

# Reason and Revolution, by H. Marcuse

- a. People / Organizations: <https://thecharnelhouse.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Herbert-Marcuse-Reason-and-Revolution-Hegel-and-the-Rise-of-Social-Theory.pdf>
- b. Quotes:
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- c. General Notes:
  - Forward, by J. M. Berstein (pg. ix)
    - **"Marcuse's Reason and Revolution is, by a long chalk, the most philosophically acute and instructive single volume presentation of the entirety of Hegel's philosophy** from the early writings through to the Science of Logic, Philosophy of Right, and Philosophy of History. It is also the classic statement of Hegelian Marxism. Its defense of dialectical thought as a negative philosophy, a philosophy facing negative states of affairs demanding to be negated, is perhaps even more urgent today than when it appeared in the early years of World War II." (pg. ix)
      - "In the new 1960 Preface, 'A Note on Dialectic,' Marcuse states that the book was written in the hope that it would encourage the revival not of Hegel's philosophy, but of what Marcuse takes to be the signature and orienting character of Hegelian thought: **the power of negative thinking, of thinking whose task is to negate that which is immediately before us. When unfreedom is the condition of freedom, or war the condition of peace, we are in a world which contradicts itself.** Such states of affairs cannot be comprehended by providing accurate representations of them, or even through explanations of how they came about, as important as such explanations can be. Rather, 'the negation which applies' to such contradictions aims to provide 'a critique of the given state of affairs on its own ground—of the established system of life, which denies its own promises and potentialities' (xxiii). **For Marcuse, the negative mode of thinking aims to secure the rational authority and obligatoriness of the emergent promises and potentialities of a form of life against those forces whose routine operation involves suppressing, fragmenting, and extinguishing them**" (pg. xi)
    - "First, if states of affairs, a particular social practice, can be accused of suppressing or seeking to extinguish a potentiality latent in its functioning, then it follows that the state of affairs is not in itself a value-neutral fact. Social practices are constituted through normative rules and potentialities. Hence **'dialectical thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process in which the subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only with the subject-object totality'** (xxiii). By the idea of a subject-object totality Marcuse means here a whole of a society or form of life as composed of interlocking and mutually dependent social practices, where the relevant social structures and practices themselves are to be comprehended as composed of contrasting but joined objective (third person) and subjective (first person) perspectives" (pg. xii)
    - "In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the life-and-death struggle occurs as the inauguration of the account of human self-consciousness. **Self-consciousness, what it means to be a human subject, Hegel argues, is intersubjectively constituted with independent and dependent aspects,** aspects that Hegel famously introduces through the figures of the independent Master who is *sotto voce* dependent on the dependent Slave who aspires to independence. It was the life-and-death struggle for recognition as being independent, as fully self-determining, that brought about the Master-Slave relation" (pg. xii-xiii)
    - **"For both Hegel and Marx, individual freedom must come to comprehend the otherness of society and nature not as a limit on their freedom, but as a condition of possibility: we are essentially dependent beings who can achieve our independence and freedom only with and through community with others.** Hegel terms such social freedom a state of being at home in otherness. Although Marcuse continually defines freedom as negative, he means by this the power of freedom to negate and transform a given unfree environment. Freedom achieved is necessarily social freedom, freedom with and through others in relation to living nature" (pg. xiv)
    - "The economy is simultaneously the material condition of community and its persistent fracturing in the decimation of individual lives. **The economy thus cannot be the final bearer or actuality of the union between individual and universal.** Only in, first, law and then in the institutions of government itself are human social freedom and equality self-consciously realized; only in political self-determination can the self-making of a community first glimpsed in social labor ever become true social freedom. **This was always the premise and promise of the French Revolution: it is in the life of the citizen that individual freedom and universality are united in actuality and know themselves to be so united**" (pg. xv-xvi)
      - "Marcuse champions the grand thesis that German idealist philosophy was interpreted as the theory of the French Revolution. The promise of both the French Revolution itself and its reprise in German idealist philosophy was that state and society could be reconstructed on a rational basis that would enable each individual to be a self-reliant master of his or her own life. The approaching world was to be an order of reason." (pg. xiv-xv)
      - "The great travail of Hegel's philosophy was that the fulfillment of reason promised by the French Revolution miscarried. Whether one interprets Hegel's philosophy as idealistically deserting historical actuality in the freedom of reason itself or, conversely, as a critical theory *avant la lettre*, seeing the betrayal of the principles of freedom, equality, and reason as the promissory rose in the cross of existing institutions, the consequence is the same: **the ideals of the French Revolution turned out to be incompatible with the practices of liberal capitalism,** and only a radical transformation in the material basis of community, in economic life, would enable Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité to become actual" (pg. xvii)
    - "Marcuse's exposition of Marx's thought is exemplary of the tradition of Hegelian Marxism. Among its central ingredients are:" (pg. xviii)
      - "(i) The claim that the account of the alienation of labor in the 1844 Manuscripts anticipates and becomes an element in the processes of commodity fetishism in Capital. (ii) **Class is the fundamental and actual unit of social and economic reality, not the individual;** and the subsumption of the individual under class 'is the same phenomenon as the subjection to the division of labor' (244). (iii) Commodity production, in which all items are produced for market exchange, necessarily subsumes use values, what items are good for, to exchange value, money or capital. (iv) Because the constraining and obligatory purpose of capitalist production is pure value creation, then commodity production can occur in a manner that is systematically indifferent to the conditions for social reproduction. **Value creation is blind to social need,** to the material well-being of its workers, and the ecological integrity of living nature. Need, labor conditions, and ecological integrity, when they are recognized as such in capitalism, are recognized only as external constraints on the system. (v) **The dominant trends of capitalism all exacerbate its irrationalities and injustice:** growing inequality increases profit margins; the replacement of living labor by technology neither enhances the character of work itself nor shortens the work day, but it does increase profits (surplus value). (vi) Growing profits enable the growth of monopolies and the consequent weakening of the political power of the laboring class" (pg. xix)
    - A Note on Dialectic, by H. Marcuse (pg. xxii)
      - "As Hegel defines it: **'Thinking is, indeed, essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us.'**" (pg. xxii)
      - **"This world contradicts itself. Common sense and science purge themselves from this contradiction; but philosophical thought begins with the recognition that the facts do not correspond to the concepts imposed by common sense and scientific reason—in short, with the refusal to accept**

- them. To the extent that these concepts disregard the fatal contradictions which make up reality, they abstract from the very process of reality. **The negation which dialectic applies to them is not only a critique of a conformistic logic, which denies the reality of contradictions; it is also a critique of the given state of affairs on its own grounds—of the established system of life, which denies its own promises and potentialities**" (pg. xxii-xxiii)
- **"The power of negative thinking is the driving power of dialectical thought, used as a tool for analyzing the world of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy.** I choose this vague and unscientific formulation in order to sharpen the contrast between dialectical and undialectical thinking. 'Inadequacy' implies a value judgment. Dialectical thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only within the subject-object totality. All facts embody the knower as well as the doer; they continuously translate the past into the present. The objects thus 'contain' subjectivity in their very structure." (pg. xxiii)
  - **"Nothing is 'real' which does not sustain itself in existence, in a life-and-death struggle with the situations and conditions of its existence.** The struggle may be blind or even unconscious, as in inorganic matter; it may be conscious and concerted, such as the struggle of mankind with its own conditions and with those of nature. **Reality is the constantly renewed result of the process of existence—the process, conscious or unconscious in which 'that which is' becomes 'other than itself';** and identity is only the continuous negation of inadequate existence, the subject maintaining itself in being other than itself. Each reality, therefore, is a realization—a development of 'subjectivity.' The latter 'comes to itself' in history, where the development has a rational content; Hegel defines it as 'progress in the consciousness of freedom.'" (pg. xxiii-xxiv)
  - **"freedom is for Hegel an ontological category: it means being not a mere object, but the subject of one's existence; not succumbing to external conditions, but transforming factuality into realization.** This transformation is, according to Hegel, the energy of nature and history, the inner structure of all being! One may be tempted to scoff at this idea, but one should be aware of its implications. Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; that is to say, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as 'other than they are.' Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is a faulty logic. Thought 'corresponds' to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure. Here the principle of dialectic drives thought beyond the limits of philosophy. For to comprehend reality means to comprehend what things really are, and this in turn means rejecting their mere factuality. Rejection is the process of thought as well as of action. While the scientific method leads from the immediate experience of things to their mathematical-logical structure, philosophical thought leads from the immediate experience of existence to its historical structure: the principle of freedom." (pg. xxiv)
  - **"Freedom is the innermost dynamic of existence,** and the very process of existence in an unfree world is 'the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny (aufheben) freedom.' Thus freedom is essentially negative: existence is both alienation and the process by which the subject comes to itself in comprehending and mastering alienation." (pg. xxiv-xxv)
    - "Freedom is relegated to the realm of pure thought, to the Absolute Idea. Idealism by default: Hegel shares this fate with the main philosophical tradition" (pg. xxv)
  - **"Dialectical thought thus becomes negative in itself. Its function is to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core of things that the development of their internal contradictions leads necessarily to qualitative change: the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs.** Hegel sees the task of knowledge as that of recognizing the world as Reason by understanding all objects of thought as elements and aspects of a totality which becomes a conscious world in the history of mankind. Dialectical analysis ultimately tends to become historical analysis, in which nature itself appears as part and stage in its own history and in the history of man. The progress of cognition from common sense to knowledge arrives at a world which is negative in its very structure because that which is real opposes and denies the potentialities inherent in itself—potentialities which themselves strive for realization. **Reason is the negation of the negative**" (pg. xxv)
    - **"Interpretation of that-which-is in terms of that-which-is-not, confrontation of the given facts with that which they exclude—this has been the concern of philosophy wherever philosophy was more than a matter of ideological justification or mental exercise.** The liberating function of negation in philosophical thought depends upon the recognition that the **negation is a positive act: that-which-is repels that-which-is-not** and, in doing so, repels its own real possibilities. Consequently, **to express and define that-which-is on its own terms is to distort and falsify reality.** Reality is other and more than that codified in the logic and language of facts. Here is the inner link between dialectical thought and the effort of avant-garde literature: **the effort to break the power of facts over the word, and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts.** As the power of the given facts tends to become totalitarian, to absorb all opposition, and to define the entire universe of discourse, the effort to speak the language of contradiction appears increasingly irrational, obscure, artificial. The question is not that of a direct or indirect influence of Hegel on the genuine avant-garde, though this is evident in Mallarmé and Villiers de 'Isle-Adam, in surrealism, in Brecht. Dialectic and poetic language meet, rather, on common ground." (pg. xxv-xxvi)
      - "Here it must suffice to emphasize that, by virtue of this principle, the dialectical contradiction is distinguished from all pseudo- and crackpot opposition, beatnik and hipsterism. The negation is determinate if it refers the established state of affairs to the basic factors and forces which make for its destructiveness, as well as for the possible alternatives beyond the status quo. In the human reality, they are historical factors and forces, and the determinate negation is ultimately a political negation. As such, it may well find authentic expression in nonpolitical language, and the more so as the entire dimension of politics becomes an integral part of the status quo." (pg. xxvii)
      - **"Dialectical logic is critical logic: it reveals modes and contents of thought which transcend the codified pattern of use and validation.** **Dialectical thought does not invent these contents; they have accrued to the notions in the long tradition of thought and action.** **Dialectical analysis merely assembles and reactivates them; it recovers tabooed meanings and thus appears almost as a return, or rather a conscious liberation, of the repressed!** Since the established universe of discourse is that of an unfree world, dialectical thought is necessarily destructive, and whatever liberation it may bring is a liberation in thought, in theory. However, the divorce of thought from action, of theory from practice, is itself part of the unfree world. No thought and no theory can undo it; but theory may help to prepare the ground for their possible reunion, and the ability of thought to develop a logic and language of contradiction is a prerequisite for this task" (pg. xxvii-xxviii)
    - **"This historical stage has changed the situation of philosophy and of all cognitive thought. From this stage on, all thinking that does not testify to an awareness of the radical falsity of the established forms of life is faulty thinking.** Abstraction from this all-pervasive condition is not merely immoral; it is false. For reality has become technological reality, and the subject is now joined with the object so closely that the notion of object necessarily includes the subject. Abstraction from their interrelation no longer leads to a more genuine reality but to deception, because even in this sphere the subject itself is apparently a constitutive part of the object as scientifically determined. The observing, measuring, calculating, subject of scientific method, and the subject of the daily business of life—both are expressions of the same subjectivity: man" (pg. xxix)
      - **"This power of facts is an oppressive power; it is the power of man over man,** appearing as objective and rational condition. **Against this appearance, thought continues to protest in the name of truth.** And in the name of fact: for it is the supreme and universal fact that the status quo perpetuates itself through the constant threat of atomic destruction, through the unprecedented waste of resources, through mental impoverishment, and—last but not least—through brute force. These are the unresolved contradictions. They define every single fact and every single event; they permeate the entire universe of discourse and action. Thus they define also the logic of things: that is, the mode of thought capable of piercing the ideology and of comprehending reality whole. **No method can claim a monopoly of cognition, but no method seems**

**authentic which does not recognize that these two propositions are meaningful descriptions of our situation: 'The whole is the truth,' and the whole is false."** (pg. xxx)

- Preface, by H. Marcuse (pg. xxxi)
  - "The content of a truly philosophical work does not remain unchanged with time. If its concepts have an essential bearing upon the aims and interests of men, a fundamental change in the historical situation will make them see its teachings in a new light. **In our time, the rise of Fascism calls for a reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy.** We hope that the analysis offered here will demonstrate that **Hegel's basic concepts are hostile to the tendencies that have led into Fascist theory and practice.**" (pg. xxxi)
- Part 1 (The Foundations of Hegel's Philosophy), Introduction (pg. 3)
  - **"German idealism has been called the theory of the French Revolution.** This does not imply that Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel furnished a theoretical interpretation of the French Revolution, but that they wrote their philosophy largely as a response to the challenge from France to reorganize the state and society on a rational basis, so that social and political institutions might accord with the freedom and interest of the individual." (pg. 3)
    - "The ideas of the French Revolution thus appear in the very core of the idealistic systems, and, to a great extent, determine their conceptual structure. As the German idealists saw it, the French Revolution not only abolished feudal absolutism, replacing it with the economic and political system of the middle class, but it completed what the German Reformation had begun, emancipating the individual as a self-reliant master of his life. Man's position in the world, the mode of his labor and enjoyment, was no longer to depend on some external authority, but on his own free rational activity. Man had passed the long period of immaturity during which he had been victimized by overwhelming natural and social forces, and had become the autonomous subject of his own development. From now on, the struggle with nature and with social organization was to be guided by his own progress in knowledge. The world was to be an order of reason" (pg. 3-4)
  - **"The concept of reason is central to Hegel's philosophy.** He held that philosophical thinking presupposes nothing beyond it, that history deals with reason and with reason alone, and that the state is the realization of reason." (pg. 5)
    - **"The core of Hegel's philosophy is a structure the concepts of which—freedom, subject, mind, notion— are derived from the idea of reason."** (pg. 5)
      - "In Hegel's view, the decisive turn that history took with the French Revolution was that man came to rely on his mind and dared to submit the given reality to the standards of reason" (pg. 5)
        - ◆ "Hegel expounds the new development through a contrast between an employment of reason and an uncritical compliance with the prevailing conditions of life. 'Nothing is reason that is not the result of thinking.' Man has set out to organize reality according to the demands of his free rational thinking instead of simply accommodating his thoughts to the existing order and the prevailing values. **Man is a thinking being. His reason enables him to recognize his own potentialities and those of his world. He is thus not at the mercy of the facts that surround him, but is capable of subjecting them to a higher standard, that of reason.** If he follows its lead, he will arrive at certain conceptions that disclose reason to be antagonistic to the existing state of affairs. He may find that history is a constant struggle for freedom, that man's individuality requires that he possess property as the medium of his fulfillment, and that all men have an equal right to develop their human faculties. Actually, however, bondage and inequality prevail; most men have no liberty at all and are deprived of their last scrap of property. Consequently the 'unreasonable' reality has to be altered until it comes into conformity with reason. In the given case, the existing social order has to be reorganized, absolutism and the remainders of feudalism have to be abolished, free competition has to be established, everyone has to be made equal before the law, and so on" (pg. 5-6)
    - "According to Hegel, the French Revolution enunciated reason's ultimate power over reality. He sums this up by saying that the principle of the French Revolution asserted that thought ought to govern reality. The implications involved in this statement lead into the very center of his philosophy. **Thought ought to govern reality. What men think to be true, right, and good ought to be realized in the actual organization of their societal and individual life.** Thinking, however, varies among individuals, and the resulting diversity of individual opinions cannot provide a guiding principle for the common organization of life. Unless man possesses concepts and principles of thought that denote universally valid conditions and norms, his thought cannot claim to govern reality. In line with the tradition of Western philosophy, **Hegel believes that such objective concepts and principles exist. Their totality he calls reason.**" (pg. 6)
      - "The philosophies of the French Enlightenment and their revolutionary successors all posited reason as an objective historical force which, once freed from the fetters of despotism, would make the world a place of progress and happiness...By virtue of its own power, reason would triumph over social irrationality and overthrow the oppressors of mankind." (pg. 6-7)
        - ◆ "But to Hegel, reason cannot govern reality unless reality has become rational in itself. This rationality is made possible through the subject's entering the very content of nature and history. The objective reality is thus also the realization of the subject. It is this conception that Hegel summarized in the most fundamental of his propositions, namely, that Being is, in its substance, a 'subject.'" (pg. 7)
  - "Everything that exists is 'real' only in so far as it operates as a 'self' through all the contradictory relations that constitute its existence. It must thus be considered a kind of 'subject' that carries itself forward by unfolding its inherent contradictions." (pg. 7)
    - "Man alone has the power of self-realization, the power to be a self-determining subject in all processes of becoming, for he alone has an understanding of potentialities and a knowledge of 'notions.' His very existence is the process of actualizing his potentialities, of molding his life according to the notions of reason. We encounter here the most important category of reason, namely, freedom. **Reason presupposes freedom,** the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. The fulfillment of these ends belongs only to the subject who is master of his own development and who understands his own potentialities as well as those of the things around him. **Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason,** for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power" (pg. 8)
  - "Unless man succeeds in reuniting the separated parts of his world and in bringing nature and society within the scope of his reason, he is forever doomed to frustration. The task of philosophy in this period of general disintegration is to demonstrate the principle that will restore the missing unity and totality" (pg. 19-20)
    - "Reason is the veritable form of reality in which all antagonisms of subject and object are integrated to form a genuine unity and universality. Hegel's philosophy is thus necessarily a system, subsuming all realms of being under the all-embracing idea of reason. The inorganic as well as the organic world, nature as well as society, are here brought under the sway of mind." (pg. 20)
      - "The realm of mind achieves in freedom what the realm of nature achieves in blind necessity—the fulfillment of the potentialities inherent in reality. It is this state of reality which Hegel refers to as 'the truth.' **Truth is not only attached to propositions and judgments, it is, in short, not only an attribute of thought, but of reality in process.** Something is true if it is what it can be, fulfilling all its objective possibilities. In Hegel's language, it is then identical with its 'notion'" (pg. 20)
    - **"The realization of reason is not a fact but a task.** The form in which the objects immediately appear is not yet their true form. What is simply given is at first negative, other than its real potentialities. It becomes true only in the process of overcoming this negativity, so that **the birth of**

- the truth requires the death of the given state of being.** Hegel's optimism is based upon a destructive conception of the given. All forms are seized by the dissolving movement of reason which cancels and alters them until they are adequate to their notion. It is this movement that thought reflects in the process of 'mediation' (Vermittlung). If we follow the true content of our perceptions and concepts, all delimitation of stable objects collapses. They are dissolved into a multitude of relations that exhaust the developed content of these objects and terminate in the subject's comprehensive activity" (pg. 21-22)
- **"Hegel's philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reaction termed it, a negative philosophy.** It is originally motivated by the conviction that the given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth are in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established by their destruction. **The driving force of the dialectical method lies in this critical conviction. Dialectic in its entirety is linked to the conception that all forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this negativity determines their content and movement. The dialectic represents the counterthrust to any form of positivism.** From Hume to the present-day logical positivists, the principle of this latter philosophy has been the ultimate authority of the fact, and observing the immediate given has been the ultimate method of verification. In the middle of the nineteenth century, and primarily in response to the destructive tendencies of rationalism, positivism assumed the peculiar form of an all-embracing 'positive philosophy,' which was to replace traditional metaphysics. The protagonists of this positivism took great pains to stress the conservative and affirmative attitude of their philosophy: it induces thought to be satisfied with the facts, to renounce any transgression beyond them, and to bow to the given state of affairs. **To Hegel, the facts in themselves possess no authority.** They are 'posited' (gesetzt) by the subject that has mediated them with the comprehensive process of its development. Verification rests, in the last analysis, with this process to which all facts are related and which determines their content. Everything that is given has to be justified before reason, which is but the totality of nature's and man's capacities." (pg. 22)
  - Chapter 1 - Hegel's Early Theological Writings (1790-1800) (pg. 26)
    - "Hegel's first discussion of religious and political problems strikes the pervasive note that **the loss of unity and liberty—a historical fact—is the general mark of the modern era and the factor that characterizes all conditions of private and societal life.** This loss of freedom and unity, Hegel says, is patent in the numerous conflicts that abound in human living, especially in the conflict between man and nature. This conflict, which turned nature into a hostile power that had to be mastered by man, has led to an antagonism between idea and reality, between thought and the real, between consciousness and existence. Man constantly finds himself set off from a world that is adverse and alien to his impulses and desires. How, then, is this world to be restored to harmony with man's potentialities? At first, Hegel's answer was that of the student of theology. He interpreted Christianity as having a basic function in world history, that of giving a new 'absolute' center to man and a final goal to life. Hegel could also see, however, that the revealed truth of the Gospel could not fit in with the expanding social and political realities of the world, for the Gospel appealed essentially to the individual as an individual detached from his social and political nexus; its essential aim was to save the individual and not society or the state. It was therefore not religion that could solve the problem, or theology that could set forth principles to restore freedom and unity. As a result, Hegel's interest slowly shifted from theological to philosophical questions and concepts. Hegel always viewed philosophy not as a special science but as the ultimate form of human knowledge. **The need for philosophy he derived from the need to remedy the general loss of freedom and unity**" (pg. 30)
      - "The unifying force he speaks of refers to the vital harmony of the individual and common interest, which prevailed in the ancient republics and which assured the liberty of the whole and integrated all conflicts into the living unity of the Volkgeist. When this harmony was lost, man's life became overwhelmed by pervasive conflicts that could no longer be controlled by the whole. We have already mentioned the terms in which Hegel characterized these conflicts: nature was set against man, reality was estranged from 'the idea' and consciousness opposed to existence. He next summarized all these oppositions as having the general form of a conflict between subject and object, and in this way he connected his historical problem to the philosophical one that had dominated European thought since Descartes. Man's knowledge and will had been pushed into a 'subjective' world, whose self-certainty and freedom confronted an objective world of uncertainty and physical necessity. The more Hegel saw that the contradictions were the universal form of reality, the more philosophical his discussion became—only the most universal concepts could now grasp the contradictions, and only the ultimate principles of knowledge could yield the principles to resolve them" (pg. 31)
    - "Only man, by virtue of his knowledge, can achieve 'the idea of Life.' We have already indicated that for Hegel a perfect union of subject and object is a prerequisite to freedom. The union presupposes a knowledge of the truth, meaning thereby a knowledge of the potentialities of both subject and object. **Man alone is able to transform objective conditions so that they become a medium for his subjective development.** And the truth he holds frees not only his own potencies, but those of nature as well. He brings the truth into the world, and with it is able to organize the world in conformity with reason" (pg. 33)
      - *\*this is a case of 'autonomy' as opposed to 'heteronomy'*
    - "For, **Hegel's philosophy is in a large sense a re-interpretation of Aristotle's ontology,** rescued from the distortion of metaphysical dogma and linked to the pervasive demand of modern rationalism that the world be transformed into a medium for the freely developing subject, that the world become, in short, the reality of reason. Hegel was the first to rediscover the extremely dynamic character of the Aristotelian metaphysics, which treats all being as process and movement—a dynamic that had got entirely lost in the formalistic tradition of Aristotelianism" (pg. 35)
  - Chapter 2 - Towards the System of Philosophy (1800-1802) (pg. 37)
    - "As we have seen, **Hegel took the view that philosophy arises from the all-embracing contradictions into which human existence has been plunged.**" (pg. 37)
    - "The first concept Hegel subjected to dialectical re-interpretation was that of reason. Kant had made the basic distinction between reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand). Hegel gave both concepts new meaning and made them the starting point of his method. **For him, the distinction between understanding and reason is the same as that between common sense and speculative thinking, between undialectical reflection and dialectical knowledge. The operations of the understanding yield the usual type of thinking that prevails in everyday life as well as in science.** The world is taken as a multitude of determinate things, each of which is demarcated from the other. Each thing is a distinct delimited entity related as such to other likewise delimited entities. The concepts that are developed from these beginnings, and the judgments composed of these concepts, denote and deal with isolated things and the fixed relations between such things. The individual determinations exclude one another as if they were atoms or monads. The one is not the other and can never become the other." (pg. 38)
      - **"Isolation and opposition are not, however, the final state of affairs. The world must not remain a complex of fixed disparates. The unity that underlies the antagonisms must be grasped and realized by reason, which has the task of reconciling the opposites and 'sublating' them in a true unity.** The fulfillment of reason's task would at the same time involve restoring the lost unity in the social relations of men." (pg. 39)
        - "As distinguished from the understanding, reason is motivated by the need 'to restore the totality.'" (pg. 39)
    - "The identity of essence and existence, per contra, can only result from the enduring effort of reason to create it. It comes about only through a conscious putting into action of knowledge, the primary condition for which is the abandonment of common sense and mere understanding for **'speculative thinking.'** Hegel insists that only this kind of thinking can get beyond the distorting mechanisms of the prevailing state of being. Speculative thinking compares the apparent or given form of things to the potentialities of those same things, and in so doing distinguishes their essence from their accidental state of existence. This result is achieved not through some process of mystical intuition, but by a method of conceptual cognition, which examines the process whereby each form has become what it is. Speculative thinking conceives 'the intellectual and material world' not as a totality of fixed and stable relations, but 'as a becoming, and its being as a product and a producing.'" (pg. 39-40)

- **"What Hegel calls speculative thinking is in effect his earliest presentation of dialectical method.** The relation between dialectical thinking (reason) and isolating reflection (understanding) is clearly defined. The former criticizes and supersedes the fixed oppositions created by the latter. It undermines the 'security' of common sense and demonstrates that 'what common sense regards as immediately certain does not have any reality for philosophy.' **The first criterion of reason, then, is a distrust of matter-of-fact authority.** Such distrust is the real skepticism that Hegel designates as 'the free portion' of every true philosophy" (pg. 40)
  - "Here, in his first philosophical writings, **Hegel intentionally emphasizes the negative function of reason: its destruction of the fixed and secure world of common sense and understanding.** The absolute is referred to as 'Night' and 'nothing,' to contrast it to the clearly defined objects of everyday life. Reason signifies the 'absolute annihilation' of the common-sense world. For, as we have already said, the struggle against common sense is the beginning of speculative thinking, and the loss of everyday security is the origin of philosophy" (pg. 41)
- Chapter 3 - Hegel's First System (1802-1806) (pg. 54)
  - "Hegel, too, believed in a unity of thought and being, but, as we have already seen, his conception of the unity differed from Kant's. He rejected Kant's idealism on the ground that it assumed the existence of 'things-in-themselves' apart from 'phenomena,' and left these 'things' untouched by the human mind and therefore untouched by reason. **The Kantian philosophy left a gulf between thought and being, or between subject and object, which the Hegelian philosophy sought to bridge.** The bridge was to be made by positing one universal structure of all being. Being was to be a process wherein a thing 'comprehends' or 'grasps' the various states of its existence and draws them into the more or less enduring unity of its 'self,' thus actively constituting itself as 'the same' throughout all change. Everything, in other words, exists more or less as a 'subject.' The identical structure of movement that thus runs through the entire realm of being unites the objective and subjective worlds" (pg. 55)
  - "Hegel's dialectic is permeated with the profound conviction that all immediate forms of existence—in nature and history—are 'bad,' because they do not permit things to be what they can be. **True existence begins only when the immediate state is recognized as negative, when beings become 'subjects' and strive to adapt their outward state to their potentialities.**" (pg. 57)
    - **"The dialectical process receives its motive power from the pressure to overcome the negativity. Dialectics is a process in a world where the mode of existence of men and things is made up of contradictory relations, so that any particular content can be unfolded only through passing into its opposite.** The latter is an integral part of the former, and the whole content is the totality of all contradictory relations implied in it. Logically, the dialectic has its beginning when human understanding finds itself unable to grasp something adequately from its given qualitative or quantitative forms. The given quality or quantity seems to be a 'negation' of the thing that possesses this quality or quantity. We shall have to follow Hegel's explanation of this point in some detail" (pg. 58)
      - "The understanding simply follows out the relations, as each is entailed, adding one to the next in the vain effort to exhaust and delimit the object. The procedure has a rational core, but only inasmuch as it presupposes that the essence of the object is made up of its relations to other objects. The relations cannot, however, be grasped by the 'spurious infinity' of mere 'added connections' (Und-Beziehungen) by which common sense links one object with another" (pg. 59)
        - ◆ *"meaning, this method supposes to-begin-with (i.e., before it proceeds with 'unfolding') that there is something "left-over" (or) "held-out" from what "is". This has been a main challenge by positivism - even by various types of rationalism - as it is difficult to 'concretely' justify (or, qualitatively and/or quantitatively demonstrate / enumerate) what's 'not-yet', especially when putting forth the idea that such 'not-yet' has a way about itself which included 'could-be' (i.e., that nothingness includes potentiality). Now, a rationalist would bite back to the positivist attack of such an inability to immediately and concretely justify with arguing that it's a false method to deal with something so abstract (i.e., non-particular or material) as (not) and (could be) through matters non-abstract. Meaning, looking at into the world of things to discern ways and ideas of how things are (and, come to be) by default already sets in focus what "is", which is not what's in question - rather, it is what's "not", which means a different method must be used. This divide in method naturally invites skepticism. And, philosophy, unfortunately, over the centuries, has devolved to focusing on the skeptical void - that is, battling over minute arguments and figuring out clever singular justifications to sub-sub-universal problems - at the expense of making philosophy useful to the common person. Standing in our great hall, we've resorted to hurling books at each other in anger of each other's beliefs and perspectives while all the average person walking by sees is a dirty room full of old people and not the knowledge which stew in their mind or fills the pages.*
  - "This is the mode of being or existence that Hegel describes as 'real infinity.' Infinity is not something behind or beyond finite things, but is their true reality. The infinite is the mode of existence in which all potentialities are realized and in which all being reaches its ultimate form" (pg. 60)
  - "Hegel's early political philosophy is reminiscent of the origins of political theory in modern society. **Hobbes also founded his Leviathan State upon the otherwise unconquerable chaos, the bellum omnium contra omnes, of individualistic society.** Between Hobbes and Hegel, however, lies the period in which the absolutist state had unleashed the economic forces of capitalism, and in which political economy had uncovered some of the mechanisms of the capitalist labor process. Hegel had indulged in a study of political economy. His analysis of civil society got to the root structure of modern society and presented elaborate critical analysis, whereas Hobbes got and used intuitive insight. And even more, Hegel discovered in the upsurge of the French Revolution principles that pointed beyond the given framework of individualist society. The ideas of reason and freedom, of a unity between the common and the particular interest, denoted, for him, values that could not be sacrificed to the state. He struggled all his life to render them consonant with the necessity of 'controlling and curbing.' His attempts to solve the problem are manifold, and the final triumph goes not to the Leviathan, but to the rational state under the rule of law." (pg. 68-69)
    - "Hegel views the contract as one of the foundations of modern society; the society is actually a framework of contracts between individuals" (pg. 70)
  - "The *Philosophy of Mind*, and in fact the whole of the Hegelian system, is a portrayal of the process whereby 'the individual becomes universal' and whereby 'the construction of universality' takes place." (pg. 76)
- Chapter 4 - The Phenomenology of Mind (pg. 78)
  - "Hegel saw that the result of the French Revolution was not the realization of freedom, but the establishment of a new despotism." (pg. 78)
  - "Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* thus presents the immanent history of human experience" (pg. 80)
    - "The factor that determines the course of this experience is the changing relation between consciousness and its objects. If the philosophizing subject adheres to its objects and lets itself be guided by their meaning, it will find that the objects undergo a change by which their form as well as their relation to the subject alters. When experience begins, the object seems a stable entity, independent of consciousness; subject and object appear to be alien to one another. The progress of knowledge, however, reveals that the two do not subsist in isolation. It becomes clear that the object gets its objectivity from the subject. 'The real,' which consciousness actually holds in the endless flux of sensations and perceptions, is a universal that cannot be reduced to objective elements free of the subject (for example, quality, thing, force, laws). In other words, the real object is constituted by the (intellectual) activity of the subject; somehow, it essentially 'pertains' to the subject. The latter discovers that it itself stands 'behind' the objects, that the world becomes real only by force of the comprehending power of consciousness" (pg. 81)
      - "...Hegel declares the subject to be 'absolute negativity,' signifying that it has the power to negate every given condition and to make it its

- own conscious work. This is not an epistemological activity and cannot be carried out solely within the process of knowledge, for that process cannot be severed from the historical struggle between man and his world, a struggle that is itself a constitutive part of the way to truth and of the truth itself. The subject must make the world its own doing if it is to recognize itself as the only reality. The process of knowledge becomes the process of history." (pg. 81)
- "Hegel describes the French Revolution as the unloosing of a 'self-destructive' freedom, self-destructive because the consciousness that strove here to change the world in accordance with its subjective interests had not yet found its truth. In other words, man did not discover his real interest, he did not freely place himself under laws that secure his own freedom and that of the whole. The new state created by the Revolution, Hegel says, only altered the external form of the objective world, making it a medium for the subject, but it did not achieve the subject's essential freedom." (pg. 82)
  - "Philosophical knowledge aims only at the 'essentials' that have a constitutive bearing upon man's destiny and that of his world. The sole object of philosophy is the world in its true form, the world as reason. Reason, again, comes into its own only with the development of mankind. Philosophic truth, therefore, is quite definitely concerned with man's existence; it is his innermost prod and goal. This, in the last analysis, is the meaning of the statement that truth is immanent in the object of philosophy. The truth fashions the very existence of the object and is not, as in mathematics, indifferent to it. Existing in truth is a matter of life (and death), and the way to truth is not only an epistemological but also a historical process." (pg. 85)
    - "The dialectical method conforms to this structure that the philosophic object has, and attempts to reconstruct and follow its real movement. A philosophic system is true only if it **includes the negative state and the positive, and reproduces the process of becoming false and then returning to truth**. As a system of this kind, the dialectic is the true method of philosophy. It shows that the object with which it deals exists in a state of 'negativity,' which the object, through the pressures of its own existence, throws off in the process of regaining its truth" (pg. 86)
  - "Knowledge begins when philosophy destroys the experience of daily life. Analysis of this experience is the starting point of the search for truth. The object of experience is first given through the senses and takes the form of sense-knowledge or sense-certainty (sinnliche Gewissheit). Characteristic of this kind of experience is the fact that its subject as well as its object appears as an 'individual this,' here and now. I see this house, here at this particular place and at this particular moment. The house is taken as 'real' and seems to exist per se. The 'I' that sees it seems to be unessential, 'can as well be as not be,' and 'only knows the object because the object exists'" (pg. 88)
    - "Sense-experience thus discovers that truth lies neither with its particular object nor with the individual 'I'. The truth is the result of a double process of negation, namely, (1) the negation of the 'per se' existence of the object, and (2) the negation of the individual 'I' with the shifting of the truth to the universal 'I'. Objectivity is thus twice 'mediated' or constructed by consciousness and henceforward remains tied to consciousness. The development of the objective world is throughout interwoven in the development of consciousness." (pg. 90)
  - "Hegel hit upon the same fact within the dimension of philosophy. Common sense and traditional scientific thought take the world as a totality of things, more or less existing per se, and seek the truth in objects that are taken to be independent of the knowing subject. This is more than an epistemological attitude; it is as pervasive as the practice of men and leads them to accept the feeling that they are secure only in knowing and handling objective facts. The more remote an idea is from the impulses, interests, and wants of the living subject, the more true it becomes. And this, according to Hegel, is the utmost defamation of truth. For there is, in the last analysis, no truth that does not essentially concern the living subject and that is not the subject's truth. The world is an estranged and untrue world so long as man does not destroy its dead objectivity and recognize himself and his own life 'behind' the fixed form of things and laws. When he finally wins this self-consciousness, he is on his way not only to the truth of himself but also of his world. And with the recognition goes the doing. He will try to put this truth into action and make the world what it essentially is, namely, the fulfillment of man's self-consciousness" (pg. 95)
    - "Positivism, the philosophy of common sense, appeals to the certainty of facts, but, as Hegel shows, in a world where facts do not at all present what reality can and ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up the real potentialities of mankind for a false and alien world. The positivist attack on universal concepts, on the ground they cannot be reduced to observable facts, cancels from the domain of knowledge everything that may not yet be a fact. In demonstrating that sense-experience and perception, to which positivism appeals, in themselves imply and mean not the particular observed fact but something universal, Hegel is giving a final immanent refutation of positivism. When he emphasizes time and again that the universal is pre-eminent over the particular, he is struggling against limiting truth to the particular 'given.' **The universal is more than the particular. This signifies in the concrete that the potentialities of men and things are not exhausted in the given forms and relations in which they may actually appear; it means that men and things are all they have been and actually are, and yet more than all this**. Setting the truth in the universal expressed Hegel's conviction that no given particular form, whether in nature or society, embodies the whole truth. Moreover, it was a way of denouncing the isolation of men from things and of recognizing that their potentialities could not be preserved except in their reintegration." (pg. 96)
  - Chapter 5 - The Science of Logic (pg. 103)
    - "If, then, truth is to be attained, the influence of common sense must be swept away and with it the categories of traditional logic, which are, after all, the philosophical categories of common sense that stabilize and perpetuate a false reality. And the task of breaking the hold of common sense belongs to the dialectical logic. Hegel repeats over and over that dialectics has this 'negative' character. The negative 'constitutes the quality of dialectical Reason,' and the first step 'towards the true concept of Reason' is a 'negative step'; the negative 'constitutes the genuine dialectical procedure.' In all these uses 'negative' has a twofold reference: it indicates, first, the negation of the fixed and static categories of common sense and, secondly, the negative and therefore untrue character of the world designated by these categories. As we have already seen, negativity is manifest in the very process of reality, so that nothing that exists is true in its given form. Every single thing has to evolve new conditions and forms if it is to fulfill its potentialities" (pg. 105)
      - "The dialectical categories construct a topsy-turvy world, opening with the identity of being and nothing and closing with the notion as the true reality. **Hegel plays up the absurd and paradoxical character of this world, but he who follows the dialectical process to the end discovers that the paradox is the receptacle of the hidden truth and that the absurdity is rather a quality possessed by the correct schema of common sense**, which, cleansed of their dross, contains the latent truth. For the dialectic shows latent in common sense the dangerous implication that the form in which the world is given and organized may contradict its true content, that is to say, that the potentialities inherent in men and things may require the dissolution of the given forms. Formal logic accepts the world-form as it is and gives some general rules for theoretical orientation to it. Dialectical logic, on the other hand, rejects any claim of sanctity for the given, and shatters the complacency of those living under its rubric. It holds that 'external existence' is never the sole criterion of the truth of a content, but that every form of existence must justify before a higher tribunal whether it is adequate to its content or not" (pg. 111)
    - "The knowledge that appearance and essence do not jibe is the beginning of truth. **The mark of dialectical thinking is the ability to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality and to grasp their relation**" (pg. 123)
      - "The concept of reality has thus turned into the concept of possibility. **The real is not yet 'actual,' but is at first only the possibility of an actual**. Mere possibility belongs to the very character of reality; it is not imposed by an arbitrary speculative act. The possible and the real are in a dialectical relation that requires a special condition in order to be operative, and that condition must be one in fact." (pg. 126)
        - "The content of a given reality bears the seed of its transformation into a new form, and its transformation is a 'process of necessity,' in the sense that it is the sole way in which a contingent real becomes actual. The dialectical interpretation of actuality does away with the

- traditional opposition between contingency, possibility, and necessity, and integrates them all as moments of one comprehensive process. Necessity presupposes a reality that is contingent, that is, one which in its prevailing form holds possibilities that are not realized. Necessity is the process in which that contingent reality attains its adequate form. Hegel calls this the process of actuality" (pg. 128)
- "Actuality thus is the title for the final unity of being that is no longer subject to change, because it exercises autonomous power over all change—not simple identity but 'self-identity.' Such a self-identity can be attained only through the medium of self-consciousness and cognition. For only a being that has the faculty of knowing its own possibilities and those of its world can transform every given state of existence into a condition for its free self-realization. True reality presupposes freedom, and freedom presupposes knowledge of the truth. The true reality, therefore, must be understood as the realization of a knowing subject. Hegel's analysis of actuality thus leads to the idea of the subject as the truly actual in all reality" (pg. 129)
  - "The concept of the subject, however, is not the last step of Hegel's analysis. He now proceeds to demonstrate that **the subject is notion.** He has shown that **the subject's freedom consists of its faculty to comprehend what is.** In other words, freedom derives its content from the knowledge of the truth. But the form in which the truth is held is the notion. Freedom is, in the last analysis, not an attribute of the thinking subject as such, but of the truth that this subject holds and wields. Freedom is thus an attribute of the notion, and the true form of reality in which the essence of being is realized is the notion. The notion 'exists,' however, only in the thinking subject" (pg. 130)
    - "According to Hegel, the notion is the subject's activity and, as such, the true form of reality" (pg. 130)
  - **Hegel's idea of the notion reverses the ordinary relation between thought and reality, and becomes the cornerstone of philosophy as a critical theory. According to commonsense thinking, knowledge becomes the more unreal the more it abstracts from reality. For Hegel, the opposite is true. The abstraction from reality, which the formation of the notion requires, makes the notion not poorer but richer than reality, because it leads from the facts to their essential content. The truth cannot be gleaned from the facts as long as the subject does not yet live in them but rather stands against them. The world of facts is not rational but has to be brought to reason, that is, to a form in which the reality actually corresponds to the truth.** As long as this has not been accomplished, the truth rests with the abstract notion and not with the concrete reality. The task of abstraction consists in the 'transcendence and reduction of reality [as from mere appearance] to the essential, which manifests itself in the Notion only.' With the formation of the notion, abstraction does not desert, but leads into actuality. What nature and history actually are will not be found in the prevailing facts; the world is not that harmonious. **Philosophical knowledge is thus set against reality, and this opposition is expressed in the abstract character of the philosophical notions.** 'Philosophy is not meant to be a narrative of what happens, but a cognition of what is true in happenings, and out of the body of truth it has to comprehend that which in the narrative appears as mere happening.'" (pg. 131)
    - "Dialectical logic holds that every particular content is formed by the universal principle that determines the movement of the whole." (pg. 133)
  - "The French Revolution had again shown that modern society was a system of irreconcilable antagonisms. Hegel recognized that the relations of civil society could, owing to the particular mode of labor on which they were based, never provide for perfect freedom and perfect reason. In this society, man remained subject to the laws of an unmastered economy, and had to be tamed by a strong state, capable of coping with the social contradictions. The final truth had therefore to be sought in another sphere of reality. Hegel's political philosophy was governed throughout by this conviction. The Logic also bears the mark of resignation." (pg. 137)
    - "The absolute idea is the true notion of reality and, as such, the highest form of cognition. It is, as it were, dialectical thought, unfolded in its totality. However, it is dialectical thought and thus contains its negation; it is not a harmonious and stable form but a process of unification of opposites. It is not complete except in its otherness. The absolute idea is the subject in its final form, thought. Its otherness and negation is the object, being. The absolute idea now has to be interpreted as objective being. Hegel's Logic thus ends where it began, with the category of being. This, however, is a different being that can no longer be explained through the concepts applied in the analysis that opened the Logic. For being now is understood in its notion, that is, as a concrete totality wherein all particular forms subsist as the essential distinctions and relations of one comprehensive principle. Thus comprehended, being is nature, and dialectical thought passes on to the Philosophy of Nature" (pg. 138)
  - **"The process of reality is a 'circle,' showing the same absolute form in all its moments, namely, the return of being to itself through the negation of its otherness.** Hegel's system thus even cancels the idea of creation; all negativity is overcome by the inherent dynamic of reality. Nature achieves its truth when it enters the domain of history. The subject's development frees being from its blind necessity, and nature becomes a part of human history and thus a part of mind. History, in its turn, is the long road of mankind to conceptual and practical domination of nature and society, which comes to pass when man has been brought to reason and to a possession of the world as reason. The index that such a state has been achieved is, Hegel says, the fact that the true 'system of science' has been elaborated, meaning his own philosophical system. It embraces the whole world as a comprehended totality in which all things and relations appear in their actual form and content, that is, in their notion. The identity of subject and object, thought and reality, is there attained." (pg. 139-140)
  - Chapter 6 - The Political Philosophy (1816-1821) (pg. 143)
    - **"Hegel saw Napoleon as the historical hero fulfilling the destiny of the French Revolution;** he was, thought Hegel, the one man able to transform the achievements of 1789 into a state order and to connect individual freedom with the universal reason of a stable social system. It was not an abstract greatness he admired in Napoleon, but the 169 quality of expressing the historical need of the time. Napoleon was 'the soul of the world,' in whom the universal task of the time was embodied. That task was to consolidate and preserve the new form of society that stood for the principle of reason. We know that the principle of reason in society meant for Hegel a social order built on the rational autonomy of the individual. Individual freedom, however, had assumed the form of brute individualism; the freedom of each individual was pitted in life-and-death competitive struggle against that of every other. The Terror of 1793 exemplified this individualism and was its necessary outcome. The conflict among feudal estates had once attested that feudalism was no longer capable of uniting the individual and the general interest; the pervasive competitive freedom of individuals now witnessed that middle-class society also was not. Hegel saw in the sovereignty of the state the one principle that would bring unity" (pg. 144)
    - "It is not an inconsistency in Hegel's system that individual freedom is thus overshadowed by the authority vested in the universal, and that the rational finally comes forward in the guise of the given social order. The apparent inconsistency reflects the historical truth and mirrors the course of the antagonisms of individualist society, which turn freedom into necessity and reason into authority. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, to a considerable extent, owes its relevance to the fact that its basic concepts absorb and consciously retain the contradictions of this society and follow them to the bitter end. The work is reactionary in so far as the social order it reflects is so, and progressive in so far as it is progressive." (pg. 150)
    - **"The fault with Hegel lies much deeper than in his glorification of the Prussian monarchy. He is guilty not so much of being servile as of betraying his highest philosophical ideas. His political doctrine surrenders society to nature, freedom to necessity, reason to caprice.** And in so doing, it mirrors the destiny of the social order that falls, while in pursuit of its freedom, into a state of nature far below reason. The dialectical analysis of civil society had concluded that society was not capable of establishing reason and freedom of its own accord. Hegel therefore put forward a strong state to achieve this end and tried to reconcile that state with the idea of freedom by giving a strong constitutional flavoring to monarchy" (pg. 181)
      - **"Hegel was thus as cynical as Hobbes** on the subject of the bourgeois state, ending in a complete rejection of International Law. The state, the final subject that perpetuates competitive society, cannot be bound by a higher law, for such a law would amount to an external restriction of sovereignty and destroy the life-element of civil society. No contract is valid among states. Sovereignty cannot be circumscribed by treaties that imply in their very nature a mutual dependence of the parties involved. Sovereign states stand outside the world of civil interdependence; they exist in a 'state of nature.'" (pg. 183)

- Chapter 7 - The Philosophy of History (pg. 189)
  - **"Being, for dialectical logic, is a process through contradictions that determine the content and development of all reality.** The Logic had elaborated the timeless structure of this process, but the intrinsic connection, between the Logic and the other parts of the system, and, above all, the implications of the dialectical method destroy the very idea of timelessness. **The Logic had shown that the true being is the idea, but the idea unfolds itself 'in space' (as nature) and 'in time' (as mind).** Mind is of its very essence affected by time, for it exists only in the temporal process of history. The forms of the mind manifest themselves in time, and the history of the world is an exposition of mind in time. The dialectic thus gets to view reality temporally, and the 'negativity' that, in the Logic, determined the process of thought appears in the Philosophy of History as the destructive power of time. **The Logic had demonstrated the structure of reason; the Philosophy of History expounds the historical content of reason"** (pg. 189)
  - "As a natural being, man is confined to particular conditions—he is born in this or that place or time, a member of this or that nation, bound to share the fate of the particular whole to which he belongs. Yet, despite all this, man is essentially a thinking subject, and thought, we know, constitutes universality. Thought (1) lifts men beyond their particular determinations and (2) also makes the multitude of external things the medium for the subject's development. **This double universality, subjective and objective, characterizes the historical world wherein man unfolds his life"** (pg. 192)
  - **"The true subject of history is the universal, not the individual;** the true content is the realization of the self-consciousness of freedom, not the interests, needs, and actions of the individual." (pg. 193)
    - "The universal law of history is, in Hegel's formulation, not simply progress to freedom, but progress 'in the self-consciousness of freedom.' A set of historical tendencies becomes a law only if man comprehends and acts on them. Historical laws, in other words, originate and are actual only in man's conscious practice, so that if, for instance, there is a law of progress to ever higher forms of freedom, it ceases to operate if man fails to recognize and execute it. Hegel's philosophy of history might amount to a deterministic theory, but the determining factor is at least freedom. Progress depends on man's ability to grasp the universal interest of reason and on his will and vigor in making it a reality." (pg. 195)
    - **"The final subject of history Hegel calls the world mind (Weltgeist). Its reality lies in those actions, tendencies, efforts, and institutions that embody the interest of freedom and reason.** It does not exist separate from these realities, and acts through these agents and agencies. **The law of history, which the world mind represents, thus operates behind the backs and over the heads of individuals, in the form of an irresistible anonymous power"** (pg. 196)
      - "Hegel's conception of the world mind emphasizes that in these previous periods of recorded history man was not the self-conscious master of his existence. The divine power of the world mind appeared then an objective force that rules over the actions of men. The sovereignty of the world mind, as Hegel portrays it, exhibits the dark traits of a world that is controlled by the forces of history instead of controlling them. While these forces are as yet unknown in their true essence, they bring misery and destruction in their wake." (pg. 196)
        - ◆ "The world mind is the hypostatic subject of history; it is a metaphysical substitute for the real subject, the unfathomable God of a frustrated humanity, hidden and awful, like the God of the Calvinists; the mover of a world in which all that occurs does so despite the conscious actions of man and at the expense of his happiness. 'History . . . is not the theater of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it.'" (pg. 197)
    - **"Hegel's picture of the Reformation is fully as erroneous as his description of the subsequent social development, confusing the ideas by which modern society glorified its rise for the reality of this society.** He was thus led to a harmonistic interpretation of history, according to which the crossing to a new historical form is at the same time a progress to a higher historical form—a preposterous interpretation, because all the victims of oppression and injustice are witness against it, as are all the vain sufferings and sacrifices of history. The interpretation is the more preposterous because it denies the critical implications of the dialectic and establishes a harmony between the progress of thought and the process of reality" (pg. 206)
  - Part II (The Rise of Social Theory), Introduction (pg. 213)
    - **"By the middle of the nineteenth century, the influence of Hegelianism was almost dead.** It got its rebirth in the last decades of the century in British Hegelianism (Green, Bradley, Bosanquet) and, later still, gained a new political impetus in Italy, where the interpretation of **Hegel was used as a preparation for Fascism"** (pg. 214)
      - "Hegel's system brings to a close the entire epoch in modern philosophy that had begun with Descartes and had embodied the basic ideas of modern society. Hegel was the last to interpret the world as reason, subjecting nature and history alike to the standards of thought and freedom. At the same time, he recognized the social and political order men had achieved as the basis on which reason had to be realized. His system brought philosophy to the threshold of its negation and thus constituted the sole link between the old and the new form of critical theory, between philosophy and social theory" (pg. 214-215)
  - Chapter 8 - Foundations of the Dialectical Theory of Society (pg. 219)
    - "We shall see that all the philosophical concepts of Marxian theory are social and economic categories, whereas Hegel's social and economic categories are all philosophical concepts. Even Marx's early writings are not philosophical. They express the negation of philosophy, though they still do so in philosophical language" (pg. 219)
    - "we must recall that Hegel's philosophy rests upon a specific interpretation of the subject-object relation. The traditional epistemological antagonism between subject (consciousness) and object, Hegel makes into a reflection of a definite historical antagonism." (pg. 220)
    - "According to Kierkegaard, the individual is not the knowing but only the 'ethically existing subjectivity.' The sole reality that matters to him is his own 'ethical existence.' Truth lies not in knowledge, for sense perception and historical knowledge are mere semblance, and 'pure' thought is nothing but a 'phantom.' Knowledge deals only with the possible and is incapable of making anything real or even of grasping reality. Truth lies only in action and can be experienced only through action. The individual's own existence is the sole reality that can actually be comprehended, and the existing individual himself the sole subject or performer of this comprehension. His existence is a thinking existence, but his thought is determined by his individual living, so that all his problems arise and are resolved in his individual activity. Every individual, in his innermost individuality, is isolated from all others; he is essentially unique. There is no union, no community, no 'universality' to contest his dominion. Truth is forever the outcome of his own decision (Entscheidung) and can be realized only in the free acts that spring from this decision. The sole decision open to the individual is that between eternal salvation and eternal damnation. Kierkegaard's individualism turns into the most emphatic absolutism. There is only one truth, eternal happiness in Christ; and only one proper decision, to live a Christian life. Kierkegaard's work is the last great attempt to restore religion as the ultimate organon for liberating humanity from the destructive impact of an oppressive social order. His philosophy implies throughout a strong critique of his society, denouncing it as one that distorts and shatters human faculties. The remedy was to be found in Christianity, and the fulfillment in the Christian way of life. Kierkegaard knew that in this society such a way of life involved incessant struggle and ultimate humiliation and defeat, and that a Christian existence within current social forms was ever an impossibility. The church had to be separated from the state, for, any dependence on the state would betray Christianity. The true role of the church, freed of any restrictive force, was to denounce prevailing injustice and bondage and to point up the individual's ultimate interest, his salvation" (pg. 224-225)
      - **"The individual is 'the truth,' not reason or mankind or the state—for the individual is the only reality"** (pg. 225)
    - **"The anti-rationalist attack on universals becomes increasingly important in the subsequent development of European thought. The assault upon the universal reason** was easily swung to an attack on the positive social implications of this universal. We have already indicated that the concept of reason was connected with advanced ideas, like the essential equality of men, the rule of law, the standard of rationality in state and society, and that



- Western rationalism was thus definitely linked with the fundamental institutions of liberalist society. In the ideological field, the struggle against this liberalism began with the attack on rationalism. **The position called 'existentialism' played an important part in this attack.** First, it denied the dignity and reality of the universal. This led to a rejection of any universally valid rational norms for state and society. Later, it was claimed that no bond joins individuals, states, and nations into a whole of mankind, that the particular existential conditions of each cannot be submitted to the general judgment of reason. Laws, it was held, are not based upon any universal qualities of man in whom a reason resides; they rather express the needs of individual people whose lives they regulate in accordance with their existential requirements. This demotion of reason made it possible to exalt certain particularities (such as the race or the folk) to the rank of the highest values" (pg. 226-227)
- **"Marx rests his theories on the assumption that the labor process determines the totality of human existence and thus gives to society its basic pattern"** (pg. 247)
    - "We have just summarized some of the decisive conclusions of Marx's analysis of the laws of capitalism. The picture is that of a social order that progresses through the development of the contradictions inherent in it. Still, it progresses, and these contradictions are the very means through which occur a tremendous growth in the productivity of labor, an all-embracing use and mastery of natural resources, and a loosing of hitherto unknown capacities and needs among men. **Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advance in production through restriction of consumption.** The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process begets its determinate negation, and the crisis is the extreme form in which the contradictions are expressed" (pg. 260)
  - Chapter 9 - The Foundations of Positivism and the Rise of Sociology (pg. 273)
    - **"Positive philosophy was supposed to overcome negative philosophy in its entirety, that is, to abolish any subordinating of reality to transcendental reason.** Moreover, it was to teach men to view and study the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid laws. This tendency became particularly important in social and political philosophy. Hegel had considered society and the state to be the historical work of man and interpreted them under the aspect of freedom; in contrast, positive philosophy studied the social realities after the pattern of nature and under the aspect of objective necessity. The independence of matters of fact was to be preserved, and reasoning was to be directed to an acceptance of the given. In this way positive philosophy aimed to counteract the critical process involved in the philosophical 'negating' of the given, and to restore to facts the dignity of the positive. This is the point at which the connection between positive philosophy and positivism (in the modern sense of the term) becomes clear. Their common feature, apart from their joint struggle against metaphysical apriorism, is the orientation of thought to matters of fact and the elevation of experience to the ultimate in knowledge. The positivist method certainly destroyed many theological and metaphysical illusions and promoted the march of free thought, especially in the natural sciences. The positivistic attack on transcendent philosophy was reinforced through great strides in these sciences around the first half of the last century. Under the impact of the new scientific temper positivism could claim, as Comte put it, to be the philosophic integration of human knowledge; the integration was to come through the universal application of the scientific method and through excluding all objectives that, in the last analysis, could not be verified by observation. **The positivistic opposition to the principle that the matters of fact of experience have to be justified before the court of reason, however, prevented the interpretation of these 'data' in terms of a comprehensive critique of the given itself.** Such a criticism no longer had a place in science. In the end, positive philosophy facilitated the surrender of thought to everything that existed and manifested the power to persist in experience. Comte explicitly stated that the term 'positive' by which he designated his philosophy implied educating men to take a positive attitude towards the prevailing state of affairs. Positive philosophy was going to affirm the existing order against those who asserted the need for 'negating' it. We shall see that Comte and Stahl emphatically stressed this implication of their work. The political aims thus expressed link the positive philosophy with the doctrines of the French counterrevolution: Comte was influenced by De Maistre, Stahl by Burke. Modern social theory got its greatest impetus from positivism during the nineteenth century. **Sociology originated in this positivism** and through its influence developed into an independent empirical science. Before we continue this line of analysis, however, we must briefly consider the trend in social theory exemplified by the so-called early French socialists, who had different roots from those of the positivists and who led in another direction, although, in their beginnings, they associated themselves with the positivist position." (pg. 276-277)
      - "Comte's positive philosophy lays down the general framework of a social theory that is to counteract these 'negative' tendencies of rationalism. It arrives at an ideological defense of middle-class society and, moreover, it bears the seeds of a philosophic justification of authoritarianism. **The connection between positive philosophy and the irrationalism that characterized the later authoritarian ideology,** ushered in with the decline of liberalism, is quite clear in Comte's writings. Hand in hand with the shackling of thought to immediate experience goes his constant widening of the realm of experience, so that it ceases to be restricted to the realm of scientific observation but claims also various types of supra-sensual power. In fact, the outcome of Comte's positivism turns out to be a religious system with an elaborate cult of names, symbols, and signs. **He himself expounded a 'positive theory of authority' and became the authoritative leader of a sect of blind followers. This was the first fruit of the defamation of reason in positive philosophy.**" (pg. 288)
    - "It had been the fundamental conviction of idealism that truth is not given to man from some external source but originates in the process of interaction between thought and reality, theory and practice. The function of thought was not merely to collect, comprehend, and order facts, but also to contribute a quality that rendered such activity possible, a quality that was thus a priori to facts. A decisive portion of the human world therefore consisted, the idealists held, of elements that could not be verified by observation. Positivism repudiated this doctrine, slowly replacing the free spontaneity of thought with predominantly receptive functions. This was not merely a matter of epistemology. The idealistic idea of reason, we recall, had been intrinsically connected with the idea of freedom and had opposed any notion of a natural necessity ruling over society. Positive philosophy tended instead to equate the study of society with the study of nature, so that natural science, particularly biology, became the archetype of social theory. Social study was to be a science seeking social laws, the validity of which was to be analogous to that of physical laws. Social practice, especially the matter of changing the social system, was herewith throttled by the inexorable. Society was viewed as governed by rational laws that moved with a natural necessity. This position directly contradicted the view held by the dialectical social theory, that society is irrational precisely in that it is governed by natural laws" (pg. 288-289)
      - "Revolution under such conditions is without sense" (pg. 291)
    - **"Positivism shifts the source of certainty from the subject of thought to the subject of perception.** Scientific observation yields certainty here. The spontaneous functions of thought recede, while its receptive and passive functions gain predominance" (pg. 295)
      - **"The concepts of positivism are relativistic because all reality is relative."** (pg. 297)
  - Conclusion: The End of Hegelianism (pg. 329)
    - "We cannot understand the basic difference between the Hegelian and the Fascist idea of the state without sketching the historical foundations of Fascist totalitarianism. Hegel's political philosophy was grounded on the assumption that civil society could be kept functioning without renouncing the essential rights and liberties of the individual. Hegel's political theory idealized the Restoration state, but he looked upon it as embodying the lasting achievements of the modern era, namely, the German Reformation, the French Revolution, and idealist culture. The totalitarian state, on the other hand, marks the historical stage at which these very achievements become dangerous to the maintenance of civil society. The roots of Fascism are traceable to the antagonisms between growing industrial monopolization and the democratic system. In Europe after the first World War, the highly rationalized and rapidly expanding industrial apparatus met increasing difficulties of utilization, especially because of the disruption of the world

market and because of the vast network of social legislation ardently defended by the labor movement. In this situation, the most powerful industrial groups tended to assume direct political power in order to organize monopolistic production, to destroy the socialist opposition, and to resume imperialist expansionism." (pg. 345)

d. Further Readings:

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