

# The Existentialist Revolt, by K. Reinhardt

a. People / Organizations: <https://ia600301.us.archive.org/16/items/existentialistre006840mbp/existentialistre006840mbp.pdf>

b. Quotes:

- **"I want honesty"** - Kierkegaard (pg. 5)
  - "modern youth must follow the exhortation of the Delphian oracle, **'Know Thyself'**! This hard saying demands that each individual 'organize the chaos within himself and that he rally all the honesty, sturdiness, and truthfulness of his character to rebel against secondhand thinking, secondhand learning, secondhand action'. For 'everything that makes for greater truthfulness is a step toward true culture, even if such truthfulness may harm the fashionable educational ideals of the day, even if it may lead to the overthrow of an entire system of merely decorative culture'" - Author on Nietzsche's view of the youth of Europe (pg. 80-81)
- "We are living in an atomic age, an atomistic chaos. Today everything is determined by the coarsest and most evil forces, by the egotism of an acquisitive society and by military potentates...A revolution is unavoidable, and it will be an atomistic revolution." - Nietzsche, *Thoughts our of Season* (pg. 6)
- "Our entire European civilization has long been moving with a tortuous tension, a tension growing from decade to decade, toward the final catastrophe" - Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (pg. 6)
  - "[Nietzsche's] lonely fight against the tremendous odds of an 'atomized' society and a disintegrating civilization, his ever growing isolation, and his final descent into the listless night of insanity make both a witness and a victim of the modern crisis, the crisis of human existence. Philosophy was for him 'love of wisdom' in the strictly Socratic sense, and the philosopher, if he was deserving of his title, was the friend and lover of wisdom" - Author (pg. 6-7)
- "the multitude remains immersed in the distraction of life" - Author (pg. 20)
- "I was already an old man when I was born...but...it was granted to me to hide my melancholy under an apparent cheerfulness..." - Kierkegaard (pg. 25)
  - "the whole of existence frightens me...from the tiniest fly to the mystery of the Incarnation. Existence is inexplicable to me in its totality, and the most inexplicable thing of all is my own existence..." - Kierkegaard (pg. 27)
- "the despair...consists in that despairingly man wants to be himself; that the despair cannot get rid of the self" - Kierkegaard (pg. 57)
- "Theodor Haecker calls the separation of the intellect from all the other human faculties in man a special characteristic of European philosophy [i.e., logical positivism and English empiricism]. 'European philosophy', he says, 'proceeds from the world through the person, who is but an empty relative point, back to the world; it goes from objects, things, sensations..., passing as quickly as possible over the subject, the self, the individual, back to objects, things, and sensations...'" - Author (pg. 39)
- "a man of spiritual depth needs friends, unless he still has God as a friend. But I have neither God nor friends" - Nietzsche (pg. 59)
- "The modern world has become very skillful in giving new names to things, and it has even tried to baptize the devil" - Author (pg. 79)
- "materialism in nineteenth-century philosophy seemed to have run its course, and the younger generation of thinkers, following the lead of Henri Bergson, was groping for a new spiritual anchorage" - Author (pg. 91)
- "if there were gods, how could I bear it not to be a god? Therefore, there are no gods" - Nietzsche (pg. 101)
- "every profound spirit needs a mask" - Nietzsche (pg. 106)
- "in the modern age 'the God remains afar', no matter how hard man labors to fill the void by the invention of substitute 'gods'" - Author (pg. 142)
- "To advance arguments against traditional logic . . . simply means to pay attention to that 'Logos' which manifested itself early in the history of human thought. . . . **What good are all the 'systems' of logic as long as they remain . . . neglectful of the task of inquiring into the nature of the 'Logos'?**" - Heidegger (pg. 148)
  - **"Thinking itself is an action, [says] Heidegger; an activity more potent and more pregnant with consequences than any kind of praxis. Thinking permeates all doing and making"** - Author (pg. 150)
- "Materialism [to Sartre] simply denotes the abdication of man in favor of the world. Within this frame of reference there is no possibility of escaping the world's crude force: assimilated to the world, man becomes hard like a rock, dense and opaque like all those things which constitute 'the world'" - Author (pg. 164)
- "while *the condition* of the existing being is common to all, every existence is personal" - J. Delhomme on Marcel's philosophy (pg. 224)
- "Immanuel Kant's saying, **'It is man's highest task to know what one must be in order to be a human being'**, can still serve as a guidepost for any philosophy of human existence..." - Author (pg. 225-226)
  - "Kant wanted philosophy to answer four main questions: (1) What can we know? (2) What are we to do? (3) What may we hope for? (4) What is man? The fourth of these questions is the one that Kant should have asked first, because on the answer to it depend to a large extent the answers to the others. It is also the question with which the thinkers whose teachings have here been discussed are chiefly concerned. And their answers differ according to their positive or negative attitudes regarding 'being' and 'Truth'. Whether they admit it or not, it is their metaphysical concepts, presuppositions, or even prejudices that determine their anthropological views" (pg. 226)
    - "The modern 'existential' philosophers are united in their protests against the claims of philosophic idealism and in their attempts to rescue the individual from the bloodless and lifeless generalities of abstract ideas and essences as well as from his submersion in the anonymous, impersonal collective. They are divided, however, in their interpretation of the nature of that personality and that freedom which are to be saved" (pg. 226)
  - "It is not true that man, as most of the contemporary 'existentialists' claim, possesses *unlimited possibilities*. . . man encounters limits: in his thought and consciousness, in his willing and doing, in his social and political relations. Even in freely willed self-destruction the human limit is not transcended but, on the contrary, radically confirmed" (pg. 227)
    - "Within the limits imposed by his situation in the world, man lives, as Jaspers has pointed out, in tensions, conflicts, and contradictions, moving back and forth between the extreme possibilities of salvation and perdition, sanctity and satanic rebellion, self-realization and self-annihilation. In addition, in his striving to explore the secrets and utilize the forces of nature, man commands vast possibilities of economic and scientific planning, possibilities which he turns into actuality in his attempts to gain the technical mastery of life. But these efforts, too, are beset with temptations and dangers. Here, too, lurks for the human intellect and will the possibility of self-betrayal: possessed by the will to power, man may in demonic passion debase his human stature by becoming the slave of those tools and machines which owe their being to his creative genius" (pg. 227)
- "The conviction of the *primacy of existence* is shared by all existentialist thinkers, ancient, mediaeval, and modern. Their concern with the individual, personal aspects of being, with the mysterious recesses of their own selves, places them in opposition to those philosophers who, like Plato or Hegel, in an attitude of detached reflection, allow the act of existing to be submerged in ideal forms or essences. *Existential thinking* may thus be defined as a type of speculation that is not only related to the concerns of actual life but decisive for human existence and human action. It is a kind of thinking that arouses and 'makes' the human self" - Author (pg. 229-230)
- "Death comes as a friend, because it promises freedom and liberation from the chains of finite existence" - Author (pg. 251)

c. General Notes:

- Introduction - The Crisis of Human Existence (pg. 1)
  - "no one, even if he should live in the most remote and least disturbed corner of the globe, can escape the disquieting of the revolutionary transformations which human civilization is now undergoing" (pg. 1)
    - "in this 'progressive' age it is both pitiful and tragic to see the ever increasing discrepancy between the plentitude of scientific knowledge and the helplessness with which governments, peoples, and individuals face the intellectual and moral problems of human life" (pg. 1)
    - "speculative thinkers of such widely differing philosophical and religious outlook as Jacques Maritain and F. S. C. Northrop share the conviction voiced by the man of action that the present age stands in need of a radical spiritual revolution and re-formation" (pg. 1)
      - \*cf. N. Berdyaev, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*  
[https://ia601403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World\\_text.pdf](https://ia601403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World_text.pdf)
        - ◆ "The economic and political situations of the world are terrible, even unbearable, but this is true above all of its spiritual situation. The very existence of spiritual life is in terrible danger, the very possibility of its existence is threatened. We live in an insane world. We have failed to perceive that man has become insane. Because of his thirst for life, his love of this world, man has lost his spiritual and mental balance" (pg. 126)
    - "this precarious situation in which contemporary man and contemporary civilization in general, but the Western world in particular, find themselves, suggests that all the manifold social and political upheavals in every part of the globe are merely the external manifestations, the symptoms and outbursts of a creeping and prolonged spiritual and moral disease" (pg. 1-2)
      - "modern civilization, it seems, is gravely threatened because the perennial values of intellectual and moral verities have increasingly been divorced from the realities of matter and nature, so that material reality, deprived of the guidance of right reason and a rationally enlightened will, is being handed over to the blind forces of chance and the biological urges of the will to power" (pg. 2)
  - "From the centuries of the Christian past **the nineteenth century had inherited certain basic convictions as to the nature of man, the structure of state and society, the rights and obligations of man as an individual and social being, the destiny of man, and the meaning of human existence and human civilization.** The questions which the men and women of these past centuries had asked concerning these matters had been answered for them by theology and philosophy, which had ranked as the two supreme sciences in the hierarchy of knowledge. But in the course of the nineteenth century and with the adoption of the 'scientific method' by historians, jurists, sociologists, and 'humanists', the Western mind began to reject the guiding principles provided by these two disciplines, 'Truth' henceforth was to be found exclusively in and by those sciences which analyzed and described extended and measurable physical reality. Sense knowledge was termed the only valid kind of knowledge, while rational or intellectual knowledge was declared synonymous with meaningless abstractions and fictitious beliefs. Theology became another name for superstition, and philosophy abandoned its ambition to arrive at universally indubitable certitude concerning the nature and destiny of man and human civilization. Instead of continuing as a normative discipline, laying down rules of human thought and conduct, philosophy became either a mere adjunct of the natural sciences or a purely historically minded discipline, relishing the re-telling of the past exploits of the human mind. Positivism and neo-positivism made philosophy the handmaid of natural science, while idealism relegated it to an abstract sphere of pure thought, apart from the universe of material realities." (pg. 2)
    - "Christianity introduced the dimension of spiritual infinity into this finite universe" (pg. 10)
    - \*cf. F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism*  
[https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_2631d9844b764ac7aae28185ce5fa4ac.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_2631d9844b764ac7aae28185ce5fa4ac.pdf)
  - "philosophy ungrudgingly surrendered its supreme prerogative of dealing creatively with fundamental human problems" (pg. 2)
    - "and thus that discipline which Plato has once described as humanity's 'best guardian'...largely lost the understanding of its legitimate function" (pg. 3)
  - "'Men', [Goethe] wrote, 'will become more shrewd and clever, but they will not be better or happier. I see a time approaching when God will no longer be pleased with man, when He will have to smash His creation to pieces in order to rejuvenate it'. And Friedrich Nietzsche was to write half a century later: 'Oh thou proud European of the nineteenth century, art thou not mad? Thy knowledge does not complete Nature, it only kills thine own nature. . . . Thou climbest toward heaven on the sunbeams of thy knowledge but also down toward chaos. Thy manner of going is fatal to thee; the ground slips from under thy feet into the dark unknown; thy life has no stay but spiders' webs torn assunder by every new stroke of thy knowledge'" (pg. 3)
  - "Hegel's metaphysical idealism...[was] a final attempt to unify science, philosophy, and religion" (pg. 3)
    - "But Hegel's own 'dialectical method' was seized upon by the radical 'Young Hegelians' in Germany and England to destroy their master's idealistic premises. Taking their cue from Auguste Comte's positivism, they developed a dialectical 'historic materialism' which saw in history no longer any issues involving problems of true and false, right and wrong, good and evil, but merely questions of fact and material force. Even while Hegel was still alive, **the inductive method of the natural sciences began to replace the deductive reasoning of the Hegelian system. Comte's positivism became first a powerful rival of Hegelianism and then its triumphant conqueror**" (pg. 3-4)
    - "Against Hegel's pantheistic identification of God and world, divine mind and human mind, Kierkegaard insisted that the Creator and the creature, God and the world, supernature and nature were separated by an unbridgeable gulf" (pg. 4)
      - "and against Hegel's deification of the omnipotent State he proclaimed the 'inwardness' of the individual" (pg. 4)
  - "Kierkegaard diagnosed the spiritual and moral sickness of the modern more profoundly and accurately perhaps than any other modern author, with the possible exception of Friedrich Nietzsche" (pg. 4)
    - "again and again he inveighed against the half-heartedness and the intellectual and moral slovenliness of those of his contemporaries who lacked the courage and consistency to face the far-reaching consequences of their philosophical and religious opinions" (pg. 4-5)
      - "he regretfully stated that...it had become an easy and comfortable things to call oneself a Christian..." (pg. 5)
        - ◆ "[Kierkegaard] drew a sharp dividing line between 'Christianity' and 'Christendom', asserting whereas the former was and remained a resplendent reality, the latter was in danger of becoming but an 'optical illusion'." (pg. 5)
          - ◇ "[he demanded] an all-decisive 'choice', an unconditional 'either-or'..." (pg. 5)
            - ▶ "it is his rejection of compromise, his call for an intellectual honesty that emanates from the deepest roots of human existence, which constitutes one of the reason for Kierkegaard's hold on many prominent thinkers of the present day" (pg. 5)
      - "'I want honesty', Kierkegaard wrote in a political pamphlet, shortly before his death" (pg. 5)
    - "Nietzsche was perhaps the first among European thinkers of great format to realize to the fullest extent the dangers inherent in a scientism that had thrown off the guardianship and guidance of human wisdom" (pg. 6)
      - "We are living in an atomic age, an atomistic chaos. Today everything is determined by the coarsest and most evil forces, by the egotism of an acquisitive society and by military potentates...A revolution is unavoidable, and it will be an atomistic revolution." - Nietzsche (pg. 6)
      - "Our entire European civilization has long been moving with a tortuous tension, a tension growing from decade to decade, toward the final catastrophe" - Nietzsche (pg. 6)
      - "Nietzsche first discerned the essential difference between science and philosophy and categorically emphasized the basic distinction between the scientific and philosophic aims and methods" (pg. 6)
        - "[Nietzsche's] lonely fight against the tremendous odds of an 'atomized' society and a disintegrating civilization, his ever growing

- isolation, and his final descent into the listless night of insanity make both a witness and a victim of the modern crisis, the crisis of human existence. Philosophy was for him 'love of wisdom' in the strictly Socratic sense, and the philosopher, if he was deserving of his title, was the friend and lover of wisdom. Possessed of the distinctive philosophic character marks of integrity, serenity, and steadfast consistency, the philosopher was first of all called to realize in his own life the virtues of a philosophic existence, and then to shape human conduct in the image and likeness of the true philosopher, whose supreme task was the consummation of a reintegration of thought, life, and civilization. This is why he calls the philosopher: **'the physician of culture'**" (pg. 6-7)
- "The crisis of Western man and Western civilization, born of a growing lack of confidence in long established spiritual values and moral standards, was recognized by both Nietzsche and Spengler as involving the totality of human existence and its cultural *milieu*: the state, society, economics, education, art, literature, philosophy, and religion" (pg. 8)
    - "The merit of Spengler's diagnosis of the crisis of human existence and of the crisis of the age lies, notwithstanding his counsels of despair, in his grim and cruel analysis of the 'spirit of the age'..." (pg. 8)
  - "their [the contemporary 'existentialist' thinkers] negations no less than their affirmations contain a stern summons to face anew the narrowness of a path marked by the dramatic possibilities of existence, by the unquestionable realities of 'choice', of good and evil, of sin, death, and judgement" (pg. 9)
  - "Intimidated by the unexpected sight of the opened abyss of human existence, man finds himself lost in a world which dangerously closes in upon him from all sides, and he laments the seeming absurdity of his situation. Everything is *'de trop'* (Sartre), gratuitous, superfluous... Thus human existence in a meaningless world becomes for the French writer Albert Camus the absurdity of all absurdities" (pg. 9)
    - "Human destiny can no longer be read in the symbolism of art and nature and in an objective reality open to reason and faith, but appears now enveloped in impenetrable and incalculable mystery, without a known beginning or a decipherable end. Human existence reaches backward to an indefinite past and forward to an indefinite future but in either direction toward a time series which no longer carries any recognizable existential meaning" (pg. 10)
  - "In individual and social life, in politics and economics, in national and international affairs, contemporary **man is confronted with a complexity of facts and events which defies even the best-intentioned efforts of governments and administrators**" (pg. 10)
    - "Thrown back on their precarious momentary situation, men grow skeptical of the tremendous intellectual and material powers which have accumulated in their minds and hands. But even if everything over which they had proudly claimed mastery seems to be slipping away, there still remains the narrow circumference of their actual individual existence with its inevitable challenges and choices. And so they become 'existentialists'" (pg. 10-11)
      - "At this very moment something unforeseen happens: a new power, more awesome than any of which man had held possession in the past, is handed over to him, the power, namely, to put an end to all human and natural power, the power to annihilate the very planet which he inhabits, to annihilate the past, present, and future of the human race as such. Thus **the power released by the splitting of the atom has made the solitary existentialist 'choice' a universally human problem and concern**" (pg. 11)
        - ◆ "Thus science has pressed anew into human hands the two-edged sword of freedom. A second time man has eagerly seized the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and again, and in the most ominous way, the promise of the Serpent has been fulfilled..." (pg. 11)
          - ◇ *\*man knows too much to know what to do with what he knows.*
    - "Emmanuel Mounier distinguishes between two types of nihilism, one of which is creative and 'preliminary', while the other is destructive and final. Creative nihilism points to the dark abyss of nothingness in order to warn and to rescue; it calls 'nothingness' by name in order to reveal and save the splendor of 'being' which lies buried in its hidden depths. This is the nihilism of Nietzsche and of Heidegger. Destructive nihilism, on the other hand, grows out of a frustrated desire to be creative in the attainment of knowledge or in the domination of life and nature. It resembles the primitive reaction of the child taking vengeance on the object or subject which refuses to be subservient to his wishes or whims. The destructive nihilist is possessed by a horrible intoxication, a raving despair which drives him to the demolition of his home, his work, and his self" (pg. 11)
    - Chapter 1 - The Problem of Human Existence (pg. 14)
      - **"Human existence has always been a problem for man**, the rational animal, who, in virtue of his faculty of rational reflection, could not help looking searchingly and critically at his own life and at life in general, and comparing his own mode of being with that of other creatures. **Existentialism in its modern and particularly its contemporary form concentrates this critical reflection on the individual human self. It confronts this individual human existence** with those collective claims and forces which threaten to submerge or pulverize individuality and personality in abstract..." (pg. 14)
        - "The rise of existentialism is thus one of the symptoms of a specifically European crisis, although in its broader ramifications it is indicative of the modern crisis of human existence as such" (pg. 14)
        - **"In existentialism, then, the weight or burden of life lies heavily on the individual and on the contingent and finite aspects of his 'being-in-the-world' (Heidegger).** But once contingency and finiteness become the exclusive frame of reference in human existence, man's interest and preoccupation center in increasing measure in his own individual predicaments and uncertainties. In such a self-centered state of mind he is prone to become oblivious to the social components and needs of human nature and, burrowing deeply in the mysterious grounds of his own self, he starts on a dangerous journey of subterranean adventures." (pg. 14-15)
          - "In its ambivalence existentialism mirrors the ambivalence and instability of human nature and both the positive and negative possibilities implicit in man's position in the universe. Beyond this, existentialism offers documentary proof of the desperate seriousness with which some of the best minds of the present age have been wrestling with both the problem of man and the problem of philosophy" (pg. 15)
          - **"The major theme of existentialism is, as the term indicates, existence**, this term being understood in the meaning conveyed by the German word *'Existenz'*, as an *ek-stasis*, an *ek-sistence*, a 'standing out' from the mere biological vitality by which all subhuman forms of existence are characterized and circumscribed. Martin Heidegger has this etymological root-meaning of 'existence' in mind when he distinguishes between three different modes in which existents are or have their being: (1) things are 'given' or exist as objects of human knowledge; (2) things are "given" or exist as tools or means of human activity (a hammer, for example, is 'given' in this way: it derives its meaning, its signification, from the practical use which man makes of it); (3) the existent called **'man' stands out from all other modes of existence** in that man is not simply and statically like minerals, plants, and animals, or like inanimate tools, but has constantly and dynamically to affirm and actualize his existence in self-knowledge and self-realization. **Man is thus a being suspended between nothingness and the plenitude of being**" (pg. 15)
      - "Kierkegaard's man concern is the possibility of man's self-realization: to what extent, he asks, can man realize himself and save himself by withdrawing from irresponsibility, superficiality, and forgetfulness of everyday life?" (pg. 16)
        - "Existence, then, is for Kierkegaard the attainment of self-possession in the spiritually directed and determined life of the individual. And 'existential thinking' is the vital thought-process by which the concrete human individual appropriates that Truth which for the armchair philosopher and the systematizer remains an abstract proposition, compelling no existential assent" (pg. 16)
        - "The heavy emphasis which Kierkegaard placed on the personal appropriation of the contents of knowledge and truth could have acted as a wholesome corrective of the excesses of Hegelian idealism, which had been both the cause and the object of the existentialist attack on abstract speculation. But in this same emphasis there loomed the danger of subjectivism and irrationalism if the existential thinker in his concentration on the personal attitude of the knower were to lose sight of the objects of knowledge" (pg. 16)

- "By **demanding of the philosopher the highest degree of 'subjectivity' in the passionate appropriation and vitalization of truth**, and by denouncing 'objectivity' as irresponsibility and indifferentism, he opened the door to an anti-intellectual voluntarism" (pg. 16)
  - **"Existentialism in all its forms is keenly aware of an element of insecurity that attaches to all purely philosophical knowledge. This awareness is the strength of existential thinking...Philosophic knowledge is never as complete and final as an article of theological faith or a mathematical equation. Far from being allowed to rest securely on its past and present accomplishments, philosophy is thrown back again and again to its original queries, to the initial stages of its struggle for certitude"** (pg. 16-17)
    - **"Existential philosophy poses anew the problem of individuality and personality** and the part the philosopher plays in the establishment of philosophic certitude. **Existentialism calls attention to the fact that philosophy is a truly human discipline** precisely because it always includes venture and risk and reflects in both its sublimity and frailty the ambivalence of human existence" (pg. 17)
  - **"Existentialism insists that no valid philosophic question can be asked and answered unless both question and answer take into account the concrete existence of the questioner. The query concerning the questioner is the central query of every existential philosophy. **That being, called 'man', who asks philosophical questions, wants first of all to know what he is and where he stands**"** (pg. 17)
    - "man is that peculiar kind of being which perpetually questions and wonders and doubts. Man is thus, existentialism tells us, at the core of every philosophical quest. With him philosophy begins, and with him it ends" (pg. 17-18)
    - **"man's philosophic awakening is an advance from knowledge to wisdom**, a wisdom which penetrates to the metaphysical grounds of sensed phenomena and farther beyond to that timeless or eternal Reason or Truth in which all existents are rooted and in which all share. **The philosopher's query thus aims at the ultimate meaning of all beings, including his own self**. Though his quest may overshoot the capacity of his reason, his thirst for truth is as imperative as his bodily appetite for food and drink" (pg. 18)
      - "This philosophic striving or rational appetite, impelled by the light of reason, gropes for light and shrinks from darkness, and it cannot be at rest until it has illumined that massive darkness which veils and shrouds Reality" (pg. 18-19)
  - **"While Kierkegaard praises Socrates as a philosopher whose existence fully and adequately expressed the Socratic ideas of truth and goodness, others (Nietzsche, Heidegger) find fault with the Greek philosopher's rationalism and give preference to those thinkers who preceded him and in whom they claim to find a more complete understanding of man and the world. The results of the most recent research seem to confirm this claim"** (pg. 19)
    - **"the Greek philosopher was interested in the totality of man and of reality, not primarily in human consciousness and human knowledge"** (pg. 19)
      - "Human existence, to gain a real possession of itself, must gather itself from distraction, and such self-collection cannot pass by the world but must proceed in the world and through the world" (pg. 20)
    - **"The common characteristic of all men, according to Heraclitus, is the possibility of *phronesis*, that is, reflection or introspection"** (pg. 20)
      - **"the multitude remains immersed in the distractions of life...The crowd does not understand, learn, know, or remember anything, but it believes to know everything. As a crowd and in the crowd human beings become forgetful of what it means to listen and to speak. They become like the deaf, of whom it is said that 'though present, they are absent'. Eyes and ears are poor witnesses in men who have the souls of barbarians. But the most reprehensible feature of their way of life is what Heraclitus calls *hybris*, that is, their presumptuous pride**. Although they behave like children or irrational animals, they are really inferior to the animal which moves with instinctive certainty within its natural orbit, whereas a human existence is bound to transcend its natural orbit positively or negatively: choosing, forming, creating, or failing to choose, to form, and to create. For whatever man is or becomes depends on what he chooses to make, or fails to make, of his natural vitality. Karl Jaspers merely elaborates this Heraclitean *thesis* when he points out that the man who chooses to descend to the level of the brute becomes not an animal but less than an animal..." (pg. 20)
        - "however, the animal-like gregarious man, the man who disappeared in the crowd, resembles the brute in that he, too, accepts life without questioning, without authentic choices, without actual command over his destiny" (pg. 20)
      - **"the many resemblances which the Heraclitean concept of man and his 'being-in-the-world' bears to the existentialist point of view are obvious"** (pg. 21)
        - "*Phronesis*, or the introspective listening to the truth of being in nature and in the self, is in the opinion of Heraclitus the way to gain knowledge of that cosmic norm which he calls *Logos*" (pg. 21)
          - ◆ **"However, the main accent of the Heraclitean metaphysics lies not, as has often been asserted, on the *panta rei*, that is, the eternal flux of all things. **For in all this flux the Greek thinker seeks that eternal harmony which underlies all change**. Although the world often looks 'like a disorderly heap of rubbish', **this foreground appearance merely veils the hidden harmony of being**, and true *phronesis* would be impossible if there were not recognizable in all becoming a normative measure, proportion, order, or law" (pg. 21)**
    - **"The discussion of some of the basic concepts in the thinking of Heraclitus seems to warrant the conclusion that existentialism is a new name applied to a philosophic attitude or method that is not only very old but actually timeless in its significance. The existential philosopher, whether ancient or modern, proclaims and teaches a truth which is all too often lost sight of: that it is the end of philosophy to furnish a way of life rather than to present an abstract doctrine, and that the genuine philosopher touches for the authenticity of his thinking with his existence rather than with his 'system'" (pg. 22)
 
      - **\*cf. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Chapter 12 - A Critical Discussion of Existentialism (pg. 201)**
        - *"the assertions made by existentialists do not convey fresh information"* (pg. 203)
        - *"the truths to which our attention is drawn by a philosopher do not convey fresh information in the sense of telling us what we did not know already or what we could not have discovered for ourselves with the aid of a professional philosopher..."* (pg. 204)
        - *\*see my remarks [https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_2631d9844b764ac7aae28185c5e5fa4ae.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_2631d9844b764ac7aae28185c5e5fa4ae.pdf)***
  - **"Thought is only 'a preliminary tool'. It is a tool, however, which, when properly used, will aid man in his self-realization and thus in the fulfillment of his human destiny"** (pg. 22)
- Chapter 2 - 'Either-Or': The Challenge of Kierkegaard (pg. 23)
  - **"Only when the philosopher, [Kierkegaard] argued, has attained this kind of self-knowledge and self-realization, only when he has become existentially rather than professionally a philosopher, a friend and lover of wisdom - only then will he be in a position to aid others in achieving the same end"** (pg. 23)
  - **"he wanted, in short, to teach his contemporaries what it means 'to think existentially', that is, to vouch for one's thought with one's personal life"** (pg. 23)
    - **"The Socratic method consists, according to Kierkegaard, in leading the reader to a point where he finds out for himself what the author has been trying to convey to him, without the need of 'direct communication'"** (pg. 23)
  - **"to be a philosopher means for Kierkegaard to understand oneself as a creature of God"** (pg. 23)
  - **"from a self-knowledge of his true nature Kierkegaard wants to lead man to an understanding of Christianity, that is, to the consciousness of both the meaning and the implications of a spiritual and everlasting existence. From this consciousness derives man's ethical task, his moral imperative"** (pg. 24)
    - **"For an age that lack religious and moral enthusiasm individual existence becomes a matter of despair..."** (pg. 51)

- "Kierkegaard centered his existence in the alternative indicated by the title of his first great book: *Either/Or* (1843). Either wholehearted obedience to God's law or open rebellion against it; either for or against Christ, for or against Truth; either hot or cold, but never lukewarm or halfhearted!" (pg. 24)
    - "As far as Kierkegaard himself was concerned, to the end of his days he never thought or spoke of himself as 'a Christian', but always and emphatically of the unfulfilled task of 'becoming a Christian', that is, a follower of Christ" (pg. 29)
- "He contracted heavy debts, was frequently drunk, and [his] *Journals* contain some references to contemplated suicide. He speaks of this period of his life as his 'lowest fall'; it was followed by his 'repentance', his 'conversion', and by the decisive event of his father's death" (pg. 25)
  - "intellectually and morally he was seriously unbalanced and headed toward a major crisis. It was this time that he formulated the question which was to become a kind of nucleus for his 'existential' thinking: 'What is Truth but to live for an idea?'" (pg. 26)
- "the purpose in writing [*Fear and Trembling* and *The Concept of Dread*] was to demonstrate the insufficiency of both aestheticism and moralism as philosophies of life. Both, he was now convinced, were unable to penetrate to the highest sphere, that of *religious existence*" (pg. 30)
  - "since **faith is a divine gift**, Kierkegaard is right when he emphatically insists that it can only be *received* but not *acquired*, regardless of any amount of scientific, philosophic, or theological effort" (pg. 31)
    - "according to Jolivet...Kierkegaard is wrong then when he asserts that one must believe without reason and even against reason and that therefore **faith is a blind 'leap of faith'**" (pg. 32)
- "in Kierkegaard's own estimate *The Sickness unto Death* - the sickness of despair, healed by faith - was his greatest religious work" (pg. 33)
- "Kierkegaard's message to the present age is eloquently summarized by Johannes Kohlenberg [in *Soren Kierkegaard*]: 'What is at stake is the choice between the individual and the collective, between the human person and the crowd, between freedom and slavery, between Christ and Antichrist. *Either*: the life of the individual person, a microcosm as the image of God, capable of free, responsible action, and therefore ... a life of toil and much suffering and many dangers; *or*: the life of an impersonal, unfree member of a collective, without the possibility of independent knowledge and responsible action, a life in the service of unknown forces -, and as compensation for the loss of freedom at best a false, illusory dream of material welfare in an earthly paradise which can never become a reality'" (pg. 36)
- "[Kierkegaard's] fear of Hegel's extreme rationalism made him recede farther and farther from a rationally grounded theology, until at last he arrived at the position of an integral supranaturalism, approaching and following Luther in his contempt of reason and his denunciation of philosophy" (pg. 37)
  - "Luther turned against Aristotle and the scholastic as Kierkegaard turned against Hegel and Schleiermacher" (pg. 37)
    - "In Thomistic scholasticism, on the other hand, the organic relationship between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, supernature and nature is duly recognized and firmly established, and both the transcendence of faith and the relative autonomy of reason are safeguarded. Thomism, then, strikes a middle path between the extremes of an integral supranaturalism (fideism) and an integral rationalism (gnosticism)" (pg. 37)
  - "both of these extremes positions are strangely enough rooted in an almost identical concept of the Deity: they both entertain the idea of a God who creates the world, only to leave it to its own evolution and proliferation" (pg. 37)
    - "Though representing the exact antithesis of Hegel's theological position, Kierkegaard was in his own spiritual development at least negatively determined by Hegel's dialectical philosophy. As Hegel finally arrived at a complete identification of God and world, Kierkegaard posited the complete and irreconcilable "otherness" of the absolute divine Mind as against all contingent created being, including the created human mind. **He thus saw no analogy, but only an abyssal difference between infinite and finite being**, between the necessary and the contingent, between the Creator and His creation" (pg. 37)
- "Hegel, starting out as a theologian, had in the end denounced all theology. Step by step he had transformed Christian dogmatics into a gnostic theory of knowledge..." (pg. 38)
  - "Kierkegaard himself, on the other hand, had started out as a speculative writer and ended as a theologian who denounced philosophy" (pg. 38)
    - "He took a forceful stand against Hegel's fatalistic theory of the predetermined evolution of the world spirit" (pg. 38)
    - "There is ample justification for accepting as essentially correct Kierkegaard's contention that Hegel's goal, as revealed in the concluding paragraphs of his *Philosophy of History*, was the secularization of religion and the divinization of nature and worldly prudence. God must become man, so that the philosopher may become God, or, to use Hegel's own phraseology, a representation of objective truth, of absolute being, of self-conscious Idea; so that in the end all oppo[1]sites may be identified and neutralized: God, World, and Man are One Idea" (pg. 38)
      - ◆ "It was his [Kierkegaard's] merit to have emphasized anew the distinction between the infinite and the finite, and to have defended this basic distinction against any philosophy of immanence and identity. **But an aspect of tragedy and frustration was introduced into Kierkegaard's life and work by his inability to recognize that both finite and infinite being partake of the common term of Being**" (pg. 39)
  - "at the time of the publication of the latter two works [*Philosophic Fragments* and *Postscripts*] it had become clear to Kierkegaard that the true enemy of existential thinking was Hegel, no Descartes" (pg. 41)
    - "Hegel had carried farthest the rationalistic attempt to understand man, the world, and God by way of logico-dialectical mediation of contingency and necessity, finiteness and infinitude, matter and mind" (pg. 41-42)
      - ◆ "it is against this Hegelian submersion of the individual in the universal and his consequent virtual annihilation that Kierkegaard protests. He refuses to let the individual self be reduced to 'a paragraph in a system'" (pg. 42)
        - ◇ "both 'the professor' who espouses such a system and the age which is willing to accept and acclaim it have forgotten what it means *to exist*. The authentically existing individual will always be infinitely interested in himself and in the realization of his destiny. That infinite interest Kierkegaard calls *the passion of human freedom*. This passion forces upon the individual a decisive *choice*, but a choice which always involves the incertitude of *risk*" (pg. 42)
          - ▶ *\*where, as a passion, such stands beyond – or, rather, outside and against – reason. It for this which makes the passion unintelligible, carrying in-itself, as the seed, if you will, such risk in choice.*
        - ◇ "Kierkegaard concludes, truth is 'subjectivity', that is, the highest degree of personal self-realization" (pg. 42)
  - "A confirmation of his own thesis that the existing individual is constantly in process of becoming, that this process makes all earthly life insecure, and that this existential insecurity in turn finds its expression in the individual's infinite striving for Truth, is found by Johannes Climacus [i.e., Kierkegaard in his *Postscript*] in Lessing's well-known saying..." (pg. 44)
    - "**Human existence, born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, is then this constant and infinite striving**, and it is only the systematizing philosopher who forgets that he himself is such a striving and insecure human being, and that his purported explanation of life omits both the existential and essential factors" (pg. 44-45)
    - "The unique historical fact which for Johannes Climacus is not only approximately but infinitely and absolutely certain is the fact of his own existence. This existence includes both positive and negative elements, simply because it is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the eternal and the temporal. And it is precisely the perpetual presence of the negative, the contingent, the finite that opens the individual's eyes to the reality of the positive, the necessary, the infinite. Thus, while the existing subject is essentially eternal, *qua* existing he is temporal. *Qua* existing, his positive security is shaken, not only by the negations implicit in his temporality and historicity, but

- by the reality of *death*, which may terminate this individual earthly existence at any moment" (pg. 45)
- "To an existing human individual, on the other hand, there applies an unconditional 'either-or': he can *either* try to forget that he is an existing individual; and thereby he becomes a ridiculous figure, because existence continually holds him in its grip, whether he remembers this or chooses to forget it. Or he can concentrate his total energy on the fact that he is an existing individual; and thereby he realizes his authentic existence. In the 'system' of the speculative philosopher (Hegel) subject and object, thought and being are identified, whereas in individual existence they are separated. The 'philosophy of identity' thus revokes and abolishes individual existence in a pantheistic unity of opposites. And **while the speculative philosopher, by identifying himself with Humanity at large, works under the illusion that he has made himself into something infinitely great, he has actually ceased to be anything at all**" (pg. 45)
  - "[my death] is with me and remains with me as an existential insecurity that imparts a peculiar flavor to everything I am and everything I do or fail to do" (pg. 47)
    - "contemplation on such questions concerning the simple and massive realities of life may teach a man what it means to think 'existentially'. He may learn that this kind of thinking is very different from the kind engaged in by the speculative philosopher who, seated at his desk, writes about what he has neither done nor ever intends to do. **In existential thinking man's very soul is on trial...**" (pg. 47)
      - "To be sure, existential thinking is not yet moral action, but it is pregnant with the possibility of moral action. It makes sense to speak of virtue in thought and sin in thought, because the external act is related to an internal moral decision. The good deed I intend to do is certainly not identical with the good deed I have done, but neither is the external act always a valid criterion of the moral disposition of the agent...**The moral accent of an action therefore lies rather with the internal decision than with the external execution**" (pg. 50)
        - ◆ *\*such is why law deals with 'intent' or 'state of mind'. Though, to be sure, law's domain is not the internal (i.e., subjective) realm of the human - it only turns to such after an 'external act' has been done.*
        - ◆ "what then is the supreme ethical task of the individual? No more and less than to become 'an entire man'" (pg. 50)
    - "the 'stages'...are the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. While aesthetic existence is said to be essentially sensuous enjoyment ('the path to perdition'), and *ethical existence* is essentially struggle and victory, *religious existence* is essentially suffering" (pg. 49)
      - "Johannes thus exemplifies the aesthetic stage of existence, its outward appearance of gaiety and its inward emptiness and despair. It is characterized by a perpetual seeking for moments filled with sensual enjoyment, moments which mutually cancel themselves out, so that the seeking and striving never end in fulfillment" (pg. 55)
        - "the type of this kind of life is the Don Juan of Mozart's opera...Don Juan's world is a world of appearance rather than reality; it is a world of the constant betrayal, a world of nihilistic. In it no 'existential choice' is possible" (pg. 55)
    - "human existence, while partaking of the Universal Idea, is not itself an Idea or a purely ideal existence. Abstract thought is thought without a thinker. Concrete thought is thought which is related to an existing thinker" (pg. 50)
    - "before he could discover that ultimate Reality, Kierkegaard had to experience in full measure the depth of the abyss that separates subject and object, thinking and being" (pg. 54)
      - "Human individuality appeared to him as implying both sinfulness and freedom, and while human existence is isolated by individuation and wounded by sin, it is, by virtue of its freedom, capable of opening itself to the life-giving action of the Infinite Spirit, of making the consciousness of sin the first decisive step toward redemption. **It is thus the consciousness of sin that opens the way toward authentic existence and that distinguishes the religious stage from the aesthetic and ethical stages of human life**" (pg. 54)
        - "**'Authentic' human existence is, however, never a real unity or synthesis but rather a togetherness of opposites**, a paradoxical and ambiguous junction of contrasting elements whose vital tension finds its expression in existential *anguish* (Danish, angst). This anguish or anxiety, which is distinguished from fear by the indefiniteness of its object, is intimately linked with the finiteness and temporality of human existence and results from the fact that man is, as it were, suspended at the danger point between Being and nothingness. Existential anguish is thus generated by the mysterious contact of the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite, the human individual and God" (pg. 54)
 
          - ◆ "the religious function which Kierkegaard attributes to existential anguish is most conspicuous in his concept of *faith*. For him as for Martin Luther faith...requires a 'leap', a plunge into the paradox, a 'fighting certitude', a certitude of the uncertain" (pg. 54)
            - ◇ "Luther in particular had asserted that human nature was hopelessly perverted and corrupted by the consequences of original sin" (pg. 70)
      - "existential despair expressed the *reductio ad absurdum* of the aesthetic mode of life. But this 'sickness unto death' may bear within itself its own cure. The shipwreck of the aesthetic life may mean the emergence and growth of the *ethical* life. The ethical is present, according to Kierkegaard, whenever an 'authentic choice' becomes possible. And thus, if man *chooses* despair, he chooses himself in his eternal validity. **The man who turns away from the glamour and lure of the external world toward the inwardness of his own self, gains with this decision his ethical existence. He learns to know himself and to form himself**" (pg. 55-56)
        - "in choosing himself, man also ethically acknowledges an absolute distinction between good and evil, a distinction which Hegel, in his 'metaphysical attempt to assassinate all ethics', had tried to 'mediate'" (pg. 56)
        - "But even the ethical structure of human existence is still seriously incomplete; although the ethical individual reaches out toward the universal, he is bound to remain within the confines of human immanence unless, by probing even deeper into the hidden layers of his selfhood, he discover in his *sinfulness* and his *faith* the bridges leading to divine transcendence..." (pg. 56)
          - "**the authentic individual is not only responsible to himself and his fellow man; he is, above all, responsible to God**" (pg. 56)
            - ◆ "the ethical mode of life is transformed into the *religious* mode of life when, with a contrite heart, man chooses himself as *guilty* and hopes for divine forgiveness..." (pg. 56)
        - "**the despair...consists in that despairingly man wants to be himself**; that the despair cannot get rid of the self" - Kierkegaard (pg. 57)
          - "And when despair turns into its opposite, namely, *faith*, man gains his authentic selfhood in virtue of the Eternal and Infinite. He 'leaps' into a nothingness in which the abyss of sin becomes the abyss of faith..." (pg. 57)
      - "Kierkegaard had started out with the contention that the deadly disease of the modern age was the divorce of thought and life. He had complained that philosophy had become highly abstract, lifeless, and artificial, and that life had been emptied of real content to such a degree that human beings no longer knew what it means 'to exist'" (pg. 57)
        - "**existential thinking calls for the unity of thought and life**" (pg. 57)
    - Chapter 3 - Man-God or God-Man? The Case of Nietzsche (pg. 59)
      - "never afraid of facing the ultimate consequences of his own ideas, even to the point of self-destruction, Nietzsche carried his relentless search for the plenitude of human existence beyond the shallow and fragmentary views of positivism and naturalism..." (pg. 59)
        - "there is no doubt that **the motivating force in all of Nietzsche's negations was his passionate will for affirmation.** It was burning desire to remake human existence in its entirety that urged him on to tear down the actual structure of human society in order to build a better one on a truer foundation" (pg. 59)
          - "his attacks on the hollowness and shallowness of nineteenth-century bourgeois morality were to clear the way for a new existential moral philosophy" (pg. 59)

- "Aware of the crisis of Western civilization, and himself unafraid of the dangerous abyss which he had opened up with his thinking, Nietzsche plunged into that very abyss and demonstrated to his age with his own tragic fate the inescapable alternatives which lay before modern man. An existential thinker in the manner of Kierkegaard, **Nietzsche valued more highly the 'how' than the 'what': more highly the subjectivity of the thinker than the objectivity of the 'system'**, more highly the growth of human personality than the conceptual integrity of abstract thought" (pg. 60)
  - "looking at man's historical reality, they both [Nietzsche and Kierkegaard] found something fundamentally wrong with human existence" (pg. 60)
    - "The common element in the anthropological views of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard is their conviction that modern philosophy has shown itself unable to resolve the problems of human existence. The 'systems' of pure thought, such as Hegel's dialectic idealism, do not correspond to reality and therefore cannot express reality. **The two thinkers are thus in search of a philosophy which will affect and transform human existence decisively**. Although they almost totally disagree in their ideas as to what constitutes authentic human existence, they are both existential thinkers in the sense that their thinking aims at arousing and creatively forming the human self. Both stand in uncompromising opposition to their age, and it is this opposition which animates and invigorates their philosophy" (pg. 61)
- "[Nietzsche] never relinquishes his intense interest in the life of the spirit and its evolution in history and civilization, but for him this evolution must proceed in the movement of *life* rather than in a sphere of abstract ideas; it must have its place in *existence* rather than in a realm of conceptualized essences" (pg. 61)
  - "**[Nietzsche] thought he has discovered in Schopenhauer's doctrine a possibility of salvation without the necessity of a savior**" (pg. 65)
    - "in the Christian dispensation man cannot save himself. He is saved by divine grace through the mediatorship of Christ. According to Schopenhauer, on the other hand, man can save himself by his own unaided effort. By virtue of his own inner worth he can raise himself about the nullity and absurdity of existence. By the exercise of his own intellectual, moral, and aesthetic powers he can attain to truth, goodness, and beauty" (pg. 65)
    - "Schopenhauer thus becomes for Nietzsche a symbol of the 'existential' educational significance of the great historic personality whose exalted function it is to be culturally creative..." (pg. 82)
    - "you are strong and noble in your aspirations, [Nietzsche] told himself. **The time is our of joint, but you may be able to set it and yourself right if only you remain true to the call of your innermost being**" (pg. 65)
- "Nietzsche no longer accepted the Lutheran view of original sin, he still retained the conviction of the actual depraved condition of human nature. Familiar through personal experience with the pain and suffering of a 'fallen' state of existence, his philosophy set out to answer the ancient outcry of man for redemption and salvation" (pg. 70-71)
  - "**Tragedy depicts, as it were, the sadness and meaninglessness of human existence**, and in his own destruction the hero overcomes the 'will to live' and reaches that timeless Reality which lies outside and beyond life's contingencies. Some tragedies, Schopenhauer admits, do not go that far. The hero sometimes refuses to be intimidated: he clings to the 'will to live' and dies without remorse. It is only in the greatest tragedies that the hero attains to a complete detachment from the 'will to live'. Tragedy thus represents for Schopenhauer the sublime possibility of art to illustrate the absurdity of existence" (pg. 71)
    - "the answer of Schopenhauer...[Nietzsche] still accepted, though with qualifications" (pg. 71)
      - ◆ "**Nietzsche offered a radically new interpretation of Schopenhauer's concept of the 'Thing-in-itself'**. For Schopenhauer the Thing-in-itself is in a permanent state of quiescence, unmoved by desire and untouched by the tempests of existence. Nietzsche, on the other hand, placed the root of life's unrest and suffering in the Thing-in-itself. For Schopenhauer suffering attached only to the world of phenomena, and man could escape suffering by turning either to the world of Ideas or to the realm of the Thing-in-itself, by either seeking a temporary refuge in the contemplation of art and beauty or a permanent release from the 'will to live' in the eternal silence and tranquility of 'Nirvana'. For Nietzsche it is the Thing-in-itself that suffers from an intolerable 'tension', and this tension can only be resolved and overcome in the world of phenomena, in a restless creative activity which transforms itself into ecstatic rapture" (pg. 71-72)
        - ◇ "*Human, All-too-Human* was written for those 'free spirits' who agreed with Nietzsche that there existed no supernatural or suprasensible world, no reality behind the surface phenomena of experience, no eternal lawgiver, and no life beyond. The world simply is, but it has no meaning. It is the human being who creates all values, and he is not responsible to anyone but himself for his choice of the values of his own making" (pg. 87)
          - ▶ "The final section of Part Two of the work bears the title, *Man alone with Himself*. It contains a profound self-analysis of great beauty and force. The motif of 'the Wanderer' reappears. He who has attained to freedom of thought, Nietzsche muses, is as a forlorn wanderer on this earth. He looks at the world with open eyes but must take care never to attach his heart too strongly to the things of this world" (pg. 87)
  - "**Nietzsche claimed that the study of Heraclitus had confirmed him in his view that war was the father of all things; that change, tension, and strife reveal the secret of Reality**. Heraclitus saw in Fire the original substance of the world the permanent reality which underlies all the changes of visible existence, the *One* which is the substrate of all multiplicity, the Being which underlies all becoming. This aboriginal Fire, which Heraclitus calls the divine Principle, is dynamic, not static: it moves in opposite directions, and in its dynamic movement it creates those tensions and conflicts which find their visible expression in the phenomena of change and evolution" (pg. 73)
    - "Parmenides of Elea, in diametrical opposition to Heraclitus, had described Reality as a huge, homogeneous, immutable sphere; as pure being, from which all becoming is excluded. By degrading and belying the data of sense perception, argued Nietzsche, Parmenides had destroyed the integrity of the intellect itself and encouraged the fallacious dualism of spirit and matter, mind and body..." (pg. 74)
      - *\*I'm not sure how Parmenides is advocating a dualism while at the same suppressing heterogeneity (this serving as the foundation to duality or, better yet, multiplicity).*
  - "Referring specifically to Germany's recent victory over France, Nietzsche asserted that a great victory is always a great danger, because human nature is so constituted that it finds it harder to retain its integrity in triumph than in defeat" (pg. 76)
  - "Nietzsche's main thesis [in the second part of *Thoughts out of Season*] stated that an excess of historical knowledge endangers and maims the spontaneity of life" (pg. 76)
    - "the knowledge of the extent to which we ourselves are heirs of the past, of its glories as well as of its errors, perversions, and crimes, may have a paralyzing effect on our own vital efforts" (pg. 77)
      - "No matter, concludes Nietzsche, to which of the three methods of historiography [cf. pg. 76-77] we give preference, one thing is certain: **We cannot do without historical knowledge, even though it harms us at times and may threaten to destroy our intellectual substance and moral spontaneity. But this need of historical knowledge should not make us blind to the dangers inherent in an oversaturation with history**" (pg. 78)
        - ◆ "Knowledge, in short, has lost its power of transforming and elevating human lives, and real culture has been replaced by some vague knowledge *about* culture..." (pg. 78)
          - ◇ "would a life ruled by science be of much value? And can the 'scientific' study of history be conducive to 'historical

- culture'?" (pg. 78-79)
- ▶ "It rather seems that the 'scientific' approach merely makes the student lose every feeling of admiration and wonderment. Since he has learned that things were different in every age, he grows skeptical regarding all ideas and all moral values, and he pays less and less heed to the status and stature of his own self. He is filled to the brim with historical and scientific "facts" (pg. 79)
  - "In his conclusion Nietzsche frankly admits that his own treatise exhibits and illustrates the maladies of the modern age and of modern man. It is the work of a 'weak personality'; it is immature and full of critical exaggerations; it wavers between irony and cynicism, between pride and skepticism. And it can hardly be otherwise, he contends, since a young modern scholar is to a large extent the product of the kind of education he has received. The goal of modern education is, however, no longer the liberally educated man, but the "scientific man," who takes his stand apart from life" (pg. 80)
    - "modern youth must follow the exhortation of the Delphian oracle, **'Know Thyself!'** This hard saying demands that each individual 'organize the chaos within himself and that he rally all the honesty, sturdiness, and truthfulness of his character to rebel against secondhand thinking, secondhand learning, secondhand action'. For 'everything that makes for greater truthfulness is a step toward true culture, even if such truthfulness may harm the fashionable educational ideals of the day, even if it may lead to the overthrow of an entire system of merely decorative culture'" (pg. 80-81)
    - "Observing realistically that most human beings never become actually what they are potentially, Nietzsche propounds a dynamic ethics of self-realization. Man, if he wants to escape mass-stupor and become a personal self, must follow the call of his conscience which constantly exhorts him, **'Be yourself! You are not actually all that which you do, think, and desire'**" (pg. 81)
      - ◆ "most men, Nietzsche avers, are loath to heed this call of conscience, either because they are afraid of being themselves or because they are too lazy to rouse themselves from their comfortable everyday routines" (pg. 81)
        - ◇ "true existence'...means emancipation from such collective beguilements and pressures" (pg. 81)
  - "his new outlook eventually uprooted his professional career and deprived him of his metaphysical anchorage, so that he became a restless wanderer without a definite goal and burdened with sickness and suffering" (pg. 83)
  - "Nietzsche was by nature inclined toward optimism. Even at the time he was most strongly influenced by Schopenhauer, he had always found refuge in a self-created inner world to some extent restored meaning to that external world in which he had lost confidence. But his optimism grew out of a profound experience of the tragic aspects of human existence" (pg. 86)
  - "for Nietzsche...the meaning of being and existence lay in the newly gained assurance that everything returns *eternally*" (pg. 90)
    - "the eternal recurrence of all things seemed to place the highest stress and strain on personal existence and personal action, for every action of the individual must now make manifest the eternal quality of his existence. Eternal recurrence, furthermore, means that all things are co-present in the idea of Being: as there is nowhere a beginning and nowhere an end, the world is always whole and perfect. Eternity, which is present in each fulfilled moment, clothes every such moment with perfection and thus redeems all things" (pg. 91)
      - *\*cf. this pg. for his moral imperative with respect to faith and loving life*
  - "politically and socially, Europe was moving toward democracy, dreaming of universal peace and security" (pg. 91)
    - "Nietzsche was placing himself more and more in radical opposition to the spirit of his age, and he began to feel more and more isolated" (pg. 91)
    - "Democratic socialism disregards the actual inequalities among men; it makes the average and the mediocrity the standard of measurement and thus leads to the tyranny of morons and to the sham morality of the herd" (pg. 92)
      - "Nietzsche then contrasts the featureless 'masses' with 'the people' and asks 'to create a people again out of the masses'. **A people (Volk) is for him something noble, while the masses are 'the sand' of humanity:** 'all alike, all very puny, very round, very sociable, and very boring'. Where the masses prevail, the individuals no longer dare to assert themselves. The masses think only of prosperity, comfort, the gratification of sensual desires, and as a consequence 'this social-democratic world is headed for a type of intellectual and moral slavery unsurpassed in all history' (pg. 92)
      - "the much-vaunted 'democratization of Europe' means for Nietzsche 'an involuntary arrangement for the breeding of tyrants'" (pg. 92)
    - "if mankind does not want to destroy itself by world government, it must, in Nietzsche's opinion, first of all acquire a thorough knowledge of those conditions which make true civilization possible..." (pg. 93)
  - "From an attack on those philosophers who demand that man adjust himself to the actual situations and conditions of life, Zarathustra proceeds to a castigation of the modern concepts of State and Society. He calls the State **'the new idol, the coldest of all cold monsters'**. **This modern State 'is false through and through'**. It claims for itself absolute power... And all the people fall on their knees to worship this new idol. They lose their own selves and become mere cogs in the gigantic mechanism of a collective pseudo-absolute..." (pg. 98)
    - "In some of the concluding chapters of Part Two Zarathustra takes issue with the founders and servants of religion and with the dispensers of knowledge and science - prisoners all, tied down by false values" (pg. 99)
    - "In Part Three Nietzsche's visionary power reaches its greatest height. Zarathustra's message is centered in the idea of the Eternal Recurrence. He preaches the new religion of atheism..." (pg. 100)
    - "But for Nietzsche himself the experience of Zarathustra provided no guarantee for this kind of happiness. He knew in his innermost heart that for mortal man the greatest height always harbors the possibility of the deepest fall" (pg. 101)
  - "Nietzsche's literary masterpiece [*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*] and personal confession aroused no one's interest. Very few read it; no one was either provoked or enthused by it" (pg. 104)
  - "the main theme [in Nietzsche's collected notes to *The Will to Power*] emerges clearly enough: **Nietzsche recognized that modern Europe was in the midst of a 'moral crisis', and it seemed to him that this crisis had its roots in the hitherto accepted system of values**. He saw the minds of his contemporaries in turmoil, uprooted and shaken by forces and experiences unknown to previous generations. The question was whether by a 'transvaluation' of the established values the substance of the European tradition could be regenerated and saved" (pg. 105)
    - "Nietzsche alone was clairvoyant enough to realize that Europe was menaced by disruptive forces which worked as yet underground, but which might erupt at any moment, especially since the guiding and binding power of God was no longer alive in human hearts and minds. In Nietzsche's opinion, Christianity was ultimately to blame for the emergence of European 'nihilism' because, he charged, it had transposed the highest values of mankind from this world to a world beyond. The 'death of God' consequently deprived human existence and the generally accepted human values of their meaning and foundation. Everything remained suspended in the void of nothingness" (pg. 107)
  - "Nietzsche's philosophy represents the most extreme and perhaps also the most consistent form of that branch of Western thought which is usually referred to as *idealism*" (pg. 107)
    - "In nineteenth-century *German* idealism, man is conceived as the epistemological center of the world which as such is regarded as a mere product or artifact of the innate faculties of the human mind. This kind of idealism imprisons man in the fortress of his own thought, and man in turn imposes the structure of his mind on whatever there is admitted as extramental reality. Man is no longer confidently opened toward Being and Reality, but he is filled with distrust and doubt as to anything which is not in the mind, of the mind, or the mind itself. It is this 'prison of the mind' that later on became the object of the attacks launched by 'realists', 'phenomenologists', and 'existentialists', from Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, and Marx to Bergson and Husserl, and from Husserl to Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, and



- Marcel" (pg. 107-108)
- "Nietzsche, in following the premises of German idealism to their extreme conclusions, **strips extramental reality of the last vestiges of independence and truth. Man, he argues, does not discover laws and values: he creates all values and then projects them into a chaotic conglomerate of phenomena.** The supposed object of knowledge is for Nietzsche nothing but an artifact arbitrarily created by the human mind and will. Ideas are nothing but arbitrarily chosen signs and symbols without any objective validity. And it is this extreme epistemological subjectivism that leads Nietzsche to the denial of any objective laws of nature and in nature. The human mind constructs its own world by transforming, uniting, ordering, and simplifying a meaningless mass of phenomena. Both the world of sense experience and the supposed ontological or metaphysical realm behind sense experience are equally unreal. There is no 'real' world at all. There is only a multitude of subjective, private worlds which Nietzsche calls 'human perspectives'. And thus, having started out from an idealistic and subjectivistic premise, Nietzsche proceeds to the complete annihilation of objective reality" (pg. 108)
    - ◆ "there is neither 'mind', nor reason, nor thought, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth...all these are fictions and quite useless" - Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (pg. 108)
      - "But the history of philosophy (Berkeley-Hume-Watson-Dewey-Carnap) shows that **with the dissolution of the objective world and of objective truth the individual subject too is threatened with annihilation. Nietzsche was not unaware of this fact"** (pg. 108)
    - "He soon came to see 'Nihilism' and 'decadence' as parallel phenomena. Modern Europe, he thought, was decadent and, aside from brief interludes, such as the Renaissance and the era of the Napoleonic Empire, it had been decadent since the fall of ancient Rome" (pg. 109)
      - "nihilism was thus seen as a consequence of individual and social decadence" (pg. 109)
    - "salvation from nihilism, Nietzsche tries to persuade himself, lies in the Will to Power. While all ideas, including the idea of the Will to Power, are fiction, some fictions may at times prove very useful" (pg. 109)
    - "All values fall a prey to Nihilism, all except the value judgment itself. Thus, the only certainty which remains is the certitude of the judgment that every so-called value is false and fictitious" (pg. 109)
      - "...the strongest ones alone are able to overcome Nihilism and to survive the annihilation of all established 'values'. But to do that they must first have learned to stand alone and forsaken in a meaningless world" (pg. 109)
      - "Thus the breeding of great, heroic individuals, that is, of genuine representatives of the Will to Power, becomes for Nietzsche at this stage both the *raison d'être* and the most important goal of human society. Being sovereign masters of their free choice, this higher breed of men will be their own lawgivers" (pg. 110)
        - ◆ "It hardly need be pointed out that Nietzsche's concept of the highest type of human existence comprises some contradictory elements" (pg. 110)
    - "**Europe, says Nietzsche, has been infected with the leveling spirit of mediocrity a spirit which, according to his way of thinking, was fostered by Christianity.** The 'spirit of the herd' has invaded science and manifests itself in varying degrees in democracy, socialism, and anarchism. The 'higher men' must fight against all these tendencies and movements: they 'must declare war on the masses'. And hand in hand with the checking of the influence of 'the herd' must go the breeding of a new aristocracy. The philosopher, the educator of the future, is to become the companion, guide, and counselor of the new rulers" (pg. 110)
      - "for this reason *Christianity* now becomes for Nietzsche the mortal enemy" (pg. 110)
  - "**the modern philosophy of existence wants to call man back to himself**" (pg. 114)
    - "In Hegel's metaphysics all beings are still situated 'in God', but only as dialectically determined entities, as 'phases' of the historical movement of the self-realization of the absolute 'World Spirit'. God Himself is drawn into the evolutionary process and is ultimately identified with this process" (pg. 114)
      - "[though] this Hegelian metaphysics is radically dissolved in the thinking of Feuerbach, Marx, Stirner, and Nietzsche..." (pg. 114)
    - "**in this hour of 'crisis', man, who by his very nature is both a questioning and a questionable, problematic being, begins in anguish to probe into the meaning of his self, of the world, and of his 'being-in-the-world'"** (pg. 115)
      - "the saying, 'God is dead', means that nothingness is spreading" (pg. 116)
        - ◆ "[Nietzsche] knew perfectly well that man cannot live a meaningless life and that therefore any *absolute* Nihilism remains an impossibility" (pg. 116)
  - "Nietzsche's anti-intellectualism, finally, wants to confine humans existence to man's bodily and earthly life" (pg. 118)
- Chapter 4 - The Call of Truth and Being: Husserl and Heidegger (pg. 121)
- "**the contemporary Philosophy of Existence in all its branches is inspired by the thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche**" (pg. 121)
    - "As has been shown in some of the preceding chapters, this does not mean that the problem of existence was not faced and subjected to philosophic analysis long before the advent of the nineteenth century. Heraclitus, Socrates, St. Augustine, and Pascal as well as many of the great Christian mystics were undoubtedly genuine existential thinkers. **What is new in contemporary existentialism is the visualization of human existence within the general frame and the specific conditions of the present age"** (pg. 121)
      - "In an almost completely secularized and disenchanted world the ancient questions concerning the nature of man and the meaning of life arc being asked with a new urgency. The loss of God in the widely disseminated philosophies of atheism, materialism, and naturalistic "humanism" has thrust modern man into a situation of spiritual abandonment and homelessness in which everything, including his own existence, has become questionable. Thus, the problem of "to be or not to be" is once more forced upon him as an alternative involving self-preservation or self-annihilation" (pg. 121)
  - "Heidegger himself has repeatedly disavowed his associations with 'existentialism', insisting that his philosophy is primarily concerned with with 'being' rather than with 'existence'" (pg. 121)
  - "The existentialist themes, discussed by various authors in the terminology coined by Heidegger, include, among others: the contingency, insecurity, self-estrangement, and dereliction of human existence (Dasein); its ultimate meaning; its 'temporality', 'historicity', and 'authenticity'; its 'care', its 'dread', and its encounter with the abyss of 'nothingness'; its 'being-toward-death' (*Sein zum Tode*) and 'freedom-toward-death'; the interrelation of 'being' and 'existence', 'being' and 'truth', 'being' and 'nothing', 'being' and 'transcendence'" (pg. 121-122)
    - "The method which is adopted by most of the contemporary existentialist thinkers for the analysis and elucidation of these basic problems is similarly uniform: it is the 'phenomenological method' which was first developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of the school of Phenomenology." (pg. 122)
      - \*cf. H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement (vol. 1), Chapter 3 - The Pure Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl & Chapter 6 - Martin Heidegger as a Phenomenologist & The Phenomenological Movement (vol. 2) - Chapter 14 - The Essentials of the Phenomenological Method*
  - "With his distinguished teachers Husserl shared the conviction that in the present age more than ever philosophy must be able to present a doctrine and a truth of universal validity" (pg. 123)
    - "It must be a truth, he answered his own question, that is absolutely univocal and immutable in its universality. **Husserl thus showed himself strictly opposed to any kind of relativism.** There must be, he argued, an essence of truth as there is an essence of every other idea, and this essence is reflected in all particular truths. Without this essential principle of truth the existence of the world would be impossible" (pg. 123)
      - "the essence of truth, Husserl asserted, is revealed in a mental act of 'intuition'. His philosophic position thus entails a realism of

- essences, that is, a form of epistemological realism as extreme and radical as that of Plato and Descartes" (pg. 123)
- ◆ "What is meant by Husserl's 'intuition of essences' may be illustrated by referring to the artistic or poetic experience as distinguished from scientific knowledge" (pg. 123)
    - ◇ "An artist who is interested in the essential nature of the world of objects...starts, to be sure, from sense perception, but he goes far beyond it in rendering the essences of things and beings. **There are then, it would seem, aspects of reality which are hidden from sense perception and inaccessible to it, but open to a different kind of mental or intellectual apperception**" (pg. 123)
    - ◆ "this is obviously what both Plato and Husserl have in mind when they speak of the knowledge of 'Ideas' or 'Essences', respectively" (pg. 123)
  - "in both kinds of perception - sense knowledge and 'eidetic' knowledge (or 'ideation') - something 'real' is directly given and perceived" (pg. 123)
    - ◆ "all 'ideation', [Husserl] insists, is rooted in sense object and sense perceptions and can never dispense with them" (pg. 124)
      - ◇ "what makes an artists is...his capacity to erect on the foundation of his sensory perceptions a new world and reality of higher validity and truth" (pg. 124)
  - **"philosophy, according to Husserl, is thus not so much a science of facts as a science of essence, and philosophic knowledge is not a knowledge of facts but a knowledge of essence"** (pg. 124)
    - "Husserl professes no interest in this central problem of the Kantian theory of knowledge. His own interest is centered in the elaboration of a science of the 'pure phenomena' or 'pure essences' of consciousness" (pg. 124)
      - ◆ "he thus develops his 'phenomenological method' as an instrument to be used in the radical analysis of 'pure consciousness'" (pg. 124)
        - ◇ "The phenomenological method in its application to the analysis of the contents of human consciousness demands the simple and unprejudiced observation and description of those phenomena which are actually encountered either in sense perception or in 'eidetic' perception." (pg. 124)
        - ◇ "In all the transformations which a thing may undergo, there persists, according to Husserl, an identity and unity of certain essential features which remain unchanged. And phenomenological description is the description of these essential features" (pg. 125)
      - ◆ "as a 'science of essences' phenomenology thus aims at the recognition of the essential predictable that belong to individual objects" (pg. 126)
  - **"Both Husserl and St. Thomas Aquinas teach that truth exists objectively, independent of the seeker and knower"** (pg. 126)
    - "As against [Aquinas's] God-centered view of the world and of every created being in it, Husserl's Phenomenology presents a radical shift of accent and viewpoint. Taking its start from the human subject and his consciousness, Phenomenology remains ego-centered throughout; at no point does it achieve a genuine transcendence of the sphere of immanence" (pg. 126)
      - ◆ \*cf. pg. 126-127 for good discussion of Aquinas's theory
        - ◇ "for St. Thomas all human knowledge is gained by way of the rational analytic and synthetic treatment of the data furnished by sense perception. Husserl, on the other hand, insists that philosophic evidence results from an 'intuition of essences'" (pg. 128)
          - ▶ "**Phenomenological 'reduction' or abstraction means 'looking away' ('bracketing')** from all accidental qualities in order to concentrate on the essence of the object" (pg. 128)
            - "Husserl's conviction that this kind of 'intuition' penetrates deeper into the world of existence than the traditional logical syllogism is shared by some leading Thomists" (pg. 128)
        - ◇ "Husserl and St. Thomas, furthermore, seem united in their opposition to any integral idealism and rationalism that regards the objects of knowledge as constructs or creations of the human mind and its innate categories" (pg. 128)
          - ▶ "But whereas St. Thomas conceives of the analytical activity of reason as both active and passive, devoting considerable effort to the elucidation of the abstractive function of the 'active intellect' (*intellectus agens*), Husserl asserts the primarily passive nature of rational intuitions" (pg. 128)
            - "**phenomenological intuitions...are regarded by Husserl as a priori truths and thus beyond the jurisdiction of experience**" (pg. 128)
    - "it had been Husserl's original endeavor to break down Kant's dogma of the rational inaccessibility of 'things-in-themselves'" (pg. 128)
      - "in this original effort Husserl did, however, not persist: he never succeeded in actually reaching the sphere of transsubjective reality" (pg. 129)
  - "for [Heidegger] as for Husserl, philosophy is primarily a reading of phenomena, but beyond that it is for Heidegger 'a universal ontology, starting out from a hermeneutics (i.e., an ontological analysis and interpretation) of man'" (pg. 129)
    - "Heidegger applies Phenomenology and its methodological devices to a Philosophy of Existence which he wants to anchor, however, in a new 'fundamental ontology'. The central question, therefore, of Heidegger's philosophy concerns not 'existence' but 'Being'" (pg. 129)
      - "he has, on the contrary, done everything possible to render difficult the access to his philosophy. First of all, he has created a philosophic language and terminology all his own, frequently either reverting to the long-forgotten root meanings of words and concepts, or coining new ones to satisfy his groping quest for an adequate verbal expression of his ideas. He has, furthermore, abandoned time-honored ways of thinking to an extent that makes it almost impossible to fit his philosophic concepts into any established categories. It is thus hardly surprising, and at least partly his own fault, that he has been so often misunderstood and misinterpreted..." (pg. 131)
    - "**'I am not primarily concerned with existence'**, Heidegger told Stefan Schimanski on the occasion of the latter's visit with the recluse of the Black Forest. 'My book bears the title *Being and Time*, not 'Existence and Time'. **For me the haunting question is and has been, not man's existence, but 'being-in-totality' and 'being as such.'**" In other words, Heidegger is primarily interested in ontology, not in anthropology" (pg. 132)
      - "It is true nevertheless that the central concept in the published part of *Being and Time* is 'existence', not 'being'..." (pg. 132)
        - ◆ "for [Heidegger] 'existence' and 'man in existence' or 'existence in man' is merely a starting point and a means for the illumination of *Being as such*, that is, for the elaboration of a *universal and fundamental ontology*" (pg. 132)
          - ◇ "Schimanski states quite correctly that Heidegger's philosophy begins where that of Sartre ends" (pg. 132)
    - "It is Heidegger's contention that the inquiry into the meaning of 'Being' was the central problem of occidental philosophy, from the Pre-Socratics down to Hegel, but that after Hegel the problem fell almost completely into oblivion. 'Being' was, as it were, henceforth taken for granted; it was treated as if it were something self-evident, and it is being made use of in an extremely vague manner in all human knowledge, in all statements and judgments, in all human" (pg. 133)
      - "[Kierkegaard] criticized Hegel for having omitted or suppressed the actual existence of the individual, and he offered his own 'existentialism' as a means to aid himself and others in the practical ethical and religious conduct of life" (pg. 133)
  - "true existential thinking, however, is, according to Heidegger, intimately related to both theoretical insight and practical conduct" (pg. 133)

- "in his attempt to inquire anew into the meaning of 'Being', Heidegger's first objective is the ontological analysis of human existence" (pg. 133)
  - ◆ "Heidegger answers that, while stones, plants, and brutes certainly exist, they lack the means to illuminate the meaning of their existence. Human life, however, differs ontologically from the life of all other existents in that it alone is and must of necessity be concerned about its Being and its potentialities. And human life alone is capable of piercing the mystery of its own existence. It alone makes genuine choices and decisions. It may gain full possession of itself and thus exist authentically, or it may lose itself and disintegrate into an unauthentic form of existence" (pg. 133)
- "To describe the way man exists, in contradistinction to other beings, he uses the term *Dasein* ("being-there"). **Human *Dasein* 'exists' rather than 'in-sists', that is, it does not 'stand in itself' like things or plants or brutes, but it 'stands out'** comprehendingly into that boundless realm of 'being' from which it receives its own meaning and which imparts to it the understanding of its own self as well as the understanding of the being of every other existent. In its 'existentialistic' structure human *Dasein* thus differs ontologically from all other existents" (pg. 133)
  - ◆ "**Human *Dasein* is, furthermore, 'being-in-the-world'**, and in this respect too man's mode of being differs essentially from the ways in which other existents (trees, stars, animals) are in the world. **Man, as existing, is actively related to the objects and beings which surround him**, and without his active insertion into the world, knowledge would be impossible. If man tries to withdraw himself from the world in detached observation, he perceives only the external aspects of things but fails to penetrate into their essential meaning. **To seize reality, man must live and act.** The external world, in turn, has no complete existential autonomy: it is rather a constitutive element of human *Dasein*, the subject matter and term of human action, a potential means for the realization of human existence. **The world is the 'space' which in the sum total of its implements is related to man and the indispensable condition of his *Dasein***" (pg. 134)
    - ◇ "In order to point out the difference between authentic and unauthentic existence, Heidegger proceeds from an analysis of the banality of everyday life ('Alltaglichkeit') and refers to a potentiality of human *Dasein* which he terms '*das Verfallen*' (the "falling away," disintegration)" (pg. 134)
      - ▶ "It is not the individual, private ego, he answers, with its genuine intentions, endeavors, and possibilities, but an anonymous and featureless public ego ('das Man'), the 'one-like-many', shirking personal responsibility and taking its cues from the conventions of those who live *en masse*" (pg. 134)
        - "**Das Man thinks, believes, speaks, behaves as 'one does' and thus expresses the conformist leveling which characterizes the average human life. Das Man has fallen a prey to the things in the world and has become alienated from authentic human purposes and possibilities.** It expresses itself and communicates with others not in genuine speech (*Rede*) but in conventional, superficial chatter (*Gerede*)" (pg. 134-135)
          - ◆ "the result is a 'self-estrangement' of human existence, leading eventually to the blotting out of its potentialities and to its disintegration in the irrelevancy of everyday life" (pg. 135)
      - ▶ "**To exist authentically** does not mean, however, that one has to disown or discard all the attitudes of everyday life. Such a demand would be impossible of fulfillment, since man exists and must continue to exist in the world and with others. **Authentic existence is something decisively different from everyday life nevertheless, because it makes man capable of seeing his everyday life in an entirely new perspective**" (pg. 135)
        - *\*i.e., is removed of the haze*
- "Human *Dasein*, as has been stated, differs from other modes of existence in that it is always concerned about its Being and its possibilities. It is permeated and saturated by 'care' (*Sorge*)" (pg. 135)
  - ◆ "as a preliminary for the analysis of 'care' Heidegger first inquires into the ontological character of 'dread' (*Angst*)" (pg. 135)
    - ◇ "Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger distinguish between 'dread' and 'fear': while the object of fear is always something definite of which man is afraid, **the object of dread is 'that indefinite something which is nothing' (i.e., no thing).** What threatens is found nowhere in particular, and yet, it is everywhere. What is dreaded is the world as such and one's 'being-in-the-world'. The struggle with 'dread' and its outcome ultimately determines whether man finds himself in the ground of "Being" or whether he is swallowed up and annihilated in 'nothingness'" (pg. 136)
    - ◆ "**Man discovers and discloses the world in which he exists by way of those objects among which he moves**, about which he is concerned and cares, and to which he attends" (pg. 136)
      - ◇ *\*cf. F. Copleston, in A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism, pg. 181-182.*
    - ◆ "Human *Dasein*, says Heidegger, is 'thrown' into a world not of its own making, and it is left there in its 'thrownness' to 'care', to engage itself and concern itself, using its own devices and acting under its own responsibility" (pg. 136)
- "Section Two of Being and Time discusses the 'temporality' and 'historicity' of human *Dasein*" (pg. 136)
  - ◆ "the understanding of the 'temporality' of *Dasein*, in its relations to the dimensions of past, present, and future, opens up the 'horizon' for a new interpretation of 'Being'" (pg. 137)
    - ◇ "to envisage *Dasein* as a whole it is necessary to understand it as 'being-toward-death'. For death, being the 'end' of *Dasein*, completes and integrates it. Death - *my own death*, viewed as an ever present possibility - is part of the *Being* of *Dasein*. As soon as *Dasein* exists, it is "thrown" into this possibility, and this "being thrown" reveals itself in 'dread'" (pg. 137)
      - ▶ "death is thus and 'end' of human *Dasein* in the sense that it may cut short my existence at any moment" (pg. 137)
        - "Since death not only completes *Dasein* but also terminates it, I can never have an adequate experience or understanding of the actual transition from life to death" (pg. 137)
          - ◆ *\*Wittgenstein said that we do live our deaths*
        - "one observes certain rules and conventions laid down by *das Man*, and one tries at the same time every possible trick to reduce the actuality of one's own death to some such abstract and detached proposition as 'all men are mortal'. The result is the self-estrangement of *Dasein* from its genuine potentiality of Being" (pg. 138)
          - ◆ "**The authentic understanding of my own 'being-toward-death', on the other hand, restores to me my true selfhood; it personalizes me, and it also imparts to me true insight into the Being of my fellowmen**" (pg. 138)
        - "By overcoming in my 'freedom-toward-death' the self-delusions of *das Man*, I can at last arrive at an understanding of my *Dasein* as a 'whole'" (pg. 138)
  - "Heidegger's second question, referring to the problem of the 'authenticity' of *Dasein*, calls for an ontological analysis of the three phenomena of 'conscience', 'guilt', and 'resolve'. **The 'call' of conscience appeals to the selfhood of man; it calls him back from the anonymity of *das Man*.** This call itself issues from the innermost self of man and is generated by 'care'. 'Conscience reveals itself as the call of Care', says Heidegger. 'Guilt' points to an intrinsic and original deficiency or privation of *Dasein*. Only by entering into the prospect of guilt can man open himself to his authentic potentiality of existence. And he projects himself into this potentiality by his 'resolve', thus imparting to his *Dasein* an authentic lucidity. **'Resolve' makes possible genuine 'choice'**; it begets action in concrete

- situations and the strength to master them. Resolute, authentic Dasein lives in the fulfilled moment and has become capable of relating itself to future, past, and present, the three dimensions of "temporality." They unveil temporality as a "being-outside-itself" and are therefore called by Heidegger the three "ex-stases." (pg. 138)
- "In the essay *On the Essence of Truth* he describes the **philosopher as 'a wanderer into the neighborhood of Being'**" (pg. 139)
    - "The problem of Truth as such, Heidegger states, is inseparably linked with the problem of Being. But the original meaning of Truth has become obscured in the course of the history of philosophy" (pg. 140)
    - "Truth as such, according to Heidegger, is essentially one and indivisible" (pg. 140)
      - ◆ *\*i.e., objective*
    - "The problem of Truth in all its magnitude was, according to Heidegger, faced for the first time when some of the early Greek thinkers in profound astonishment asked the question, **'What is all that which is?'** This question marked not only the beginning of the history of philosophy and metaphysics but also of history and civilization. To ask such a question the thinker had first to withdraw from the everyday view of things, in a way analogous to the withdrawal described by Plato in the famous parable of the 'cave'" (pg. 141)
      - ◆ **"Truth thus consists in the 'uncovering', in the bringing back into 'the open' that which is. Man, in the process of this 'uncovering' of the being of things, enters into Dasein"** (pg. 141)
        - ◇ "while this insight into the Truth of Being liberates man for authentic existence, the previous **'concealment' of the Truth of Being had held man imprisoned in untruth and error.** True philosophy, Heidegger concludes, is always obedient to and a servant of 'Being.'" (pg. 141)
  - "Here [in his lecture on the nature of Metaphysics (1929)] the philosopher analyzes the concept of 'nothingness', viewed as a metaphysical category and in its relation to the problem of 'Being'. To pose the problem of 'Being', Heidegger contends, one must first have faced the problem of 'nothingness'. The discussion of 'nothingness' is thus intended as a preliminary step leading to the elucidation of metaphysics" (pg. 143)
    - "the one specific mood in which 'nothingness' is experienced is 'dread'" (pg. 143)
      - ◆ **"for Heidegger 'nothingness' is a strange and bewildering metaphysical phenomenon.** Though it cannot be actually apprehended, it is much more than a mere vague feeling or emotion" (pg. 143)
        - ◇ "In this frightening experience all things seem to slide away from the grip of man: the 'nothing' seems to annihilate them. But this sinking away of things may and should be followed by a second and reverse movement: man's rediscovery of the true nature of things and his subsequent turning back to them with his newly gained love and understanding. **Once he has been threatened and stirred to his depths by the engulfing terror of nothingness, he now is prepared for a new and radically different approach to reality.** Things, after having been tested in the contrast to nothingness, are revealed in the total 'otherness' of their true being" (pg. 143)
    - **"metaphysics is defined by Heidegger as the 'questioning beyond' the things that are, in order to regain them in their full reality and totality"** (pg. 143)
      - ◆ "The traditional technical term for such a 'questioning beyond' is, of course, 'transcendence'. Without transcendence, that is, without the metaphysical inquiry, knowledge and learning become a mere statistic and positivistic accumulation and classification of data" (pg. 143)
    - "In the *Postscript* to the lecture on metaphysics Heidegger dwells in particular on the distinction between science and philosophy, contrasting scientific 'calculation' (which he calls 'the will to will' or 'the will to power') and philosophico-metaphysical thought. In metaphysical speculation the phenomena and problems which the philosopher proposes to analyze and interpret can never be made 'objects' in the sense in which one speaks of the objects of scientific research. The reason is that in the approach to metaphysical data the of the thinker is always involved and implied. He can neither step outside his own Being nor outside 'Being' itself and thus achieve a scientific 'objectivity'" (pg. 143-144)
      - ◆ "Heidegger concludes his inquiry into the nature of metaphysics by describing **the true philosopher as the one who obediently and faithfully responds to the 'call of Being'**, the one who dedicates his life to the maintenance of the Truth of Being" (pg. 144)
  - "Heidegger...insists on the essential difference between the scientific and philosophical approach to reality. Modern philosophy, he argues, is haunted by the fear of losing its dignity and validity unless it can make itself into a 'science'. But such a transformation would entail the surrender of the very essence of thinking" (pg. 144)
    - "Heidegger points out that true humanism is concerned with the essence or nature of man..." (pg. 144)
      - ◆ "But how is human nature properly defined?" (pg. 145)
        - ◇ "Karl Marx believed he had discovered human nature in the 'social man'. For him the totality of man's natural needs and wants is secured and safeguarded in and by Society" (pg. 145)
        - ◇ "If 'humanism' is defined as the endeavor to enable man to recover in freedom his *humanitas* or his human dignity, then there are as many different kinds of 'humanism' as there are different concepts of the 'freedom' and the 'nature' of man" (pg. 145)
          - ▶ "every such 'humanism' is grounded in metaphysics, that is, it presupposes a knowledge of the most general nature or essence of man" (pg. 145)
    - "'Being' is nearest to man, but this nearest has become his farthest because he has lost his relationship to Being in its plenitude and is clinging to things and beings rather than to 'Being'. And this loss of his relationship to Being in its plenitude is the real reason why modern man - rootless and homeless - moves in the *void of nothingness.* When man forgets the Truth of Being in the midst of the noisy crowd of existents, his *Dasein* disintegrates" (pg. 146)
      - ◆ "Parmenides' ancient saying... 'Being certainly is', implies that existents never really and fully 'are'" (pg. 146)
    - "It seems to Heidegger that any true 'humanism' understands the *humanitas* of man from his nearness to Being, from his 'ex-static' dwelling in the neighborhood of Being, and from his 'care' for and about Being. The real meaning of 'humanism' can thus only be restored by a redefinition of the term, and such a redefinition requires first of all a more genuine understanding of man's nature and *Dasein*" (pg. 147)
    - "There is no doubt that in this age of technology man, who has been handed over to the impersonal forces of the featureless collective, can be brought back to a personal steadiness of his badly shaken existence only by a moral ordering of his planning and doing" (pg. 149)
      - ◆ "To argue against 'values' . . . means therefore to protest against subjectivism..." – Heidegger (pg. 149)
      - ◆ **"Thinking itself is an action, replies Heidegger; an activity more potent and more pregnant with consequences than any kind of praxis. Thinking permeates all doing and making.** Thinking aids 'in the building of the House of Being', and the nature of Being will some day make it possible for us to meditate on the meaning of 'house' and 'abiding in the house'. Only in so far as man has his abode in the Truth of Being can he receive directives from the heart of Being, directives which he may then accept as his law and rule and compared with which all other 'laws' are merely poor artifacts" (pg. 150)
  - "Existence, as the term is traditionally used, predicates that something is. Essence (*Wesen*) predicates what something is: it refers to a thing

- or a being's nature or to the 'internal possibility' (*interna possibilitas*) which makes it of necessity what it is. **A philosophy whose basic concept is the essence of things and beings is an essentialist philosophy. And a philosophy which centers in the existence of things and beings is an existentialist philosophy**" (pg. 151)
- "the nature of Dasein lies in its ex-sistence', [Heidegger] states" (pg. 151)
  - "the exemplary prototype of all *essentialist* philosophies is the essentialism of Plato" (pg. 151)
    - ◆ "And there is also an essence of man, an essence which every human being carries within himself and which permits him to determine whether or not his existence corresponds to the essential human nature. It is man's task to realize this human essence, that is, to translate into existence his 'internal possibility': to become existentially what he is essentially" (pg. 151)
      - ◇ "Thus, in Platonic essentialism, the reality of the essence precedes the borrowed and inferior reality of existence, since this latter is nothing but the imperfect realization of the enduring, immutable essences" (pg. 151)
        - ▶ "As Max Muller points out, in Plato's essentialism the relationship between eternity and time, essential and existential reality, constancy and change, remains unexplained" (pg. 151)
  - **"Freedom in the highest sense is therefore the taking upon myself of a task which is uniquely and exclusively my own. This is what Heidegger means by an "existential decision" or "choice"; this is for him the authentic mandate of an 'existential ethics'. And this is also why he designates "historicity" as the fundamental category of existential thinking. Kant's 'categorical imperative', which enjoins me to do what every other human being would do if he were placed in my position, is thus the exact opposite of the 'existential imperative', which tells me to do what I alone and no one else can do"** (pg. 153)
  - "The German philosopher shows himself equally opposed to Positivism and Idealism: Positivism, he contends, suffered shipwreck because it concentrated its attention exclusively on the finiteness and contingency of matter. Idealism suffered shipwreck because it contemptuously denied the finiteness and contingency of human Dasein and was bent on submerging the individual existence pantheistically in the absolute and infinite spirit. Heidegger's philosophy is laboring with the problem of giving verbal expression to a new experience of both the finite and the infinite" (pg. 153-154)
  - **"'Being' for Heidegger is that reality which is encountered in everything that is and which makes possible everything that is. 'Being' is the historical evolution of this all-pervading reality toward its actual existence"** (pg. 154)
    - **"Heidegger's 'Being' is the actuality of the essence, from which the individual essences issues as *modi* of its contingency"** (pg. 154)
  - **"It seems to be Heidegger's conviction that, since what at first appears as 'nothingness' is ultimately revealed as 'Being', all existents are ultimately grounded in that immense realm of 'Being' which reveals itself behind the veil of nothingness and which restores to man all things and beings, including his own authentic Dasein. 'Without Being there can never be any existent', says Heidegger"** (pg. 154-155)
- Chapter 5 - The Ape of Lucifer: Jean-Paul Sartre (pg. 156)
    - "three major intellectual forces are today struggling for the soul of France: Christianity, Marxism, and Atheistic Existentialism" (pg. 156)
    - "existence is not something which can be thought from a distance: it overwhelms you brusquely" - Sartre (pg. 157)
      - **"existence is for Sartre pure contingency: it means simply 'to be there'; existents appear, they are encountered, but they can never be inferentially deduced"** (pg. 157)
      - "every existent is *'de trop'*: superfluous, absurd" (pg. 157)
        - "and yet people are trying to hide themselves behind the idea of law and necessity. In vain: **every existent is born without reason, prolongs its existence owing to the weakness of inertia, and dies fortuitously**" - Sartre (pg. 157)
    - "Sartre and the hero of his novel [*La Nausee*] are concerned with the things of everyday life because of their conviction that the meaning of 'being' and its relationship to human existence can be discovered in them. In philosophic idealism human consciousness is the epistemological center of the world of being and of the being of the world. **Everything that is, is nothing but an artifact of the human mind**" (pg. 158)
      - **"Sartre, in *La Nausee*, makes this formidable mental bastion of philosophic idealism the object of his attack"** (pg. 158)
        - "In *La Nausee* the center of the world is not man or human consciousness, but the massive extramental universe as it is symbolized in the seemingly most insignificant objects of everyday life" (pg. 158)
        - "What strikes and overwhelms Antoine Roquentin is the brutal reality of existing things, in contrast to the phantomlike reality of ideas. The experience which makes him aware of the naked 'being-there' of existents is *la nausee*, the 'great disgust' (Nietzsche)" (pg. 158)
          - ◆ "As this world of 'dead' objects confronts man with silent and stubborn hostility, there arises in the human consciousness a horrible, oppressive fear of the obscene nakedness of the 'being-there' of things" (pg. 159)
        - "Antoine Roquentin has made the shocking discovery that all being spends and wastes itself on a prodigious scale, but that it does so gratuitously, without any meaning or purpose. Man faces the fearful sight of **this colossal, inert mass of being**, and he simultaneously experiences himself as the only existent that is aware in his consciousness of the extent, the weight, and the ultimate meaninglessness of this gigantic realm of being" (pg. 159)
      - "In his philosophic analysis of 'existence' Sartre logically confines himself to a phenomenological investigation of the only empirically known being that can consciously experience what it means 'to exist', namely, man. It is human consciousness which makes possible this experience" (pg. 159)
        - "Sartre states with Brentano and Husserl that consciousness always posits an object: it is of necessity consciousness of *something*; of something which is different from and beyond consciousness. This 'transphenomenal being' Sartre calls the 'in-itself' (*l'en-soi*), and he opposes to it the 'for-itself' (*le pour-soi*) of human consciousness. Nothing can be said of the *en-soi* except that it is. **Sartre's work is therefore not primarily concerned with this 'being-in-itself' but rather with the phenomenological analysis of the structure, the projects, and the limitations of human consciousness"** (pg. 159)
          - "One characteristic element of human consciousness, according to Sartre, is negation, its capacity of saying 'no'. This possibility of negation enters into man's questioning of himself and of the world. The **'nothingness' of negation, that is, the possibility of not-being, is lodged like a worm in the very core of being**: 'Nothingness haunts being'" (pg. 160)
            - ◆ **"Death is not part of the ontological structure of human consciousness: it can never become part of my projects; I can neither experience nor anticipate death..."** (pg. 163)
              - ◇ "far from imparting any meaning to human life, death rather reveals most clearly that life in its totality is absurd: 'it is meaningless that we were born; it is meaningless that we die'" (pg. 163)
          - "Human consciousness, says, Sartre, is discordant, divided in itself. It knows of itself, but it does so in such a way that this knowledge and the knower are neither entirely different nor entirely identical" (pg. 160)
            - ◆ "When, for example, I perceive a tree, I am conscious of the tree and, in addition, I am conscious of the fact that I perceive a tree. I and the tree are two different things. But my perception of the tree, and my being conscious of this perception are neither two entirely different things nor are they entirely identical" (pg. 160)
              - ◇ **"nothing' separates the two phenomena** to such an extent that they can neither converge nor become entirely separate and independent. **They are both linked and held apart by an 'abyss of nothingness' which is unbridgeable. Owing to this split in his consciousness, man, Sartre concludes, is divided in himself, never fully himself**. The *'en-soi'* that is, the

- objective world of things, on the other hand, is undivided, impregnable, massive, unshakable. In the *en-soi* the fullness and security of being manifests itself" (pg. 160)
- ▶ "man experiences himself not only as discordant and fragmentary but also as *free*" (pg. 160)
    - "Freedom, in Sartre's view, thus results from the fact that man is not self-sufficient, not fully real and therefore actually inferior to the fullness of being of the *en-soi*. Man's freedom, in other words, is a consequence of his ontological inferiority, of a diminution of his being. But, understanding himself as thus divided and incomplete, man strives to fill this lacuna in his being: **he aspires to the plenitude of the *en-soi*, but in doing so he wants to retain the consciousness of his own self, his prerogative as a 'pour-soi'**" (pg. 160)
      - ♦ "The goal of all human striving is thus an ideal 'self', combining the fullness of being with the fullness of consciousness. **Man, says Sartre, is nothing but this striving to become 'I-en-soi-pour-soi' or, in other words, the striving to overcome the debility of his being by divinizing himself**" (pg. 160-161)
        - ♦ "Man is therefore, Sartre concludes, 'a futile passion'" (pg. 161)
          - ♦ "no matter how passionately man forges ahead in this endless chase, the fullness of being forever escapes him" (pg. 161)
            - ♦ "we are existents who can never catch up with themselves" - Sartre (pg. 161)
            - ♦ "every human being, Sartre avers, is animated by the radical desire to become God" (pg. 163)
        - ♦ "man, in his futile pursuit of his flighty and fugitive self, 'is not what he is, and he is what he is not'..." (pg. 161)
          - ♦ "**'to exist' means for man to realize himself in action**, to storm ahead toward an impossible goal. Although he knows that all his projects are destined to suffer shipwreck, although he knows that he spends himself in vain, he is condemned to continue in activities which constantly annihilate his past, his present, and the projects of his anticipated future. **Man, in short, is 'condemned' to a freedom which weighs upon him like an inescapable fate**" (pg. 161)
        - ♦ "Man *is* his freedom, says Sartre, and therefore this freedom is absolute. It extends to anything and everything; it leaves no room for any kind of determinism" (pg. 161)
          - ♦ "All the modes of my being equally make manifest my freedom; all of them are projects in the pursuit of my ideal 'self'" (pg. 161)
        - ♦ "**Human freedom, therefore, is not a blessing, but a curse and horrible yoke**" (pg. 161)
  - ◇ "Sartre next proceeds to trace the 'nihilitating' function of human existence in all directions and dimensions. In every one of them man is separated from himself by the insurmountable barrier of nothingness" (pg. 161)
    - ▶ "he remain separated from both [past and future] by that 'nothingness' which always intervenes between him and time. Man is thus relinquished, abandoned by his past: it avails him nothing. But the absolute dictate of his present freedom commands him and compels him to assert himself, to *make himself*, that is, to invent and set up motivations and values to sustain his life" (pg. 161-162)
      - "Constantly checkmated in his projects, constantly thrown back on his fragile momentary existence, man, in his dereliction, experiences dread and anguish. **He knows that he is completely alone, absolutely on his own, under the fearful pressure of his own responsibility**. The freedom to which he is 'condemned' frightens and worries him. He would like nothing better than to rid himself of this burden, by shifting responsibility for his actions either to the determining forces of environment and heredity or to the decree of a superhuman power: by becoming either a nonconscious and non-responsible being or a being subject to a superior law and necessity" (pg. 162)
        - ♦ "But such attempts at escape - materialistic determinism as much as religious predestination - are essentially dishonest and foredoomed to failure. **Man is what he makes himself, and he alone is responsible for what he makes himself**" (pg. 162)
  - "the world of idealism is a world without human beings" (pg. 162)
    - ♦ "the existence of 'the other' confronts me with a new and different set of experiences and shatters the solipsism of any idealistic dreamwork" (pg. 162)
      - ◇ "Two principal attitudes are possible in regard to the phenomenon of 'the other', says Sartre. The first is illustrated by the phenomenon of *love*. Here I recognize and acknowledge the beloved as a free subject, but 'the other' in this case regards me as an *en-soi*, that is, as an object or thing. To please, to attract, to fascinate the beloved, I try every possible means to present myself as a perfectly fulfilled and integrated being. But the beloved, if he loves me, demands in turn that I acknowledge in him the attribute of absolute ontological plenitude, and neither of us is willing to enter into a reciprocal relationship on such fictitious and self-contradictory premises. The second principal attitude in regard to 'the other' is illustrated by the phenomenon of *sexual desire*. Here 'my regard' transforms the other into an object or thing of which I try to gain possession, whose freedom I try to appropriate. But blinded by carnal passion, I completely lose sight of my original aim: instead of enjoying the anticipated rapture of possession, I either forget 'the other' in the auto-intoxication of lust or I sadistically subdue and enslave him. In neither case is the desired union with the other a possibility" (pg. 162-163)
      - ♦ "Sartre claims, **the original and natural attitude among human beings is not love, harmony, and peace, but hate, conflict, and strife**" (pg. 163)
  - "**The only true and absolute value is embodied in a freedom which affirms itself in its profound contingency and turns this contingency into a personal adventure**" (pg. 165)
  - "The entire structure of [Being and Nothingness] rests on the arbitrary postulate of an absolute and massive 'being-in-itself' (*en-soi*)" (pg. 165-166)
    - "With a grand sweep Sartre replaces the several philosophic dualisms of the past by a simple phenomenological monism: the 'being' and the 'appearance' of things are identical or, in other words, things are exactly what they *appear* to be; there is no 'within' and 'without', no hidden 'nature' or 'essence' of things" (pg. 166)
      - ♦ "Since the phenomenon is the entire reality of a being, 'everything is in act', and the appearance of a thing is its total essence. The essence merely ties together the successive 'apparitions' of existents and is thus itself nothing but a phenomenal appearance" (pg. 166)
    - "In his phenomenological analysis of the 'being-for-others' Sartre mingles half-truths with fully grown falsehoods" (pg. 167)
      - ♦ "**In Sartre's thinking 'the other' never appears as a 'thou' but always as the enemy or the stranger who wants to subdue and dominate me**" (pg. 167)
        - ◇ \*cf. M. Buber, *I and Thou*
    - "Sartre's world is, in short, an absurd and impossible universe, populated by contingent and isolated beings, all self-enclosed and merely physically juxtaposed in a metaphysical and moral vacuum. The neighbor is 'the other', and he is the enemy..." (pg. 167)



- knowledge there would be no freedom" (pg. 182)
- ◇ "My freedom, furthermore, presupposes my being conscious of a law or a hierarchy of values. Freedom of choice, that is, a human act of freedom in the strict sense, is impossible without a law. But this law - the indispensable condition of my freedom - must be an internal, personal law rather than an external, universal norm..." (pg. 182)
    - ▶ **"Existential choice is not obedience to an objectively formulated imperative", but my obedience to an internal imperative.** Since the world is inexhaustible in its contents and since science is by its very nature incomplete and fragmentary, I must act without first acquiring a complete and exact knowledge of all the factors involved in my decision. Otherwise, I will never get beyond the stage of deliberation" (pg. 182)
      - *\*I wonder - where does such internal imperative ultimately derive?*
        - ◆ "It is obvious, of course, that in his doctrine of freedom **Jaspers defends a strictly anti-intellectualistic position.** For any rational philosophy freedom of action is inconceivable without a prior intellectual knowledge which can deliberate and weigh motives" (pg. 183)
        - ◆ "For Jaspers, on the contrary, it is precisely the absence of any rational, objective knowledge that makes freedom of action possible. Objective knowledge for him means constraint..." (pg. 183)
          - ◆ **"No action that is conditioned by an external motive or end can be a free action; to be free, it must be 'unconditioned'"** (pg. 183)
    - ◇ "existential freedom chooses to act, that is, it chooses to live" (pg. 183)
      - ▶ "to be free means to be one's self; freedom is loyalty to one's self" (pg. 183)
      - ▶ In freedom I seize my existence. Freedom 'is' existence, says Jaspers" (pg. 184)
    - "Dasein as such, isolated from existence, is essentially incomplete, fleeting, relative, evanescent: a contingent and transitory 'nullity'. Man therefore succumbs to a monstrous delusion if he regards it as an absolute reality, if he endows it with the attributes of stability, necessity, permanence, and absolute universal validity" (pg. 184)
  - "In the act of freedom my existence not only takes possession of itself but it also enters into *communication* with other existences. I cannot really become myself in isolation, says Jaspers, but only in communication and collaboration with others" (pg. 185)
    - **"In genuine communication those who enter into the existential relationship "open themselves" and "reveal themselves" to each other without reservation in the original depth of their being,** ready to see and to be seen, to penetrate and be penetrated, to mold and be molded in a reciprocal give-and-take" (pg. 186-187)
      - ◆ "In order to gain 'existence' I am willing to forsake all my attachments to empirical goods and values, so that I may become free to experience sympathetically the profound existential truth of 'the other'" (pg. 187)
    - "True communication, on the contrary, respects and preserves the distinctions between individual and individual and between their existential truths" (pg. 187)
      - ◆ "like existence, communication is thus undefinable and ineffable: it cannot be expressed in abstract concepts" (pg. 187)
      - ◆ "True communication always brings to light something in human beings which makes them feel that they did not meet each other by chance in the domain of *Dasein* but that they have been related to each other from eternity" (pg. 188)
  - "The philosophic search for being moves, according to Jaspers, in three main directions: toward 'the world', toward 'possible existence', and toward 'transcendence'. The search for the world leads to 'world-orientation'; the search for possible existence leads to the step-by-step 'illumination of existence'; and the search for transcendence leads into the proximity of the fullness of being. Philosophy must 'transcend' the world of objects because what is given to man as an object of his research embodies Being in its fullness" (pg. 188)
    - "The Dasein of everyday life in its satiety and complacency is without transcendence. In the immanence of Dasein I am capable of experiencing pleasure in the brutal vitality of things and beings, but I remain empty in my satiety, helpless and forlorn in sudden loss, shiftless in the flux of time" (pg. 188)
    - "Transcendence is realized in the three dimensions of world-orientation, the illumination of existence, and the metaphysical penetration of the realm of being. To these three dimensions correspond the three existential impulses of (1) exploration of the world in order to learn what being is; (2) exploration of the interrelationship of the world and myself as an agent in the world; and (3) the search for God. If any one of these impulses is silenced, philosophy ceases to function. For it is precisely in my capacity as a philosopher that I study the disciplines which make possible world-orientation; that I am engaged in the illumination of my existence in the world; that I have an open mind for the metaphysical lucidity and transparency of things" (pg. 189)
      - "Jaspers at times uses the terms 'Transcendence' and 'God' synonymously" (pg. 189)
        - ◆ "To elucidate further what he means by 'Transcendence', Jaspers makes use of a term which recurs again and again in his discussion of metaphysical problems: he speaks of '*das Umgreifende*' (literally, that which 'envelops'). **Everything we know, Jaspers contends, appears to us within the frame of a 'horizon', and that which 'envelops' all horizons is the unknowable '*Umgreifende*'"** (pg. 193)
        - ◆ "There is, however, transcendence in the sense of a 'going beyond' in every one of these three phenomena: in the illumination of existence, in world-orientation, and in metaphysics" (pg. 193)
        - ◆ "there is transcendence in the illumination of my existence: this means that there is in my ego an unknown zone which 'envelops' my knowledge of my own being" (pg. 193)
          - ◇ "my 'consciousness in general', Jaspers affirms with Kant, unifies and organizes those objects which my mind encounters" (pg. 193)
        - ◆ "there is transcendence in world-orientation: this means that outside myself the unknown 'envelops' me on all sides. This unknown is 'being-in-itself'" (pg. 193)
          - ◇ "while 'being-in-itself' is unknowable, it manifests itself indirectly: it is experienced as the outer limit of human consciousness, a limit which is sensed, felt, and thought but which cannot be intellectually penetrated" (pg. 194)
    - **"Existential philosophy finds it equally impossible to endorse faith in the God of a 'revealed religion'** founded upon the claim that God has manifested Himself once and for all in human history, and supporting this claim by the promulgation of fixed dogmas. Existential freedom is strictly personal, and its truth is always incomplete; it therefore excludes and rejects any truth established once and for all and of supposedly timeless and universal validity" (pg. 189)
      - "Since the existential philosopher can thus neither endorse the religious nor the atheistic position, he has to live by the *tertium quid* of a 'philosophic faith'" (pg. 189)
      - "Although religion is inaccessible to strict philosophy, it is nevertheless of eminent value and significance for human existence" (pg. 189)
        - "To demand universal acceptance of the contents of religious faith as an embodiment of universal truth leads, according to Jaspers, to intolerance and makes true existential communication impossible. On the other hand, Jaspers finds in the biblical religion many sublime truths which can be utilized for the synthetic structure of 'philosophic faith'" (pg. 190)
      - "Although 'philosophic faith', then, differs in many respects from religious faith, both are grounded in 'transcendence', and a philosophy without faith in transcendence ceases to be philosophy in the true sense" (pg. 190)
    - "Much of what Jaspers says concerning God, transcendence, and reality follows at least in part the traditional doctrines of Christian philosophy



- and theology” (pg. 191)
- "Philosophy in its search for being seizes the 'ciphers' as possible '*vestigia Dei*' as signs and signals pointing toward the ultimate depth and plenitude of Being. But such a 'seizure', such an 'enlightening certitude' of the Divine Reality has, according to Jaspers, nothing in common with empirical perception and with objective, rational knowledge. In this experience 'the search becomes the finding'. God is 'already present wherever and whenever I seek Him... Presence and search are one'. And such seeking and finding is, in Jaspers' view, not helped but hindered by any positive religious rites and cultic observances. The search must of necessity proceed by way of doubt, disquietude, and distress rather than by way of 'a daily assurance that God is there'. Official worship, cult, and religious propaganda lead away from rather than into the neighborhood of the 'hidden God'. We can approach God only individually, in the most personal of all human acts" (pg. 195)
  - "it is, says Jaspers, the function of philosophic *metaphysics* to prepare the way for the experience of Transcendence" (pg. 195)
  - "Man, as long as he lives, is faced with the alternative of the conquest or loss of his self. In view of the possibility of self-annihilation he is overcome by dizziness, fright, and dread. But the threat of annihilation may point the way to 'existence'. 'There is no freedom without the threat of possible despair' [says Jaspers]" (pg. 196)
    - "**There are in human existence contradictions ('antinomies') which cannot be resolved, opposites which cannot be reconciled or neutralized. There is freedom linked with dependence,** communication bound to solitude. There is no good without an admixture of evil, no truth without falsehood, no happiness without grief, no life without death" (pg. 197)
  - "Karl Jaspers' existentialism is a philosophy of 'becoming' rather than a philosophy of 'being'" (pg. 198)
    - "The 'becoming' is said to be better, more perfect, richer in content than the 'become'. Such a view is, of course, neither sustained by common sense nor by philosophic reasoning. Movement and becoming are as such incomplete, deficient realities; they are partial or particularized being, aspiring toward the fullness of being. The same is true of the movement we call human action. **Man moves physically, morally, and intellectually in view of an end, in order to attain to a greater richness of his own being and existence as well as in order to enrich and enhance the being he finds in the surrounding world.** It is self-contradictory and nonsensical to assume that the fulfillment of such a striving leaves man poorer than he was in the state of striving" (pg. 198)
      - "Life... is in his view a perpetual becoming" (pg. 198-199)
    - "As far as the sphere of moral action is concerned, **the German philosopher asserts that it is spiritual suicide to submit to any objective, universal rule of thought and conduct. The authentic act of freedom is unmotivated**" (pg. 199)
      - *"If entirely 'unmotivated' (or, un-connected or separated or dis-jointed), then human activity (or, movement or engagement or involvement) can be moved (or, facilitated or impelled) by neither passion nor reason (which, in total, (is) the Human). To this, Reinhardt correctly notes, "The 'existential freedom' which Jaspers espouses appears equally indefensible from the psychological and metaphysical point of view. Freedom loses its meaning and vanishes when one tries to detach it from both rational knowledge and motivation."* (pg. 200)
      - "To carry out this precept with logical consistency would evidently lead to the suspension of all the laws and rules of thought and action. Whatever course of action I may have decided to choose, I can then justify both my deeds and my misdeeds by stating that in my present historical situation I was forced by an internal necessity to act as I have acted; to have enacted my truth, in obedience to the commandment of my personal existence" (pg. 201)
        - ◆ "It is interesting, however, to note the amount of reasoning Jaspers has to make use of in order to demonstrate the supposed weakness of human reason" (pg. 199)
        - ◆ "Jaspers, furthermore, rejects any attempt to define rationally the nature of man" (pg. 199)
          - ◇ "**the fact that knowledge does not comprise or exhaust the totality of being, hardly justifies the assumption that knowledge is impotent and reality unintelligible**" (pg. 201)
            - ▶ "The epistemological presumptuousness of the idealist and the epistemological despair of the 'existentialist' are both unrealistic because they both misjudge the nature and the capacities of the human intellect" (pg. 201)
        - "Human existence itself appears gravely endangered by the assertion that every existing individual has *his* truth, *his* way of reading the 'ciphers', *his* Transcendence, and *his* God. This danger can only be warded off by the affirmation of a moral law which, anchored in the supremely 'existential' law of Divine Transcendence, guides individuals and groups and makes possible true communication within the frame of a genuine human civilization" (pg. 202)
    - Chapter 7 - 'From Refusal to Invocation': Gabriel Marcel (pg. 203)
      - "**there is only one suffering: to be alone**", says Rose, the main character in *Le Coeur des autres*, one of Gabriel Marcel's plays" (pg. 203)
      - "The strictly philosophic works of Gabriel Marcel are few in number. The presentation of his ideas is informal and unsystematic. Although outwardly these books seem little more than collections of diary fragments and philosophic essays, there is found in them a coherence and continuity of thought which add up to a consistently integrated philosophy of life" (pg. 205)
      - "Having been exposed to the influence of agnosticism at home and in school and thus lacking any personal contact with positive religion, Marcel, even as a young man, felt in himself and in his environment an emptiness which oppressed and perplexed him. His philosophic inquiry soon brought him face to face with the phenomenon of religious faith" (pg. 205)
        - "Though himself an unbeliever, he had begun to take a profound interest in the faith of others and to analyze philosophically the inner structure of the *act of faith*" (pg. 205)
      - "**Marcel's philosophic inquiry starts out from the experience of the individual's 'being-in-the-world'.** The philosopher is a human being who seeks to illuminate the human situation. My 'being-in-the-world' and in history particularizes and limits me. How can I accept my human situation and make it the starting point of my becoming a *human person*? The answer, says Marcel, cannot be given in the abstract, in a theory; it can only be found in steady contact with concrete reality, in personal engagement, and, ultimately, in a personal act of faith. To philosophize in the concrete means to philosophize *hic et nunc*; it means to be seized by reality and to be and remain ever ready to stand in wonderment in view of the unfathomable richness of reality" (pg. 206)
        - "Philosophy is for Marcel a phenomenological analysis with an ontological goal. Philosophic rationalism, he is convinced, misses this goal because it regards as true only that which can be either rationally or scientifically verified. It defines truth as an accord of minds reached by the submission of individual thought to 'thought in general'. And it is the supreme ambition of rationalism to reconcile and harmonize the partial views of individuals in the absolute and definitive synthesis of a total explanation of the universe" (pg. 206)
        - "**philosophic rationalism can be of no help in resolving the many problems and dilemmas of human existence;** all its attempts to this effect must of necessity fail, because it removes all these problems from the concreteness of reality. Its craving for 'objective' verification leads to the artificial dualisms of subject and object, 'appearances' and 'things-in-themselves', the empirical and the thinking ego, individual thought and 'thought in general'" (pg. 207-208)
      - "**What is impossible for speculative reason becomes, however, an actuality in the act of faith,** which arouses and rescues the individual from the perplexity, anxiety, and even despair engendered by the uncertainty and instability of the human situation" (pg. 208)
        - "The act of faith thus marks the birth of both human personality and human freedom. But what is commonly called the 'freedom of choice' is for Marcel only a prelude to the true and authentic 'freedom of engagement'. In relating myself as a subject to the world and to history, I accept and fulfill the destiny prescribed for me by my particular human situation. In the act of faith I respond to the divine call to become a free person" (pg. 208)

- "In my personal situation I will then be able to understand and affirm myself as a creature here and now, and everything relating to this situation will then acquire a new weight and significance" (pg. 208)
  - "for Marcel the free acceptance of this same human situation becomes the source of religious humility" (pg. 209)
    - "And, like Jaspers, Marcel finds in the 'tension' which exists between human freedom and the limitations imposed by the human situation the way to 'transcendence'" (pg. 209)
    - **"to conceive of God 'objectively', that is, as a separate, objective entity, apart from myself and apart from the world, is an impossibility.** Such a concept of God, Marcel claims, would amount to a denial of His very essence for the 'living God' is an 'incarnate' God, who is present *per essentiam* in myself and in all things" (pg. 209)
  - "The individual human existence is linked with *time* and with *history*. **The world in which I exist is in perpetual flux, moving toward its dissolution.** Not only my body, but the entire psychophysical structure of my being is involved in this universal mobility. At times I abandon myself to this flux and allow myself to be carried to new and unknown shores. In my temporary refusal to will and to choose, I hold myself open to exhilarating experiences which may enrich and transform my being. But as long as I let myself thus drift, I renounce judgment and evaluation of my life, and I am in constant danger of losing my real self and substance in the excitement and agility of the moment..." (pg. 210)
    - **"I transcend the fleeting moment by exercising my freedom in a threefold 'engagement':** in confronting my present, in accepting my past, and in projecting my future. By thus affirming myself in the continuity of my personality I oppose myself to the featureless collective" (pg. 211)
      - "Only in voluntary engagement can I impart meaning to that series of events which constitute *my past*. I assume full responsibility for all my past acts, in saying to myself: it is I who have acted in this way; I am what I have done" (pg. 211)
      - "But while I thus depend on my past, my past no less depends on me. It receives its meaning from my present as soon as it is incorporated into the whole of my destiny. By affirming my past and confronting my present I am laying the foundations for the possibilities of my *future*" (pg. 211)
    - **"The acknowledgment of my individual destiny is then no longer a blind submission to the dialectic of history, but a free appropriation on the basis of valuation, judgment, and choice"** (pg. 211)
      - "Once I have freely accepted my human situation and my life has become unified by my fidelity to my vocation as a human person, every one of my acts is organically integrated in the totality of my existence. And it is only in this totality that I acquire my authentic freedom and my full human stature" (pg. 212)
        - ◆ **"Authentic freedom manifests itself in choice; it fulfills itself in engagement;** and the highest form of engagement is the *act of faith*" (pg. 212)
          - ◇ \*compare this to Jaspers' 'unmotivated' freedom - cf. pg. 199
        - ◆ "The world is, in the words of Keats, 'the value of soul-making'. That means that in the sequence of my choices my freedom may - depending on the nature of my choices - become authentic, or it may die; my personality may realize itself, or it may disintegrate" (pg. 212)
      - "Whereas for Sartre man is 'thrown' into a hostile world and abandoned to his own devices and projects, for Marcel man, as an 'incarnate' being in an 'incarnate' world, is not left to realize his destiny in absolute solitude. His voyage through time and history is illumined by certain 'values', which are not of his own making but are themselves 'incarnate' in 'being'" (pg. 212)
        - **"Whereas in Sartre's philosophy it is the human 'choice' which creates values, it is Marcel's contention that it is the values which command a choice"** (pg. 212)
          - ◆ "Thus understood, value is the basis of choice, although it does not determine the choice: the value can always be negated in favor of the absurd. But such a negation is a self-betrayal of human freedom. In the light of the incarnate value, being is encountered, revealing itself in its enduring quality and appealing, like Jaspers' 'ciphers', to a creative interpretation on the part of man" (pg. 212)
    - "links between thought and reality are established by dialectics, that is, by questions and answers based on observation and verification" (pg. 213)
      - "Although the knowledge thus gained is valid and can be communicated, it is a knowledge confined to the sphere of 'seeing' and 'having', that is, a purely scientific and technical knowledge. Its frame of reference is not the existing individual, but 'thought in general', the impersonal thinking of '*das Man*'" (pg. 213)
        - "It is Marcel's conviction that every epistemology which rests on 'thought in general' inevitably leads to a 'democratization of knowledge' which ultimately means the self-destruction of knowledge. Such an epistemology tends to glorify the purely 'technical man', the 'man in the street', the 'common man'. Philosophical and metaphysical knowledge, on the contrary, is essentially opposed to '*das Man*'" (pg. 213)
      - "Philosophic reflection is aware of the fact that it is deeply rooted in reality and therefore incapable of looking at reality from the outside as upon an object of scientific investigation. **Philosophic reflection is not concerned with 'problems' but involved in 'mysteries'**" (pg. 214)
        - "Philosophic reflection, says Marcel, transcends all objective knowledge and all objectivity. But this transcendence carries a meaning totally different from both the negation of the Hegelian dialectic and the 'nihilation' of Sartre. In Hegel's 'logical' progress from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, the antithesis 'negates' the thesis, and the synthesis both 'negates' and 'sublates' thesis and antithesis. The Hegelian synthesis establishes a new logical term, but not a new reality. And in Sartre's dialectic, the proper act of the '*pour-soi*' is 'negation'. Condemned to freedom, the '*pour-soi*' first exhausts itself in negation and then remakes itself in the ultimately absurd *elan* of a 'futile passion'. **Marcel's 'negation' and 'transcension' of objectivity, on the other hand, are essentially the endeavor of human thought to escape its limitations by reaching beyond itself into the realm of 'being'**" (pg. 214)
          - ◆ "Marcel claims that every problem of knowledge becomes eventually involved in an endless regress: that which is sought in the end is always presupposed at the outset" (pg. 214)
      - "It is equally improper, according to Marcel, to speak of the 'problem of being': there is only a 'mystery of being'" (pg. 215)
        - "this mysterious element, though obscure, is not entirely unintelligible. While it is true that a mystery cannot be known in the way scientific facts are known, this does not mean that nothing can be known about it. Since 'being' has been the inseparable companion of thought on all of its dialectical exploits, philosophic reflection discovers that genuine thought and knowledge are always grounded in and enveloped by 'being'" (pg. 215)
      - "the *real* subject is a *free* subject" (pg. 216)
        - "Objective knowledge is neither definitive nor total knowledge. **In order to remain loyal to itself it must transcend itself and give way to 'the ontological mystery'**" (pg. 216)
          - ◆ \*i.e., it must be 'letting'
      - "Adopting the method and terminology of '*negative* theology', Marcel states that, first, this knowledge must be *negative*, that is, a knowledge arrived at by exclusions rather than by positive affirmations; second, it must be *concrete*. The ontological mystery must be surrounded, as it were, by a series of predications, stating what it is *not* rather than what it *is*, until in the end 'being' can be envisaged in its transcendent integrity" (pg. 216)
        - \*this is similar to the (n-1) (i.e., all that not-itself) in statistics, where, in order to learn of the "1", I only need to identify what it is not through a collection of all that beside itself. Though, I would say that this 'method', as well as its opposite, does not entail any true

depiction of the meaning of Being - rather, I believe, the meaning of Being refers to 'how' what exists, not only ex-sists but, ex-sists interdependently while (being in the mode of (in)-dependence (i.e., serving-itself, where shame from one's inability to wholly account for their whole existence in the first instance is (be)ing's predominate impetus).

- "participation is never so much an accomplished fact, says Marcel, as it is an appeal to the will to participate" (pg. 220)
  - "man is called upon by being, and he is to respond to this call by a total dedication. This response, taking either the form of *faith* (as opposed to 'refusal') or of *hope* (as opposed to 'despair'), is always in the nature of a 'testimony' manifesting itself in works. Man is 'a witness', and 'bearing witness' is of his very essence" (pg. 221-222)
    - ◆ **"Instead of being a mere spectator**, looking at facts and events as a stranger from the outside, the witness tests things by receiving them into himself in virtue of a personal act which **engages him in his entire being**. Such a receptivity is, above all, **an existential 'overtness' toward the world, toward 'the others', and toward God**" (pg. 222)
      - ◇ \*Marcel's 'receptivity' is much like that of Heidegger's 'openness' to Being
- "Philosophy, too, is a 'creative attestation'. **The thinking being, that is, the philosopher, is 'a witness'**" (pg. 222)
  - "Extricating himself momentarily from the functional mechanisms of the world which is his temporal abode, the philosopher begins to wonder about his own existence, and he interrogates himself concerning his 'being-in-the-world'. If everything is not to be reduced to a meaningless play of fleeting appearances... then there must be an absolute ground of *being*" (pg. 223)
  - **"The authentic philosopher is 'the fully awakened human being'**, says Marcel" (pg. 223)
    - ◆ "while the *condition* of the existing being is common to all, every existence is personal" - J. Delhomme on Marcel's philosophy (pg. 224)
- "Gabriel Marcel began with the refusal to acknowledge the traditional rationalist distinction between subject and object. His entire work is oriented toward the recognition of a reality which is both transsubjective and transobjective. This reality he calls the 'meta-problematical' or the 'ontological mystery'. As against the philosophers and philosophies of nihilism and of the absurd he holds that both reflection and existence are steeped in the Truth of Being. Marcel adds his own voice to that of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jaspers, warning of the dangers which modern man faces, as the forces of an almost exclusively technical civilization threaten to engulf his personality and thereby to annihilate the very substance of the 'ontological mystery'. He insists that today perhaps more than in any other historical epoch it is necessary to rescue human existence from these tyrannical forces of the inhuman and the inhuman, so that the path to the suprahuman and eternal may be found again. The French thinker also **joins his fellow 'existentialists' in condemning the increasing degeneration of human relations and the virtual impossibility of genuine communication in a society** which in growing measure is losing the understanding for speech and language - the means of communication - and the respect for the individual - the subject of communication. **He deplors with Heidegger that social relations in the contemporary world have as their frame of reference the cold egalitarian irresponsibility of *das Man* rather than the personally creative polarity of the 'I' and the 'thou'.**" (pg. 224)
  - \*cf. M. Buber, *I and Thou* <https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~akantor/readings/BuberMartin-i-and-thou.pdf>
  - \*cf. N. Berdyaev, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World* [ia801403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World\\_text.pdf](https://ia801403.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.61425/2015.61425.The-Fate-Of-Man-In-The-Modern-World_text.pdf)
  - "Marcel sometimes seems to forget that there is an 'ontological weight' also embodied in the creative manifestations of communal life, in economic and political organisms, in the institutions of science and learning, in the Church and in the State. It can hardly be denied that without at least some of these communal bodies the private human existence would be left unsheltered. There is a middle term, after all, between individualistic anarchy and authoritarian collectivism" (pg. 225)
  - "Marcel finally criticizes the aberrations of philosophic idealism, rationalism, and positivism" (pg. 225)
- Conclusion: The Thematic Structure of Existentialism (pg. 228)
  - "all philosophy begins - as the ancient Greeks so well knew - with astonishment and wonder. But this attitude may be caused either by the mere fact *that things and beings are or exist*, or it may be caused by a consideration of *what these existents are*, that is, by their essence or nature" (pg. 228)
  - "Jacques Maritain, following a similar line of argument, asserts that Thomism is 'the philosophy of existence and existential realism'. He distinguishes between an 'authentic', Thomist, and an unauthentic or 'apocryphal' philosophy of existence. In the latter category he places all atheistic forms of existentialism in general and the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre in particular. **Both 'authentic' and 'apocryphal' existentialism affirm, according to Maritain, the primacy of existence**, but whereas the former preserves essences and thereby the intelligibility of existents, the latter denies essences and thus marks the self-defeat of the intellect and despairs of intelligibility" (pg. 228)
    - "The French thinker finds the basic error of the atheistic existentialists in false presupposition that 'existence done is the nourishing soil of philosophy. They treat of existence without treating of being.' (pg. 228-229)
    - "For the Thomist existentialist (who is a "theist"), on the other hand, essence and existence in their correlation make up the *one concept of being which*, analogically, permeates all things as their very act of existing. Being is 'that which is' or 'that which is able to exercise existence'..." (pg. 229)
  - "The conviction of the *primacy of existence* is shared by all existentialist thinkers, ancient, mediaeval, and modern. Their concern with the individual, personal aspects of being, with the mysterious recesses of their own selves, places them in opposition to those philosophers who, like Plato or Hegel, in an attitude of detached reflection, allow the act of existing to be submerged in ideal forms or essences. *Existential thinking* may thus be defined as a type of speculation that is not only related to the concerns of actual life but decisive for human existence and human action. It is a kind of thinking that arouses and 'makes' the human self" (pg. 229-230)
    - "The modern Philosophy of Existence may be said to have taken its start from the attacks launched by the 'Young Hegelians' against the idealistic "system" of their master. This "existentialist" revolt was greatly encouraged by the Berlin lectures (1841) of the German philosopher F. W. Schelling..." (pg. 230)
      - "Against Hegel's 'essentialism' (the identification of essence and existence in the general 'idea') Schelling insisted that pure thought cannot explain the transition from the 'idea' to 'nature' or to concrete reality. **He calls Hegel's idealism 'absolute' in the sense that it posits being without existents**. As soon as 'the system' attempts to take the decisive step from pure logic to reality, the thread of the dialectical movement of the 'idea' is cut, and there remains nothing but 'a broad and ugly ditch' between *what* a thing is and the fact *that* it is. Schelling concludes that pure rationality is incapable of ever reaching concrete reality and that Hegel's 'pure being' is actually 'nothing', just as 'pure whiteness' remains an empty concept unless there is something that is white. Thus **Schelling's 'positive philosophy' begins with 'existence'**: it does not (like Hegel's dialectic) proceed from thought to being, but from existing beings to thought. His starting point is, to use his own words, an 'a priori empiricism'" (pg. 230)
    - "[Kierkegaard] evidently found even Schelling's new 'positive philosophy' too much steeped in abstract idealism, too far removed from "existence." From then on **Kierkegaard turned polemically against any attempt to comprehend reality by way of rational speculation**" (pg. 231)
      - **"By making the act of existing the criterion of reality**, Kierkegaard thus shifts the problem of being from the abstract to the concrete, from being in general to human" (pg. 231)
  - "Following Kierkegaard's lead, **modern and contemporary existentialism designates as the center of thought the existing thinker**. But it remains preoccupied with the problem of the interrelation of thought and existence, of 'whatness' and 'thisness'. In stressing, however, the fact that

- the thought of the existing thinker is determined by the uniquely concrete tasks of his *Dasein*, existentialism claims to be a philosophy of the 'I' rather than a philosophy of the 'It'. **While the 'abstract thinker' is a 'disinterested' theorist, the existentialist thinker is inwardly concerned'** (pg. 231)
- **Major Themes of Existentialism** (pg. 231-244)
    - (1) Subjective Truth
      - "It is the common conviction of all modern existentialists that there is no knowledge independent of a knowing subject" (pg. 231)
      - "this means that even in the sphere of thought and knowledge true universality is only possible in the concreteness of moral action, that is, in personal existence. In this sense, they say, 'subjectivity' is truth" (pg. 231)
        - ◆ "all true knowledge includes the dimension of existence" (pg. 231)
      - "Kierkegaard, for example, does not deny that there is an 'objective' truth, an 'objective' knowledge, and even (for God) a 'system' of objective truth and knowledge. But for the individual human being, he says, the important thing is not the 'what' but the 'how': the content of knowledge must become the content of personal life..." (pg. 231-232)
    - (2) Estrangement
      - "In Franz Kafka's novel, *The Trial*, human existence is symbolically described as a paradoxical legal process or trial in which man finds himself entangled without being able to discover the precise nature of the charge brought against him" (pg. 232)
      - "The animal is sheltered, Rilke asserts with Jaspers, but **man is homeless**. He is the most helpless and defenseless of all creatures. He is surrounded by a world of utter strangeness and beset by dangers on all sides. If he wants to prevail in the face of estrangement, he must persevere in the midst of danger rather than hide in an illusory security. But in trying to meet the challenges of his surrounding world, man experiences most profoundly the finiteness of his existence, the outer limit of all human striving and achievement. He recognizes, in Heidegger's terminology, **his 'being thrown' into a place and situation not of his own choosing**. In courageous 'resolve' he must take upon himself the risks which such a precarious existence implies and thus eventually 'transcend' the crisis of estrangement" (pg. 232)
        - ◆ "The experience of 'estrangement' is equally fundamental in the thinking of Sartre" (pg. 233)
    - (3) Existence and Nothingness
      - "The mysterious and uncanny background of existential thinking appears in the experience of nothingness or 'the nought'. This experience tears to shreds all the familiar relations and proportions of everyday life; it forces man into an existential 'crisis', in which the marks of his finiteness or contingency - his 'temporality' and his 'historicity' - are strikingly revealed. **Face to face with nothingness man enters into a state of 'existential despair'**, from which he may be rescued by 'resolve' (Heidegger) or 'faith' (Kierkegaard)" (pg. 234)
    - (4) Existential Anguish and Nothingness
      - "All modern existentialists stress the creative significance of anguish" (pg. 234)
        - ◆ "Heidegger who, like Kierkegaard, insists on the distinction between 'anguish' and 'fear'. It is the peculiarity of anguish that it cannot be rationally understood or explained. **In existential anguish man is not threatened by something definite** (as is the case with 'fear'), something that could be named or defined. If the object of anguish could be thus determined, man might be able to rise in defense, ward off the danger, and regain his security. But in existential anguish man's relationship to the world is totally shaken and becomes wholly questionable. Something utterly mysterious intervenes between him and the familiar objects of his world, between him and his fellowmen, between him and all his 'values'" (pg. 234-235)
          - ◇ "What threatens is 'nothing' (no thing), and he finds himself alone and lost in the void. But when this dark and terrible night of anguish has passed, man breathes a sigh of relief and tells himself: it was 'nothing', after all. He has experienced 'nothingness'" (pg. 235)
        - "it is anguish, according to Heidegger, that arouses man from the false tranquility of his everyday life and makes him free for the fulfillment of his existential tasks. Anguish, thus understood, is the positive privilege of man... It destroys all artificial security and hands man over to that total abandonment in which 'authentic existence' originates" (pg. 235)
          - ◆ "boredom, melancholy, and despair are degree, modes, and variations of anguish" (pg. 235)
            - ◇ "authentic [boredom] forces man into decision and choice and thus aids him in gaining his authentic existence" (pg. 235)
            - ◆ "anguish and melancholy reach their greatest intensity in *existential despair*" (pg. 235)
        - "despair is the 'crisis' through which man passes on his way to authentic existence" (pg. 236)
        - "The understanding of anguish points the way to the understanding of 'being'. **What is actually dreaded in anguish is man's 'being-in-the-world' as such**. But because what is dreaded is 'nothing', no human being and 'no thing' can help man in this dreadful experience. In the night of the nothingness, of anguish, however, originates the 'overtness' toward existence as such. **Nothingness, according to Heidegger, reveals to man 'the favor of Being': under the veil of nothingness he becomes a partaker of Being**" (pg. 236)
      - (5) Existence and 'the Others'
        - "The existentialist thesis asserts that authentic existence can only be realized in and by the solitary individual. **The social collective can be of no help in the attainment of this kind of authenticity; it can only retard or frustrate it**. This is why 'the individual' is the basic category in the thinking of Kierkegaard. The 'self' and 'the masses' are at opposite poles. And what is true of 'the masses' applies equally to "the world"" (pg. 236)
          - ◆ "Nevertheless, authentic existence cannot do without the world and 'the others'" (pg. 236)
      - (6) Situation and 'Limit Situation'
        - "Human existence is essentially 'being in a situation'. Man has not chosen the particular situation in which he finds himself 'in the world'..." (pg. 236)
        - "In his attempts to gain mastery of his 'situation' he meets with new and stubborn limitations which he recognizes as conditioned by the finiteness and contingency of his existence. While he may succeed in improving or mastering certain individual circumstances, he inevitably must confess his inability to cope with the most fundamental limits of his human condition, such as he encounters in suffering, guilt, and death. These are, according to Jaspers, integral elements of human existence as such. **They are the walls which resist every attack, and they are the causes of human shipwreck. They inject into human life the elements of contradiction, insecurity, risk, and constant danger**. The realization that they are an integral part of the lot of finite man shakes human existence to its depths" (pg. 237)
        - "**'Limit situations' are thus situations in which man faces the insurmountable walls surrounding his existence and becomes profoundly conscious of the many clefts and abysses which cannot be closed or bridged over by any exertion of human thinking**. These 'paradoxes' of life impress upon man the actuality of his imperfection, his fragility, his homelessness. But by opening his eyes to his precarious human situation, they intensify his efforts toward self-realization" (pg. 237)
      - (7) Temporality and Historicity
        - "*The future*, the existentialist contends, is not something wholly indefinite that will occur at some later date and therefore does not concern me at this present moment. The future is already alive in human hopes and fears, in human planning and designing: it is a

formative force and an integral part of the present. Similarly, *the past* is not something that merely 'has occurred' at some earlier date and therefore no longer concerns me at this present moment. In its aspects of both good and evil [the past] reaches into the present and determines it to a considerable extent. The *present*, finally, is not an unextended point in the transition from past to future but the firm bond which ties together the dimensions of time" (pg. 238)

◆ "Heidegger calls them the three 'ex-stases' of time" (pg. 238)

- "In his given situation **man finds himself always to some extent determined and limited in his action by the past; not only by his own past decisions and choices but by those massive historical structures** (states, societies, social and family groups) of which he partakes. He is, says Heidegger, an 'heir' who lives in his 'heritage'. His projects for the future can therefore never ignore or circumvent the historical past. Positively and negatively, in his affirmations as much as in his negations, he must take account of his heritage and is therefore never absolutely free in his existential choices" (pg. 238)

◆ "the impersonal 'it' of 'objective' history must become a personal 'mine' in the appropriation of its contents" (pg. 238)

- "In the category of 'the existential' the idea of 'progress' becomes meaningless..." (pg. 238)

◆ "In its own inwardness the authentic human being gains an ultimate and absolute value which transcends the fluctuating relativity of history" (pg. 239)

#### ▪ (8) Existence and Death

- "**The existentialist thus regards death as a constitutive part of life** and he demands that it be incorporated into the texture and pattern of his existence. He sees in death the decisive motivating power which spurs man on to the highest existential resolve. Any stoic indifference to death, he argues, is not courage but cowardice, a kind of escapism which shies away from the real abyss of life" (pg. 239)

◆ "Man, in short, must adapt the pattern of his existence to the prospect of his certain death, his ultimate and inexorable 'limit situation'" (pg. 240)

- "The non-authentically existing individual veils and beclouds his knowledge of the inevitability of death by living thoughtlessly and distractedly from day to day and never facing realistically the possibilities and the boundaries of his *Dasein*... The authentically existing individual [however], according to the 'categorical imperative' of existentialism, must live in such a way that he is prepared to die at any moment and that such a sudden end does not render his life meaningless" (pg. 240)

◆ "By forcing man to ask himself as to what is absolutely essential in his existence and by making him free and resolute in his action, **death becomes the final challenge and supreme test of existence**" (pg. 240)

#### ▪ (9) Existence and God

- "If God is omitted (as in Heidegger's speculation) or if God is denied (as in Nietzsche's and Sartre's thinking), then there remains only the yawning abyss of nothingness..." (pg. 240)

- "Jaspers emphatically relates human existence to transcendence, but he halts short of 'stepping over' the threshold: he confines the human 'overtress' toward transcendence to the 'limit situations' of suffering, strife, guilt, and death, in which man is 'enveloped' by transcendence as by an impassable boundary of his existence" (pg. 241)

- "Atheistic existentialism, much against its avowed intention, demonstrates conclusively the utter futility of every endeavor to save man after having abandoned God" (pg. 242)

#### ▪ Appendix: Existential Psychotherapy and the Synthesis of Existence (pg. 244)

- "Two contemporary schools of philosophic thought discussed in the chapters of this book - *Phenomenology* and *Existentialism* - have in recent years gained increasing significance in psychotherapeutic methodology. *Phenomenology*, understood in Husserl's sense as a 'hermeneutics' or descriptive analysis and exploration of the ontological structure of human existence and human essence (or nature), has proved of substantial value in the attempt to penetrate to the interiority of the human soul" (pg. 244)

- "The recent impact of Phenomenology and even more of Existentialism is most noteworthy in *depth-psychology* or *psychoanalysis* (in the broadest sense of the term), that is, in that **scientific discipline which aims at an adequate understanding of both the conscious and unconscious life of the psyche, from the theoretical-scientific as well as from the practical-therapeutic point of view**. It is by disclosing or making accessible the *unconscious* life of the soul that the several schools of depth-psychology have cumulatively deepened and widened also the understanding of man's *conscious* life" (pg. 244)

- "Psychotherapeutic existential analysis therefore has as its goal an ever deepening understanding of the life-history of the patient" (pg. 245-246)

▪ "The existential analyst moreover calls upon the aid of philosophy, art, and literature, in the conviction that they are or contain expressions and genuine self-revelations of human beings. And he observes that similar authentic insights may be gained by the analytic study of certain cultural movements which are expressive of the anxieties and conflicts of contemporary man" (pg. 246)

○ *\*this is Jungian archetypal psychology (i.e., symbolism) - not so much existential psychoanalysis.*

▪ "the existentialists are vitally concerned with the rediscovery and re-formation of the human person amid the fragmentation and collectivization of modern culture and society. Depth-psychology and existential analysis are today regarded as efficacious tools in achieving that end in cases where human beings have individually fallen victim to the collective neuroses and psychoses of the age" (pg. 246)

- "Both Rollo May and William Barrett make specific reference to the relations which exist between existentialism in the West and the eastern wisdom embodied in Taoism and Zen Buddhism, especially as far as the ideas of *being* and *existence* and their interrelatedness are concerned. **Like existentialism, these oriental modes of thought are trying to overcome the fatal subject-object dichotomy and there with the estrangement of man from the world, from nature, and from himself**, by leading the individual back to that 'ground of being', from which all action springs and wherein it must remain anchored if it is to retain meaning and vitality" (pg. 246)

- "both existentialists and existential psychotherapists analyze *limit or crisis situations* as they reveal themselves in anxiety, estrangement, despair and their concomitants and derivatives" (pg. 246)

▪ "personal *engagement*, involvement or commitment increases rather than decreases the chances of such insight and understanding" (pg. 247)

- "The lament over the loss of the 'sense of being' which permeates all of Heidegger's philosophy and which prompts his search for a new 'fundamental ontology', constitutes also one of the main themes of existential psychotherapy. **The loss of the 'sense of being' results in the subordination of existence to professional and vocational specialization and submission to the demands of the conformist life structure of the 'organization-man'**" (pg. 248)

▪ "the existential psychotherapist...has as its goal the reconquest of the core of the being of the individual or the reactivation of the full scope of the 'inner possibilities' of the human person" (pg. 248)

- "The existential analyst distinguishes between *Umwelt* (the 'biological world', the material environment), *Mitwelt* (the social world, the world in which I live with my fellow-men), and, most important in the existential frame of reference, the *Eigenwelt* (**the world of the self and the mode of the individual's relationship to himself**). Both *Umwelt* and *Mitwelt* are fairly adequately dealt with in modern psychology and classical (Freudian) psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The *Eigenwelt*, on the other hand, is virtually ignored or, if taken into consideration at all, it is misunderstood owing to the massive materialistic and naturalistic philosophic biases of orthodox psychoanalysis. And yet it is precisely the *Eigenwelt* and its structural dimensions which - in the case of the mentally sane - makes it possible for the individual to see reality in true perspective or - in the case of psychopathologically disturbed persons - accounts for the fact that the individual sees both *Umwelt* and *Mitwelt* in distorted

- perspective. It is thus correct to say that these three modes of 'being-in-the-world' are strictly interrelated and mutually condition each other: 'they are three simultaneous modes of 'being-in-the-world''. And it is a matter of historic record that Freud and his school never took real cognizance of that particular mode of 'being-in-the-world' with which Kierkegaard and all modern and contemporary existential thinkers were and are primarily concerned - the mode of the relation of the self to itself. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exploration of the *Eigenwelt* is one of the primary concerns also of the existential psychotherapists" (pg. 248-249)
- "Heidegger's discussion of the structure of 'temporality' has proven eminently fruitful in existential psychotherapy. In appraising the relative significance of the dimensions of past, present, and future, it appears that, as far as human existence is concerned, the future far outranks the past and the present. The future is that dimension of time in which or into which the individual actualizes or realizes himself, unless he is prevented from doing so by some mental disturbances or blocks" (pg. 249)
    - "the human being can avail himself to a greater or lesser extent of his faculty of *free choice* in selecting among several possible relationships between his self and the world and thus among several modes of 'being-in-the-world'" (pg. 250)
  - "Carl Gustav Jung...made it the object of his labors as a psychologist and psychiatrist to penetrate to the very core of human personality..." (pg. 254)
    - "Jung discovered, among other things, that the veil of the *unconscious* covers not only the unsatisfied pleasure-drives of the child but also a vast territory of primitive or archaic experiences which are the property of the collective unconscious life of the human race" (pg. 254)
      - "While in animals the instinctive drives are relatively undetermined, in human beings they require definitive determination at the hands of conscious, rational and individual life. This is why man strives of necessity for growing *individuation* and for an ever higher degree of consciousness. **And it is, according to Jung, one of the crucial problems of human existence whether the individual remains ignorant of or hostile to that collective unconscious which acts as a motivating force in human life** - only to be destroyed in the end in his specific individuality by this force - or whether he has learned to listen to the voice of the collective unconscious, illumines it with the light of his conscious life and thus uses it for the enrichment of his personality" (pg. 254)
      - "The most important of these functions of the unconscious - the one which regulates and directs all the others - is fulfilled by what Jung calls *the Self*. The Swiss psychotherapist has repeatedly refused to define this somewhat mysterious entity, on the grounds that in his opinion he would overstep the boundaries of empirical psychology by attempting such a definition. Nonetheless, it is obvious that **Jung regards the gradual attainment of knowledge of the *Self* as part of the process of *individuation***. It would appear that *individuation*, in Jung's sense, tends toward an eventual *unification of human existence and human essence*" (pg. 255)
        - ◆ "The remaining ambiguity in Jung's depth-psychology hinges then on this somewhat vague and indefinite concept of the *Self*" (pg. 255)
      - "In Jung's psychology the Freudian psychological determinism is almost totally abandoned. In his analytical theory and therapy **religious faith appears no longer as 'nothing but' an illusory 'sublimation' of the sexual drive**" (pg. 256)
        - "What we call an illusion is perhaps a psychological reality of preeminent importance" – Jung (pg. 256)
          - ◆ "And yet, Jung has so far refused to relate what he calls the 'autonomous content', that is, the 'divine archetype' (or the idea of God) in the individual soul, to any objectively existing reality" (pg. 256)
        - "Martin Buber and other critics of Jung therefore suspect that the Swiss analyst sees in the '*archetypes*' little more than symbolic or mythical representations of the collective unconscious in the individual" (pg. 256)
    - "Caruso distinguishes in every mental disturbance of this type a negative and a positive aspect: every neurosis is characterized by a negation of wholeness and by a corresponding overemphasis on partial truths an overemphasis which results in a distortion of the entire world view. Owing to his failure to see the whole, the neurotic person bases his judgments on his fragmentary or fractional view of reality. This distorted world view Caruso designates as an '**existential lie**'. But, in addition, there is in every neurosis a violent conflict between affirmation and negation, between 'good' and 'evil', between 'truth' and 'falsehood'" (pg. 256-257)
      - "**the problem of neurosis is thus essentially the problem of man's proper or improper relationship to the hierarchy of values**. While in its negative aspect neurosis is a metaphysical life-lie, in its positive aspect neurosis is characterized by the more or less conscious desire to restore the lost orientation in the objective world and its values" (pg. 257)
      - "Caruso states in effect that **a neurosis is always simultaneously a flight from the Absolute and a longing for the Absolute** and that the psychotherapist must take account of this twofold striving" (pg. 257)
        - *\*this would point to neurosis as being a dialectic in-itself*
      - "Caruso insists that every practical psychology - whether it be clinical psychology, psychotherapy, medical pedagogy, or psychological counseling - must have as its frame of reference a 'realistic' or 'objective' scale of values. When the person suffers shipwreck as a consequence of certain 'fixations' or false absolutizations (that is, in servitude to fictitious values), it becomes the task of the educator, the physician, the psychologist, the psychotherapist, to liberate the individual from his fixations by leading him back to the 'real' world of objective values" (pg. 258)
        - "Wilfried Daim points out that any absolute attachment to that which is by its nature relative implies the total surrender of the person to some object or subject which by their very nature are incapable of fulfilling the exorbitant demands and expectations imposed by such a 'fixation'. As a result, the person for whom a relative good assumes the character of an Absolute, experiences extreme terror and oppressive compulsion" (pg. 258)
          - ◆ "as long as the ethical concepts and categories of depth-psychology merely absolutize the partial truths established by scientific observation, they are insufficient to liberate the neurotic person from the tyranny of his idols and false absolutes" (pg. 258)
          - ◆ "As Kierkegaard pointed out in the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, every absolutization of relative values leads eventually to solipsistic solitude. **For Kierkegaard the symbols or 'archetypes' of such a solipsistic existence are the eternally restless *Ahasverus*, the endlessly searching and striving *Faust*, and the interminably emoting Don Juan - all of them divorced from the realm of objective truth and value and therefore forever in pursuit of some absolutized ego-centered fractional truth and never finding true self-fulfillment**" (pg. 259)
      - "Caruso sees the principal error of Freudian psychoanalysis in its attempt to treat neurosis as a purely biological phenomenon" (pg. 258)
        - "**neurosis is, when seen in this new perspective, not only a disturbance of the equilibrium of the psyche: it is simultaneously a more or less concealed effort on the part of the neurotic person to restore the lost equilibrium**" (pg. 257)
      - "Caruso also deplors that classical psychoanalysis is usually not cognizant of the fact that a neurotic conflict may be of great existential significance and that therefore a psychotherapy which merely resolves the conflict without projecting it to a higher plane of existential values, leads frequently to an impoverishment of the human person" (pg. 258-259)
      - "In speaking of the neurotic *guilt complex*, Caruso observes that the disease of a *guilty conscience* is by no means confined to neurotics: it is the most conspicuous and universal disease of modern civilization. **The inflated ego, knowing of no law but its own, feels itself paradoxically drawn toward the philosophies of self-abasement and self-annihilation**. The more inflated the ego, the more the guilty conscience asserts itself. And the more self-sufficient or absolutely autonomous modern societies strive to be, the more absurd and desperate become their creeds" (pg. 259)
        - "Atheistic existentialism regards man as a being that is disorganized to the point of absurdity but that bears within itself the ultimate measure of order" (pg. 259-260)

- "Caruso considers existentialism as the most important philosophic movement of the present age and existential psychotherapy as the most significant development in modern psychology and psychiatry" (pg. 261)
  - "In principle, **all existentialist psychotherapy aims at 'individuation'** in Jung's sense of the term: it endeavors to dissociate the concrete irreplaceable individual from the impersonal, undifferentiated, collective life patterns, to guide the individual to a point where he is ready to assume his full personal responsibility" (pg. 261)
    - ◆ "the purpose of 'integration' to lead the patient to a closed or fully 'harmonious' system or pattern of life" (pg. 262)
      - ◇ "The goal of integration is not the dubious harmony of uniformity but rather a heightened awareness and overtness together with a retention and a strengthening of the person's creative potentialities" (pg. 262)
    - ◆ "In the overtness gained by re-integration, the person recovers not only a realistic relationship to himself but also to the world and to reality as a whole" (pg. 262)
  - "The ultimate aim of the existential synthesis then is the relativization of those values which the neurotic fixation had previously absolutized or idolized" (pg. 262)
- "An integrated psychotherapy in the sense proposed by the therapists of the "Vienna Circle" will thus lead the patient, first, to a recognition of an objective scale of values and then aid him in appropriating these values in a free and conscious choice" (pg. 262)
  - "the truth which is capable of liberating the neurotic from his pathological anxiety cannot be an abstract truth but must be a *lived*, experienced truth. To become effective in the patient, it must become *his* truth, that is, a truth which permeates his being and doing" (pg. 262)
    - ◆ *\*thus, it is personal truth (through) objective truth.*
  - "Jung insists that the pedagogical aim of psychotherapy cannot be realized without the aid of *ethical and religious* norms and values" (pg. 263)
  - "As long as the individual remains attuned to objective reality, he is usually willing and able to wrestle with the difficult task of bridging the gap between thinking and doing, theory and practice, ideal demands and freely creative realizations" (pg. 264)
    - ◆ "Neurosis develops when the individual loses his trust in objective norms and values and begins to live instead in a more or less unreal world of emotional fixations, a world of superstitions and idolatries" (pg. 264)
      - ◇ "A person who finds himself in such a situation feels himself torn, as it were, by an ambivalent emotional experience: he feels oppressed and enslaved by his fixations, and he feels at the same time a strong desire for liberation, a desire which may reach such an intensity that the corresponding psychological mood can adequately be described as 'existential despair'. But this despair is again ambivalent: on one side stands the system of idolizations, the distorted system of values, while on the other side beckons the possibility of overtness and liberation. While the idolized false absolutes are consciously adhered to and loved, they are unconsciously dreaded" (pg. 264)
        - ▶ "the more strongly the neurotic person clings to his idol, the more intense becomes his hatred of God who, as Nietzsche phrased it, is then experienced as 'a thief behind the clouds', a jealous tyrant who is trying to steal one's dearest possessions, who demands detachment from what appears to be the very cornerstone of existence. It is this hatred that lies at the root of the neurotic's 'resistance' against the analytic treatment as well as against reality as such. Tortured by this dialectic of love and hatred (August Strindberg's "love-hatred"), the patient would rather retain his neurosis than allow the analysis to continue" (pg. 264)
        - ◇ "What asserts itself at this crucial stage of the analysis is, phenomenologically speaking, a *drive toward Nothingness*, that is, a tendency to negate and annihilate reality as a whole. The neurotic person feels totally abandoned, exposed to all demons, completely disoriented. But once this *crisis* is overcome, the idol assumes a radically different character: its arrogated absolute power is unmasked, its purely destructive force stands revealed. The perverted 'act of faith' is recognized as an illusion; the former attachment turns into revulsion, and the resistance against reality collapses. This revolt against the idol is usually accompanied by a feeling of 'rebirth' or 'resurrection'. The patient finds himself in a new world the real world and a corresponding realistic adjustment has become possible" (pg. 264-265)
  - "Existentialistic psychology of every shade is willing to acknowledge the reality of the mind or spirit of man. It heralds a break with nineteenth century psychology in that it no longer regards man as a mere mechanism of associations, moved by the motor of consciousness. It makes, in addition, a valiant effort to understand man in his freedom, in his intellectual resolve, in his concrete situation" (pg. 260)
    - "There is no doubt, on the other hand, that atheistic existentialist psychology - like atheistic existentialism - shows an unrealistic inflation of the concepts of freedom, responsibility, choice, and resolve. For the classical psychoanalyst man was the product of his conscious and unconscious drives; for the existential psychologist of the Sartrean school he is the product of his free choices" (pg. 260)
      - "It would rather seem that man always carries with him the limiting heavy weights of chance and circumstance..." (pg. 260)
      - "It seems safe therefore to conclude that absolute indeterminism is as unrealistic and impracticable as absolute determinism" (pg. 260)
  - "for Kierkegaard... every moment of existence calls for decision, choice, resolve an either/or: either freedom or servitude, either a divinely sanctioned being or the emptiness of non-being, the domain of Nothingness" (pg. 260-261)
    - "a neurosis is in most instances a flight from a decisive either/or: it results from an inability to make an existential choice, for the simple reason that valid criteria of choice are lacking" (pg. 262)
  - "From the point of view of a *materialistic or naturalistic depth-psychology*, moral, spiritual, religious values are regarded as 'nothing but' *illusory superstructures* of the massive substructure of biological drives and instincts. **Error and Guilt are said to be 'nothing but' symptoms and syndromes of repression and pathological fixation.** From the point of view of an *existentialist psychotherapy* (as practiced by the members of the "Vienna Circle"), **repressions and fixations result from false absolutizations or idolizations.** Such absolutizations mean that the person has been moving from the center to the periphery of the Self and has thus become "ex-centric"" (pg. 265)
    - "It was the belief (or superstition) of the nineteenth century that every kind of knowledge must be conformed to the model of natural science and reduced to the 'scientific method'. Even theology, philosophy, art and literature followed this general trend, as is documented by the several schools of positivism and by the naturalistic theories of H. Taine and E. Zola. No knowledge was considered valid unless it could be fitted into a system of measurable causes and effects. It is only in the past few decades that psychology has tried to surmount this narrow anthropological frame" (pg. 266)
  - "There are many evils - physiological, social, political, moral problems and contradictions of every kind - which are not due to any pathological fixations. **Psychotherapy can be successful in aiding the individual in overcoming his neurotic fixations and in thereby establishing the preconditions for personal creative living and for realistic adjustments**" (pg. 267)
    - "psychotherapy may succumb to the danger of absolutizing itself by mistaking itself for a substitute of religion" (pg. 267)

d. Further Readings:

- Human, All-too-Human, by F. Nietzsche  
[https://onemorelibrary.com/index.php/en/?option=com\\_djclassifieds&format=raw&view=download&task=download&fid=3367](https://onemorelibrary.com/index.php/en/?option=com_djclassifieds&format=raw&view=download&task=download&fid=3367)
- The Phenomenological Movement, by H. Spiegelberg
  - Volume 1 -

- [https://ia803204.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement/Herbert\\_Spiegelberg\\_The\\_Phenomenological\\_Movement.pdf](https://ia803204.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement/Herbert_Spiegelberg_The_Phenomenological_Movement.pdf)
- Volume II - [https://ia600509.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement2/Herbert\\_Spiegelberg\\_The\\_Phenomenological\\_Movement\\_2.pdf](https://ia600509.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement2/Herbert_Spiegelberg_The_Phenomenological_Movement_2.pdf)
  - Existentialist Philosophies, by E. Mouneir <https://dn790007.ca.archive.org/0/items/existentialistph009371mbp/existentialistph009371mbp.pdf>
  - Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism, by F. Olafson [https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa\\_monograph/book/67853](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_monograph/book/67853)
  - Phenomenology and Existentialism, (ed.) E. Lee & M. Mandelbaum [https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa\\_edited\\_volume/book/72318](https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_edited_volume/book/72318)
  - Six Existentialist Thinkers, by H. J. Blackham [https://ia600803.us.archive.org/34/items/merged\\_201709/six%20existentialist%20thinkers.pdf](https://ia600803.us.archive.org/34/items/merged_201709/six%20existentialist%20thinkers.pdf)
  - Existentialism From Within, by E. L. Allen
  - The Existential Analysis School of Thought, by L. Binswanger
    - *\*see book below - chapter 7*
  - Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, by R. May [https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/Rollo%20May.%20Ernest%20Angel%20.%20Henri%20F.%20Ellenberger%20\(Editors\)%20-%20Existence\\_%20a%20New%20Dimension%20in%20Psychiatry%20and%20Psychology-Basic%20Books%20\(1958\).pdf](https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/Rollo%20May.%20Ernest%20Angel%20.%20Henri%20F.%20Ellenberger%20(Editors)%20-%20Existence_%20a%20New%20Dimension%20in%20Psychiatry%20and%20Psychology-Basic%20Books%20(1958).pdf)
  - Irrational Man, by W. Barrett [https://ia903108.us.archive.org/31/items/irrationalman\\_201911/Irrational%20Man\\_text.pdf](https://ia903108.us.archive.org/31/items/irrationalman_201911/Irrational%20Man_text.pdf)
  - (Article) Existentialist Philosophies and Political Decline, by W. Bultmann <https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1208&context=jaas>
  - (Article) Existentialism <https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/win2021/entries/existentialism/>