Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought,

by S. Mitchell & M. Black

- a. People / Organizations:
- b. Quotes:

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- "the contemporary psychoanalytic world can only be meaningfully characterized as post-Freudian. Anyone who thinks that a familiarity with Freud's work is equivalent to an understanding of psychoanalysis is out of touch" Authors (pg. xvii)
 - ♦ "contemporary psychoanalysis has been a method in search for a rationale" Authors (pg. 228)
- "contemporary psychoanalysis has become quite complex and varied. Rather than a cohesive school of thought, contemporary psychoanalysis might be more accurately characterized as a university unto itself, with many different theories and areas of knowledge coexisting in an intricate and complicated relationship with one another" Authors (pg. 206)
- "effective teaching has always involved finding a way to help the student see past jargon and political packaging to the experiential kernel of theoretical concepts" Authors (pg. xxi)
- "Human beings are inseparable, always and inevitably, from their interpersonal field. The individual's personality takes shape in an environment composed of other people. The individual is in continual interaction with other people" Authors (pg. 62)
- "it is precisely because the analyst has anxieties and conflict similar to the patient's that the analyst is able to identify with the patient's projections onto her and then use those identifications to understand the patient" Authors (pg. 107)
 - *cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity: Go(o)d without Good https://www.binseelsnotes.com/ files/ugd/d7b063 5516fdbb15b14b74855f044d0a6d8dc8.pdf
 - humans are a commonality in-themselves, and it is for this common-ness which serves as the foundation for objectivity (i.e., semblance of harmony between...) with respect to how each relates to each other 'through' their activities. Commonality serves as the establishment for objectivity in that it's what's common-between things, pointing to a lack in subjectivity. It is this commonality which is, in a sense, isolated from, outside of or beyond, not being wholly dependent upon, the subject itself this non-dependability is the criterion for objectivity" (pg. 3-4)
- "Human beings, in Freud's account, are born at odds with their environment. They are wired the way Freud and his contemporaries understood animals to be, oriented toward pursuing simple pleasures with ruthless abandon. But in Freud's Hobbesian view of human society, the individual's pursuit of egoistic satisfactions endangers other individuals, necessitating a control by the group on the hedonic aims of each individual. The project of childhood is socialization, the transformation of the infant, with his or her bestial impulses, into the adult, with his or her complex psychic apparatus and its intricate and elaborate system of checks and barriers channeling those impulses and aims into socially acceptable forms of civilized living" Authors (pg. 112)
 - "Freud's clinical observations charted the vicissitudes of human misery, the ways people systematically make themselves unhappy over and over again: the symptom neurosis, in which compulsive, bizarre behavior intrudes into experience; the character neurosis, in which maladaptive, self-defeating patterns of behavior compromise interactions with others; the fate neurosis, in which the same self-destructive destiny is orchestrated repeatedly; depression, in which emotional pain is perpetually regenerated. Yet Freud's broad motivational theory, anchored in his concepts of instinctual drive and the pleasure principle, is a hedonic theory: People seek pleasure and avoid pain" Authors (pg. 114)
 - "According to the pleasure principle, libido is malleable, employing a variety of interchangeable objects in its pursuit of pleasure; it ought to be able to discard painful desires and frustrating objects. Yet, Freud noted in 1905, the libido also has a property he termed adhesiveness, which seems to operate at odds with the pleasure principle. Libido gets painfully stuck to old, inaccessible objects, frustrated longings, thwarted desires. The Oedipus complex, the heart of Freud's clinical theory, is the prime example of this" Authors (pg. 114)
 - "Freud was born into a world where the ways of thinking about these kinds of questions were in transition. Generations prior to Freud's time viewed humans as the maverick children of the divine, designed in God's image in a unique and special fashion. But the scientific speculation of Freud's era no longer allowed humans this unquestioned privilege. Darwin's influence cast a long, gray shadow over what had been a black-and-white divide between humans and other creatures; Freud was fascinated not with humankind's godlike visage but with the beast in men and women. The rich illumination Freud brought to our contemporary understanding of human experience often entailed pointing out the call of the wild, primitive impulses and fantasies beneath the thin veneer of civilized conduct and demeanor. For Freud, the process of socialization involved the taming of the beast. He saw infantile experience as dominated by raw sexual and aggressive impulses, culminating in the oedipal crisis. As that crisis was resolved under the threat of castration, it was essential that the sexual and aggressive energies be rerouted into less dangerous pathways, and it was this energy, now expressed in socially acceptable and sublimated forms, that was employed in the service of enculturation. For Freud, the distinctly human form of being was generated in the very process through which the primitive, bestial sexual and aggressive impulses were brought under control" Authors (pg. 140)
 - "In Freud's theorizing, the id is understood as never in contact with external reality. Its discharges in the real world are mediated through the ego. The id operates beneath external reality, expressing the archaic heritage that is present at birth. The digging of the archaeologist takes him deeper into the past; the interpretations of the psychoanalyst enables him to sift through the surface, daily interactions to uncover the deeper, inherited primal fantasies" Authors (pg. 190)
 - "Freud drew on the scientific understanding of his day, borrowing from Newtonian physics the idea of the universe as an intricate system of mechanisms composed of matter and forces and applying it to the mind, envisioning it as a psychic apparatus composed of structures and psychodynamic forces. Freud demonstrated that the subjective sense of self as an omnipotent agent over one's experience and actions is an illusion. Consciousness is merely the tip of an iceberg; thoughts and feelings are actually (psychically) determined by unconscious forces not accessible to self-reflection. One often does not, in fact, know what one is really doing. Consequently, in Freud's system the person as agent is dispersed. A conscious sense of agency is illusory; the conscious self is more correctly depicted as a puppet. The strings are being controlled elsewhere, in the unconscious, by psychic agencies (id, ego, and superego) and by dynamic forces (instinctual impulses and defenses)" Authors (pg. 181)
- c. General Notes:
 - Acknowledgements (pg. xi)
 - o "we have seen psychoanalytic concepts taught well, and we have seen them taught poorly" (pg. xi)
 - "when taught well, psychoanalytic concepts have the capacity to enrich rather than deplete, to empower rather than diminish, to deepen
 experience rather than haunt it" (pg. xi)
 - "our subject matter is vast. Only a portion of all the existing concepts could be presented, and only a portion of the relationships among them
 explored" (pg. xi)
 - Preface (pg. xv)
 - o "The problem is that <u>psychoanalytic concepts derive from and are concerned most fundamentally with the experience of the analytic process</u>, an intensely emotional, highly charged, deeply personal experience for both participants. From the *inside*, in the eyes of those who practice and study psychoanalysis as well as those who have undergone a 'successful' (i.e., personally meaningful) analysis, the world of psychoanalysis is a rich

and intriguing place. Its basic concepts and modes of thought are imbued with an experiential vividness, a conceptual clarity, and a continual practical applicability to the day-to-day conduct of their lives. Psychoanalytic thought helps knit together different domains of experience: past and present, waking and sleeping, thinking and feeling, interpersonal events and the most private fantasies" (pg. xv)

- "to the psychoanalytically informed mind, analytic concepts provide useful tools for expanding, consolidating, and enriching one's own life
 and one's relationships with others" (pg. xvi)
- Myth #1: Psychoanalysis is largely the work of one man (pg. xvi)
 - "Freud regarded psychoanalysis as a form of treatment, but also as a new brand of science" (pg. xvi)
 - "Freud also regarded psychoanalysis as a quasi-political movement, and proved himself a dominant leader, wary of opposition, often reading others' creativity and originality as signs of disloyalty" (pg. xvi)
 - "since 1939...psychoanalytic thought has been released to flow more naturally. Where there was one channel, now there are many. Where there was one tradition, now there are multiple school, technical terminologies, and forms of clinical practice" (pg. xvi)
 - □ "psychoanalysis is no longer the work of one individual" (pg. xvi)
- Myth #2: Contemporary psychoanalysis, in both theory and clinical practice, is virtually the same as it was in Freud's day (pg. xvii)
 - "Psychoanalysis is sometimes presented as if it were fundamentally unchanged since Freud's time. Because of their deference to Freud and psychoanalytic tradition, some analytic authors write as though caught in a time warp, oblivious to the burgeoning innovative literature of psychoanalytic theory and technique. Others, more aware of contemporary developments but still maintaining their loyalty to tradition, publicly advance a version of psychoanalysis that no longer reflects their actual clinical practice. And many dismissive critics of psychoanalysis believe that knocking Freud, or taking easy shots at outdated features of his thought, is equivalent to demolishing psychoanalysis in its entirety" (pg. xvii)
 - "The startling reality is that very little of the way Freud understood and practiced psychoanalysis has remained simply intact. The major pillars of his theorizing instinctual drives, the centrality of the Oedipus complex, the motivational primacy of sex and aggression have all been challenged and fundamentally transformed in contemporary psychoanalytic thought" (pg. xvii)
 - "[clinicians] rely for their impact not on the presumption of the analyst's authority, but on the development of a collaborative inquiry between analyst and analysand. And with a deeper understanding of the subjective nature of experience, today's analyst does not naively presume to be the arbiter of reality as much as the guide on a mutually undertaken journey" (pg. xvii)
- o Myth #3: Psychoanalysis has gone out of fashion (pg. xviii)
 - "in our modern world, with its frantic rate of change, its emphasis on cost effectiveness, its relentless demands for profit and productivity, the languorous timelessness and deep reflectiveness of psychoanalysis can seem as dated as Freud's [work]..." (pg. xviii)
 - "psychoanalytic object relations theories and psychoanalytic self psychology have been among the most important influences on casework within the field of social work and on virtually all forms of psychotherapy practiced today" (pg. xviii)
 - "psychoanalysis is not only a professional and scientific discipline within our culture, but a form of thought, an approach to human experience, that has become constitutive of our culture and pervades the way we have come to experience ourselves and our minds" (pg. xviii-xix)
 - "the portrayal of psychoanalysis as slipping into irrelevance is far from accurate" (pg. xx)
 - "the dominant concerns within the contemporary analytic literature and current analytic practice the nature of subjectivity, the generation of personal meaning and creativity, the embeddedness of the subject in cultural, linguistic, and historical contexts are, in fact, the predominant concerns of our time" (pg. xx)
- Introduction (pg. xxv)
 - o "Freud and Beyond was inspired by our increasing concern that psychoanalysis was in trouble. In its elitist 'analyst knows all' attitude, arcane language, and ivory tower isolation from related academic fields, it was becoming further and further removed from the minds of the general public and the hearts of a younger generation of talented people in search of a personally meaningful profession" (pg. xxv)
 - "therapy [ought concern] itself with a person's feeling alive and enjoying a satisfying intimacy with other people or just being comfortably alone..." (pg. xxvi)
 - o "[Stephen Mitchell] encouraged the development of a paradigm shift in psychoanalytic thinking, reflecting what he felt was already implicit but not directly formulated in the writing of most of the authors included in this book: humans are not best understood as isolated beings motivated by and struggling with the prefigured innate forces of sex and aggression; rather, human beings are fundamentally social, developing within, internalizing, and shaped by their relationships with important others in their lives. These experiences find expression in the development of internal structure and fantasy. They affect relationships in an ongoing way. Culture, gender, race, and sexual orientation all figure into this development as well. Sex and aggression remain fundamental aspects of our experience but are not unmoored energies on the loose, arising in a vacuum. Sensuality and frustration are intertwined with relationships, arising in response to and deriving meaning within experience with others" (pg. xxvi)
 - "this alternative vision is referred to as 'relational psychoanalysis'" (pg. xxvi)
 - "we are increasingly aware that <u>perception and memory are constructions affected by social conditions</u> (like racism and gender bias), language, (which is shaped by one's culture and has changing meanings), and, most importantly, our differing and unique ways of organizing and taking in what we see" (pg. xxvii)
 - o The Nature of Reality and Place of Fantasy in Human Experience (pg. xxvii)
 - "our *inner* experience is not best regarded as composed of repressed conflictual fantasies that need exposure to an objective truth. Our inner experiences, although still seen as holding troubling areas of psychic life, is now understood to function as the *personally specific lens* through which we *construct* our vision of external reality" (pg. xxviii)
 - □ "neither patient nor analyst is capable of viewing experience objectively" (pg. xxviii)
 - *I don't like this; though, I agree with meaning as subjective constructs. Objectivity and 'what objective features mean' are separate matters. No objectivity at all teeters towards solipsism (i.e., subjectivity is the only currency).
 - "fundamentally people are searching for connection, not for drive satisfaction" (pg. xxviii)
 - *but, where one may be unknowledgeable as to how to successfully establish meaningful connections, pursuit of individual pleasure
 - "Winnicott offered intriguing conceptualizations regarding the function of fantasy in normal human development. He explored fantasy as offering a potential space within which newly emerging configurations of self-experience and personal subjectivity could be held. He envisioned the child's sense of objective reality as developing alongside and interweaving with fantasies of subjective omnipotence rather than replacing it. One who lives completely in 'objective reality' has no subjective center, no sense of himself as a viable person" (pg. xxix)
 - "Donnel Stern has helped us better understand and engage unconscious experience. Stern refers to such experience as 'out of awareness', seeing it not as disguised and hidden away but as dissociated, unrealized, vague, and never having been given shape or meaning by an articulation in language" (pg. xxx)
 - "dissociated content carries no built-in energy pressing for expression" (pg. xxx)
 - by "the study of intersubjectivity has built substantially on Winnicott's evocative concept of transitional space, envisioning a 'third' that is created by the coming together of the minds of analyst and patient, an opaque area of intermediate experience within which mental complexity may develop"

(pg. xxxi)

- o "the roles of patient and analyst are no longer scripted but instead are creatively and uniquely formed within each analytic dyad" (pg. xxxii)
- Chapter 1 Sigmund Freud and the Classical Psychoanalytic Tradition (pg. 1)
 - "Freud...tended to draw his inspiration from ancient heroes such as Moses and Hannibal" (pg. 1)
 - "the historical development of Freud's theories is extremely intricate and complex" (pg. 2)
 - From Brain to Mind (pg. 2)
 - "Freud graduated from medical school at a time when the study of the physical structure of the brain was in its burgeoning infancy. The neuron, the individual nerve cell, had recently been isolated; techniques were being developed for tracing neural pathways; the enormous complexity of the brain was just beginning to be sensed" (pg. 2)
 - "Freud...and other practitioners of medical hypnotism, demonstrated that hysterics suffered a disease not of the brain but of mind" (pg. 3)
 - "for example, 'glove anaesthesia', the lack of feeling in the hand, makes no sense neurobiologically. The nerves in the hand extend up the arm; if the nerves themselves were damaged, the numbness would not be limited only to the hand. But glove anaesthesia makes sense psychologically. The idea the patient has of his hand is central to the functional disability. It is not the nerves themselves that are damaged; something is disordered in the patient's thoughts, thoughts about his hand. The patient may have no direct access to these thoughts; they may be absent from the conscious portion of his mind" (pg. 2)
 - □ "it was ideas, not nerves, that were the source of trouble" (pg. 3)
 - "[it was believed] hysteria was caused by trapped memories and the feelings associated with them, [Freud and Breuer] argued. Those memories and feelings had never been lived through in an ordinary way; they had become split off from the rest of the mind, only to fester and rise to the surface in the form of disconcerting and seemingly inexplicable symptoms. If those symptoms were traced to their origins, their meanings would become apparent and the feelings would be discharged in a cathartic burst" (pg. 4)
 - "Freud [believed]...the pathogenic memories and feelings were dissociated not because of a prior altered state of consciousness but because the actual *content* of those memories and feelings was disturbing, unacceptable and <u>in conflict</u> with the rest of the person's ideas and feelings" (pg. 4)
 - "[such memories and feelings] were incompatible with the rest of consciousness and were therefore actively kept out of awareness" (pg. 5)
 - o From Hypnosis to Psychoanalysis (pg. 5)
 - "from 1895 to 1905...psychoanalysis emerged from hypnotism and became a distinct methodology and treatment in its own right; many of
 the basic concepts that guide psychoanalytic thought to this day were established" (pg. 5)
 - "Freud realized that what was most crucial to a permanent removal of symptoms was for the objectionable, unconscious material to become generally accessible to normal consciousness" (pg. 5)
 - □ "there was a resistant force in the patient's mind, which Freud called the *defense*, that actively kept the memories out of awareness" (pg. 5)
 - o The Topographic Model (pg. 6)
 - "[Freud] began to envision a topographical model of the mind, dividing it into three different realms: an unconscious, containing unacceptable ideas and feelings; a preconscious, containing acceptable idea and feelings that are capable of becoming conscious; and the conscious, containing those ideas and feelings in awareness at any particular time" (pg. 6)
 - "Freud struggled to find a method that would dismantle or dissolve the defenses rather than temporarily lull them as hypnosis did. Around the turn of the century, he settled on the method of *free association*, the basic procedure that has been the backbone of psychoanalytic technique ever since" (pg. 6)
 - Free Association (pg. 6)
 - "free association retained some of the trappings of hypnotism" (pg. 6)
 - "the patient says whatever comes into her mind, with no effort to screen or select thought, and is encouraged to become a passive observer of her own stream of consciousness" (pg. 6)
 - □ "by encouraging the patient to report on all the fleeting thoughts, the analyst hopes to get the patient to bypass the normal selection process that screens out conflictual content" (pg. 6)
 - o Transference and Resistance (pg. 6)
 - "free association is impossible to do for very long, Freud discovered. The defenses block the emergence of thought too closely linked to the repressed secrets. Furthermore, conflictual thoughts and feelings that constitute the center of the patients difficulties are soon transferred to the person of the analyst, who becomes an object of intense longing, love, and/or hate" (pg. 6)
 - "the resistance to particular free associations is the very same force, Freud began to speculate, that drove the original memories out of consciousness in the first place. It is precisely this transference and this resistance that need to be exposed, identified, and dissolved. By analyzing the patient's free associations and resistances to free associations, Freud believed, he could gain access to both sides of the pathogenic conflict: 1) the secret feelings and memories and 2) the defenses the thoughts and feelings rejecting those secret feelings and memories" (pg. 7)
 - "among Freud's most important clinical observations was that the patient's difficulties in the analytic situation (the resistance and transference) are not an obstacle to the treatment but the very heart of it" (pg. 8)
 - o Dreams (pg. 8)
 - "Freud treated dreams like any other associations: they were likely to contain hidden thoughts and links to earlier experiences" (pg. 8)
 - "Freud himself was a prolific dreamer. He also had certain troublesome neurotic symptoms. Soon, his most important patient became himself" (pg. 8)
 - "dreams are disguised fulfilments of conflictual wishes, Freud became convinced. In sleep, the dynamic force (the defense) that ordinarily keeps forbidden wishes from gaining access to consciousness is weakened, as in a hypnotic trance. If the wish were simply represented directly in the dream, sleep would likely be disrupted. A compromise is struck between the force that propels the wish into consciousness and the force that blocks access to consciousness. The wish may appear in the dream only in a disguised form, an intruder dressed up to look as though he belongs. The true meaning of the dream (the *latent dream thoughts*) undergoes an elaborate process of distortion that results in the dream as experienced (the *manifest content* of the dream). Condensation, displacement, symbolism all are employed in the dream work to transform the unacceptable latent dream thoughts into acceptable, although apparently meaningless, disconnected images, which are strung together into a story, to throw the dreamer even further off the track" (pg. 8-9)
 - "the technique for interpreting dreams follows from this conception of their formation. Each element of the manifest content of the dream is isolated and associated to. The associations to the various elements lead in different directions, exposing the different memories, thoughts, and feelings that had created them (through condensation, displacement, and symbolization). Eventually the various lines of association coalesce in the nodal latent thoughts. <u>Dreams interpretation reverses the process of dream formation, tracing the path from the disguised surface to the hidden secrets lying beneath</u>" (pg. 9)
 - "the form that Freud delineated in his theory of dreams became the central structural pattern for his understanding of all important psychic phenomena. The structure of neurotic symptoms, slips of the tongue, and motivated errors in general are all identical to the structure of the

dream: a compromise is struck between an unacceptable thought or feeling and the defense against it. The forbidden material is allowed into conscious experience only in disguised form" (pg. 9)

- o Childhood Sexuality (pg. 10)
 - "Freud found that many of his patients, not just hysterics, were suffering from troubling memories or earlier experiences. If each exposed memory was examined to see whether it concealed earlier prototypes, all symptoms could be traced to traumatic incidents during early childhood (before the age of six). Even more surprising, these incidents invariably had to do with a precocious involvement with sexuality" (pg. 10)
 - "these discoveries led Freud to the controversial theory of infantile seduction: the root cause of all neurosis is the premature introduction of sexuality into the experience of the child" (pg. 11)
 - □ "Freud expanded and developed his theory of infantile seduction, despite the considerable criticism from his medical colleagues" (pg. 11)
 - "the more data Freud accumulated in support of his theory, the less probable the theory appeared" (pg. 12)
 - "it was a particular hallmark of Freud's genius to turn apparent setbacks into opportunities for further exploration. The collapse of his theory of infantile seduction forced him to grapple with his clinical data in a very new different way" (pg. 12)
 - "the theory of infantile seduction had seemed so compelling because it accounted for the introduction of sexuality into the innocence of childhood by an adult seducer. But if the seductions never happened...the whole assumption of childhood innocence needed to be rethought" (pg. 12)
 - "the collapse of the theory of infantile seduction led in 1897 to the emergence of theory of infantile sexuality. The impulses, fantasies, and conflicts that Freud uncovered beneath the neurotic symptoms of his patients derived not from external contamination, he now believed, but from the mind of the child itself" (pg. 12)
- o The Theory of Instinctual Drive (pg. 13)
 - "The theory of sexuality that Freud developed over the next several years (1905) is based on the notion of instinctual drive, which became Freud's fundamental building block for all his subsequent theorizing. The mind, Freud reasoned, is an apparatus for discharging stimuli that impinge upon it. There are two kinds of stimuli, external (such as a threatening predator) and internal (such as hunger). External stimuli can be avoided; internal stimuli keep mounting. The mind becomes structured so as to contain, control, and, if possible, discharge internal stimuli. Central among the internal stimuli are the sexual instincts. These appear as a broad array of tensions arising from different body parts, demanding activity to effect their discharge, Freud believed. Thus, for example, oral libido arises in the oral cavity (its source), creates a need for sucking activity (its aim), and becomes targeted toward and attached to something (generally external to the person) such as the breast (its object), which is required for satisfaction. The source and aim are inherent properties of the drive, Freud believed; the object is discovered through experience. Thus in feeding for purposes of self-preservation, the infant discovers that the breast is a source of libidinal pleasure; hence, through experience, the breast becomes the first libidinal object" (pg. 13)
 - "Freud proposed a sequence of psychosexual stages, through which one or another body part and its accompanying libidinal activity
 assumes prominence: oral, anal, phallic, and genital" (pg. 13)
 - "if psychoanalysis in general was like an archeological dig, the development and elaboration of Freud's vision of human sexuality had all the intensity and excitement of the expeditions or early explorers searching for the source of the Nile" (pg. 13)
 - "The impulses of childhood sexuality survive in adulthood disguised (neurotic symptoms) and undisguised (sexual perversions), Freud believed. Some of them persist as foreplay, having been subsumed under the ultimate goal of genital intercourse. But most of the pieces of infantile sexual experience are objectionable to the socialized adult mind. Under the best of circumstances they are channeled into sublimated, aim-inhibited forms of gratification. Many of the drive impulses are too objectionable to be allowed any gratification at all; elaborate defenses are built to keep them repressed or to divert them into harmless activities. Thus the river of adult experience is composed of the continuous flow from its infantile sources, now merged, disguised, blended together into what appears to be a transparent whole" (pg. 14)
 - □ "socialization requires a complex set of inhibitions and restrictions of [certain] wishes" (pg. 14)
 - "Freud came to the conclusions that...a great deal of adult functioning is constructed either to provide disguised forms of gratifications or effective defenses or, most often, complex combinations of gratification and defense" (pg. 14)
 - "Freud had struggled with the same problem in different terms, in his efforts to reconcile higher cultural pursuits (such as literature and the arts), which he deeply loved, with a motivational theory that regarded all intentions as fundamentally sexual and aggressive. Freud's solution was the concept of *sublimation*, a quasi-defensive process that harnesses the power of the sexual impulse and channels it into acceptable, productive pursuits" (pg. 37-38)
 - "But even when drives are sublimated, they retain, in a disguised form, their sexual and aggressive qualities. If the ego's conflict-free functions are truly autonomous, they seem to require an energy without such qualities. Hartmann proposed a process he termed neutralization, through which the ego strips the drives of their sexual and aggressive qualities. Unlike sublimation, neutralization actually changes the nature of the drives themselves, much as a hydroelectric plant transforms the raging, muddy river into clean, usable electrical energy" (pg. 38)
- o The Oedipus Complex (pg. 15)
 - "the centerpiece of Freud's theory of development was the Oedipus complex. Freud believed that the various elements of sexuality converge around the age of five or six in a genital organization, in which the component pregenital instincts are subsumed under a genital hegemony. The aim of all the child's desires becomes genital intercourse with the parent of the opposite sex. The parent of the same sex becomes a dangerous, feared rival. Like Sophocles's Oedipus, each child is destined to follow her desires and thereby become caught in a powerful, passionate drama with no easy resolution" (pg. 15)
 - "the Oedipus complex is resolved, Freud believed, through the threat of castration anxiety. A boy wants to remove the threat posed by his rival by castrating him, and assumed that his father will punish him in like fashion" (pg. 15)
 - "for all of us, Freud suggested, the central themes of childhood sexuality become organized in the Oedipus complex, and that organization becomes the underlying structure for the rest of life" (pg. 15)
 - "the Oedipus complex has always been the concept most widely associate with Freudian psychoanalysis" (pg. 16)
- Psychic Conflict (pg. 16)
 - "The terms Freud introduced in presenting his theories of the unconscious, infantile sexuality and instinctual drive have become so commonplace, it is difficult to appreciate just how revolutionary his understanding of the psyche was and how striking it remains today. What we experience as our minds, Freud suggests, is merely a small portion of it; the rest is by no means transparent to our feeble consciousness. The real meaning of much of what we think, feel, and do is determined unconsciously, outside our awareness. The mind has elaborate devices for regulating the instinctual tensions that are the source of all motivation and that exert a continuous pressure for discharge. The apparent transparency of mind is an illusion; the psyche and the personality are highly complex, intricately textured layers of instinctual impulses, transformations of those impulses, and defenses against those impulses" (pg. 16)
- The Aggressive Drive (pg. 18)
 - "from the point at which he abandoned the theory of infantile seduction until 1920, Freud regarded the sexual drive as the source of all

conflict and psychopathology" (pg. 18)

- "it was, he felt, the impulses and wishes deriving from the sexual drive, in all its complexity and urgency, that created self-fragmentation" (pg. 18)
- "In 1920 Freud introduced what has come to be known as his dual-instinct theory, which granted aggression equal status with sexuality as a source of the basic instinctual energy that drives mental processes. This was no minor addition. The way a theorist understands motivation, the underlying goals of behavior, imparts a crucial cast to his portrait of the mind and human activity. In his early writings (e.g., 1908) Freud conjured up a vision of people struggling with impulses and wishes that had become forbidden largely because of social conventions concerning sexuality, some of which he regarded as unnecessarily severe and constrictive. He envisioned the products of successful analysis as individuals constructively free of repression, able to use their manifold component sexual instincts for their own pleasure and satisfaction. Increasingly, and especially after 1920, Freud's view of human nature darkened. What is repressed are not just harmless sexual wishes, he came to believe, but a powerful, savage destructiveness deriving from a death instinct. With this crucial shift in the way Freud envisioned the instincts came an important reformulation of the way he and the early generations of psychoanalysts understood the relation between the individual and society. Repression is not imposed unnecessarily by a restrictive society; repression is a form of social control that saves people from themselves and makes it possible for them to live together without perpetually killing and exploiting one another. Ideal mental health does not entail an absence of repression, but the maintenance of a modulated repression that allows gratification while at the same time preventing primitive sexual and aggressive impulses from taking over. The turn toward a darker vision of instincts brought a more appreciative attitude toward social controls, which he now regarded as necessary to save people from themselves. Freud thus moved from an early implicit political philosophy that was Rousseauian in tone to one more darkly Hobbesian. In his most widely read book on culture, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud painted a picture of man requiring culture for survival but, because of the instinctual renunciation it entailed, necessarily always being dissatisfied in some fundamental fashion" (pg. 18-19) □ https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.218475/2015.218475.Civilization-And_text.pdf
- From Topography to Structure (pg. 19)
 - "Freud regarded conflict as the central clinical problem underlying all psychopathology" (pg. 19)
 - "one part of the mind was at war with another part of the mind, and the symptoms were a direct, although masked, consequence of this hidden, underlying struggle. Freud's theoretical models of the psyche were all efforts to portray the patient's conflict, which was at the heart of analytic treatment" (pg. 19)
 - "by the early 1920's, the topographical model (of unconscious, with its inaccessible, repressed wishes, impulses, and memories, at odds with the more acceptable conscious and preconscious) was proving insufficient as a map of conflict" (pg. 19)
 - □ "growing clinical experience and conceptual sophistication led Freud to theorize that the unconscious wishes and impulses are in conflict with the defenses, not with the conscious and preconscious, and that the defenses cannot possibly really be conscious or accessible to consciousness. If I know I am keeping myself from knowing something, I must also know what it is that I am keeping myself from knowing" (pg. 19-20)
 - "Freud had discovered something else in the unconscious: guilt, prohibitions, self-punishments" (pg. 20)
 - "when Freud began to perceive the basic conflictual seam in the psyche as not between conscious and unconscious but inside the unconscious itself, a new model, the structural model, became necessary to delineate the primary constituents of mind" (pg. 20)
 - "the structural model puts all the major components of the self in the unconscious, and the significant boundaries are between the *id*, *ego*, and *superego*. These are not topographical regions, but rather three very different kinds of agencies: the <u>id</u> is a 'cauldron full of seething excitations' of raw, unstructured, impulsive energies; the <u>ego</u> is a collection of regulatory functions that keep the impulses of the id under control; the <u>superego</u> is a set of moral values and self-critical attitudes, largely organized around internalized parental images" (pg. 20)
 - □ "Drawing heavily on the Darwinian metaphors of his day, Freud portrayed humankind as only incompletely evolved, as torn by a fundamental rift between bestial motives and civilized conduct and demeanor, between an animal nature and cultural aspirations. And the very process of socialization entailed self-alienation and self-deception. Consistent with Freud's understanding of animal nature (drawn from the zoology and animal psychology of his day) was his view of people as 'driven' to seek pleasure in a single-minded and rapacious fashion. In order to become acceptable, both to others and to oneself, one has to conceal from oneself these purely hedonic motives. The ego, with the aid of the internalized parental presences in the superego, represses and regulates bestial impulses in the id to maintain safety in a world of other people, Freud proposed. The result is a mind largely unknown to itself, filled with secrets and disavowed impulses, sexual and aggressive. It is the pressure of those impulses in the 'return of the repressed' that creates the neurotic symptoms whose code Freud felt he had broke" (pg. 20-21)
- o Freud's Legacy (pg. 21)
 - "Freud always regarded his discovery of the meaning of dreams to be his greatest contribution. This is because hidden in the story of the dream are secrets that pertain to human subjectivity in general" (pg. 21)
 - □ "subsequent psychoanalytic authors were to demonstrate that all the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves are secondary elaborations, woven from a broad and varied range of fragments of past and present psychic life: wishes and longings, fantasies and perceptions, hopes and dreads" (pg. 21)
 - "Freud's contributions gave birth to the universe of psychoanalysis just as exclusively and completely as the big bang gave birth to the
 universe we find ourselves in" (pg. 22)
- Chapter 2 Ego Psychology (pg. 23)
 - "what Freud wanted to find were the secrets, not the more ordinary levels of mental life within which the secrets were concealed" (pg. 23)
 - "Freud's excavation had opened up the dramatic cross-sectional perspectives on the inner structure and developmental stratification of the
 psyche. These newly exposed vistas prompted an explosion of investigation into the early history of the human psyche and its functioning"
 (pg. 24)
 - "Before 1923 Freud has used the term *ego* in a loose, unsystematic fashion to refer to the dominant, largely conscious mass of ideas from which the repressed was split off. In 1923, in The Ego and Id, he began to use *ego* to represent one of the three fundamental psychic agencies of the mind. The ego's major functions were to represent reality and, through the erection of defenses, to channel and control internal drive pressures in the face of reality" (pg. 24)
 - "as we shall see, the ego psychologists shared many concerns with other schools of psychoanalytic thought: interpersonal psychoanalysis, object relations theories, and self-psychology. All these theoretical traditions that branched off from Freud's opus began to address, in one fashion or another, problems of normal development and the impact of the environment and early relationships. What distinguishes the ego psychology approach from other lines of thought is the careful preservation of Freud's theory that underlies it" (pg. 24)
 - Anna Freud: The Building Blocks of Defense Theory (pg. 25)
 - "Sigmund Freud's early topographical model depicted a clash between conscious and unconscious mental functioning in which id impulses pushed against ego defenses erected to contain them. The success of psychoanalytic treatment was seen as depending on the innate pressure within id impulses to seize the moment and gain expression once the patient temporarily suspended defensive operations by obeying the "fundamental rule" of free association. The structural model, introduced in 1923, depicted a more complex psyche containing a struggle

among three internal agencies: ego, id, superego. According to this model, neurosis is the result of a compromise-formation worked out unconsciously among these fundamentally antagonistic parties: the id, pressing to gratify infantile wishes; the superego, striving to prevent this morally forbidden gratification; and the ego, mediating among the claims of the id, the superego, and the outside world. Displaying some sympathy for the id, the ego works out a strategy that allows a certain amount of instinctual gratification but channels this gratification through a complex system of clever defenses. The ego disguises the appearance of the id's impulses, thereby both preventing social censure and keeping the impulses under careful regulation. For the neurotic person, these compromises between forbidden impulses and defenses result in complex, uncomfortable symptoms and a constriction of functioning (often involving sexual inhibitions or an inability to work and compete successfully). One has to pay a price for maintaining and pursuing, even in disguised forms, socially unacceptable infantile longings. This inherent punishment is negotiated by the ego to satisfy the demands of the superego" (pg. 25)

- "Anna Freud...a pioneer of child analysis, was a crucial figure in the further exploration of the ego" (pg. 25)
- "Pondering her father's 1923 structural model of the psyche, Anna Freud detected a strategic technical problem: If the crucial battle line of psychic conflict was no longer between unconscious impulses and conscious defenses but among three psychic agencies, each of which carried out significant aspects of its functioning unconsciously, then the clinical process by which these unconscious aspects of the patient's psychic life could be revealed needed to be reevaluated. The topographical model had explained that the id's impulses would seek expression in the treatment for purposes of gratification" (pg. 25)
 - "the ego also contains complex unconscious defensive arrangements that have evolved to satisfy the demands of neurotic compromise, ways of thinking that keep repressed impulses out of conscious awareness in an ongoing way. Unlike unconscious id impulses that respond with enthusiasm to the prospect of liberation in making their presence felt in the analytic hour, <u>unconscious ego defenses gain nothing from being exposed</u>. Their unobtrusive, seamless presence in the patient's psychic life is perfectly acceptable (ego syntonic) to the patient; they often function as a central feature of the patient's larger personality organization" (pg. 26)
 - ◆ "Consider the defense of reaction formation, whereby the ego obscures unacceptable hostile impulses by transforming them into their opposite. The angry person becomes overly nice, often insistently helpful, even suffocatingly kind; he may be regarded by many (including himself) as a pillar of the community. To undo this carefully crafted solution by unmasking the defensive aspect of it, to tell the patient that his niceness is actually a clever cover for his nastiness, is not just to release id impulses from the clever defensive constraints of the ego, but to threaten a whole way of life. The ego, charged with the daunting task of keeping the peace between warring internal parties and ensuring socially acceptable functioning, works more effectively if it works undercover. The psychoanalyst, whose interest is in making unconscious experience conscious, is the longed-for liberator to unconscious id impulses, but a menace to the embattled ego and its unconscious, characterological defenses. If psychoanalysis was still to be conceived of as a battle, it had become less a rescue mission to release captives behind the lines and more a full-scale attack against a culture" (pg. 26)
 - "reaction formation...is a defense called into play to keep one consciously unaware of the continuing, socially unacceptable pleasures involved in [certain activities]" (pg. 37)
- "Free association was increasingly viewed as an unavoidably compromised activity from the start, at best a goal of the analytic process rather than the immediately available vehicle it had been naively assumed to be. As much as the patient tries to be cooperative in choosing to suspend ego attitudes and conscious objections for some period of time, unconscious defensive patterns and corresponding unconscious superego attitudes are always operating, outside the patient's awareness and control. This revised understanding of unconscious psychic activity necessitated a shift in the analyst's role" (pg. 27)
 - □ "It is the task of the analyst to bring into consciousness that which is unconscious..." Anna Freud (pg. 27)
 - *this sounds highly similar to the existentialist's wont for 'authenticity'.
 - "the analyst needed to more actively discern subtle workings of defensive operations *within* the associations themselves, which compromised and distorted them" (pg. 27)
 - "the analytic focus needed to turn from the pursuit of id impulses, concentrating instead on the out-of-awareness workings of the ego" (pg. 27)
 - "In the defense of *isolation of affect*, for example, conflictual ideas are allowed into consciousness in an intellectualized form; the disturbing feelings associated with them are blocked. The ego may permit a flow of ideas that looks like 'free' associations, but the ideas are separated from their corresponding feelings. A patient might speak of intense sexual encounters, for example, but in a detached, dispassionate manner. Or, using the defense of *projection*, a patient might deny feelings of anger but be very sensitive to and preoccupied with angry feelings in others around her. The patient might seem to be talking 'freely', but it is the impact of the unconscious defense as much as it is the impact of the instinctual pressure that shapes the verbalizations" (pg. 27)
 - "Anna Freud's book The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense was a partial response to this problem" (pg. 27-28)
 https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Freud-A.-1936-1993.The-ego-and-the-mechanisms-of-defence.-London-Karnac-Books.pdf
 - "reorienting analysis from its concentration on tracking down id derivatives, Anna Freud defined the proper analytic attitude as 'neutral', an evenhanded oscillation in attention among all three parties in the neurotic construction, the id, the ego, and the superego" (pg. 28)
 - ♦ "in chapter 1 we noted the ways Freud himself had become increasingly interested in defenses as well as the secrets they were protecting. Anna Freud greatly extended this shift in clinical focus by cataloging and studying various defensive operations of the ego, noting both their modus operandi as well as locating them, in terms of appearances and operational sophistication, along a developmental continuum. Her investigations produced interesting observations on aspects of defensive functioning that had not received careful attention" (pg. 29-30)
 - While internally arising conflict and ensuing superego guilt had been offered as the common formula for prompting the ego's defensive activity, Anna Freud clarified that defenses, such as denial, can also be called into action by displeasure that has its source in the external world. She also observed that while this defense had been generally associated with severe psychopathology (e.g., psychotic delusions), her work with children gave evidence of the early developmentally normal appearance of this kind of defensive operation. Children regularly simply 'get rid of unwelcome facts' (1936, p. 83) by negating their existence, while their overall reality testing remains unimpaired. Her work suggested that the use of denial, as well as that of projection and introjection, signaled, in the adult, disturbances that were rooted in developmentally early phases of childhood" (pg. 30)
 - "Kris discovered a persisting boyhood wish to admire and learn from a disappointing father whose own inhibitions prevented his professional success. In his unconscious efforts to redress this childhood disappointment and create an impressive father worthy of admiration, the patient infused his older friend with his own intellectual substance, sabotaging his own progress. <u>Using the defense mechanism of projection</u>, he had attributed his own abilities to his friend, whom he then regarded with awe and admiration" (pg. 29)
- "Anna Freud established the ego itself as an object of psychoanalytic inquiry worthy of study in its own right" (pg. 30)
- o An Assessment of Psychic Structure (pg. 32)

- "from the perspective of the structural model, neurosis is a long-standing compromise arrived at by the psychic agencies of id, ego, and superego" (pg. 32)
- "Prior to the development of ego psychology, the clinical goal of psychoanalysis had been the release of trapped, unconscious energies.
 Freud had stressed a nondirective, nonsuggestive approach. Removing the debris clogging the stream was the task, not strengthening the channel through which it flowed" (pg. 34)
- o Heinz Hartmann: The Turn Toward Adaptation (pg. 34)
 - "Heinz Hartmann came to be known as the father of ego psychology" (pg. 34)
 - "Hartmann's contributions broadened the scope of psychoanalytic concerns, from psychopathology to general human development, from an isolated, self-contained treatment method to a sweeping intellectual discipline among other disciplines" (pg. 35)
 - "Sullivan and the interpersonalists (see chapter 3) stressed, like Hartmann, the shaping influence of the environment on personality, but <u>Sullivan had abandoned Freud's drive theory</u> and thus his contributions were not considered psychoanalytic within the Freudian mainstream. Hartmann, on the other hand, carefully and ingeniously developed his innovations as extensions and elaborations of Freud's basic vision" (pg. 35)
 - "prior to Hartmann, the ego's functions were still perceived as being embedded in psychic conflict" (pg. 35)
 - "Like Freud, Hartmann took his inspiration from Darwin's theory of the evolution of the species, but Hartmann drew on a different dimension of Darwin's account. Freud had derived from Darwin the notion, commonplace today but stunning to those living in the nineteenth century, that having evolved from other species, humans were not wholly different creatures from other animals. Much of Freud's vision of the instinctual source of human motivation, the primitive forces of infantile sexuality and aggression, could be traced to this Darwinian view. Hartmann put his emphasis on the notion that animals were designed, through the process of survival of the fittest, to be highly adapted to their surroundings, so that there would be a continual 'reciprocal relationship between the organism and its environment' (1939, p. 24). If humans, like all organisms, are intrinsically designed to fit into their environment, this must also be true of not just their physical but their psychological self, Hartmann reasoned. Conversely, the natural environment must be, by design, specifically suitable to humans' psychological existence. Consequently, Hartmann envisioned not a dreamily drifting baby who is suddenly forced to get to work, but a baby who arrives with built in ego potentials, waiting, like the seed awaits the spring rains, for the proper 'average expectable' environmental conditions to spark their growth" (pg. 36)
- o Development of Ego Psychology: Rene Spitz (pg. 38)
 - "Rene Spitz's heartbreaking publication Hospitalism (1940) played a seminal and dramatic role in deepening the interest in issue of environment. It left no doubt that whatever inborn psychological potential humans may have, its realization is doomed in the absence of emotional connectedness with another person" (pg. 38)
 - * *cf. J. Tracy & R. Robbins, The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/tracy2.pdf?t=1
 - *cf. J. Tangney & J. Tracy, Self-Conscious Emotions
 https://ubc-emotionlab.ca/wp-content/files_mf/tangneytracyselfandidhandbkchapter2012published.pdf
 - ♦ "all human emotions are, in a loose sense, 'self-relevant' (pg. 446)
 - "understanding the self-conscious emotions is critical to understanding the self" (pg. 467)
 - □ "Spitz studied children left, from birth, in a foundling home, whose physical needs were adequately met but who were deprived of any ongoing nurturing interaction. They invariably became depressed, withdrawn, and sickly" (pg. 38)
 - "Spitz's study of 'failure to thrive' infants dramatically suggested that the 'brick wall of reality' is deadly in the absence of a loving caregiver's touch" (pg. 38)
 - □ "Hartmann had offered that an average expectable environment is essential to the emergence of ego capacities such as object comprehension and perception..." (pg. 39)
 - The Libidinal Object (pg. 39)
 - "[Spitz] conducted what many would regard as the first analytic research on *object relations* between infants and their primary caregivers..." (pg. 39)
 - "Freud had introduced the term *object* to refer to the target of instinctual impulses, through which the instinctual tension is discharged. This object could be a person, but it could also be inanimate" (pg. 39)
 - "the mother becomes important [to the child] as she provides gratification, [Freud] believed; human love is built on both direct and disguised (aim-inhibited) gratifications, as the ego finds ways to repress, sublimate, and refine instinctual impulses so they find a place in more complect object relations" (pg. 39)
 - "Freud did not assume that libidinal connections with other are sought in their own right. Consider his approach to identification, the process through which the child makes someone or an aspect of someone a part of himself" (pg. 39)
 *which ought be how we define 'identity' (cf. D. Binseel, On The Theory of the Aggregate Image).
 - "as long as gratification is available via objects in the real world, identification is irrelevant. When gratification is interrupted, when the object is lost or becomes unavailable because of conflict, the object is internalized to permit fantasy gratification. Identification with an object, for Freud, is a second-best solution, a compensation reluctantly accepted when instinctual gratification is itself not possible" (pg. 40)
 - "Spitz preserved Freud's notion that libido itself is pleasure-seeking, but added new dimensions to pleasure-seeking that deepened and filled out Freud's vision of development of early relations to objects. Spitz added to the id's libidinal purposes a set of capacities that originate and develop in the ego, parallel to the libido's pursuit of pleasure, that allows for the unfolding of a sense of caring and a deeply gratifying personal connection. In Spitz's system, having a libidinal object is not a given, something easily obtained with even the most impersonal experience of gratification. Rather, having a libidinal object is a developmental achievement reflecting the complex psychological capacity to establish a selective, very personal attachment that is retained even in that person's absence. Spitz's libidinal object is not simply a means to an end, drive discharge, nor the consequence of defensive internalization, but fundamentally important in its own right. The libidinal object provides the essential human connectedness within which all psychological development occurs" (pg. 40)
 - Psychological Fusion (pg. 40)
 - □ "Hartmann had characterized the immature psyche as internally 'undifferentiated', to suggest that at birth, the ego, superego, even the basic drives of libido and aggression are not yet articulated and distinguishable from one another" (pg. 40)
 - "the mother...is the environment for the essentially helpless, vulnerable baby" (pg. 41)
 - *cf. D. Winnicott, The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, Chapter 12 True and False Self, pg. 145 for 'The Mother's Part' (i.e., the 'good-enough mother' and the 'not-good-enough' mother) https://psptraining.com/wp-content/uploads/Winnicott-D.W.-1965.-The-maturational-processes-and-the-facilitating-environment.pdf
 - □ "Spitz likens the newborn to a blind person whose sight is restored. Far from being overjoyed, the newborn, like the newly sighted, is initially overwhelmed by a maelstrom of meaningless stimuli that he cannot process. The mother mediates this encounter. Processing the experience, she functions as the baby's 'auxiliary ego', regulating the experience, soothing him, shielding him from disorganizing overstimulation, until he develops the ego capacity to process and regulate experience on his own" (pg. 41)

- "Spitz was particularly interested in how the infant acquires the capacities that the environment-mother intially provides" (pg. 41)
- □ "Spitz concluded that complex interactional patterns develop between infant and mother, a kind of 'dialogue', a 'sequential actionreaction-action cycle within the framework of the mother-child relations...that enables the baby to transform step by step meaningless stimuli into meaningful signals' (1965, pp. 42, 43). This dialogue takes place initially outside the verbal and gestural channels of adult communication that rely on the capacity for symbolic understanding. Through physical contact, body tension, posture, motion, rhythm, and tone, the mother communicates with her baby using a 'total sensing system'. The infant is receptive to expressive signals, rather than perceptive; that is, he soaks up the sense of the mother's message, which is strongly shaped by the affective climate she creates with him: Is it safe? Is it good? Is it food? Is it frightening? Through expression, tone, and touch she mediates every perception, every action, every piece of experience, in repetitive patterns, gradually building up recognizable systems of meaning out of the chaos of stimulation, laying the groundwork for what will be the infant's emerging perceptual capacity. Spitz brought to life Hartmann's principle of adaptation, detailing the psychic plasticity between mother and infant as they fit together, reciprocally influencing each other. Exquisitely sensitive to her infant's nonverbal messages, the 'good' mother empathically divines the needs of her baby with near clairvoyant accuracy, relying on her capacity to regressively revive in herself this early communication channel that, Spitz felt, is lost to most adults. She senses why her infant is crying, a mystery to others, and is able to respond correctly. Each accurate reading and satisfying intervention - picking him up, feeding him, jostling him, soothing him become another interaction in the essential cycle of meaning-making. Spitz saw these repetitions as also helping the infant sort out feeling state into discernable, sequential categories with beginnings and endings, contributing to the laying down of memory traces of recognizable experience" (pg. 41-42)
 - *D. Winnicott, in The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, remarks "the good-enough mother meets the omnipotence of the infant and to some extent makes sense of it. She does this repeatedly...the True Self does not become a living reality except as a result of the mother's repeated success in meeting the infant's spontaneous gesture or sensory hallucinations" (pg. 143)
- □ "the first indicator is the baby's first social response, the smiling response which occurs predictably at three months of age" (pg. 42)
 - "by eight months, the infant not only recognizes the mother's face, distinct from all others, but reacts with anxiety and retreats from a stranger's face" (pg. 42)
 - ♦ "the stranger's presence alerts him to his mother's absence" (pg. 42)
- "for Spitz, the child's 'no' is the external indication of a deeply enriching preoedipal identification with [the mother]..." (pg. 43)

 "Spitz demonstrated that virtually every aspect of early psychic development is mediated through the maternal environment. This
 - revised conceptualization shifted attention to issues concerning the infant's emergence from psychological embeddedness with the mother and establishment of a personal sense of separate identity" (pg. 43)
- o Developmental Ego Psychology: Margaret Mahler (pg. 43)
 - "the demands of the treatment process itself seemed to screen out those with more severe disorders. A patient in psychoanalysis must be able to lie on the couch, suspend ego functioning, detach herself from 'reality' concerns, and say whatever occurs to her, no matter how illogical it may sound. Once having thus 'regressed', the patient must be able to bounce back to normal functioning at the hour's end. The psychotic seems lost in her own world of fantasy and illogical thought from the start. Since the capacity for normal reality-testing is already compromised, encouraging selective regression in which reality-testing is abandoned altogether seemed therapeutically pointless, if not dangerous" (pg. 43)
 - "Mahler, extending Spitz's emphasis on the crucial role of early relationships, initiated a more constructive exploration of sever disturbances of childhood" (pg. 44)
 - "like Spitz, Mahler also emphasized the importance of the human environment. The infant needs 'an optimal level of pleasure' to secure 'safe anchorage' (p. 17) and psychic growth within the symbiotic orbit. The mother provides for her infant's immature ego the crucial 'mirroring frame of reference' (p. 19). If she is unpredictable, unstable, anxious, or hostile, the frame will be compromised and eventual independent functioning of the child is less likely" (pg. 45)
 - Separation-Individuation (pg. 46)
 - "Mahler subdivided the overarching process, which she defined as *separation-individuation*, into identifiable subphases, each with its own onset, normal outcome, and risks. *Hatching*, the first subphase, is signaled by the infant's increased alertness and 'prototypical biphasic visual pattern' (p. 16), the regular alteration in the gaze, now more outwardly directed, now checking back to the mother as a point of orientation. This phase culminates at about nine months, when active locomotive capacities and physical development usher in the *practicing* subphase. Now an increasingly capable toddler launches himself into the world, elated with his new abilities, infused with a sense of omnipotence: despite actual moving away from his mother, he experiences himself, psychically, as still at one with her, sharing in her perceived omnipotence. During *rapprochement*, which occurs between fifteen and twenty-four months, the child experiences a crucial psychic disequilibrium, Mahler theorized. Now psychological development catches up with physical maturation, bringing the distressing awareness that this very mobility demonstrates psychic separateness from the symbiotic union with the mother" (pg. 46-47)
 - "Such problems were categorized as preoedipal in nature, to distinguish them both in origin and in dynamic composition from maturationally later pathology. <u>Oedipal dynamics emphasize competitive sexual and aggressive conflict</u>, exploring primarily the role of the father as the little girl's longed-for oedipal object and the little boy's feared oedipal rival. <u>Preoedipal dynamics center on the role of the mother</u>, and consider developmental disruption in the formation of the psychological structures that would eventually play a part in these oedipal struggles. If defective, these structures can, in their own right, contribute to a host of earlier, often crippling disturbances" (pg. 47)
 - Preoedipal pathology manifests not so much in discrete symptoms or guilty, conflictual indecision as in more pervasive disturbances of psychological function: intense, unregulatable feeling states, extreme fluctuation in images of self and/or other, impaired capacity for steady relatedness disturbances that characterize pathology like masochism and severe depression" (pg. 47)
 - "The baby Freud had envisioned is a creature filled with untamed instinctual tensions, a prehuman beast, that is brought under control, only incompletely, by social regulation. The unconscious, Freud stressed, is timeless; these infantile instincts always remain in a state of tension beneath the social veneer of adults. The baby envisioned by the developmental ego psychologists emerges sequentially out of a symbiotic union with the mother. The psychological birth of this baby is not coincident with his physical emergence from the womb. The mother's care contains his fragile psyche in much the same manner as her body contained his fetal development. This vision of the symbiotic prehistory of human development that emerged in Freudian ego psychology has provided a new vantage point for understanding many features of human experience" (pg. 48)
- A Revised Theory of Instinctual Drive: Edith Jacobson (pg. 48)
 - "the rich account of the early years of life formulated by Hartmann, Spitz, and Mahler posed increasingly knotty problem for existing Freudian theory. In particular, the emphasis on the formative impact of the very early relations with caregivers was in direct conflict with

some of Freud's established tenets" (pg. 48)

- "Two of the particularly problematic classical concepts in this regard were Freud's closely related notions of the death instinct and primary erotogenic masochism, both introduced in 1919. Freud was stunned and deeply saddened by the scope of human destructiveness displayed in World War I; he had also struggled in the consulting room with certain masochistic patients who seemed impervious to help, seemingly relentless in their pursuit of pain and suffering. The apparent attraction of painful experience posed a challenge for the fundamentally hedonic framework of Freud's libido theory, according to which the mind operates on the pleasure principle (always reducing pain and seeking pleasure). We noted in chapter 1 that Freud's view of human instinctual endowment turned darker in 1919, when he concluded that aggression was a second instinctual drive equal in importance to libido. Libido, in Freuds account, begins as inwardly (narcissistically) directed, and is only secondarily directed toward objects. Freud used this pattern as a template for understanding the aggressive drive as well. Thus he suggested that aggression also begins as inwardly directed, derived from a death instinct. The baby begins life with both self-directed love and self-directed destructiveness. This revised Freudian infant, now infused with both sexual and aggressive energies, is often in a state of heightened tension, within which she may be indiscriminately aroused, stimulated by both libidinal and aggressive feelings, pleasure and pain" (pg. 48-49)
- "biology and experience, Jacobson proposed mutually influence each other and are in ongoing interaction throughout development" (pg. 49)
 - □ "Jacobson, in *The Self and the Object World*, effectively reworked the entirety of Freud's energy theory, his account of the psychosexual stages of development, and his conceptualization of id, ego, and superego" (pg. 49)
 - ◆ "In agreement with Hartman, Jacobson proposed that instinctual drives are not 'givens' but rather are biologically predetermined, innate potentials. While responsive to internal maturational factors, their distinctive features are acquired in the context of early relationships. Experience is, from the start, registered in terms of how it feels to the baby and is organized by what Spitz had termed 'affective perception'; memory traces cluster, like iron filings in a magnetic field, around the distinctive poles of feeling good or feeling bad. Normally, the baby's experience is predominantly satisfying; libido gradually emerges from a collection of good experiences into a strong, solid motivating force in the infant's life. Ideally, aggression is present in lesser levels. Early experience can, however, shift this balance. If it is largely frustrating and registers negatively, a more powerful and intense aggressive drive will consolidate that distorts the still vulnerable normal developmental processes. Because experience is subjectively processed, Jacobson stressed, there is no such thing as simply "good" mothering, in some objective sense, only mothering that feels good to this particular baby" (pg. 50)
 - "Jacobson's model thus offered a description of the interplay between actual experience and drive development. Further, she argued that the balance in the subjectively registered feeling tone of earliest experience not only contributes to the consolidation of libido and aggression as drives, but also lays the groundwork for ongoing tendencies in the ways we feel about ourselves and others. This aspect of experience was felt to be represented in features of psychic development termed self images and object images" (pg. 50)
 - ◇ "Jacobson proposed that when experiences feel good, images of a loving, giving mother and a happy, contented self accumulate in the infant's psyche; conversely, when experiences feel frustrating or upsetting, images of a frustrating, unloving mother and an angry, frustrated self accumulate. Since the newborn is at first unable to distinguish self from other, Jacobson believed that these earliest images are often fused and confused rather than distinct, self-contained units.
 Just as drives emerge from the registering of good and/or bad experience, so is one's deepest subjective sense of self and others an eventual outgrowth of the consolidation of these earliest images, providing a set of lenses through which subsequent experience is continually filtered" (pg. 50-51)
 - "at six months of age...he is now capable of picturing his mother as a discrete presence who is gratifying but also sometimes frustrating, and similarly, of experiencing himself as generally feeling good and loving but also capable of feeling bad and angry. This integration of good and bad images (i.e., the same mother who is bad and frustrating is also good and loving) must, Jacobson observed, facilitate the capacity to integrate conflictual feeling states" (pg. 51)
 - "as a consequence, the affective singularity of intense love altering with intense hate is replaced with more varied and subtle feeling states" (pg. 51)
 - "The attainment of affectively integrated images of self and of other allows a greatly increased capacity for more complex experience: an ability to register and to tolerate differences between one's emotional state and that of an important other; gradations in emotional response enhancing capacities to think and to learn that are jeopardized by unqualified acceptance or complete rejection; the ability to be disappointed by someone but still love her; and tolerance of anger without an internal collapse and a loss of a sense of one's being worthwhile or loving" (pg. 51)
 - "Jacobson's new model deftly rendered Freud's conceptualizations of primary erotogenic masochism and the death instinct logical impossibilities. If the newborn arrives with libido and aggression only as unformed, undirected potentials and without a distinct, articulated self, libidinal and aggressive drives cannot be initially self-directed. Into the conceptual vacancy created by removing key energic building blocks of Freud's drive metapsychology, Jacobson inserted new ego psychology formulations, detailing a fascinating interplay between richly elaborated processes of psychic development and the human environment within which they evolve." (pg. 51)
 - ♦ "This included an expanded vision of the development of the superego. <u>Jacobson described the superego as evolving over a long period of time</u>, during which the child's experience of the human environment is continually internalized, transforming the child's drive-derived impulses and wishes. According to Jacobson (elaborating Spitz), <u>early preoedipal experiences with the mother have two kinds of broad impact on the development affecting superego formation</u>.
 Experiences of gratification and frustration shape the formal consolidation of the drives themselves, and experiences of maternal constraints and prohibitions leave behind early images as precursors around the which the later (oedipal) superego is formed. The formation of the superego was thus rendered more broadly dependent on the complex interpenetration between passions and experiences with others" (pg. 51-52)
 - ▶ "Freud had, in his later writings, described the <u>libido as a synthetic force</u> that brings together, <u>aggression as a force that undoes connections</u>" (pg. 52) *sounds like 'harmonizer and 'disintegrator'.
 - "Jacobson applied these sensibilities to the recently articulated processes of separation and individuation which the ego psychologists had found to be so fundamental. in early development. <u>Libido</u>, in <u>Jacobson's account</u>, provides the psychic <u>glue</u> in developmental processes, <u>integrating</u>, for example, opposing images of good and bad objects and a good and bad self. <u>Aggression</u>, in developmental processes, <u>energizes</u> an <u>awareness of differences</u>, promoting separation and the establishment of differentiated images of self and other. For Jacobson, <u>libido</u> and <u>aggression function as indispensable counterbalances to each other</u>. Libido (evoked in moments of gratification) encourages pulling close, taking in; aggression (evoked in moments of frustration)

prompts pushing off, moving out. **Both libido and aggression figure cyclically in the evolution of a stable identity**, an achievement that ultimately depends on one's capacity to function autonomously, building up and continually enriching oneself by taking in from one's environment" (pg. 52)

- o Clinical Applications of Developmental Ego Psychology (pg. 53)
 - "Freud regarded the repression of conflictual impulses as the core of neurosis. The ego psychologists, as we have seen, came to pay increasing attention to disruptions in developmental processes that were felt to result in a broad range of problems in the structuralization of the psyche itself. Freud's focus was on *oedipal* conflict, organized in the more mature cognitive and linguistic schemata of later childhood. The ego psychologists investigated *preoedipal* disturbances, those that often take place prior to the emergence of language" (pg. 53)
- o Conclusion (pg. 58)
 - "the psychoanalytic process can be, and has been, conceptualized in many different ways. The metaphors that are chosen to illustrate principles of clinical technique often provide the best indication of the underlying assumptions of each analytic model. Freud's metaphors all have an adversarial quality: war, chess, hunting wild beasts. As the ego psychologists shifted the focus from the id to the ego, from the repressed to the central nexus of psychological processes, their models of the analytic process also began to change" (pg. 58)
 - □ "developmental ego psychologists further explored the role of parental functions in building [a] strong and healthy psychic structure..." (pg. 59)
- Chapter 3 Harry Stack Sullivan and Interpersonal Psychoanalysis (pg. 60)
 - "interpersonal psychoanalysis was born in the 1920s in the clinical encounter of the American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan with patients on the extreme end of the mental-health continuum: schizophrenics" (pg. 60)
 - □ "perhaps the most distinguishing feature of schizophrenia is the disconnection from ordinary channels of relationships with other people. Schizophrenics have disordered thought and live in their own world. They adopt postures that dramatically discourage any efforts by others to reach them" (pg. 61)
 - "To understand psychopathology, Sullivan became increasingly convinced, the individual is simply not the unit to study. Human beings are inseparable, always and inevitably, from their interpersonal field. The individual's personality takes shape in an environment composed of other people. The individual is in continual interaction with other people. The personality or self is not something that resides 'inside' the individual, but rather something that appears in interactions with others. 'Personality... is made manifest in interpersonal situations and not otherwise' (1938, p. 32), Sullivan suggested. Personality is "The relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (1940, p. xi)" (pg. 62)
 - "The principle that the field, not the individual, is the most meaningful unit of study sounds simple, but it has profound implications for thinking about personality, psychopathology, and psychoanalysis. From the interpersonal perspective, focusing on the individual without considering past and present relationships wrenches the object of study from the context that makes it understandable, like studying animal behavior by observing an animal in a cage rather than its natural habitat. Sullivan came to feel that human activity and human mind are not things that reside *in* the individual, but rather are generated in interactions among individuals; personalities are shaped to fit interpersonal niches and are not understandable unless that complex, interactive honing process is taken into account" (pg. 63)
 - "Whereas the Freudian analyst is looking for repressed wishes and fantasies, Sullivan is looking for unattended interactions" (pg. 63)
 - □ "in Sullivan's [clinical] approach, the analyst inquires into the interactions; the relevant data will not simply appear, because the patient (without awareness) leaves out what is most important" (pg. 63)
 - Anxiety and Motivation (pg. 65)
 - "Sullivan's study of interpersonal processes increasingly focused on anxiety as the crucial factor determining the way the individual shapes his experiences and his interaction with others" (pg. 65)
 - □ "Sullivan introduced a developmental theory in which anxiety is the key pathological factor in shaping the self and regulating interactions with others" (pg. 66)
 - "Sullivan portrayed the newborn as oscillating between a state of more or less complete comfort and a state of tension in which needs of various sorts are demanding attention. Most of the tensions that arise for the newborn are not problematic, as long as a reasonably responsive caregiver is present. The baby's needs are matched by complementary responses in the caregiver. The expression of physical needs for food, warmth, absence of irritation; emotional needs for safety and tenderness; intellectual needs for play and stimulation—all these tend to call out a satisfying reciprocal response in the caregiver, thereby reducing the tension. Sullivan called these needs integrating tendencies because their essential nature is to draw people together in mutually satisfying ways. The nursing interaction between baby and mother is the most vivid example of the complementarity of integrating tendencies. The baby is hungry and needs to feed. The breasts of the lactating mother are full of milk she needs to nurse. They are drawn together in a mutually gratifying integration. These needs for satisfaction generate reciprocity with others not just for the newborn but all throughout life, Sullivan believed; various needs in adults tend to evoke complementary needs in other adults. Given a reasonable amount of patience, flexibility, and tact, various emotional, physical, sexual, and intellectual needs can generate mutually satisfying integrations with others" (pg. 66)
 - "In contrast to Freud, Sullivan envisioned human needs as unproblematic in themselves. We are not born with asocial, bestial impulses needing to be tamed and socialized only through great threat and effort, Sullivan argued; rather, we have evolved into social creatures who are wired in a way that draws us into interactions with others" (pg. 67)
 - "Sullivan distinguished between fear and anxiety. If a loud noise occurs, if hunger is unaddressed, if tensions of any sort increase, the baby becomes afraid. Fear actually operates as an integrating tendency; as it is expressed in crying and agitation, it draws the caregiver into an interaction that will soothe the baby and address the problem. Anxiety, in contrast, has no focus and does not arise from increasing tension in the baby herself. Anxiety is picked up from other people" (pg. 67)
 - "In Sullivan's vision, anxiety becomes a nightmarish condition for the infant that has a profound impact on early experience. Not only is anxiety stressful, frightening, and inescapable in itself, it also operates as a disintegrating tendency with respect to all the infant's needs for satisfaction. When the infant is anxious, she is unable to feed, to cuddle, to sleep. Anxiety in adults likewise interferes with thinking, communicating, learning, sexual performance, emotional intimacy, and so on. Anxiety, for Sullivan, is the monkey wrench in a complexly evolved, otherwise harmonious system of interpersonal and social mutual regulation" (pg. 68)
 - "because anxiety is so strikingly different from other states, Sullivan believed, the first basic differentiation in the infant's experience is...between anxious states and nonanxious states" (pg. 68)
 - The Self-System (pg. 69)
 - "The final and crucial step in the child's assumption of some degree of control over his own experience comes with the realization that he can shape his own activities in a direction which will make it more likely that 'good mother' will appear and less likely that 'bad mother' will appear. A more active set of processes (the self-system) develops, allowing access to awareness largely to 'good me' and excluding 'not me' altogether. The self-system steers activities away from gestures and behaviors associated with rising anxiety in the child's caregivers (and therefore also in himself) and toward gestures and behaviors associated with decreasing anxiety in his caregivers (and therefore also in himself)" (pg. 69)

- □ "gradually and incrementally, but inevitably, the self-system shapes the child to fit into the niche supplied by the personalities of his significant others" (pg. 69)
 - *like water finding the lowest point, taking the path of least resistance?
- "Sullivan regarded the self-system as conservative but not fixed: as the child develops, the self-system steers experiences in the direction
 of the familiar, the known" (pg. 70)
- "Sullivan felt, the major developmental epochs of childhood and early adulthood are precipitated by the emergence of a powerful need for a new form of relatedness with others (a new need for satisfaction)" (pg. 70)
- "his formulations concerning the self all pertain to processes designed to keep anxiety at a minimum" (pg. 70)
 - "When anxiety is not a threat, the self-system fades into the back-ground; needs for satisfaction emerge and operate as integrating tendencies, drawing the individual into mutually satisfying interactions with others. When anxiety is looming, the self-system dominates: controlling access to awareness, producing interactions that have been successful in minimizing anxiety in the past, selectively shaping the individual's impressions both of herself and of others she is dealing with" (pg. 70)
- "the source of difficulties is not in the inherent nature of the impulses themselves, but in the response of the human environment" (pg. 71)
 - □ "Freud regarded the intensity of conflict largely as a property of the impetus behind the drives (the amount of libido or aggression one is born with)..." (pg. 71)
- Security Operations and the Point of Anxiety (pg. 71)
 - "Sullivan used the term suave to describe the processes of a well-functioning self-system. Each of us moves through life exquisitely sensitive to rising anxiety, developing complex, extremely rapid, covert security operations to steer us from points of anxiety back onto familiar footing. One of the central techniques of the interpersonal psychoanalyst is to increase awareness of the operations of the self-system by asking questions and encouraging self-reflection, so that crucial, rapid sequences can be observed, understood, and, through understanding, gradually altered.
 - □ *cf. G. Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, Chapter 4 Psychoanalytic Therapy & Chapter 6 Existential Therapy https://perpus.univpancasila.ac.id/repository/EBUPT190498.pdf
 - "these Freudian revisionists including Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan agreed that relational, social, and cultural factors were of great significance in shaping personality" (pg. 103)
 - "Sullivan viewed security operations as purchasing a short-term reduction in anxiety at the price of a long-term maintenance of the anxiety-causing situation" (pg. 74)
 - □ "the more the patient understands about the workings of the self-system in its effort to avoid anxiety, the more easily that patient can make different choice, Sullivan believed" (pg. 74)
- Sullivan's Approach to Obssessional (pg. 74)
 - "obsessional [are] people who tend to be extremely controlling of both themselves and others: stingy, competitive, fastidious, and mired in paralyzing detail" (pg. 74-75)
 - □ "obsessionals were portrayed [by Wilhelm Reich] as sadistic and power-hungry. Their controlling personality characteristics were understood as an expression of their wish to gain and maintain power over others..." (pg. 75)
 - "[Sullivan] regarded the obsessional's need for control...as a preemptive defense against anticipated humiliation and profound anxiety.
 Obsessional, Sullivan found, were raised in families of hypocrites" (pg. 75)
- o Contemporary Interpersonal Psychoanalysis (pg. 77)
 - "the person most responsible for shaping interpersonal psychoanalysis in its contemporary form was Clara Thompson" (pg. 77)
 - "Human beings develop different character types at various points in history, Fromm reasoned, because different types of societies require particular types of people to perform specific socioeconomic functions. We are profoundly social creatures who dread isolation above all else; there is thus a tremendous pressure for all people to shape themselves according to social need. The separation of experience into conscious and unconscious realms is determined, therefore, not by the inherent primitivity of instinctual drives, but by the social selection of desirable and undesirable traits from the broad range of human possibilities. In Fromm's view, the unconscious is a social creation, maintained because of the deep abhorrence each of us has of our own freedom and the social isolation we fear may result from a fuller expression of our authentic, personal experience" (pg. 78)
 - "what mattered [for contemporary interpersonal analysts] was not so much a reconsideration of the patient's early, formative relationships but the manner in which those relationships shaped an approach to living in the present. The crucial scene of the action was felt to be the patient's way of integrating relationships with others" (pg. 79)
 - "a preoccupation with the past was in many cases regarded as a distraction from dealing with real issues taking place in the present..."
 (pg. 79)
 - "the person one takes oneself to be, the self-system, is a construction, Sullivan suggested, whose purpose is to invent illusions to dispel anxiety" (pg. 84)
 - although we experience ourselves as *having* a self as a quasi-object inside us, we partially construct ourselves variably through memories and anticipations in the moment, developing on the interpersonal context we find ourselves in" (pg. 84)
- Chapter 4 Melanie Klein and Contemporary Kleinian Theory (pg. 85)
 - "Melanie Klein has had more impact on contemporary psychoanalysis than any other psychoanalytic writer since Freud" (pg. 85)
 - "Klein's intent, which she continually reaffirmed throughout her long and productive career, was to merely validate and extend Freud's hypotheses through direct observation and clinical work with children" (pg. 85)
 - "Klein took the position that children were analyzable, much in the way adults are, as long as their play is interpreted the way an adult analysand's free associations are interpreted. Anna Freud argued that small children are not analyzable because the weak and undeveloped ego cannot handle deep interpretations of instinctual conflict. She recommended a quasi-educational approach to children with emotional problems" (pg. 86)
 - "up until the 1980's, the dominant ideology within American psychoanalysis was Freudian ego psychology, which...was greatly shaped by the work of Anna Freud" (pg. 86)
 - "Sigmund Freud saw the central neurotic conflict as concerned with secrets and self-deceptions. The core of this conflict is formed in the culmination of infantile sexual life, the oedipal phase, during which the five- or -six-year-old struggles with intense and dangerous incestuous wishes, Freud believed" (pg. 87)
 - ◆ "Klein became interested in earlier processes. She found what she felt was evidence that Freud's hypotheses about the older child (five or six years old) could apply to the much younger child (two or three years) and even to the infant. In extending Freud's theories to earlier developmental phases, Klein argued that fantasies of both incestuous union (Oedipus complex) and terrifying self-punishments (superego) are present from a very young age, although in more 'primitive', frightening forms. Yet to read Klein as merely extending Freud backward in developmental time misses the dramatic difference between the mind as Freud saw it and the mind as Klein came to see it" (pg. 87)
 - □ "For Freud, the psyche is shaped through the oedipal conflict into stable and coherent structures, with hidden recesses and illicit designs. In an increasingly dramatic although unannounced fashion, <u>Klein substituted for Freud's vision a portrayal of mind as a</u>

continually shifting, kaleidoscopic stream of primitive, phantasmagoric images, fantasies, and terrors. For Klein, the psyche, not just of the small child but of the adult as well, remains always unstable, fluid, constantly fending off psychotic anxieties" (pg. 87)

- "for Freud, each of us struggles with bestial wishes, fears of retribution, and guilt. For Klein, each of struggles with the deep terrors of annihilation (paranoid anxiety) and utter abandonment (depressive anxiety)" (pg. 87-88)
- "Klein came to regard the adult mind in the same way she understood the child's as beset with dep, psychotic-like terrors, as unstable, dynamic, and fluid, and as always responsive to 'deep' analytic interpretations. The ego psychological tradition (which we traced in chapter 2) is based on a view of the adult mind as highly structured and stable, stratified by layers of ego capacities and defenses. According to the ego psychologists, for adults in analysis, deep interpretations of intrapsychic conflict can come only from layer-by-layer interpretive work, from the surface down. The Kleinians tend to view ego psychology as concerned with shallow dimensions of emotional life. The ego psychologists tend to view the Kleinians as wildly interpretive, overwhelming patients with concepts they cannot possible understand or use" (pg. 88)
- "it was Melanie Klein who provided the crucial bridge between Freud and modern British object relations theories" (pg. 113)
 The Paranoid-Schizoid Position (pg. 88)
 - "Freud's idea of instinctual impulse was a borderline concept between the psychical and the psychical. He portrayed the impulse as
 beginning in an accumulation of substance in somatic tissues, outside the mind, which then generates a psychical tensions in the mind..."
 (pg. 90-91)
 - * "Klein never departed from the language of Freud's instinct theory. All her contributions derive from and are framed in terms of Freud's postulation of libidinal and aggressive energies as the basic fuel of mind, and the gratification of and defense against libidinal and aggressive impulses as the underlying drama of mental life. Yet Klein's formulations markedly altered these conceptual building blocks. For Freud, the instinctual impulse was discrete and distinguishable both from the mind from which it demands gratification and from the object to which it becomes serendipitously associated. Klein gradually extended the concept of the impulse on both ends, both in terms of the source from which it arises and in terms of the aim toward which it is directed. Klein's instinctual impulse, although embedded in bodily experience, was much more complex and personal. She saw libidinal and aggressive impulses not as discrete tensions, but as entire ways of experiencing oneself, as 'good' (both loved and loving) or as 'bad' (both hated and destructive). Although libido and aggression are expressed in terms of body parts and substances, they are generated by and reflect more complex organizations of experience and senses of self, Klein believed. For Freud, the aim of the impulse was discharge; the object was the accidentally discovered means toward that end. Klein regarded objects as built into the experience of the impulse itself. To experience thirst, even prior to drinking, was to long for, in some vague and inchoate fashion, the object of that thirst. The object of desire was implicit in the experience of desire itself. The libidinal impulse to love and protect contained, embedded within it, an image of a lovable and loving object; the aggressive impulse to hate and destroy contained, embedded within it, an image of a hateful and hating object, Klein believed" (pg. 91)
 - □ "Freud's account of the workings of the structural model conjures up an image of a cohesive and integrated ego, now dealing with a specific libidinal impulse, now dealing with a specific aggressive impulse. Klein's account of early experience conjures up an image of a discontinuous ego, vacillating between a loving orientation toward loving and lovable other people and a hateful orientation toward hating and hateful other people" (pg. 91)
 - "although Klein retained Freud's terminology, her understanding of the basic stuff of mind had shifted, from impulses to relationships..."
 (pg. 92)
 - "Klein portrayed the infant's experience as composed of two sharply polarized states, dramatically contrasting in both conceptual organization pod emotional tone. The paradigmatic images of these states involve the infant at the breast. In one state, the infant feels bathed with love. A 'good breast', filled with a wondrous nutriment and transforming love, infuses him with life-sustaining milk and envelops him in loving protection. He in turn loves the 'good breast' and is deeply grateful for its protective ministrations. At other times, the infant feels persecuted and in pain. His belly is empty, and his hunger is attacking him from within. The 'bad breast', hateful and malevolent, has fed him bad milk, which is now poisoning him from within, then abandoned him. He hates the 'bad breast' and is filled with intensely destructive retaliatory fantasies" (pg. 92)
 - "It is important to keep in mind that this account, written in adult language, makes assumptions about the experiences of preverbal infants; it attempts to cross a boundary that we can never fully cross. Klein and her collaborators always assumed that what they were depicting in more or less clear verbal terms referred to experiences in the child that were likely to be neither clear nor verbal, but amorphous and phantasmagoric, at some distance from what adults are able to remember or experience themselves" (pg. 92)
 - "The divided world Klein depicted was seen as being formed long before any capacity for reality-testing of any sort. The infant believes that his fantasies, both loving and hateful, have powerful actual impact on the objects of those fantasies: his love for the 'good breast' a protective and restorative effect, his hatred for the "bad breast" an annihilating destructiveness. It is precisely because of the omnipotence with which the child experiences his impulses that this world is an extremely dangerous place and the stakes are always very high" (pg. 92)
 - *how one (child or otherwise) deals with omnipotence is usually a critical facet of any psychoanalytic theory.
 - ◆ *cf. (ed.) J. Arundale, The Omnipotent State of Mind: Psychoanalytic Perspectives
 - "Emotional equanimity in this earliest organization of experience depends on the child's ability to keep these two worlds separate. For the good breast to be a safe refuge, it must be clearly distinguishable from the malevolence of the bad breast. The child's rages against the bad breast, played out in powerful fantasies of destroying it, are experienced by the child as real, doing actual damage. It is crucial that the destructive rages be contained in the relationship to the bad object. Any confusion between the bad object are the good object could result in an annihilation of the latter, which would be catastrophic, because the demise of the good breast would leave the child without protection or refuge from the malevolence of the bad breast" (pg. 92)
 - * *this is the ground to the notion of 'splitting' cf. G. Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, Table 4.1: Ego-Defense Mechanisms (pg. 67-68) https://perpus.univpancasila.ac.id/repository/EBUPT190498.pdf
 - "Klein termed this first <u>organization of experience</u> the paranoid-schizoid position" (pg. 93)
 - "Paranoid refers to the central persecutory anxiety, the fear of invasive malevolence, coming from the outside" (pg. 93)
 - "Schizoid refers to the central defense: <u>splitting</u>, the vigilant separation of the loving and loved good breast from the hating and hated bad breast" (pg. 93)
 - "the bifurcated world of good and bad was not a developmental phase to be traversed. It was a fundamental form for patterning experience and a strategy for locating oneself, or, more accurately, different versions of oneself, in relation to various types of others" (pg. 93)
 - *i.e., a means for associating amidst difference that is, in light of the difference between the 'good' and 'bad breast. For instance, 'this' and 'that'; 'here' and 'there'; 'then' and 'now; etc. This can be seen as a way for discerning the difference which meets us, therein keeping such as 'different'.
 - □ "Klein derived the paranoid-schizoid position from the urgent necessity to defend against the persecutory anxieties generated by the death instinct. All other major psychoanalytic theorists besides Klein treated Freud's notion of a death instinct as a biological, quasi-

mythological speculation, but <u>Klein built it into the center of her theorizing</u>" (pg. 93)

- ◆ "The beleaguered primitive ego projects a portion of the self-directed impulses outside the boundaries of the self, thereby creating the 'bad breast'. It is somewhat less dangerous to feel that malevolence is located outside oneself, in an object from which one can escape, than inside one-self, from which there is no escape. Some of the remaining portion of the aggressive drive is redirected toward this malevolent external object. Thus a relationship to the original bad object has been created from the destructive force of the death instinct for the purpose of containing the threats posed by that instinct. There is a malevolent breast trying to destroy me, and I am trying to escape from and also destroy that bad breast." (pg. 93)
- ◆ "To live in a world filled only with malevolence would be intolerable, so the infant also quickly <u>projects loving impulses contained in primary narcissism</u> out into the external world, thereby creating the 'good breast'. Some of the remaining portion of the libidinal drive is redirected toward this loving external object. Thus a relationship to the original good object has been created from <u>the loving force of the libidinal instinct</u> to serve as a counterpart to and refuge from the threat of the bad object" (pg. 93-94)
- "there is a malevolent breast trying to destroy me, and I hate and try to destroy the bad breast. There is also a good breast that loves me and protects me and which I in turn love and protect" (pg. 94)
 - "good parenting can soothe persecutory anxieties, thereby diminishing paranoid fears of bad objects and strengthening the relationship to good object. The malevolence of the paranoid-schizoid position begins with constitutional aggression; a good environment can ameliorate its terrors" (pg. 94)
- o The Depressive Position (pg. 94)
 - "There is an inherent tendency toward integration in the patterning of experience, Klein felt, that encourages in the infant a sense of a whole object, neither all good nor all bad, but sometimes good and sometimes bad. The good breast and the bad breast begin to be understood not as separate and incompatible experiences, but as different features of the [same] mother as a more complex other, with a subjectivity of her own. Much is gained in the movement from the experience of others as split into good and bad to the experience of others as whole objects. Paranoid anxiety diminishes; one's pain and frustration are not caused by pure malevolence and evil, but by fallibility and inconsistency. As the threat of persecution abates, the necessity for the vigilance of splitting is reduced; the infant experiences herself as more durable, less in danger of being crushed or contaminated by external or internal forces. Yet the gains inherent in the movement out of the paranoid-schizoid position are accompanied by new and different terrors. The central problem in life, according to Klein, is the management and containment of aggression. In the paranoid-schizoid position, aggression is contained [through expression] in the hateful relationship with the bad breast, safely distanced from the loving relationship to the good breast. As the infant begins to draw together the experiences of goodness and badness into an ambivalent (both loving and hating) relationship to a whole object, the equanimity that the paranoid-schizoid position provides is shattered. The whole mother who disappoints or fails the infant, generating the pain of longing, frustration, desperation, is destroyed in the infant's hateful fantasies, not just the purely evil bad breast (with the good breast remaining untouched and protected). The whole object (both the external mother and the corresponding internal whole object) now destroyed in the infant's rageful fantasies is the singular provider of goodness as well as frustration. In destroying the frustrating whole object, the infant [in the same movement] eliminates her protector and refuge, depopulating her world and annihilating her own insides. Klein termed the intense terror and guilt generated by the damage done to the child's loved objects by her own destructiveness depressive anxiety and the organization of experience in which the child relates with both love and hate toward whole objects the depressive position" (pg. 94-95)
 - "In the paranoid-schizoid position, the problem of inherent human destructiveness is resolved through projection, resulting in an ominous sense of persecution, danger from others. In the more integrated, more developmentally advanced depressive position, the powerful force of inherent human destructiveness creates a dread of the impact of the child's own rage on those she loves. Klein portrayed the state of the infant following a fantasy of rageful destruction toward the frustrating mother as one of deep remorse. The frustrating whole object who has been destroyed is also the loved object toward whom the child feels deep gratitude and concern. Out of that love and concern, reparative fantasies (deriving from libidinal instincts) are generated, in a desperate effort to heal the damage, to make the mother whole once again" (pg. 95)
 - "The child's belief in her own capacity for reparation is crucial to the ability to sustain the depressive position. To be able to keep her objects whole, the child has to believe that her love is stronger than her hate, that she can undo the ravages of her destructiveness.

 Klein saw the constitutional balance between libidinal and aggressive drives as crucial. In the best of circumstances, the cycles of loving, frustration, hateful destruction, and reparation deepen the child's ability to remain related to whole objects, to feel that her reparative capacities can balance and compensate for her destructiveness" (pg. 95)
 - "Even in the best of circumstances, however, this is not a static and conclusive solution. In Klein's view, we are all subject, in unconscious (and sometimes conscious) fantasy, to intense rageful destructiveness toward others, whom we experience as the source of all frustration, disappointment, physical and psychic pain. That perpetual destructiveness toward loved others represents a continual source of depressive anxiety and guilt and an unending need to make reparation" (pg. 95-96)
 - "in the blurring of the distinctiveness of the other into a general category, one regains a sense of solace, necessarily temporary and illusory, for one's intense, helpless dependency and a sense of power over one's objects" (pg. 96)
 *this has political significance
 - "Klein portrays the state of relative mental health not as a developmental plateau to be reached and held but as a position continually lost and regained. Because love and hate are both perpetually generated in experience, depressive anxiety is a constant and central feature of human existence. At times of great loss, rejection, frustration, there are inevitable retreats into the security provided by the splitting of the paranoid-schizoid position and the manic defense" (pg. 96)
 - □ *this is quite existential
- o Sexuality (pg. 98)
 - "In Freud's framework, sexuality concerns pleasure, power, and fear. For the woman, sexual inter-course, on the deepest unconscious levels, is seen as providing possession of the father's penis in compensation for the narcissistic wound of her own sense of castration. She longs to become pregnant as a sign of possession of the father and of her missing penis, and of triumph over the rival, the mother. For the man, sexual intercourse, on the deepest unconscious levels, is seen as being experienced as the ultimate possession of the mother, a triumph over the father, proof that he has not been castrated for his sexual ambitions. To make a woman pregnant is a demonstration of his uncastrated, potent status" (pg. 98-99)
 - "In Klein's framework, sexuality is about love, destructiveness, and reparation. Men and women are seen as deeply concerned about the balance between their own ability to love and to hate, about their capacity to keep their objects alive, both their relationships to others as real objects and their internal objects, their inner sense of goodness and vitality. Klein viewed sexual intercourse as a highly dramatic arena in which both one's impact on the other and the quality of one's own essence are exposed and on the line. The ability to arouse and satisfy the other represents one's own reparative capacities; to give enjoyment and pleasure suggests that one's love is stronger than one's hate. The ability to be aroused and satisfied by the other suggests that one is alive, that one's internal objects are flourishing" (pg. 99)
 - *this gets us into asking ourselves 'what is involved in the act of partaking in porn?' what are the psychoanalytic underpinnings to one who 'uses' another physically for their own 'pleasure' and 'show'; even more, what can be said of someone, in terms of how they

understand themselves, who holds knowledge of the fact that they will be 'used' and 'displayed' as an object for purposes of other's 'pleasure' and 'fantasy'? (i.e., what are the mental currents, or the amalgamation of various emotional and rational features of one's intelligence in this particular activity? Meaning, when is one thing demanded over and, thus, at the expense of another? When must one emphasize only the appearance of another as they penetrate them physically versus suppress the logic of the act itself and the humanness of the other for whom they are using as simply an object?).

- o Envy (pg. 99)
 - "Klein's understanding of envy is best grasped by comparing envy to greed" (pg. 99)
 - "The infant at the breast, as is typical for Klein, provides the prototype. Infants, as Klein portrayed them, are intensely needy creatures. They feel abjectly dependent on the breast for nourishment, safety, and pleasure. The infant experiences the breast itself, Klein imagined, as extraordinarily plentiful and powerful. In more suspicious moments, the infant thinks of the breast as hoarding its wonderful substance, good milk, for itself, enjoying its power over the infant, rather than allowing the infant continual and total access to its resources. Oral greed is one response to the infant's helplessness at the breast. He is filled with impulses to totally appropriate the breast for his own needs, to use it up. The intent is not the destroy but to possess and control." (pg. 99-100)
 - "greed [soon] becomes ruthless in its acquisitiveness" (pg. 100)
 - "Envy is a different response to the same situation. The envious infant no longer wants to gain access to and possess the good, but now becomes intent on spoiling it. The infant cannot tolerate the very existence of something so powerful and important, able to make such an enormous difference in his experience, yet outside his control. The infant would rather destroy the good than remain helplessly dependent on it. The very existence of goodness arouses intolerable envy, the only escape from which is the fantasied destruction of the goodness itself. Envy is the most destructive of all primitive mental processes. All the other hatred and destructiveness that characterize life in the paranoid-schizoid position are contained in the relation to the bad breast; through splitting, the good breast is protected as a refuge and source of solace. The extraordinary and unique feature of envy is that it is a reaction not to frustration or pain, but to gratification and pleasure. Envy is an attack not on the bad breast, but on the good breast. Thus envy undoes splitting, crosses the divide separating good from bad, and contaminates the purest sources of love and refuge. Envy destroys hope" (pg. 100)
- o Projective Identification (pg. 101)
 - "Projection was a term used by Freud to designate the fantasied expulsion of unwanted impulses: that which could not be experienced as in the self was experienced as located in others, external to the self. Klein extended this concept in a characteristic fashion. In projective identification, Klein suggested, what is projected is not simply discrete impulses, but a part of the self not just aggressive impulses, for example, but a bad self, now located in another. Since that which is projected is a segment of the self, a connection to the expelled part is maintained, through an unconscious identification. The projected psychic content is not simply gone; the person struggles to keep some connection to and control over that content." (pg. 101)
- Wilfred Bion and Contemporary Kleinian Thought (pg. 102)
 - "Klein's ideas have had an enormous impact...forming the basis of various object relations theories like those of Fairbairn and Winnicott" (pg. 102)
 - "one can also think about projective identification in connection with the phenomena of intuition and affective contagion" (pg. 105)
 - □ "affects are contagious. One person's excitement and enthusiasm can arouse excitement in others" (pg. 105)
 - "When people are in tune with each other, affective resonance operates like tuning forks spontaneously reverberating at the same pitch. Affective attunement seems to be an intrinsic feature of human intimacy and, perhaps, is a highly adaptive survival mechanism in the relationship between parents and infants, whose affective states need to become known without language. Bion's account of projective identification in the relationship between infant and mother might be understood in this context" (pg. 105)
- o The Analytic Situation (pg. 106)
 - "the patient and analyst are much more fundamentally enmeshed than in Freud's view" (pg. 106)
 - "At times, the analyst is a good breast, magically transformative; interpretations are good milk, protective, nurturing, restorative. At times, the analyst is a bad breast, deadly and destructive; interpretations are poisonous, destroying from within if ingested. In this view, transference is not a resistance to or distraction from the baseline of the analyst's observational position; the patient inevitably and necessarily experiences the analyst and the analyst's interpretations with profoundly intense hopes and equally intense dreads, through her unconscious organizations of experience" (pg. 106)
 - "Racker, an Argentinian psychoanalyst (1910-1961) who wrote a series of brilliant papers on the psychoanalytic process, focused on extending Klein's concepts in a study of transference and countertransference, strikingly anticipating many features of the most recent innovations in psychoanalytic thought, whereby the analytic relationship is understood in increasingly dyadic terms (see chapter 9).
 Racker stressed the importance and utility of the analyst's identifications with the patient's projections, the versions of self and object that the patient experiences as inside the analyst. Racker (1968) portrayed the analyst (like everyone else) as struggling with dynamics similar to those of the patient: persecutory and depressive anxieties and a need to make reparation. He argued against what he called 'the myth of the analytic situation', the assumption that 'analysis is an interaction between a sick person and a healthy one'.
 Racker stressed the analyst's embeddedness and participation in the analytic process..." (pg. 107)
 - "it is precisely because the analyst has anxieties and conflict similar to the patient's that the analyst is able to identify
 with the patient's projections onto her and then use those identifications to understand the patient" (pg. 107)
 - *cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity: Go(o)d without Good https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_5516fdbb15b14b74855f044d0a6d8dc8.pdf
 - Inhumans are a commonality in-themselves, and it is for this common-ness which serves as the foundation for objectivity (i.e., semblance of harmony between...) with respect to how each relates to each other 'through' their activities. Commonality serves as the establishment for objectivity in that it's what's common-between things, pointing to a lack in subjectivity. It is this commonality which is, in a sense, isolated from, outside of or beyond, not being wholly dependent upon, the subject itself this non-dependability is the criterion for objectivity" (pg. 3-4)
- Chapter 5 The British Object Relations School: W. R. D. Fairbairn & D. W. Winnicott (pg. 112)
 - "Human beings, in Freud's account, are born at odds with their environment. They are wired the way Freud and his contemporaries understood animals to be, oriented toward pursuing simple pleasures with ruthless abandon. But in Freud's Hobbesian view of human society, the individual's pursuit of egoistic satisfactions endangers other individuals, necessitating a control by the group on the hedonic aims of each individual. The project of childhood is socialization, the transformation of the infant, with his or her bestial impulses, into the adult, with his or her complex psychic apparatus and its intricate and elaborate system of checks and barriers channeling those impulses and aims into socially acceptable forms of civilized living" (pg. 112)
 - "all the important contemporary psychoanalytic schools view the human infant as less alien, more suited and adapted to the world into which he or she is born" (pg. 113)
 - "In redefining the nature of 'drive' to include built-in human objects, Klein fundamentally altered the basic premises and metaphors

underlying psychoanalytic theorizing. Freud envisioned a developmental passage from animal to person. <u>Klein portrayed a distinctly human infant from the start</u>, an infant who does not learn about the breast through 'accidental' association, but who instinctively knows about the breast because she is born with that knowledge" (pg. 113)

- "Yet Klein's baby is not a very happy baby. This baby is born with the capacity to organize discomfort and pain into an image of a persecutory, 'bad' Other, and to organize comfort and pleasure and pain into an image of a rescuing, 'good' Other. Because early experiences collect around pre-wired objects, constitutional patterns of danger and refuge, that infancy is inevitably fragmented and terrifying. For Klein, the project of childhood is not socialization, but amelioration of the frightening, nightmarish conditions of the infant's experience of being in the world which derive from the intensity of the infant's needs and the overwhelming force of constitutional aggression. We are born with psychotic anxieties and, under favorable conditions, sanity becomes a developmental achievement. Although pre-wired to draw her into the human environment, the infant's instincts, in Klein's account, generate inevitable and considerable psychic pain, which, under favorable circumstances, can be contained, organized and assuaged by good parenting" (pg. 113)
- "an 'independent' or middle group...developed non-Kleinian versions of what came to be known as object relations theories. The major figures in this middle group [e.g., between the adherents of Freud and Klein], W. R. D. Fairbairn, D. W. Winnicott, Michael Balint, John Bowlby, and Harry Guntrip, all built on Klein's vision of an infant wired for human interaction. Yet they also all broke with Klein's premise of constitutional aggression deriving from the death instinct..." (pg. 113-114)

o W. R. D. Fairbairn (pg. 114)

- "Freud's clinical observations charted the vicissitudes of human misery, the ways people systematically make themselves unhappy over and over again: the symptom neurosis, in which compulsive, bizarre behavior intrudes into experience; the character neurosis, in which maladaptive, self-defeating patterns of behavior compromise interactions with others; the fate neurosis, in which the same self-destructive destiny is orchestrated repeatedly; depression, in which emotional pain is perpetually regenerated. Yet Freud's broad motivational theory, anchored in his concepts of instinctual drive and the pleasure principle, is a hedonic theory: People seek pleasure and avoid pain" (pg. 114)
 - "According to the pleasure principle, libido is malleable, employing a variety of interchangeable objects in its pursuit of pleasure; it ought to be able to discard painful desires and frustrating objects. Yet, Freud noted in 1905, the libido also has a property he termed adhesiveness, which seems to operate at odds with the pleasure principle. Libido gets painfully stuck to old, inaccessible objects, frustrated longings, thwarted desires. The Oedipus complex, the heart of Freud's clinical theory, is the prime example of this" (pg. 114)
- The Object-Seeking Libido (pg. 115)
 - "Fairbairn questioned Freud's premise that the fundamental motivation in life is pleasure and proposed a different starting point: **Libido is not pleasure-seeking, but object-seeking.** The fundamental motivational push in human experience is not gratification and tension reduction, using others as a means toward that end, but <u>connections with others as an end in itself</u>" (pg. 115)
 - "Freud's infant operates as an individual organism; others become important only through their function in satisfying the baby's needs [which is quite sadistic as grounds for a theory]. Fairbairn, in contrast, envisioned an infant wired for interaction with a human environment. The premise that libido is object-seeking provides, Fairbairn felt, a much more economical and persuasive framework for explaining Freud's observations of the ubiquity of the repetition compulsion. The libido is adhesive because adhesiveness, rather than plasticity, is its very nature. The child bonds to the parents through whatever forms of contact the parents provide, and those forms become lifelong patterns of attachment and connection to others" (pg. 115)
 - * "pleasure is one form, perhaps the most wonderful form, of connection with others. If the parents engage in pleasurable exchanges with the child, the child becomes pleasure-seeking, not as an end in itself, but as a learned form of connection and interaction with others" (pg. 115)
- The World of Internal Object Relations (pg. 116)
 - □ "for Klein, internal objects were fantasied presences that were an accompaniment to all experience" (pg. 116)
 - "internal objects for Klein were a natural and inevitable feature of mental life; internalized object relations were the primary forms of thought and experience" (pg. 116-117)
 - □ "for Fairbairn, internal objects are not (as for Klein) essential and inevitable accompaniments of all experience, but rather compensatory substitutes for the real thing, actual people in the interpersonal world" (pg. 117)
- Repression (pg. 118)
 - "as Freud shifted from the theory of infantile seduction to the theory of infantile sexuality, he began to conceive of the center of the repressed as forbidden impulses, too dangerous to be allowed access to consciousness. Memories may very well be repressed as well, but they were now understood to be repressed not because of their traumatic nature in itself, but because they are associated with conflictual, forbidden impulses. Fairbairm saw the center of the repressed as neither memories nor impulses but relationships, ties to features of the parents that cannot be integrated into other relational configurations. Memories and impulses may also be repressed, but not primarily because they are traumatic or forbidden in their own right; rather, they are representative of, and threaten to expose, dangerous object ties. For Freud, the repressed was composed of impulses, but the repressor was composed essentially of an internal relationship, the alliance between the ego and the superego. The ego, concerned with reality and safety, and the superego, concerned with morality and punishment, combined to block forbidden impulses from access to consciousness. For Fairbairn, both the repressed and the repressor were internal relationships. The repressed was part of the self tied to inaccessible, often dangerous features of the parents; the repressor was a part of the self tied to more accessible, less dangerous features of the parents" (pg. 118)
- The Splitting Ego (pg. 119)
 - □ "because all of us have had less than ideal parenting, Fairbairn presumes a universal splitting of the ego" (pg. 119-120)
 - "This internalization of the parents also necessarily creates a split in the ego: part of the self remains directed toward the real parents in the external world, seeking actual responses from them; part of the self is redirected toward the illusory parents as internal objects to which it is bound. Once the experiences with the parents have been split and internalized, a further split takes place, Fairbairn felt, between the alluring, promising features of the parents (the exciting object) and the frustrating, disappointing features (the rejecting object)" (pg. 120)
 - □ "Although most of us experience ourselves as a single, continuous self, Fairbain envisioned people as actually structured into multiple, subtly discontinuous self-organizations, different versions of ourselves with particular characteristics and points of view" (pg. 121)
 - "Each of us shapes his relationships according to the patterns internalized from his earliest significant relationships [i.e., we act against what we see to be 'there']. The modes of connection with new objects [i.e., we bring forward our acting against what was 'there' in our acting against what is now 'here', where what is 'here' amounts to what we believe is 'there']. Another way to describe the repetitiveness of patterns in human relations is to say that each of us projects his internal object relationships onto new interpersonal situations. New love objects are chosen for their similarity to bad (unsatisfying) objects in the past; new partners are interacted with in a way that provokes old, expected behaviors; new experiences are interpreted as if they fulfilled old expectations. It is because of this cyclical projection of old

patterns and the reinternalization of self-fulfilling prophecies that character and disturbances in interpersonal relations are so difficult to change" (pg. 121-122)

- Fairbairns Analytic Situation (pg. 122)
 - "In Fairbair's understanding of the analytic situation, the patient, although searching hopefully for something new, inevitably experiences the analyst (in the transference) as an old, bad object. The basic assumptions and prototypes of human connection established in the past and preserved in internal object relations shape the experience with the analyst. If the analyst isn't experienced through old patterns, the analyst isn't important, and the analysis isn't deeply engaged" (pg. 122)
 - "for Freud, it was insight that set the analysand free. She comes to understand that the pleasure she unconsciously pursues in her infantile strivings is not possible. The reality principle gains dominance over the pleasure principle, and the doomed longings of early childhood are renounced" (pg. 122)
 - □ "For Fairbairn, it is not unconscious pleasure-seeking that imprisons the analysand in neurosis; the neurosis embodies the only forms of relation with others the analysand believes in. She feels connected to others, both in the real world and to the presences in her inner world, only through painful states of mind and self-defeating patterns of behavior. She is convinced that renouncing these painful states and old patterns would lead to total isolation, abandonment, annihilation. Insight is not enough. Insight alone doesn't allow the analysand to realize the impossibility of her neurotic strivings; she can't imagine being herself without them. According to Fairbairn, no one can give up powerful, addictive ties to old objects unless she believes that new objects are possible, that there is another way to relate to others in which she will feel seen and touched. For the analysand to renounce the old, transferential forms of connection to the analyst, she must begin to believe in new, less constrained patterns of relatedness" (pg. 122)
 - "Fairbairn located analytic change not in the drawing of insight, but in a changed capacity for relatedness, an ability to connect with the analyst in new way" (pg. 122-123)
- O D. W. Winnicott (pg. 124)
 - False Self Disorder (pg. 124)
 - "Winnicott was concerned with the quality of subjective experience: the sense of inner reality, the infusion of life with a feeling of personal meaning, the image of oneself as a distinct and creative center of one's own experience" (pg. 124)
 - "false self disorder was the term Winnicott began to use to characterize this form of psychopathology in which subjectivity itself, the quality of personhood, is somehow disordered" (pg. 124)
 - "Winnicott argued that fundamental disorders in selfhood originate prior to the oedipal phase (to which Freud had traced neurosis), even prior to later infancy (to which Melanie Klein had traced depressive disorders). Winnicot's most profound and most productive insight was the connection he began to draw between false self disorders in adult patients and the subtle variations he observed in mother-infant interactions from the very beginning of life. What seemed most telling was not gross abusiveness or severe deprivation, but something in the quality of the mother's responsiveness to the baby, her 'management' of the baby's needs. It was not just feeding that was crucial, but love, not need gratification, but the mother's responsiveness to the 'personal' features of the infant's experience. The bridge Winnicott constructed between the quality and nuances of adult subjectivity and the subtleties of mother-infant interactions provided a powerful new perspective for viewing both the development of the self and the analytic process" (pg. 124-125)
 - ◇ "Winnicott portrayed the newborn as drifting in a stream of unintegrated (not disintegrated) moments; discrete wishes and needs emerge spontaneously and, as they are met, melt back into the drift, which he termed 'going-on-being'. Winnicott's choice of unintegration to characterize the child's earliest state of mind is very important, suggesting, in contrast to Klein, an experience that is comfortably disconnected without being fragmented, diffuse without being terrifying. Winnicott saw the quality of the infant's experience of the earliest months of life as crucial for the emergence of personhood. It was the environment that the mother provided (not the child's conflictual instinctual pressures) that determined the outcome. False self disorders, in Winnicott's perspective, were 'environmental deficiency diseases'" (pg. 125)
 - "in providing the environment for the infant, the mother finds her own subjectivity, her own personal interests, her own rhythms and concerns fading into the background; she adapts her movements, her activities, her very existence to the baby's wishes and needs" (pg. 125)
 - "as the infant's needs and wishes emerge from the unintegrated drift of consciousness, the good-enough mother intuits the child's desire relatively quickly and shapes the world around the child so as to fulfill that desire" (pg. 126)
 - "the physical responsiveness of the nursing mother's body (the 'letting down' of breast milk) is the prototype for a more general responsiveness to the baby's 'spontaneous gestures', the mother's own deeply felt need to offer herself as a vehicle for the baby's wants and expressions" (pg. 126)
 - ♦ "The baby's experience in this extraordinary time is one in which he is the all-powerful center of all being subjective omnipotence is the term Winnicott used. His wish makes things happen. If he is hungry and desires the breast, it appears; he makes it appear; he creates the breast. If he is cold and starting to feel uncomfortable, it becomes warmer. He controls the temperature of the world around him; he creates his surroundings. The mother 'brings the world' to the infant without delay, without skipping a beat, and, Winnicott suggested, her responsiveness is what gives the infant that moment of illusion, the belief that his own wish creates the object of his desire. It is crucial that the mother be there when needed, but it is equally crucial that she recede when she is not needed. She creates what Winnicott termed a holding environment, a physical and psychical space within which the infant is protected without knowing he is protected, so that very obliviousness can set the stage for the next spontaneously arising experience" (pg. 126)
 - "[the] slow, incremental failure of the mother to 'bring the world' to the baby has a powerful, somewhat painful, but constructive impact on his experience. He slowly begins to realize, in the gradually widening gap between desire and satisfaction, that contrary to his plausible and compelling earlier beliefs, his desires are not omnipotent. It was not his wants and gestures that themselves created their own satisfaction, but his mother's responsive facilitation" (pg. 126-127)
 - "This slowly dawning realization has enormous implications, among which is that the infant who, to the outside observer, has of course been quite helpless and dependent all along, begins to feel dependent for the first time. There is a gradual awareness that the world consists not of one subjectivity, but of many; that satisfaction of one's desires requires not merely their expression but negotiations with other persons, who have their own desires and agendas" (pg. 127)
 - Transitional Experience (pg. 127)
 - "To the child's experience of subjective omnipotence is eventually added an experience of *objective reality*. The latter does not replace the former, but rather exists alongside or in dialectical relation to it. Winnicott did not regard development as a linear sequence in which each stage replaces the preceding one, and this is crucial in his innovative vision of mental health. The person who lives completely in objective reality is a false self without a subjective center, completely oriented toward the expectations of others,

toward external stimuli. Being a distinctly human person with a continually regenerating sense of self and personal meaning requires the preservation of the experience of subjective omnipotence as a deeply private, never fully revealed core of experience" (pg.127)

- *existentialists would categorize such living as 'inauthentic', wrapped up in the 'They' (cf. M. Heidegger, Being and Time)
- "The temporary experience of subjective omnipotence provided for the infant by the mother's holding and facilitating remains as a precious legacy and resource. This crucial early experience enables the growing child to continue to experience his own spontaneously emerging desires and gestures as real, as important, as deeply meaningful, even though they must be integrated in adaptive negotiation with other persons" (pg. 127)
- "Between the two forms of experience that Winnicott called subjective omnipotence and objective reality lies a third form: transitional experience. In subjective omnipotence, the child feels she has *created* the desired object, such as the breast, and believes she has total control over it. In experience organized according to objective reality, the child feels she has to *find* the desired object out in the world; she is acutely aware of the separateness and distinctness of the object and her lack of control over it. The 'transitional object' is experienced as neither subjectively created and controlled nor as discovered and separate, but as somewhere in between. The status of the transitional object is, by definition, ambiguous and paradoxical. What is crucial in good-enough parenting with respect to transitional experience is that the parent does not challenge its ambiguity. The specialness of the teddy bear is accepted" (pg. 127)
 - * "But Winnicott had something else in mind: not the transition from dependence to independence, but the transition between two different modes of organizing experience, two different patterns of positioning the self in relation to others. What makes the teddy bear so important is not just that it stands for the mother, but that it constitutes a special extension of the child's self, halfway between the mother that the child creates in subjective omnipotence and the mother that the child finds operating on her own behalf in the objective world. The transitional object, with its paradoxical ambiguity, cushions the fall from a world where the child's desires omnipotently actualize their objects to one where desires require accommodation to and collaboration of others to be fulfilled" (pg. 128)
- "Transitional experience became the protected realm within which the creative self could operate and play; it was the area of experience from which art and culture were generated. A person who lived essentially in subjective omnipotence, with no bridge to objective reality, was autistic and self-absorbed. A person who lived essentially in objective reality, with no roots in subjective omnipotence, was superficially adjusted, but lacking in passion and originality. It was precisely the ambiguity of the transitional realm that rooted experience in deep and spontaneous sources within the self and, at the same time, connected self-expression with a world of other subjectivities" (pg. 128)
 - "Object usage is another concept Winnicott introduced in his later papers, in exploring the place of aggression in the transition between subjective omnipotence and objective reality. In subjective omnipotence, the child uses the object "ruthlessly." He creates it, exploits it thoroughly for his own pleasure, and destroys it in his total appropriation of it. From a perspective outside the child's subjectivity, this experience requires a mother who surrenders herself to and can survive being used this way. Gradually, the child begins to become aware of the other who survives his destruction of her. It is the cyclical process of omnipotent creation, destruction, and survival that begins to establish for the child some sense of externality, a real other who exists in her own right, outside his omnipotent control" (pg. 128-129)
 - ♦ "Adult love, in Winnicott's vision, entails periodic mutual object usage, in which each partner can surrender to the rhythms and intensity of his or her own desire without having to worry about the survivability of the other. It is a firm and solid sense of the durability of the other that makes a full and intense connection with one's own passions possible" (pg. 129)
- The Psychopathology of Not-Good-Enough Mothering (pg. 129)
 - "When the mother is unable to provide the kind of good-enough environment necessary for the consolidation of a healthy sense of self, Winnicott felt, the child's psychological development essentially ceases. He remains stuck in psychological time, with the rest of his personality growing past and around a missing core. The kernel of genuine personhood is suspended, buffered by an adaptive compliance with the deficient environment, until a holding environment can be found that allows the emergence of a more spontaneous, authentic subjective experience" (pg. 129)
 - "Rather than providing a protected psychic space within which the self can playfully expand and consolidate, the not-good-enough mother presents the child with a world he has to immediately come to terms with, to adapt to, and the premature concern with the external world cramps and impedes the development and consolidation of the child's own subjectivity" (pg. 129)
 - □ "In Winnicott's view, it is chronic maternal failure that causes this kind of radical split within the self between the genuine wellsprings of desire and meaning (the true self) and a compliant self (the false self), which is fashioned out of the premature, forced necessity for dealing with the external world" (pg. 131)
 - ◆ "In Winnicott's view, the baby faced with an inadequate holding environment has no choice but to disconnect her mind (the baby's head) from its sources in the body and more spontaneous experience, and to mold her experience around what is provided from the external world. The baby is no longer really a baby, in the sense of the beginnings of authentic personal subjectivity. The child shapes a false self that both deals with an external world that must be watched and negotiated and also shelters the seeds of more deeply genuine experience until a more suitable environment is found" (pg. 133)
- Winnicott's Analytic Situation (pg. 133)
 - "The psychoanalytic situation, as Winnicott understood it, is perfectly designed for exploring and regenerating personal subjectivity. The analyst, like the good-enough mother, provides an environment in which her own subjectivity is on hold. The analyst, like the good-enough mother, tries to grasp the deeply personal dimensions of the patient's experience, the patient's spontaneously arising desires. The patient is offered refuge from the demands of the outside world; nothing is expected except to 'be' in the analytic situation, to connect with and express what one is experiencing. No continuity or order is demanded; unintegration and discontinuity are expected and accepted. The analyst and the analytic situation provide a holding environment in which aborted self-development can be reanimated, safe enough for the true self to begin to emerge" (pg. 133)
- Chapter 6 Psychologies of Identity and Self: Erik Erikson and Heinz Kohut (pg. 139)
 - "how does a human become a *human* being?" (pg. 139)
 - "Freud was born into a world where the ways of thinking about these kinds of questions were in transition. Generations prior to Freud's time viewed humans as the maverick children of the divine, designed in God's image in a unique and special fashion. But the scientific speculation of Freud's era no longer allowed humans this unquestioned privilege. Darwin's influence cast a long, gray shadow over what had been a black-and-white divide between humans and other creatures; Freud was fascinated not with humankind's godlike visage but with the beast in men and women. The rich illumination Freud brought to our contemporary understanding of human experience often entailed pointing out the call of the wild, primitive impulses and fantasies beneath the thin veneer of civilized conduct and demeanor. For Freud, the process of socialization involved the taming of the beast. He saw infantile experience as dominated by raw sexual and aggressive impulses, culminating in the oedipal crisis. As that crisis was resolved under the threat of castration, it was essential that the sexual and aggressive energies be rerouted into less dangerous pathways, and it was this energy, now expressed in socially acceptable and sublimated forms, that was employed in the service of enculturation. For Freud, the distinctly human form of being was generated in the very process through which the primitive, bestial sexual and aggressive impulses

were brought under control" (pg. 140)

- "The domain of the ego includes all those processes that were taken for granted in Freud's earlier focus on the channeling and rerouting of infantile sexual and aggressive energies. Anna Freud's study of the complexities of defenses, Hartmann's introduction of the importance of adaptation and autonomous ego functions, and the explorations of the developmentalists into early relations with caregivers all established the ego, its development, and developmental processes in general as crucial areas of psychoanalytic concern, both in theory and in clinical practice" (pg. 140)
 - "'Id' and 'ego' are neither places nor things; they are words that embody an approach to organizing and thinking about the enormous complexities of human experience. The shift from id psychology to ego psychology signaled a shift in the way the fundamental project of psychoanalysis was conceived. In broad strokes, id psychology was the exploration of the implications of the Darwinian revolution for the study of the human psyche; ego psychology became an avenue for the study of the ways individuals develop a distinct and secure sense of themselves. But ego psychology itself never abandoned drive theory. The energy that fuels the ego's functions was still thought to be libido and aggression" (pg. 140-141)
- "Erik Erikson's elaboration of the concept of identity and Heinz Kohut's development of self psychology have been two of the most important and influential offshoots of ego psychology. Both Erikson and Kohut were steeped in Freudian ego psychology and drew heavily on its concepts. Yet each, in his own way, created a psychoanalytic vision that broke with ego psychology in fundamental respects. Whereas ego psychologists traced the development of the individual within the framework of instinctual conflict, both Erikson and Kohut established fresh frameworks, fully centered on the emergence of a deep and complex personal subjectivity within an interpersonal and cultural context." (pg. 141)
 - "Erickson placed the individual in his historical time and cultural context. Kohut explored the phenomenology of selfhood. Taken together, they (along with Winnicott) opened up the problem of personal subjectivity and meaning for contemporary psychoanalytic exploration" (pg. 141)
- Erick Erikson (pg. 142)
 - □ "Erikson arrived on the psychoanalytic scene at the brink of a dramatic expansion of analytic concerns: from the inner world of the drives to the relations of the individual with the environment; from psychopathology to normality; from the adult patient to child development" (pg. 142-143)
 - The Psyche and Culture (pg. 143)
 - □ "The title of Erikson's classic work, Childhood and Society, succinctly summarizes his fundamental concern" (pg. 143)
 - "Freud had created a complex account of child development, centered on the sequential, maturational unfolding of body-based, instinctual drives. Freud's understanding was fundamentally psychobiological: the psyche is an extension and derivative of the body; the mind develops to channel and control instinctual energies that emerge as peremptory physical tensions demanding action and discharge. The social world, in Freud's scheme, is where the drives come up against a reality that necessitates their control, repression, or largely disguised gratification. From a traditional psychoanalytic viewpoint, society is simply an extension of the ego in its campaign to regulate the drives: cultural leaders are quasi-parents; social forces are camouflaged defenses; group processes are psychodynamics writ large" (pg. 143)
 - "Erikson found this to be a lopsided approach to the world as he understood it, a world where culture and cultural differences mold the development of the individual. The central theme throughout his theorizing is the interpenetrability of individual and culture: the individual psyche is generated and shaped within the requirements, values, and sensibilities of a particular cultural context; cultural and historical change are effected by individuals struggling to find meaning and continuity in their lives" (pg. 143)
 - "in his study of various Native American cultures, Erickson found that geography and economic, mediated through child-rearing practice, shape personality to create the sort of individuals the culture requires" (pg. 143)
 - "Freud viewed childhood as a time when psychobiological drives unfolded, expressed themselves, and then were brought under social control; <u>Erikson viewed childhood as</u>, additionally, a way that culture preserves itself, by giving meaning to infantile anxieties and bodily experiences. Traditional psychoanalytic understanding established instinctual drives as the stuff of mind, to be shaped and honed by external, social forces. <u>Erikson regarded culture and history as giving life to mind, as the medium within which shapeless biological potentials can be transformed into a distinctly human life" (pg. 144)</u>
 - "Erikson was not merely suggesting a change in emphasis. He was relocating the basic constituents of mind and thereby introducing a fundamentally different psychoanalytic framework..." (pg. 144)
 - "The metaphor of depth was always a central feature of Freud's vision: Beneath the surface of mind operate hidden psychodynamic forces; beneath the present lie the residues of the past, of both the individual and the species; beneath the manifest level of social interaction, instinctual forces push for expression. The former element in each of these pairs can be understood only reductively in terms of the latter. For Freud, this was what made psychoanalysis a 'depth' psychology" (pg. 144)

 ◆ "Erikson, although continually drawing on traditional psychodynamic understanding, was struggling to make these relationships
 - "Erikson, although continually drawing on traditional psychodynamic understanding, was struggling to make these relationships dialectical rather than reductive. Culture and the individual, present and past, the social and the biological interpenetrate and create each other" (pg. 145)
 - "for Erikson...cultural process constituted an independent, causative dimension that generate meanings of their own" (pg. 145)
 - Epigenesis and Development (pg. 146)
 - □ "at the center of Erikson's contribution is his theory of ego development which envisions the ego, like the drives, as unfolding across a sequence of stages or crises:
 - "he envisions the infant as struggling in her orientation to the world, as attempting to master a problem at the core of her sense
 of self in relation to others, as striving for a way to position herself in her world that will allow for future ego growth" (pg. 146)
 - "Klein's concept of the paranoid-schizoid position organized around the polarity between the good breast and the bad breast addresses the same struggle as Erikson's first stage of ego development does. For Klein, good and bad derive from the infant's instinctual conflicts between libido and aggression, while for Erikson, trust and mistrust are experiences derived from the child's interactions, successful and unsuccessful, with caregivers. For Winnicott, the quality of the holding environment that provides opportunities for either true-self or false-self experiences is determined by the mother, her own psychodynamics and character. Similarly, Sullivan saw points of anxiety in the mother as the origin of the child's early splitting of good and bad. For Erikson, the mother is the representative of and vehicle for a cultural approach to living that organizes and ranks safety and dan-ger, pleasure and restraint, gratification and frustration. Thus, for Erikson, the baby's experience and subsequent identity are shaped through child-rearing practices that reflect the values and needs of the culture into which the child is born" (pg. 146-147)
 - "Erikson framed the crises of the ego in terms of a battle, one thing vs. another, as if healthy development at each stage would result in a victory and a banishment. But Erikson actually regarded these crises less as battles and more as dialectical tensions. Trust is always complemented by and in a creative tension with mistrust, autonomy with shame and doubt, and so on. Further, even though one or another crisis is in the forefront at any particular time, all these issues and tensions are active throughout the life cycle. Each stage is

reworked anew by the struggle with subsequent ego qualities, and <u>Erikson envisioned ego development across the life cycle less in terms of a stepladder and more in terms of a complex set of vital tensions, progressively unfolding and in constant resonance with <u>each other</u>. Second, Erikson presented his psychosocial stages as extensions of Freud's psychosexual stages. But they are much more than extensions. Erikson changed the very concept of the drives, not simply added on to them. In his integration of Freud's maturational timetable of biological instincts with the structure of social institutions, Erikson transformed the psychoanalytic understanding of both drives and the social world. For Freud, social reality is the realm in which the drives are gratified or frustrated; **for Erikson, social reality is a realm that shapes the drives in a culturally distinct fashion.** In Freud's framework, the individual is pushed by the drives; <u>in Erikson's framework</u>, the individual is pushed by the drives and pulled by social institutions" (pg. 148)</u>

- o Heinz Kohut (pg. 149)
 - □ "Freud, as we have seen, envisioned the establishment of 'human' nature as consequent to a long-standing battle between animal appetites and civilized standards of behavior. In his view, a painfully guilty conscience was a triumph of sorts, heralding a civilized code of ethics in an otherwise lower nature. Psychopathology, for Freud, reflected an imbalance in these necessarily conflictual internal forces" (pg. 149)
 - "Heinz Kohut (1923-1981) offered a very different vision of human experience, consistent with the major themes in late-twentieth-century literature and social analysis. He spoke not of battles but of isolation of painful feelings of personal alienation, the existential experience anticipated and so hauntingly captured in Kafka's Metamorphosis, where a person is terrifyingly separated from a sense of his humanness and feels himself to be a 'nonhuman monstrosity' (1977, p. 287). Kohut's man in trouble was not riddled with guilt over forbidden wishes; he was moving through a life without meaning. Devoid of that zest for life that infuses the mundane with interest, he looked and acted like a human being but experienced life as drudgery, accomplishments as empty. Or he was held captive on an emotional roller-coaster, where exuberant bursts of creative energy alternated with painful feelings of inadequacy in response to disrupting perceptions of failure. The creative process was short-circuited; creative strivings defied realization. Relationships, eagerly, even desperately, pursued, were repeatedly abandoned with an increasing feeling of pessimism at ever getting what one really 'needs' from another. Freud's man was appropriately guilty; Kohut's man was decidedly 'tragic' (1977, pp. 132, 133)." (pg. 149)
 - "Like Hartmann, Kohut envisioned development less as 'culture shock', whereby civilized society impinges on and eventually tames bestial humans, and more in terms of intrinsic 'fit'. Human beings, Kohut came to feel, must be designed to flourish in a certain kind of human environment. That environment must in some way provide necessary experiences that allow a child to grow up not only being human but feeling human, an energized, connected member of the human community. Kohut attempted to identity these crucial environmental conditions in a child's early life" (pg. 149)
 - Narcissistic Character Disorders (pg. 150)
 - "Kohut's initial contributions were introduced in terms of a radical reformulation of Freud's concept of narcissism. Freud believed that all the infant's libidinal energy was initially self-directed, a state that he termed primary narcissism. The infant's early experience was magical and fantastical. Caught up in what Freud called the omnipotence of thought, the infant feels herself to be perfect and all powerful. Early instances of frustration in gratifying herself through these fantasies of omnipotence and grandeur interrupt the infant's narcissistic self-absorption. Unable to secure gratification via this route, the infant turns her libidinal energy outward toward others in her search for palpable, albeit imperfect, satisfaction. In this process, narcissistic libido normally becomes transformed into object libido, and the child takes her parents as the crucial love objects of her infancy. This attachment to the parents, and the oedipal fantasies that develop within it, pose the next psychic hurdle; if the child is unable to relinquish these oedipal fantasies, her libido becomes fixated on her infantile love objects and she becomes neurotic. Later, when she enters psychoanalytic treatment as an adult, the transference of those enduring infantile attachments onto the person of the analyst allows them to be both intensely experienced as well as available to curative analytic interpretation" (pg. 150)
 - "for Freud, the transference became the emotional heart of analytic treatment. The discovery of conflicted unconscious strivings
 must occur, Freud decided, within an emotionally engaged context, in which the patient experiences intense, conflictual
 emotions from childhood toward the person of the analyst" (pg. 152)
 - Kohut and the Classical Tradition (pg. 153)
 - until the last ten years of his life, when his writings became too divergent from the mainstream, Kohut was an eminent spokesman for and teacher of classical psychoanalysis" (pg. 153)
 - From Freud to Kohut (pg. 155)
 - $\hfill\Box$ "Freud one proposed that normality is defined by an ability to love and to work" (pg. 155)
 - □ "Freud's theory of libidinal development the inverse relationship between self-love and love-of-others seemed to Kohut to be in need of reformation" (pg. 156)
 - Vicarious Introspection and the Narcissistic Character (pg. 157)
 - □ "In his work with narcissistic patients, Kohut tried to suspend his own classical organizing frame of reference, as well as all preconceived ideas about the meaning of the patient's communications. He tried to put himself in his patient's shoes, to understand the experience from the patient's point of view. This approach, which he described as *empathic immersion* and *vicarious introspection* (1959), became, for him, the defining feature of psychoanalytic methodology" (pg. 157)
 - *cf. E. Husserl's 'empathy' as the means for 'knowing' (or, reaching) the Other.
 - The Development of Normal Narcissism (pg. 159)
 - "Children live in a world of superheroes and superforces. At times they imagine themselves totally perfect and capable of anything. At times they imagine their caregivers, to whom they are attached, as larger than life and all-powerful. Consider the terms that traditional psychoanalytic theorists applied to this early phase of development: *omnipotence, grandiosity, exhibitionism, archaic idealism*. Traditional theory regarded the inflated overestimation of self and caregivers that characterizes the early years of life as shot through with infantile fantasy, as an immature irrationality to be over-come, thereby allowing the development of realistic connections with others and the outside world in general. Kohut took a fresh look at these early experiences in light of his patients' narcissistic disorders. What he saw in the world of early childhood was a vitality, an exuberance, an expansiveness, a personal creativity that were often missing in adults who led lives devoid of excitement and meaning, or else...defensively guarded a brittle, exaggerated self-image that isolated and undermined them. Kohut became interested in the fate of infantile vitality and robust self-regard, the developmental process through which it can be preserved in healthy adulthood or become derailed into pathological narcissism" (pg. 159)
 - "early narcissistic states of mind contain the kernels of healthy narcissism; they must be allowed slow transformation on their own, Kohut suggested, simply by virtue of exposure to reality. The child comes to appreciate the unrealistic nature of his views of himself and his parents as he suffers the ordinary disappointments and disillusionments of everyday life..." (pg. 159-160)
 - "in healthy development, the inflated images of self and other are whittled down, little by little, to more or less realistic proportions. Inevitable yet manageable, optimal frustrations will take place within a generally supportive environment. Against this secure backdrop, the child rises to the occasion, survives the frustration or disappointment, and in the process internalizes

functional features of the selfobject" (pg. 160)

- Selfobject Transferences (pg. 160)
 - □ "Kohut identified three basic types of selfobject transference" (pg. 160)
 - "some patients...establish a powerful attachment to the analyst based on a need for the analyst to grasp and reflect back their experience of themselves, their excitements, their perceptions, as well as their disappointments" (pg. 160)
 - ♦ "Kohut called this the *mirroring transference*" (pg. 161)
 - "A second type of narcissistic transference develops when the patient regards the analyst as perfect and wonderful and feels himself to be increasingly strong and important by virtue of his connection to this powerful and important other. Kohut called this the <u>idealizing transference</u>. Eventually Kohut identified an <u>alter ego</u> or twinship transference, wherein the patient yearns to feel an essential likeness with the analyst, not in terms of external resemblance but in significance or function" (pg. 161)
 - "the analyst in these forms of transference is experienced not as a separate being but as a needed extension of the patient's weakened self..." (pg. 161)
 - "Kohut found...that his patients needed an extended immersion in these transferential states to gradually develop a more reliable sense of vitality or well-being" (pg. 161)
- The Psychoanalytic Situation (pg. 162)
 - "Kohut advocated technical innovations that directly challenged longstanding tenets of classical technique. As we have seen, he argued for a radically different approach to working with the transference. In the analytic situation, he saw the patient as attempting to reanimate a disrupted developmental process. The analyst must not ignore or resist these transferences, despite the countertransferential anxiety they may engender, but allow the patient to experience her in the needed developmental role, thus allowing the patient's stalled developmental process to be once again resumed" (pg. 162)
 - "Kohut discovered that in the early stages of selfobject transferences, interpretation is not only unnecessary but destructive; interpretation may call attention to the analyst's separateness and thus interfere with the patient's immersion in the developmentally necessary selfobject experience" (pg. 162)
 - "like the parent, the analyst cannot always be perfectly attuned to the patient's needs. Like the parent, the analyst cannot make the sun come up or protect the patient from the harsh realities of life. So the analyst, like the adequate parent, fails the patient slowly and incrementally, allowing the narcissistic transferences to become transformed into a more realistic, but still vital and robust, sense of self and other" (pg. 162-163)
- New Wine in Old Bottles (pg. 163)
 - □ "Kohut emphasized the chronic traumatizing milieu of the patient's early human environment, not the primitive urges arising from within; he described the patient's anxious efforts at self-protection, not his clever routes for obtaining forbidden gratification" (pg. 163)
 - *i.e., sublimation 'clever routes for obtaining forbidden gratification'
 - "he understood the patient's aggression and rage in the treatment not as expressing an intrinsic force but as evidence of a legacy of vulnerability. Aggressive denigration could be the patient's way of protecting himself from the risk of retraumatization inherent in embracing the analyst as selfobject. Bitter fury could be understandably precipitated by the patient's perception of the analyst's unreliability, weakness, lack of attunement, when, having entered into a reanimation of this needed selfobject tie, he has become deeply and desperately dependent on its effective functioning. Aggression, for Kohut, was reactive, not fundamental" (pg. 164)
 - *cf. J. Tangney & J. Tracy, Self-Conscious Emotion, (ed.) in M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney, Handbook of self and identity https://ubc-emotionlab.ca/wp-content/files_mf/tangneytracyselfandidhandbkchapter2012published.pdf
 - ♦ See 'shame' on pg. 448 & 'anger and aggression' on pg. 450
 - "He fundamentally reconceptualized the basic human project. An investigation of issues like creativity, feelings of internal coherence and viability, and functional harmony replaced traditional analytic attention to the vicissitudes of sexual and aggressive drive gratification. The patient's subjective sense of self-realization and the underlying experience of himself as well-put-together, of a piece, holding a sameness over time, containing and balancing varied emotional states, became the crucial focus. Kohut tried to cull out what might be the operational building blocks of this self-realization, settling on two basic components: a vitalizing, expansive ambition and basic idealized goals. Kohut envisioned a healthy self as launching, via talents and skills, from this energizing platform of ambition toward goals that were idealized-infused with personal meaning. His emphasis, again, was not on 'doing' it right but on the capacity to feel one's life experience as energized, creative, and personally meaningful" (pg. 164)
 - *cf. J. Tracy & R. Robins, The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions, (ed.) in J. Tracy (et al.), The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research https://www.guilford.com/excerpts/tracy2.pdf?t=1
 - "if an individual subjectively feels ashamed, guilty, embarrassed, or proud, then that, in itself, is an important psychological event with implications for the individual's future behavior, decisions, and mental and physical health" (pg. 5)
 - □ "for Kohut, **the self became 'the core of the personality'**, the center of human initiative with its own motivational force aiming toward 'the realization of its own specific programme of action'" (pg. 164-165)
 - "Kohut came to regard selfobject needs for affirmation, for admiration, for connections with others who can buoy us up and whom we can respect, as undergoing maturation and change of form but operating continually from birth till death, and as fundamental to human experience as are the needs for companionship or solitude. We do not outgrow them" (pg. 166)
- "An interesting effort has been made in the recent self psychology literature to reconceptualize the nature of transference itself. Originally within classical theory, transference was viewed as representing a displacement from the past, with the patient distorting the present in order to make room for the expression of some encapsulated earlier fantasy or experience. An alternative formulation sees transference as reflecting 'a universal psychological striving to organize experience and construct meanings' that operates in an ongoing way, 'an expression of the continuing influence of organizing principles and imagery that crystallized out of the patient's early formative experiences'. Rather than using distortion to smuggle into the analytic relationship something from the distant past, the transference is the patient's here-and-now experience of the analyst. Implicit in this formulation is an acknowledgment of the subjective validity of the patients experience of the analyst, whose person and actions the patient 'assimilates' into the structure of meaning that shape his or her subjective experience" (pg. 166-167)
- "All post-Kohut self psychologists tend to regard as the most central and creative features of Kohut's contributions the methodological innovation of sustained empathic immersion in the patient's subjective reality and the theoretical concepts of the selfobject transferences" (pg. 167)
- "it is true that classical psychoanalysis was pervaded by rationalism, objectivism, rigid patriarchalism, and an idealization of conventional maturity that run counter to the irrationality or nonrationality that is often intrinsic to both creativity and passion" (pg. 169)
 - □ "The very term *analysis* was employed by Freud and his contemporaries to suggest a breaking up of things into their underlying component parts. Adult passions and compulsions were seen as driven by infantile wishes and antisocial impulses. Classical analytic interpretation had a reductive quality to it, revealing the underlying, conflictual, infantile meanings of adult activities and experience.

Further, the classical analytic process was marked by a renunciatory spirit: once exposed, infantile wishes were necessarily renounced, so that sexual and aggressive energies could find more mature modes of gratification. In this framework, narcissism - including the self-absorption and grandiose flights of fancy that accompany so much creative production - could only be regarded as self-indulgent and infantile" (pg. 168)

- "a fundamental feature that distinguishes postclassical psychoanalysis the shift in emphasis and basic values from rationalism and objectivism to subjectivism and personal meaning" (pg. 168)
 - "Winnicott and Kohut were among the most important figures in this movement" (pg. 168)
 - "[recall] Winnicott's emphasis on play and the anchoring of authentic self in the omnipotence of subjective experience" (pg. 168)
 - "For many contemporary psychoanalytic authors, the analyst's interpretive understanding is much less important than the reality and personal meaning of the patient's productions to the patient. In this sense, the basic features of contemporary psychoanalytic thought are consistent with, are reflective of, and have played a role in shaping what many have termed postmodernism. Meaning is to be found not in an objective, rational perspective, but in local, personal perspectives; the value of life is not measured by its conformity with a mature and transcendent vision, but by its vitality and the authenticity of its passion" (pg. 169)
 - *cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_5516fdbb15b14b74855f044d0a6d8dc8.pdf
- "Kohut's advocacy of a less objectively positioned, less interpretive involvement, his encouragement of empathic resonance with the patient's experience, and his legitimization of the therapeutic impact of what had previously been labeled 'gratification' these are all departures from standard technique that introduce an analytic presence organized around qualities that are regarded as much more conventionally female. Thus, in this sense as well, contemporary psychoanalytic thought both reflects and has contributed to the redefinition of the nature of authority and the reworking of traditional gender roles that has been such a central feature of postmodern currents" (pg. 169)
- · Chapter 7 Contemporary Freudian Revisionists: Otto Kernberg, Roy Schafer, Hans Loewald, and Jacques Lacan (pg. 170)
 - "the generational transfer of power and authority has been one of the greatest challenges for all human cultures and subcultures" (pg. 171)
 - "On one end of the psychoanalytic continuum have been those descendants who have remained devoted to Freud's texts in their pristine form. Orthodox (or "strict") Freudians try to preserve Freud's own concepts as a sufficient and exclusive basis for current clinical practice. On the other end of the continuum are those who have found it most compelling to assimilate many of Freud's clinical insights and discoveries into their own emerging body of thought, often replacing Freud's basic theoretical concepts with fundamentally different alternatives" (pg. 171)
 - □ "Between these two extremes are the Freudian revisionists, who want to preserve Freud's concepts yet, at the same time, alter them in fundamental ways to keep the old building, but find a way to modernize it and make it functional as a contemporary abode" (pg. 172)
 - "until recently, the version of psychoanalysis cited in most interdisciplinary efforts was Freud's biologically grounded drive theory. Over the past two decades, the relationships between psychoanalysis and other disciplines have been largely reshaped; the most productive and stimulating ideas are now drawn not from the classical Freudian system but from contemporary psychoanalytic authors, many of them taking revisionist approaches to basic Freudian concepts. It is for this reason that any honest attempt to address the place of psychoanalysis in modern thought, either appreciatively or critically, must look beyond Freud to the ways Freud's ideas have become revised and transformed in the hands of current analytic authors and clinicians" (pg. 172)
 - □ "Recall the general features of Freud's developmental perspective: We are born with an array of bodily based impulses, sexual and aggressive, that unfold sequentially over the course of early childhood. These impulses reach their crescendo in the genitality of the oedipal phase, where their incestuous and patricidal goals are experienced as highly dangerous. The mind becomes organized and structured for the sole purpose of channeling these dangerous drives so as to maximize the satisfactions they provide while keeping hidden and/or diverted their antisocial intents" (pg. 173)
 - Otto Kernberg (pg. 172)
 - "His fundamental project (1975, 1976, 1980, 1984) has been to bring together, in a genuinely integrated and comprehensive fashion, major features of traditional instinct theory and Freud's structural model, the object relations theories of both Klein and Fairbairn, and the developmental perspective of Freudian ego psychology, particularly Jacobson's work on pathological forms of early identifications" (pg. 172)
 - "he has maintained a steadfast commitment to the classical clinical principle of the centrality of interpretations in generating meaningful change; yet he has also been a key figure in the exploration of the analyst's personality and the relevance of the analyst's passionate experiences in the analytic process" (pg. 173)
 - □ "Edith Jacobson...proposed that...<u>a distinct and reliable sense of individual selfhood emerges only gradually over the first eighteen months of life, from an earlier mode of being in which there is no independent sense of self, but rather a diffuse, symbiotic merger with the mother..." (pg. 173)</u>
 - "In Melanie Klein's vision of the essence of human experience, we are born with two powerful, primitive, passionate modes of relating to the world: an adoring, profoundly caring, deeply grateful love and a horrifyingly destructive, spoiling, intensely envious and spiteful hate. Our love creates the possibility for caring, reparative relationships with others experienced as good and nurturant; our hate creates aggressive, mutually destructive relationships with others experienced as evil and dangerous. All humans struggle throughout life, from the first few months until their death, to reconcile these two modes of experience, to protect the good, loving experience from hateful, destructive feelings, to knit together the affective polarities within which they operate" (pg. 173-174)
 - □ "although sharing some common ground, Freud, Jacobson, and Klein each propose a quite distinctive vision of the psyche, its origins, its fundamental nature, its tensions" (pg. 174)
 - A Developmental Model (pg. 174)
 - "In concert with Jacobson and Mahler, Kernberg envisioned the infant during the first few months of life as sorting out experience on the basis of its affective valence, and thus as moving back and forth between two strikingly different affective states with very different qualities: pleasurable, gratified states and unpleasurable, painful, frustrated states. In both states, there is no distinction between self and other, between the infant and the mother. In one situation, the satisfied infant feels merged with a gratifying, pleasure-giving surround; in the other, the frustrated, tension-filled infant feels trapped in an ungratifying, painful surround. The first major developmental task, in Kernberg's scheme, entails psychic clarification of what is self and what is other (a separation of self images from object images). If this is not accomplished, no dependable sense of self as separate and distinct emerges, no reliable boundary can develop between internal and external, no clear distinction between one's own experience, one's own mind, and the experience and mind of others. A failure to accomplish this first major developmental task is the central, defining precursor of psychotic states. All schizophrenic symptoms hallucinations, delusions, psychic fragmentation derive from a fundamental failure in differentiation between self and object images. The second major developmental task is the overcoming of splitting. After self and object images are held together by positive (libidinal) affects and are separated from the bad, hateful self images and the bad, frustrating object images, which are themselves joined by negative (aggressive) affects. This developmentally normal splitting is overcome as the infant develops the capacity to experience 'whole objects' that are both good and bad, gratifying

and frustrating. Simultaneous with the integration of the object images is the integration of the self images; now the self is felt to be of a piece, experienced as both good *and* bad, loving *and* hating. This integration allows a concomitant integration of basic drive dispositions. Because good and bad feelings are combined, the singular intensity of loving or hating is tempered. A failure to accomplish this second developmental task results in 'borderline' pathology. In contrast to the psychotic, the borderline personality is developmentally able to distinguish between images of self and others, but defensively retreats from the capacity to knit together good and bad affects and object relationships" (pg. 174-175)

- "In the beginning, in Kernberg's system, there are no drives. Over the course of early development, the infant's diffuse good and bad affect states become consolidated and shaped into libidinal and aggressive drives. Subjectively registered good, pleasurable, satisfying interactions with gratifying others consolidate, over time, into a pleasure-seeking (libidinal) drive. Similarly, subjectively registered bad, unpleasurable, unsatisfying experiences with ungratifying others consolidate, over time, into a destructive (aggressive) drive. The child wants to maximize pleasurable experiences with good objects and to destroy bad objects who provoke unpleasurable experiences. The libidinal and aggressive forces that emerge from the powerful affective states that dominate early object relations are themselves conflictual in Kernberg's account, just as in Freud's. Libidinal impulses, because they are infused with childhood sexual aims, are experienced as potentially antisocial and dangerous. Aggressive impulses are dangerous (once splitting is overcome) because they are directed toward the very objects that are also loved. Thus the third tier of Kernberg's developmental hierarchy of psychopathology is neurosis. Individuals who have achieved the separation between and others and overcome splitting qualify for the kind of neurotic conflict between impulses and defenses that constituted classical Freudian theory of psychopathology" (pg. 175-176)
- "What Kernberg did, in concert with Jacobson, was to broaden and deepen Freud's drive theory by deriving drives from a complex developmental sequence centered around early object relations. Drives for Freud were given, inborn; drives for Kernberg are still dependent on constitutional pre-dispositions, but are ultimately forged in interaction with others and are thus developmentally constructed. **Kernberg stacks theories**. By excavating and erecting new scaffolding beneath classical drive theory, Kernberg was able to preserve Freud's basic understanding of neurosis as generated by instinctual conflict, and, at the same time, employ Kleinian theory, object relations theories, and ego psychology in understanding more severe psychological disturbances." (pg. 176)
- Character and the Psychopathology of Love Relations (pg. 176)
 - □ "in classical Freudian theory, the centerpiece of personality is the predominant mode of instinctual gratification. For Kernberg, the centerpiece of personality is the developmental level of internal object relations the patient has reached" (pg. 176)
 - "experience can be organized and processed in an infinite number of ways; according to classical theory, the predominant libidinal fixation provides any given individual with a central set of bodily based metaphors around which all experience comes to be organized" (pg. 176-177)
 - "Neurotic-level issues involving love and sexuality are understood, in Kernberg's system, in terms of classical impulse-defense conflicts. Neurotic patients have established self-object differentiation and have overcome splitting. They relate to whole objects with an integrated self, and their difficulties concern conflicts over impulses" (pg. 179)
 - an integrated self, and their difficulties concern conflicts over impulses" (pg. 179)

 "in this revised Freudian theory, sexuality still plays a central but no longer causative role. The meanings of sexuality itself are derived from earlier and deeper structures composed of self-object relationships" (pg. 179)
 - □ "for Kernberg, the central dynamic struggle is between love and hate, and these manifest themselves necessarily in the transference to the analyst" (pg. 180)
- o Roy Schafer (pg. 180)
 - Agency (pg. 181)
 - "Freud drew on the scientific understanding of his day, borrowing from Newtonian physics the idea of the universe as an intricate system of mechanisms composed of matter and forces and applying it to the mind, envisioning it as a psychic apparatus composed of structures and psychodynamic forces. Freud demonstrated that the subjective sense of self as an omnipotent agent over one's experience and actions is an illusion. Consciousness is merely the tip of an iceberg; thoughts and feelings are actually (psychically) determined by unconscious forces not accessible to self-reflection. One often does not, in fact, know what one is really doing. Consequently, in Freud's system the person as agent is dispersed. A conscious sense of agency is illusory; the conscious self is more correctly depicted as a puppet. The strings are being controlled elsewhere, in the unconscious, by psychic agencies (id, ego, and superego) and by dynamic forces (instinctual impulses and defenses)" (pg. 181)
 - "Kleinian theory and various British object relations theories inspired by the work of Fairbairn and Winnicott brought about in the 1950s and 1960s a population explosion in the psychoanalytic world of unconscious quasi-agents. Not only were the strings of mind seen as being controlled by Freud's puppeteers (impulses, defenses, id, ego, superego), but to these were added all sorts of personifications: internal objects, introjects, identifications, incorporations, part objects, and many more. Analysts had begun to write and speak in a fashion that assigned both intentionality and power to these internal agents" (pg. 181)
 - "In Schafer's account, the basic transformation that takes place in the analytic process is the patient's gradual assumption of agency with respect to previously disclaimed actions. The patient initially considers her beliefs about herself and her world to simply be true. She has been crushed; the world is dangerous. These are taken as givens, objective facts. In analysis, the patient comes to see that these "facts" have actually been created by her; even though she suffers greatly because of them, she both needs and wants to see herself and the world in just this way. She comes to understand that she derives secret satisfactions from these beliefs; they generate unconscious pleasures, and they provide her with a sense of safety and control. She comes to see that even though she hates thinking about herself and the world in these ways, she systematically refuses to have it any other way. She is committed to these beliefs and experiences. Her objectionable experience of herself and her world is not simply given or discovered; she is dedicated to keeping both herself and her world just this way. She is the agent of her world, the designer, the builder, the interpreter, yet she disclaims her agency and thereby feels herself to be at the mercy of her situation and her fate. As the analysand comes to understand and experience herself as the agent of her (internal and external) world, it becomes possible for her to imagine herself making other choices, acting in the world and organizing her experience in a more open, more constructive fashion" (pg. 182)
 - *'belief' is very much a tool individuals leverage as a way to assert control otherwise, 'to have' (cf. E. Fromm, To Have or To Be?) their Being 'meet' (or, connect or enmesh-with) that which surrounds them (i.e., to be a part of...and, in that way, feel 'as a part') where, in so doing, they receive some type of assurance regarding the world they 'make' for-themselves.
 - *'letting' is our standing (in) that place which is 'between' control and mercy, wherein 'we let' that which is be.
 - □ "from Shafer's point of view, the problem of agency, at first disclaimed and then gradually reclaimed, has been the at the center of clinical psychoanalysis from its inception and is at the heart of each truly analytic process" (pg. 183)
 - "Schafer...asks us to consider more closely the language Freud chose to describe psychodynamic processes. Drives build up autonomously 'inside' the mind, pressing for discharge. If they are not discharged, they become dammed up and grow toxic. This language, Schafer points out, is the language of primitive bodily processes, of urination and defecation. Freud was describing the mind as if it were a body, with clear boundaries, interior spaces and substances. Not only is this not an adequate language for depicting the way the mind works, it is riddled with the same misunderstandings and fantasies that neurotic patients need analysis to clarify, Schafer argues. Freud bequeathed us a language for understanding neurosis that is saturated with neurotic fantasies and

<u>infantile misunderstandings</u>. And, ironically, the most widespread omission in traditional psychoanalytic language is, precisely, the person as agent, the central focus of clinical psychoanalysis as it is actually practiced" (pg. 183)

- Narrative (pg. 183)
 - □ "mind in not the end result of impersonal forces, as Freud had described mind is generated by actions, particular kinds of actions; mind is generated by and organized according to narratives, Schafer proposed" (pg. 183)
 - □ "for Schafer, the dream is a creation, a narrative construction..." (pg. 185)
- o Hans Loewald (pg. 186)
 - □ "his reading of Freud appears offbeat..." (pg. 187)
 - The Unitary Whole (pg. 189)
 - "The traditional reading of Freud assumes a material reality 'out there'. The baby, containing various biological resources and propensities, is born into that material reality. Among the baby's constitutional givens are a set of instinctual drives, urgently pressing for discharge, which inevitably clash with the social environment. Mind is the apparatus built up to channel and regulate the drives, necessarily negotiated between the baby and the environment. Other people, 'objects' of the drives, serve as both vehicles for drive discharge and an aid (through internalization into the superego) for drive regulation and control. Loewald challenges all these traditional premises, positing instead an original, unitary whole composed of both the baby and the caregivers as a starting point for psychological development. In the beginning, there is no distinction between self and other, between ego and external reality, between instincts and objects. Everything that traditional psychoanalytic theory takes for granted as basic and irreducible, Loewald regards as secondary and derivative of dichotomies that emerge from this original unity. One of the central implications of this perspective is that there is nothing in the developing child which was in the baby from the start (neither instincts nor a "true self" in Winnicot's sense). Everything in the developing child, and later the adult, is a product of interaction" (pg. 189)
 - "Loewald's id is an interactional product of adaptation rather than a constant biological force. Mind does not become interactive secondarily, but is interactive in its very nature. Loewald sees life as beginning in a union between the baby and the mother; the mother's handling of the baby, the mother's image of the baby, the mother's sensual experience of the baby all become essential dimensions of the baby's own experience of himself. Whatever 'drives' come to motivate the developing child are shaped through interaction with the mother; they do not preexist and find the mother as their object" (pg. 190)
 - "Leowald portrays the mind as extremely rich in internal connections between past and present, inside and outside, infantile and
 mature, self and other, fantasy and actuality. He understands these distinctions as richly interpenetrating dialectics, not sharp
 dichotomies" (pg. 190-191)
 - Sublimation and Symbolism (pg. 191)
 - □ "Symbolic representation makes it possible for instinctual impulses to find disguised, socially acceptable forms of gratification, not as satisfying as direct physical pleasure, but a reasonable compromise with necessary social constraints. Thus the snake charmer, and the architect of skyscrapers and the violinist, have found symbolic masturbatory equivalents. In fact, Freud became convinced, all of culture is built on sublimation, the disguised gratification of infantile sexual and aggressive impulses" (pg. 191)
 - "The neo-Freudians (Sullivan, Fromm, Horney) and the more radical of the object relations theorists (Fairbairn, Bowlby, Guntrip) abandoned Freud's drive theory altogether. Thus they didn't regard the higher pursuits of culture as being derived from Freud's dual-instinct theory. Hartmann and other ego psychologists took a different route, maintaining drive theory but using the concept of drive neutralization to legitimate motives other than sex and aggression. Culture could be seen as being derived from the ego's autonomous motives for mastery, functional expression, and so on" (pg. 192)
 - □ "Loewald's characteristic approach was to try to find a way to reconcile rather than choose between modes of experience, levels of organization. He saw higher-level mental processes, creative cultural pursuits as always connected with, yet never simply reducible to, lower mental processes, primitive infantile experience. The snake or the skyscraper is always a penis, but never just a penis. Further, the penis, once represented by the snake or sky-scraper, is no longer simply a penis, but has become transformed and enriched through the symbolic process. Symbolism is not a process of camouflage, but of mutual transformation. Thus the symbol for Loewald is not a disguised version of something that already exists; the symbol creates a novel experience. As in the relation between fantasy and reality, past and present, childhood and adult love, the symbol gives new and enriched life to the symbolized [i.e., a re-birth]. Culture is a representation of infantile experience, but not only a camouflaged equivalent. Culture is a representation and reconciliation of childhood experience on a new, expanded, and enriched level of organization" (pg. 192-193)
- o Jacques Lacan (pg. 193)
 - See text
 - "Lacan's mode of presentation was intimately connected to what he was trying to teach about psychoanalysis. He was deliberately obscure, elusive, provocatively difficult. He did not want to be easily understood, at least not in the usual way we understand one another's communications" (pg. 194)
- Chapter 8 Controversies in Theory (pg. 206)
 - "contemporary psychoanalysis has become quite complex and varied. Rather than a cohesive school of thought, contemporary psychoanalysis
 might be more accurately characterized as a university unto itself, with many different theories and areas of knowledge coexisting in an intricate
 and complicated relationship with one another" (pg. 206)
 - "psychoanalytic ideologies tend to inspire deep passions among their adherents that have sometimes impeded a constructive exchange of ideas" (pg. 207)
 - o "The preceding chapters have explored the diversity of psychoanalytic ideas theory by theory, considering each school in terms of its own history, basic principles, and clinical applications. En route, we have briefly noted some of the general issues that cut across the different schools. In this chapter and the next, we focus on these controversies themselves— some of the basic problems that all psychoanalytic systems have had to struggle with. This perspective will highlight the interrelationships of the various schools and the way the internal debates within psychoanalysis tend to reflect larger battles and currents in Western intellectual history" (pg. 207)
 - o "Freud believed, the mind does not become embattled and generate the hysterical and obsessional neuroses that plagued the early patients he treated. Trauma creates affects and thoughts that simply cannot be integrated. The adult who had a normal, nontraumatic childhood is able to contain and assimilate sexual feelings into a continuous sense of self. The adult who experienced a precocious sexual seduction as a child suffers with memories and feelings incompatible with the central mass of thoughts and feelings that constitute his or her experience. Psychic disorders are a direct consequence of experiences that cannot be assimilated" (pg. 208)
 - "all adults suffer from conflictual sexual impulses, Freud decided, not just those who had been molested as children. Sexuality does not
 become problematic only when introduced precociously; there is something in the very nature of human sexuality that is problematic,
 generating inevitable, universal conflicts" (pg. 208)
 - "The delicate beginnings of personal experience in the infant can be sustained, Winnicott suggested, only in the protective "holding environment" created by the solicitous attention of the ordinary 'good-enough' mother. By meeting the infant's needs and actualizing his spontaneous gestures, the mother buffers him from all intrusions, both external and internal. He is free to do what he needs to do float along in the state of 'going-on-being' and await the spontaneous emergence of personal impulses. The mother can fail the child in many ways: by allowing external stimulation

to reach painful levels, by intruding into the base state of drifting quiescence, or by allowing the child's internal needs to build to frustrating levels. In Winnicott's terms, all these failures result in impingement-the failure to protect the delicate state necessary for psychological growth and health" (pg. 209)

- "trauma for Winnicott is not just the introduction of something dramatically negative, frightening, and noxious; it is most fundamentally the failure to sustain something positive the necessary conditions for healthy psychic development" (pg. 209)
- "the child is not traumatized by a sexual event, per se; the child is traumatized by parental character pathology. Because the parent's inability to provide what is necessary, because of the interfering impact of the parent's own difficulties and anxieties, the child is distracted from the delicate project of becoming a person. Instead, attention becomes prematurely diverted to survival, to the parents' needs, to self-distorting adaption to the external world" (pg. 209-210)
 - □ "nature and nurture are now generally regarded less as distinct, separable causes and more as interactive, mutually created sets of processes" (pg. 210)
 - "contemporary drive theorists regard the drive as very much affected by the external, interpersonal world" (pg. 210)
- "Contemporary relational theorists (modern psychoanalytic authors who have chosen to build on relational rather than drive concepts) tend to take inherent, internal factors much more into account, not regarding them as drives per se, but as temperamental traits such as excitability, sensitivity to pleasure and pain, and so on. These more recent authors (e.g., Daniel Stern, Joseph Lichtenberg) depict early development less in terms of a healthy infant either facilitated or failed by parents and more in terms of complex interactions through which children and caregivers either fit or do not fit with each other. Individuals are seen as having differing sensibilities and rhythms. A parent whose caregiving style might be quite effective with one child might encounter enormous difficulties with another. Parenting, in this view, is shaped in the context of the inherent temperamental features of both parent and child. In this way, nature is built into nurture from the beginning" (pg. 211)
 - "from our current perspective, the very vision of nature that Freud established as an antipode to social and historical convention was itself a social and historical convention of Freud's own time. The images of animals that Freud and his contemporaries generated in the flush of the Darwinian revolution, creatures driven by rapacious sexuality and aggression, do not much resemble animals as understood by contemporary zoologists. In part, Freud used animals as a projection screen for a portrayal of human frustrations and rage in a society that too often squelched individual energies and twisted them back against themselves" (pg. 213)
 - "Post-Freudian psychoanalysis proposes a less definitive account of nature. The infant's experience is understood as powerfully impacted upon from the very beginning by the rhythms, values, and personalities of the caregivers. Views of nature and our nature are presumed to reflect, themselves, the social and historical context in which we live. However, post-Freudian psychoanalysis is no less fundamentally subversive vis-a-vis social conventions than Freud's psychoanalysis was. As we have seen, essential to the contributions of object relations theorists such as Fairbairn and Winnicott, post-ego psychologists such as Erikson revisionist Freudians such and Loewald and Lacan, and Kohut and the subsequent self psychologists, has been the centrality in the analytic process of the development and emergence of the analysand's authentic, personal voice from the internalization of social forces and significant others" (pg. 213-214)
- "The traditional model of psychopathology that dominated classical Freudian psychoanalytic thinking was centered around the concept of conflict.
 Neurosis was seen as the product of mental warfare, the psyche at odds with itself. The mind is rent by internal conflicts because different aspects of psychic life are not compatible; impulses deriving from childhood sexual and aggressive drives are in conflict with each other and with repressive forces" (pg. 214)
 - "the alternative model of psychopathology that has dominated postclassical psychoanalysis proposes the principle of arrested development rather than conflict as the root of difficulties in living" (pg. 215)
 - "The central defense in the <u>classical conflict model</u> is repression. Drive-based instinctual fantasies inevitably come into conflict with one another and the regulating functions of the ego. They are necessarily barred from awareness, denied access to action, and buried within the psyche. The <u>arrested-development model</u> is often presented in concert with an understanding of defensive processes centered on **dissociation rather than repression**. Instead of a horizontal split between consciousness and buried impulses, developmental theorists envision a mind rent by vertical splits between different self-states that have not been integrated with one another" (pg. 217)
- Chapter 9 Controversies in Technique (pg. 229)
 - See text
- d. Further Readings:
 - Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, by G. Corey https://perpus.univpancasila.ac.id/repository/EBUPT190498.pdf
 - The Inner World of Teenagers and Their Parents, by G. Diem-Wille https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/053d47c2-d0a3-4c03-8551-51d621c0d40e/9781000336856.pdf
 - o *cf. Chapters 3, 4, & 5
 - The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known, by C. Bollas https://perpus.univpancasila.ac.id/repository/EBUPT190600.pdf
 *cf. Chapters 1-4 & Chapter 13
 - Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, by W. R. D. Fairbairn
 https://kuswoyoaji.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/psychoanalytic-studies-of-the-personality.pdf
 *rf Part I
 - The Analysis of Self, by H. Kohut https://www.ccmps.net/PT10/kohutself.pdf
 - Childhood and Society, by E. Erickson https://ia801707.us.archive.org/17/items/dli.ernet.19961/19961-Childhood%20And%20Society text.pdf