- "Whereas for Freud the central human problem is the conflict *between* mind and body, the uniquely human and the animal in man that is, between a socialized ego-superego and a primitive, ultimately animal id - **for Melanie Klein the conflict is one *within* the human mind and heart between our love and our hate,** our constructive and our destructive inclinations. In transcending Freud's centaur model of man, Klein was following out the implications of Freud's own thinking more consistently than he himself managed to do" (pg. 38)
 - "Klein's achievement was that while manifestly adhering to Freud's concepts she came to treat the life and death drives as, to all intents and purposes, entirely psychological and emotional motives or passions of love on the one hand and hate on the other. In other words, whereas Freud himself was never able to entirely transcend material in favor of immaterial or psychic reality, Melanie Klein managed to do so, transcending psych-biology in favor of psychoanalytic psychology." (pg. 38)
- "**If the past century has shown us anything, it is the involvement of human reason (ego) and human ideals and ideologies (superego) in the perpetration of evil"** (pg. 38)
 - "the problem is not the animal in man; it is the conflict in our hearts and minds between our love and our hate, between our employment of our uniquely human capacities for reason, idealism and empathy in the service of nurturance or of sadistic aggression and revenge" (pg. 38-39)
- "Freud discovered the role of transference in therapy" (pg. 39)
- "it is difficult for people to find in large group settings the kind of responsiveness that facilitates personal growth and, as a result, regression rather than progression all too frequently occurs" (pg. 39)
 - "The trouble with abstract substitutes for the therapist, such as a loving and forgiving God for believers, or a trusted theory of history providing political guidance, is that such abstractions are precisely that - abstractions - rather than living, breathing others with the heart and the conscience to confront. Such abstract others are not really "other" and can as easily support destructiveness as personal growth. They can easily come to represent not the conscience, but the superego, which in any case, frequently seeks to masquerade as and even usurp the role of conscience, even though it is driven by hate rather than love" (pg. 39)
 - **cf. C. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society*
<https://files.libcom.org/files/57798630-Castoriadis-The-Imaginary-Institution-of-Society.pdf>
 - "an abstract other, such as God or a prized theory of the laws of historical development, are as likely to feed my madness as to help me overcome it" (pg. 40)
- "As both Fromm and Levinas (1961) understood, it is through the face-to-face encounter with a concrete other that the wall of narcissistic self-enclosure may sometimes be breached creating an authentic opening to the other. Whereas **for Sartre (1943) the look of the other objectifies me** and transcends my transcendence causing my world to 'hemorrhage' and 'bleed' toward him or her (pp. 349-352), for Levinas the face of the other, while equally disrupting my narcissistic equilibrium, calls me, not to a 'battle to the death of consciousnesses' (Sartre, 1943, p. 65), but to my infinite responsibility toward the other [i.e., that I am not *alone* - that I exist among others just like me]. In marked contrast to Sartre (1944) for whom 'hell is other people', **Erich Fromm**, as Burston (1991) points out, 'resembles Martin Buber in thinking that relationships based on reciprocal validation and individuated fellowship are not only possible but in fact prerequisite to the experience of authentic selfhood' (p. 92). While, **for Sartre, at least under conditions of bad faith, human relations fail to transcend sado-masochistic, paranoid-schizoid dynamics, both Fromm and Levinas describe the move toward, caring for and commitment to the other** characteristic of the reparative position. This is the goal of any genuinely healing psychotherapy, a goal that may only be approached through authentic, 'I-Thou' (Buber, 1937), person-to-person encounter, **a form of meeting that may only take place in a sacred space** beyond all theory and technique a space that in light of Saga (200) reassertion of the secular sacred must not be allowed to be colonized by religion" (pg. 40)
 - **cf. R. Laing, Self and Others*
 - **cf. R. Laing, The Divided Self* [http://www.centrebombe.org/Ronald.D.Laing-The.Divided.Self.\(1960\).pdf](http://www.centrebombe.org/Ronald.D.Laing-The.Divided.Self.(1960).pdf)
 - **cf. M. Mauss, The Gift* <https://files.libcom.org/files/Mauss%20-%20The%20Gift.pdf>
 - **cf. J. Sartre, Being and Nothingness*
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/6564640/mod_resource/content/2/Being%20and%20Nothingness.pdf
 - **cf. M. Buber, I and Thou* <https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~akantor/readings/BuberMartin-i-and-thou.pdf>
- Chapter 2 - Expanding Structural Theory: Id, Ego, Superego, Ego-Ideal and Conscience (pg. 42)
 - "Wurmser (1998) referred to the superego as the 'sleeping giant' of contemporary psychoanalysis" (pg. 42)
 - "most psychoanalysts have understood that the concept of mental 'structure' - like that of a 'social structure' - is a metaphor and that psychoanalysis, like all physical and social sciences, proceeds through the use of metaphors of this sort" (pg. 43)
 - "although in many ways I have followed the Kleinian development of Freudian thought, I remain steadfastly Freudian in my adherence to the structural theory as an illuminating conceptualization of the mind in conflict" (pg. 43-44)

- "the concept of the ego-ideal as the 'heir to primary narcissism', the projection into the future of infantile omnipotence and perfectionism, is useful and worth reinstating as a separate mental structure and function. It enables us to conceive of self-esteem regulation as [a] comparison of one's real ego with one's ego-ideal, generating states of inflation and deflation depending on the relative distance between them" (pg. 44)
 - ◆ *cf. K. Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts*, Chapter 6 - *The Idealized Image*
https://ia904705.us.archive.org/19/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.97302/2015.97302.Our-Inner-Conflicts_text.pdf
 - ◆ *cf. K. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth*
<https://merton.bellarmino.edu/files/original/f8327de5adb7b4804bbe41b3fbdeadb0e4f27670.pdf>
 - ◆ *cf. K. Horney, *Self-Analysis* https://ia802600.us.archive.org/0/items/dli.ernet.7985/7985-Self%20Analysis_text.pdf
 - "while the ego-ideal enables me to feel good or bad about myself by advancing toward or falling away from my ideals, occasionally I actually manage to get my mind off myself, my progress or regress and glimpse the reality of others and even, sometimes, to care about *them*, not just about *me*" (pg. 44)
 - ◆ "in this light there are three dimensions of self-esteem regulation. In addition to measuring myself in relation to my ideals, I assess myself in terms of what I owe to other (conscience) and how well or poorly I conform to internalized rules or standards (superego)" (pg. 44)
- Conscience (pg. 45)
 - "most dictionaries define conscience as an inner faculty or voice that distinguishes right from wrong and generates guilt when we choose the latter" (pg. 45)
 - "regrettably, Freud chose to make conscience a superego function, viewing it as a representative of the culture formed through the child's internalization of the parental superego" (pg. 45)
- Transcending the Normative (pg. 45)
 - "**In identifying conscience with the superego, Freud made it a social product, an embodiment of the normative, rather than a moral force capable of conflicting with and morally challenging the social norms.** Just as in relativistic social science a society could only be judged immoral from the standpoint of another society's equally relative morality, for psychoanalysis the superego could only be judged immoral by another superego representing the conflicting values of a different culture or subculture" (45-46)
- The Secular Sacred (pg. 46)
 - "While the idea of an ethic grounded in something more fundamental than the socially constructed laws of men has usually been associated with the sacred laws of God, today a purely secular social science and psychoanalysis can conceive the still small voice of conscience in entirely non-religious, non-supernatural terms, as emanating from the innate, unlearned attachment systems (Bowlby, 1969-1980) we share with our primate cousins. We are social by design, not through the imposition of sociality upon an allegedly asocial or antisocial nature. We come into the world designed to attach to the primary caretakers upon whose nurturance we depend for survival and development and with whom we form early identifications. Recent research (De Waal, 1997, 2011) has demonstrated the biological roots of moral behavior in animals and infant research (Bloom, 2013) has shown a preference for right (helpful) over wrong (harmful) in infants as young as three months of age" (pg. 46)
- The Superego (pg. 46)
 - "In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud (1930) described the build-up of guilt and self-punishment resulting from the need to preserve civilized order by repressing aggression, which then, via the superego, is retroflected upon the self. But he did not recognize Melanie Klein's (1948; Grinberg, 1964) crucial distinction between punitive or persecutory guilt and 'depressive' or reparative guilt..." (pg. 47)
 - "As Bion (1962a, 1962b) understood, **ultimately the analytic task involves leading people to the point where they can begin to understand that their early decision to base their lives on the avoidance of pain has only led to more pain**" (pg. 48)
 - **by not confronting dis-balance when it so meets them, individuals, through their avoidance (i.e., by way of skirting around the center of, or suppressing, a dilemma) of conflict (whether "innerly" or "outerly" stimulated; that is, intra-personal or inter-personal), indirectly and inevitably set-up (or, foster or foment) for-themselves (i.e., (for)ward-of-themselves, off in the distance to themselves to-be had by themselves), adding (or, compiling or 'building-up') ambiguity through lost intermixing of past uncertainties with present ambivalence, future conditions for confusion as they will surely, in later instances of conflict, be without any proper means for managing and reconciling ego-disequilibrium.*
- The Ego (pg. 48)
 - "If psychoanalysts have at times lost sight of the destructiveness of the superego, the same can be said for the reality-testing ego. If it is not informed or in some sense enveloped by an intact conscience, the ego pursues a purely instrumental rationality, one that can be pressed in the service of psychopathy. This kind of instrumental rationality is essential to the creation and mass manufacture of the killing machines employed in the service of superego ideologies. Associating the superego with morality and the ego with reason, psychoanalysts have found the roots of both antisocial sexuality and aggression in the id drives that Freud (1915a) insisted arose from somatic sources. Civilization, he concluded, requires inhibition, especially of what he had come to view as our innate aggressive drive, which though exacerbated by frustration was, for him, ultimately a biologically-given, asocial or antisocial element of our human nature. In projecting our uniquely human viciousness onto animals and the alleged animal in ourselves we appear to have got it backward. **Only human beings, capable of empathy, are able to invent diabolical forms of torture.** The evidence suggests that our prosocial tendencies are grounded in the innate attachment systems we share with our primate cousins and in early identifications with nurturing others, while **our destructiveness appears grounded in our uniquely human symbolic functions (both ego and superego) that often lead us to care more for abstractions, ideologies and ourselves than for others or even life itself.**" (pg. 48)
 - **this is where the political notion of 'the State' comes in - that is, how this abstraction serves human ulterior motives.*
- Fifteen Conflicts (pg. 49)
 - "Along with the ego-ideal and the conscience, **Freud (1923) merged the function of self-observation into the superego.** While **self-observation does not require a separate structure**, being a self-reflexive ego function that variously involves looking at oneself from the standpoint of the superego, the ego-ideal and the conscience, I believe it makes sense to expand psychoanalytic structural theory to include the conflicts *within* as well as *among* the five mental structures: id, ego, superego, ego-ideal and conscience. I say *within* as well as *among* because we need to look at *intra-systemic* as well as *inter-systemic* conflicts..." (pg. 49)
 - "I feel folding conscience and ego-ideal into the superego was a mistake and separating them out enhances our thinking in this field" (pg. 50)
- Capacity for Concern (pg. 52) *cf. D. Winnicott, *The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment*, Chapter 6 - *The Development of the Capacity for Concern*
<https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Winnicott-D.W.-1965.-The-maturational-processes-and-the-facilitating-environment.pdf>
 - "whereas the superego conforms to the talion law, eye for an eye, returning hate for hate, the conscience conforms to a similar law of reciprocity, returning love and nurturance for love received" (pg. 52)
 - "this is the core of conscience, **the ethic of love and responsibility, what Winnicott called the capacity for concern for the other** - a capacity we acquire as we being to transcend Klein's narcissistic, paranoid-schizoid position and move into the reparative position" (pg. 54)

would hardly seem anything remotely near what could be classified as an 'ethic'. So, what this tells me is, in conjunction with 'honest' (i.e., authentic, where responsibility is pivotal) living, there must also be 'right' conduct.

- "but the idea that psychoanalysis has no ethic other than that of honesty is not honest. At best it is an illusion, hopefully without a future. For, like it or not, 'where id was there ego shall be' is a moral imperative requiring far more than replacing illusion with truth: it enjoins us to transcend impulsive action and, instead, develop ego strength, prudence, discretion and self-mastery" (pg. 56)
 - "sublimation of primitive drive is encouraged" (pg. 56)
- "psychoanalytic therapy, however much it has tried to disguise the fact, has always implicitly chosen, advocated and practiced an ethic it refuses to preach, an ethic in which love is better than hate; life is better than death; kindness is better than cruelty; gratitude is better than envy; etc." (pg. 56)
- Conscience: A Training Requirement (pg. 57)
 - "in my view **a central aim of psychoanalysis and analytic therapy is to emancipate conscience from its domination** by both the superego and the ego, by both internalized pseudo-morality and by instrumental reason" (pg. 57)
 - "Since the ego-ideal is a narcissistic structure in which I focus on myself, not the other and my rational ego can bring reason to bear on questions of value, but it cannot generate them or authorize value choices, it is necessary to posit conscience as the ethical center of the personality, grounded in our mammalian and primate sociality, our attachments and our identifications with our nurturers" (pg. 57)
 - "Only if we can acknowledge our own guilt-evasion, study the conflicts within and among the five structures, and re-orient ourselves on a conscientious basis can psychoanalysis hope to realize its emancipatory potential for our patients, our societies and our world" (pg. 57)
- Real and Induced Guilt (pg. 58)
 - "In dealing with guilt we must distinguish that for which we are truly responsible from guilt-feelings induced in us through projective identification by others who are too narcissistic to own up to their own hurtful acts and impulses and to bear the resulting guilt themselves. The inferiority feelings of oppressed people are often attributed, both by themselves and others, to their own defects or shortcomings when in reality such feelings result from relentless projective identification on the part of their oppressors" (pg. 58)
 - "Aside from such induced guilt, a great deal of the pain and symptomatology from which our patients suffer arises from guilt-evasion from their inability and/or refusal to bear the pain of reparative guilt. When patients complain about feeling "guilty" and yet carry on with behavior that is harmful to themselves or others, they need help discerning how much of such persecutory guilt and shame results from trauma and induction and how much arises from ongoing evasion of reparative guilt" (pg. 58)
- Chapter 3 - Is There a Future in Disillusion? (pg. 66)
 - Illusioning or Disillusioning?
 - "certainly both Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein...viewed psychoanalysis and analytic, insight-oriented, dynamic or uncovering psychotherapy as treatments for emotional disorder" (pg. 69)
 - "Both Freud and Klein viewed neurotics and psychotics, their followers subsequently included borderline personalities as well, as captured or "possessed" by a range of positive or negative illusions or phantasies, which distort their relationship to the things, events and people around them. Patients were viewed as, to varying degrees, estranged from reality due to the operation of a wide range of distorting psychological processes such as repression, reaction-formation, displacement, transference, denial, projection and projective identification, to mention but a few of such defensive processes" (pg. 69)
 - "Since psychopathology was viewed as a condition in which one suffers from illusions and delusions, therapy was conceived as disillusioning, that is, as helping patients to fight free of their distorting transferences, projections, pathological identifications and irrational beliefs. Since pathology was seen as mistaking phantasies or feelings for facts, therapy aimed at enhancing reality-testing by helping patients become acquainted with their phantasies and feelings and their potentially distorting effects. In all this, there was no denial of the fact that therapists too have illusions and confuse reality and phantasy. **Freud referred to the therapist's distorting transference as countertransference and the Kleinians came to include under this rubric the emotional effects induced in the analyst by the analysand's projective identifications as well.** The traditional psychoanalytic insistence that analysts themselves undergo analysis as a precondition of practice is based on this recognition" (pg. 69)
 - "In these respects, Freud and Klein and their followers were operating, broadly speaking, as Enlightenment rationalists. But theirs was a chastened rationalism, tempered by romanticism's recognition of the irrational depths of human nature. But, however qualified in this respect, it was a rationalism determined to subject the irrational to a rational inquiry that, through knowing it, would disarm, or at the very least sublimate or redirect it, and bring it, for Freud (1933) at least, under an overall 'dictatorship of reason'" (pg. 69)
 - "For the late Freud, rather than being a potential source of creativity, the unconsciousness constituted a barbarous threat to the thin veneer of civilization. For many Freudians, analysis became more a matter of seeking rational mastery over, rather than integration of, emotion and the unconscious" (pg. 70)
 - "**Freud, Klein and their followers were disillusionists;** practitioners of what Nietzsche called the art of mistrust. Along with Marx and Nietzsche himself, they belonged to the Western tradition of suspicion (Remmling, 1967) whose adherents **sought emancipation from the idols of the age by unmasking the false consciousness and dominant ideologies that are the collective equivalent of the personal illusions and delusions, the wishful thinking, transferences and projections that distort the neurotic individual's relation to reality**" (pg. 70)
 - "less through knowledge...than by transcending the counterfeit creeds that stand in the way of any genuine salvation; and less by direct discovery of the true self than by fighting free of the false selves that are its masquerades" (pg. 70)
 - "for workers in the tradition of suspicion therapeutic progress is judged in terms of overcoming their resistances" (pg. 71)
 - "For many today, the disillusionist perspective is not only regarded as outmoded, a relic of the past, but as morally suspect, best consigned to the dustbin of history along with the Eurocentrism, racism, patriarchal sexism, heterosexism and homophobia with which it is thought, I believe incorrectly, to be inextricably associated" (pg. 71)
 - "For many psychoanalysts a very different model of emotional disorder, therapy and cure became dominant. It is a model in which patients or clients are not so much seen as suffering from illusions that need to be transcended and conflicts that need to be understood, resolved or trans-formed, as from psychological deficits that need filling-in and from arrested development that needs to be resumed. It is important to recognize that both the therapies of construction and of deconstruction, of identification and disidentification, recognize the role of trauma, abuse and deprivation, among other factors, in the genesis of emotional disorders" (pg. 71-72)
 - ◆ "In my opinion, it is simply incorrect to reduce the difference between the therapies of faith and the therapies of doubt to that between perspectives favoring nurture and those emphasizing nature in the genesis of psychopathology, or to identify the disillusionist approach with a now outmoded drive theory that evades recognition or underplays the significance of environmental factors in pathogenesis" (pg. 72)
 - ◇ "In referring to drive theory as outmoded I refer to its literalistic form in which the *triebe* are defined by aim, object, pressure and source, the latter being held to be a somatic organ or zone (Freud, 1915a). In a broader, more psychological and less reductively biologicistic form, as a theory of libidinal and aggressive *motives* and of oral, anal, phallic and oedipal

- meanings* (freed from their alleged somatic sources, without of course denying the grounding of mind in brain) it remains significant" (pg. 72)
- "While certainly acknowledging environmental factors, in the deconstructionist approach trauma, abuse and deprivation are seen as generating anxiety, rage, guilt, conflicts, defenses, transferences and projections in need of analysis. In contrast, in the constructionist or synthetic (as distinct from analytic) therapies, such factors are viewed as generating psychological defects, deficits and arrests that require the therapists provision of the psychological and emotional nutriment of which the patient is thought to have been deprived and hence lacks, and provision of a climate in which arrested development may be resumed, this time in the presence of and under the benign influence of the therapist" (pg. 72)
 - "In this [latter] perspective, therapy is less a matter of removing pathogenic presences (anxieties, phantasies, illusions, transferences, projections, etc.) than of filling-in or compensating for pathogenic absences (the deficits and arrests resulting from environmental failure in childhood)" (pg. 73)
 - "Anna Freud's early insistence against the Kleinians that the child's ego is too weak to sustain analysis without a prior period of education and support contributed to the legitimation of therapeutic approaches that were more supportive than analytic" (pg. 73)
 - "I believe that therapeutic provision is necessary, but insufficient, to bring about therapeutic disillusionment" (pg. 74)
 - Via Negativa (pg. 74)
 - "I prefer *via negativa* in which **therapy is less a matter of arriving at the truth than of clearing the path toward it by removing a whole host of pseudo-truths, illusions or delusions that pass for it and that block the way to its progressive approximations**" (pg. 75)
 - "That last phrase is reminiscent of Popper (1972) and I recognize a parallel between what I'm saying here about analysis and what he said about science—namely that it is less a matter of verification than of falsification, less a matter of achieving absolute knowledge of the truth, than of progressively approximating an ultimately incompletely knowable reality through a never-ending process of eliminating errors and illusions" (pg. 75)
 - "With this in mind, I propose that we substitute for the distinction made by Langs (*Truth Therapy/Lie Therapy*) that between therapies, on the one hand, that in the long run seek to deconstruct and disillusion and those, on the other, that are content to construct or illusion. Whereas the disillusionist seeks ultimately to negate, falsify, debunk, deconstruct and invalidate various beliefs or phantasies considered pathogenic, the illusionist, engaging in a very willing suspension of disbelief, seeks to, at the very least, acknowledge the plausibility of, if not to affirm, confirm or vali-date, various constructions deemed to be of therapeutic benefit to the patient and not merely as a temporary means to the long-term goal of disillusion). Whereas the constructionist seeks to inspire a new or a renewed faith by affirming the patient's narratives and metaphors, the deconstructionist raises doubt with respect to every narrative, most especially in regard to those taken so literally and held so unquestioningly that their status as metaphors or perspectives, as more or less plausible constructions, has been lost sight of altogether" (pg. 75)
 - "The goal of deconstruction is not the destruction of meaning, but only the revelation of particular meanings as more or less plausible approaches to and approximations of the truth, not the truth in and of itself" (pg. 75)
 - ◆ "the sort of 'knowing' and 'belief' that must be therapeutically surpassed refers to what may otherwise be described as dogma, ideology or reification, or as an alienated or undialectical consciousness" (pg. 76)
 - Gnostic or Agnostic? (pg. 77)
 - "**The anti-foundationalism and radical cultural relativism of postmodern theory casts as much doubt on the existence of truth as it does on the existence of God.** In this context, critical reason (as distinct from merely instrumental or technical rationality) is itself called into question. If truth can no longer be distinguished from error or illusion, what point is there to critique? In this context, psychoanalysis, the form of psychotherapy traditionally most allied to the Enlightenment spirit of critique is itself in danger of being eclipsed, in psychiatry by biological reductionism and in the field of psychotherapy by fundamentally irrationalist, romantic and revisionist therapeutic religions..." (pg. 77-78)
 - "like Epstein (1995), **I believe disillusionist psychoanalysis shares with certain Buddhist traditions a common commitment to the *via negativa* in which systematic deconstruction and disidentification promote a condition of non-attachment to every idolatrous image of the self and others**" (pg. 79)
 - "I think this parallel becomes most evident in a certain version of Lacanian psychoanalysis that seeks (or at least is supposed to seek) to systematically dismantle the Imaginary specular 'ego' (composed of all the images, representations and narratives that compose the self as idol) in favor of the emergence of the living "subject" that I think in some ways parallels Winnicott's (1960a) 'going-on-being' understood, not reductively as referring exclusively to our psychosomatic existence, but existentially with reference to our existence as symboling and self-reflexive human subjects." (pg. 79)
 - "For any therapy to work, there must exist a working or therapeutic alliance, an atmosphere of safety, some degree of basic trust or faith in the therapist and the process, and some considerable degree of shared belief or 'knowledge' of what therapy is, what the respective roles of therapist and patient are, what goals they are working together toward, and so on" (pg. 80)
 - "For a therapy to constitute itself as agnostic (a therapy of doubt as distinct from gnostic (a therapy of belief), it must move beyond this background of identification toward the disillusionist task. Like Winnicott's mother, it must move beyond the phase of providing illusion toward that of providing a corrective emotional experience of therapeutic disillusion and disidentification. Nothing less is 'good enough'. From a deconstructionist point of view, the problem with constructionist therapies is that they mistake the necessary conditions of analysis for analysis itself" (pg. 80)
 - Melting Frozen Metaphors (pg. 82)
 - "among other factors in the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis, the insight and mastery to be obtained through the deliteralization, deconstruction or dereification of literalized, reified, concretized, 'dead' and 'frozen' metaphors are central to the psychoanalytic cure" (pg. 82)
 - "when the metaphor refers to the object, literalization turns analogy into identity and, as a result, a multi-dimensional view of the object is lost by a mind that, in this way, becomes one-dimensional; when it refers to the self, it effects a one-dimensional equation of the self with some concept or image..." (pg. 82)
 - "I came to understand that a significant portion of the emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis lies in its power to 'resurrect' or bring 'dead' metaphors back to 'life'" (pg. 83)
 - "[it is] the process of turning identities back into analogies, of restoring the mental gap [i.e., eradicating mental fixations, therein opening ourselves up to 'Being'] or space between a metaphorical concept and its object..." (pg. 83)
 - ◆ "psychic reality, as a system of concretized and absolute (primary process) or abstract and relative (secondary process) associations of one thing with another, is a system of metaphors..." (pg. 84)
 - Therapeutic Iconoclasm (pg. 87)
 - "[Melanie] Klein's concept of projective identification is not a mental mechanism in the sense of Freudian mechanisms of defense. Rather, it is a phantasy of putting part of the self into others. Being aware, in this way, that the mind is composed of phantasy, many Kleinians are protected from **the danger of reifying [i.e., making real of something which isn't; or, proceeding "as if" ...without knowing "how so"]** such phantasies and treating them as literal facts" (pg. 88-89)

- "this is not to say that such phantasies are not taken seriously. Rather, they are taken seriously as phantasies, for it is understood that our phantasies constitute the tissue of our minds and the basis of our actions" (pg. 89)
 - "Over time, such systematic disidentification may lead to the relative decentering of the (specular) ego. **With the gradual disappearance of the ego from center stage, the *subject*, hitherto 'upstaged' or relegated to the wings, may begin to make an appearance.** Here the *subject* refers not to anything like a knowable 'true self', for in the iconoclastic perspective any self we know is not the true self, merely another idol in need of analytic deconstruction and disidentification. But if such work should prove productive then, freed from domination by all 'self-knowledge' - by all the idols, icons and imaginings of the ego - the resurrected *subject* could, like Lazarus, resume its *going-on-being*" (pg. 89)
 - "I believe this is how, as therapists, we ought to be working. By the standard, I believe we fail a good deal of the time. The problem is that we are perpetually seduced into believing - that is, into taking quite literally, concretizing or reifying - a good deal of what our patients tell us about themselves" (pg. 89)
 - "**Our experience of any reality is a construction** and reality may be construed or symbolized in a variety of ways, some of which are more plausible than others. In emphasizing this point, an iconoclastic technique seeks to open up for the patient a certain critical distance between himself as a critically questioning subject and his 'ego' regarded as the sum-total of his experiences - that is, of the stories he tells himself about himself" (pg. 90)
 - "**our experience is never direct or unmediated, but always already the product of interpretation. But contrary to a radical, postmodern epistemological relativism, this in no way implies that facts do not exist, are not discoverable or are irrelevant**" (pg. 90)
 - Theory or Ideology? (pg. 91)
 - "how easily in psychoanalytic work, without realizing it, we regress from an iconoclastic into an idolatrous, reifying or literalizing technique and from productively triangled work on the level of the Symbolic to Imaginary dyadic enmeshment and identification" (pg. 91)
 - "psychoanalytic theorists and therapists, not just our patients, fall into the type of literalization I have been describing. Regrettably, the history of psychoanalysis - like human history in general - is, to a considerable degree, a history of reification, ideology and idolatry" (pg. 92)
- Chapter 4 - Self Psychology and the Intersubjective Perspective: A Dialectical Critique (pg. 99)
 - "**a new personality type has emerged whose ego-identity is diffuse and shifting due to its lack of inner support from internalized values and ideals**" (pg. 100)
 - "in this situation, the 'mediation between the self and the other gives way to [i.e., making priority of] immediate identification'..." (pg. 100)
 - "**the inner-directed character gives way to an other-directed personality oriented less by the 'gyroscope' constituted by internalized values and goals than by a wish to achieve a positive self-image in the mirror constituted by significant others and by a radar-like sensitivity to their expectations and responses**" (pg. 100)
 - "the narcissism, fragmentation, emptiness and other manifest symptoms of the disordered self, however much they reflect early environmental failure, turn out on analysis to be grounded in conflicts with which we have long been familiar. The fragmented self is in my view ultimately produced by a fragmenting, sadistic superego, itself fed by the rage stemming from preoedipal and oedipal trauma and frustration, as well as by the largely unconscious, primitive, persecutory guilt that inevitably arises from such reactive aggression. The defect, deficits, fragmentation and emptiness characteristics of the disordered self are not the simple, direct result of inadequate provision, but rather, the consequence of a devastating attack by an annihilating superego fueled by rage in reaction to trauma" (pg. 100)
 - "I maintain a distinction between self psychology (or selfobject theory) and the intersubjective approach..." (pg. 103)
 - "...dialectic refers to reasoned argument as such. But, beyond this very general usage, the concept is associated with the dialectical logic of Kant, Hegel and Fichte in which thought is held to evolve through the clash of opposites. Although Hegel (1807; Singer, 1983) himself seldom employed this formula, dialectical logic entails the idea of a thesis giving rise to an antithesis that negates it and, out of this opposition, a synthesis emerges that negates, preserves and elevates the opposing elements. This synthesis then becomes the thesis evoking another antithesis, giving rise to yet another synthesis, and so on, as both thought and history evolve. With Marx, Hegel's dialectical idealism is brought down to earth, as it were, taking the form of a dialectical *materialism* in which the clashing elements are not ideas, but socioeconomic classes, the thesis being the bourgeoisie, the antithesis the proletariat, and the synthesis the socialist state destined to 'wither away' with the emergence, at the end of history, of the final communist utopia (Singer, 1980). Against the idea that dialectical thought must envisage a synthesis that necessarily negates the real autonomy of the elements composing it, Adorno offers a 'negative dialectic', while Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou describe a 'disjunctive synthesis' or a 'synthesis that separates'" (pg. 103)
 - "in dualism, the clash of opposites is fundamental and although the form of the conflict may be modified...conflict itself is built-in to the very nature of reality or the psyche and no fundamental transcendence is possible" (pg. 104)
 - "in dialectical thinking, by contrast, conflict is recognized as a necessary but intermediate stage in a three-step developmental process in which an initial monism gives way to a dualistic clash of opposites, which is then transcended, however momentarily, in a higher-ordered synthesis of some type" (pg. 104)
 - "dialectical thinking rejects both dualism and monism in whatever form or tradition they appear" (pg. 105)
 - ◆ "**in dialectical thinking, development through differentiation and integration is also a reality**; evolution is real" (pg. 105)
 - "the point is only that, against the monists, conflict is a reality; but against the dualists, conflict is neither the only nor the ultimate reality" (pg. 105)
 - "when Freudians attack self psychology, the dialectician defends it. When Kohutians attack Freudianism, the dialectician upholds it" (pg. 106)
 - "for the dialectician, advancing toward the synthesis is our job" (pg. 106)
 - "both monistic and dualistic perspectives give rise to either/or thinking..." (pg. 106)
 - "what remains largely missing from psychoanalytic discourse is any adequate recognition of the reality of *Dasein*, human *being-in-the-world*, as a uniquely humans, existential condition of symbolic self-awareness, freedom and time-consciousness that is emergent from, but irreducible to the interaction of biological and environmental factors" (pg. 109)
 - "It remains the case that most schools of psychoanalytic thought, in their general theory if not in their clinical attitude and praxis, lean heavily toward either a biologism that privileges the somatically-rooted drives or an environmentalism that privileges a range of relational factors in the understanding of personality development and psychopathology" (pg. 108)
 - "it is a mistake to seek to confine the psychoanalytic method to the empathic study of the patient's subjective world. In optimal psychoanalytic work, we need to move back and forth between viewing out patients as subjects and as objects" (pg. 110)
 - "in addition to exploration of patients' subjectivity I believe it is necessary for analyst to keep in mind in very broad, tentative and shifting terms such things as their character structure, the quality of their reality-testing, the level of their object relations, the degree of their regression and capacity to internalize, the state of the therapeutic alliance, the nature of the transference and the countertransference and their interpenetration, and other such considerations" (pg. 111)
 - "the analyst is the mirror in which patients can view themselves in otherwise unavailable ways" (pg. 111)
 - **I don't like this depiction of the analyst role as it connotes the analyst taking up in full form the whole-figured façade of the patient. That, to me, is not really what the analysts' function entails.*

- "the analyst is frequently not in a position to independently verify or falsify various beliefs of the patient" (pg. 122)
 - "analyst and patient engage in a mutually corrective dialogue in an attempt to approximate the reality of their ongoing encounters; of the patient's psychological, interpersonal and existential situation; and of his or her past" (pg. 124)
 - "if the patient and I can agree about reality, and even if we cannot, we can nevertheless, explore the possible symbolic meanings encoded in the patient's experience" (pg. 125)
 - ◆ "it is not necessary for me to subscribe to their experience or even to beg the question as to its validity in order for us to analyze it..." (pg. 125)
 - ◇ *meaning, we do not need the establishment of absolute objectivity before we can proceed in the world of things. We are free to act under the conditions (or, circumstance) of which we are (in).
 - "any psychology worthy of being called psychoanalytic must recognize that we are all double in this sense, split between a self that communicates in secondary process categories and one that communicates in primary process terms. Psychoanalysts do understand something about the laws and mechanisms of this second language permitting us, not to know with any authoritative certainty how to decode its messages, but at least to hazard a range of intelligent and plausible interpretive guesses that will be either supported or disqualified in light of the patient's own associations" (pg. 116)
 - "rejecting either pole of the binary opposition Naïve Subjectivism / Naïve Objectivism, we embrace the *Perspectivism* that acknowledges the reality of the object but also that it can only be known from the standpoint of multiple perspective. Despite the association of this epistemology with continental phenomenology and existential philosophy, I believe it shares a substantial measure of agreement with Popper's conception of objective knowledge as an evolutionary process in which our conjectures or approximations are progressively accommodated to an ultimately incompletely knowable reality" (pg. 120)
- Chapter 5 - Lacanian Theory: Appreciation and Critique (pg. 131)
 - "as we all know, one of the functions of our analytic abstinence and relative silence is to cloak ourselves in a certain obscurity the better to evoke the analyst's transference phantasies..." (pg. 133)
 - "I feel we cannot afford to dismiss or ignore Lacan" (pg. 137)
 - "if I were to single out what to me is one of the most important contributions of Lacanian theory is would have to be: the deliteralization of Freudian concepts" (pg. 140)
 - "Take, for example, the theory of the Oedipus and castration complexes. Students have often told me that only once this theory was presented to them in a deliteralized (i.e., Lacanian) form, could they begin to appreciate its real human meaning and importance. No wonder the theory seems incredible and is frequently rejected in favor of other psychologies when it is presented as, the child's literal desire for sexual intercourse with one parent with an accompanying wish for the death of the other, wishes that are only repressed due to fear of literal castration or equivalent bodily mutilation at the hands of the rival parent" (pg. 141)
 - "Not only does Lacan deliteralize Freudian concepts, but he liberates them from the biologism of Freudian instinct theory and relocates them within what is essentially a theory of narcissism or the self. For example, **Lacan makes a fundamental distinction between organic need, on the one hand, which exists on the biological level and is shared by both human beings and animals, and human desire, on the other, which arising from an inner sense of absence established in the human psyche as a semiotic system of differences and distinctions (between subject and object, signifier and signified), is uniquely human.** Animals and preverbal infants *need*, but they do not *desire*, for desire can only exist on the basis of the fundamental alienation, the sense of lack, from which it originates. This sense of lack can itself exist only on the basis of the symbolic subject/object or self/other distinction, which places a bar or gap between self and other generating a sense of the self as a lack of the other, a sense of lack or absence (*Fort!*) which gives rise to desire for that comforting presence (*Da!*) that is felt to be missing (Freud, 1920)" (pg. 144)
 - "Lacan re-situates psychoanalysis as a theory of desire and aggression in a semiotic rather than a biologicistic context" (pg. 144)
 - "for Lacan, psychoanalysis is certainly a psychology of desire and aggression, but *human* desire and aggression, while obviously dependent upon a neurological substrate, have their source not in the body, but in the human mind as a semiotic system" (pg. 145)
 - "psychoanalysis was for Lacan a semiotic science of the structure of the unconscious mind" (pg. 145)
 - "as Lacan understood, the unconscious and its primary processes, far from representing a subhuman, asocial and pre-cultural chaos of drive energies, is already symbolically, that is, culturally structured in accordance with the very laws of condensation and displacement that Freud discovered..." (pg. 145-146)
 - "In Freud's (1930) pessimistic and culturally conservative sociopolitical ideology, in which the claims of culture (as represented by the ego and superego) are forever in conflict with those of nature (as represented by the id), and in which repression and resulting neurosis are the price of civilized order, we see the reactionary ideological consequences of the failure to recognize that, in a significant sense, the unconscious is always already cultural and the id is profoundly and uniquely human. For, as Freud himself taught us, unconscious mental life, far from being a meaningless chaos is meaningfully structured through condensation (metaphor) and displacement (metonymy), rhetorical tropes that represent key elements of our distinctively human symbolic behavior" (pg. 147)
 - "it is generally unwise to seek support for psychoanalytic ideas in empirical psychology and Lacan was foolish to do so" (pg. 148)
 - "for Lacan inner fragmentation, emptiness and lack are intrinsic aspects of the human condition" (pg. 149)
- Chapter 6 - The Melancholic Existentialism of Ernest Becker (pg. 161)
 - "Becker's work elaborates an existential psychology in which human beings suffer from a primary death anxiety that is...irreducible to infantile fears" (pg. 161)
 - "Becker argues that our primary death anxiety necessarily and quite literally drives us to distraction. Repression, if not imposed by civilization, would be self-imposed due to our need to deny the body that, in a variety of ways...is a constant reminder of the morality we cannot face. Society offers a range of possibilities for heroism in which death is denied and an illusion of immortality constructed" (pg. 161)
 - *we can find 'permanence' in the host of institutions - if not at least in their features - which constitute our society (i.e., media, money, material, etc.)
 - "in my view, Becker's ontology of anxiety is a contemporary manifestation of the agnostic heresy that Judaism and Christianity have both sought to reject..." (pg. 164)
 - "Ernest Becker and Peter Berge produced such one-sidedly dark and pessimistic visions of human existence..." (pg. 166)
- Chapter 7 - Concordant and Complementary Countertransference (pg. 168)
 - "the mind of the psychoanalyst, like that of the analyst, experiences tensions and conflicts between id (impulses, affects and wishful phantasies of love, hate and their varying combinations), ego (relatively rational and reality-oriented mental processes), and superego (moral demands, ideals and prohibitions, including guilt and needs for either punishment or reparation)" (pg. 168)
 - "today it is widely recognized that our personal conflicts bias us in various respects and generate countertransference identifications that, in contrast to the conscious and preconscious trail identifications that constitute empathy, may take the form of more global, concrete and unconscious identifications..." (pg. 168-169)
- Chapter 8 - Clarifying and Deconstructing Winnicott (pg. 181)
 - Clarifying (pg. 181)
 - "according to Heidegger, it is by means of a 'marginal experience' - such as the shocking recognition of the reality of personal death - that an

- individual may be shaken out of inauthentic and awakened to authentic existence" (pg. 181)
- "Winnicott's 'false self' would correspond to Lacan's 'ego' as a narcissistic structure reflecting an omnipotent denial of reality..." (pg. 182)
 - "in *The Use of An Object and Relating Through Identification*... what [Winnicott] is really concerned with is the shift from a narcissistic attitude towards objects as extensions or projections of the self, to what most would regard as a more advanced mode of object-relating in which the object is recognized as separated and distinct from the self" (pg. 182)
 - "for Winnicott, the subject is only able to achieve mature relations with objective objects through a process of separation from the subjective objects - a process entailing both the 'destruction' of the latter and, at the same time, a giving up of the illusion of omnipotence and the need for omnipotent control that underlies both enmeshment with the subjective object and resistance to recognizing the otherness of the objective object" (pg. 184)
 - "Freud and Winnicott... are referring to a state in which the cognitively differentiated object is emotionally experienced primarily through projections of the subject's own phantasies and self- and object-representations and predominantly in terms of the subject's pressing needs. And they mean to contrast this sort of narcissistic object-relation to one in which the subject is more able to get beyond such projections and egocentric demands for need-satisfaction and to recognize and make empathic contact with the real otherness of the object. This entails development of what Winnicott (1963a) calls 'the capacity for concern'..." (pg. 187)
 - Chapter 9 - Neo-Kleinian Theory: A Dialectal Re-Vision (pg. 193)
 - "Kleinian theory has sometimes been interpreted in a way that conveys an oversimplified conception of emotional growth as development beyond the splitting and part-object functioning characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position, to the ambivalence and whole-object functioning of the depressive position (Ps →D). In this perspective Ps functioning is devalued, viewed as primitive or regressive, in contrast to the advance into the more complex, realistic, mature and responsible functioning characteristic of D. But in viewing Ps as all-bad and D as all-good, this perspective itself involves splitting." (pg. 193)
 - "by ordering experience into all-good and all-bad categories, splitting not only protects the good from being destroyed by the bad, but rescues the developing personality from the psychotic confusion prevailing when the split cannot be held, the good going bad and the bad turning good" (pg. 193-194)
 - "psychic evolution must be conceived dialectically in such a way as to be able to recognize good (in addition to bad) in Ps and bad (in addition to good) in D" (pg. 195)
 - "Klein constantly stressed the crucial importance of good, loving care-taking, for only this can hope to offset the inevitable rage and paranoia resulting from frustration..." (pg. 195)
 - "the validity of these ideas of adaptive regression melting a frozen structure and opening up new possibilities for creative change and growth is not in doubt" (pg. 199)
 - "The frozen order providing security is composed of paranoid-schizoid, concretized, literalistic, black and white thinking. It needs to be unfrozen, deconstructed through the de-literalizing processes that open up the depressive position and evoke a subject capable of self-reflection and toleration of ambivalence and ambiguity. **This is an often painful process of facing and bearing the insecurity involved in letting go and mourning lost certainties, replacing oversimplifications with complexity and allowing what is new and different to come into being.** Such 'patience' is found not in Ps but in D. This is not at all to deny that a mere swing of the pendulum in the opposing direction may be equally pathological; an excessive and one-sided depressive position functioning alienated from the passion and intensity of Ps might well turn 'patience' into complacency, inaction, even paralysis" (pg. 199)
 - "Britton's description of the process of creative psychic growth as moving 'from integration, to disintegration, followed by reintegration' is unproblematic" (pg. 199)
 - "development requires leaving the security of paranoid-schizoid, rigidly held coherence, dogma founded usually on black and white thinking and the suppression or repression of one term of a polarity over the other, for a new round of depressive position uncertainties" (pg. 200)
 - "valid knowledge and proper mental functioning requires us to attend to both similarities and differences, to appreciate both links and distinctions or boundaries" (pg. 206)
 - "the tendency for one or another image of absolute similarity or difference to hold us captive arises either from genuine ignorance of other possibilities or from a defense against affects of anxiety and depression associated with the full range of infantile danger situations" (pg. 210)
 - Chapter 10 - Beyond Nature and Culture: Erich Fromm's Existentialism (pg. 214)
 - "That many sociologists accepted such a deteriorated concept of the self - a *situational* as distinct from a *substantive* theory of the self in which the self is reduced to a subjective echo of the ever-changing roles one plays and personality is reduced to performance - is a fact that itself requires sociological explanation. Sociologists of knowledge know that ideas often become established for reasons other than their truth-content. Sociological ideas arise in particular historical contexts, in this case a late capitalist society in which the marketing orientation is so dominant that individuals are loathe to invest heavily in a self that might well go out of fashion, prove difficult to shed or transform, and thus, turn out to have been a poor investment" (pg. 215)
 - "Today, a range of contemporary thinkers are concerned to 'challenge the excessive culturalism and anti-personalism which characterize most 'postmodern' thinking, whether it be structuralist, poststructuralist, or posthuman' and to promote 'the *dialectical supersession* [original emphasis] of the anti-humanist paradigm' (Durkin, 2014, p. 211) in favor of a renaissance of humanism" (pg. 217)
 - "Fromm follows Marx in... adopting a 'qualified essentialism' that recognizes the existence of a human nature grounded in very general, universal biological and existential aspects of the human condition, but always as shaped by particular personal, historical and cultural circumstances. Both reductive, ahistorical essentialism and reductive, extreme social constructionism are rejected in this dialectical model" (pg. 218)
 - "critical theory failed to recognize the Fromm has placed the critique of the over-socialized model on a far more solid footing than Freudian drive theory through his qualified essentialism and existentialism" (pg. 218)
 - "Fromm rejected both reductive biological and environmental determinism in favor of an existentialist view of the human being's 'emergence' a self-conscious creature, rooted in nature by the body and yet significantly transcending it due to its capacity for symbolic processes, relatively free from instinctual determination and, hence, as in the Sartrean (1943) vision, suffering from a 'fear of freedom' and a marked temptation to surrender it" (pg. 219)
 - "Fromm's qualified essentialism enabled him to distinguish human nature in general from its manifestations under particular historical and cultural circumstances. As a result, he is able to recognize a range of universal human needs and dilemmas as revealed by the human sciences. In the face of the anxiety and loneliness arising from our existential situation as both immersed in nature and separated from it, Fromm recognized five possible 'solutions', four regressive and one progressive..." (pg. 219)
 - "in addition to the *receptive, exploitative, hoarding and marketing* orientations, there is the *productive* orientation that includes the capacities for love and reason" (pg. 219)
 - "**an ethic grounded in the study of human nature can be developed without obscuring the value choices involved**" (pg. 221)
 - "Freud and his colleagues failed to understand that because reason is descriptive and not prescriptive and we cannot deduce an *ought* from an *is*, the ego cannot serve as a conscience" (pg. 222)
 - Postscript: Dialectical Thinking (pg. 230)
 - "related to my advancing conscience as a separate structure and function from the superego is my claim that psychoanalysis is a fundamentally ethical enterprise" (pg. 230)
 - "just as he failed to distinguish persecutory guilt from reparative guilt, so Freud failed to distinguish the superego from the conscience and

the two fundamentally different types of morality governing each" (pg. 230)

- "the superego is merely normative, reflecting the often immoral values of particular societies, while the conscience manifest a universal value-orientation grounded in our mammalian and primate heritage and our universal experience as helpless nurslings responded to well or poorly by primary carers" (pg. 230-231)
- "with respect to the way we organize and manage our psychoanalytic institutions, we need to move away from the essentially paranoid-schizoid, sado-masochistic, authoritarian and secretive forms of organization established by Freud toward more conscientious, reparative and democratic forms" (pg. 231)
- "running like a red thread through my work is my stress on the need to dialectically deconstruct the privileging of one pole of a binary opposition over the other and the need to strive toward the synthesis that negates and yet preserves and elevates both. Although the Kierkegaardian *either/or* legitimately complements the Hegelian *both/ and*, Hegel is ultimately victorious in that on the level of the *Aufheben*, the higher-level synthesis that abolishes, preserves and elevates, we find a place for both *either/or* and *both/and* thinking" (pg. 232)
- "Dialectical thinking is evolutionary thinking" (pg. 233)
- "only the rational animal can go mad" (pg. 235)

d. Further Readings:

- (Article) The Immoral Superego: Conscience as the Fourth Element in the Structural Theory of the Mind, by D. Carveth
https://www.academia.edu/12453432/The_Immoral_Superego_Conscience_as_the_Fourth_Element_in_the_Structural_Theory_of_the_Mind