Jean-Paul Sartre: Key Concepts, ed. by S. Churchill & J. Reynolds

a. People / Organizations:
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b. Quotes:
  ▪ "Sartre was a philosopher in the broadest, truest and best sense of the word: a lover of wisdom wherever and however expressed" - G. Cox (pg. 6)
  ▪ "Sartre was not addicted to drugs but to writing" - G. Cox (pg. 7-8)
    ○ "from childhood, he wrote for six hours a day most days of his life" - G. Cox (pg. 8)
  ▪ "always fond of working on more than one project at once, it was inevitable that not everything he started would be finished" - G. Cox (pg. 8)
  ▪ **"from a surprisingly early age [Sartre] felt that his existence was absurd and pointless**. He dreamt he was travelling on life's train without a ticket, without justification or purpose. He soon realized that <u>only he could give himself a purpose and he chose writing as his</u> *raison d'être*. He adopted the <u>ambition of becoming a great, dead French writer</u>, although of course he knew he had to live a relatively long life first in order to achieve this goal. This was his *fundamental choice* of himself, an original choice of self that influenced all subsequent choices and so shaped his life" - G. Cox (pg. 9)
    ○ "**The notion of fundamental choice as the basis of each person's fundamental life project is central to Sartre's existentialism**: his philosophy and psychology of the human condition" - G. Cox (pg. 9)
  ▪ "Consciousness and the world are given at one stroke: essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially relative to consciousness" - Sartre (pg. 21)
  ▪ "Sartre went to unheard of extremes in his total rejection of universals. To him, general laws and concepts and all such abstractions were nothing but hot air: people, he maintained, all agreed to accept them because they effectively masked a reality which men found alarming. He, on the other hand, wanted to grapple with this living reality" - Simone de Beauvoir (pg. 47)
  ▪ **"All at once consciousness is purified, it is clear as a strong wind. There is nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond itself. If, impossible though it may be, you could enter 'into' a consciousness, you would be seized by a whirlwind and thrown back outside, in the thick of the dust, near the tree, for consciousness has no 'inside'. Precisely this being beyond-itself, this absolute flight, this refusal to be a substance is what makes it be a consciousness"** - J. Sartre, *Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology*, pg. 2 (pg. 62)
  ▪ "a life develops in spirals; it passes again and again by the same points but at different levels of integration and complexity" - J. Sartre, *Search for Method*, pg. 106 https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/index.htm
    ○ "Interestingly Freud himself recognizes in a rather remarkable passage that <u>determinism only works backwards</u>. When one attempts to move from the present neurosis to the childhood origins, all seems inevitable. But when one gets to the original circumstances, one becomes aware that there could have been a different outcome and that this might have been just as understandable" - B. Canon (pg. 82)
  ▪ "*Being and Nothingness*…is also a rambling work, demonstrably in need of editing, and within its many pages Sartre is often inconsistent" - S. Richmond (pg. 101)
  ▪ **"an effective method of deception is to employ ambiguity and vagueness, coupled with an appeal to the intended audience's interests and prejudices, so as to suggest a message that would not be received so uncritically if it were stated clearly"** D. Detmer (pg. 122)
  ▪ "Sartre insists that consciousness is not unconscious of itself, but is aware of itself. However, <u>this awareness of itself is not positional or focal</u>. Rather it is non-positional, tacit and in the background. **The structure of consciousness is to be intentional or positional of an object and simultaneously non-positionally self-aware.** The reflexivity of non-positional self-awareness marks the creation of a 'self' that necessarily comprehends its difference from its objects" - T. W. Busch (pg. 166)
    ◆ *pre-reflective consciousness is aware of itself but completely lost in its own cloud / haze / plume of light, unable to see its arms, legs, and chest, so to speak.*
  ▪ "In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre takes up the structure of consciousness explored in *The Transcendence of the Ego* in terms of an ontology that stresses subjectivity, particularly <u>defending its radical freedom</u>. Epistemologically, all human experience, for Sartre, is dichotomized into subject/object and ontologically into self/other. The difference embedded in and making possible the dichotomy is *néant*, the break or fission in the continuity of being (in non-positional self-awareness) that allows for radical freedom. '**The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist** *at a distance from itself* **as presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness'** (BN1: 78; BN2: 102). <u>The disruption of being from coincidence with itself temporalizes the being of consciousness</u>, projecting it into the non-being of the future, haunting it with the imaginary. <u>Exiled from identity with itself, human reality cannot rest in the stasis of being, but exhausts itself in temporalizing action</u>, creating and supporting a way of life, projecting meaning and value. 'In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself' (BN1: 40; BN2: 63)" - T. W. Busch (pg. 167)
  ▪ "Sartre offers a motivation for bad faith by considering the 'break' in being, which he located in the non-positional self-awareness of being-for-itself, as a *lack* of self-identity, which <u>provokes a desire for self-identity</u>. Exiled from the identity of being, dispersed temporally and self-divided, <u>being-for-itself seeks to catch up with itself, to recover its dispersion and split identity in order to give itself meaning in the form of self-identity</u>. Being factual, **the for-itself is not its own foundation; it has no fundamental justification, no intrinsic meaningfulness**. In its self-making, the for-itself creates and sustains a meaningful life, but cannot actually be that mode of life in self-identity, the mode of being-in-itself. If being-for-itself could actually be the life that it makes and sustains as a project, it would be self-justifying, its own foundation. But, of course, if the for-itself were to be, it would no longer exist as a for-itself, a self-maker. It would lose itself as a self because a self is a 'break' in the identity of being" - T. W. Busch (pg. 169)
  ▪ **"there are only human beings and the relations between human beings"** - Sartre, *The Family Idiot* (pg. 193)
  ▪ "every ethics, whatever ontological base is concerned with values" - T. C. Anderson (pg. 198)
c. General Notes:
  ▪ Chapter 1 - Introduction: Sartre vivant, by S. Churchill & J. Reynolds (pg. 1)
    ○ "Most philosophers live and die in relative obscurity. If they are both insightful and fortunate, they sometimes achieve a measure of fame and posterity afterwards. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) bucked this trend. <u>Perhaps no other philosopher was as famous in his own time as Sartre</u>, or so we would claim" (pg. 1)
    ○ "Sartre…seemed 'dead' in academic circles, perhaps twenty years ago, and much earlier in France. Sartre himself would no doubt have been unhappy to learn of this posthumous fate; after all, in his beautifully crafted autobiography, entitled Words (1964), he positioned his life's work as a writer as rooted in **his desire to achieve a kind of immortality through his writings**…" (pg. 1)
      ▪ *this may possible explain his "going too far" (cf. F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, pg. 127-133).*
      ▪ *https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_f672969890724b53b81ed15b2df625b3.pdf*
        □ *"Sartre, in Between Existentialism and Marxism, remarks "Today I think that philosophy is dramatic in nature. The time for contemplating the immobility of substances which are what they are, or for laying bare the laws underlying a succession of phenomena, is past. Philosophy is concerned with man - who is at once an agent and an actor, who produces and plays his drama while he lives the contradictions of his situation, until either his individuality is shattered or his conflicts are resolved. A play (be it epic, such as Brecht's, or dramatic) is the most appropriate vehicle today for showing man in action - i.e. man full stop. It is with this man that philosophy, from its own point of view, should be concerned. That is why the theatre is philosophical and philosophy*

dramatic….If literature is not everything, it is worth nothing. This is what I mean by 'commitment'. It wilts if it is reduced to innocence, or to songs. If a written sentence does not reverberate at every level of man and society, then it makes no sense" (pg. 11-14)

- □ **cf. pg. 47 - "the practical implications of Sartre's early radicalism with regard to contingency are nothing short of dramatic…"*
- ○ "since Sartre's work have yet to be understood and appreciated in their full depth as the totality they represent, we would argue that Sartre is very much *alive*…" (pg. 2)
- ○ "Sartre's concepts of 'need' and 'scarcity' that featured in his dialectical ethics are complemented in these interviews by his concept of 'reciprocity' (alternatively described as an ethics of the 'We'). **Ethical action is driven here by the ideal that individuals may relate to each other in a way that positions the Other's interests and needs as continuous with one's own.** In this 'fraternal' mode of being-together, the objective of ending scarcity and lack would become goals shared in common by all of humanity, bringing about truly ethical relations between human beings.
  - ▪ **commonality is the 'ground' for (o)bjectivity. Cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity: Go(o)d without God, pg. 4 https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_795d5e35faaf49c6a197e1dd2fe00fc5.pdf*
- ▪ Chapter 2 - Life and Works, by G. Cox (pg. 5)
  - ○ "Sartre is famous for his wide and copious reading. He devoured thousands of texts in his lifetime, always looking to feed his own theories, and in his early days was capable of producing a new or modified theory on a daily or even thrice-daily basis. He had no respect for the constraints of the traditional divisions between philosophy, psychology and literature and tended to see each as somewhat retarded when isolated from the others. Always a supreme interdisciplinarian, he advocated a more philosophical psychology and a more literary philosophy" (pg. 6)
  - ○ "Sartre succeeded in breaking down many traditional, stultifying barriers between intellectual subjects and in so doing opened up many new territories to intellectual enquiry. It is this that is perhaps the most impressive feature of his life's work. The longer one studies him, the more territories appear. Perhaps these territories cannot be enumerated because where Sartre did not explore a territory so thoroughly as to make it his own, he pointed the way towards it, either promising to reach it himself in due course or inviting others to investigate his sketchy insights" (pg. 6)
    - ▪ "Sartre's many territories are not best seen as separate areas…[but] must instead be seen as integrated regions of a single, extensive landscape" (pg. 7)
  - ○ "Sartre might reluctantly accept that he had a *natural* ability as far as his fluency was concerned, but he would insist that it was what he chose to do with his ability that was all important, that brought it into reality. Without his choice and self-determination to write, his natural ability would have been nothing" (pg. 8)
  - ○ "He learnt from Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Bergson and Heidegger that **consciousness is relational rather than an entity in its own right**, that it exists only as a temporal consciousness of the world and is nothing beyond that" (pg. 10)
    - ▪ "As **we are essentially nothing**, whatever we are, we must choose to be it. We are burdened with the constant responsibility of having to choose, or, as Sartre puts it, we are 'condemned to be free' (BN1: 439; BN2: 462). Of course, there are certain givens: our body, our immediate physical situation, our mortality. **Sartre calls these givens** *facticity*. Facticity does not limit freedom because freedom is not doing whatever one imagines but constantly having to choose in face of one's facticity: what to do with one's body, one's circumstances, one's limited life span; what meaning to give to it all. Constantly having to choose what we are by **choosing what we do makes us anxious**. We would like to be complete, a being at one with itself rather than a being constantly striving for completion in a future that is never reached. So most, if not all of us resort to some degree of bad faith, fooling ourselves that we are fixed entities that need not or cannot choose. **We use our freedom to try and cancel out our freedom by choosing not to choose**. But as Sartre points out, "Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose" (BN1: 481; BN2: 503). Bad faith cannot achieve its goal, and the person in bad faith lives their life in denial, refusing to positively affirm their freedom. The existentialist holy grail of **authenticity involves a person overcoming their bad faith**, recognizing that they are inalienably free and living their life accordingly. In practice, this involves living a life without regrets or excuses, throwing oneself into each situation and meeting its demands head on" (pg. 10)
      - □ **with respect to 'Bad Faith' and the for-itself's "choosing not to choose", cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity: Go(o)d without God, pg. 2, December 19, 2023 entry (Father protect me) - "It cripples itself through its reaching out (which is an act of the for-itself), pretending, to be other than itself (a for-itself-as-not-for-itself), as it, nonetheless, keeps itself, but not anymore as for-itself as in its reach to be beside itself it dissipates the value of itself as a for-itself…consciousness (i.e., the for-itself) tells itself ("father protect me…father correct me") to not anymore be that which it is - a consciousness which thinks and makes for-itself" https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_795d5e35faaf49c6a197e1dd2fe00fc5.pdf*
    - ▪ "Sartre recognized that humans are very flawed and that the goal of authenticity is therefore very difficult to obtain" (pg. 10)
      - □ "Arguably, the holy grail of sustained authenticity is just too difficult for anyone to achieve, in that it must be maintained moment by moment in face of life's myriad temptations to slide back into bad faith. Just as one cannot be anything, only play at being it, one cannot simply be authentic. To believe that one is authentic, as a stone is a stone, is simply another form of bad faith. Nonetheless, authenticity is a goal worth striving for if one wants to live lite to the full and draw near to achieving one's full potential" (pg. 11)
  - ○ Chapter 3 - Sartre and Husserl's Ideen: phenomenology and imagination, by B. Stawarska (pg. 12)
    - ▪ "Sartre's relation to Husserl may seem curious, if not downright paradoxical. An outspoken enthusiast of phenomenology, which would liberate philosophy of its idealist heritage and bring it back into the world, Sartre was simultaneously, and just as passionately, an uncompromising critic of the methodological and categorical apparatus the Husserl of Ideen I (first published 1913; translated as *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Husserl 1983) put into the service of mapping out transcendental consciousness" (pg. 12)
    - ▪ "Sartre holds philosophy accountable in the face of the world where suffering, hunger and the war are both a possibility and a daily reality - the philosophical task cannot therefore ever be confined to a narrowly epistemological problem, but must also be existential, ethical and political" (pg. 12)
      - □ "Husserl's phenomenology was oriented towards the more classically academic task of ascertaining true knowledge and founding a rigorous philosophical science" (pg. 12-13)
      - □ "while Sartre caught a glimpse of the liberating potential of the phenomenological method, he seemed just as eager to liberate the set of doctrines espoused by Husserl's phenomenology from its perceived *scholasticism*" (pg. 13)
        - ◆ "Sartre is then an anti-scholastic thinker…" (pg. 13)
      - □ "Even though Sartre was to distance himself from Husserl's intellectual influence in favour of Heidegger, and then Marx, Husserl's role in Sartre's philosophical trajectory remains unique: it renewed his confidence in the value and relevance of philosophy to the quotidian and the mundane, and launched Sartre on the path of sustained philosophical writing" (pg. 17)
    - ▪ "Sartre employs the phenomenological method adopted from Husserl to suspend the validity of the claims and concepts posited by Husserl; his loyalty is in the approach and not in the doctrine, and his goal is to purify the phenomenological field established by Husserl by clearing it of any mental furniture adopted from the philosophical tradition" (pg. 17)
      - □ "Sartre's goal is then to liberate Husserl from himself" (pg. 18)
    - ▪ "The phenomenological method becomes in Sartre's hand a radical purifying solution that leaves nothing behind - or better, that attains nothingness as ultimate realization of consciousness itself; the world is restored in its density and transcendence unmediated by essences and ideas; the dialectic of being and nothingness is then a logical and necessary extension of phenomenology of consciousness" (pg. 18)

- "The overt task of *'La Transcendance de l'ego'* (Sartre 1936-7, 1960a) is to adopt and improve on Husserl's phenomenology so as to free it of unnecessary encumbrances, turning Husserl's method back onto the field of his philosophy. Sartre adopts the method of phenomenological reduction to gain access to the field of pure consciousness, but he radicalizes it to the point of excluding the transcendental ego itself" (pg. 19)
  - "Contrary to Husserl, Sartre claims that the ego is not a necessary substrate of all the individual acts of the cogito; it would rather be **an object engendered *après coup* by reflection** which therefore distorts the originally non-thetic or non-positional character of (pre-reflective) consciousness, making it appear as an object, rather than as pure subjectivity" (pg. 19)
    - **"Sartre contends that the ego is an element of the transcendent world**…" (pg. 19)
  - "*Contra* Husserl, Sartre argues that the synthetic unity of apperception makes no existential claims concerning the (I). Kant is interpreted to be saying that 'I can always regard my thought or perception as mine: nothing more' (Sartre 1960a: 104). In Sartre's view, there is no phenomenological place for a pure ego" (pg. 19)
    - "Sartre argues that the unity of consciousness is safeguarded already by its intentional relatedness to an object" (pg. 20)
      - "Now, it is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I. Indeed, consciousness is defined by intentionality. **By intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It unifies itself by escaping from itself.**.. The object is transcendent to the consciousnesses which grasp it, and it is in the object that the unity of the consciousnesses is found" - Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, pg. 38 https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Jean-Paul-Sartre-The-Transcendence-of-the-Ego_-An-Existentialist-Theory-of-Consciousness-The-Noonday-Press-1960.pdf
        - "intentionality, this basic stance of consciousness, figures as a mark of consciousness's direct and unmediated contact with the transcendent world…" (pg. 21)
          - "Sartre's decidedly realist reading of intentionality does not mention that the meaning-endowing consciousness actively constitutes its object" (pg. 21)
  - "Intentionality is figured as externality, a bond of non-assimilable excess weighing down consciousness to the world. Intentionality so redefined is then turned back onto its nourishing ground, and put in the service of arguments *contra* Husserl; it puts pressure on any need to locate transcendence within immanence, and to posit an ego as a transcendental substrate of experience" (pg. 22)
- "Sartre is advancing the phenomenological project by actively countering the charge that each individual consciousness may be shown to constitute its own private world only. This concern is obviously tied to the charge of solipsism, and Sartre considers the problem of the being of the world on a par with the problem of knowing others" (pg. 22)
  - "]Sartre's] argument 'against' the transcendental ego is simultaneously an argument 'for' the possibility of knowing others within phenomenology of consciousness" (pg. 23)
    - "An ego-less construal of consciousness would dispel the threat of solipsism hovering over Husserl's phenomenology. Refigured as transcendent rather than transcendental, **the ego is not locked in the interiority of the first person experience and can engage in relations with others.** There is no longer anything 'impenetrable' about the other nor about the self in this perspective (Sartre 1960a: 77, 96); the threat of *solus ipse* is rendered null and void" (pg. 23)
    - "non-egological consciousness can give full and concrete measure of human agonies, suffering - and rebellion" (pg. 23)
- "in both books [on the imagination], Sartre deems intentionality to be key to understanding imagination" (pg. 25)
  - "The principal merit of the intentionality thesis is that it provides the only means of preserving the transcendence of the object of a conscious act, whether perceptual or imaginary. Defining consciousness in terms of intentionality ultimately breaks with any form of immanentism where the object *of* consciousness gets identified with a content *in* consciousness, and so where its transcendent character with regard to consciousness is compromised" (pg. 25)
    - "Sartre targets especially Berkeley's idealism for having reduced transcendent objects to their mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world to subjective impressions. The intentionality thesis permits, Sartre contends, to restore the transcendent character to the world, because the intendum ceases to be the content of the subjective act" (pg. 25)
    - "More importantly still, the intentionality thesis provides the ultimate means of breaking away with a long and faulty tradition of theorizing imagination as a variant of perception. Sartre's critical studies of the dominant theories of imagination produced in the history of Western philosophy, from Descartes to Bergson, aim to dissipate the common illusion haunting these theories that the image is a sort of a lesser thing, a trace of the perceived object" (pg. 25)
      - "the 'illusion of immanence'…takes consciousness to be a receptacle for mental representations" (pg. 26)
    - "The intentionality thesis permits to theorize imagination otherwise than as observation of perceptual traces left behind in consciousness with the mind's eye. The image ceases being an immanent psychic content" (pg. 26)
- "Even though the object of an imaginary act is a 'nothing', Sartre does not deny that there is real content in the imaginary act" (pg. 26)
- "The foundation for Sartre's own unitary theory of the imagination [is] defined in *L'Imaginaire* as "an act [of consciousness] which aims at an absent or non-existent object as a body (*dans sa corporéité*), by means of a physical or mental content which is present only as an 'analogical representative' of the object aimed at" (Sartre 2004a: 20; 1940: 46)" (pg. 27)
  - "In imagining an object one has an immediate consciousness of its nothingness (2004a: 13; 1940: 33), and so absence or lack are the defining features of the imaginary, not a (possible or intended) presence" (pg. 27)
  - "we cannot allow that an image comes to fulfill a consciousness; it is itself a consciousness" - Sartre, *L'Imaginaire*, pg. 59 https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_e3d1414c58f64a1ebc6fb909d6b69009.pdf
- "In any case, Sartre overtly chastizes Husserl for failing to rise to the standards of (Sartre's own) understanding of the intentionality of consciousness as being like a vortex expelling any content out into the world" (pg. 27)
  - "The rationale of Sartre's critique of Husserl can be found in his commitments to the creative force deployed by imaginary activity, as irreducible to simply representing what is already there (or what was already realized in perception), and thus as direct expression of freedom. Sartre argues throughout *L'Imaginaire* that imagination and perception are the two irreducible attitudes of consciousness, the former deploying the free rein of creative activity unmotivated by any intuitively available contents. What is primary then is not perception but a duality of positive and negative acts - perception and imagination, with imagination having its object manifest in a *sui generis* fashion, and despite the greatest paucity of content. The presumed richness and vivacity of the imaginary world is illusory; rather than attribute quasi-perceptual presence to it, we should bring out the, at times, acutely experienced lack of the imaged object, as when I imagine a loved one who is away or maybe even dead. In such cases, imagination stages the non-being of its object in a dramatic fashion, and it is precisely the impossibility of attaining fulfilment that constitutes the drama of realizing that the loved one is *not* there, not in this photograph, painting, caricature, or mental vision. **Imagination then has everything to do with the potential of consciousness to live and gain distance from the ensnaring presence of the perceptual world; it frees consciousness up from the usual entanglement in the brute being-there and opens up a space of non-being and negativity.** Imagination provides the royal road to consciousness as a field where lack and absence are both possible (consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition thereof) and acutely felt. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger would have given justice to this basic fact that the existential nature of consciousness is that of a lack (Sartre 1993b: 70)" (pg. 27-28)

- "Sartre contends that <u>the emotion like any other act of consciousness must be intentionally oriented to an object</u> - to hate someone is to find them hateful, to love is to find them loveable. Furthermore, **emotions, together with all other conscious acts, involve a non-thetic or pre-reflective consciousness of self.** As such, emotions possess and must be thematized according to their meaning or signification, rather than as sheer accidents or as mere sum totals of scientific facts" (pg. 29)
  - "<u>The emotions are purposive,</u> rather than being passive states or hidden treasures of the unconscious. The object of the emotion is not simply discovered in the pre-existent natural world, but consistently tied to the magical productivity of consciousness itself, and engendered in an effort to flee the world experienced as resistant or difficult. Like the imagination, <u>the emotions deploy therefore the creative potential of consciousness</u> and involve a measure of active distancing from the already available world" (pg. 29)
    - "since pre-reflective consciousness of self is distinct from knowledge of self…the emotional consciousness involves a degree of captivity or bad faith, which can only be dispelled by purifying reflection" (pg. 29)
- "Transcendental phenomenology needs therefore to be expanded into ontology - it needs to raise the question of being as irreducible to appearance, but without dropping the descriptive method of phenomenology" (pg. 29)
  - "[Sartre's] 1942 opus *L'Etre et le neant*…seeks to accomplish just that: it develops an ontological system from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness" (pg. 30)
- Chapter 4 - Sartre's understanding of the self, by C. Onof (pg. 32)
  - "Sartre's metaphysics are borne out of phenomenological investigations into the emotions, the imagination, and particular phenomena that are revelatory of ontological truths…" (pg. 32)
  - Sartre's Early Theory of the Ego (pg. 32)
    - "The phenomenological investigations that are illustrated so powerfully in Sartre's novels, and *La Nausée* in particular, provide building blocks for a theory of consciousness that has direct implications for the understanding of the self who is conscious" (pg. 32)
    - **"the in-itself 'is' in a self-contained way, while the for-itself's existence can only be understood in relation to the in-itself"** (pg. 33)
      - "<u>this relatedness defines a fundamental characteristic of consciousness for Sartre</u>: it is always to be understood as consciousness of something: consciousness is fundamentally intentional" (pg. 33)
        - "This different way of being of consciousness implies that any notion of self cannot be a notion of a self as substance in the sense that being in-itself is the type of being of substances. And not being substantial means two interrelated things for Sartre: first, it means that <u>there is no substratum for this type of being</u>, which is pure appearance; second, it means that <u>this kind of being is not its own foundation</u>" (pg. 33)
    - *Consciousness Before* Being and Nothingness (pg. 33)
      - "there is a long history to the conception of <u>intentionality</u>, or <u>directedness towards an object</u>, and much of it is marked by the introduction of a notion of representation, which explains how the intended object constitutes mental content. To have a certain representation, on this account, is to be intentionally directed towards an object, *and* the object defines, in some sense, the content of the representation" (pg. 33)
        - "[representationalism posits] the see an object is just to have a representation that is related in the right way to the object. Such an understanding of the role of mental representations is rejected by Sartre in his early work on the imagination. <u>There are no such things as mental images inside consciousness</u>, and which account for our relation to objects" (pg. 33)
          - **"Sartre is a direct realist"** (pg. 33)
        - "it is a fundamental feature of Sartre's understanding of **<u>consciousness</u>**, that it **<u>is a pure transparency directed to the object</u>**. Consciousness is not therefore understood in terms of the usual notion of mental content for Sartre" (pg. 33)
          - "any notion of ego that would be the ground of all the subject's intentional relations is excluded. By making this claim, Sartre is directly targeting Husserl's notion of transcendental ego" (pg. 34)
            - "Husserl claims that such an ego can be identified as that which does not change throughout our experience" (pg. 34)
      - "Sartre has it that the (I) is the result of a synthetic unity of representations…" (pg. 34)
    - *Reflective Consciousness* in the Transcendence of the Ego (pg. 35)
      - "Sartre [affirms] that <u>there is a form of *reflexive* consciousness in which an (I) appears</u>" (pg. 35)
        - "psychological entities that transcend consciousness, such as states, qualities and actions, are unified by being brought under a 'transcendent pole of synthetic unity'" (pg. 35)
      - "in the conclusion to *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre brings out the practical dimension of the natural attitude (where the world is considered as it appears naturally, without any phenomenological reduction) in which <u>the ego appears alongside pure consciousness</u>. For Sartre (ibid.: 48), <u>the natural attitude masks consciousness's spontaneity</u>, a spontaneity that is anguish-inducing. This pre-empts a theme that Sartre develops at length in BN, namely that of bad faith: **by interpreting oneself as having some apparent identity in the ego, the subject can conceal the fact that it is in fact a pure spontaneity that bears full responsibility for its choices**" (pg. 35)
    - *Self-Consciousness* (pg. 35)
      - "Sartre makes the important claim that all consciousness must involve self-consciousness: this is described by Sartre as a form of "non-positional" consciousness, and distinguished from reflection…" (pg. 35)
      - "The claim is that <u>consciousness is transparent</u>, and in particular transparent to itself; hence it must be the case that all consciousness is conscious of itself. What is rather unclear, however, is where this leaves the 'self', and indeed it appears that Sartre somewhat skirts this problem in *The Transcendence of the Ego* by referring to 'consciousness of itself' rather than 'self-consciousness'" (pg. 36)
    - The Self in *Being and Nothingness* (pg. 36)
      - "self-consciousness is a non-positional consciousness that is pre-reflective" (pg. 37)
        - "this provides the necessary grounding for the developmental of a theory of the self…" (pg. 37)
      - "**what separates consciousness from the belief it is consciousness (of) is exactly nothing. This is the nothingness which lies at the heart of the for-itself**" (pg. 39)
        - "the for-itself is essentially a nihilation" (pg. 39)
      - "the account of consciousness in *The Transcendence of the Ego* stressed the error of assuming that an (I) can be found at the heart of the cogito. In so doing, however, it left unaddressed the issue of the individuality of the cogito. <u>Each cogito is a personal one, but this was not explained by Sartre's account of consciousness as a transparency with no interior.</u> The account in BN does remedy this lacuna through the notion of presence to oneself. **In so far as I am present to myself, I am individuated as this person rather than another.** So, without having to postulate some ego at the heart of consciousness, Sartre's account is able to account for <u>the personal dimension of the for-itself</u>" (pg. 39-40)
        - "at the heart of the notion of selfness lies the Sartrean understanding of <u>the for-itself as a lack</u>" (pg. 40)
    - The For-Itself as Lack and the Notion of Selfness (pg. 40)
      - "In the introduction to *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre had presented the for-itself as a degenerate form of being, one which, as the analysis of the notion of presence to itself has shown, contains nothingness at its heart. This form of being was contrasted with <u>the</u>

plenitude of the in-itself which just is what it is (BN1: xli). Unlike the in-itself, the for-itself does not coincide with itself. In his analysis of the for-itself in part 2, Sartre reformulates the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself in terms of a dependence: the **for-itself 'can establish itself only in terms of the in-itself and against the in-itself'** (BN1: 85; BN2:109). That means that the for-itself establishes itself as a lack of in-itself, and Sartre uses examples of desire to illustrate the phenomenology of lack (BN1: 87; BN2: 111). What the for-itself lacks is called the for-itself *possibilities*" (pg. 40)

- ◆ *it should be noted that D. Moran, in Introduction to Phenomenology, remarks "Sartre constantly claims that there is no relation possible between in-itself and for-itself - these two regions do not communicate" (pg. 357). By my knowledge, Moran is incorrect.*
- □ "this lack is…the origin of transcendence for Sartre" (pg. 40)
  - ◆ "the being which thus haunts the for-itself is not just pure in-itself, for this would correspond to an annihilation of consciousness. Rather, it is the impossible synthesis of the for-itself and the in-itself" (pg. 40)
  - ◆ "we thus have a notion of self 'as the individual completion of the self which haunts itself'" (pg. 40)
  - ◆ "the lack defines a desire directed to the world; this amounts to making mine some in-itself by interpreting it as instrumental to the satisfaction of my desire (this is my possibility). This in turn identifies my selfness as the result of this circuit that connects my desiring consciousness to a satisfied one. This defines the self in terms of what Sartre calls a *circuit of ipseity*" (pg. 41)
- ▪ Reflection (pg. 41)
  - □ "Sartre's account builds upon the failure of the for-itself to coincide with itself in the pre-reflective structure of mirroring. The for-itself has, in effect, "lost itself outside itself" (BN1: 153; EN: 200). As that which is "having to be itself", the for-itself therefore seeks to recover its being by taking itself to be a unity which it apprehends as though it were a being in-itself, that is, a self-contained totality. But this attempt fails: in taking its possibilities as object of reflection, the for-itself distinguishes itself from them; and this negation defines a distance from the for-itself's possibilities (BN1: 175). This lack of identity takes on a temporal form: I am always beyond that which I reflect upon (BN1: 154; EN: 200). As a result, the psychological object, which is thus projected in reflection, fails to provide an adequate representation of the self" (pg. 41-42)
    - ◆ *meaning, as I turn to face who I 'was' I, in the same movement, turn 'from' my possibilities (i.e., that which is ahead-of-myself, off in the distance to myself). I cannot be in a position where I have before me both my past and my future. My 'self' includes not only that who I 'was' but also who I am 'to-be'; thus, any notion of the self is always partial.*
  - □ "This projection of a psychological object in reflection is a key component of Sartre's account of bad faith. For in so far as the for-itself flees from the abyss of its unlimited freedom (BN1: 464-5), and fails to recognize its nature as both facticity and freedom, it clings to an understanding of itself in terms of determinate psychological characteristics" (pg. 42)
    - ◆ "That is, it deceives itself that, rather than being a for-itself who is condemned to constantly having to choose for himself while recognizing his groundlessness, his is a grounded being which has the solidity of the in-itself. And this has immediate moral consequences: claiming that the psychological object which I wrongly claim to be has certain determinations amounts to diminishing my responsibility as an agent" (pg. 42)
    - ◆ "for Sartre, there are no pre-determinations to my choices: it is al up to me, and as a result, I have to face the full responsibility for my acts" (pg. 42)
- ▪ Conclusion (pg. 42)
  - □ "Sartre's account of the nothingness that lies at the heart of the cogito has the advantage of setting up the framework for his analysis of the human condition as defined by a pre-reflective presence to itself, which, as an instable unity/duality, reveals a teleological dimension manifested in the notion of lack, which in turn enables the for-itself to be viewed as a project" (pg. 42)
- ○ Chapter 5 - Contingency and Ego, Intentionality and Nausea, by S. Churchill (pg. 44)
  - □ "the post-war imagery commonly associated with Sartre is that of the 'engaged writer', using words as a means of commenting on - and indeed actively fighter for - the social and political causes of his day" (pg. 44)
    - ◆ *cf. comments on pg. 1 - "going too far"*
  - □ "we may reasonably regard Sartre early on in his career as a man seeking constantly to engage with the world head-to-head, so to speak, in both philosophical and literary terms" (pg. 45)
- ▪ Realism (pg. 45)
  - □ "Sartre understood his perceptual realism as necessarily having sociopolitical implications. **If one sees things as they really are, then one is able to critique the lives of those blinded to reality by their own moral and intellectual hypocrisy**; for Sartre, those living in bourgeois society represented the very epitome of such hypocrisy" (pg. 45)
    - ◆ "the bourgeoisie lived mired in self-deception, on Sartre's view" (pg. 45-46)
  - □ "'bad faith' [is] the refusal to recognize the true extent of one's freedom, and to assume the full weight of the responsibility it entails" (pg. 46)
- ▪ Radical Contingency (pg. 46) *keep in mind that 'contingency' works against 'facticity' as a concept pertaining to human existence.*
  - □ "To say that existence is contingent, is to hold that there is no guiding hand of necessity that governs existence. The world does not *have* to be as it is, such that things *could* be otherwise; indeed, nothing *need* be, at all. At this point, the full extent of the radicalism associated with Sartre's idea of contingency begins to become clear; to say that anything is possible in a contingent world, means just that" (pg. 46)
  - □ "the practical implications of Sartre's early radicalism with regard to contingency are nothing short of dramatic…" (pg. 47)
  - □ "Sartre's 'theory of contingency', as he called it, thereby coincided with his realist thirst after personal and political authenticity; a view of existence as contingent, after all, is conceived entirely in opposition to the notion that there is (or ought to be) a necessary order of things, serving as the ultimate justification for maintaining the status quo" (pg. 47)
    - ◆ "Sartre himself tended to minimize the extent of Nietzsche's influence upon his philosophy" (pg. 47)
  - □ "in Sartre's first published novel, entitled *Nausea*…Roquentin's feelings of repulsion and disgust ('the nausea') are eventually revealed for him as having its source not in any one project, event or relationship, but rather in the sheer fact of Being, in the sheer fact of existence *itself*. The fact of existence is thereby unveiled not as an abstract epistemological designation bestowed upon things by academicians, but as a real and immediate *presence* in the world" (pg. 50-51)
    - ◆ "**The essential thing is contingency. I mean that one cannot define existence as necessity. To exist is simply *to be there*; those who exist let themselves be encountered**, but you can never deduce anything from them. I believe there are people who have understood this. Only they tried to overcome this contingency by inventing a necessary, causal being. But no necessary being can explain existence: contingency is not a delusion, a probability which can be dissipated; it is the absolute, consequently, the perfect free gift. All is free, this park, this city and myself. When you realize that, it turns your heart upside down and everything begins to float...Here is Nausea; here there is what those bastards ...try to hide from themselves with their idea of their rights. But what a poor lie: no one has any rights; they are entirely free, like other men, they cannot succeed in not feeling *superfluous*. And in themselves, secretly, they are superfluous, that is to say, amorphous, vague, and sad" - Sartre, *Nausea*, pg. 131 (pg. 52)

◇ *a ball will never all-of-a-sudden roll uphill.*
- □ "Sartre argues that there can be 'no such thing' as an indestructibly powerful and pleasurable Will underlying all things; this is plainly evidenced, on Sartre's account, by <u>the general frailty and feebleness of existence</u>. Sartre argues that 'Everything is too weak' to have ever been underpinned by such a well-spring of lively energy. Indeed, Sartre opposes Nietzsche's life-affirming Romanticism further still, in explicitly ascribing a feel of morbidity to this weakness; <u>Sartre writes that 'all things carry the seeds of their own death'</u>" (pg. 53)
- □ "For Sartre…a view of all things as underpinned by a vitality nurtured by ongoing struggle requires too great an embellishment of the real state of things, as he understands it. Things are understood by him in terms of a mortal apathy, a pervasive *listlessness*" (pg. 54)

- Phenomenology: A Way Forward (pg. 54)
  - □ "Phenomenology…is a philosophical methodology for the study of the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness; phenomenology's central aim therefore lies in revealing [the] nature of consciousness and its objects, through the methodical and meticulous description of appearances in experience" (pg. 54)
  - □ "By taking up the study of Husserl's works with such <u>single-minded</u> passion, <u>Sartre had certainly left behind the brash intuitive simplicity of his earlier realism</u>. Indeed, it may be thought that Sartre had retreated from his uncompromising initial assertion: namely, that philosophy ought to be founded on the claim that consciousness perceives things purely and simply as they are. Rather than abandoning his earlier realist intuitions, though, Sartre saw himself as realizing their rightful fruition, by grasping the real just as it is, through phenomenological description. Although Sartre did not interpret Husserl himself as advancing a philosophy of Realism *per se*, then, he nevertheless regarded his general goal of engaging directly with the world as it really is, as one he shared with Husserl" (pg. 54)

- Ego (pg. 55)
  - □ "In *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre argues that Husserl's conception of the ego as transcendental, in the sense of its being included in consciousness, is inconsistent with his earlier views" (pg. 55)
    - ◆ "Sartre reasons that if consciousness is fundamentally consciousness 'of' something in the world, as Husserl claims it is, then no psychical object, least of all a transcendental ego, should continue to be included in consciousness. Accordingly, Sartre wrenches the ego out from its supposed hiding-place somewhere 'behind' consciousness, and leaves it exposed to the travails of existence" (pg. 56)
  - □ "<u>Consciousness, then, becomes quite literally self-less for Sartre, a totally transparent *nothing*</u>. Consciousness purified of a transcendental Ego is constantly in the process of overflowing itself, of <u>reaching out into the world in free pursuit of its possibilities</u>. Sartre's view of self-creation here is understood in terms of a spontaneous, moment-to-moment process, that is never entirely 'finished' in its becoming. Here, then, is a nascent formulation of Sartre's famous maxim, 'existence precedes essence'" (pg. 56)
    - ◆ *'reaching' to-be or 'drawn forth' to 'meet'?*
  - □ "at base, Sartre regards this view of selfhood and self-creation as the optimal foundation for an ethic and a politics that is outward-looking, worldly, and above all, positive" (pg. 56-57)
    - ◆ "Sartre conceives of Husserl's transcendental Ego as 'slicing through' each moment of conscious activity like 'an opaque blade', which would lead to the 'death' of consciousness. A transcendental Ego would act to govern, and therefore weigh down consciousness, on Sartre's view, and he claims consciousness cannot be limited 'except by itself'. Sartre acknowledges that one might argue that a transcendental Ego is the source of consciousness, without holding that a transcendental Ego is the master of consciousness. However, Sartre claims, <u>nothing can be the source of consciousness, except consciousness itself</u>" (pg. 57)
    - ◆ "where Descartes and Husserl both went wrong…on Sartre's account, was to presume that they were encountering an (I) that had been there ['behind' consciousness or 'underneath' experience] *all along*" (pg. 57)
      - ◇ "Sartre argues that what was actually occurring for Descartes and Husserl was the discovery of personalized consciousness, instantaneously created *through* reflection. In other words, **Sartre holds that introspection does not reveal an (I), but instead *creates* one, at the very moment introspection takes place**" (pg. 57-58)
        - ▸ "On this basis, Sartre asserts that <u>we ought to approach with extreme caution the idea that it is possible to derive a solid ground for knowledge through introspective reflection, since it is in fact a seductive psychological mirage of sorts, which is often dubious, if not downright dishonest, in terms of the information it purports to provide us</u>. Indeed, in the concluding section of *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre asserts that all of the dramas people typically associate with their 'inner life' including doubts, remorse and various emotional crises of the kind that people tend to record in diaries, are not features of our 'inner selves' that are laid bare through introspection; rather, Sartre argues, these forms of inward-looking subject matter are 'mere representations', that materialize along with the (I), upon introspection. Sartre is not claiming, it must be said, that our 'inner lives' are of no consequence for us in terms of our attitude toward existence; rather, <u>his claim is that we tend to treat what he regards as essentially transient and ephemeral thoughts, feelings and so on, as if they were immutable features of our self-hood,</u> as it were, that cannot be grappled with, much less overcome" (pg. 58)
        - ▸ "Having claimed that a transcendental ego is absent from consciousness, but also that **the *appearance* of an (I) is created when we undertake introspective reflection**, Sartre then makes a much brasher assertion; namely, that <u>an (I) is absent from *unreflective* consciousness</u>. Initially, this phenomenon seems impossible to describe, given that unreflective consciousness is, by definition, resistant to its being reflected-upon, let alone to its being phenomenologically described" (pg. 58-59)
          - – "Sartre argues that unreflective consciousness can be demonstrated with recourse to memory; by carefully retrieving an experience in which we did not enter into reflection, Sartre argues, we may describe this situation without 'disturbing' its unreflective quality. Sartre gives some substance to the role he envisages here for memory, through the experience of reading a particularly engrossing book" (pg. 59)
            - ◆ "Everything is *happening*, but there is no sense of anything happening for *me*. In this way, the absence of an (I) in unreflective consciousness is demonstrated, without recourse to reflection" (pg. 59)
  - □ "Sartre asserts that, whereas physical objects are inert and reciprocally limited and defined by their relation to other such objects, consciousness is absolute and spontaneous" (pg. 60)
    - ◆ "Sartre asserts that his conception of the ego is constituted of states, qualities and actions, with ego serving to unify each of these entities as they are constituted in relation to consciousness" (pg. 59)
    - ◆ "the central thesis [Sartre] advances in relation to the constitution of the ego is…the ego acts to being together its own component-parts (states, qualities and actions), but the absolute spontaneity of consciousness means that the relations between consciousness and the 'me' cannot be rendered in a typical phenomenological fashion. Sartre's conception of the ego, then, emphasizes the extent to which any attempt to 'contain' or delineate consciousness in its pure spontaneity, particularly in terms of its relationship to the 'me', is bound to slip through one's fingers, so to speak; 'magical' notions therefore represent our only real hope of describing the interrelation between psychical states on the one hand, and episodes of consciousness on the other"

- (pg. 60)
  - □ "Sartre claims that his conception of <u>the ego as 'out there', in the world</u>, just like the ego of another, overcomes two great philosophical conundrums, both of which also confronted Husserl: the problem of other minds, and the problem of solipsism. As far as Sartre is concerned, his conception of the ego's transcendence allows us to move from theorizing consciousness as secluded in the privacy of individual minds, to understanding it as an inherently worldly (and therefore public) phenomenon" (pg. 61)
- ▪ Intentionality (pg. 62)
  - □ "Sartre also argues that consciousness exhausts itself completely in its object. According to Sartre, consciousness is nothing other than its escaping itself in its Other - its object. In this way, Sartre gives expression to his view that consciousness is not a process that can be formally observed or grasped as such; consciousness is pure intentionality alone, in Sartre's view. In undertaking to purify consciousness of everything but its intentionality, its directedness toward its object, Sartre uses phenomenology's descriptive prose" (pg. 62)
  - □ "Sartre uses similarly descriptive prose to formally attack the subjective Idealism he had been educated in" (pg. 63)
    - ◆ "The object experienced is not the thing in itself; the subject experiences 'contents of consciousness' constituted by its own mediating processes. Subjects therefore experience only *themselves*" (pg. 63)
- ○ Chapter 6 - Sartre: Novelist and Playwright, by A. van den Hoven (pg. 66)
  - ▪ "[in *Nausea*, Roquentin] views most human endeavors as pathetic attempts to disguise reality and to obscure, or embellish and prettify man's real position in the world" (pg. 66)
  - ▪ "*Nausea* represents a quest for a lucid understanding of man's place in the universe" (pg. 67)
    - □ "*Nausea* represents a comprehensive confrontation with the absurdity of mankind's existence and, paradoxically, it is also a valiant attempt to see beyond it and create a 'human' space for us" (pg. 68)
- ○ Chapter 7 - Psychoanalysis and Existential Psychoanalysis, by B. Canon (pg. 76)
  - □ "It may also be that when Sartre remarks in *Search for a Method* that only psychoanalysis 'allows us to discover the whole man in the adult; that is, not only his present determinations but the weight of his history' (Sartre 1968: 60), he was thinking of his recent encounter with Freud in writing the screenplay" (pg. 77)
  - □ "The truth is that <u>Sartre gave Freud an enormous amount of credit while disagreeing with him on many crucial issues</u>. Sartre is aware that existential psychoanalysis could not have existed without the prior invention of Freudian psychoanalysis. He understands that his version of existential psychoanalysis is only a set of principles and that it provides nothing like the application to work with patients that fills out the literature of psychoanalysis" (pg. 77)
  - □ "Sartre welcomed <u>R. D. Lang's work</u>, which <u>is deeply influenced by Sartre</u>, as exemplifying a psychoanalytic perspective compatible with his own" (pg. 77)
  - □ "This chapter will compare and contrast existential with Freudian psychoanalysis, concluding with a brief consideration of how Sartre might be useful to psychoanalysis today" (pg. 77)
  - ▪ Freud's Theory and Method: The Appeal to Natural Science (pg. 77) *cf. S. Mitchell & M. Black, Freud and Beyond* <u>https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_28fd4b356e764157aad6858542e602c2.pdf</u>
    - □ "Freud…attempted to ground his approach in the natural science of his day. **His position is fundamentally deterministic and materialist**" (pg. 77)
      - ◆ "Freud's aim is to reduce psychology to neurophysiology…" (pg. 77-78)
      - ◆ "The four major hypotheses of his psychological metatheory are all scientistic postulates in the sense that they use natural science metaphors to try to establish the validity of psychoanalysis. The most experience-distant of these, <u>the drive theory of the economic hypothesis, is based on energy flow, inhibition and displacement</u> - metaphors derived from charge and discharge theories borrowed from physics, hydraulic metaphors adapted from the discovery of the steam engine, and Freud's study with his mentors, Brucke and Meynert, in neurophysiology" (pg. 78)
        - ◊ "The flow of energy in the organism is first conceived in terms of psychobiological forces - <u>libidinal and aggressive drives in the early Freud and, in his later work, life and death instincts, Eros and Thanatos</u>. Freud believed that instinctual energy can neither be created nor destroyed, that it is at least theoretically measurable, that it can be condensed or displaced from its original objects to others (as in transference), that it can be "converted" from one form to another (as in hysterical blindness), and that it can be withdrawn from the external world towards the ego or a lost object (as in narcissism or mourning)" (pg. 78)
        - ◊ "the ultimate aim of the organism, according to Freud, is the return to zero energy charge. <u>The pleasure principle</u> is a mechanical principle involving the physical reduction of quantities of energy in the organism" (pg. 78)
    - □ "Although many current psychoanalysts dismiss or minimize <u>drive theory</u>, it <u>is actually the engine that makes the Freudian machine go</u>. The dynamic (conflictual forces in the psyche), topographic (consciousness, preconscious and unconscious) and structural (ego, superego and id) hypotheses all require it. <u>The repository of the drives is the id, and the source of reality orientation is the ego</u>, where drive energy is neutralized or sublimated or displaced or defended against. The internalization of prohibitions against drive satisfaction combined with castration anxiety leads to the development of the superego, which may get some of its virulence from aggressive drives originating in the id. Because they do not have castration anxiety, women do not develop adequate superegos. The <u>neurosis develops when drives press for gratification and are met with resistance from the outside world and/or the superego</u>. Substitute satisfactions in the form of symptoms result since energy cannot be destroyed but only displaced in the psyche. For example, compulsive hand-washing substitutes for the desire to handle faeces or other 'dirty' activities" (pg. 78-79)
    - □ "Freud's method involves asking the analysand to commit to a process in which she says everything that comes to mind" (pg. 80)
      - ◆ *this is known as 'free association'*
  - ▪ Sartre's Approach: Phenomenological Inquiry and the Fundamental Project of Being (pg. 80)
    - □ "Although Sartre was always appreciative of Freud's great discoveries…he at the same time seriously objected to Freud's metapsychology. His objections are rooted in existential phenomenology, which rejects the premises of positivistic science as applied to human beings. Phenomenology is first and foremost an answer to Cartesian dualism: it does away with the division between mind and body, self and world, of seventeenth-century French philosopher René Descartes - a perspective that has deeply influenced the development of modern science" (pg. 80)
      - ◆ "the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, poses a view of consciousness as intrinsically intentional and world-related. **There is no self without the world, and no world without the self**" (pg. 80)
    - □ "<u>for Sartre and Heidegger, there is no transcendental ego</u>. There is only consciousness (Dasein, or 'being there', in Heidegger's philosophy) experiencing the world in this way or that" (pg. 81)
      - ◆ "It is from the perspective of existential phenomenology that Sartre rejects Freud's four fundamental hypotheses. From this perspective, there is no such thing as a psyche with substance and structure. There is no ego, superego and id, no consciousness, preconscious and unconscious, no psychobiological drives behind intentional acts, no internal dynamics that are separated from the world in which a person lives. There is only bodily lived consciousness grasping the world in this way or that" (pg. 81)

- "Sartre says that **existential psychoanalysis attempts to grasp an individual's fundamental project of being**" (pg. 81)
    - "the project is…an original gut-level bodily lived conscious choice of a way of being in the world" (pg. 81)
    - "the fundamental project is freely chosen, though that choice is always situated - that is, it is always a combination of what the world brings and what I make of what the world brings" (pg. 81)
- "for Freud, desire refers to the sexual instinct and its objects, modulated through the psychosexual stages. For Sartre, <u>desire refers to the fundamental lack of Being</u> (nothingness or *no thingness*) <u>that consciousness is</u>" (pg. 81)
    - "my desire…manifest in my experience as I related to the objects of that experience in a variety of ways. It is motivated by the desire to fill the fundamental lack. It is the desire to use objects and other people to create a substantialized self" (pg. 81)
- "<u>the fundamental project</u>…is less a totality in the static sense than a totalization, <u>a continuous way of making sense of self and world that is always moving and changing</u>" (pg. 81-82)
    - "the fundamental project…has its origins in the past…" (pg. 82)
- "The reason present symptoms may seem determined by past circumstances is that we remember the circumstances vividly and see no other way that we could have lived them. This is partially so because we did choose to live them in this way and not in another" (pg. 82)
    - **this is being blinded by our own choice (i.e., turning backward upon ourselves to see only the remnants / outline of an object obscured by a bright light), where what's lost is the true standing of our historical choice amidst what was at that moment still possible for us to-do but never afforded enough reason to-be.*
- "the fundamental project is not just past-oriented. It is present and future-oriented as well. The present moment is, of course, where we live and where change takes place" (pg. 82)
    - "**the fundamental project…is a *pro-ject*, or throwing myself forward** out of the past toward the future" (pg. 83)
    - "the fundamental project is always an attempt to try to solve the problem of being, rather than a merely mechanical response to internal forces or external conditions. This is the problem of needing to create a substantial self while yet remaining free - to be somebody or something…" (pg. 83)
        - "all of our different ways of doing, being and having are attempts to solve the problem of being - to create meaning down there in the future by bringing into existence a substantialized self as value" (pg. 84)
    - "we must discover the person's fundamental project not behind concrete lived experience, but in that very experience itself" (pg. 85)
    - Sartre's Answer to the Problem of Self-Deception (pg. 85)
        - "Freud explains self-deception in terms of unconscious dynamics and wishes. **Sartre explains it in terms of the division between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness and the structures of bad faith**. <u>Pre-reflective consciousness is simple gut-level awareness</u>, basic intentionality. It is bodily lived, conscious and intentional, but not necessarily even verbal since, as Sartre says, language is fundamentally for others. Sartre says that pre-reflective consciousness 'is penetrated by a great light without being able to express what this light is illuminating'" (pg. 85)
        - "lack of recognition as a person also plays a major role in Laing's examples of 'ontological insecurity'" (pg. 86)
        - "Self-deception arises from the desire to view or make myself into a particular kind of object - for myself and/or others. Actually, the very belief that I can be an object like other objects in the world, a substantialized self as a table is a table, is a distortion. It is an act of what Sartre calls bad faith, or lying to myself about the nature of my existence, because I am not an object but a free subject" (pg. 86)
            - "a rigidly developed ego is a primary source of self-deception" (pg. 86)
                - **cf. B. Russell, The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, Chapter 25 - John Dewey, pg. 182 - "The test of error in the above illustration is surprise. I think this is true generally of beliefs that can be tested. A false belief is one which, in suitable circumstances, will cause the person entertaining it to experience surprise, while a true belief will not have this effect"* https://www.emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/The-Basic-Writings-of-Bertrand-Russell.pdf
            - "Even viewing myself as a miserable, bad, inferior, ineffective, selfish or otherwise objectionable object is a matter of bad faith. Yet such a position, like all solidifications of the ego, serves the purpose of giving me at least a sense of identity. **It allows me to imagine that I am something and to avoid the nothingness that I actually am**. Hence people often stubbornly cling to such identities" (pg. 86)
                - "introjecting the original others [i.e., that beside, and thus not, myself] aids me in developing a solid sense of self" (pg. 86)
                    - "we are not dealing here with unconscious processes, but with <u>maneuvers in bad faith</u>" (pg. 86)
                        - **'maneuvers' as in 'movement' (e.g., flight from oneself)*
        - "<u>since there are two poles to human reality - freedom and facticity - there are actually two poles to bad faith</u>" (pg. 87)
            - "what I actually am is a freedom in situation, not a simple facticity or an ungrounded freedom" (pg. 87)
            - "If I find myself unwilling, for whatever reason, to accept the tension implied in these two poles, freedom and facticity, I may try to escape in one direction or the other. I may overemphasize facticity, trying to make myself into a solid something, as in the form of bad faith discussed above. Or else I may try to escape into ungrounded freedom, pretending to be absolutely free in the sense of not being impacted by my present circumstances, my past, my socioeconomic conditions, my relationships, and so on. This second form of bad faith, in its more extreme forms, might lead to mania or psychosis - just as the other form might lead to severe depression or the grandiosity of narcissism. In milder cases, the second form might lead to 'commitment phobia' or denial" (pg. 87)
    - "Purifying Reflection" and Change (pg. 87)
        - "there are <u>two other forms of reflection</u> that Sartre discusses briefly in *Being and Nothingness*. They are <u>pure reflection and purifying reflection.</u> It is these forms of reflection that can lead a person to recognize the image of himself 'as if he were seeing himself in a mirror' (BN1: 573; BN2: 594) - and thereby make a new choice of a way of being in the world. This indeed is the aim of psychoanalysis, Sartrean or Freudian, according to Sartre" (pg. 87)
            - "<u>Pure reflection</u>, which Sartre describes as the "simple presence" of the consciousness reflecting to the consciousness reflected on (BN1: 155; BN2: 177), is both 'the original form of reflection and its ideal form'. It is the original form since without it no other forms could exist. <u>It is the ideal form because it does not try to create an object self</u>. The impassable gulf between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness does not disappear, but it is not contaminated by the motive to construct an object self. <u>Purifying reflection</u> goes a step further. It allows us to grasp all of those reflective distortions, with their roots in childhood, that keep us entangled in the structures of bad faith that form the neurosis. Sartre says that the nothingness that consciousness is cannot be known to pre-reflective consciousness nor grasped as a psychic object by impure reflection, but that it 'is accessible only to the purifying reflection' (BN1: 199; BN2: 222)" (pg. 87-88)
                - "Sartre associates purifying with play. He says that 'play as contrasted with the spirit of seriousness appears to be the least the possessive attitude'" (pg. 88)
                - "**play…allows for a lightness rather than a heaviness of being**" (pg. 88)
                    - **cf. S. Cooper, Playing and Becoming in Psychoanalysis, pg. 2 - "play is a way of thinking…" & pg. 6 - ""the ability*

to play with perfervid involvement diminishes as one ages…"
https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_23ec2adca4bd4f479570eff844a829a5.pdf
- ◆ "purifying reflection, in conjunction with play, can therefore be said to create a space for radical change in therapy" (pg. 88)
- ☐ **"[existential psychoanalysis'] task is to allow us to move to a place where we take freedom itself, our own and that of others, as value"** (pg. 89)
- ■ Sartre and Contemporary Psychoanalysis (pg. 89)
  - ☐ "contemporary relational, intersubjective, and interpersonal psychoanalysts have continued the abandonment of Freudian drive theory…" (pg. 90)
  - ☐ "Sartrean existential psychoanalysis has not yet found its Freud" (pg. 91)
    - ◆ "few have taken Sartre's work on existential psychoanalysis seriously" (pg. 91)
- ○ Chapter 8 - Nothingness and Negation, by S. Richmond (pg. 93)
  - ☐ "A principal aim of [Sartre's *L'Imaginaire*] is to reject an influential philosophical conception of imagination as a capacity to entertain mental images, where these are conceived as immanent states of consciousness that are similar in type to sensations. Sartre argues cogently against that view (of which the best-known proponent is probably David Hume), putting forward a number of objections to the very idea that imagination involves the presence of 'images' to the mind. Sartre argues instead that imaginative activity involves a relationship to the imagined object that requires a radical break, on the part of consciousness, with the world. In addition, he denies the existence of any 'images' in the mind. Instead we are to understand that the imagining consciousness, like consciousness in general, is directed to an object. But the objects with which the exercise of the imagination puts us in contact are unreal. The imagining consciousness 'must be able to form and posit objects affected by a certain character of nothingness' (Sartre 2004a: 183)" (pg. 93)
    - ◆ "Sartre's 'Conclusion' to *The Imaginary* argues that for any consciousness to have the capacity to imagine, it is a necessary condition that it be free - and, further, that the imagination makes manifest a freedom which, in fact, any conceivable consciousness must possess" (pg. 94)
    - ◆ "*The Imaginary* was, for Sartre, a 'rehearsal' for the more ambitious project of *Being and Nothingness*" (pg. 94)
  - ☐ **"from the outset…Sartre's interest in phenomenology co-existed with and was an instrument for his wish to demonstrate the existence of human freedom, and his sense that the way to do this was by establishing an essential connection of consciousness with nothingness"** (pg. 94)
  - ☐ "in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre announces that his project is 'phenomenological ontology', and argues that <u>an adequate ontology must take account of nothingness, 'alongside' being</u>" (pg. 94)
    - ◆ *cf. D. Binseel, A Demonstration of (O)bjectivity, pg. 5 - See December 6, 2023 entry (Email on Determinism) - "it is not so much 'transposing' or 'transforming' the positive to-be a negative so much it is making the negative...to stand alongside the positive, reaching out to clasp that which is silent, surpassed, 'secondary' to draw forth to reside in the foreground and be on equal footing with its counterpart, so as to attain fuller understanding of man and his situation"*
      https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_795d5e35faaf49c6a197e1dd2fe00fc5.pdf
- ■ Sartre's Argument for Nothingness in *Being and Nothingness* (pg. 94)
  - ☐ "Sartre's route to this problem [of nothingness] has been the need…to understand how the two 'regions' of being so far described - the for-itself and the in-itself - are related to each other" (pg. 95)
  - ☐ "Closely tracking Heidegger's methodology in *Being and Time*, Sartre suggests that we choose, as our initial example, the very activity in which we, as knowledge-seekers, are currently engaged: the activity of asking a question or, as Sartre often puts it, "interrogation". From here his path diverges from Heidegger's: Sartre wishes to focus specifically on the fact that, <u>for any question, the possibility of a negative reply exists</u>. This is true for every question, Sartre argues, not only for those that admit of a yes/no answer" (pg. 95)
  - ☐ "The core of Sartre's argument that, in addition to the negativity involved in negative judgements, nothingness requires ontological recognition is his well-known example of Pierre's failure to turn up in the café where he is expected" (pg. 95)
    - ◆ "Sartre's point is that if, in the course of looking out for Pierre, one sees, say, a female customer in a brown coat, that experience is not *just* a perception of a woman in a brown coat. Rather, <u>part of what one sees, in seeing the woman, is that she is *not* Pierre</u> - the experience of each person, as they are visually scanned, is *modified* by the possibility of their being Pierre, such that Pierre's non-appearing person 'haunts' it. If one compares this with the experience of the cafe that another person, not expecting anyone in particular, might have, we can see how different the two experiences will be.
      - ◇ *one might think of this not so much as evidence of the non-being of Pierre but a pre-conception (revealed or patterned through an 'expectation'), which, then, might not have anything to do with the being of Pierre at all (notice the relative position of the 'not' in this sentence - it is isolated from 'the being of Pierre').*
    - ◆ "According to <u>Gestalt theory</u>, sensory experiences typically involve a perceptual 'field', which may be differently organized by different subjects, according to their expectations and their practical orientation. The perceptual field is typically articulated into a salient *figure* - the object of explicit attention - against a more or less indifferently experienced *background*" (pg.96)
      - ◇ "Borrowing this figure/background distinction, <u>Sartre suggests that in the case of the person who has the appointment with Pierre, the café as a whole forms the background for a specific anticipated figure - that of Pierre. But as he is not there, the figure is experienced as an absence</u>" (pg. 96)
        - ▷ "the negative judgement depends upon the antecedent, pre-judicative 'intuition'" (pg. 97)
          - – *meaning, if I do not anticipate anything, then there can be no nothing which flows outwardly to 'meet' me - otherwise, if I 'do not', then 'not' there is. But, this is backwards to how Sartre construes 'not' - mainly, as that which proceeds from 'doing' (i.e., anticipating). I would argue, 'not' is mostly revealed to us 'through' reflection (i.e., the shooting backwards that is reflecting, crossing over the nothing which fills the between 'reflection' and 'reflected').*
    - ◆ "<u>Sartre's account invites the objection that the experience of Pierre's absence from the café is **merely subjective** in so far as it depends on the prior belief or expectation that Pierre will be there</u>: the 'intuition' of his absence is not after all of something that is there "for all to see" but is a function of the spectator's expectation" (pg. 97)
      - ◇ "Sartre agrees that Pierre's absence is subject-relative in so far as it depends upon the observer's expectations" (pg. 98)
      - ◇ "This admission, however, is not supposed to diminish the 'reality' of nothingness; we are not to conclude that, because Pierre's absence is only apparent to his friend, the 'intuition' is an illusion. Rather, Sartre claims, it shows that <u>nothingness is *associated with* human consciousness, it tells us something about its 'location'</u>. **Sartre is happy to admit that without consciousness there would be no nothingness**" (pg. 98)
        - ▷ *this would mean that consciousness 'creates' nothing. But, if that be the case, then all of consciousness stands in question - viz., "what does consciousness 'do'?", one might ask. "Well, nothing", another could say. "So, then what 'is' consciousness?", the first fellow might then reply. "It 'is' precisely what it 'does'", the other might remark.*
    - ◆ "it must be kept in mind that nothingness, *qua* non-being, has no being. It cannot be explained in terms of the in-itself, because that 'region' of being, as Sartre has told us, is 'full positivity': it cannot therefore 'contain…Nothingness as one of its structures'"

(pg. 98)
- ◇ "So if nothing cannot be produced either by being or by nothingness, Sartre concludes that there must be some being that in some way 'is' its own nothingness: *'the being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness'* (BN1: 23; BN2: 47; Sartre's emphasis). <u>There must be a being 'shot through' with nothingness</u>, a dynamic being which 'nihilates Nothingness in its being in connection with its own being' (BN1: 23; BN2: 47; Sartre's emphasis). And **the only being that fits the bill, Sartre argues, is consciousness**" (pg. 99)
  - ▸ **see above comment on pg. 98*
    - – "Indeed, Sartre argues, the very possibility of asking a question - the conduct which Sartre initially sets out to investigate - requires the capacity to 'stand out' from being, in order to put it into question. <u>A withdrawal, or detachment (*'recul'*), from being is required, and nothingness makes this possible</u>" (pg. 99)
      - ◆ "Sartre could have managed…by simply arguing, as he does, that nothingness - or, as it now takes on the guise of this new name - freedom, is a necessary condition of the human capacity to ask a question" (pg. 99)
        - ◆ "Indeed, our freedom qua rational beings is often illustrated by our capacity to 'question' - as when we step back from our immediate beliefs in order to question their well-foundedness, and to decide, on the basis of reflective judgement, whether to endorse or dismiss them" (pg. 99)
          - ◆ **it should be seen that this act of 'stepping back' can be done in the face of a past as well as in the face of a future (but, not done simultaneously).*
- ▪ Problems for Sartre (pg. 100)
  - ▢ "there are several passages where Sartre appears to make the concept of nothingness internally contradictory by reifying it - allowing it to stand as the subject of a verb…" (pg. 101)
  - ▢ **"*Being and Nothingness*…is also a rambling work, demonstrably in need of editing, and within its many pages Sartre is often inconsistent"** (pg. 101)
  - ▢ "as I have attempted to show, <u>Sartre takes himself to be offering a chain of arguments that lead to the conclusion that consciousness 'introduces' nothingness into the world, that it is *literally* its vehicle</u>" (pg. 102)
  - ▢ "It is clear then that **Sartre intends nothingness to *ground* our freedom ontologically**. But once this intention is given full recognition, it also becomes clear that the requirements made of the concept of nothingness cannot be met" (pg. 103)
  - ▢ "things go awry in Sartre's account at a number of points. One problem if that his argument often moves much too fast" (pg. 103)
    - ◆ "Sartre jumps from the claim that nothingness is necessarily associated with human consciousness to the claim that it is somehow 'woven into' the fabric of consciousness" (pg. 103)
      - ◇ **much like Kierkegaard's "leap".*
  - ▢ "adding non-being to the picture does not add any genuine further way of establishing human freedom" (pg. 104)
- ▪ Problems without Sartre (pg. 104)
  - ▢ "Sartre is often at his most brilliant when criticizing and noticing the weaknesses in the theories he rejects" (pg. 104)
  - ▢ "I have argued that <u>Sartre's attempt to make the transition, from the phenomenon of negative judgements to a 'nothingness' that allegedly provides their foundation, is insufficiently motivated</u>" (pg. 105)
- ○ Chapter 9 - The Look, by S. Overgaard (pg. 106)
  - ▪ Introduction (pg. 106)
    - ▢ "the present chapter offers a presentation and defence of Sartre's analysis of the look" (pg. 106)
  - ▪ Husserl: Intersubjectivity (pg. 107)
    - ▢ "'Intersubjectivity' is Husserl's term of choice for anything having to do with the relations between subjects" (pg. 107)
      - ◆ **'between' is the pivotal word.*
  - ▪ Heidegger: Being-with (pg. 108)
    - ▢ "Heidegger generally puts greater emphasis on our practical involvement with our surroundings than does Husserl…" (pg. 108)
      - ◆ **i.e., 'equipmentality'*
    - ▢ "Heidegger's term for what Husserl would call the 'subject' is 'Dasein', or 'being-there'" (pg. 109)
    - ▢ "solicitude is Heidegger's umbrella term for our way of relating to others" (pg. 109)
  - ▪ Sartre's Critique (pg. 110)
    - ▢ "according to Sartre, Husserl is unable to escape solipsism…" (pg. 110)
    - ▢ "Sartre imagines that he is sitting in a park. Suddenly he notices another man pass by a bench located at the edge of a lawn. Sartre sees the man 'as an object and at the same time as a man' (BN1: 254; BN2: 277). What this involves, according to Sartre, is noticing how <u>the surroundings - the lawn, the benches, and so on - organize themselves around the stranger</u> (BN1: 254; BN2: 277-8). This has the further implication that **these surroundings are no longer organized or grouped around me but flee from me towards a new centre in the shape of the other person**" (pg. 110-111)
      - ◆ "Sartre emphasizes how my experience of the embodied other is at the same time an experience that the world is not exhausted by its being for me, but is also what it is for the other" (pg. 111)
      - ◆ "the other is a very special object given his power to reorganize my surroundings; yet he is nevertheless still my experienced *object*" (pg. 111)
  - ▪ The Look (pg. 112) https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_58e159a8f9f949f99543bb6970411215.pdf **see pg. 347*
    - ▢ "I encounter the other as *subject* precisely when I experience myself as the one who is being looked at, as opposed to the one who is looking" (pg. 112)
      - ◆ "Sartre claims that <u>the most original encounter with the other</u> is an encounter with 'the one who looks at me' - an encounter with the other's 'look'" (pg. 112)
    - ▢ "The other's look does not have to be in the shape of two eyes directed at me. The look 'will be given just as well on occasion when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, or the slight opening of the shutter, or a light movement of a curtain' (BN1: 257; BN2: 281)" (pg. 112)
    - ▢ "'The look', therefore, refers more to a subjective experience than to a phenomenon 'out there' in the world. <u>It is supposed to articulate our experience of another subject's presence</u>, an experience we may have when no one is actually there and may fail to have when another person is actually looking at us" (pg. 113)
    - ▢ **"Sartre quite generally associates the experience of the look with feelings of vulnerability, disempowerment and even enslavement"** (pg. 113)
      - ◆ **see comments on pg. 1 - "going too far"*
      - ◆ "<u>The look paralyses me and makes it impossible for me to act naturally</u> (or even look back). The nervousness we may feel if we have to speak, sing or dance in front of a large audience illustrates Sartre's point. <u>We need not believe that the audience is a</u>

hostile one to feel that the sheer weight of their looks makes it difficult to act naturally. Even to walk or speak naturally can be almost impossible when one feels the others' looks piercing one's skin, as it were" (pg. 113)
- ◇ "According to Sartre, the only way in which I can escape my role as the other's paralysed object is by making the other my object, thereby again assuming the role of experiencing subject. But <u>this means that the most fundamental relation with others becomes one of conflict where we struggle to objectify each other</u>…" (pg. 113-114)
  - ▸ "not only is this perspective on social life pretty bleak in itself, what makes matter worse is that the conflict is quite irresolvable" (pg. 114)
- ☐ "much of what Sartre says about concrete relations with others is clearly reminiscent of Hegel's dialectics of master and slave, but **for Sartre mutual recognition is not in the cards**" (pg. 114)
  - ▪ Criticisms of Sartre (pg. 115)
    - ☐ "perhaps the most common critical reaction to Sartre's account of the look - and his account of social life more generally - is to fault it for its extremely negative slant" (pg. 115)
- ○ Chapter 10 - Bad Faith, by D. Detmer (pg. 118)
  - ☐ "'<u>Bad faith</u>', as a first approximation, refers to self-deception. While lying to oneself might be the clearest example of what is meant by bad faith, most of the examples that Sartre discusses involve techniques that are subtler than overt lying, and might better be characterized as <u>attempts to evade the truth and to keep it hidden from oneself.</u> Such conduct is widespread and common, according to Sartre, **especially when the truth to be evaded concerns one's own freedom and consequent responsibility**. Accordingly, Sartre, as a champion of both freedom and truth, devotes a great deal of attention to describing, explaining, and attacking bad faith. Indeed, bad faith emerges as a central concept in his thought, one that is repeatedly taken up both in his philosophical work and (implicitly) in his literary writings, and throughout all phases of his career" (pg. 118)
  - ▪ The Challenge of Bad Faith (pg. 119)
    - ☐ "if I successfully deceive myself it would appear that I must, at one and the same time, both know the truth (so that my denial of it counts as a deception, rather than as a mere mistake) and not know it (so that I am genuinely deceived). But how can I both know something and not know it at the same time?" (pg. 119)
    - ☐ "<u>A conscious being</u>, according to Sartre, differs radically from other kinds of beings in that it fails fully to coincide with itself, but rather <u>always stands somewhat at a distance from itself.</u> **Its manner of being is shot through with negations, dualities, and ambiguities; and it is precisely the exploitation of these that facilitates bad faith**" (pg. 119)
  - ▪ Anguish (pg. 119)
    - ☐ "Sartre begins his analysis by distinguishing between anguish and fear" (pg. 119)
      - ◆ "whereas fear refers to concern about an external threat, '<u>anguish</u>' is Sartre's term for the reflective awareness of one's own freedom" (pg. 120)
    - ☐ "<u>The phenomenon of anguish thus exposes one of the ways in which I fail to coincide with myself.</u> Though I exist as a temporal being, because I am always engaged in projects that are rooted in my past and which aim to bring about a specific future for me (such as one in which I return safely from my walk in the mountains), still, <u>I am temporally separated from my past and my future</u>, both of which, at least to that extent, therefore elude me and remain separate from me." (pg. 120)
  - ▪ Freedom and Negation (pg. 121)
    - ☐ "My lack of self-identity, my standing apart from myself, can also be approached by means of an analysis of freedom. On Sartre's view, every free action involves a double negation. On the one hand, to act every free action involves a double negation. On the one hand, to act is to attempt to bring about a state of affairs that currently is not. On the other hand, every act is also an attempt to negate what currently is" (pg. 121)
      - ◆ "Such double negativity characterizes the way of being of all consciousnesses. **I am constantly oriented towards, aiming at, and striving for, what is not; and I do so on the basis of a standing apart from, and a fleeing from, what is**" (pg. 121)
        - ◇ "<u>a conscious being…escapes, evades and negates itself at every turn. It is what it is not and is not what it is</u>" (pg. 121)
  - ▪ How to Deceive Successfully: General Principles (pg. 122)
    - ☐ "it is usually easier to deceive with unclear and misleading half-truths than it is with clear statements of blatant falsehoods. For one thing, clarity aids, and vagueness inhibits, the critical project of investigating a claim so as to determine whether or not it is true. In order to refute an assertion, one ordinarily needs a reasonably clear understanding of what it means. So **an effective method of deception is to employ ambiguity and vagueness, coupled with an appeal to the intended audience's interests and prejudices, so as to suggest a message that would not be received so uncritically if it were stated clearly**" (pg. 122)
      - ◆ "it is vastly more difficult…to expose as deceptive statements that are, strictly speaking, true…but which mislead by means of omission and emphasis" (pg. 122)
        - ◇ "To anticipate, and thus to be able to investigate, all of the different ways in which a statement might mislead because it simply leaves out (rather than lies about) something of crucial importance, or because it puts undue emphasis on something else (even without lying about it), is often well beyond the critical resources of the intended audience for the deception" (pg. 122)
    - ☐ "So <u>the ambiguity of consciousness…enables bad faith</u> by rendering deceptive beliefs about oneself merely misleading partial-truths rather than clear thoroughgoing falsehoods. I deceive myself about myself by playing up one aspect of the complex being of my consciousness while playing down another, rather than by telling myself stories about myself that are clearly and wholly false" (pg. 122)
  - ▪ The Specific Mechanisms of Bad Faith (pg. 122)
    - ☐ "[facticity] refers to everything about me that is 'given', that 'is'" (pg. 122-123)
    - ☐ "'transcendence', on the other hand, refers to all the ways in which I go beyond these givens by thinking about them, evaluating them, and, most importantly, by undertaking actions on the basis of them" (pg. 123)
      - ◆ "in short, '<u>transcendence</u>' is a synonym for '<u>freedom</u>'" (pg. 123)
    - ☐ "This 'double property of the human being' (BN1: 56; BN2: 79) facilitates bad faith because it allows me to deceive myself by (1) identifying myself with my facticity while ignoring my transcendence, (2) identifying myself with my transcendence while ignoring my facticity, or (3) sliding back and forth, in an unprincipled way, between identifying myself with my facticity and doing so with my transcendence" (pg. 123)
      - ◆ "it is only as I am going beyond, or transcending, facticity that it emerges as meaningful" (pg. 124)
    - ☐ "distinction…facilitates bad faith by the simple means of selective focusing" (pg. 125-126)
      - ◆ *this is a moment in Sartre's philosophy which he becomes impossible - i.e., he has created and honed-in on a nuance to the point where he 'traps in place' anything and everything, while taking such a singularity to be a wholistic representation of reality. See comments on pg. 1 "going too far".*
    - ☐ "if I am…confronted with clear instances in my past of some kind of misconduct, I can still refrain from investigating them, inquiring

into them, bringing them to full and lucid clarity, and asking myself what sort of pattern they suggest. This is surely self-deception, but it falls short of the kind of full-blooded lie to oneself that would entail a contradiction. **It relies, instead, on the technique of keeping vague things vague, and of exploiting the ambiguities and self-divisions of consciousness so as to enable me to emphasize what I want to emphasize and to omit what I want to omit**" (pg. 126)

- *this is where the technique of 'play' enters - see S. Cooper, Playing and Becoming in Psychoanalysis*
  https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_23ec2adca4bd4f479570eff844a829a5.pdf
  "it is not only that we unveil a hidden meaning but that we construct a new, absent meaning, or a new kind of meeting created in analysis" (pg. 24) This is exactly what re-engaging our own subjective product ought to do (i.e., "am I right for thinking this way?", "how else might I understand what's going on?", etc.). The goal is to question our project to (dis) cover in-itself what might be "sloppy" (or, miscontrived) and, therefore, subject to misunderstanding. Furthermore, a positive consequence of such questioning is also the silent acknowledgement of our Being as something in question.

- "Sartre argues that **the primary mode of consciousness is pre-reflective**. In this mode consciousness is fired out towards the objects in the world with which it is concerned. <u>It does not reflectively focus on itself</u>. That is a secondary mode of consciousness, made possible by consciousness's non-thetic, or marginal, awareness of its own activities when it is engaged pre-reflectively with other objects" (pg. 126)
- "probably the most important technique of bad faith is simply the ability to allow oneself to be persuaded by weak evidence" (pg. 126)
  - "these are methods of self-deception that do not involve overt lying. With them there is no denying of plain facts that one is staring in the face. Rather, they deal with matters of judgment in weighing and evaluating evidence, issues that are difficult and controversial, making the transgression of valid norms concerning them often difficult to detect, and impossible to dismiss in a quick and principled way" (pg. 127)

- Bad Faith as an Explanation of Widely Held False Beliefs (pg. 128)
  - "One reason is that Sartre holds a distinctive conception of consciousness, maintaining that it is always self-aware. In this same vein, <u>he rejects any kind of psychoanalytic notion of an unconscious mind</u> in which some contents might be hidden from consciousness" (pg. 128)
  - "Bad faith emerges as a plausible explanation, however, in light of the fact that the false beliefs in question are comforting, and involve denials of truths that would be demanding, disturbing, or threatening. For example, as we have seen, Sartre claims that <u>when we are reflectively aware of our freedom, we experience it as anguish</u>. One reason why we so seldom focus on our freedom and face up to its implications, and why so many of us deny it entirely in favour of a deterministic worldview, is, for Sartre, precisely that **we wish to flee our anguish and to escape the irksome obligations it imposes, namely, the obligation to act, and to take responsibility for our actions**" (pg. 128)

- Chapter 11 - Authenticity, by J. Webber (pg. 131)
  - Introduction (pg. 131)
    - "Sartre's concern with individual authenticity pervades his early philosophical and literary writings. Ye his conception of authenticity is somewhat elusive" (pg. 131)
    - "In two immediately subsequent works, *Existentialism Is a Humanism* and *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Sartre argues that authenticity is the fundamental virtue in his ethical outlook and he characterizes various examples of authentic and inauthentic ways of living, but in neither work does he give a clear explication of the idea of authenticity itself" (pg. 131)
      - *see comments on pg. 125-126 - he can't give a full account because he has trapped himself too in his own impossibility.*
    - "in plays and novels as well as in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre explores the ways in which people fail to be authentic and the damage this causes to their own lives and to the lives of those they affect" (pg. 131)
    - "for Sartre authenticity should not be confused with sincerity or good faith. The ideal of sincerity requires us to recognize and accept the motivations that drive our behaviour. The ideal of good faith requires us to inspect our own motivations honestly with a view to accepting who we are. But in Sartre's view, the very idea that we must accept the motivations that we have, rather than seek to shape our motivations, is at the very core of bad faith" (pg. 132)
  - Depth and Commitment (pg. 134)
    - "Larmore is right to describe Sartre's account of being human in terms of undertaking commitments, and to identify authenticity as the recognition of this" (pg. 134)
  - "Public Behavior and Private Experience (pg. 136)
    - "awareness of the way the world seems to us can furnish knowledge of our values and feelings" (pg. 138)
    - "what is required is a particular kind of reflection on one's own experience" (pg. 138)
  - Pure and Impure Reflection (pg. 138)
    - "Pure reflection preserves the sense of oneself as a normative being whose identity is conferred by commitments one undertakes and that one can revoke. Impure reflection, on the other hand, denies this" (pg. 139)
    - "From impure reflection, one could infer that the way the world seems is the way the world is, or that the way the world seems is a result of unchangeable facts about oneself. Impure reflection thus supports inauthenticity, since it allows one to live as though the evaluative and affective texture of the world is not the result of one's commitments. <u>Pure reflection supports authenticity</u>, since it delivers knowledge of that texture as resulting from one's commitments" (pg. 139)
  - Authenticity and Bad Faith (pg. 139)
    - "authenticity does not essentially require resisting social pressure. Neither does it essentially require viewing oneself and the world from one's own perspective, rather than taking up the perspective of other people. The difference between authenticity and inauthenticity, that is to say, is not based on the role that other people play in one's life at all. Authenticity is rather the recognition of the particular person that you are. This has two dimensions. One is recognition of what it is to be a person, which is to be a normative being whose identity is conferred by their commitments. The other is recognition of the particular commitments that one has, as these are manifested in the way the world seems in experience" (pg. 140)
    - "authenticity and inauthenticity, according to Sartre, concern how one understands oneself to be. One kind of inauthenticity involves affirming one's traits as though they were fixed…The other kind involves denying one's actual traits and pretending to have contrary traits that explain one's behavior" (pg. 140)
    - "bad faith in [a] larger sense is asserting a claim about oneself despite being aware, to some extent, that this claim is not true" (pg. 140)
  - The Ethics of Authenticity (pg. 141)
    - "Sartre's attempt to cast authenticity as the supreme value need not face this problem. This is because <u>Sartre does not think of authenticity as coinciding with oneself</u>. It is possible, therefore, that authenticity can set constraints on one's attitudes towards others as well as towards oneself. If authenticity can be shown to require the recognition that people in general are normative beings with ongoing commitments, that is to say then this might be argued to set important constraints on the ways in which one treats people in general" (pg. 141)

- ◆ *such would mean, then, that authenticity speaks more to how we are with others*
  - ☐ **"Sartre's account of values [are] rooted in the commitments one has already undertaken. This is integral to his idea of authenticity, since authenticity requires recognizing the values to which one's existing commitments give rise"** (pg. 141-142)
- ○ Chapter 12 - Knowledge, by A. Hatzimoysis (pg. 142)
  - ▪ Introduction (pg. 143)
    - ☐ "knowledge for Sartre is what we may call a contrastive notion: <u>knowledge is what consciousness</u> - including one's primary relation to oneself, to one's own body, to other beings in a situation, and to the world - <u>is not</u>" (pg. 143)
  - ▪ Intuition and Belief (pg. 144)
    - ☐ "Knowledge worthy of its name is intuitive; any non-intuitive relation to an object is withdrawn as soon as intuition is attained; and intuition concerns the presence of consciousness to its object. Those are, in outline, the three pillars on which Sartre's theory of knowledge stands" (pg. 144)
      - ◆ "there is only one type of know, properly speaking, and that is 'intuitive knowledge'" (pg. 144)
    - ☐ "intuitive knowledge, simply put, is knowledge procured by intuition" (pg. 144)
      - ◆ "in ordinary parlance, intuition stands for the (seemingly) ungrounded but (apparently) indubitable apprehension of some fact" (pg. 144)
      - ◆ "Sartre does not relate intuition to belief or to a similar kind of propositional attitude" (pg. 145)
      - ◆ "within the Sartrean system, intuition is not in need of justification because **intuition itself is the ultimate source of justification**" (pg. 145)
        - ◇ *this is quite solipsistic for someone who aims to work against such's current.*
      - ◆ "The influence of the 'method of intuition' is evident in <u>Sartre's aversion to both rationalism and empiricism in their dogmatic versions</u>, his emphasis on lived experience, and his understanding of temporality as an 'original synthesis' rather than a mere aggregate of unrelated instances" (pg. 145)
  - ▪ Intuition and Discourse (pg. 146)
    - ☐ "the order of intuition and deduction is reversed: for Descartes, intuition provides the principles from which deductive reasoning ought to proceed; for Sartre, 'deduction and discursive argument... are only instruments which lead to intuition'" (pg. 146)
    - ☐ "in Sartre's discussion…intuition is not the revealing of *a priori*, conceptual truths: **intuition is 'of a thing' and pertains to the relation of consciousness to 'the being'**" (pg. 146)
  - ▪ Intuition and Presence (pg. 147)
    - ☐ "We have been told so far to what <u>intuition is opposed (discourse and deduction) and what it is of (a thing or the being)</u>. Sartre completes his introduction of intuition by bringing in another notion: presence. He writes that **'intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing'**" (pg. 147)
      - ◆ **"<u>unmediated experience of presence</u> gives the core meaning of intuition"** (pg. 148)
    - ☐ "Sartre defends his conception of intuition as consciousness's presence to an object, by laying out what has to be the case about consciousness, so that knowledge of an object be possible" (pg. 148)
  - ▪ Consciousness and Knowledge (pg. 148)
    - ☐ "In Sartrean terms, we may say that knowledge is first and foremost an instance of 'being-in-the-world', which is a 'synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only moments' (BN1: 3; BN2: 27). Hence, to understand knowledge, we need, first, to make sense of how consciousness is related to whatever it is conscious of; and, second, to see what sets knowing apart from other modes of one's conscious relation to the world" (pg. 148)
    - ☐ "for consciousness to be, it has to be consciousness of some thing; but to be conscious of any thing, it has, at a minimum, to be conscious of itself as not being the thing of which it is conscious. However, consciousness cannot be conscious of itself before being directed to its object, simply because **consciousness is not a thing - it is itself no thing, but the revealing intuition of things**. Consciousness's intending of a thing reflects back on itself, rendering consciousness the reflection of that thing on which it is reflected; the reflection is something of which consciousness is always necessarily (non-positionally) aware, while it is (positionally) aware of its object. Indeed, consciousness is (nothing but) that (non-positional) presence to itself being (positionally) present to its object. The conscious being is self-presenting, a being for-itself, directed towards a being in-itself, of which it is conscious" (pg. 148-149)
    - ☐ "Sartre puts emphasis on the immediacy of the relation between consciousness and the world. However, immediacy may not be mistaken for fusion" (pg. 149)
      - ◆ "The knower cannot disappear in the known, and the known can never be absorbed by the knower. The absorption of the known by the knower is disallowed by Sartre's forceful critique of idealism: the object of knowledge is not an ethereal item locked in a mental box, but part of the reality towards which consciousness is directed. And the total disappearance of the subject in the object is not possible because consciousness never ceases to be (non-positionally) aware of itself being (positionally) conscious of its objects" (pg. 149)
  - ▪ Concluding Remark (pg. 150)
    - ☐ "Sartre offers an analysis of knowledge in terms of presence, and unpacks that notion by showing the ontological bond that connects consciousness with the world" (pg. 150)
- ○ Chapter 13 - The Fundamental Project, by P. Crittenden (pg. 152)
  - ▪ Freedom: The Free Project and Action (pg. 152)
    https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_58e159a8f9f949f99543bb6970411215.pdf *cf. Part 4 - To Have, To Do, and To Be (pg. 567)
    - ☐ "**'Project' is a basic term in Sartre's ontology, for in its separation from in-itself being, the for-itself is at once thrown into the world and engaged in a free project**. The free project, in his description, is 'the impulse [élan] by which the for-itself thrusts itself toward its end' (BN1: 557; BN2: 578). Consciousness is one with freedom and thereby with engagement in free projects for "the freedom of <u>the for-itself is always *engaged*</u>; there is no question here of a freedom which could be undetermined and which would pre-exist its choice... <u>freedom is simply the fact that this choice is unconditioned</u>" (BN1: 479; BN2: 501)" (pg. 152)
      - ◆ *'impulse' seems a strange word for someone avidly against determinism / biologism.*
    - ☐ "the free project in this sense point to the notion of the *fundamental project*, understood as my being, what I make myself to be in choosing the person I am in what I do" (pg. 152)
    - ☐ "Sartre says that '<u>to act is to modify the *shape* of the world</u>; it is to arrange means in view of an end'" (pg. 152)
      - ◆ "an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not" - Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (pg. 153)
    - ☐ "freedom 'makes itself an act'; it is 'an existence which perpetually makes itself'" (pg. 153)
      - ◆ "**what I do yields an essence, indicative of past acts: 'my essence is what I have been'**. But freedom itself has no essence and cannot be defined" (pg. 153)

◇ *'existence precedes essence'
- □ "in acting, the for-itself cannot avoid the experience of itself as the permanent possibility of putting its past out of play and perpetually faced with having to make itself to be" (pg. 153)
  - ◆ "Freedom is precisely 'the nothingness which is *made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human-reality *to make itself* instead of *to be*…it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be - down to the slightest detail' (BN1: 440-41; BN2: 463)" (pg. 153)
- □ "For Sartre, freedom is manifested in passion no less than will. He therefore rejects the view that will and passion are opposed - that the will to do something leads to free action, and passion to causally determined behaviour. He argues rather that a passion or emotion, such as fear, is itself a type of free conduct, a response adapted to the situation as a means to pursuing ends posited by freedom. Will, as the choice of proceeding in a reflective and deliberative way, differs from passion only as a different means to the end" (pg. 153-154)
  - ◆ "will and passion both presuppose an original freedom…" (pg. 154)
- ▪ Freedom and Original Choice (pg. 154)
  - □ "The upsurge of freedom "beyond reasons, motives, and ends" appears mysterious. Sartre must say of it what he says of consciousness - that it comes from itself, that nothing is its cause, that the for-itself is 'a being which exists by-itself', a (non-substantial) absolute that creates and supports its essence (BN1: xxxi-xxxii, 80). **Freedom makes itself perpetually and spontaneously**" (pg. 154)
    - ◆ "he does not intend anything arbitrary or capricious" (pg. 154)
  - □ "This is my-being-in-the-world conceived as a choice - not a particular choice, but the basic or original choice in which I choose myself as a whole in every particular choice, the fundamental project which is my total being-in-the world in every particular project, the fundamental act of freedom which gives meaning to my every act" (pg. 155)
    - ◆ *I 'am' all that which has brought me to be 'here'. And, 'here' is where I am in-the-world.
  - □ "Sartre appeals to anguish as evidence that I am conscious of the choice that I am. Anguish also shows that we are aware that this choice cannot bind our future freedom, for, as the basis for all particular choices, it is contingent and unjustifiable" (pg. 157)
  - □ "the claim that freedom creates meaning 'by itself' in original choice is…questionable" (pg. 158)
    - ◆ "nonetheless, the idea that I make myself the person I am an that I am responsible for myself as a whole seems entirely plausible" (pg. 158)
- ▪ Existential Psychoanalysis and the Fundamental Project/Desire (pg. 158)
  - □ "Existential psychoanalysis is "a method destined to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each living person makes himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is" (BN1: 574; BN2: 595). Since "what the method seeks is a choice of being at the same time as a being, it must reduce particular behaviour patterns to fundamental relations - not of sexuality or of the will to power, but of being - which are expressed in this behaviour" (ibid.)" (pg. 158)
    - ◆ "the basic principle once again is that the human being is a totality, a unity responsible for itself and its world, not a collection. And the aim is to show how each tendency, each inclination of a person has a meaning that does beyond itself and which expresses in some way the subject's choice of being as a whole" (pg. 158-159)
  - □ "Freudian psychoanalysis provides an immediate context for Sar-tr's proposal, and he seeks common ground with it, especially in the emphasis on the symbolic character of behaviour and the search for underlying meaning. But he rejects the recourse to mechanistic explanation in Freudian theory and the idea of the unconscious" (pg. 159)
  - □ "Its concern is precisely with the subject's empirical tendencies and choices conceived as particular expressions of the postulated original choice. The task is to compare the various tendencies in the attempt 'to discover and disengage the fundamental project which is common to them all' on the understanding that each 'is the entire person' (BN1: 564; BN2: 585)" (pg. 159)
  - □ "the object of the desire to be can only be being-in-itself. What the for-itself lacks, what it desires and values is "the ideal of a consciousness that would be the foundation of is own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself" (BN1: 566; BN2: 587)" (pg. 159)
  - □ "Sartre's depiction of existential psychoanalysis appears as a bold sketch. The first stage, which he sets aside as beyond ontology, is the detailed psychological, social, historical and moral study of individuals designed to uncover in each case their particular fundamental project" (pg. 160)
  - □ "[Sartre] argues that the meaning of all our striving lies, as previously announced, in the desire of being, that is, in the general project of appropriating the world as a totality of being-in-itself, the project of being God" (pg. 161)
  - □ **"existential psychoanalysis involves moral description concerned with the ethical meaning of what we do…"** (pg. 161)
    - ◆ "the desire for being is a truth concerning human reality, arising in the fundamental relation of the for-itself to the in-itself" (pg. 161)
- ○ Chapter 14 - Self-Making and Alienation: from bad faith to revolution, by T. W. Busch (pg. 163)
  - □ **"the centrepiece of *Being and Nothingness* is the free individual…"** (pg. 164)
    - ◆ "His concern is to refute determinism and to do this he promotes a strong view of the autonomous individual subject. **Subjectivity, ontologized as being-for-itself, is constituted by a perpetually secreted negativity, which precludes identity with itself or its environment**, confirming his 'theory' of the individual 'whom society cannot affect, because he is free'. Absent a stable identity, this volatile subjectivity must choose its way in the world, on its own, creating and sustaining, but never 'being', an identity" (pg. 164)
  - □ "the message of *Being and Nothingness* was none other than a call to change one's attitude, to effect a 'conversion' of one's life to accept and live out one's radical freedom" (pg. 165)
    - ◆ "While [later in life] not taking back his ontological claims about total freedom in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre appears to be conceding that these claims are incomplete. In fact, as his attention turns to the issue of "possibilities of choice", **his hyperbolic claims about free subjectivity in *Being and Nothingness* are marginalized and minimized**" (pg. 165)
      - ◇ *cf. comments on pg. 1
  - □ "To understand what freedom is for Sartre, it is necessary to see his understanding of it develop throughout his works. Too often his views are identified with *Being and Nothingness*. He realized this and protested **"that they all stop too soon. I think that a study of my philosophical thought should follow its evolution.** But no, they don't do it. It's odd" (Sartre 1981b: 8)" (pg. 165)
    - ◆ *In my opinion, Sartre only has himself to blame for others choosing to not further pursue his philosophy, seeing that what he offers is 900 page monstrous texts of highly complex language and, at times, rambling thoughts.
- ▪ Self-Making: Existence Precedes Essence (pg. 165)
  - □ "The ground for Sartre's ontology of self-making in *Being and Nothingness* is found in *The Transcendence of the Ego*, his 'existentialist theory of consciousness'. **Consciousness is a priority for Sartre because for him what is distinctively human is a unique awareness of self and world**" (pg. 165)
    - ◆ "He appropriates Husserl's intentional understanding of consciousness, that consciousness is always consciousness of an object,

that <u>consciousness is relational in nature</u>, while transforming it into his existentialist view that existence precedes essence. For Sartre, consciousness operates on <u>two different levels, pre-reflective and reflective</u>. A reflective, or secondary level of consciousness, intends or posits an object that is another act of consciousness, as in Descartes's cogito, whereby he becomes aware of his own thinking.

- ◇ *it is for this 'relationality' that intersubjectivity and psychoanalysis has importance. And, it is Sartre's belief that the ego is what is posited to oneself upon reflection - otherwise, that it is mostly from-the-world the individuals finds themselves as they turn (in)to themselves. Cf. Chapter 4 - Sartre's understanding of the self, by C. Onof (pg. 32)*
  - ◆ "Sartre insists that consciousness is not unconscious of itself, but is aware of itself. However, <u>this awareness of itself is not positional or focal</u>. Rather it is non-positional, tacit and in the background. **The structure of consciousness is to be intentional or positional of an object and simultaneously non-positionally self-aware.** The reflexivity of non-positional self-awareness marks the creation of a 'self' that necessarily comprehends its difference from its objects" (pg. 166)
    - ◇ *pre-reflective consciousness is aware of itself but completely lost in its own cloud / haze / plume of light, unable to see its arms, legs, and chest, so to speak.*
  - ☐ "Sartre distinguishes the 'ego' from the 'self'. While the latter is integral to the structure of consciousness, the former is constituted through acts of reflection. In reflecting on the pre-reflective life of consciousness, reflection transforms it through objectifying it with some serious consequences" (pg. 166)
    - ◆ "Sartre…argue[s] that having a deep identity (nature or essence) is incompatible with <u>radical freedom</u>" (pg. 166)
    - ◆ "Sartre's existential lesson…is that **one must create oneself, ungrounded by essence, by freely choosing, committing, and sustaining oneself faithfully or unfaithfully as a way of life**" (pg. 166-167)
  - ☐ "In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre takes up the structure of consciousness explored in *The Transcendence of the Ego* in terms of an ontology that stresses subjectivity, particularly <u>defending its radical freedom</u>. Epistemologically, all human experience, for Sartre, is dichotomized into subject/object and ontologically into self/other. The difference embedded in and making possible the dichotomy is *néant*, the break or fission in the continuity of being (in non-positional self-awareness) that allows for radical freedom. '**The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist *at a distance from itself* as presence to itself, and this empty distance which being carries in its being is Nothingness**' (BN1: 78; BN2: 102). <u>The disruption of being from coincidence with itself temporalizes the being of consciousness</u>, projecting it into the non-being of the future, haunting it with the imaginary. <u>Exiled from identity with itself, human reality cannot rest in the stasis of being, but exhausts itself in temporalizing action</u>, creating and supporting a way of life, projecting meaning and value. 'In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself' (BN1: 40; BN2: 63)" (pg. 167)
    - ◆ "The self as the place of the causal continuity of being is radically free, that is, not determined by any factual state of affairs: 'No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological 'state,' etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever' (BN1: 435; BN2: 457). Since radical freedom is the very being of the self, there is no middle ground, **one is either determined or radically free**: 'Either man is wholly determined (which is inadmissible, especially because a determined consciousness - i.e., a consciousness externally motivated - becomes itself pure exteriority and ceases to be consciousness) or else man is wholly free' (BN1: 442; BN2: 464). **Human actions are not grounded in the foundation of an essence of being, but in the choices of a self by definition exiled from such a foundation**" (pg. 167)
      - ◇ *yet, one could say that human's 'essence' is their 'freedom' (i.e., that humans are 'essentially free' beings), which is 'nothing'; but, though their essence is not really any-thing (rather, in fact, such is no-thing), this does not equate to there not-being any essence at all.*
- ▪ From Bad Faith to Revolution (pg. 167)
  - ☐ "Bad faith is presented as a self-deception. Deception or lying presupposes a duality of liar and lied to wherein the liar hides the truth from the lied to. In the case of self-deception, one is hiding from oneself what one thinks to be true" (pg. 168)
    - ◆ "This self-deceptive behaviour is applied to the defining aspects of human reality, freedom and facticity. The very condition of radical freedom is its break in the continuum of being and from essential identity. Yet, as a contingent factical being in the world, human reality must choose and commit itself in a process of self-making" (pg. 168) *the author here mentions Sartre's "somewhat awkward language" (pg. 168)*
  - ☐ "While <u>human reality is not what it is in the sense of essence</u>, it 'is what it is not' in the sense of self-making, a creation and support of a mode of life for which it is responsible. **A person in bad faith is in denial of one of its terms**" (pg. 168)
    - ◆ *recall that Sartre correlated human 'essence' with the past. Cf. P. Crittenden - "what I do yields an essence, indicative of past acts: 'my essence is what I have been'. But freedom itself has no essence and cannot be defined" (pg. 153). So, based upon this, Sartre's conception of 'essence' is deeply enmeshed with (or, dependent upon) 'temporality'. But, if temporality is fiction (viz., a superfluous construct), then what is 'essence'?*
  - ☐ "The ontological mode of being-for-others affords more opportunities for self-deception. <u>The look of the Other objectifies the for-itself revealing a dimension of its reality unknown to the individual for-itself, as a factical object in the world.</u> In its objectivity for the Other, the for-itself apprehends the meaning of its being and world <u>slip from its control</u>, producing new tensions between subjectivity and objectivity" (pg. 168)
    - ◆ *alienation is sometimes defined by 'lack of control' (i.e., "feeling of powerlessness"). Cf. R. Schacht, Alienation, Chapter 5 - The Sociological Literature https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_40b2c807a8af4059966249a878ebf3d3.pdf*
  - ☐ "Sartre offers a motivation for bad faith by considering the 'break' in being, which he located in the non-positional self-awareness of being-for-itself, as a <u>lack</u> of self-identity, which <u>provokes a desire for self-identity</u>. Exiled from the identity of being, dispersed temporally and self-divided, <u>being-for-itself seeks to catch up with itself, to recover its dispersion and split identity in order to give itself meaning in the form of self-identity</u>. Being factical, **the for-itself is not its own foundation; it has no fundamental justification, no intrinsic meaningfulness**. In its self-making, the for-itself creates and sustains a meaningful life, but cannot actually be that mode of life in self-identity, the mode of being-in-itself. If being-for-itself could actually be the life that it makes and sustains as a project, it would be self-justifying, its own foundation. But, of course, if the for-itself were to be, it would no longer exist as a for-itself, a self-maker. It would lose itself as a self because a self is a 'break' in the identity of being" (pg. 169)
    - ◆ "bad faith is a way to live the impossibility ever fulfilling an always-deferred self-foundation through a belief that one has achieved it…[but] this demands that we deceive ourselves by denying those aspects of our situation (either our freedom or our facticity) that get in the way of sustaining that belief" (pg. 169)
    - ◆ "from time to time in Being and Nothingness Sartre reminds us that it is possible to overcome bad faith, to effect a 'conversion' to authentic life" (pg. 169)
      - ◇ *cf. B. Canon, Nothingness at the Heart of Being: Existential Psychoanalysis and Gestalt Therapy - "like existential psychoanalysis, Gestalt therapy rejects universal symbolism, and looks for what is individual and unique. The aim of both approaches is not adjustment or normality, but instead to evoke a special kind of awareness that will lead to the recovery of spontaneity and the embracing of freedom and responsibility. Sartre calls this awareness 'purifying reflection'" (pg.*

431) & "Gestalt therapy…attempts to facilitate a 'radical conversion' or purifying 'katharsis' that promotes the recognition of our freedom, accompanied by authentic contact with others" (pg. 443-444) https://www.sartreonline.com/CannonNothingness.pdf

- □ **"*Being and Nothingness* is a mix of phenomenological description, ontological categorization and metaphysical narrative"** (pg. 170)
- □ "On a number of occasions (e.g. ibid.) [Sartre] tells us that <u>the book where he has best explained what he means by freedom is, in fact, *Saint Genet.*</u> Here, in his attempt to understand Jean Genet's life, Sartre is led to speak of 'the making of Genet' (Sartre 1963). Contrasting with the adult world of *Being and Nothingness*, **Sartre emphasizes the pivotal role of Genet's childhood in the development of his subjectivity**. The vulnerable child, marked by social meanings attached to his illegitimacy, is 'provided with a monstrous and guilty ego' (ibid.: 27). His attempts to be like other children are twisted by others into a nightmarish stigma. <u>The child accepts the social verdicts levelled at him and, knowing no other recourse, sets out to enact them</u>, **'progressively internalizing the sentence imposed by adults'** (ibid.: 49). *Being and Nothingness* is ill suited to make Genet's situation intelligible, for only two options in life were there offered, bad faith and authenticity. However, the child Genet was not running away from a radical freedom he did not know. <u>He sees himself through the eyes of others, which in turn are conditioned by social structures alienating to him</u>. As he internalizes the definitions and judgments of others, Genet makes them his self-definitions and judgments, resulting in his 'alienation'" (pg. 170)
  - ◆ **this 'seeing ourselves through the eyes of others' is critical to the pathology of 'self' in social media (i.e., this "hunt" or "thirst" for recognition) and such's implications for alienation (self- or otherwise). Sartre, in Between Existentialism and Marxism, says "a writer alienates himself to his writing…" (pg. 31). The same can be said of an individual and their selfie.*
  - ◆ **cf. W. Storr, Self: How We Became So Self-Obsessed and What It's Doing to Us*
  - ◆ **cf. B. Barton, The Pornification of America: How Raunch Culture is Ruining our Society*
- □ "<u>In his later work Sartre vigorously delves into the processes by which people are 'made' by their environment</u>. It is not a question of rejecting existential self-making, but of taking into account social processes of 'making'. A concrete appreciation of freedom in this sense provokes <u>a 'dialectical' understanding of the subject and its world.</u> He drops the ontological terminology of for-itself and in-itself in favour of praxis and practico-inert, emphatically more actional and material notions than ontological and psychological. Praxis, the actional subject, works on the world, engraves its projects upon it, and it in turn, modified by these imprints, constrains praxis" (pg. 171)
  - ◆ **here, the dialectic is such that we produce based what we consume, where what's produced is in turn consumed - it is a cyclical sick process, which seems unbreakable / unavoidable. Cf. R. Samuels, The Psychopathology of Political Ideologies - "the model I am presenting here is centered on the dialectical relation between culture and subjectivity. Just as people with certain personality types are drawn to certain political ideologies and parties, these social organizations and belief systems are themselves structure[d] by particular psychopathological forces. Moreover, in a mutual feedback loop, culture shapes individuals and individuals shape culture…" (pg. 42). There, I said, "'dialectic' is a particular 'movement' (what some say is 'contradictory in nature') subsumed in the 'structure' that is a 'relation'"* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_643988b3484b45aca18a1b02b3c89545.pdf
  - ◆ *Cf. D. Carveth, Psychoanalytic Thinking: A Dialectical Critique of Contemporary Theory and Practice - "in my view, psychoanalysis as its best involves a dialectical relationship in which theory and practice are mutually determining, theory both informing practice and being re-informed by it" (pg. 7)* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_5d09e53b85d0468889e9e4410d7836f2.pdf
- □ "Until his death Sartre continued to do what he could to combat colonialism, racism and economic oppression. It is not an exaggeration to consider him a major voice of conscience in his age. He died still hopeful that a liberated society would materialize, a hope based upon his unwavering conviction that human beings are not stuck in the continuum of being but can always project a future different from the past" (pg. 172)

- ○ Chapter 15 - Politics and the Engaged Intellectual, by W. L. McBride (pg. 173)
  - ▪ Sartre's Path to Political Engagement (pg. 173)
    - □ "Sartre had a fairly strong sense of identification with his generation; he was not alone in regarding it, in retrospect, as the 'between the wars generation'" (pg. 173)
  - ▪ Sartre's Post-War Commitments (pg. 174)
    - □ "In light of Sartre's later development it is worth considering to what extent, if any, *Being and Nothingness* may be considered to have political significance. <u>The simple answer is, very little. It is above all a work of systematic ontology</u>…" (pg. 174)
  - ▪ Breaking with Camus (pg. 178)
    - □ :in his book, Camus, in effect, through numerous historical and literary analyses, concluded that, while individual revolt is often creative and productive, political revolutions are doomed to be counter-productive and to fail" (pg. 178)
  - ▪ Sartre and Communism: The Need for a New Marxian Methodology (pg. 179)
    - □ "The central question of method in *Search for a Method* is whether we have the intellectual tools today to enable us to understand the actions of any single individual…" (pg. 180)
- ○ Chapter 16 - Sartre's Theory of Groups, by P. Caws (pg. 184)
  - ▪ The Existential Subject (pg. 184)
    - □ "Sartre's ontology begins from the situation of the subject, not as an abstract category but as embodied and individual. Each of us is such a subject, and each of us knows only the subject that he or she is. As a subject I exist, that is to say <u>I stand out (the root meaning of 'exist')</u> into a world that I encounter in its immediacy and its otherness. Objects in the world are what they are, but this implies also that they just are, that they have being" (pg. 184)
    - □ "Objects in the world disappear and reappear, and the simplest way of accounting for this is to assume that <u>they have a form of being which is independent of their 'being-for-me'. Sartre calls this 'being-in-itself'</u>" (pg. 184)
      - ◆ **though Sartre denies that there is any difference between 'appearance' and the 'being of appearance', this, to me, says otherwise. Cf D. Binseel, A Very General Introduction to the Trajectory of Jurisprudence - "Kant maintained that the individual is a unity between their phenomenal being (external realm of appearances, or a posteriori concepts) and noumenal being (internal realm of intelligence, or a priori concepts)"* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_588aec88de3d4b309ad21f4204726c24.pdf
      - ◆ *Cf. D. Binseel, On the Theory of The Aggregate Image - the model* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_eea5e9a5a0ca40c3b1fd3d4e4fa4d913.pdf
    - □ **"being-for-itself is perpetually in flight from itself, perpetually ahead of itself"** (pg. 185)
  - ▪ The Other and the Look (pg. 185)
    - □ "[my] awareness of being looked at may trigger an emotion, in Sartre's paradigm case the emotion of shame…" (pg. 185)
      - ◆ "suddenly I am no longer the subject and agent in control of the event, but a vulnerable object, at its mercy" (pg. 185)

- □ "emotions, for Sartre, are ways of being in the world; they colour the situation of the existential subject" (pg. 185)
  - ▪ The Third (pg. 186)
    - □ "the look opens up my situation to the presence of Others. I have an inkling or a foreboding of the existence of the Other, but nothing binds us together into any sort of unity. Our relation is one of pure interiority, and one-sided interiority at that, since I have no access to the other pole of the relation. At this point Sartre invokes the concept of the Third (Sartre 1976a: 106, 114) - a spectator, perhaps, who sees me, and also the one who is looking at me, who sees my furtive apprehension at being observed, who embraces me and the Other in a dyad of psychological or philosophical interest. Our interior relation now has an exterior embodiment. The activity of the Third in constructing this dyad does not, however, depend on the interior relation: he or she may observe two individuals who are unaware of one another's presence or even existence, and group them under some concept for purposes of study or analysis or imagination or the like" (pg. 186)
    - □ "two things, however, are to be noted here - Sartre's insistence on the radical equality of human beings (I could be or have been 'just anyone') and his eventual rejection of the notion of history as an intelligible adventure of humanity" (pg. 186)
      - ◆ "there must always be a Third standing outside in order to lend unity to any social being. Ontologically speaking, there is no higher level than the triad of subject, Other and Third…" (pg. 186-187)
        - ◇ *Cf. D. Binseel, On the Theory of The Aggregate Image - "governance demands two things…" (pg. 10) & "consent is that principle which serves to bridge liberty and authority. Nevertheless, in light of this criterion, and this being my determination, it is a fallacy to believe the international system to be anarchic merely by way of the absence of some sort of higher governing entity. The epitome of such fallacy derives from the misconception regarding the extent of dependence between all entities (states and individuals) which exist"* https://www.binseelsnotes.com/_files/ugd/d7b063_eea5e9a5a0ca40c3b1fd3d4e4fa4d913.pdf
  - ▪ The Series (pg. 187)
    - □ "The social world comprises very many individuals, some of whom know one other or interact with one another in groups of greater or lesser extent. One eventual question, to which an answer was suggested above, concerns the existence of a total and inclusive group worthy of the name of humanity, the subject of world history. This would be the outcome of the great dialectic, summing up the contributions of all the individuals who ever lived in their reciprocal relations to one another" (pg. 187)
    - □ "The case he chooses is that of people waiting at a bus stop (Sartre 1976a: 256ff.). All of them have an interest in taking the bus, but this is not a collective interest; they do not all have the same destination or purpose in mind, there is no internal connection between them. Such a contingent assembly of unrelated subjects united only by a common object Sartre calls a series. Serial relations abound in daily life - customers in the market, spectators in the theatre, listeners to the radio or watchers of television, voters in an election, drivers on a highway, all constitute series whose members share a connection to an external object but have no internal connections between themselves" (pg. 187)
  - ▪ The Group in Fusion (pg. 188)
    - □ "True group formation begins when the members of a series become aware of one another not merely as accidental neighbours having no internal relations to one another, but as sharing a common interest that engages a common emotion. I now encounter my fellow bus riders, for example, as subjects who experience and suffer the same frustrations and inconveniences as I do when the bus is late or crowded or badly driven. We comment on these things while waiting in the queue; we resolve, perhaps, to write a joint letter to the directors of the bus company. Sartre calls such an informal association, establishing ties of sympathy and purpose, a 'group in fusion'" (pg. 188)
  - ▪ The Institution (pg. 191)
    - □ "the statutory group is an organization but not yet an institution - it has structure but not standing in a larger context" (pg. 191)
    - □ "what is 'political' about the state is its claim to dominate and administer the polis" (pg. 191)
    - □ "the institution…carries within it the seeds of its own dissolution" (pg. 192)
      - ◆ "The political or administrative leadership becomes remote from the rank and file, whose members awaken one day to the realization that they are not in fact true elements of the group, but stand in a serial relationship to its leaders. They organize into a new group in fusion within the institutional structure, and by the now familiar development into sworn group and then statutory group emerge as a force capable of challenging the leadership. This for Sartre is, *mutatis mutandis*, the pattern of history, the dialectic of power. Movements, parties, governments, states, alliances - with time individuals and groups follow cycles in which revolutionary groups displace sitting governments, if only to become oppressors in their turn, and in their turn to be overturned by new revolutionary groups" (pg. 192)
        - ◇ *it is in this that the notion of sovereignty - as innate and universal, following the notion of 'divinity' - is discredited.
    - □ "Sartre's eventual conclusion is that 'Humanity is not' - **there is nothing unified or integral to constitute the subject of history**. History is a series of brief sketches, each dealing with a broken-off chain of events whose governing principle is nothing more or less than the production of the human by the human, via local practice for limited ends" (pg. 192-193)
- ○ Chapter 17 - Sartre's Second or Dialectical Ethics, by T. C. Anderson (pg. 195)
  - □ "in an interview he gave towards the end of his life, Sartre himself stated that he had always been a 'moral philosopher' and also that he attempted to write to write three different ethics in his lifetime" (pg. 195)
  - □ "almost from the beginning his ethics was humanistic in that he identified the goal of morality and the goal of human existence" (pg. 195)
  - ▪ Ontological Foundations (pg. 196)
    - □ "From his earliest philosophical writings, Sartre sharply divided all reality into just two realms. This culminated in his distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, set forth in detail in his major work of phenomenological ontology *Being and Nothingness* in 1943. Being-for-itself, human consciousness, is described as non-substantial and contentless ('total emptiness'; BN1: xxxii; BN2: 12). It is nothing but a web of all kinds of intentional conscious acts in relation to objects. It is "all activity, all spontaneity" (BN1: xxxv; BN2: 15), 'self-determining', 'self-activated', 'cause of itself' and, therefore, free (BN1/BN2: introduction). Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is described as passive and inert. It is thoroughly identical with itself and filled with being. It is nothing but a full positivity of being, which contains no nonbeing and so 'does not enter into any connection with what is not itself'. It simply 'is itself', 'glued to itself' and so 'isolated in its being'. Thus being-for-itself and being-in-itself are 'absolutely separated regions of being', Sartre asserts (BN1: xxxix; BN2: 19). One consequence of their separation is that being-for-itself is totally free from any influence of being-in-itself. Human consciousness is not affected by the being it is aware of; its relation to being is totally negative" (pg. 196)
      - ◆ **"I must confess that I consider [this] very implausible"** (pg. 196)
        - ◇ "[Sartre] minimizes to the point of denial any limitations of human freedom referring to it as 'absolute', 'total', 'infinite', and 'without limits'" (pg. 197)
          - ▶ "such a view of human reality and human freedom is for the later Sartre…far too 'abstract' and 'irreal' (his words)" (pg. 197)
    - □ "a major reason Sartre labels his second ethics 'realistic' is because it accurately recognizes the dialectical character of human relations

to the world. That is, there is mutual interaction and causation between humans and the world" (pg. 197)
- □ **"Sartre's early and his later ontologies have such fundamentally different conceptions of the nature of human reality and its relation to the world…"** (pg. 197)
  - ▪ The Nature and Source of Values (pg. 198)
    - □ "In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre states unequivocally that the human being 'is the being by whom values exist' and more precisely that 'his freedom [is]...the unique source of values' (BN1: 627; BN2: 647). He is equally clear on the devastating impact this position has on ethics. **If human freedom makes values exist, then this 'paralyses' and 'relatives' ethics, for it means that no values exit objectively or apart from human freedom**. Rather, whatever one freely chooses to value, whether love or hate, freedom or slavery, torture or kindness, will be of value" (pg. 198)
      - ◆ "I cannot appeal to any objective values to justify my actions for there are none and any morality which tries to set forth objective norms of human conduct is doomed from the start" (pg. 198)
        - ◇ "Sartre's argument for this position is as follows. **Values are experienced as imperatives or norms. As such they are not being but are 'beyond being'; they are not something that is but something which should be brought into being**. As imperatives and norms, values are experienced not as something real but as requirements and demands to be made real. Since values are beyond what is, their reality can be due only to a being that is able to transcend what is and posit what is not. Such a being is, of course, human reality and values are precisely that towards which every human being surpasses what is" (pg. 198)
    - □ "in contrast to his first ethics however, in his dialectical ethics Sartre insists that there is a 'given', 'assigned', even 'imposed' character to moral values and goals. That is because **he now believes that 'the root of morality is in need'**. Needs, he explains, are not just a lack of something, they are felt exigencies, felt demands to be satisfied" (pg. 198-199)
      - ◆ **Sartre 'struck out' with this conclusion - his conception is diametrically opposed to the normal understanding of morality in terms of 'ought'. Necessity cannot ever serve as the ground to morality - as the latter deals with possibility, while the former evades / neglects such.*
    - □ "In other words, because <u>we are specific kinds of organisms with specific needs</u>, certain kinds of objects are necessary to satisfy these needs. Since **we do not freely choose the needs we have, we cannot freely choose the kind of things that fulfil those needs**. It is not up to an individual's free choice, for example, whether oxygen or knowledge or love fulfil his or her needs and are thereby of value for them. Thus, by making human needs rather than human freedom the source of moral values, Sartre's second dialectical ethics grants them a certain objectivity, that is, an independence from human freedom - for it can neither create nor remove their value" (pg. 199)
      - ◆ **Sartre has, now, 'struck out' twice in a row. He previously, in Being and Nothingness, rejected Freud's deterministic viewpoint, while, here, admitting in part some of such's undertones - that is, that human action is biologically rooted. This view is heavily naturalistic and deterministic.*
  - ▪ The Goal of Ethics (pg. 199)
    - □ "the goal of Sartre's first ethics is freedom" (pg. 199)
      - ◆ **"To propose freedom as our highest value is simply to propose human existence as our highest value. There is a serious problem with doing so, however, namely, Sartre's total <u>subjectivism</u> when it comes to values"** (pg. 199)
        - ◇ **he lapses into the very solipsism he so emphatically denies.*
    - □ "We still need to address the justification Sartre offers for proposing the fulfilment of human needs or integral man as the ultimate value and goal of his second ethics. The answer lies in the ontological structure, the needs, of the human organism: 'Need posits man as his own end'" (pg. 202)
      - ◆ "The very fact that our needs demand to be satisfied makes their satisfaction our primary value and goal. **We do not need to come up with reasons to justify seeking that goal which is required by our needs.** Indeed, we are not free to decide what our ultimate end and primary value is. We are organisms with needs and so our ultimate end/value, human fulfilment, is 'given', 'assigned', even 'imposed' on us, Sartre states (ibid.: 97-8). <u>We do not need, nor can we find, any reason for valuing this goal other than the fact our needs require it</u>…To demand such reasons is to seek what cannot be given, since there is no value/goal more fundamental than human fulfillment to which one could appeal to justify choosing it" (pg. 202)
        - ◇ **this, to me, is the high-point of Sartre's philosophy running down the drain.*
  - ▪ Human Relations (pg. 202)
    - □ "<u>One of the most important human needs that Sartre cites</u> - especially in his last major work, *The Family Idiot* (Sartre 1971-2) - <u>is for the affection and approval of other people.</u> His early view of human relationships, he complained, was far too negative and too individualistic. In *Being and Nothingness* he minimized the power of human beings to affect each other and stressed instead the complete responsibility of each individual for his or her life. He also looked upon other people primarily as dangers to one's individual freedom and in conflict or potentially in conflict with me" (pg. 202)
      - ◆ "<u>Sartre moved very quickly beyond this negative position</u> even in his first ethics. In *Notebooks*, which were written in the late 1940s, he stresses the importance of intersubjective relations of 'authentic' love, friendship and generosity and makes it clear that the conflictual relations presented in *Being and Nothingness* were never meant to be taken as the only possible human relationships" (pg. 202-203)
    - □ "in his last major work, *The Family Idiot*, which he says contains 'concrete morality', he emphasizes the needs human being have for each other, in particular their needs for love" (pg. 204)
- ○ Chapter 18 - Hope and Affirmation: An Ethic of Reciprocity, by M. La Caze (pg. 206)
  - □ "Jean-Paul Sartre's final ethics of the 'we' (or reciprocity) remains controversial and less developed than his other ethics. Scholars have generally accepted the periodization of his ethics into three, as Sartre himself described them: the first ethics of authenticity, the second Marxist or dialectical ethics, and this final ethics, that considers the ontological basis of ethics, based primarily on the 1980 interviews in Hope Now (*L'Espoir maintenant*; Sartre 1991b, 1996)" (pg. 206)
  - ▪ The Ethics of Reciprocity (pg. 207)
    - □ "<u>Reciprocity in *Hope Now* concerns each human being's link to the other</u>, a link that was difficult to envisage in the apparently conflictual conception of human relations in *Being and Nothingness*, where Sartre began from the isolated individual subject. Sartre makes clear that the ethics he is conceiving is different from the spirit of seriousness, criticized in Being and Nothingness, which desires being one's own foundation or cause (Sartre 1996: 59). <u>Sartre's ethics of reciprocity provides an alternative to bad faith and conflict between human beings,</u> an alternative that Sartre gestured to and struggled to describe throughout his writings. That conflict arose from incompatible and paradoxical projects to become one's own foundation. Nevertheless, as early as the *Notebooks for an Ethics* (Sartre 1983b, 1992), written in 1947 to 1948, the concept of reciprocity was important because it indicates the recognition of the freedom in situation of the other (Sartre 1992: 285). When Sartre returns to reciprocity in *Hope Now*, **he expresses a fuller idea of being together,** incorporating the concept of need from his dialectical ethics, where 'what I have is yours, what you have is mine; if I am in need, you give to me, and it you are in need I give to you' (Sartre 1996: 91). <u>Reciprocity is the ideal of an ethics where no-one is</u>

in lack because of the ethical relation shared with all others and the scarcity of resources has been overcome. The source of this ethical relation, Sartre argues in Hope Now, is an ethical imperative, demand or obligation in our actions" (pg. 207)

- □ "Ethics begins from this imperative or requirement. The imperative is seen as an 'inner constraint' of our consciousness in everything we do, a must that is an ethical must. The constraint comes from striving to achieve something that goes beyond our present reality. Nonetheless this constraint is not a determining one; we can choose to follow it or not. <u>Sartre sees this imperative as ethical because it involves a sense that things can and **should** be different from what they are, which motivates us to act</u>. Such a motivation is only the beginning of an ethics, to be sure, but it contains a concept of normativity that can be linked to the ethical, or to our relations with others" (pg. 207)
  - ○ Chapter 19 - Sartre's Legacy, by S. Churchill and J. Reynolds (pg. 213)
    - ▪ "whereas Foucault had dismissed Sartre as outmoded…Derrida had regarded him as symptomatic of a culture of rewarding intellectual superficiality…" (pg. 221)
- d. <u>Further Readings</u>:
  - ▪ Jean-Paul Sartre: A Life, by A. Cohen-Solal
  - ▪ Sartre: A Philosophic Study, by A. Manser
  - ▪ Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, by I. Murdoch
  - ▪ The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, by J. Webber
  - ▪ Ontology and Ethics in Sartre's Early Philosophy, by Y. Zeng
  - ▪ Consciousness, self-consciousness, and introspective self-knowledge, by I. Muzio https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1445604/1/U592928.pdf
  - ▪ The Childhood of a Leader, by J. Sartre https://www.greek-love.com/media/PDFs/Sartre.Childhood.pdf
  - ▪ Good Faith and Other Essays: Perspectives on a Sartrean Ethics, by J. Catalano
  - ▪ (Article) Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenology, by J. Sartre https://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sartre-JP-Husserl-Intentionality.pdf
  - ▪ (Article) Self-Knowledge (SEP) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/
  - ▪ (Article) Knowledge of the Self (SEP) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/supplement.html
  - ▪ (Article) Dualism (SEP) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/
  - ▪ (Article) Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate, by B. Gertler https://uva.theopenscholar.com/files/brie-gertler/files/gertler.rational_agency_struggle.pdf
  - ▪ (Article) Dualism: how epistemic issues drive debates about the ontology of consciousness, by B. Gertler https://uva.theopenscholar.com/files/brie-gertler/files/dualism_how_epistemic_8.pdf
  - ▪ (Article) Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: What is the boundary of the thinker?, by B. Gertler https://uva.theopenscholar.com/files/brie-gertler/files/understanding_the_internalism_8.pdf