

# A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism, by F. Copleston

## a. People / Organizations:

- Alfred North Whitehead (pg. 1) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whitehead/>
- F. H. Bradley (pg. 1) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bradley/>
- G. E. Moore (pg. 3) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/>
- Bertrand Russell (pg. 4) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russell/>
- Ludwig Wittgenstein (pg. 4) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/>
- A. J. Ayer (pg. 6) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ayer/>
- Rudolf Carnap (pg. 6) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/carnap/>
- R. B. Braithwaite (pg. 6)
- J. L. Austin (pg. 7) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-jl/>
  
- Vienna Circle <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/>
- Logical Empiricism <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/>

## b. Quotes:

- "it is certainly true that G. E. Moore suggested that a large part of the difficulty encountered in discussing and solving philosophical problems was due to a lack of clarity and precision in the formulation of questions and to a careless lumping together of several distinct questions as though they were one question" - Author (pg. 3)
- "when philosophers say strange things, it is unhelpful to jump to the conclusion that they are talking nonsense" - Author (pg. 14)
- "to say that metaphysics is nonsense is nonsense" - Friedrich Waismann (pg. 15)
- "it cannot be taken simply for granted that the philosopher is in a position to prove the existence of God... **before we can usefully discuss whether there is a God, we must first clarify the concept of God.** If it proves to be riddled with contradiction and incoherence, there is no more point in discussing the existence of God... If, however, we can agree on a viable concept of God, we can then inquire whether there is any good reason for thinking that the concept is instantiated" - Author (pg. 19-20)
- "we ought to remember that philosophers, like other men, have different interests and talents" - Author (pg. 25)
- "philosophy does not develop in complete isolation from other elements of human culture" - Author (pg. 26)
  - "Plato's philosophy was clearly influenced by the general cultural situation in which he was born and brought up" - Author (pg. 26)
  - "the political theory of both Plato and Aristotle has to be viewed in close connection with the concrete political life of contemporary Greece" - Author (pg. 26)
    - *\*cf. D. Binseel, A Very General Introduction to the Trajectory of Jurisprudence, \$Attitudes of Thinkers*
- "**science does not come across God in its investigations, and, indeed... cannot come across God, since God is, *ex hypothesi*, incapable of being an object of investigation by the methods of science**" - Author (pg. 30-31)
- "in his own mild way [Locke] was a metaphysician" - Author (pg. 35)
- "we should never attempt to understand anything unless we believed that there was something to understand" - Author (pg. 72-73)
- "the mediaevals believed before they philosophized. Indeed, all the great mediaeval philosophers, including Ockham, were theologians" - Author (pg. 91)
- "**Marxism functionalizes man in one way, Freudianism in another; in either case the spiritual freedom and uniqueness of the human person are overlook**" - Author (pg. 106)
  - *\*D. Winnicott, in The Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, remarks "Freud is here dealing with human nature in terms of economies, and deliberately simplifying the problem for the purpose of founding a theoretical formulation. There is an implied determinism in all this work, an assumption that human nature can be examined objectively and can have applied to it the laws that are known to apply in physics" (pg. 16). Similarly, Marxism emphasizes materialism, which comprises in-itself a deterministic conception. Copleston continues, "Marxism... tends to interpret man simply in terms of its initial economic categories" (pg. 112).*
- "Hegel was in some sense passionately interested in working out the details of the dialectic" - Author (pg. 128)
- "**the individual has become a riddle to himself**" - Author (pg. 141)
  - "he has been described as alienated man, or as man in a state of alienation. And it is to this alienated individual, thrown back on himself and yet unable to find in himself the answers to the problems which best him, that the message of existentialists seems especially to be addressed" - Author (pg. 142)
  - "but in order to facilitate authentic existence, deliberate self-commitment in the light of realization of man's existential situation, [existentialists] try to break through the crust of social consciousness and crowd-mentality and awaken the individual to a vision of his existential situation and of his responsibility and potentialities as a free individual" - Author (pg. 143)
- "social adjustment should be understood with reference to the whole nature of man and not simply with reference to his biological and economic interests" - Author (pg. 216)

## c. General Notes:

- Chapter 1 - Contemporary British Philosophy (pg. 1)
  - "logical positivism was at any rate provocative, forthright, clear-cut. The logical positivists took science seriously; they had a definite programme; they knew what their presuppositions were and what they were trying to do" (pg. 1)
  - "the old philosophers produced world-views, sometimes accompanied by ways of life. Their modern successors disclaim any intention of providing world-views or of telling people how they ought to act; but at the same time they are past master at insinuating a certain world-view, without clearly stating it, and at recommending, in a covert manner, a generally conservative attitude" (pg. 2)
    - "from a Marxist point of view, it is a thoroughly bourgeois philosophy" (pg. 2)
  - "the notion that most British philosophers are logical positivists is a misconception. The modern analytic movement, which, from a negative point of view, can be considered as a reaction against British idealism, antedated logical positivism in the proper sense" (pg. 3)
    - "the bent of G. E. Moore's mind was towards meticulous analysis... he laid emphasis on analysis of meaning" (pg. 3)
      - "his own interests led him into what might be described as a phenomenology of perception" (pg. 3)
  - "[Bertrand Russell] never accepted the principle of verifiability as a criterion of meaning... Further, Russell tended to look on reductive analysis as a way of obtaining knowledge about the world" (pg. 4)
    - "he expressed indeed sympathy with logical positivism. But he always believed that philosopher should keep in close touch with empirical science and that philosophical theories should be built on a scientific foundation" (pg. 4)
  - "it has been maintained that **the principle of verifiability, considered as the criterion of meaning**, is implicitly contained in the *Tractatus*" (pg. 5)
    - "[Ludwig] Wittgenstein very soon abandoned the theory of language expounded in the *Tractatus*..." (pg. 5)

- "insight into the complexity of language is generally associated with the name of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (pg. 7)
- "the members of the Vienna Circle were not, of course, concerned simply with attacking metaphysics. They had a positive programme, the unification of the sciences through the creation of a common language" (pg. 7)
  - "they focused their attention on scientific language...in so far as their criterion of meaning was based on an analysis of the scientific hypothesis..." (pg. 7)
- **"logical positivism involved elevation of descriptive language, and in particular of the language of science, to the rank of the paradigm or model language.** And its criterion of meaning was the result of an extension or extrapolation of a certain analysis of synthetic or empirical statements, namely as predictions of possible sense experiences. If, however, a philosopher rejects this narrow concept of meaning and insists on the complexity of language and the variety of meaningful language-games or linguistic activities, he cannot properly be described as a logical positivist" (pg. 8-9)
  - "to use the idea of empirical verifiability as an instrument for distinguishing scientific hypotheses is not the same thing as to use it as a general criterion of meaning" (pg. 9)
- "Wittgenstein, it is true, did not hesitate to make dogmatic pronouncements about the nature and function of philosophy. In the *Tractatus* he maintained that there are no philosophical propositions; and he implied that the philosopher's job is to exhibit the origins of 'most' philosophical questions and statements in logical confusion" (pg. 9-10)
- "if metaphysics is taken to mean the construction of comprehensive systems or world-views, there is a general mistrust of this activity" (pg. 11)
  - "system-builders are [prone] to making assumptions which should not be taken for granted" (pg. 11)
- "British philosophers show little confidence in the philosopher's ability to prove the existence of a transcendent God or of the Absolute. Many of them would claim that Kant successfully demolished 'dogmatic' metaphysics, or at any rate its claim to cognitive value. But it by no means follows that they reject the whole field of what has traditionally been known as metaphysics" (pg. 12)
- "it is all very well to talk blithely about seeing the facts for what they are or letting the facts speak for themselves. The question arises whether what we call a fact does not represent an interpretation. To put the matter in another way, **we cannot get at the phenomena without thinking about them; and the question arises whether we can think them without symbolic expression**, without language" (pg. 13)
  - "it is a question of the relations between thought and its object and between thought and language" (pg. 13)
- "the descriptive metaphysician...explores or tries to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure, the basic concepts by which we think the world. That is to say, the descriptive metaphysician is concerned...in analyzing the basic concepts or categories of our actual thought, of the way in which we actually see the world" (pg. 15)
  - "if a philosopher sets out to develop a system of basic categories in terms of which the world as we know it can be interpreted, this is more what [W. H.] Walsh calls immanent metaphysics...If, however, a philosopher postulates or tries to prove the existence of a transcendent being or reality to explain this world or the events in the world, this is what Walsh describes as transcendent metaphysics" (pg. 15-16)
- "there has been a marked tendency in recent British ethics to take as axiomatic the Human thesis that no 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'" (pg. 18)
- Chapter 2 - Some Reflections on Logical Positivism (pg. 26)
  - "Christian theology provided the mental background and atmosphere in which philosophers philosophized. One can legitimately say that it was theology which, to a large extent, set the problems for the philosopher and acted as a fertilizing principle" (pg. 26)
    - "in the modern era, however, that is to say, in the period after the Renaissance, the background of philosophy has been provided, to an increasing extent, by the empirical sciences..." (pg. 26)
      - "it is sufficient to remind oneself of the influence of mathematics and dynamics on the Cartesian philosophy, of the influence of the growth of historical science on Hegelianism, of the influence of biology, in a wide sense, on Bergson, of the influence of sociology and the rise of economics on Marxism, and of the influence of the newer physics on a philosopher like Whitehead" (pg. 27)
      - **"Modern existentialism is not without its roots in the cultural milieu and general spiritual atmosphere**, though one has to remember that the influence of the spiritual atmosphere in which a philosopher finds himself is not always 'positive': in many cases it produces a strong reaction. But to produce a reaction is, of course, to exercise an influence" (pg. 27)
      - "this rise of empirical science is, indeed, one of the major features of the post-Renaissance world" (pg. 28)
        - "the advance in knowledge has thus been due to science rather than to speculative philosophy. And, when one comes to look at the theories of speculative philosophers that are not empirically verifiable, one finds a succession of highly personal interpretation of the universe of being, the truth and falsity of which cannot be established" (pg. 29)
          - ◆ "they may have a certain value, for they express certain political or emotional reactions to the world...But this does not mean that they represent 'knowledge'. **If we seek factual knowledge, we must go to science**" (pg. 29)
    - "the problem of motion in the fourteenth century paved the way for a new cosmology, like that represented by the philosophy of Descartes in one of its aspects" (pg. 27)
      - "philosophers like John Buridan and Albert of Saxony discarded the Aristotelian theory of motion and adopted the impetus theory of Philoponus...preparing the way for a conception of the world as a system of bodies in motion, in which impetus or energy is transmitted from one body to another, the total amount of energy remaining constant. The origin of motion or energy was ascribed to God..." (pg. 26)
    - "another factor which has to be taken into account if we want to understand how the logical positivist mentality has arisen, or perhaps rather how a mental climate favourable to logical positivism has arisen, is the tremendous growth of applied science in recent times and its influence in making possible our industrialized and technocratic civilization. I am talking now of the 'masses' who live in highly industrialized and materially developed societies. These people are very conscious of the great benefits which have been brought to them and to society in general by applied science. They understand little of the nature of scientific hypotheses or of the provisional character of many scientific concepts; but they clearly see the practical benefits of applied science and they become accustomed to look to science for anything which makes 'a difference' to life. Philosophic theories and speculations about the world seem to them, so far as they ever think of such theories, to be little more than a harmless pastime; they make 'no difference' and they produce no tangible results. If one wants tangible results, one must go to the scientists; and it is tangible results which are the criterion of real knowledge about the world. The ordinary man does not think of questioning the assertions of the scientists, since the latter have proved their worth; but it would not occur to him to accept without question the assertions of theologians or philosophers. How can they know the truth of what they say? The only proof of the truth of their assertions would be a scientific proof; and no such proof has been forthcoming. What I am suggesting is that the immense growth of empirical science and the great and tangible benefits brought to civilization by applied science have given rise to science that degree of prestige which it enjoys, a prestige which far outweighs that of philosophy, and still more that of theology; and this prestige of science, by creating the impression that all that can be known can be known by means of science, has created and atmosphere or mental climate which is reflected in logical positivism" (pg. 29-30)
      - "the philosopher will not increase human knowledge in the sense of extending our factual knowledge of reality; but he will perform the humbler, though useful, task of clarifying the meaning of terms and showing what they denote in terms of immediate experience" (pg. 30)
        - *\*they're function relegated.*
    - **"the soil out of which has grown the mentality favourable to logical positivism was prepared by the development of the empirical sciences which is characteristic of the modern era"** (pg. 31)
      - "the fact remains that the growth of empirical sciences has helped to produce a mental outlook which is unfavourable to metaphysics and to



- "it seems to me that this kind of analysis can sensibly be called 'metaphysical'" (pg. 69)
  - "what I am suggesting is that **what is called by philosophers 'linguistic' analysis is not radically different from what in the past has been known as 'metaphysical' analysis**" (pg. 69)
- "in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* the first unmoved mover is postulated as the ultimate explanation of 'movement'" (pg. 70)
  - "in the case of metaphysical theories of this kind their function seems to be that of explaining what may be called the *how* of the world rather than the *that* of the world" (pg. 70-71)
- "a philosopher like Bergson was not concerned with elaborating a 'system'. He considered problems separately, moving from one problem to another" (pg. 72)
- "**the attempt to understand empirical reality involves at the end, even if not at the beginning, an attempt to understand the *that* of finite beings**" (pg. 73)
- "the metaphysician trades on linguistic confusion, vagueness and imprecision; he is able to impress other people only in so far as they are already involved in the same confusion as himself..." (pg. 73)
- "it may be said that...human beings are prone to wishful thinking, and that there are always a large number of them who endeavor to find some rational or pseudo-rational justification for what they believe or want to believe on other grounds" (pg. 74)
- "**The primary datum is not, I think, either subject or object but the self as existing in an undefined and unarticulated situation. Man finds himself 'there', within the area of Being.** The consciousness of the self as a reflectively apprehended center and of definite external objects, a consciousness which grows with experience, presupposes a pre-reflective awareness of existing in encompassing Being. As empirical knowledge grows and as definite objects are marked off within a general field, that is, as 'my world' is gradually constructed, these objects are still conceived, perhaps in a very vague way, as existing against a background of Being or as within encompassing Being. And accompanying the building-up, as it were, of a definite empirical world there is an articulation, an expression to the self, of the nature of this background. By a great many people it is thought of as 'the world' or 'the universe'. There are, I think, many people who, perhaps without clearly recognizing the fact, conceive themselves and other things as existing within 'the world', as though all definite things were phenomena existing within an all-encompassing and meta-phenomenal 'world'. In this sense there is an implicit metaphysic in the outlook of many people who are far from being metaphysicians. Again, **the pre-reflective awareness** (perhaps one might say the 'felt' awareness) **of things as standing in relation to an obscure Ground of existence** may be expressed in the way in which we find it expressed in the writings of some poets. On the other hand, there may be an attempt to render explicit on the reflective level this pre-reflective awareness. And this attempt gives rise to various metaphysical systems. The attempt to state the 'felt' dependence of finite things may give rise to a system like that of Spinoza or to a theistic philosophy or even to a philosophy like that of Sartre, with its conception of the *en-soi*. I do not want to argue here in favor of any particular philosophy or type of philosophy; but I do suggest that the question of the ultimate Ground of empirical existence would never be raised, were there not a primary implicit awareness of existing against a background of Being. To avoid misunderstanding I had better say that by using the word 'Being' with a capital letter I do not mean to imply a direct awareness of God. A pre-reflective awareness of dependence or of what used to be called "contingency" is not the same thing as a direct awareness of God" (pg. 74-75)
  - "one function of speculative metaphysics is to make explicit the pre-reflective awareness of which I have been speaking and to state its implications" (pg. 75)
  - "the real reason why the central metaphysical problem constantly recurs in different forms in spite of critical analysis is, I think, that it springs from man's existential situation, accompanied by an awareness of dependence or 'contingency'..." (pg. 76)
    - "inability to find any value in metaphysics may very well be an indication of the limits of a man's 'world'" (pg. 76)
- Chapter 6 - On Seeing and Noticing (pg. 77)
  - "the metaphysician as a metaphysician does not see more things than other people see...I mean also the he does not enjoy a mental vision or intuition of spiritual things or beings, which the non-metaphysician does not enjoy" (pg. 77)
  - "I don't think that mysticism falls within the extension or denotation of the term 'metaphysics'" (pg. 77)
    - "in the sense in which I use it, [metaphysics] excludes mysticism" (pg. 77)
  - "if we take 'being' in the sense of 'existence', it is obvious that it is not a thing. Things exist, but existence does not exist as a thing among other things" (pg. 80-81)
    - "if being is not a thing, neither is it a characteristic of a thing..." (pg. 81)
      - "existence or being-ness, therefore, cannot be a characteristic among other characteristics" (pg. 81)
      - "[though,] existence is a necessary condition of the possession of any characteristics" (pg. 83)
  - "**to notice or advert...is not to see things which other people do not see; it is to advert to or notice what many people rarely advert to explicitly, partly because of the familiar and it-goes-without-saying character of what is noticed, partly because their predominant interests do not facilitate their noticing it**" (pg. 85)
    - "but I don't think that this noticing by itself makes the metaphysician" (pg. 85)
      - "John's attention, canalized by his affection for Mary, is concentrated on a particular instance; he does not abstract from this particular instance; he does not undertake any work of reflective analysis, nor does he inquire into the general implications of what he notices" (pg. 85)
        - ◆ "I think that this noticing is a condition of metaphysics" (pg. 85)
    - "if metaphysics is concerned with real being, it must, I think, start with adverting to existence in particular cases...For I am convinced that metaphysical problems rise out of common experience or, rather, out of adverting to what is in some sense perfectly familiar to all" (pg. 86)
- Chapter 7 - The Meaning of the Terms Predicated of God (pg. 87)
  - See text
- Chapter 8 - The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy (pg. 103)
  - "it is true to say, I think, that in what one may call, in a very wide sense, **the idealist current in modern philosophy the tendency has been to look on consciousness, or rather self-consciousness, as the chief characteristic of personality**. In the system of Hegel, for example, we find the progress of mind or spirit consisting predominately in the advance of self-consciousness, though self-consciousness did not mean for Hegel precisely what it meant for Descartes" (pg. 104)
    - "but in the case of the modern thinkers whose philosophies of personality I wish briefly to discuss the emphasis is laid on freedom rather than on self-consciousness. **Freedom becomes recognized as the chief characteristic of the human person**. Perhaps, however, it would be preferable to say that human freedom is regarded as the efficient cause of personality, or at least as its necessary condition, for **personality is looked on as something to be won, something to be created and maintained with effort**. In the eyes of certain thinkers one can become a person and one can cease to be a person; one can descend, for example, into being a mere 'individual' or a mere 'self'" (pg. 104)
  - "one scarcely needs to recall to mind the fact that Kierkegaard, the father of modern existentialism, rejected the Hegelian conception of the Absolute, which seemed to him to reduce the individual human person to a mere moment in the life or self-unfolding of the Absolute. Kierkegaard drew attention to the category of the 'individual' and ridiculed the absolute idealist who forgets himself, the individual thinker, and tries to become impersonal, abstract thought or mind" (pg. 105)
    - "Kierkegaard emphasized the individual's act of free submission to the moral law and his free acceptance or choice of his personal

- relationship to God. **A man becomes an 'individual' by the exercise of his free choice, by freely giving form and direction to his life"** (pg. 106)
- "[Marcel holds that] in modern life a man is not primarily a human person; he is an embodied function, a railwayman, a clerk, a civil servant, a schoolmaster, a trades-union official, or whatever it may be. When he retires, he is still regarded and regards himself in terms of his function; he is a retired civil servant, a retired doctor, a retired detective" (pg. 106)
    - ◆ "Marcel is a convinced Christian; but a like theme is emphasized by Camus, who is an atheist, and, to a certain extent, by Sartre...**for both [Marcel and Sartre] man is more than an embodied social function, just as he is more than a mere biological urge"** (pg. 107)
      - ◇ *\*i.e., a 'sovereign propensity' - cf. D. Binseel, On The Theory of the Aggregate Image, pg. 4 - "to not allow the reader to confuse such sovereignty with that of the political sort, it is very important to clarify what I mean by 'sovereign'; specifically, that propensities are innately engrained in the faculty of all humans – otherwise being, universal. It is in this determinate fashion which make propensities sovereign".*
      - ◆ **"in place of man as a mere member of the social complex existentialism sets the individual human being, aware of his personal freedom, his potentialities and the incommunicable and unique in himself"** (pg. 107)
        - ◇ "it is also true that existentialism expresses a reaction against positivism" (pg. 108)
          - ▶ "in the preface to the volume of essays entitled *Personal Idealism* Henry Sturt spoke not only the neglect of personality by some of the leading thinkers of his day but also of the attack made on it by the naturalists...Naturalism and Absolutism, agnostic as they seem to be, combine in assuring us that personality is an illusion" (pg. 107-108)
        - ◆ "the existentialists depict man as existing in a literal sense, as standing out from the background of nature..." (pg. 108)
          - ◇ "for the existentialist there is a sharp difference between the *Umwelt*, the world of things or objects, and the *Mitwelt* or the world of persons" (pg. 108)
            - ▶ **"Heidegger represents the world of things as the field of action of the human person"** (pg. 108)
              - *\*i.e., all the ways in which man can involve himself as being-in-the-world.*
            - ◇ **"both Heidegger and Jaspers, I think, maintain that, since man can raise the problem of being in general, the metaphysical problem, he thereby shows that he transcends the sphere of immediate vital needs and impulses to which the animal is confined"** (pg. 108)
          - ◆ "the theistic current in existentialism emphasizes man's openness to the Transcendent. This emphasis can be seen in the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, Berdyaev and in...Lavelle and Le Senne" (pg. 108-109)
    - "according to Mounier, the individual is 'the diffusion of the person on the surface of his life and his satisfaction in losing himself therein'" (pg. 109)
      - "the individual thus corresponds to the man who stands on the lowest level of the Spinozistic ethic; he is a man who regards himself as the only pebble on the beach, the man who, from a practical point of view, absolutizes his own ego" (pg. 109)
        - ◆ *\*E. Cassirer, in An Essay on Man, says "Man is always inclined to regard the small circle in which he lives as the center of the world and to make his particular, private life the standard of the universe. But he must give up this vain pretense, this petty provincial way of thinking and judging"* (pg. 14)
      - "one might also say that he is man considered on the biological level, the man in whom the biological urge to self-preservation is all-dominant. He is not unlike the atomistic individual depicted by Thomas Hobbes" (pg. 109)
    - "the 'person' on the other hand, is conceived by the personalists in close connection with the idea of moral vocation. According to M. Mounier, the person is 'mastery, choice, formation, conquest of self'" (pg. 110)
  - **"in political theory we find two extreme positions.** First, there is extreme individualism which makes the private interests and purposes of the individual supreme. I suppose that a representative theory of this type would be that of Herbert Spencer, according to whom the state exists simply in order to enable individual being to pursue their private interests in peace. The individual is everything, and the more the importance of society or of the state is minimized the better. Secondly, there is extreme collectivism or totalitarianism. This may take various concrete forms; but in essence it means the complete subordination of the individual to society and of the private interests of the individual to the interests of the group..." (pg. 110-111)
    - **"individualism absolutizes the 'individual'; it endeavors to make absolutes of the parts at the expense of the whole - just as though an individual cell in an organism were to assert itself at the expense of the organism. Collectivism, on the other hand, represents the organism's reassertion of its own greater value and importance against the undue self-assertion of the cell or the part"** (pg. 111)
      - **"but man is not simply an 'individual', a member of the group; he is also a 'person', and independent being with a spiritual nature** which surmounts the biological and economic levels. It follows that both atomistic individualism and totalitarianism are wrong, since neither allows for the person's moral and spiritual nature and vocation" (pg. 111)
      - **"the person is a social being; but at the same time he is more than a mere member of the group.** He is oriented towards society, but not like a cell in an organism; **he is oriented towards a society or persons, and a society of persons is a society of free, morally responsible human beings...**" (pg. 112)
        - ◆ "Marxism...tends to interpret man simply in terms of its initial economic categories" (pg. 112)
  - **"the existentialist regard man as capable of what they call 'authentic existence'** but at the same time as ever menaced by the tendency to 'unauthentic existence'" (pg. 113)
    - "the personalists regard man as capable of becoming a 'person' but at the same time as threatened by the tendency to surrender either to egocentric individualism or to submersion in the totality" (pg. 113-114)
      - "it might appear to follow from this that personalism is an anti-social philosophy or that it at least belittles objective social institutions like the state" (pg. 111-112)
        - ◆ "Sartre has had to defend his doctrine against the charge of being anti-social" (pg. 114)
    - "the personalists...emphasize the person's orientation towards society" (pg. 114)
      - "the personalists concern themselves extensively with problems arising out of the present conditions of society, particularly with the relation between the person and the common good..." (pg. 117)
    - **"existentialists...tend to describe authentic existence in negative terms.** It involves a tearing oneself away from the mentality of the crowd, a separation, a refusal." (pg. 114)
      - "for the personalists, however, the person and the society of persons are taken as the positive standard: the 'individual' is simply a degraded condition of the person, just as the totalitarian state is a degraded form of the true state" (pg. 114)
  - "both personalists and existentialists possess a sense of the dramatic aspects of man's existence, the former insisting that personality, the latter than authentic existence is something constantly to be won and maintained, that it is for ever threatened. The theme of self-creating is common to them both; and 'self-creating' is the achievement of freedom" (pg. 114)
  - "I am very doubtful if any strict definition of freedom can be given which would give a clear idea of it to any who was not already experimentally acquainted with it...it would seem that a definition of freedom must either presuppose some awareness of freedom or misrepresent it by defining

- it in terms of what it is not" (pg. 115)
- "but I think that it would be a mistake to allow one's natural impatience with vague or unfamiliar language to lead one into rejecting the modern Continental philosophers unheard, that is, without one's making any real attempt to understand what they are getting at" (pg. 122)
  - **"Sartre assures us that freedom is the being of man"** (pg. 115)
    - "self-consciousness...means presence to oneself; therefore distance from oneself" (pg. 115)
      - ◆ "what separates oneself from oneself is nothing, Man, as *pour-soi*, perpetually 'secretes' his own nothingness; by his very structure he is perpetually torn away, as it were, from what he was and what he is: he is a perpetual movement away from what he was to what he will be. We can never say of him, without qualification, that he is; he is perpetually constrained to make himself: he is *project*. Now, freedom is precisely the nothingness which is at the heart of man and which 'constrains the human reality to *make* itself, instead of *being*'...Values are not recognized by man but determined by him: I am the being by whom values exist. Freedom is thus unoriented, in the sense that there is no objective value correlative to the human will" (pg. 115-116)
        - ◇ "for man, to be is to choose oneself: nothing comes to him either from within or from without that he can receive or accept. He is entirely and helplessly abandoned to the insupportable necessity of making himself be, even down to the last detail" - Sartre (pg. 116)
      - ◆ "it appears that Sartre regards freedom as identical with man's being" (pg. 116)
        - ◇ "Sartre's doctrine of freedom, taken in itself, seems to me to be nihilistic in character..." (pg. 116)
        - ◇ "Sartre seem to be, to all intents and purposes, a materialist: at least his philosophy seems to be deeply influenced by the materialism of the French Enlightenment, in so far as the latter was materialistic in spirit: but Marcel interprets personality in the light of a philosophy of spiritual being" (pg. 117)
          - ▶ "Marcel is concerned [with showing] how one 'becomes' a person by transcending one's self-enclosedness in love for other persons and in the free acceptance of a personal relationship to God" (pg. 117-118)
    - "for Berdyaev, freedom is not natural to man; it is something to be won; and it is to be won only by entering an order of being which is superior to the natural order" (pg. 118)
      - *\*this sounds quite Hobbesian*
  - Chapter 9 - Existentialism: Introductory (pg. 125)
    - **"the term 'existentialism' does not connote any one particular philosophic system"** (pg. 125)
    - "[Sartre] connects ['existence precedes essence'] with atheism, by declaring that it means, or that part of its meaning is, that there are no eternal essences, present as 'ideas' in the mind of God, which precede the existence of things. He also appears to mean that there are no objective essence at all, essences being determined in terms of human interests and choice" (pg. 126)
      - "the proposition 'existence precedes essence', as understood by Sartre, would be acceptable neither to Kierkegaard nor to Jaspers" (pg. 127)
    - "in his work *Existentialism from Within* Dr. E. L. Allen describes existentialism as an attempt to philosophize from the standpoint of the actor rather than, as has been customary, from the standpoint of the spectator" (pg. 127-128) <https://jep.utm.edu/existent/>
      - "Kierkegaard...philosophizes in function to his own personal problem. **Philosophy and biography go together** in the sense that the former arises in response to personal problems in which Kierkegaard is involved and which are solved on the existential level, by choice, rather than simply on the abstract and theoretical level. **He does not stand back from problems as an impersonal analyst and spectator; he grapples with them as one who is involved in them with his whole being**; they are for him not merely objects of intellectual curiosity but rather matters of vital concern which he cannot regard with a purely detached interest. **He is not spectator, but actor**" (pg. 128)
    - "philosophizing inevitably involves standing back from the sphere of immediate experience; in involves reflection, communication, or at least communicability, and so universalization" (pg. 129)
      - *\*cf. H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Chapter 11 - Thinking and Doing: The Spectator (pg. 92) - "it is not through acting but through contemplating that the 'something else', namely, the meaning of the whole, is revealed...the spectator, not the actor, holds the clue to the meaning of human affairs"* (pg. 96) [https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_baa0f1a451df43d8a5d6f882a73bb7ac.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_baa0f1a451df43d8a5d6f882a73bb7ac.pdf)
    - "the distinction with which we are concerned is...between philosophizing from the standpoint of a spectator and philosophizing from the standpoint of the actor. And the contention with which we are concerned is that existentialism is an attempt to philosophize from the standpoint of the actor rather than from that of the spectator" (pg. 129)
      - "Marcel tries, for example, to penetrate the metaphysical significance of love or hope from within the experience itself rather than by treating it in the detached 'objective' manner that a psychoanalyst might. In other words, he tries to combine the immediacy of experience with philosophical reflection" (pg. 130)
      - "we find **both Jaspers and Sartre**, in spite of the striking differences between their philosophies, **united in their concern to reveal to man what he is and what the concrete possibilities of human choice are, with a view of illuminating and promoting authentic choice**" (pg. 131)
        - "their concern with the illumination and promotion of authentic choice shows that they are concerned with the actor and not simply with satisfying the intellectual curiosity of the spectator" (pg. 131)
      - "as for Heidegger, his philosophizing would seem to be that of the spectator rather than that of the actor if we go by his declared intentions in *Sein and Zeit*. For he is concerned with the construction of an ontology, with examining and solving the problem of Being, or of the meaning of Being; and he insists that the existential analysis of man is a preliminary stage in the treatment of the general ontological problem" (pg. 131)
    - "it is often said that existentialists are primarily concerned with man" (pg. 132)
      - It will not...fit the case of Heidegger who, as we have seen, set out to take up afresh the problem of the meaning of Being (das Sein), so that for him the ontological problem of Being is more central than any discussion of man. Nor, it may be objected, will the statement fit the case of Jaspers who has explicitly declared that the philosophy of the present day is, like that of former times, concerned with Being" (pg. 132-133)
      - "when we come to writers like Sartre and Camus, it is clear, I think, that their philosophies center round man" (pg. 133)
      - "existentialists...are not concerned with man in so far as he can be treated as an object like any other object and studied with the aid of scientific method" (pg. 134)
        - "though man can objectify himself, he is also subject, a fact which is shown, indeed, by his very capacity to objectify himself. And it is with man as subject that the existentialists are concerned" (pg. 134)
          - ◆ "for them **the primary datum is man-in-the-world** and not the self-enclosed ego of Descartes" (pg. 134)
            - ◇ "Marcel avoids the gulf between the self-enclosed consciousness of Descartes and the external world..." (pg. 134)
            - ◇ **"Sartre, it is true, has declared that his starting-point is subjectivity and that the first and basic truth is the Cogito"** (pg. 134)
      - "man, therefore, as considered by the existentialists, is the concrete human person, not an abstract epistemological subject. But at the same

time he is considered under a particular aspect, namely as a free, self-creating and self-transcending subject" (pg. 134-135)

- **"man creates himself in the sense that what he becomes depends on his freedom, on his choice.** And man transcends himself in the sense that, as long as he lives, he cannot be identified with his past. Through the exercise of freedom he transcends the past, the already-made" (pg. 135)
  - ◆ "man...is capable of freely transcending the weight of the past" (pg. 135)
- **"but it would be a mistake to suppose that the existentialist are concerned simply with an academic analysis of man as free, analogous to the scientific analysis performed, for example, by the physiologist. Rather do they try to illuminate human freedom and its implications with a view to promoting authentic human choice"** (pg. 135)
  - **"Kierkegaard drew attention to what it means to be an existing individual, above all to what it means to be a Christian.** And he did so in order to illuminate and facilitate choice. Whether a man drifts with the crowd and hardly merits to be called an existing individual or whether he becomes by free affirmation what he is, a finite individual related to God, is a question which can be answered only existentially, that is, by free choice; and no amount of theorizing or of purely intellectual dialectics can take the place of choice" (pg. 135)
    - ◆ "though theorizing cannot solve a man's existential problems, reflection can illuminate and facilitate choice" (pg. 136)
      - ◇ "according to Jaspers, existentialism as a general theory is the death of the philosophy of existence. It is not the function of the philosopher to teach a *Weltanschauung*. The philosopher should be concerned with making clear to man the possibilities of choice and showing what authentic choice is" (pg. 136)
    - ◆ **"to be sure, no philosophy is possible without reflection, analysis and description of universal terms; but at the same time the object is to illuminate human existence with a view to the decision and choice which the individual has to make for himself"** (pg. 136)
      - ◇ "I must admit, however, that the statement that the existentialists are concerned with promoting the exercise of authentic freedom is not applicable to Heidegger, if, that is to say, one takes into account, as one should, the philosopher's own explanation of his intentions. For though Heidegger draws distinction between authentic and unauthentic existence, and though he has been interpreted as intending to promote the former, he has protested that the distinction was purely a matter of analysis and that he was not concerned in any way with exhortation. If, therefore, one persists in applying to Heidegger what I have just been saying about existentialists in general, one does violence to his thought" (pg. 137)
  - **"we can say that existentialism in general is the form taken in a particular historical epoch by the recurrent protest of the free individual against all that threatens or seems to threaten his unique position as an ex-sistent subject, that is to say, as a free subject who, though a being in the world and so part of nature, at the same time stands out from the background of nature"** (pg. 137)
    - "from time to time we find in philosophy the tendency to treat man simple as 'object', as an item in the physical cosmos, to reduce him, as far as possible, to the level of every other object in the world, and to explain away the consciousness of freedom. But we find also that **this tendency is offset by a counter-affirmation, which is more than a mere protest, since it draws attention to aspects of man which have been slurred over or neglected.** The 'spiritualist' movement in French philosophy can be said to constitute a counter-affirmation to materialism and determinism and to embody the free human being's reassertion of himself. But it is not only materialism which can threaten to engulf the free individual: absolute idealism can appear to do the same" (pg. 137)
      - ◆ **"[Kierkegaard] revolted against the Hegelian exaltation of the Idea or Absolute at the expense of the individual** and against the Hegelian insistence of mediation and on the dialectical synthesis of opposites. **The primary fact is the individual,** and it is simply comical if the individual strives to strip himself of his individuality by the exercise of thought and to merge himself in the universal consciousness or cosmic reason. Absolute idealism may be a philosophy for the study and for the professor's chair; but it is not a philosophy which has much relevance to the existential problems of human life" (pg. 138)
        - ◇ "existentialism lays special emphasis on the free individual" (pg. 141)
    - **"existentialism, by insisting on the individual, on the free subject, is also a protest the general tendency in our civilization to resolve the individual into his social function or functions..."** (pg. 139)
      - ◆ "this theme has been developed by Gabriel Marcel in particular, who believes that the tendency towards the functionalization of man involves a degradation of the human person" (pg. 139)
      - ◆ "in general, therefore, we can say that **existentialism represents the reassertion of the free man against the collectivity or any tendency to depersonalization**" (pg. 139)
        - ◇ "but existentialism is more than a protest of the free individual against totalitarianism and impersonal functionalization. For in certain of its forms it seems to me to be presented, tacitly at least, as a way of salvation" (pg. 139)
          - ▶ "in the ancient world we find people looking to philosophy for a way of life, for reasoned guidance in conduct and belief...I do not mean, of course, that great numbers of people turned to philosophy for moral guidance and for religious belief. Serious philosophy is scarcely a popular pastime; and the number of people who pay much attention to philosophers is at any time comparatively restricted" (pg. 139)
          - ▶ "in the mediaeval world the situation was very different. The way of salvation was provided by the Christian religion, and, whether they practiced it or not, men accepted the Christian code as the norm of moral action. Philosophy, therefore, tended to be a purely academic pursuit..." (pg. 140)
          - ▶ "it is now realized more clearly than it was in the last century that **we cannot expect science to provide us with a normative morality..."** (pg. 140)
      - ◆ **"the individual has become a riddle to himself"** - Author (pg. 141)
        - "he has been described as alienated man, or as man in a state of alienation. And it is to this alienated individual, thrown back on himself and yet unable to find in himself the answers to the problems which best him, that the message of existentialists seems especially to be addressed" (pg. 142)
        - **"but in order to facilitate authentic existence, deliberate self-commitment in the light of realization of man's existential situation, [existentialists] try to break through the crust of social consciousness and crowd-mentality and awaken the individual to a vision of his existential situation and of his responsibility and potentialities as a free individual"** (pg. 143)
          - ▶ "and this, I think, is one of the reasons why some of them use or seem to use such dramatic and highly colored language. For in many cases they use this language **to draw attention to a real or supposed truth which is in some sense already known though it has not been realized by the individual as a truth affecting and deeply involving himself.** For instance, everyone is aware in a vague way that 'one eventually dies'. But it is one thing to be aware that 'one dies', and it is another thing to realize that I personally am advancing towards my death from the first moment of my existence, to see this as a sign of my finitude and to realize vividly the problems concerning the significance and value of human hopes and ideals which arise out of finitude and its consequences" (pg. 143)
      - "preoccupation with the drama of human existence...is, indeed, the feature which most strikes the reader; and it is the feature which most obviously qualifies these philosophers for the title 'existentialist'" (pg. 144)

- ◆ "the so-called 'existentialists' are, as we have seen, primarily concerned with human existence, considered in a dramatic light; and the term 'existence' has for them a special meaning, referring first and foremost to man as free, self-transcending subject" (pg. 144)
    - "if it is proper to make the distinction between authentic and unauthentic existence, it must, it seems to me, be proper to speak of man as willing or as not willing to become what in some sense he already is" (pg. 146-147)
  - "Marxists have represented the existentialism of M. Sartre as being the philosophy of the dying bourgeois" (pg. 138-139)
- Chapter 10 - Theistic Existentialism (pg. 148)
  - (Kierkegaard)
    - "it may, of course, be said that [Kierkegaard] did scant justice to Hegel. For the latter has no intention of advocating the suppression of individuality: what he maintained was that the human being attains the fulfillment of his true nature, not as an atomic individual, but by accepting his moral responsibilities as a member of society. Furthermore, **the state was not for Hegel the highest good.** The state belongs to the sphere of 'objective spirit'; and above this sphere stands the sphere of 'absolute spirit': in which the human spirit reveals itself in the activities of art, religion and philosophy. Moreover, it is a mistake to think that Hegel attached no value to freedom" (pg. 148)
      - "[though,] the notion of a higher synthesis whereby individuality and personal freedom are lifted dialectically on to a higher plane was repugnant to [Kierkegaard]. The individual expresses or finds his true self, not by being caught up, as it were, in a higher synthesis, but by becoming more and more of an individual" (pg. 149)
      - "[Kierkegaard] rejected altogether the process of rationalization which he found in Hegel, the substitution of mediation for faith" (pg. 154)
        - ◆ "the Hegelian dialectic is an enemy within the gates; and it is not the business of any Christian writer or preacher to dilute Christianity to suit the general educated public" (pg. 154-155)
          - ◇ *\*I would have said 'un-educated' public*
    - "Kierkegaard, who was born in 1815, was brought up by his father, a deeply religious man but one afflicted by melancholy and tormented by a sense of guilt" (pg. 149)
    - "the aesthetic man refuses to recognize and to choose himself, to commit himself; anything which binds him down and gives shape and definiteness to his life, such as morality and religion, he rejects" (pg. 151)
      - "above the aesthetic stage is the moral or ethical stage. The shapeless 'individualism' of the first stage is renounced in favor of subordination to the universal, that is, the universal moral law..." (pg. 151)
      - "thirdly, we have the religious stage, the standpoint of faith. The specific character of this stage is that the individual does not subordinate himself to an impersonal universal law but stands in an immediate relation, affirmed by faith, to the supreme Subject, the personal Absolute, God" (pg. 151)
        - ◆ "it is through the affirmation, in faith, of his relationship to God that the human being becomes the individual in the highest possible degree" (pg. 151)
    - "in the theory of these stages we have, indeed, a dialectic. But it is not an existential dialectic" (pg. 152)
      - "the passage from one stage to the other is effected by choice" (pg. 152)
        - ◆ "the stages are thus discontinuous. To say this is not to say that there is no connection at all between them." (pg. 152)
          - ◇ "on the aesthetic level a man never comes to the integration of his personality; he does not give form and definiteness to his existence, and in this sense he has no self. This dispersion of the personality produces melancholy, one form of despair; and the way out is achieved by making the leap to the ethical level on which a man overcomes the formless dispersion of the personality characteristic of the aesthetic level by subordinating himself to the universal" (pg. 152)
            - ▶ "we are left with the leap of faith, the passionate appropriation by the individual of an 'objective uncertainty'" (pg. 153)
      - "to choose oneself before God, to commit oneself to faith, appears to be equivalent to losing oneself, to throwing oneself into the abyss; and man recoils from it. On the other hand, if a man risks all and leaps, he finds himself; he chooses his true self...He who has no God is alienated from himself: he is 'in despair'. He who makes the leap of faith 'recovers' himself, his true self, after the dispersion of the aesthetic level. Faced with the leap, therefore, man is simultaneously attracted and repelled" (pg. 153)
        - "We can now understand what Kierkegaard means by 'existence'. It does not mean simply being there, in the world, nor even simply living. Kierkegaard uses the illustration of a drunken peasant who is asleep in his cart and lets the horses proceed on their accustomed way. Inasmuch as he is there with the reins in his hands he is in some sense a driver. But we can also say that he does not drive. **So there are many who exist but who at the same time do not 'exist'.** That is to say, they drift along, following custom and convention and without ever becoming individuals in anything but an ontological sense. **To 'exist' means choosing one's true self; 'existence' is something to be won by choice**" (pg. 153-154)
          - ◆ "Kierkegaard can therefore speak of it as a 'process of becoming' and as a 'striving'" (pg. 154)
    - (Jaspers)
      - "to Jaspers...philosophy is still concerned with Being. But the rise of the sciences has made it impossible any more to regard philosophy as the 'science' of Being" (pg. 157)
        - "Kant saw clearly that metaphysics is not a science....Metaphysical philosophy is still concerned with Being; but it is not theoretical science of Being" (pg. 157)
          - ◆ "Kant has shown us that there is no theoretical science of Being. But we should not conclude that philosophy is not concerned with Being" (pg. 157)
        - "**the first task of philosophy is to justify itself, to show that there really is room for philosophy.** And this is done by breaking through the idea of an all-comprehensive scientific system of reality, that is, by breaking down, not only the positivist conception of an all-inclusive scientific conception of reality, but also any idealist notion, of the type defended by Hegel, of a comprehensive system" (pg. 158)
          - "a universal science would deal with Being; but there cannot be a science of Being. In order for there to be one, Being would have to be objectified, to be turned into a determinate object. And then it would not be Being; it would be a being" (pg. 158)
            - ◆ "the positivist spirit endeavors to understand man scientifically" (pg. 159)
              - ◇ "in order to understand the world scientifically, myself included, I must, as it were, stand back from the world; I must turn myself into an object. But though I can do this up to a certain point, it is absurd to think that I can objectify myself completely. To do so would be to cancel out the significance of understanding. I cannot be simply an object of my mind. But if positivism falls short, so does idealism. The idealist tries to subordinate all things to mind, or even to reduce all things to mind, in a way which neglects both the individual, in favor of consciousness in general, and the being which presents itself as 'the other' and as irreducible to mind or consciousness" (pg. 159)
          - "Jaspers regards it as desirable, if not essential, that a philosopher should possess some first-hand knowledge of a particular science" (pg. 159)
            - ◆ "for a true understanding of the nature and function of philosophy, therefore, it is necessary to grasp the fact of the limitations of science" (pg. 159)



- "the being which stands over against the world of objects, in the sense that it cannot be properly said of it that 'it is', is that being which is essentially the potentiality of its own being. **This is what Jaspers calls *Existenz*.** As an empirical being which is 'there', which can be objectified and analyzed scientifically, I am Dasein, object. But **I am something more than something 'there'. I am, in a sense, not there at all: I am the possibility of my own being, in the sense that I am never something already made, something finished and classifiable: I am constantly creating myself, as it were, or freely realizing my being through my own choices.** Existence in the sense of *Existenz* is always possible existence. It is true that one can talk about this in general terms; but **my possibilities are not yours and my relationship to myself is not yours. *Existenz* is 'something' individual and personal.** Philosophy, therefore, while it can draw attention to and clarify the meaning of *Existenz*, cannot treat it as a scientifically investigable object. One cannot properly use the categories of Kant in the description of *Existenz*: one has to use categories such as freedom" (pg. 160)
  - "the Kantian categories apply to objects of scientific knowledge; the notion of freedom is applicable to the self which transcends scientific treatment. Freedom cannot be proved or disproved; it is not something given which enters the sphere of phenomena. Freedom is, however, experienced in actual choice when I am aware of my possibilities for what I make of myself. In fact, **admission of freedom is the act of one who has the courage to recognize that what he makes of himself is his own creation**" (pg. 160-161)
- "the purpose of [Jasper's *Philosophie*] is not to give a scientific analysis of *Existenz* but rather to appeal to the individual to recognize his peculiar character as potential existence. It is a means of reminding or of awakening rather than instructing" (pg. 161)
  - "Jaspers thinks that it is largely in and through what he calls 'communication' that one comes to realize one's own possibilities" (pg. 161)
- "on the purely scientific level the problem of Being has no meaning. For science deals with the world of objects, and Being is not objectifiable. If it were, it would not be Being. To ask what Being is, is not a scientific question, and it can receive no scientific answer. But the philosopher can show, as we have seen, that science is limited...in the sense that it necessarily takes the form of the particular sciences, no one of which can become a substitute for metaphysics" (pg. 162)
  - "the problem of Being does not arise in a positive way on the scientific level; it arises on the plane of *Existenz*. It arises in the context of man's forward-movement towards the discovery of himself in liberty" (pg. 162)
    - ◆ "man does not and cannot discover the Transcendent by science. He discovers the Transcendent only because he is himself a 'transcending' being. It is, as it were, in the flight towards his true self that man discovers the Transcendent" (pg. 162)
      - ◇ "Kant was right in saying that [definite and systematic] knowledge [of the Transcendent] is not possible" (pg. 163)
      - ◆ "in man's forward movement towards the achievement of his true self in liberty he becomes conscious of his finitude. He is conscious of his limits and at the same time of his movement towards the transcending of limits" (pg. 163)
        - ◇ "I become conscious of the enveloping presence of Being as the ground of all beings" (pg. 163)
          - ▶ "this awareness is a purely personal act. It cannot be reduced to any universally-valid proof of the Transcendent. Nor have I any private proof of the existence of the Transcendent. I apprehend the Transcendent, not by mystical experience of a positive nature, but only in the authentic exercise of my liberty" (pg. 163)
            - "the Transcendent is not something the existence of which can be proved. Its affirmation or denial is a matter of liberty. I can affirm it and come to my true self, grounded in Being, or I can deny it: the two possibilities, represented by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, remain open" (pg. 163-164)
          - ▶ "a man can remain immersed in 'unauthentic' existence, immersed purely in the world of objects; and then he will remain blind to the Transcendent" (pg. 163)
      - "philosophy is, fundamentally, an opening-up of the mind to the Transcendent" (pg. 162)
        - ◆ "all philosophy can do is to clarify and facilitate choice. It cannot make a man's choice for him; nor can it provide proofs as a substitute for choice" (pg. 164)
  - "[Jaspers's] philosophy has really one aim, to illuminate and facilitate man's act of transcending all that can be clearly conceived" (pg. 165)
  - (Gabriel Marcel)
    - "he is a peculiarly elusive thinker, a philosopher whom it is extremely difficult to summarize" (pg. 165)
    - "Marcel is a personal thinker in the sense that he reflects on experiences which have for him in his own life a special importance and which seem to him to possess metaphysical significance and implication" (pg. 165-166)
      - "Marcel reflects on experiences such as hope, love and fidelity, which can in principle be shared by anyone" (pg. 166)
        - ◆ "no systematized summary of his thought can really convey the spirit of his philosophy" (pg. 166)
  - "for each of [whom we've discussed] God is discovered or encountered by the individual in the movement towards the free realization and appropriation of his true self rather than as the term of impersonal objective argument" (pg. 173)
    - "the theistic existentialists thus strive to overcome human alienation by the rediscovery of the world of personal communion with other persons and with God. They try to reawaken modern man to a sense of depth and mystery in the familiar and to show how he can find his true self only in the conscious appropriation of his relation both to the finite and to the infinite 'thou'. Modern man, alienated from his true self, strives to find it. Philosophy can illuminate his way. But the last word rests with man's liberty. **Philosophy can illuminate choice: it cannot perform a man's act of choice for him**" (pg. 174)
  - Chapter 11 - Atheistic Existentialism (pg. 175)
    - "the atheistic existentialist starts from the position of the man for whom, in Nietzsche's phrase, 'God is dead'; that is to say, from the position of the man for whom the idea of God...no longer possesses any validity" (pg. 175)
      - "most people, at least in our technical civilization, do not believe in elves and fairies" (pg. 175)
        - "some would claim, it cannot, in the nature of the case, be proved that God does not exist; but there is no good evidence that He does exist, and many people have ceased to believe that there is a God" (pg. 175)
    - "Nietzsche argued that once belief in the Christian God is dead belief in the Christian moral code, as a universally valid moral code, must also eventually perish. To put the matter more generally, if there is no God, there is no universally-obligatory moral law and no absolute objective values" (pg. 175)
      - "if there is no God, 'everything is permitted', as Dostoevsky's character said. The free human being is thus thrown back on himself and made totally responsible. In a godless world he has to choose his own set of values, and if any meaning is to be found in human life it can only be the meaning which man himself has given it. We have, therefore, the man who has to act in this world in which he finds himself and who at the same time cannot look for help or guidance either to God or to an autonomous and universally valid moral law or to a realm of absolute values. It is to man in this state of alienation and loneliness that the message of atheistic existentialism is primarily addressed" (pg. 175)
        - "*\*I disagree with the notion that in the absence of God there, too, is a correlating and necessary absence of objective morality - humans are a commonality in-themselves, and it is for this common-ness which serves as the foundation for objectivity (i.e., semblance of harmony between...) with respect to how each relates to each other through their activities.*"
    - "even though [Heidegger] does not state that there is no God, he does not affirm God's existence" (pg. 176)
    - (Heidegger)
      - "at the beginning of *Sein und Zein* Heidegger speaks of renewing this problem, the problem of the meaning of Being (*das Sein*)" (pg. 177)
        - "to ask for the meaning of Being...is to ask what the Being of beings is" (pg. 177)

- "according to Heidegger, we must start with the being of the questioner himself. Man stands in a peculiar position with regard to the problem of Being. It is he who raises the problem; and he is able to do this because he has a special relation to Being. The raising of the problem is itself a mode of Being" (pg. 177)
          - ◆ "we should start rather with man considered as the being who is capable of raising the problem of Being" (pg. 177)
            - ◇ "according to Heidegger God would be a being rather than Being. And it is Being, not beings or a being, with which we are concerned" (pg. 177)
            - ◆ "we should start with an analysis of man as the being who is open to Being" (pg. 178)
- **"man, Dasein, is 'existence', Existenz. But human existence cannot really be defined; for it is potential being or a potentiality of being. Man is continually in advance of himself [i.e., for-himself; or, forward-of-himself; or, ahead-of-himself-to-be-himself], so to speak, reaching out into the future, transcending himself"** (pg. 178)
  - "at the same time we can analyze the ontological structure and mode of existence of man. And the first thing to notice is that **man is being-in-the-world...in the sense that he stands in relation with other things and persons...**" (pg. 178)
    - ◇ "to say that man is a being in the world means, according to Heidegger's interpretation of his philosophy, that man is open to Being. And in later writings he has depicted man as the 'shepherd' or guardian of Being. It is man who can raise the problem of Being; and he can do so because he ex-sists or stands out from the background of Nature as open to Being" (pg. 183)
      - ▶ "man, as man, is potentially open to the mystery of Being" (pg. 183)
    - ◆ "but Heidegger does not mean merely that man finds himself standing, as a matter of fact, in relations with other things and persons. He means that man exists as a being which is necessarily preoccupied or concerned with 'the other'" (pg. 178)
      - ◇ "but the relationship of being preoccupied or concerned with is a constitutive mode of his existence: he exists as being preoccupied or concerned with 'the other'. He is concerned with 'the other' in his forward movement towards the realization of his own possibilities; and through his preoccupation or concern he constitutes the world as a meaningful system of objects standing in intelligible relations to one another and to man himself" (pg. 178-179)
- **"the world of things is for Heidegger the world of tools or instruments"** (pg. 179)
  - "man is being-in-the-world as concerned with things as tools in the realization of his own possibilities" (pg. 179)
  - "that which is created by my preoccupation is the meaningful system or systems which form my world, not the brute 'thereness' of the other" (pg. 180)
    - ◆ *"which is to say, what (is) is what I make of it; not that it just 'is'. Rather, what things 'are' (or, at least, are-to-me) depend on how I take-up a certain disposition with respect to that beside myself - otherwise, how I step-into-myself to be- or not-be-with that which is other than myself. In short, how I am with myself with influence how I am with all that else.*
  - "the individual comes to discover himself as an individual subject only as a being within the world and as a being in relation with other persons. Social interdependence, being-with, is also constitutive of my mode of existence as a human being. The human being is in the world as a member of 'the one' (*das Man*); and this fundamental social interdependence shows itself in his participation in established ways of thinking ('one thinks') and feeling ('one feels'). Being-in-the-world is being-with (*Mitsein*)" (pg. 180)
    - ◆ "My world pre-supposes 'one's' world" (pg. 180)
  - **"Man is a being who is set towards the realization of his possibilities, not as an isolated ego, but as a being who is necessarily interrelated with the world of things and the world of persons"** (pg. 180)
- "it follows that man can never wholly escape from the impersonal anonymous form of existence which is rooted in membership of 'the one'. At the same time man, as potential being, is not condemned to one way of realizing himself, of existing. Two main paths lie open to him. He can acquiesce in his membership of 'the one' to the extent of becoming absorbed or immersed in the crowd-consciousness, thus gaining assurance at the expense of personal responsibility and resolute self-direction. This is 'unauthentic' existence. Or he can, within limits at least, assume personal responsibility for his destiny, freely choosing his own possibilities, above all his destiny of death. This is 'authentic existence'" (pg. 180)
  - "a pure authentic existence is not possible, since a man always retains his membership of 'the one'. But authentic existence is possible within limits" (pg. 181)
- "we must realize that man is in the world as 'thrown' into the world. It is as a being which is 'thrown' into the world, finite and abandoned, that he reaches out towards the realization of his possibilities and, in so doing, interprets the world and form his particular projects. And his final 'possibility', which itself annihilates all other possibilities, is death. **Man is the being who transcends himself in his movement towards the future, as a being who is 'thrown' into the world and who is destined to death**" (pg. 180-181)
- "according to Heidegger, **the fundamental structure of man is Care (Sorge). And this comprises three moments or elements. First**, there is man's concern with what he is to be. *Existenz* means being-in-front-of-oneself or self-project. And as man is Existenz, we must say that futurity characterizes man. Or, rather, man, self-projection, grounds futurity. And his concern with what he is to be is the first moment of Care. Secondly, man also himself in the world as 'thrown'. And man's concern with himself as thrown into the world grounds the past. Thirdly, man's being-wit (the things in the world) and his entanglement with particular preoccupations in the world grounds the present. Care, therefore, has three temporal moments, the primary moment being futurity. And as Care is the fundamental structure of man (of him who exists as self-projection in a world in which he finds himself as thrown and in which he is entangled through his preoccupations), it follows that man is temporal in structure. **My being is a flight from nothingness to nothingness in which, as accepting and willing my thrownness into the world and my relations in the world, I constitute past and present as I reach out to the future**" (pg. 181-182)
- "Heidegger...protested in energetic terms against the atheistic interpretation of his philosophy" (pg. 182)
  - "Heidegger tells us that his philosophy is a waiting for God, for a new manifestation of the divine" (pg. 183)
- "[what's] important from the point of view of the student of Heidegger's philosophy is the difficulty experienced in the deciphering his meaning, especially perhaps when he speaks about Being and Nothingness" (pg. 184)
- (Sartre)
  - "there is no doubt about his atheism. Sometimes, indeed, he says that, even if God existed, this would make no difference (in the sense at least that man would still be free and so responsible)" (pg. 185)
    - "he argues that the idea of God is self-contradictory; there cannot be a God" (pg. 185)
  - **"the shadow of Descartes lies over French philosophy"** (pg. 185)
    - "consciousness is always consciousness (of) something. True, implicit in consciousness and accompanying it is awareness of my consciousness. But awareness of my consciousness is awareness of my being conscious of something. And this something, the object of consciousness, is other than the subject. To say that consciousness is always consciousness of something is not to say that consciousness creates the being of the object; it is to say that consciousness by its very nature implies an object which cannot be reduced to consciousness" (pg. 185)
      - ◆ *"I would pause in saying 'aware of my consciousness' to say, otherwise, that we have 'knowledge' (of) ourselves as being a being which is conscious (in) the same moment of our consciousness. The reason for this structure of presumption is that it is opposite*

to the above - that which is presumed 'knowledge' (or, knowledge-able) pertains to the object (of) consciousness as opposed to the consciousness (of) consciousness. I would affirm that the only 'knowledge' one can truly have is what is (of) themselves - e.g., interiority.

- "all objects are phenomenal in the sense that they appear to or for consciousness" (pg. 186)
  - "we cannot, according to Sartre, properly inquire what lies 'behind' appearance. But we can investigate the being of appearance or the being of the phenomenon. And if we do so, transphenomenal being turns out to be opaque, self-identical being. **Strip away all determinate characteristics and all those meanings which are due to human interpretation in function of human purposes, and you are left with being-in-itself, of which we can only say that it is**" (pg. 186)
- "there are, therefore, two fundamental modes of being, *pour-soi* [for-itself] and *en-soi* [in-itself].
  - ◆ "on the one hand... there is being-in-itself. This is neither created nor necessary: it is simply there, gratuitous... On the other hand there is being-for-itself, consciousness, which is necessarily finite and contingent" (pg. 188)
  - "[consciousness] is therefore distance from or negation of [something]. Consciousness is a separation from; and yet what separates the *pour-soi* from the *en-soi* is nothing. Consciousness comes into being through the secretion of nothing. A rift or fissure, as it were, appears in being; and this rift or fissure cannot be described because it is nothing. **Nothingness lies at the heart of consciousness**. The latter is said by Sartre to secrete the nothingness which separates it from opaque, self-identical being; and man can thus be described as the being by which nothingness comes into the world. This does not mean that consciousness achieves a separation from the *en-soi* and a constitution of itself once and for all: it is constantly reconstituting itself as separation-from in regards to every particular object. Consciousness is always contingent: it always on the *en-soi*. At the same time it is separated from the *en-soi*, though that which separates it is nothing" (pg. 186)
    - ◆ "we must add that the *pour-soi* does not separate itself only from the *en-soi* in the sense of the 'external' object... [but] also separates itself from itself, constituting its own past as *en-soi*. By doing this I project myself into the future. By my self-transcendence and flight into the future I constitute past and present. Man's mode of being is thus temporal or historical. Temporality is in fact created by consciousness" (pg. 187)
      - ◇ "the act by which the *pour-soi* separates itself from its past constitutes man's liberty. I am not simply my past: on the contrary, I separate myself from it, though the interval is nothing. **I am thus not determined by my past; for I am separated from it. I am free**. And I remain free, freely constituting my future, until death supervenes and extinguishes all my possibilities. Death reduces me finally to the condition of *en-soi*..." (pg. 187)
      - ◆ "liberty can thus be described as the human being separating himself from his past 'by secreting his own nothing'. **My essence is what I have made of myself, it is myself considered historically. In this sense existence precedes essence...**" (pg. 187)
        - ◇ *\*meaning, I must exist first before my existence can acquire for-itself a past, where "each temporal dimension has its meaning in the other"* (J. Catalano, *A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness*, pg. 140-141)  
[https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063\\_12fda047d8be4df3a168019e413bfca2.pdf](https://www.binseelsnotes.com/files/ugd/d7b063_12fda047d8be4df3a168019e413bfca2.pdf)
    - "**Consciousness thus means being present to oneself as distant from oneself; and this distance is nothing. Nothingness is present at the heart of consciousness, haunting it;** and consciousness is inherently and perpetually unstable and contingent" (pg. 187)
      - ◆ "the fundamental drive in self-transcendence, in the flight into the future, is the drive towards the unification of *pour-soi* with *en-soi*, towards consciousness' self-grounding as conscious being-in-itself, and so towards the overcoming of its contingency. But this ideal project is doomed to frustration. And in this sense man is *une passion inutile* ["a useless passion"]. For **consciousness means presence to oneself as distant from oneself**, whereas being-in-itself means the absence of that fissure or rift which is essential to consciousness. It is thus impossible for *pour-soi* and *en-soi* to be united in one self-identical being" (pg. 187-188)
        - ◇ "this idea of the *pour-soi-en-soi* ["for-itself-in-itself"] is... the idea of God" (pg. 188)
          - ▶ "but this idea is self-contradictory. Consciousness excludes self-identity, and self-identity excludes consciousness. It is not simply that God does not exist as a matter of fact: there can be no God" (pg. 188)
      - "the problem of the existence of other selves is a false problem" (pg. 188)
        - ◆ "I and others are alike gratuitous" (pg. 188)
    - "the most important conclusion which [Sartre] draws seems to be... if there is not God, there are no universally-obligatory moral law and no set of absolute fixed values" (pg. 189)
      - *\*cf. comments on pg. 175*
      - "man is the sole source of values, and it rests with the individual to create or choose his own scale of values, his own ideal" (pg. 189)
        - ◆ "acts are performed with motives. But it is man himself who makes the motive a motive, who gives it value. And the choice of particular values depends on an initial project, an initial choice of an ideal" (pg. 189)
      - "man's liberty is thus unrestricted. There is no given universally-obligatory moral law, according to which he ought to act. He is the source of his own moral law. There are no absolute values which it is his task to realize in the world in concrete acts. He is the source of the values which he recognizes" (pg. 189)
        - ◆ *\*the key words, here, is 'given'. And, it is true that morality is not something given in the same sense as man is given his existence. However, along with man's given existence - or, more properly said, 'afforded'; 'handed to him through another's' - there also is the givenness of existence - that is, to-exist. And, it is for this 'to-exist' that morality can be objectively grounded, as each who does exist shares, at base, the want-to-exist. Those who wish not-to-exist will not-exist, leaving behind all those who do possess such want - thus the stipulation 'each who does exist...'. Morality strives at protecting and enabling those who exist 'to-exist'.*
        - ◆ "it may be said [however] that man's liberty is in fact restricted... For it is restricted by his own character, by his physico-psychological make-up, and by the historical situation in which he finds himself. But Sartre tries to make the individual responsible even for his physico-psychological make-up and for the historical situation in which he finds himself and in which he has to act. For by constituting his own past man assumes and makes himself responsible for himself as *en-soi*. And it is man who creates his own situation by projecting his ends" (pg. 189)
          - ◇ "my historical situation is what it is *for me*; and what it is for me depends on the end which I have set before myself. And since I choose my ideal or end freely, it also depends on me what my historical situation is. By choosing my ideal or end I choose and assume my historical situation" (pg. 190)
            - ▶ "one great difficulty about this interpretation of liberty is that the word 'free' seems to be used in such a wide sense..." (pg. 190)
            - ▶ "yet [acts] are free acts in the sense that I am not determined to perform them" (pg. 190)
            - ▶ "according to Sartre, I am never determined" (pg. 191)
              - "**unreflective or indeliberate acts... are none the less free acts. It remains true, therefore, that for Sartre liberty is unrestricted**" (pg. 191)

- ♦ *\*Here is where I would challenge the liberty (or, freeness) of such unreflective (or, pre-reflective) (i.e., impulsive or spontaneous) acts of consciousness. Maybe it is so that in such a mode of acting consciousness is nevertheless 'absolutely free', where all that differs between reflective and pre-reflective acts of consciousness is the correlative knowledge which accompanies reflective-consciousness.*
  - "the affective tonality of this unrestricted liberty, or rather of the apprehension or consciousness of this liberty, is dread" (pg. 191)
    - ♦ "this dread is to be distinguished from 'fear'. Fear is directed towards something other than oneself" (pg. 191)
    - ♦ **"it is in dread that man becomes conscious of his freedom"** (pg. 191)
      - ♦ "in unreflective acts... a man is not conscious of the 'nothing' which characterizes liberty, and these acts are therefore performed without dread. But dread accompanies the perception of this 'nothing' which separates my essence from my choice; and it is thus in dread that I become consciously aware of my liberty" (pg. 191-192)
        - ♦ "I can attempt to flee from this dread... by trying to hide from myself the 'nothing' which separates my essence from my choice... I am then in 'bad faith'" (pg. 192)
          - ♦ "bad faith can be distinguished from lying. To lie is to say what one knows or believes to be false; one attempts to deceive others rather than oneself. But **in bad faith one attempts to mask the truth from oneself**. And the possibility of bad faith is always present; its possibility is part of the structure of consciousness" (pg. 192)
          - ♦ "he may, indeed, attempt to evade [his] responsibility by surrendering to bad faith; but then he has himself chosen this bad faith" (pg. 192)
  - "all that the philosopher can do, and, indeed, all that one man can do for another, is to illuminate the possibilities of action and the meaning of liberty, with a view of promoting authentic choice or self-commitment as contrasted with drifting into decisions under the influence of the pressure of social conformity" (pg. 192)
    - "every individual human being creates his own values and his own moral law. He is totally responsible, and he can find no justification for his choice from without" (pg. 192)
      - ♦ "a man may, of course, make his particular choices as a member of 'the one' and try to throw the responsibility on society. But he is merely masking from himself the fact that he has chosen this way of acting" (pg. 193)
    - "the individual as free subject is essentially isolated and alone. And it is in this isolation and loneliness that he creates his world and his values" (pg. 192)
  - "[Sartre] attempts to show that a tremendous responsibility rests upon a man's shoulders in the exercise of choice and values" (pg. 194)
    - "but a man may, of course, possess great ability and yet at the same time give a most inadequate picture of human existence and human experience" (pg. 195)
      - ♦ *\*this is the author's view of Sartre generally.*
- (Camus)
  - "The 'philosopher of the absurd' is rather Albert Camus" (pg. 196)
  - "[to Camus] the world is unreasonable and it is impossible to find any significance in it" (pg. 196)
    - "the human reason is naturally impelled to seek for clarity about the meaning of the world and of human life and history in particular; but it can find no given meaning either in the world apart from man or in human life itself" (pg. 196)
  - "both Sartre and Camus speak for and to the man who is lost..." (pg. 200)
    - "both Sartre and Camus preach an ethic of self-commitment, of *engagement*" (pg. 200)
- Chapter 12 - A Critical Discussion of Existentialism (pg. 201)
  - **"existentialism, as we have seen, lays emphasis on the human situation or condition.** We are told, for example, that man finds himself in the world, that he is a being in the world. We are told that he is a finite, unstable being, menaced by death from the start. We are told that he is free, that he transcends his past and inevitably shapes himself by his free choices in such a way that he is never a mere 'object' until death has extinguished his possibilities" (pg. 201)
  - "the truth of the proposition that man is free is, indeed, a matter of dispute" (pg. 201)
  - "what the existentialist does is to enunciate trivialities, in the sense of propositions which tell us what we all know already" (pg. 202)
    - "we do not require philosophers to tell us such truths" (pg. 202)
  - "his language is part of his technique for the communication or evocation of affective attitudes and of emotions" (pg. 203)
    - "[the existentialist] states his trivialities in particularly solemn language and talks in dramatic and tragic tones about one's presence in the world, about man's finiteness, about death and about dread" (pg. 202-203)
    - "the existentialist has, as it were, to administer a shock in order to bring about the change of attention which he desires" (pg. 207)
  - "it seems to me undoubtedly true that many of the assertions made by existentialists do not convey fresh information in the sense in which a physicist or an astronomer or an explorer may give us fresh information" (pg. 203)
    - *\*says the philosopher. To the layman, I'm sure what's purported by existential philosophers is received as being quite profound and not so trivial.*
  - "the relevance of these remarks is this. The fact that the truths to which our attention is drawn by a philosopher do not convey fresh information in the sense of telling us what we did not know already or what we could not have discovered for ourselves with the aid of a professional philosopher does not constitute a fatal objection to the propriety of drawing attention to these truths, provided, of course, that there is sufficient reason for doing so" (pg. 204)
    - *\*I strongly disagree with this criticism. If these truths are so readily accessible then why is it that they have been discussed in the first instance? Why have people decided to sit down and write about that which was already 'apparent' to most? I would argue, given the Human is the mark by which such philosophers focus upon to detail and discuss, there must be something about the everydayness of said human and their activity which does not reflect, much less even point in the general direction of, said 'truths'. If it were the case that intimate and deep knowledge of existence and being were as commonplace as the author supposes such is, then intellectuals alike, in the first instance, would have witnessed no value in writing all that they had (or, at least, desire to) - it would have seemed to them but an inconsequential repetition, which, given the brilliance of those thinkers which have written, would have been evidence enough to not write. It is also important to notice that many existential tinkers were writing during periods of World War or epochs of High-Human-Tragedy and misfortune (e.g., Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, Berdyaev, etc.).*
  - "although there is, indeed, no such thing as a group mind or a group consciousness in the same sense in which there are individual minds and individual consciousness, there are certainly ways of reacting to events, ways of thinking and ways of feeling which are characteristic of individuals as members of the group" (pg. 205)
    - "language, which is itself a social construction, is one very important means of communicating and perpetuating these shared opinions and reactions and standards of action..." (pg. 205)

- "the pressure of society is with us always, and, normally speaking, it is not felt as a burden, as a pressure from outside, because each individual is from the start integrated into society and oriented to society. The group mind or consciousness is, as it were, prefigured in the structure of the individual" (pg. 205)
- "the existentialist, it seems to me, changes or tries to change the perspective in which we see certain facts of which we are already aware" (pg. 206)
- "the only way to show conclusively that a problem is a pseudo-problem is to show that no intelligible question is asked" (pg. 210)
  - \*This is what the author identifies as the 'problematic' aspect of existentialism (pg. 214)
  - "if questions are asked, the purpose of asking them is presumably to obtain answers" (pg. 216)
    - \*I disagree. Sometimes raising a question to therefore know it is one which is 'unanswerable' gives us, granted indirectly, a separate answer - one which can, nonetheless, be useful as a derivative of the intended first. It is not really anyone's true and honest goal to 'prove' or 'disprove' the existence of God, as each alternative would as equally devastating to humans as the other; rather, it is (in) the mere raising of the question of such's existence which informs us as to our own - i.e., why we feel God is a necessary, why it takes the form it does, what role such a value has in our daily living, etc. God, existent or otherwise, has already performed its service in that, even as merely a concept, it has pointed us and our thinking in the direction of 'rightful' living.
- "the theistic existentialists are escapists; and escapism is a socially undesirable phenomenon. The atheistic existentialists do, indeed, insist on self-commitment in the world; but by questioning the ultimate value and purpose of human activity and strivings they tend to impair social cohesion and devotion to social tasks" (pg. 215-216)
- "I think that existentialism can serve as a stimulus to metaphysical reflection..." (pg. 216)

d. Further Readings:

- Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings <https://ia902206.us.archive.org/19/items/SartreJeanPaulLiteraryAndPhilosophicalEssaysCollier1962/Sartre%2C%20Jean-Paul%20-%20Basic%20Writings%20%5Bed.%20Priest%5D%20%28Routledge%2C%202001%29.pdf>
- Being and Nothingness, by J. Sartre [https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/6564640/mod\\_resource/content/2/Being%20and%20Nothingness.pdf](https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/6564640/mod_resource/content/2/Being%20and%20Nothingness.pdf)
- Six Existentialist Thinkers, by H. J. Blackham [https://ia600803.us.archive.org/34/items/merged\\_201709/six%20existentialist%20thinkers.pdf](https://ia600803.us.archive.org/34/items/merged_201709/six%20existentialist%20thinkers.pdf)
- (Article) Existentialist Philosophies and Political Decline, by W. Bultmann <https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1208&context=jaas>
- Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, by S. Kierkegaard <https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/concluding-unsci-post.pdf>
- A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, by R. Metz [https://ia802908.us.archive.org/5/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.458436/2015.458436.A-Hundred-Years-Of-British-Philosophy\\_text.pdf](https://ia802908.us.archive.org/5/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.458436/2015.458436.A-Hundred-Years-Of-British-Philosophy_text.pdf)
- A Hundred Years of Philosophy, by J. Passmore [https://ia804709.us.archive.org/23/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.135724/2015.135724.A-Hundred-Years-Of-Philosophy\\_text.pdf](https://ia804709.us.archive.org/23/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.135724/2015.135724.A-Hundred-Years-Of-Philosophy_text.pdf)
- My Philosophical Development, by B. Russell [https://ia801400.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.125760/2015.125760.My-Philosophical-Development\\_text.pdf](https://ia801400.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.125760/2015.125760.My-Philosophical-Development_text.pdf)
- Our Knowledge of the External World, by B. Russell
- Philosophical Essays, by B. Russell [https://ia902906.us.archive.org/0/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.125798/2015.125798.Philosophical-Essays\\_text.pdf](https://ia902906.us.archive.org/0/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.125798/2015.125798.Philosophical-Essays_text.pdf)
- Human Society in Ethics and Politics, by B. Russell [https://ia801505.us.archive.org/32/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.460577/2015.460577.Human-Society\\_text.pdf](https://ia801505.us.archive.org/32/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.460577/2015.460577.Human-Society_text.pdf)
- Logic and Knowledge, by B. Russell
- Unpopular Essays, by B. Russell
- Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by L. Wittgenstein
- Philosophical Essays, by A. J. Ayer
- Language, Truth and Logic, by A. J. Ayer
- The Concept of a Person, by A. J. Ayer
- The Origins of Pragmatism, by A. J. Ayer
- Metaphysics and Common Sense, by A. J. Ayer
- Words and Things, by E. Gellner
- Logical Positivism, by R. Carnap
- Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, by A. J. T. D. Wisdom
- Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, by P. F. Strawson
- Metaphysics, by W. H. Walsh
- Personalism Idealism, by H. Sturt <https://ia800204.us.archive.org/31/items/personalidealism00sturuoft/personalidealism00sturuoft.pdf>
- Present Philosophical Tendencies, by R. Perry <https://ia904708.us.archive.org/16/items/presentphilosop00perr/presentphilosop00perr.pdf>
- Existentialism From Within, by E. L. Allen
- An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief, by R. B. Braithwaite <http://epiphanyphilosophers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/EVNRB1.pdf>
- Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy, by M. Cornforth
- Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. By H. D. Lewis
- Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. By J. H. Muirhead [https://ia801508.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46370/2015.46370.Contemporary-British-Philosophy-Personal-Statements\\_text.pdf](https://ia801508.us.archive.org/8/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46370/2015.46370.Contemporary-British-Philosophy-Personal-Statements_text.pdf)
- Decadence: A Philosophical Inquiry, by C. E. M. Joad [https://ia601508.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.462599/2015.462599.Decadence--\\_text.pdf](https://ia601508.us.archive.org/13/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.462599/2015.462599.Decadence--_text.pdf)