

The Existentialists: A Critical Study, by J. Collins

a. People / Organizations:

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b. Quotes:

- "the poet's care is for the holy, whereas the philosopher's is for being" - Author (pg. 188)

c. General Notes:

- Chapter 1 - Existential Backgrounds: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl (pg. 1)
 - "existentialism, perhaps more than other philosophical movements, is usually evaluated on cultural and social grounds" (pg. 1)
 - "to existentialists themselves, one of the strongest reasons for accepting this new standpoint is its honest attempt to meet the needs of the age. This way of thinking tries to be responsive to the predicament of contemporary man and to supply an interpretation of his anguish and aspirations. It pays heed to the moods, catastrophes, and projects which are usually passed over by academic philosophies. Instead of retreating to a realm of eternal verities or of scientific methodology, it hugs close to the terrain of ordinary living" (pg. 1)
 - ◆ "this same close link between existentialism and the course of actual events is regarded by its critics as a sure sign of its transitory and non-philosophical character. They view this movement as a concealed way of salvation rather than as a serious effort at rational analysis" (pg. 1)
 - ◆ "existentialism is the formulation of Europe's wartime nightmare, and like all nightmare products it must eventually give way to daytime sobriety" (pg. 2)
 - "in studying existentialism, there is a danger of so foreshortening the historical perspective that its roots in the philosophical tradition are overlooked. The kind of approach favored by the existentialists...has striking parallels to St. Augustine, Pascal, and other respectable thinkers" (pg. 2)
 - "many mind contributed to the current of thought from which existentialism stems, but the heaviest debt is owed to three men: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl" (pg. 3)
 - Soren Kierkegaard (pg. 3)
 - "[Kierkegaard's] own protest against the academic, social, and religious establishments of his day have set a pattern for the existential criticism of the accepted institutions and philosophies of our time" (pg. 3)
 - "he is best understood when placed in the line of European moralists, men who have criticized their contemporaries in a satirical yet constructive way. Despite their attempts to provide metaphysical underpinnings, the existentialists have retained this fundamentally moral orientation of philosophizing" (pg. 3)
 - The Individual versus the Crowd
 - "both Marx and Kierkegaard agree that contemporary industrial society has endangered the dignity of the human person. They point out that man counts for nothing in a society that is governed primarily by impersonal 'laws' of production and consumption and by the ends of selfish gain. Both critics see that the primacy of human values must be championed against the reigning bourgeois interests. The sharp divergence between them comes when more concrete proposals are made for reconstructing society along human lines" (pg. 4)
 - ◆ "Marx identifies the 'truly human man' with the social group which can integrate itself so closely with the processes of industrial production that the gap is closed between human desires and material possibilities of social control. **Thoroughly socialized man, having no illusions, about a transcendent goal, is the Marxian solution to the inhumane conditions of the modern world**" (pg. 4)
 - "Kierkegaard moves in the opposite direction. He does not believe that we are under any necessity to work out the immanent logic of capitalism or that the remedy is to be found in an exclusively social direction. For it is a utopian hope to think that a humane society can be produced without a direct reformation of individual life. Social change within the state is more profound than political reorganization, but **the ultimate success of both social and political revolution depends upon the basic transformation of individual existence**" (pg. 4)
 - "Kierkegaard's observation of his environment reveals that men are ridden by a total forgetfulness of what it means to be an individual" (pg. 4-5)
 - "Kierkegaard refers to man in industrial society as a cipher or a fractional man, since as an individual he commands no respect and cannot have significance. This is due to the paramount devotion paid to the ideal of equality. Although equality is one of the abiding human goals, it cannot be pursued in isolation from other objectives, such as freedom and personal responsibility, without sacrificing the members of society to the collectivity. **The modern individual is 'lost' in the crowd and 'at a loss' without the crowd**. He finds it uncomfortable to stand out in any unusual way, since issues are decided on the basis of what everybody thinks. Anonymity is the saving virtue, numerical superiority the decisive consideration, and mass opinion the criterion for truth. No one cares to act in a distinctive way, since such conduct would count for nothing except as a sign of queerness" (pg. 5)
 - ◆ "here is a source of the existentialist antipathy towards the anonymous, featureless standards which prevail in our age" (pg. 5)
 - ◇ "**there is a need for a recall of the individual to himself, an awakening to the possibilities of self-determination that slumber within him**. This is not a plea for economic or political individualism, since the ascendancy of the crowd would also result from an individualistic appeal to unbridled self-seeking. **Neither laissez faire nor collectivism can arrest the process of universal leveling, since neither policy is directed to an inward edification of the individual self**" (pg. 5)
 - ▶ "this is an aristocratic ideal, to the extent of acknowledging that the best in a man is left untilled when his character is determined mainly by a group pressure and catchwords. It is aristocratic in the Socratic sense of singling out each man from the irresponsible public and requiring him to render personal account for what he believes and acts upon" (pg. 6)
 - "the famous Kierkegaardian doctrine of the three spheres of existence - the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious - fits into this context. It is a theory about stages in the growth of personality rather than a metaphysical scaffolding, after the manner of Hegel's triad of moments. Kierkegaard's dynamic conception of personality is of seminal importance for existential thought. Certain broad and fixed traits belong permanently to human nature. **The common human condition is shared by all men and constitutes the given, necessary factor**. But man is the one being endowed with conscious freedom and hence with possibilities for existing at various levels of adequacy. He can propose his own leading principles, organize his life around them, and thus transform the given reality into a freely orientated self." (pg. 6)
 - ◆ "there is no place for philosophy of nature in Kierkegaard and the existentialists, because they are wholly absorbed in a study of the venture of human freedom and its pitfalls" (pg. 6)
 - "[Kierkegaard's] studies of boredom, despair, and dread have proved to be specially fertile sources. He draws attention more to the

- dark and turbulent moments than to the tranquil ones" (pg. 6)
 - ◆ "the darker moods announce the consequences of failing to follow through to the full flowering of personal existence" (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "boredom, for instance, is a warning that all the goods of life may turn to ashes in the mouth. When a man concentrates all his energies upon pursuit of momentary pleasures, no matter how refined and subtle, he exposes himself to surfeit and a state of tedium from which his esthetic principles cannot rescue him. Anguished dread is the state of spiritual growing pains of a man who stands poised at the brink of personal exercise of freedom, in the full awareness of its consequences for time and eternity. He is held fast in awful fascination at the stakes. Not this or that object but the very situation of making mature choices arouses dread in him" (pg. 7)
 - ◆ "Kierkegaard's own interest in these states of soul is primarily religious and ethical, whereas his successors have exploited the psychological and metaphysical aspects of such concrete treatments of the human situation" (pg. 7)
- "[Kierkegaard] deplores the rationalist tendency to understate the role of the emotions and reduce will to a function of reason. The rationalist account of man is unbalanced for failing to give due weight to the affective side of our lives. An understanding of the whole man and his attitude toward reality awaits appreciation of the great resources of the passions, which are decisive in shaping individual outlooks" (pg. 7-8)
 - ◆ "without the passional factor, especially will, there is no way of advancing from the dreamy, esthetic state to the moral and religious phases of existence" (pg. 8)
 - ◆ "will and practical reason are accorded more autonomy by Kant than Kierkegaard" (pg. 8)
- "the capstone of Kierkegaard's view of the individual is man's freely acknowledged bond with God. The entire drive of the dialectic of the stages of existence points at the conclusion that to be an individual in the plenary sense is to orientate one's life toward God" (pg. 8)
 - ◆ "**all existentialists, whether admitting the religious solution or not, make allowance for some sort of movement of transcending or seeking beyond the immanent structure of human nature**" (pg. 8)
 - ◆ "God is not found by leaving the world behind in a flight to the beyond but by discerning His presence in the temporal process itself" (pg. 9)
 - ◇ "religious faith is the Archimedean lever whereby the 'accentuated' individual can move the world" (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "the man of faith is a non-conformist, as far as human conventions and mass impulses are concerned. He can stand out as an exception..." (pg. 9)
 - ◇ "faith is not susceptible of mass techniques: each man believes in his own heart and on his own responsibility" (pg. 9)
 - ▶ "each individual can make the act of faith, provided only that he does so on the basis of his own freedom. This is the crucial opportunity for becoming an individual in the highest existential sense" (pg. 9)
- "**[Kierkegaard's] legacy to the existentialists is the problem of reconciling individual and society**" (pg. 9)
 - ◆ "his own religious statements underline the difficulties rather than suggest a way of integrating the two poles" (pg. 9-10)
- The Existent versus the Speculative System
 - "Kierkegaard's attack upon Hegel has been widely reported as a repudiation of all philosophy and of all reason. This interpretation seems the more plausible, at least regarding philosophy, because Kierkegaard himself looked indulgently upon Hegel's claim to have elaborated the definitive philosophy. Hence [Kierkegaard] seemed to be faced with the alternative of accepting Hegel or of rejecting not only the Hegelian system but all philosophy along with it. Since he regarded [Hegel's] system as the major theoretical bulwark of the mass mind, Kierkegaard could not compromise on the issue as so formulated, despite the disastrous alternative" (pg. 10)
 - ◆ "Kierkegaard's mind is clearly set forth in regard to the rationalism-irrationalism controversy" (pg. 10)
 - ◇ "he accepts neither horn of the dilemma..." (pg. 10)
 - ◆ "things in the world and events in history are not absurd in themselves and their interrelations. They have a definite intelligible structure..." (pg. 11)
 - ◇ "it stands open to His vision, although it is only by Him that it can be known comprehensively and systematically" (pg. 11)
 - "as far as creaturely intelligence is concerned, Kierkegaard distinguishes among abstract thought, existential thought, and pure thought" (pg. 11)
 - ◆ "abstract thought or objective thinking is the approach employed by the natural sciences, mathematics, and logic. These are valid disciplines and yield reliable knowledge about the essential aspects of things. But they have two limitations: they do not attain to actual existence and do not involve the personal relationship of the knowing individual to the things known. Disinterestedness and objectivity are the primary notes of abstract thinking" (pg. 11)
 - ◇ "this is the proper way to treat things, as distinguished from personal selves. Even human nature, in so far as man is one natural thing along with others in the world, is accessible in a partial way to the objective method" (pg. 11)
 - "Kierkegaard is more successful in describing what existential is *not* than in specifying its positive features" (pg. 11-12)
 - ◆ "existential knowledge is constituted precisely by the manner in which the meditative individual relates himself to the aims of existence. Existence is not predicated of things but of persons in their moral dispositions. **Existential truth, for Kierkegaard, is a moral and religious state of being rather than a purely cognitive perfection.** It rests on the attempt to shape one's conduct in accord with what one knows about the purposes of freedom. At its maximum, it is the true and upright state of being fully committed to search for eternal happiness" (pg. 12)
 - ◇ "in the natural order, an individual can have reflective existential knowledge only of his own existence and of other selves only in so far as they bear upon his own freedom" (pg. 12)
 - ◆ "the existential situation cannot be transcribed within an idealist system of pure thought. For the latter is based upon dialectical necessities and a presumption of the basic completeness of the historical process, whereas existence has freedom and genuine novelty as its proper medium" (pg. 12)
 - "thus **Kierkegaard's opposition is to 'pure' thought, or the systematic identification of thought and being**, rather than to the 'abstract' thought of the sciences" (pg. 12)
 - ◆ "his position is non-idealist rather than irrationalist, although he does not see that systematic explanations can be made on a non-idealist basis" (pg. 12)
 - But [existentialists] have not found in Kierkegaard sufficient indications about the cognitive aspects of existential reflection or subjective thinking. It is not a form of subjectivism and arbitrary creation of fantasies. But the directions are lacking about how to discern the natural cognitive factor in the midst of affective sympathy and religious faith" (pg. 13)
 - "metaphysics has been subjected to critical examination, following Kierkegaard's observation that it does not figure as one of the three stages of existence" (pg. 13)
 - ◆ "the unavoidable question arises as to whether there is any legitimate place for metaphysics in an existentially-centered viewpoint. Most existentialists agree that an affirmative answer cannot be made until the history and the methodology of metaphysics have been subjected to a thorough revision" (pg. 13)
 - "another acute problem raised by Kierkegaard is the relation between metaphysics and ethics. In attacking Hegel's ethical theories, he

- is careful to trace out the metaphysical roots of the position he opposes" (pg. 13)
 - ◆ "Kierkegaard has made it impossible for these philosophers to undertake ethical studies without first declaring their mind, one way or another, about metaphysics and its bearing upon a philosophy of conduct" (pg. 14)
- "[Kierkegaard's] criticism of Hegel is carried out in a thoroughly speculative spirit. In order to have a self-sufficient system, Hegel would have to make a 'presuppositionless' start in his thinking. When it is a question of human cognition, Kierkegaard believes that such a beginning can be made only at the price of wiping out the distinction between God and the finite mind" (pg. 14)
 - ◆ "in the existentialist tradition, [Kierkegaard] tends to counterbalance Husserl's claim to make a presuppositionless beginning" (pg. 14)
 - ◆ *"in other words, here is Kierkegaard's own bias - that he shows himself unwilling to occupy from the outset such a 'indifferent' (or, neutral) attitude; hence, his 'either/or' protestation.*
- "[Kierkegaard] has associated existence too exclusively with the exercise of human freedom in the formation of the self" (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "[as such] he is prevented from applying existence to God. He is the fountainhead of the existential commonplace that God is, but does not exist" (pg. 15)
 - ◇ **"existence cannot be predicated of the eternal, immutable being, since to exist means to be engaged in becoming, time, freedom, and history"** (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "man is not only central to existence: he is the only truly existing being" (pg. 15)
- The Illumination of Existence by Christian Faith
 - "[Kierkegaard's] own answer to the problem of man's relationship to God was formulated in terms of faith in the Incarnation" (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "rather than mediate these extremes of reality in Hegelian fashion, Kierkegaard spoke of faith as a crucifixion of the understanding" (pg. 15)
 - ◇ **i.e., that one (in) faith need not anymore 'understand'.*
 - ◆ "on the other hand, he maintained that the attitude of faith is indispensable for synthesizing the many aspects of existence" (pg. 16)
 - "most existentialists agree that existence is a historical reality and that some sort of faith is a motive force in human history. There is no unanimity, however, on the relevance of Christian faith for the hermeneutic of existence" (pg. 16)
- Friedrich Nietzsche (pg. 17)
 - "there is a definite intellectual affinity between [Kierkegaard and Nietzsche]. This is due, in part, to the common cultural and religious situation in which they were reared and against which they both rebelled" (pg. 17)
 - ◆ "both men flourished more in combat and disturbed solitude than in peaceful society. They were proud, sensitive, and intense individuals, given much to introspection and gifted with a superb command over language" (pg. 17-18)
 - New Morals for Old
 - "[Nietzsche] deplores the predominance of the impersonal public in determining our conduct and our institutions. There has been a deliberate campaign to suppress outstanding individuals and exceptional course of action in favor of standardized men and safe mediocrity of aim" (pg. 18)
 - ◆ **"the tendency in social life is towards 'one flock and no shepherd', one amorphous mass in the midst of which no original person dare speak his mind, assume creative leadership, or go his way in the face of numerical opposition"** (pg. 18)
 - ◇ "what Kierkegaard calls the apotheosis of the crowd is termed by Nietzsche the rule of flock morality. In place of individual intrepidity, the drift of the totality sets the goals of human aspiration" (pg. 18)
 - "inevitably, the collective sights are aimed too low. Instead of goading the individual on to further peaks of adventure and experiment, the approved middle-class norms stifle innovations and the works of genius. The assured result is frustration and stagnation, since **the major lesson of history is ignored: that man is a still unfixd animal**" (pg. 18-19)
 - ◆ "Nietzsche's humanism is based upon the indefinite capacity of man to surpass himself and to leave behind the previous outposts of achievement" (pg. 19)
 - ◇ "since Christianity is identified as the bulwark of this debilitating conservatism, **Nietzsche calls revealed religion an enemy of life and a traitor to mankind**. It encourages conformity, at the expense of the daring unrest which alone has justified human existence by its creative fruits" (pg. 19)
 - "Nietzsche's criticism of accepted standards is not made in the spirit of anarchy and destructiveness. His ultimate intent is to remove the disabilities placed upon unusual individual, without eliminating the mores which govern the herd. He states explicitly his opposition to both collectivism and individualism, in so far as both view rest upon a conviction of the fundamental equality among men" (pg. 19)
 - ◆ "unlike Kierkegaard, [Nietzsche] is unwilling to admit an acceptable sense in which equality can be reconciled with self-development toward maximal ideals" (pg. 19)
 - ◇ **meaning, he doesn't believe that "being equal" equates to "one realizing their own potential" - though, to be sure, each equally possess for-themselves some potential, even if what's their own potential is not the same as any other's.*
 - ◆ **"he establishes an antithesis between humanism and egalitarianism"** (pg. 19)
 - "Kierkegaard and Nietzsche present existentialists with conflicting inferences from the principle that human nature is no mere given substance subject to quantitative mass regulation" (pg. 20)
 - ◆ "Nietzsche...has a strictly deterministic and atheistic outlook" (pg. 20)
 - ◇ "only the gifted few have a destiny for the furthest reaches of existence. The new morality of creating one's own ends and procedures is intended only for the liberation of these exceptions from mass tyranny" (pg. 20)
 - ▶ "Kierkegaard himself admits that ethico-religious equality rests on a proportionate obligation, which takes realistic account of actual differences" (pg. 20)
 - ◇ "few existentialist profess an ethics of the elite founded on a rigid separation among grades of men" (pg. 21)
 - ▶ "but neither is there unqualified support of Kierkegaard's stand" (pg. 21)
 - ▶ "for one possible alternative is to generalize Nietzsche's theory of creative morality, extending it from privileged geniuses to all men. All men may be regarded as having the power to reject given values and to fashion their own norms. Nietzsche's stylized morality would then be the prerogative and obligation of everyone, and to fail to develop a distinctive way of acting would incur censure in every case" (pg. 21)
- New Gods for Old
 - "[Nietzsche] resembled Marx in refusing to submit arguments for God's existence to rational analysis and in resting his own criticism on broad cultural judgements" (pg. 21)
 - "Nietzsche's postulatory atheism furnished a model for those existentialists who wish to describe an existence lived entirely apart from God. His philosophy encouraged them to maintain that both belief and disbelief in God are optional attitudes and that is worth

experimenting with the assumption that God does not exist" (pg. 21-22)

- ◆ **"the revolution in values, Nietzsche teaches can never be carried out in all thoroughness until loyalty to a transcendent order is suppressed.** Platonism in the ancient and Christianity in the modern era have been the great champions of the supernatural order of values." (pg. 22)
 - ◇ "it is God in the traditional Christian sense whom Nietzsche seeks to destroy with the hammer blows of his dialectic" (pg. 22)
- ◆ "if a transcendent, immutable entity is admitted, there results a devaluation of the temporal sphere and a dichotomy between what 'merely appears' and what 'truly is'" (pg. 22)
 - ◇ "the practice is to identify 'true being' with the systems and interests of the dominant group in a society. Instead of open admission of the shifting power-basis of moral distinctions, the dominant class places its moral values on a divine foundation, congeals them in their present form, and imposes them universally" (pg. 22)
- ◆ "Nietzsche's rejection of the Christian God rest on the assumption that, since Christianity is a total system, it includes in an essential way the public standards of culture and morality promulgated under Christian auspices in the nineteenth century. Consequently, an attack upon the latter entails the annihilation of Christianity, especially of its central tenet: the existence of God" (pg. 22)
 - ◇ "in Kierkegaard's estimate, the real malaise of the age lies in the confusion between the eternal God and the traditions of men, between Christianity and the various establishments which water down the Christian requirements to the vanishing point" (pg. 22)
 - ◇ "Nietzsche holds that Christianity and belief in God must stand or fall with the present social order; Kierkegaard warns that Christianity and theism cannot survive unless they are detached from the abuses and distortions of 'Christendom'" (pg. 23)
- "a further matter of dispute between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard concerns the relation between being and becoming. Nietzsche regards it as axiomatic that a transcendent, immutable being is incompatible with our world of becoming" (pg. 23)
 - ◆ **i.e., that it is non-sensical to think of an 'innate and universal' entity as ever 'becoming' itself as such would negate the very notions by which it exists as itself.*
 - ◆ "the situation is complicated, however, by Kierkegaard's remarks that freedom enters even into the way in which we regard our own finitude...From his standpoint, loyalty to our human condition involves the possibility of deliberately misreading the nature of that condition...Kierkegaard understands the precept of fidelity to our own state to mean that individual existents must refuse to pretend to be other than they are; temporal, finite, subject to becoming, dependent upon God" (pg. 23)
 - ◇ "only God is; only finite existents become" (pg. 23)
- "Nietzsche declares the death of God but retains...a sense in which being maintains its primacy over becoming" (pg. 24)
 - ◆ "becoming itself is apotheosized by being rendered absolute and eternal. It is an eternity of complete immanence, a passionate restrictions of all one's interests and valuations to the things of time" (pg. 24)
- "Kierkegaard looks for no lasting city on earth, since man is a pilgrim of the absolute. Nietzsche declares that the whole of human history is the lasting city, so that no particular moment in the recurrent cycle can claim this title. Kierkegaard vindicates the integrity of that which appears and becomes in history by regarding historical existence as the loving handiwork of the eternal God; Nietzsche makes a similar vindication by denying the real transcendence of eternal being. Kierkegaard tarries on metaphysical territory and phenomenalism; Nietzsche proclaims an end to all metaphysics, only to make this proclamation the prologue to a new theory of being" (pg. 25)
 - ◆ "these contradictions have been heightened rather than lessened by the existentialist, who keep the question of God and man at the center of discussion" (pg. 25)
- "Nietzsche [recalls] a forgotten aspect of the older doctrine on the transcendentals, which point out that the true and the good impenetrate each other. Truth is a good for the intellect, just as the good can be subjected to intellectual analysis" (pg. 25-26)
 - ◆ "the existentialists agree with Nietzsche that science is not 'value-free', in the sense of escaping social and moral regulation in view of human needs and purposes" (pg. 26)
 - ◇ "despite their stress upon concrete approaches, most existentialists recognize the indispensable contribution of abstractness, generalization, and disinterestedness in the study of nature and of man in his objective side" (pg. 26)
 - ◇ "subjective or existential considerations become primary in the region of freedom and personal formation. The bearing of scientific findings upon personal happiness cannot be determined solely on the basis of the objective scientific method. Existentialists try to secure the distinctiveness and primacy of existential thinking by limiting rather than by disparaging the abstract, objective techniques of scientific control" (pg. 26)
 - ▶ "this limitation runs counter to the philosophical program of positivism, which is pledged to universalize a single method for its own extra-scientific purpose" (pg. 26)
- Edmund Husserl (pg. 27)
 - "the impact of Edmund Husserl upon existentialism has not been as uniformly felt as that of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but it is nonetheless of the first magnitude" (pg. 27)
 - ◆ "phenomenology provides the indispensable method for Sartre and at least a major strain in Heidegger's procedure" (pg. 27-28)
 - Philosophy as a Rigorous Science
 - tbd
 - Radical Transcendental Idealism
 - tbd
- Chapter 2 - Sartre's Postulatory Atheism (pg. 40)
 - "Jean-Paul Sartre occupies a paradoxical place in the existential movement" (pg. 40)
 - "[his] literary success and popular audience have caused many academic philosophers to dismiss Sartre without serious study on the ground that his doctrine is only a passing sensation" (pg. 40)
 - "Heidegger himself...does not acknowledge his French admirer as making a legitimate continuation of his own views" (pg. 42)
 - "[Sartre] has indicated his divergence in such characteristic questions as the relation between essence and existence, moral law and human freedom, consciousness and being" (pg. 42)
- Phenomenology, Ontology, and Metaphysics (pg. 42)
 - "in their eagerness to reach the more concrete and practical issues involved in the Sartrean world view, many students have neglected the fundamental questions on method and theory of the sciences which underlie this outlook. Sartre himself has never encouraged this narrow concern with practical applications but has consistently stressed the importance of his general methodology" (pg. 42)
 - "the trouble with [Sartre's] forerunners was they did not adhere with sufficient fidelity and singlemindedness to the phenomenological standpoint itself. They did not base ontology squarely upon their methodological premises but smuggled some doctrinal content in from

- alien sources" (pg. 43)
 - "the privileged place of the ego as a transcendental sphere of reflection in Husserl's philosophy is evidence of his dependence upon the Cartesian and Kantian theories of being. He introduced a special zone of reality so that phenomenological studies could be made to yield results relevant for a theory of being. But this supposes that the inquiry into essential structures and the conditions of intentionality is not adequate by itself to found an ontology" (pg. 43)
 - "the findings of [Sartre's phenomenological] method are, as such, significant for determining the meaning of being. In settling the general structures of the meaning of being for man, it already accomplishes the work of ontology. Ontology is not a further deduction and hence does not require the introduction of further principles" (pg. 43)
 - "**reflection upon the situation within which intentional meanings are founded, supplies the required starting point for a phenomenological ontology**" (pg. 43-44)
 - "[Sartre] makes it clear that there is no adequate distinction between a science of phenomena and a science of being. The latter discipline cannot hope to do more than comprehend the general structure of human reality as present to the world, and this insight can be acquired by phenomenology from its own resources" (pg. 44)
 - "in the opening lines of his investigation...[Sartre] distinguishes between this paper as a thing, having its own reality, and as it is for him. This distinction can be drawn legitimately because the qualities of the paper seem to be ascertained by me without being produced by the spontaneity of my consciousness" (pg. 44)
 - "what the thing is in itself is a sort of inert being. The only way in which it can retain some autonomy and reality of its own is to be an inert existence *in-itself*" (pg. 44)
 - "**consciousness** does not exist after the manner of a thing but is an active form of existence *for-itself*" (pg. 45)
 - "Sartre holds that ontology must begin with a few postulates, which express the conditions for the description of intentional phenomena, that is, acts of the mind which are essentially directed to some object of knowledge or desire in its otherness from the conscious subject" (pg. 45)
 - "the only aspects of being that are admitted into court are precisely those features which tend to corroborate [Sartre's thesis that the sum of reality is contained in being-in-itself and being-for-itself] (pg. 46)
 - ◆ "Sartre does more than maintain that his analysis reveals these two modes of being. **He claims that these are the only basic components of reality and the nearest substitute for a comprehensive notion of being as such**" (pg. 46)
 - ◇ "by restricting his attention to human meanings and their foundation in finite existence, he reinforces his view that the phenomenological report is final in every respect" (pg. 46)
 - ◇ "Sartre's ontology rests on a twofold option that precedes all his philosophizing. He starts by accepting Nietzsche's atheistic postulate and Husserl's postulate of a self-sufficient phenomenology. On these two underpinnings rest his entire system of thought. They are indispensable and mutually strengthening foundations" (pg. 46)
 - "A similar purpose is served by the distinction made between ontology and metaphysics, a distinction which is traceable eventually to Husserl's attitude toward empirical existence. True to its phenomenological constitution, **Sartrean ontology focuses upon the universal essential structures entering into the organization of the world. Metaphysics is possible only as a subsequent discipline incorporated into the wider context of ontology.** Its stated purpose is to investigate particular events, contingent processes, actual beings, in order to determine their origin in a hypothetical way. It can never reach apodictic certainty, since it deals with contingent particular instances and physical causes. At most, it makes surmises about the actual causal origins of this particular world, leaving the assured analysis of world-in-general to ontology. Thus **Sartre makes metaphysics a hypothetical, particularist, and causal discipline, in contradistinction to the certitude, universality and non-causal character of ontology.** Actual existents cannot be dealt with philosophically apart from the phenomenological reduction, and to deal with these aspects within the phenomenological context is to admit the impossibility of achieving scientific rigor in their regard. One should place little confidence in the deductive explanations of metaphysics and should remain satisfied with ontological descriptions. The contrast between these two sciences plays an important role in Sartre's philosophy, since it enables him to offer a description of human existence without becoming entangled in embarrassing questions about God and the soul. The latter entities are problems for philosophy only under the heading of metaphysics, not of ontology" (pg. 47)
 - "according to the phenomenological principle that scientific certitude refers only to what sustains universal, necessary, and essential relations, metaphysical inquiries about contingent, particular modes of being and their actual causes can never scientific standing" (pg. 48)
 - "both thinkers [Max Scheler and Sartre] make the conditions governing phenomenological investigations universal standards of scientific inquiry. It is, indeed, legitimate for this discipline to prescind from questions of actual causal origin, since it operates within parentheses drawn around the actual world" (pg. 48)
 - The Myth of Being In-Itself (pg. 48)
 - "**in one of his summary definitions of existentialism, Sartre describes it as the doctrine which maintains the primacy of existence over essence and which takes its start from man's subjectivity**" (pg. 48)
 - "[Sartre's] general ontology...has three main traits: it is a *realism* based upon the nature of consciousness and its phenomenal object; it defines being in terms of opaque, inert stuff; it regards consciousness as a powerful principle of lack and existence, whence stem the essential structures of our human world" (pg. 49)
 - Phenomenal Realism
 - "Sartre prefaces his analysis of cognition with the historical remark that the major achievement of modern philosophy has been the reduction of being to the series of its manifesting appearances" (pg. 49)
 - ◆ "[Nietzsche] proclaimed that 'truth' is dead and all is 'falsity'. By this he meant that our world can no longer give credence to the idealistic theory of an absolute truth about a realm of things-in-themselves" (pg. 49)
 - ◇ "there is no absolute reality existing behind the appearances. The appearances are all in all..." (pg. 50)
 - ▶ "because there is no behind and no beyond, man must learn to find his absolute and his truth solely in the process of finite events" (pg. 50)
 - "**in Kantian terms, there is no noumenal order except the order of phenomena themselves. It there is any true knowledge of being, it must be knowledge of being as wholly phenomenal and constituted by phenomena**" (pg. 50)
 - ◆ "to Sartre, Nietzsche's aphorisms...warn us against returning to a naively paradisaical state of mind, which would search for a transcendent or noumenal source of our experience" (pg. 50)
 - "Sartre seeks to combine his theory of self-sufficient phenomenal being with realism rather than subjective idealism. Granted that being is nothing more than the totality of appearances which are linked together according to an essential law; granted that being does not stand behind the appearances but it constituted in and by them" (pg. 50-51)
 - ◆ "Sartre maintains the 'transphenomenality of being'. This means that the intentional relationship of perceiving and being perceived does not exhaust the real. The act of perceiving is also to be regarded precisely as a mode of being proceeding from and revealing a real principle: human subjectivity" (pg. 51)
 - ◇ "similarly, the appearance of the perceived object stands in relation to other appearances as well as to the conscious

- perceiver. Thus there is a twofold transphenomenality: that of the knowing subject and that of the known object" (pg. 51)
- "[Sartre remarks] that his existentialism begins with the human subjectivity or the Cogito" (pg. 51)
 - ◆ "'Cogito' means 'I am thinking', and it stresses the existing 'I' or self just as much as its act of thinking. It is the same thing to make a beginning here and to assert the primacy of existence over essence" (pg. 51)
 - ◇ "historically, however, this starting point has always led to subjectivism and idealism. In order to circumvent such an outcome in his case, Sartre corrects Descartes' description of the primary situation" (pg. 51)
 - ◇ "the self as described by Descartes is formally posited through a reflect act; it has become itself the object of an intentional meaning and process of unification. But there is a more primitive situation in which consciousness is concomitantly aware of itself in the very act of knowing some object. In knowing something, there is also at least an implicit awareness of doing and knowing. This suggests that the fundamental reality of human subjectivity is not a personal self but a non-positing, non-objectified, **pre-reflective consciousness**. At the source of all objects, including the ego, is the pure act of consciousness, the pre-reflective Cogito. In this sense alone is the Cogito the point of departure for Sartre" (pg. 52)
 - ▶ "the bedrock zone of autonomy is only reached when consciousness in the second degree (the reflective, personal self) is brought back to its presuppositions in consciousness in the first degree (pure impersonal spontaneity of consciousness). The ego and the world are principles of unification posited by unreflective consciousness: they are noetic and noematic correlates within which it is possible to have personal selves and objects. But in becoming conscious of an object, there is also consciousness of consciousness...in [the] consciousness of the object, there is an interior awareness of consciousness by itself" (pg. 52)
 - "consciousness grasps itself in an absolute way as a pure spontaneity, an act of positing and intending, rather than as something posited and intended" (pg. 52-53)
 - ◆ "this is the perfect existential certitude, an absolute interiority that needs no completion or further reduction and that is the absolute source of all existences, personal and objective" (pg. 53)
 - ◆ "the primacy of existence and subjectivity is assured without admitting the prejudice of a self or subject in a privileged position" (pg. 53)
 - "[Sartre] thinks that consciousness produces the ego, as an ideal unity of its own actions, states, and qualities, in order to mask its own impersonality and sheer spontaneity. It is unable to bear this sense of absolute interiority and lucidity, in which there is no distinction between being and appearance, the possible and the real, the willed and the inflicted. Hence **consciousness deceives itself by projecting the self as a unified personal center,** which can make these distinctions. Acquiescence in this self-deception is the basic, non-moral meaning of 'living in bad faith'. **It generates the natural attitude of accepting the world and the personal self as given substances** and accepting hard-and-fast distinctions between possibility and actuality, being and appearances, what one will and what one suffers from the action of another, independent agent" (pg. 53)
 - ◆ "it is a matter of having the courage to face what lies behind the self, and such courage is within the grasp of us all" (pg. 54)
 - ◆ "[Sartre] dissipates the unified self, only to find a kind of selfhood in the moments in the stream of pure spontaneity" (pg. 54)
 - "**to be conscious of something is to be in the presence of that which is not consciousness itself**" (pg. 55)
 - ◆ "although the object does appear in consciousness, it is not in every respect defined by this relation or produced in a transcendental way. It is an object of consciousness only because it is also a mode of being-in-itself. This is the second absolute pole of being and the second indispensable condition of knowledge" (pg. 55)

▪ Description of the In-Itself

 - "Sartre summarizes his phenomenalist realism in the statement that **the 'being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it does appear. The transphenomenal being of that which is for consciousness is itself in-itself'**" (pg. 55)
 - ◆ **transphenomenal meaning 'multi-faceted'-phenomena regarding the being of an object, which serves an object-for-consciousness.*
 - "consciousness terminates in being in-itself only in its phenomenal aspect. **Our knowledge is of the phenomenal essence or binding pattern among appearances.**" (pg. 56)
 - ◆ "the transphenomenal being of the object is literally transcognitive; it goes beyond the possible scope of human intelligence" (pg. 56)
 - "Sartre seeks to avoid the obvious criticism that he is reinstating the Kantian noumenon as the counterweight to constitutive idealism. His reply is that the in-itself is not a distinct reality from the phenomenon: that which appears is the same being which is also in-itself" (pg. 56)
 - ◆ "this is not an adequate principle of difference, however, since Kant did not intend the things-in-themselves to occupy another region of being distinct from that of the phenomena" (pg. 56)
 - ◇ "in both philosophies, the dualism between the knowable and the unknowable aspects of being remains a sharp one, and the difficulty must be faced as to the grounds on which the unknowable can be asserted" (pg. 56)
 - "as far as determining something about the nature of being in-itself...Sartre admits the necessity of relying upon an emotional experience for the first clues. This experience is not sufficient by itself to indicate the nature of the in-itself, but careful reflection upon the emotional encounter does yield an indirect understanding" (pg. 56-57)
 - ◆ "phenomenological description of certain unique emotional attitudes takes the place of direct eidetic intuition of the transphenomenal being of the object" (pg. 57)
 - "the background for Sartre's theory of the in-itself is found in his novel, *Nausea*" (pg. 57)
 - ◆ "beyond the familiar relations which things sustain with us as our tools and as catering to our practical needs, the hero of the novel is brought in contact with the amorphous, bloated reality of being in-itself" (pg. 57)
 - ◇ "like the roots of the chestnut tree, **the transphenomenal being of each object is simply there, one portion crowding out the other** through its equal and equally senseless hold upon existence" (pg. 57)
 - ▶ **cf. pg. 55 comments for 'transphenomenal'*
 - ◆ "the key to [the hero's] nausea is the discovery of the complete contingency of everything, the total absence of any reason for transphenomenal being. No existent thing is explainable by, or reducible to, another. They all share in an absurdity which is the senseless meaning of the being of the phenomenon" (pg. 57-58)
 - ◇ "every being that shares in the in-itself is *de trop*, too much of a dead weight for itself and other. The in-itself surrounds and penetrates us as a stifling fullness, and absolute that gives no response, no shelter, no hope. In all its disgusting ultimacy, it simply *is*" (pg. 58)
 - "the weak point remains the nature of the link between the original emotional experience and the ontological reflection. No matter how genuine and compelling a mood of this sort may be, it cannot be transformed into a philosophical first principle without passing certain tests" (pg. 58)
 - ◆ "no reason is advanced by Sartre for making an unconditional ontological generalization out of this experience" (pg. 58)

- ◇ "Sartre's extrapolation is accomplished more after the manner of a creative novel than an essay on ontology. **Imagination remains his major tool in discerning the traits of being**" (pg. 58)
 - "it would be sufficient to observe that the mind uncovers rather than creates this mode of being and that what it does uncover fails to exhaust the being of the thing" (pg. 59)
 - ◆ "this is not the same as claiming that being in-itself is absurd and beyond the standards of reason" (pg. 59)
 - ◆ "like dialectical materialism, **Sartrean existentialism defends cognitional realism at the expense of the graded reality and intelligibility of the things known**" (pg. 59)
 - ◇ **meaning, through his 'reduction' toward reality, Sartre, in the same moment, aims to dislodge (or, bypass or ignore) the significance of there possibly being a 'gradation' (i.e., variation) of knowledge (or, what's knowable) regarding the being of things.*
 - "[Sartre] accepts the common realistic premise that the unique existence of [some] individual finite thing cannot be deduced by mere logical implication from a prior principle. An existent being must be respected in all its contingent givenness and concrete uniqueness" (pg. 59)
 - ◆ "the non-deducible character of the existent does not entail its unintelligibility and imperviousness to *every* sort of rational analysis. Existence has meaning when taken along with the essential nature, even though there is no way available for our determining this meaning beforehand" (pg. 59)
 - ◆ "Sartre is right in defending the contingency of existent things, but **he offers no proof that the best or only defense is by allying contingency with absurdity**. He has simply assumed that the contingent means the underived and unintelligible, whereas contingency by itself excludes only a certain type of derivation and meaningfulness" (pg. 59)
 - ◇ "but contingent being is precisely that mode of being which owes its origin to a free, creative production and which realizes an irreplaceable meaning or individual essential structure" (pg. 61)
 - ◆ "**what impels Sartre to identify to contingency of the in-itself with its absurdity and lack of causal origin is his plan of subverting the traditional proofs for God's existence**. Once it is established that the being of the in-itself is unamenable to intelligible explanation, then it escapes the force of the principle of causality" (pg. 60)
- Consciousness, the Power of Negativity (pg. 60)
 - "**although the myth of the in-itself serves Sartre's atheistic ends, it also leads him to the verge of irrationalism**" (pg. 60)
 - "by itself, it affords no basis for objectively founded meanings, controlled generalizations, or reasonable planning or hope" (pg. 60-61)
 - "Sartre is aware that no philosophical theory of the world can be developed from the standpoint of the in-itself. Hence, one he has placed it beyond the constitutive power of reflective consciousness, he turns back to consciousness as the source of recognizable structures and relations in the world" (pg. 61)
 - "despite a good deal of harsh criticism of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, he as appropriated their doctrines on the negating and creating power of consciousness. He could not remain within the bounds of an empirical and realistic examination of knowledge, since then he would have to admit that in large measure our perceptual and intellectual meanings are drawn from a natural sphere of being in-itself that possesses its own essential intelligibility and determinations. Instead, he must account for all such meaning and patterns in terms of the intentional activity of consciousness itself" (pg. 61)
 - "**consciousness, as so regarded, is erected into the second mythical entity, the for-itself**" (pg. 61)
 - ◆ "**the significance and structure which we find in our humanly familiar universe are wholly products of the for-itself**" (pg. 61)
 - "whereas Dewey's pragmatic naturalism does not entirely rule out the intrinsic structure of nature, this exclusion is systematically required by Sartre's doctrine of the invertebrate nature of the in-itself" (pg. 61-62)
 - "the determinate traits are due exclusively to the work of consciousness" (pg. 62)
 - "the world of significant being is the world of intentional acts and objects. **The transphenomenal being of the object owes its multiple differentiations, meanings, and essential structures entirely to the projects of subjectivity**" (pg. 62)
 - "From idealism, he appropriates the view that consciousness is productive in so far as it is a power of negativity. Hegel's hymn to the omnipotent richness of negativity in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is repeated in a minor key by Sartre. It is only by *not being* the being of the In-itself that consciousness can give rise to the world we experience. This process of 'nothing-ing' is required because of the nature of being in-itself. The latter is a dense, viscous, cohesive mass which enjoys the self-identity of opaque and sunless matter. There is no room in being in-itself for the activity and self-lucidity of knowledge. To 'make room' for the cognitive activity means to carve out a hollow region in the womb of the In-itself, a lack of being in-itself and a perspective of distance and distinctness. Consciousness is a gnawing worm in the heart of being, but one whose activity stirs up human reality to produce rich works. Thus the naughting-function of consciousness is not nihilistic in intent but supremely creative. It permits the light of meaning and structured order to shine through the dark chaos of being in-itself. Consciousness not only assists at the birth of the world of human meaning but is its generative source, in virtue of a temporary victory over unintelligible being" (pg. 62)
 - "instead of being the agent and expression of absolute mind, human subjectivity is a precarious growth at the heart of being in-itself, a fragile creation that is constantly threatened by the inroads of the in-itself" (pg. 62-63)
 - "whereas Hegel was assured beforehand of the synthesis of being in-itself and being for-itself in absolute mind, Sartre looks forward to no such happy outcome. Consciousness and substance, negativity and stolid self-identity, are pitted against each other in an unequal struggle" (pg. 63)
 - ◆ "Sartre's viewpoint marks a return to the pre-Socratic feeling that our human cosmos, born of conflict, is always on the verge of being engulfed in the primal abyss of dark night" (pg. 63)
 - "the Sartrean consciousness never becomes the being of the in-itself through a noetic union: it affirms not the being of the other as the other but its own otherness from being" (pg. 63-64)
 - ◆ "for Sartre, consciousness is differentiated from being not as the knower is distinct from the known but as a region of objects and essences not founded by the in-itself" (pg. 64)
 - ◇ "consciousness does not make itself a lack so that it may receive from being in-itself intelligible determinations in a nonmaterial way. It makes itself a lack of chaotic indetermination so that it can become the originative source of a definite, structured universe" (pg. 64)
 - "existence enjoys a primacy over essence" (pg. 64)
 - "**essences are intentional projects of consciousness** in the direction of being in-itself" (pg. 64)
 - "the ordinary existents of our experience depend for their significance upon the establishment of human intentional activity at various level. Until intentional projects have been instituted by consciousness, distinct and significant objects are not present in being. From this standpoint, existence as a factor in the familiar world depends upon the essential structures specified by consciousness [which would point to essence (i.e., consciousness or some intelligibility in the first instance) preceding existence, as opposed to what Sartre otherwise asserts]. Because consciousness intends definite essences or patterned sequences of appearances, the existent world is rendered present as a significant whole" (pg. 65)

- ◆ "Sartre remains faithful to [his] phenomenological method in placing empirical existence within the framework of intentional essences, as far as the sense of being is concerned" (pg. 65)
 - "Sartre regards it as a mark of a theistic outlook that it must assign first place to essence over existence, and likewise a mark of his existentialism that it maintains the opposite order" (pg. 65)
 - ◆ "in the case of the individual extent itself, there is no question of the priority of either essence or existence, although the act of existing enjoy the primacy within the being. The one cannot be prior to the other in any temporal or spatial sense, since neither essence nor existence is a thing that can have being by itself" (pg. 65)
 - ◇ "they are co-principle in finite being and hence require each other simultaneously in order to constitute the actual being, which has a composite reality" (pg. 66)
 - ◇ "**there can be no independently enjoyed being on the part of one principle alone, by the very nature of their relation and mutual reference**" (pg. 66)
 - "Sartre's thesis refers rather to the moral order than to the metaphysical" (pg. 66)
 - ◆ "**in the [moral] sense, it is true that the existent agent precedes the essential traits of character which result from the exercise of his freedom**" (pg. 66)
 - ◇ "and theistic morality is insistent upon the individual's responsibility for determining his own character throughout a lifetime of free decisions" (pg. 66)
- "because consciousness is the source of essences, Sartre also regards it as the explanation of manyness in the world. The in-itself is a shapeless, homogenous mass, which is insufficient to account for the distinctions and multiplicity encountered among beings" (pg. 66)
 - "this theory...assumes that the conscious mode of being is already fundamentally distinguished from the unconscious. This or that product of intentional subjectivity can be differentiated only on condition that subjectivity itself has already been set off somehow from being in-itself" (pg. 67)
 - ◆ "Sartre does not account for this first and most radical differentiation, upon which all manyness depends. The function of naughting is simply posited as an ontological characteristic already there. The question of the actual origin of consciousness is relegated to 'metaphysics' and hence to a discipline which can only make guesses that deserve no scientific consideration" (pg. 67)
 - ◇ "from this standpoint, there is no reason why the dense, opaque, absurd being of the phenomenon should ever give rise to a principle that is eminently agile, reasonable, and illuminative. The in-itself does not contain the qualities required to constitute consciousness. And since it is by nature inert and purposeless, **it could not serve as a causal, purposive agent in the production of a zone of subjectivity**. Yet everything happens as if being did give rise to *le neant* [i.e., nothing] as its fundamental project. For Sartre to banish this difficulty to the nether region of metaphysics is to confess his inability to face one of the most pressing issues of philosophy. It also reveals that his distinction between ontology and metaphysics provides him with a handy repository for storing away from critical inspection the difficulties to which his theory of being inevitably leads" (pg. 67)
 - ▶ "if the in-itself can be grasped somehow indirectly in an emotion experience, containing a sufficiently determinate content to guide a reflective analysis, then it does come indirectly within the region of determinateness, intelligibility, and the claims of causality" (pg. 68)
 - "[But,] it cannot have a definite status in a theory of being at one moment and no such status at the next" (pg. 68)
 - "[Sartre] consistently merges the view that our knowledge of a contingent existence cannot be derived from knowledge of a prior principle with the quite different contention that the existence of the primal modes of being requires no cause" (pg. 68)
 - "the first thesis is a noetic one, referring to our manner of gaining knowledge, the second in an ontological one, referring to the origin of a being" (pg. 68)
 - ◆ "the first is a hallmark of realism, the second is peculiar to atheistic existentialism. It is one thing for a being to have an adequate cause and quite another thing for us to be able to ascertain the existence of this being merely by an inspection of its purported cause or ideal principle" (pg. 68)
 - ◇ **I don't know what the hell the difference is here - the author's language shows itself as an impediment to understanding.*
 - ◆ "the only reasonable basis on which Sartre could forbid our asking about the sufficient cause of conscious subjectivity would be if such an inference were the same thing as deducing existence from a purported cause. By using the terms 'deduction' and 'inference' interchangeably in this instance, he blurs the difference between two modes of reasoning" (pg. 68-69)
 - "in respect to Sartre's two existential poles of being, no attempt is made to deduce or otherwise derive our knowledge of the actual presence of consciousness or the in-itself from a supposed higher source. The givenness and contingency of existence are respected by being taken as the starting point rather than the terminus of the inference. Here the existential character of the for-itself is not a bar to inquiring about its cause. At least, Sartre admits that his ontological principles cannot supply the answer" (pg. 69)
 - "**for Sartre, consciousness is defined precisely as a lack of being**, in the sense of the in-itself" (pg. 74)
- The Will to Atheism (pg. 69)
 - "[Sartre] lives in the wake of Hegel and Nietzsche..." (pg. 69)
 - "There is an irrational depth in Hegel that escaped the notice of the confident rationalists who propagated the optimistic implications of his dialectic" (pg. 69)
 - ◆ "despite his heroic efforts at reconciliation of opposites, Hegel never achieved the Easter morning of a systematic rational whole of speculation" (pg. 69)
 - "Nietzsche tried to present the death of God as the good news of human liberation..." (pg. 69)
 - ◆ "he spent himself in the attempt to make a godless world a human and hopeful one, in which man would regain rank and value" (pg. 70)
 - "**Nicolai Hartmann...worked out a theory of values and conduct in a world where god is nonexistent**" (pg. 70)
 - <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nicolai-hartmann/>
 - "in Sartre's estimate, atheism is only a contrary postulate to the equally gratuitous assumptions of theists that God does exist. He does not sustain this charge, however, by a direct examination of the procedures of theistic philosophers in the realistic tradition" (pg. 70)
 - "once he has advanced his postulate, however, Sartre does not seek to make a reasonable defense of the atheistic principle. He takes his cue again from Nicolai Hartmann, who contends that the idea of God is contradictory in itself and traceable to man's wishful thinking" (pg. 70)
 - "Sartre's indirect justification is based upon three arguments: the intrinsic contradiction in the notion of God, the impossibility of creation, and the genetic explanation of the idea of God" (pg. 70-71)
 - "in each case, the problem of God discloses itself as the problem of human nature as well" (pg. 71)
 - "The intending function of consciousness can also be understood as a tendency to transcendence. Moreover, this transcendence is in a vertical direction as well as towards the constitution of a world. As Hegel perceived in his doctrine on unhappy consciousness, human

subjectivity is essentially restless and dissatisfied with its mundane condition. Taken by itself, the for-itself is a lacuna and an interrogative activity. But it is always seeking completion and a satisfactory answer. It hopes to found itself, to give itself a firm, substantial mode of being. It attempts to flee from its own intrinsic emptiness and contingency by acquiring a stable plenum of reality. At the same time, consciousness does not want to lose its own integrity and distinctive existence; it tries to protect its self-presence and activity. Contradiction surrounds the movement to transcendence from the fact that the only stable foundation for the for-itself is the in-itself, that is, that mode of being which excludes consciousness, self-presence, and agility of spirit. **Man cannot avoid trying to combine being in-itself and being for-itself in a superior synthesis: this is the most essential drive of his nature.** What he could avoid doing... is to project this synthesis into another world and endow it with actuality. **The illusory union of the in-itself and the for-itself is the same as the God of religious belief.** God is not a real transcendent being but only the directional limit of man's self-transcending activity. It would be impossible to have an actual God, because of the contradictory notes comprising the notion of deity. God would be both necessary and contingent, underived and derived, eternally immobile and temporally active" (pg. 71-72)

- "[God] is the hypothetical reconciliation of two modes of being that can never be reconciled" (pg. 72)
 - ◆ "it is apparent that this reasoning is just as strong and just as weak as Sartre's general ontology. The contradiction lies not in God or in the religious conception of God but in the Sartrean theory of the modes of being. He defines being in-itself in a univocal and material way and then shows that being, as so defined, excludes consciousness and the other attributes usually applied to God. Clearly enough, the trouble lies in the doctrine of the in-itself and not in the concept of a purely actual being" (pg. 72)
 - ◆ "similarly, Sartre has given a one-level account of consciousness. He assumes that the human mode of being for-itself is the only way in which conscious life can be realized" (pg. 72)
- "the more perfect the type of cognitive act, the more intimate is the union between consciousness and the object known. Man possesses the world more closely and comprehensively than do beings with a less adequate conscious life. The increasing immanence of the cognitive union suggests that the factors of otherness and distance are due to the finite conditions under which consciousness operates in the world. There is no intrinsic barrier against supposing both self-identity and self-consciousness in an infinite being. This is, indeed, no proof of the existence of such a being but only a clearance of one alleged hinderance to making such a proof" (pg. 73)
- "Sartre's antinomy shows only that prime matter and intelligence cannot be the same, not that being and intelligence cannot coincide in an infinitely actual being" (pg. 73)
- "since the starting point of such a comparative study must be the finite instances within our immediate range, it is unlikely that we can gain a perfectly adequate notion of divine consciousness" (pg. 73)
 - "if being were present in the divine subjectivity, it would be a purely intra-subjective mode of being. As such, it could never represent an objective world and could never rouse in the divine subjectivity a will to create the objective order of things" (pg. 74)
- "what Sartre has done is to translate the realistic proposition that our finite minds cannot give rise to the beings of nature into the altogether different proposition that no mind whatever can give rise to natural being" (pg. 74)
 - "since human subjectivity is pictured as a fortunate accident clinging to the surface of being and forever dependent upon this morass, it is concluded that the origin of natural being cannot be ascribed to a creative act of a divine consciousness" (pg. 74)
- "Sartre considers mainly the Cartesian and Leibnizian theories of divine creation and, indeed, gives no hearing to the earlier Scholastic theories of God" (pg. 75)
 - "[Sartre] takes no account of the theistic position, which defines a creature both by its substantial distinctness from God and by its creaturely dependence upon God" (pg. 76)
 - ◆ "dependence upon some causal source is the condition for...the distinctive reality of finite things..." (pg. 76)
 - ◆ "for God to be an independent being is not the same as to be a self-caused being" (pg. 76)
- "the contrast between inert being in-itself and agile being for-itself prevents Sartre from noticing the proportion between the kind and degree of being and the kind and degree of causal power among things is nature" (pg. 77)
- Human Freedom (pg. 77)
 - "Sartre characterizes man as a useless passion. In his system, man cannot be regarded in any other way, since human nature is constituted by a futile and yet unquenchable thirst to be God. Thus the dynamic ideal of all human striving is to realize a state of being that is intrinsically contradictory and incapable of realization. Like Hegel, Sartre teaches that man is an unhappy consciousness; but there is no longer an absolute being to assuage the sorrow and redeem the striving. **To be a man is to try to be God: man is nothing other than this vain desire for self-divinization.** Transcendence towards the divine is the radical project of human nature, one that by definition cannot be consummated" (pg. 78)
 - "Sartre's notions on being and consciousness...are systematically incapable of supplying an accurate description of man's religious aspirations" (pg. 78)
 - "because he has defined God as the hypothetical juncture of human subjectivity and being in-itself, Sartre cannot define religious transcendence otherwise than as a search after self-realization of deity" (pg. 78)
 - "Sartre's ontological scaffolding cannot stand the weight of an intentional activity, the entire meaning of which is to try to realize in a finite way some likeness of the infinite perfection of God and to have a creaturely sharing in eternal life. There is no way to preserve the difference between being a partaker of the divine nature and being the divine nature, between becoming perfect like our heavenly Father and becoming the heavenly Father" (pg. 78-79)
 - "**for Sartre, the denial of God is the beginning of man's self-development**" (pg. 79)
 - "he contends that only after God has been banished as a living belief, does man really become free and conduct himself as befits his nature" (pg. 79)
 - ◆ "one way to show this is to reduce the whole problem of God to insignificance. Even if the existence of God were proven, it would make no difference for mankind. The meaning of this obscure remark is that creation of a free being would relieve that being of all responsibility toward, and bond of dependence upon, its creator" (pg. 79)
 - "The Sartrean self is bound by no prescribed rules, for the simple reason that all rules are the product of this self. Human subjectivity is a spontaneous, autarchic center of freedom, since it underlies all its essential projects and need be under bondage to none of them. Every act of this self is free; every act proposes an intentional project and hence sets a value for itself. **There are no laws set for man, because there is no transcendent being to legislate for him.** He makes his own values and his own morality. All human courses of action are good in so far as they seek a self-proposed end. The only condition is that one should act in good faith and should share freedom with others. A man does act in good faith when he acknowledges that there are no given standards and hence assumes unlimited responsibility for what he does. The man of bad faith is he who deceives himself into believing that he acts in conformity with a decalogue carrying some supra-human sanction or at least deriving from a source beyond the individual himself" (pg. 80)
 - **there is, here, a heavy discount on the 'act' which is performed, mainly with respect to such's inherent value (or, quality or consequence). Under such ambiguous criteria, a rape or murder, so long such is performed in 'good faith', would serve as a condonable act. This, to me, seems no ethic at all. Such is merely the very solipsism (or, subjectivism) for which he attempts to bypass in his ontology, only to later come back to be precisely such. Any 'faithful' account of one's doing merely amounts to how one construes their own subjectivity - this is precisely the solipsistic alternative.*

- "apparently, the only necessity man need admit is that of being free. **He is 'condemned' to freedom:** he cannot *not* be free. And the only ideal recognized by his freedom is that of making choices in an authentic spirit, that is, with full lucidity about his total responsibility for the ends he proposes and the means he takes. Added to that is the recognition that in choosing for oneself, one must also choose for all other selves. The authentic individual, the only genuinely free man, is the one who can bear to look at life from the perspective of an atheistic ontology. All other men are incapable of bearing the burden of this vision and hence seek various escape devices. They try to divest themselves of their freedom, and hence their actions have inhumane consequences both for the individual and for other men. Cowardice and courageous freedom are thus the great alternatives open to human subjectivity; the gaining of authentic freedom is the sole prize of life. A man is no more than the sum of his free acts, and his character will be good or bad in proportion to his approach to or flight from the practical consequences of Sartre's heroic atheism" (pg. 80-81)
 - "confronted with this theory of freedom, the student's main difficulty is to decide how literally to take its various propositions" (pg. 81)
 - ◆ "human subjectivity is not an unbounded mode of freedom..." (pg. 81)
 - ◇ "Sartre does not inquire too closely into the origin of these limiting conditions or their influence upon the operation of subjectivity" (pg. 81)
 - "reflection upon the relation between these fundamental conditions and liberty would destroy the prejudice that to receive is incompatible with being free. Even within a completely finite context, this statement is not verified. The recognition of one's limitations and the receipt of aid from other are normal conditions for personal development" (pg. 81)
 - "Sartre states explicitly that free choice... is only an act of announcing projects and decisions already made by pure consciousness" (pg. 82)
 - **which, to me, sounds nothing like 'freedom' if what is consequence of consciousness' spontaneity was 'already' decided upon.*
 - "conscious subjectivity is nothing else than a series of acts, each of which is a free act in so far as it embodies this primal dynamism" (pg. 82)
 - ◆ "**freedom is here reduced to spontaneity**, with the result that it loses all distinctive meaning" (pg. 82)
 - ◆ "basically, the Cogito is a determined thrust" (pg. 82)
 - "What authenticates an individual's act of choice, so that it becomes a humane act? Sartre offers two criteria: that it be done with perfect lucidity, and that it involve an acceptance of responsibility for other men as well. If these conditions are fulfilled, then the act is unconditionally free, value-creative, and authentic or good. Most moralists would grant that a clear understanding of the situation is a requirement of moral behavior, not in the specific sense of good behavior but merely responsible behavior. **Freedom has its roots in an intellectual judgment, based upon a calm appraisal of the situation.** But this is no guarantee that the choice will be a good one or in conformity with human nature" (pg. 83)
 - "taken by itself, an awareness of how man stands in existence is too formal a rule to prove useful in resolving particular problems of conduct" (pg. 83)
 - ◆ "it is so hospitable that it is ready to authenticate any act, just as long as the self takes full responsibility for performing the act" (pg. 83)
 - ◇ **see notes on pg. 80*
 - "this criterion does not prove adequate for determining concrete choices or settling conflicts" (pg. 84)
 - "[furthermore,] a man's sensitivity to the needs of others is no guarantee that he will appraise the situation correctly or will eventually act in accord with his better judgement" (pg. 84)
 - ◆ **i.e., even if one 'knows better', this does not mean he will 'do better'*
 - "if the fundamental project of the self is to constitute the world, then it cannot choose for itself without determining the relative positions of other selves within its world. Having care for other men is the same as having care for the integrity and orderliness of one's perspective, in so far as it involves other selves as constituent factors" (pg. 84)
 - "Sartre admits that every concrete application of his social criterion is bound to end in failure. For another self is bound to rebel against being included as an object in my world. [The other] has its own counterworld, within which I am to be fitted as an objective component. Hence social action is basically a form of mutual conflict and hatred..." (pg. 84)
 - ◆ "[Sartre] seek to undermine religious conviction by offering a genetic, psychological explanation of the idea of God. It is generated as one last, desperate attempt to rescue the values of social life in an objective direction" (pg. 85)
 - "in his system, atheism is not part of the evidence but a presupposition deliberately laid down as a determinant of evidence. It is this wishful atheism that calls for a critical overhauling. Absurdity is not in the nature of being but is a conclusion following upon an aboriginal and systematically developed atheism, integrated with an autonomous phenomenological method" (pg. 87)
 - "Sartre and Beauvoir have a firm grasp on the half-truth that man is not a clod and cannot become perfect after the manner of a mere thing. He must learn to affirm his own selfhood, assume his own attitudes, and take responsibility for what he does. **This growth in freedom is not incompatible with recognition of the moral law. The moral law must be appropriated and made one's own**, as Kant insisted. **The work of human freedom is to interiorize the law, embrace it as one's own and, in doing so, give it an incommunicably personal import.** Moreover, the circumstances and situations in which a man finds himself placed are often morally indifferent or ambiguous, until a personal stand is taken toward them. This does not argue to the absence of a universal moral law but to the office of human freedom in making it function in the context of concrete action. That is why man is required not only to be aware of his human condition but also to cultivate the virtues. They are principles whereby the moral law is appropriated by the individual and made relevant for particular lines of conduct" (pg. 87)
- Chapter 3 - Jaspers' Quest of Transcendence (pg. 88)
 - The Present Situation (pg. 90)
 - tbd
 - Becoming Aware of Existence (pg. 98)
 - tbd
 - Transcendence and the Transcendent (pg. 110)
 - tbd
 - Religious and Philosophical Faith (pg. 123)
 - tbd
- Chapter 4 - Marcel's Concrete Philosophy of Participation (pg. 128)
 - Restoring the Ontological Weight (pg. 133)
 - tbd
 - Mystery and Problem (pg. 146)
 - tbd
 - Being and Having (pg. 155)
 - tbd
 - Creative Fidelity (pg. 160)

- tbd
- Chapter 5 - Heidegger's Recall of Man to Being (pg. 168)
 - Heidegger and His Critics (pg. 168)
 - "the most decisive and personal influence came from his association with Edmund Husserl, under whose direction he wrote his dissertation..." (pg. 168)
 - "[upon Heidegger's return to philosophy] instead of taking his text from the rationalist philosophers, he now turned to the Romantic poets. Instead of restricting himself to an analysis of human existence as projected into a world of technical relations, he considered man in a wider natural setting and in close intercourse with apparently supernal powers" (pg. 170)
 - "it became apparent that either Heidegger's original position has been misunderstood or he was undergoing a profound intellectual revolution within his own mind" (pg. 170)
 - "on Heidegger's own reckoning, very few students of *Being and Time* have grasped its true meaning" (pg. 171)
 - "as for his interest in human existence, this is not the focal point of Heidegger's philosophy but a means of attaining a view of being as such" (pg. 173)
 - "**the movement of his thought is from existence to being rather than a constant preoccupation with man's condition**" (pg. 173)
 - "whereas Jaspers contends that thought is brought to a standstill in attempting to search out the origins of things, Heidegger defines 'essential' thinking as that inquiry into the foundations of being which must successfully precede every other use of thought" (pg. 173)
 - "in numerous ways, [Heidegger] shows that Sartre's theories have 'not the slightest thing in common' with his own. The basic contrast arises from Sartre' anthropocentric view of human consciousness and freedom. For Sartre, man is all in all. For Heidegger, being is what counts most and provides a measure for human comprehension and freedom" (pg. 173-174)
 - "Sartre fails to see that human conditions and situations are determined primarily by being rather than by creative human consciousness" (pg. 174)
 - "J. B. Lotz warned...that Heidegger's critics did not appreciate the degree to which his position, as outlined in *Being and Time*, was still indecisive and open to further clarifications" (pg. 174)
 - "**Heidegger's warning at the end of *Being and Time* should be taken seriously: he does not propose these views as definitive conclusions. They are meant to rekindle questions and to prepare their solution in the perspective of being**" (pg. 175)
 - The Destruction of the History of Ontology (pg. 176)
 - "Heidegger no more than Jaspers is motivated by an anti-metaphysical animus in his desire to 'destroy' the previous accomplishments in ontology" (pg. 176)
 - "[Heidegger] expresses it pithily in the observation that metaphysicians are constantly talking about 'being as such' and forgetting the nature of being. Ever since the lines of speculation hardened with Aristotle, there has been a fundamental confusion between...being itself and this or that concrete instance of that-which-is. Metaphysicians declare themselves to be investigating the nature of being, whereas their statements really bear upon *this* being, *a* being, beings, or the totality of that-which-is [i.e., either particular being or particular being in the aggregate]. That in virtue of which each being or mode of being is what it is - an instance of being, a manifestation of being-ness - has been obscured in the effort to explore and universalize some particular region of being. Hence the constituent standpoint for an ontology or theory of being as such is lacking. The history of so-called ontology is not false or worthless, but it suffers from this fundamental deficiency" (pg. 177)
 - "what Heidegger wishes to 'destroy' is the claim that an ontology can be founded without bringing the discussion back to considerations more primary than those so far considered in the history of philosophy: (pg. 177)
 - ◆ "**his aim is...to clear the ground for a radical comprehension of being**" (pg. 177)
 - "the fruitful soil of thought, the presupposition of metaphysics, and the entire philosophical inquiry, is being" (pg. 178)
 - "this is a very simple consideration, regarded in itself, but it cannot be taken seriously unless the philosopher is willing to take a step backwards, going behind what is usually taken to be metaphysics or first philosophy" (pg. 178)
 - ◆ "Because they have been unwilling to take this step, the great philosophers from Aristotle to the present have been led astray about the nature of being. The various general explanations of reality in terms of mind, matter, subjectivity, and the will to power provide striking testimony to the confusion between being itself and some aspect of that-which-is. In each of these conflicting descriptions of the real, some particular kind of being has been proposed as characterizing being as such. The Greeks, for instance, made an unwarranted extension of the categories. In their original sense, the categories were taken as the widest discoverable traits of the objective world about us. But the ideal of a metaphysics or generalized doctrine on being led to the application of the categories to man himself, to God, and to being as such. This interpretation of all entities according to the standard of one domain of being placed a greater burden upon the categories than they were capable of supporting" (pg. 178)
 - ◇ "despite their insight that time provides a point of departure for studying being, the Greek thinkers understood time and being in terms of a static present. Time became for them a series of present moments dominated somehow by an immanent principle of permanence or eternity" (pg. 178)
 - ◇ "both human duration and being itself were modelled upon the flow of *nows* or motions in the physical world" (pg. 178)
 - ◆ "[Heidegger] is openly critical of the entire tradition of Scholastic philosophy and theology for taking over unchanged the Greek approach to metaphysics. No matter how much they extended and refined this tradition, the Scholastics never submitted it to the kind of radical revision and refounding declared by Heidegger to be a philosophical necessity" (pg. 179)
 - "[Heidegger] does not deny God in his philosophy..." (pg. 179)
 - "to apply the categories of the objective world to God is to implicate Him as but one among the other being in the world and hence to overlook the distinctive character of the divine" (pg. 189-190)
 - "[Descartes] contributed a good deal towards the modern conviction about the sharp distinction between man and the beings around him, and for this end he demanded new methods and new ideas. Nevertheless, he continued to measure man by comparison with one particular mode of being rather than in relation to being as such. Just as the Scholastics patterned their notions of God and man after the Greek image of the physical world, so Descartes and his successors followed the lead of mathematical physics or the modern scientific world view. On such a basis, man is seen to be other than the rest of nature, but his distinctive reality is studied only by way of contrast with the prevailing notion of the physical universe. Man the thinker is still correlated mainly with the order of extended things; the human spirit is still taken as a peculiar type of substance, although counterpointed with the substantial things of material nature" (pg. 180)
 - "Heidegger's criticism of Descartes and Kant are significant" (pg. 180)
 - ◆ "they are too rationalistic in elaborating a theory of human nature primarily in terms of knowledge and reason. Despite their liberal interpretations of the nature of thought and reason, they overlook other ways in which man is related to the world. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows the immense significance of the practical and productive relationships, the emotional responses, and the whole complexus of tools [i.e., what Heidegger refers to as 'equipmentality']" (pg. 181)
 - "Heidegger's own existential analytic is an attempt to capture some of the existential (rather than categorial) traits of human being. This approach seeks to overcome the antinomy between objectivism and subjectivism and hence to lay bare the point of departure for a treatment of being as such" (pg. 181)

- "as [Heidegger] now understands this science [i.e., metaphysics], it is the general theory of that-which-is as such and in its totality. This gives to metaphysics a valid but limited field of inquiry. It can no longer be accepted at its face value as the study of being as being; rather, it investigates the nature and field of that-which-is. In the course of such a study, being itself is connoted [i.e., pointed at] but never formally considered under its own conditions" (pg. 182)
 - "Hegel's glory is to have given the complete conceptual formulation to the proper object of metaphysics in this restricted sense...Hegel offers the most comprehensive formulation of the Western view of being in the mode of that-which-is" (pg. 182)
- "Particularly unfortunate is Heidegger's failure to consult the effort of St. Thomas to resolve the dualistic Greek view of metaphysics. In the Thomistic outlook, there is a fruitful and humanly unavoidable tension between the subject and object of metaphysics. Our mind finds being as exhibited under the categorical modes of finite, sensible being (the subject of meta-physics). The object of the metaphysical enterprise is to obtain as full an understanding of being as such, the diverse realizations of the act of existing, and the supreme causes of being, as is humanly possible from the starting point in sense experience" (pg. 183)
 - *cf. F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*
<https://ia804501.us.archive.org/3/items/a-history-of-philosophy-complete-volumes-collection-image-edition/A%20History%20Of%20Philosophy%2C%20Complete%20Collection%20-%20Frederick%20Copleston%20%5BArchivable%5D.pdf>
- "Having limited metaphysics in this way, Heidegger is compelled to adopt some version of the commonplace existentialist distinction between ontology and metaphysics. Instead of accepting the Wolffian equation between general metaphysics and ontology, he usually refers to his own standpoint as a *fundamental ontology*. This is one of the conventional terms which can be misleading, if given the usual connotation. For Heidegger does not mean that his doctrine is one among many varieties of ontology but that it is occupied with exploring the fundamentals of ontology. More precisely, **ontology is the study of the foundations upon which metaphysics and all philosophy rest: it is the study of the soil in which all speculation of a right sort is rooted.** Metaphysics is truly the theory of what is first in philosophy, but what is first in philosophy is not first in every respect. What is unconditionally primary for all thought is being; consequently, fundamental ontology is the unconditionally first investigation" (pg. 183)
 - "the proposed fundamental ontology is to effect an overcoming of metaphysics, not in the sense of a refutation and obliteration but as establishing limits and providing foundations that cannot be supplied by metaphysics itself" (pg. 184)
 - "the limitation of metaphysics to the field of that-which-is is based upon a historical survey rather than upon a theory of the sciences and the intrinsic nature of metaphysics" (pg. 184)
- "**Heidegger calls man a metaphysical animal in virtue of his existent reality.** Although human existence is *de facto* faced in the direction of that-which-is, it retains an intrinsic freedom to inspect its relation to being and being's relationship to human selfhood. **A change in human existence, a turnabout of our interests and speculations, is the condition for becoming aware of our placement in being.** But to be a man is precisely to be such a possibility of revaluing and redirecting our existence. Since metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence of human existence, it shares this power of returning to its own foundation in being. The transformation of human existence, as it passes from primary concern for the things of the world and man in correlation with his environment to primary concern for being, should find speculative expression in a transformation of metaphysics" (pg. 184-185)
 - "if Heidegger is reluctant to refer to reflective thought on being as metaphysics or first philosophy, it is because of his historical interpretation of metaphysics and his initial deprecation of metaphysical 'categories'" (pg. 185)
- God's Absence and Man's Homecoming (pg. 185)
 - "**Both Marx and Nietzsche corroborate the thesis that Hegel reached an extreme limit in metaphysical thinking.** It is their joint witness that no hope lies for man in concentrating upon that-which-is, to the exclusion of being. Heidegger terms the Marxian theory of human alienation the most profoundly realistic appreciation of man's fate elaborated in recent times. He contrasts it explicitly with the humanistic views of Sartre and Husserl which lack a historical foundation and an anchorage in material circumstances. Yet Marx does not grasp the significance of his own indictment of Hegel and capitalism. He frankly accepts the view that every being or *Seiendes* is valuable only as providing material for work and for the further conquest of nature. The wholly technical outlook of Marxism is more critical than a Platonizing metaphysics but is no more effective in removing the root-cause of human self-estrangement. **As long as man is dedicated wholly to the ends of that-which-is, he cannot gain full possession of himself. For the principle of self-possession is to arouse in man a sense of his responsibility to being and his power of making room for being in the world of that-which-is**" (pg. 185)
 - "The lasting value of Nietzsche is to have underlined the homelessness of contemporary man and to have suggested that there is more involved in nihilism than a simple negation of all values. **Homelessness is another way of expressing the self-alienation observed by Hegel and Marx.** For all the energy and genius expended upon the control of nature, man today feels less at home in his natural setting than he did in the time of the Greeks" (pg. 186)
 - "Heidegger suggests, on the contrary, that man may have failed to fulfill an indispensable condition for acquiring the sense of being at home, namely, a recognition of the presence and power of being as the foundation of all that is. Man cannot be at home in the world of all that is. Man cannot be at home in the world until he learns to be at home with being and to domicile it in the center of that-which-is" (pg. 186)
 - "Heidegger lists the opinion that his philosophy is a doctrine of nihilism as one of the major misconceptions of his position: (pg. 187)
 - "**Heidegger has suggested that being is not the same as the totality of that-which-is** and that therefore being takes on the aspect of a naught from the perspective of this totality" (pg. 187)
 - "the philosopher's search after being opens up the horizon wherein alone the questions of the holy, divinity, and the word 'God' can be considered" (pg. 189)
 - "it is only our abandonment of the holy that estranges us from it. In our homecoming, however, we return to the holy as it is in its own nature, that is, precisely as a mystery" (pg. 190)
 - "a mystery is approximated by being respected as a mystery" (pg. 190)
 - "Heidegger regards the thinker's attitude toward being as similarly determined by the historical situation. **Being remains a hidden treasure in a world centered upon that-which-is.** The thinker who has been called to the task of essential thought is aware of the authentic basis of human dignity. Man is not primarily the overlord of that-which-is, as pragmatism and the technical mentality maintain. **He is first of all the shepherd of being.** Only on condition that he fulfills this office, is he able to establish control over that-which-is without degrading himself. Homecoming for the thinker means dwelling in the proximity of being. The essential or primary thinker obtains and retains his existence in the neighborhood of being. He must be loyal to the guardianship of being, protecting it from hasty identification with that-which-is and at the same time assuring it a dominant place in the world of that-which-is" (pg. 190)
 - "the thinker is related to being as to a hidden presence, a reserved treasure, a vivifying absence" (pg. 190)
 - "the thinker must be just as sparing in language as he is rigorous in thought" (pg. 191)
 - ◆ "yet the word is not merely an extrinsic index attached to something that is already known and mastered. Being only is for us when we express it in the essential word, the naming act that enshrines it in our existence" (pg. 191)
 - "in a world that places a premium upon catchwords, facile phrasing, and articulateness, [Heidegger] defends the value of silence, speechlessness, and halting testimony. We must learn to live with the nameless and to endure this condition" (pg. 191)
 - "**Homecoming is closeness to the truth of being.** Such proximity belongs only to essential thought, which Heidegger defines as thought

- that at once listens and belongs to being, making a free return to its source. This mode of thinking is 'of being' in two ways: it is owned by being and it attends to being. To be a man in the most essential way is nothing other than to acknowledge the claim of being upon oneself. Being takes the initiative and retains the primacy. For the relationship of man to being can only develop within the fundamental and constitutive relationship of being to man. In explicit opposition to Sartre, Heidegger holds that man is not alone in a chaos of that-which-is. Being is his element, as it is the element for every other instance of that-which-is. Hence **essential thought is an engagement by being and for the ends of being. Not man but being is the essential**: Heidegger declares this to be the simple truth animating *Being and Time*, which is a phase in his own attempt at essential thinking" (pg. 191)
- "as a homecoming or return to origins, essential thought does not overcome metaphysics and technical attitudes by transcending them but by getting behind them to 'the poverty of existence', to the situation of the 'shepherd' or responsible thinker, whose sole office is to care for being. Essential thought precedes not only the distinction between subject and object but also the division of thought itself into theoretical and practical" (pg. 192)
 - ◆ "Heidegger has been accused of at once elaborating a theoretical framework from which no practical, ethical results can issue and exalting man's practical, instrumental relationships" (pg. 192)
 - "[Heidegger] regards [essential thought] as the initial act which supplies the basis for all particular actions, since it founds our actions firmly upon the basis of being. At the same time, this act formally consists in nothing else than the free saying of the truth of being. Its total and proper effect is to domicile being in a human way by bringing the unspoken word of being to language in fitting words. **[Essential thought] studies the light of being, which precedes every theoretical investigation, and the power of being, which precedes every active project**" (pg. 192)
 - ◆ "in *Being and Time*...[Heidegger] stated that the possible is better than the actual, and that there is being only as long as there is human existence" (pg. 192)
 - ◇ "by 'the possible' he means neither sheer conceptual possibility nor potency as opposed to act in the Aristotelian sense) nor essence (as that which is actuated by existence or actuality). These notions are infected with the 'categorical' standpoint of that-which-is. Rather, it designates that in virtue of which a thing authentically is and takes a hold on its essence. In this sense, being itself is the supremely possible, the enabling power whereby whatever is is. As the enabling power with respect to man's essential thought and essence, it permits thought to realize itself as an affirmation of being and hence constitutes **man in his essence as what he is: a participation in being**." (pg. 193)
 - ◇ "The second proposition does not signify that the Cogito-subject of modern epistemology produces being. For being is the altogether transcending reality, which conditions the things that are and is not created by them. A clearing must be made for being, however, so that its presence in the midst of that-which-is may be recognized and revered. Only when this clearing is made, is being rendered accessible to man. Human existence is the place that is cleared for the advent of being, and yet being itself is the clearing. Being is essentially broader than any instance of that-which-is, including human existence, and clears a place for itself in man. The act whereby man domiciles being in the essential word is itself destined by being. To say that, as a consequence, 'there is being', means that being gives itself to the world of beings through giving itself to human existence and human essential thought" (pg. 193)
 - ◆ "Heidegger emphasized the fact that thought is responsible for the enunciation of being" (pg. 194)
 - ◇ "thought is bound to being by essential ordination and reaches its perfection only with the advent of being. **This ordination is not set by thought itself but is the work of being**, so that the recognition of being is man's way of meeting the prior claim of being" (pg. 194)
 - "although the guardianship of being is man's destiny, he may refuse to accept it and may bury himself in the cares of that-which-is. His homecoming to being can never be forced: homelessness may be deliberately preferred. This claim of being upon human existence is what moralists call a moral necessity, a demand that is unconditionally made - upon our freedom." (pg. 194)
 - ◆ "the danger and challenge of being are greatest precisely for those who become aware of the vocation of man to being and of his power to refuse or accept this grace" (pg. 194-195)
 - Man, the Horizon of Being (pg. 195)
 - "**Heidegger refers to the philosopher as one who is constantly *en route* as a wanderer in the neighborhood of being**. He is unwilling to enter into full possession of the treasure, if such possession means the abandonment of our historical predicament. With all the other existentialists, Heidegger gives an ontological ring to the religious notion of a call to repentance or change of mind. To be lost in the cares of the world means, in this context, to center oneself exclusively upon that-which-is. The philosopher's function as a 'wanderer', a *homo viator* (in Marcel's terms), is both to respect the incomprehensibility of being and to offer guidance to his fellow men. This guidance is best given by convincing them that they are indeed wanderers or pilgrims, who are in search of a homecoming to the truth of being. There are certain aspects of human experience that illuminate this hidden tendency of man to the proximity of being. All of Heidegger's phenomenological analyses are directed to the recall of man to being, through an interpretation of these indicative signs. His hermeneutic of existence is an effort to orientate existence in the neighborhood of being" (pg. 195)
 - "the center of gravity is being rather than man: what counts in human existence is not the subjective states but the bond with being" (pg. 195)
 - "from Heidegger's standpoint, phenomenology makes a presuppositionless beginning only within the context of logic; but logic itself has presuppositions in the comprehension of being. There can be no pure logic, if by 'pure' is meant complete autonomy with respect to being" (pg. 196)
 - "[Heidegger] observe that consciousness is not sufficient to establish the original overtness of that-which-is, the intelligibility which renders it accessible to us. Furthermore, consciousness stands in need of a prior act of freedom whereby man opens himself to the significance of that-which-is, allowing it to stand over against the mind as an object" (pg. 196)
 - "in sum, Husserl fails to explain the intentionality of consciousness: it is not an irreducible, given fact but a consequence of man's establishment of an open relationship with the things that are. Only a fundamental ontology can illuminate the ground of intentionality, and in doing so, this discipline discredits the phenomenological claim to absolute presuppositionlessness by showing a presupposition in our freedom" (pg. 196)
 - "The naught is the veil of being or the veiled way in which being appears to us by contrast with particular instances of being. What is said about the naught applies to being and, indeed, is an indirect way of inspecting being itself. The naught is not a logical negation or denial, but is the condition rendering such logical act possible. It is more original or primary than our negations. We encounter rather than constitute it, and we are able to encounter because it is first given to us for acceptance. Hence the naught cannot be demonstrated from a prior premise. It is not an a posteriori explanation but the anterior principle for both our logical acts of negation and our understanding of particular instances of being. A logical method that attempts to be utterly self-founding is soon converted into a doctrinaire logicism by glossing over the radical rectification of thought by being and its surrogate, the naught. Unlike a nihilistic philosophy, **Heidegger's analysis of the naught is intended to pave the way for an experience of being precisely in the naught**. There are two positive effects of this study of the naught. When being is understood as completely other than this or that being-which-is and other than the totality of beings-which-are, then for the first time the entire realm of that-which-is is revealed in its proper nature. Confusion is no longer possible between being and

the totality of that-which-is, once being is adjudged as not identical with that-which-is. At the basis of the various calculative sciences (what Marcel calls the problematic approach), dealing with the world of that-which-is, lies this clarifying proposition that the entire field of investigation is distinct from, and dependent upon, being itself. Thus the essential thought which is responsible for this proposition underlies phenomenology and the other sciences. It deals with a subject matter that is too simple and originary to become the object of a calculative investigation, after the manner of phenomenology. The second consequence of a discussion of the naught is to prepare a place in our experience for the truth of being. This result serves to correct the usual interpretation of *Being and Time*. **It was a widespread opinion that, for Heidegger, human existence, or Dasein, is a brief moment of light shining between two abysses of utter nothingness. Man is thrown from whence he knows not and advances whither he knows not.** Nothingness has cast him up on the beach of that-which-is and has made his essence to be a care of death, leading to total extinction and return to the void. The things that surround man in their brute presence have no intrinsic significance. They are simply present to him, and acquire meaning and value as tools in his milieu. Human projects succeed in organizing a network of tools, a global relationship of instruments of human purpose. But for each individual existent, the world is experienced in time from the standpoint of the *Dasein*, which is already fallen into that-which-is and hurtles by anticipation of the future into the final 'whole' of death. On this reading, **Heidegger makes of human life an idiot's tale, which in the end literally signifies an empty nothing. That there is a positive significance hidden in the experience of the naught, and revealed by means of dread, is the central contention of Heidegger's fundamental ontology.** The defect in the notion of dread, as expounded in *Being and Time*, is that it remains wholly within the confines of human existence. But from the standpoint of the relation of being to man, dread takes on a new meaning. [Dread] is the basic mood overtaking a man when he first comes to realize the contingency of that-which-is as such and in its totality, as well as its complete otherness from being. The total response of man to the contingency of the world, including himself, is not terror of annihilation but a sense of our otherness and distance from being. It is dreadful anguish before the withdrawal of being" (pg. 197-199)

- "only because man is capable of responding to the call of being, is he also capable of feeling dread at the situation in which being reserves itself from that-which-is. Because it is both the foundation of that-which-is and other than the totality of particular beings, being opens itself to man as kind of nothingness. **The power of the naught over human existence is nothing other than the powerful presence of being to that which is other than itself**" (pg. 199)
 - ◆ "It is being which throws man into the zone of that-which-is and destines him for a return to his native attachment to being. Man is free either to accept this destiny or to attempt to ignore his calling to being. The latter state is that of inauthentic existence, what Heidegger (along with the other existentialists) calls the world of anonymity and 'what one says'. **The rule of the anonymous herd seeks to destroy the belongingness of man to being by sinking him in the affairs of that-which-is. Genuine selfhood and freedom are constituted only when man stands open to being and thus makes the overtress of being the effective principle within himself.** In the Introduction to *What Is Metaphysics?*, Heidegger inserts a warning concerning the relation between selfhood, consciousness, and existence. He accepts the existential commonplace that whereas other beings are, only man exists. Only a being capable of existence can be a self. But from this it does not follow that selfhood and existence are the same or that existence is only an affair of consciousness. Husserl's accusation of psychologism is probably founded on this unwarranted inference. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger places emphasis upon one's self-being, acquired through acts of freedom, in order to show what is peculiar to man. Man is not merely a substance, like other things in the realm of that-which-is, and not merely a cognitive subject correlated with noetic objects. These assumptions of the modern philosophies of man are inadequate. **He is above all a center of responsibility for his own nature: he becomes truly human when he accepts this responsibility for developing a mature self.** But this analysis, while fitted to its designated purpose, does not exhaust the description of human existence" (pg. 199-200)
- "Heidegger's later theories of truth and *Dasein* require a revision of this judgment. He does not regard the world of non-human things-that-are as being devoid of meaning, except through human projects. We are related to a world of 'things' whose structure and reality cannot be reduced flatly to their functional status as tools of man and features in his environment. Poets and other artists can teach us the fundamentals of having respect for natural things. There is intrinsic significance in the world of that-which-is: ontological truth consists in letting that-which-is be and hence reveal itself in its own import. Freedom is the foundation of all explanation and truth, in the peculiar sense that man must freely assume the attitude of letting things become present to him in their overtress" (pg. 200)
 - ◆ "man's freedom to stand open to that-which-is and to conform to its demands is the ground of truth and the binding force at work in every instance of a search for truth" (pg. 200)
 - ◇ "This casts a new light upon the *whither* and the *why* of human projects or transcendence. The fundamental direction of transcendence is not the horizontal one to the world of practical materials and tools but the vertical one to being. To this extent, Heidegger approaches closer to Jaspers than either is willing to admit. **Concern for the world is conditioned by, and contained within, the anterior attitude of openness and orientation to being itself.** Moreover, it is not merely a brute fact that man is of such a nature as to be a projection. His existence is of this sort because of the special relationship of being to man. **Being determines man to be nothing else than the place where being manifests itself in the world,** and for this end man must be an orientation to being and the world together. Transcendence is expressed primarily in the relation of being to that-which-is and then in the reciprocal, free relation of man to being. It is only in this perspective that the full meaning of the term *Dasein* can be appreciated. Heidegger repudiates Sartre's exegesis on this key word. *Da-sein* does not signify the absurd and irrevocable fact that man is there, hurled up on the beach of that-which-is...and let no more be said about it. In its primary sense, it [*Da-sein*] means that man is the *there* for being, the point of insertion for being as such amidst the things that are. Man is the focus of the relationship of being to the totality of that-which-is, the temple where being can make a clearing shelter for itself. The truth of being can be realized in man, because his mind can establish a free relation with the overtress of being. Hence **for man to exist is to be the place of the truth of being.** *Dasein* is not identical with the truth of being and does not exhaust it. Being can be without that-which-is, including man, even though that-which-is cannot be without being. But man cannot enjoy his proper mode of being, his existence, unless his fundamental project be to open himself in true, essential thought to the manifestation of being" (pg. 201-202)
- "When Heidegger writes that man's essence is his *Dasein*...He does not have in mind any Scholastic pairing of essence and existence as potential and actual co-principles of created being. Like Kierkegaard, his treatment is not so much in terms of created being generally as in terms of the basic, free orientation of human life. It would be more correct to say that he presents an ontologized ethics than that he favors ontology at the expense of ethics. This is evidenced by his practical restriction of existence to man. ***Dasein* is man's self-presence or essence, in the sense that he is most truly and distinctively a man when he relates his essential thought to the openness of being, recognizing his own contingency and that of the world in respect to participation in being.** Man's essence is the realization of the truth about the proximity of being. His care is not a self-centered worry or a nihilistic obsession but a solicitude to realize this essence and so to become truly human. This is the only sense in which Heidegger acknowledges his philosophy to be a humanism, and it is also the only kind of presuppositionless beginning that he admits. He interprets humanism as the doctrine that man's essence is essential for truth in such a way that truth is not due to man as such but to his call to the guardianship of being. This explanation is in direct conflict with Sartre's theory of truth as a purely human invention. **But Heidegger**

is not far removed from the Thomistic teaching that man enjoys the privilege and responsibility of giving a unique, created expression of truth, both in his intellectual judgment and in the rectitude of his conduct. In Heidegger, the notion of a call to the guardianship of being serves to remove any lingering equivocation in his doctrine on human existence as a project. **The human project does not create being because it is a project that [is] thrown. Rather, the thrownness of Dasein is the human side of the call to make a clearing for being. Being itself is the thrower and the caller: human existence is a project or throw only because it has been destined and thrown by being.** Thus the thrownness of man's being is not a dereliction and abandonment to the world, but a mission or sending forth to live in the neighborhood of being. Only he who wills to exist in a final mode of inauthenticity refuses to heed this invitation by despairing over the environing naught. Man lives in the world not under a ban but with an importunate summons to enter into free relationship with being and thus to give recognition to the presence of being in that-which-is" (pg. 202-203)

- "During the past decade, Heidegger has used the term existence (*Existenz*) in a more comprehensive way than in his earlier writings. Previously, he limited the term to mean the tendency of human Dasein in a forward direction as constituting the basic temporal mode, the future. He referred to the various modes of time (past, present, and future) as ec-stacies of *Dasein*, its historical projections in the world. In the perspective of fundamental ontology, however, history is primarily the history of being, within which is incorporated the temporal activities of man. This is the sense in which time and history constitute the horizon of being itself. The basic ec-stacy or outward striving of man is toward being itself. In its authentic mode, existence is ec-static first of all in the direction of being. Heidegger now speaks of 'ex-sistence', as a reminder that **man becomes a genuine existent in so far as he accepts the call to attend to being**" (pg. 203)
 - **"Dasein is realized only in human ex-sistence.** To ex-sist is to open a sheltering clearing for being and to express this vocation in carefully chosen words and deeds" (pg. 204)
 - ◆ "ex-sistence 'leaps' into being by engaging in a pure finding of being, a finding of that which is already present as a gift to us and a demand upon us" (pg. 204)
- Being and God (pg. 204)
 - "[Heidegger] explicitly rejects what the philosophers usually call God. The attributes of prime mover, first cause, and highest value are all still taken from the region of immanent, objective traits of that-which-is. In Heidegger's eyes, their attribution to God is sacrilegious, since He is not contained in the order of that-which-is, even as its highest instance" (pg. 204)
 - "Heidegger discerns a wide gulf between the Christian concept of God and the metaphysical view" (pg. 204)
 - "[Heidegger's] own philosophy refrains from pronouncing anything about God, not out of indifference but because of a respect for the limits of philosophical inquiry. **Philosophy is a study of being and of that-which-is.** God is not identified with being, and neither is being the same as a world-ground" (pg. 204-205)
 - "Heidegger admits that the absolute reality is somehow connoted in the idea of being as such, but philosophy is incapable of establishing this absolute as God. From the philosophical standpoint, God does not emerge from His hiddenness, as He does in revelation" (pg. 205)
 - **"Heidegger, qua philosopher, makes no decision about theism"** (pg. 205)
 - "the resolve of the philosophical thinker is one of openness to being and restriction within its limits" (pg. 205)
 - "it is difficult to evaluate Heidegger's position on God, since his remarks have been few and guarded" (pg. 205)
 - "if by 'God' is meant an unbounded reality, then this reality is placed not only beyond everything that participates in being (the order of that-which-is) but is also beyond being itself or what is knowable through philosophical means" (pg. 206)
 - "in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, [Heidegger] places the humanness or finiteness of reason at the source of metaphysics. This shows that our knowledge of being is finite but not that being itself is essentially finite" (pg. 206)
 - **I agree - Being's breadth for openness is not finite; rather, only is what humans, in their existence (i.e., finitude), are able to leverage so as to 'open up' the Being of which they ex-sist.*
 - ◆ "[Heidegger] defines man as that instance of that-which-is which is in the mode of ex-sistence" (pg. 207)
 - **"Heidegger's thought is still developing** and changing under the impact of new insights. This is evident not only in terminological shifts but also in the careful revisions and additions given to his writings..." (pg. 207-208)
- Chapter 6 - Five Existential Themes (pg. 211)
 - "it is only after each of the representatives has been heard at some length do the common elements in their viewpoint begin to emerge" (pg. 211)
 - "the inductive approach also shows the wisdom of defining existentialism more in terms of its problems and methods than its doctrines" (pg. 212)
- The Venture of Philosophizing (pg. 212)
 - "the existentialist have given currency to a line of Fichte's... 'we philosophize out of need for our redemption'" (pg. 212)
 - "[existentialist] agree with Dilthey and Scheler that the gap between intelligence and life [i.e., between what's possible to know and how we conduct ourselves] must be closed [i.e., that we should be acting in a manner which reflects the breadth of human intelligence]" (pg. 212)
 - "trying to liberate themselves from idealistic categories, the existentialists have subjected the notion of an ironclad philosophical system to concentrated fire. They have taken to heart Kierkegaard's warning that a logical system of existence is impossible of human achievement [i.e., really, is not useful]" (pg. 213)
 - "in the context of Hegelian idealism, it is easy to slip into universal skepticism about the mind's ability to give a coherent, generalized explanation of reality" (pg. 213)
 - ◆ "[as a result,] the existentialists do provide grounds for the charge that they foster irrationalism in the course of criticizing the idealistic exaggerations about philosophical reason" (pg. 213)
 - ◇ "[Jaspers's] philosophy is a successful study of the failures to which all philosophical efforts at understanding being must lead. He plots a cunning course, so that logical reason cannot but run aground on the shores of personal existence and transcendence. Philosophy is thus conceived as a salvage activity, which can only begin to function properly after there has been a shipwreck of the traditional categories" (pg. 213-214)
 - **"courage to face the as yet uncharted areas, rather than devotion to achieved certitudes, is the fundamental virtue demanded of a philosopher in an age of crisis"** (pg. 214)
 - "in this same vein is the prominence accorded to personal activity as a condition for philosophizing. The existentialists speak sparingly about philosophy but quite freely about philosophizing. They think is more important to follow Plato's advice of philosophizing with one's whole soul than to become fluent about this or that historical theory. They share the Greek view that philosophy connotes first of all a habit of mind or intellectual virtue and only thereafter a body of doctrine. Only he who has made a personal effort to uncover and appropriate truths is on the road to wisdom" (pg. 214)
 - "existentialism is in rebellion against the notion that transmission of the philosophical heritage is an automatic, impersonal and uncritical process, involving no risk or radical revision. Philosophizing is kept vital precisely by the resolve to re-vise or see reality with a fresh vision" (pg. 215)

methodically underplayed by Descartes in favor of a first truth grasped by an act of pure intelligence. Kant, on the other hand, limited the immediate grasp of being to sensuous intuition. Consequently, he refused to allow any strict knowledge of the supersensuous order of reality. Thus metaphysics was divorced from sensuous existence and ordered to the study of human subjectivity. Marcel regards the dilemma of sensuous versus intellectual intuition as an artificial predicament, caused by overlooking the properly human way of knowing. Human cognition is a synthesis of intellectual and sense factors, both of which are involved intuitively in the immediate affirmation of existence with which metaphysics begins" (pg. 223-224)

- "Because our original acquaintance with existing being is intellectual, metaphysics need not be limited to the sensible, objective modes of being. Yet because the senses are also operative in the existential judgment, metaphysical knowledge is grounded in actual; sensible beings and does include an analysis of their way of existing. The initial apprehension of being is never attained in separation from particular, sensible instances of being. Hence Marcel regards the sensible world as a gateway to the transcendent..." (pg. 224)
- "**Aquinas regards metaphysical thinking not as a withdrawal from the reality of the concrete existent but as a means of grasping that reality in an intelligible way. The intellect does not empty out the concrete sensible existent from thought but at once affirms its immediately given reality and denies that the existential act must be confined to the material mode of being.** Thus the constitutive act that calls forth the metaphysical approach to things has its broad basis in sensible entities and our interior experience of an immaterial mode of existing. The various principles of being entering into the structure of material and immaterial modes of being are nothing other than the principles of concreteness, since finite being is realized only in individual, concrete acts of existing" (pg. 225)
- **"they [Marcel and Heidegger] regard [metaphysical] investigation [of human existence] as a means of access to being** as such and to other modes of being" (pg. 225)
 - "phenomenological description is a valid phase in the metaphysical enterprise, but it cannot be followed exclusively without converting the study of being as being into a study of consciousness and its acts. Metaphysics is transformed into philosophical anthropology, unless description of human experience is supplemented by an attempt to draw out the existential implications of that experiential situation" (pg. 226)
 - "Marcel advises the metaphysician to dig or excavate rather than expend himself upon imposing but foundationless superstructures. In like manner, Heidegger seeks to get behind the particular modes of being of man and the world. These are precepts which outstrip the process of phenomenological description. For they call attention to the real causal conditions which determine the structure of human existence, the material world, and even the intentional world of purified consciousness. Without any formal recognition of the fact, there has been a renaissance of the conception of metaphysics as a study of being in its causes and principles as well as in its existential act" (pg. 226)
- Man in the World (pg. 226)
 - "the most generally accepted existentialist proposition is that **existence means having one's being as a human individual in the world.** From the conjunction of man and the world, the existentialist dialectic invariably takes its rise. Albert Camus sees in this bond between the world and man an absurd juxtaposition of a blind, relentless environment and a being incorrigibly given to planning, hoping, and seeking response from nature. Camus makes capital out of the evolutionist warning against reading human purposes into nature and viewing the environment as benevolently disposed toward man. He also translates Franz Kafka's tales about the individual's bewilderment before natural events and social conventions into a semi-philosophical theory of universal nonsense and frustration. The only virtue is a dignified acceptance of our Sisyphean tasks, with no illusions about ever attaining permanently significant ends. This doctrine of absurdity is in open revolt against loose and sentimental interpretations of the Christian belief that God has ordained material things to minister to man's needs" (pg. 226-227)
 - "because consciousness intends [i.e., *reaches* through itself] a world in general, our mode of being is necessarily implicated in a world" (pg. 227)
 - "the intentional character of thought means that our ideas are primarily about something other than ideas themselves" (pg. 227)
 - "Husserl's analysis concentrates upon the originary act whereby transcendental consciousness (which is taken as individual but not empirical) constitutes the world of meanings and relations within its own immanence. Sartre follows along the same path, with a significant reservation. He holds that consciousness itself, no matter how purified and autonomous, arises in an unintelligible way within the womb of unconscious being. Hence the founding act of consciousness produces a world order on the surface of amorphous being, without producing this inactive reality itself. **Man's consciousness is the projective source whence proceed the meanings which are related as a world order. The world as an organized whole of rational purposes and relations is a human product, but this world is precariously carved out of the given *en-soi* and soon collapses into it again.** Absurdity is here extended to the very meaning of a stable world, not merely to its relation to man, as in Camus' outlook. Camus' world is senseless because it pays no heed to human pleas and cajolings; Sartre's world is intrinsically senseless because it is overladen with human designs, seems to be independently ordered, and is nevertheless destined to relapse into an irrational quicksand. In addition, Sartre finds it difficult to refer to the world. Men are individual existents and hence individual centers of consciousness. Each individual makes his own project of endowing a world with meaning, organization, and teleology. But the public world of science and inter-subjective experience poses a problem for phenomenological reconstructions" (pg. 227-228)
 - **"the most general *a priori* traits constitutive of the world are rooted in the common structure of consciousness found among all human individual. Hence we can all intend and agree upon the public world and the public standards of verification for our widest scientific explanations"** (pg. 229)
 - "[Heidegger's] study of being-in-the-world is undertaken in order to effect the transition from a Kantian outlook to that of a new metaphysical realism" (pg. 232)
 - "against classical scientific mechanism, he stresses the practical character of the objective world [i.e., "equipmentality"]" (pg. 232)
 - ◆ "the scientific ordering of materials under organizational categories is not for the sake of arranging an epistemic spectacle but primarily for facilitating human control over the environment. This instrumentalist view is corroborated by noting that things take on meaning in the degree that they enter into human plans. Heidegger analyzes at length the distinction between brute entities as merely there before us in an intermediate way and as definitely available or 'at hand' in their status as tools. **The truly human milieu is constituted by natural things in so far as they become incorporated into a network of human utensils** [i.e., that there exists *outside-of-ourselves* things for which we can take-up and use]. The scientific world is the world of useful things; it stands in the service of the existential world formed by the individual self with other existents. **It is into the world of tools or useful categories as well as into the social world that the existent individual is plunged.** This world may well appear to him as something already completely and impersonally formed: he need only fit himself into it in the least conspicuous and least strenuous fashion. This is the attitude of mediocrity or banal living, and it is literally death-dealing to the dynamic aspirations of existence. The everyday interpretation of our predicament makes no special problem out of the world. But the world retains its infraproblematic status only as long as the self is content to remain a thing determined mainly by outside forces and its proportionate responses. Fortunately, life contains earthquakes, shocks of existence that rock the solid basis of the impersonal outlook. **The purpose of dread, care, anticipation of death, and like attitudes is to convince the**

individual that his soul or selfhood is under threat. Heidegger refers to the voice of conscience as a device of the individual self for assuming responsibility for its own being. A man assumes responsibility existentially by becoming aware of his situation is a being already launched out in the world and headed toward his own determination of the world" (pg. 232-233)

- ◇ "to become a self is to appreciate the power of human projects in organizing a world of significant temporal and historical relations, yet a world ordained to one's own death" (pg. 234)
- ◇ **"the placement of man in the world is an ineluctable condition of his existence,** indeed, but not a senseless one. Man still retains his freedom of interpreting his presence in the world and toward death. His plunge into the mundane order may be regarded as something more than a brute hurtling into chaos, even though it remains true that the significance of human history requires the co-operation of our conscious projects. Man's being-there in the world may be seen as his being-sent-forth on a mission from being and toward being. The world would then bear still other traits than those imposed upon it by our practical, scientific interests" (pg. 234)
 - ▶ "man's presence in the world is that of a witness as well as of a master planning. He must tend to the demands of being as well as to his own needs, and he must see in nature something more than a storehouse for satisfying his desires and supporting his projects" (pg. 234)
- ◆ **"Heidegger's present task is that of reconciling the viewpoint of saints and artists with that of scientists and metaphysicians.** He is groping toward a philosophy of being which will do justice to both sets of deliverances, which will uncover the common ground between the 'Hymn to Brother Son' and the 'Treatise on the Cosmos'. His own hesitancy reflects the general existentialist division of opinion about the significance of man's orientation to the world. The existentialists have not yet developed a metaphysics of existence based squarely upon the theoretical affirmation of existential act and the implications of this affirmation. Until such a basis is secured, the existentialists will have no central tableland from which to evaluate the scientific and ethico-religious notions of the world. The differences between the objective and the reflective approaches to man's mundane condition cannot be emphasized indefinitely in the face of the similarities and convergences. A synoptic treatment of the question is required, so as to take account of both methodological differences and areas of mutual reinforcement and communication between science and existential reflection" (pg. 235)
- Man and Fellow Man (pg. 235)
 - **"There is no sharp distinction between the problem of the world and that of the human community.** For one's fellow men also belong to the zone of the other and must first be approached through the medium of things. Just as the individual self must pass from the condition of a given thing to that of a responsible existent, so a similar transition is required in the individual's relations with his fellow humans. At first, social relations belong to the undifferentiated problem of the self and the world. Only as the individual comes to have awareness of his own distinctive nature, does he also realize the special quality of his dealings with other centers of subjectivity and freedom. The social relationship is not established in its distinctive nature until the possibility of transcending the network of things and tools is recognized by the self" (pg. 235-236)
 - "There is, however, a remarkable correspondence in existentialist philosophies between the general doctrine on man-in-the-world and the theory of society. This is plainly seen in Sartre's case, since he decides social issues on the basis of his general commitments on the nature of the world. He rejects the hope of his fellow existentialists that communal forms of being can be placed on a satisfactory basis. This denial is not the fruit of direct inspection of the whole gamut of societal existence but is a rigorous deduction from his phenomenological premises. **Sartre's concern is not so much with intersubjective knowledge in the scientific sense as with the personal efforts at mutual understanding and the emotional acts that bear a social reference.** The existence of other egos presents no trouble to him, even though their reality is by no means evident from his starting point in the transcendental consciousness of the individual self. His example of the stare of one person outstaring another or embarrassing another is a psychological argument which is perfectly compatible with transcendental solipsism. Within the purified consciousness of the individual there is room for conflicts and disintegrations among the empirical attitudes" (pg. 236)
 - "In addition to allowing the existence of other selves, Sartre also admits a deep-seated desire for social harmony among men. It would be as futile to try to account for this social tendency as for any other given fact of our existence. Man is just as irrationally devoted to seeking an understanding with other men as to attempting to become divine or to constitute a world. Indeed, it is in function of the direction of consciousness to the world and God that Sartre settles the social question in an a priori way. Every entity other than myself figures in my consciousness as an object in my world. My native inclination is to order all the objects I encounter according to the pattern of my private project. Some of these objects are recognized as being other selves, but they must also submit to the general law of the subject and its subordinate objects. However, the resistance of selves to my imperialistic designs is different than that of things, since other people are also centers of consciousness and freedom. Each man has his own subjective perspective, within which he tries to fit other men as facets reflecting a central brilliance. **Thus there is an inevitable clash of private worlds and personal projects"** (pg. 236-237)
 - ◆ **"Since social life is a mutual robbing of the other man's subjective integrity, the basic social form is hate.** All other attitudes are variations on the dominant theme of hatred, either in an overt or in a concealed, hypocritical way. Sartre is especially insistent on the impossibility of overcoming hatred through motives of love, personal respect, or belief in God. It is just as natural to desire a loving, interpersonal, human community as to desire to become God - and just as impossible of fulfillment. **For love tries to unite the self as consciousness with the beloved as an ordered element in one's cosmos, as a thing which regards the self as an absolute.** Love therefore conceals an explosive contradiction that is bound to revert to hatred. It hides a desire to trick the beloved into becoming an object in the lover's world, a worshipper before his own divinity. Since the beloved is motivated by a similar purpose, all social efforts are doomed to failure. Sartre pours his empirical analyses into this rigid mould, choosing only those instances where some sort of hatred and lust are implicit" (pg. 237)
 - "Sartre's extreme doctrine has not [been] met with acceptance from the other existentialists" (pg. 237)
 - ◆ "[such] has confirmed Marcel's view that phenomenological description is not adequate for all philosophical tasks" (pg. 238)
 - **"Marcel has helped revive the insights of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard into the I-Thou relation.** A humane community rests upon the moral resolve to treat another man as a person rather than as a thing, as a thou rather than as an it. One's social conduct is thus regulated by a cognitive appreciation of the reality of other personal existents. Yet recognition of the thou-character of another means more than classification of him in a privileged group of objects. It stems from an awareness of that in the other entity which is not objective and which does not coincide with mere thinghood. Just as the existential judgment affirms the actuality of that which can never be reduced to my mental states, so the personal nature of another is irreducible to an objective component in my field of intentional projects. Far from frustrating the social design, this realistic self-restraint before the inalienable personality of another is the condition for community life. When this recognition animates practical behavior, it serves to differentiate the attitude of the friend and lover from that of the technician and conqueror" (pg. 239)
 - "Incisive reasons for the personalist foundation of human society are advanced by Jaspers. He notes that the individual, in treating the other as a fellow existent or self, not only contributes to social reality but also perfects himself as an individual. **The other is a mirror of one's self,** and to love the other is to treat him as oneself. Learning how to act properly toward another person is a lesson in self-

knowledge as well. **The individual self does not attain his mature growth of self-possession until he has developed his capacities for social intercourse. When the other being passes from the status of an *it* to a *thou*, there is a corresponding transformation in the self, who discovers the meaning of being related** now to an objective thing and now to the subjective integrity of a person. There are some aspects of his own freedom which refuse to reveal themselves as long as a man restricts himself to the subject-object relationship. Not until the differences between impersonal control and interpersonal communion are practically experienced, can a man realize his full potentialities as a person" (pg. 239-240)

- **"Personal existence is coexistence not with things but with fellow men.** All beings make some sort of response to the individual existent concerned about them. But, as Heidegger observes, the quality of our concern becomes differentiated when it is engaged first by things and then by other selves. Genuine solicitude is only forthcoming when another free form of being is involved, for in this case there is room for response at the same level. Jaspers psychological studies substantiate this philosophical conviction that **human society rests on mutuality among fellow selves.** The *we*-form of being develops only between individuals who respect each other as free subjects. The various kinds of societies bring out different phases of the communal mode of existing. Jaspers employs two criteria for determining the authenticity of social modes of existing and the value of their free projects: their aptitude to promote the attitude of seeking beyond the finite world and their contribution to human communication. **Achievement of mutual understanding through personal communication is among the major goals of the existential dialectic of transcendence.** The main lines of tension in existence run from man to man and from man to God. For both Marcel and Jaspers, the availability and openness of one human self to another correspond to the openness of existence as a whole to the transcendent" (pg. 240)
- "Marcel sees an analogy between approaching God as a person and approaching other men as persons, since in both cases the basic social virtues of fidelity and hope are the animating principles of the social mode of existing. Without the strength of these virtues, the individual will be fearful of opening himself by way of just dealings and love for others. His social situation will remain one of dire necessity and mistrust, approximating his attitude toward things. It is this degeneration of community life which Sartre regards as its highest flowering" (pg. 241)
- **"Heidegger's account of 'being-there-with' or human coexistence is the best example of a nonreligious but existential analysis of adequate societal modes of being"** (pg. 241)
 - "Heidegger's investigations show that the possibilities of existence are only incompletely actuated until they give birth to a manner of being along with other selves in a common work of freedom" (pg. 241)
 - "Heidegger's theory of *being-with* as a fundamental mode of human existence forces Sartre to retreat to his last bastion: the exigencies of phenomenological method. [Sartre] contends that Heidegger's postulation of a social reality is similar to his postulation of the world, time, and history. Heidegger establishes a most intimate connection between the self and the space-time world in which it exists. [Heidegger] has given an anthropological interpretation of Kant's doctrine on space and time as forms of sensibility and transcendental conditions of all experience. The individual existent is by nature a transcending project in a forward direction. Hence its very existential dynamism temporalizes and exteriorizes itself as a temporal and spatial world having history. Similarly, the existent self projects itself in the direction of other selves, attempting to organize other free selves within its own world. Sartre presses the analogy between Heidegger's theory of the transformation of brute natural things into handy tools and the transformation of other individual existents into components in my milieu. Each of these other selves, in turn, constitutes its milieu in terms of a subordination of the remaining selves who are jointly there in the world. Hence Sartre claims that his own conclusion follows logically from these premises, despite Heidegger's intention to the contrary" (pg. 242)
- **"To exist means to be there in the world along with other selves. Heidegger agrees with Marcel and Jaspers that mutual relation among selves is required for the perfection of human existence. Other existents cannot be approached as utensils but only as free selves, jointly present in and to the world.** Sartre's objections center around the way in which the existent self constitutes itself as existing along with others in a mutual world. Heidegger's revision of the radical phenomenological constitution of being can be extended to include the Sartrean theory of mutually conflicting personal worlds, if the latter be proposed as the necessary and sole form assumed by human society. Just as there can be some effective union with the beings of nature apart from the projection of a world, so there can be a way of access to other selves otherwise than as a subject relates itself to its objects or to its possible conquerors. **The stewardship of being is not the exclusive concern of any one existent individual but can be shared by him along with others.** This sense of a joint vocation may have a retroactive effect upon one's attitudes concerning other forms of social union. An individual's solicitude for others and with others for the common ends of society stems naturally from a common solicitude for assuring the recognition of being in the world. Once more, it is not metaphysical necessity but a free decision that leads to Sartre's despair about man's social use of freedom" (pg. 243-244)
- Man and God (pg. 244)
 - See text.

d. Further Readings:

- Human, All-too-Human, by F. Nietzsche https://onemorelibrary.com/index.php/en/?option=com_djclassifieds&format=raw&view=download&task=download&fid=3367
- The Phenomenological Movement, by H. Spiegelberg
 - Volume I - https://ia803204.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement/Herbert_Spiegelberg_The_Phenomenological_Movement.pdf
 - Volume II - https://ia600509.us.archive.org/32/items/HerbertSpiegelbergThePhenomenologicalMovement2/Herbert_Spiegelberg_The_Phenomenological_Movement_2.pdf
- Critique of Dialectical Reason, by J. Sartre
 - Volume I - <https://files.libcom.org/files/jean-paul-sartre-critique-of-dialectical-reason-volume-1.compressed.pdf>
 - Volume II - <https://files.libcom.org/files/jean-paul-sartre-critique-of-dialectical-reason-volume-2.pdf>
- Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings <https://ia902206.us.archive.org/19/items/SartreJeanPaulLiteraryAndPhilosophicalEssaysCollier1962/Sartre%2C%20Jean-Paul%20-%20Basic%20Writings%20%5BEd.%20Priest%5D%20%28Routledge%2C%202001%29.pdf>
- Being and Nothingness, by J. Sartre https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/6564640/mod_resource/content/2/Being%20and%20Nothingness.pdf
- Existentialist Philosophies, by E. Mounier <https://dn790007.ca.archive.org/0/items/existentialistph009371mbp/existentialistph009371mbp.pdf>
- Existential Psychotherapy, by I. Yalom https://ia802905.us.archive.org/20/items/irvind.yalomexistentialpsychotherapyzlib.org/%5B%20Irvin_D._Yalom%5D_Existential_Psychotherapy%28z-lib.org%29.pdf
- Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism, by F. Olafson https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_monograph/book/67853
- Phenomenology and Existentialism, (ed.) E. Lee & M. Mandelbaum https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_edited_volume/book/72318
- Six Existentialist Thinkers, by H. J. Blackham https://ia600803.us.archive.org/34/items/merged_201709/six%20existentialist%20thinkers.pdf
- Existentialism From Within, by E. L. Allen
- The Existential Analysis School of Thought, by L. Binswanger
 - *see book below - chapter 7

- Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, by R. May [https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/Rollo%20May.%20Ernest%20Angel%20,%20Henri%20F.%20Ellenberger%20\(Editors\)%20-%20Existence_%20a%20New%20Dimension%20in%20Psychiatry%20and%20Psychology-Basic%20Books%20\(1958\).pdf](https://cyberdandy.org/wp-content/uploads/Rollo%20May.%20Ernest%20Angel%20,%20Henri%20F.%20Ellenberger%20(Editors)%20-%20Existence_%20a%20New%20Dimension%20in%20Psychiatry%20and%20Psychology-Basic%20Books%20(1958).pdf)
- Irrational Man, by W. Barrett https://ia903108.us.archive.org/31/items/irrationalman_201911/Irrational%20Man_text.pdf
- (Article) Existentialist Philosophies and Political Decline, by W. Bultmann <https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1208&context=jaas>
- (Article) Existentialism <https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/win2021/entries/existentialism/>