

Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, by H. Marcuse

a. People / Organizations: https://monoskop.org/images/5/57/Marcuse_Herbert_Negations_Essays_in_Critical_Theory_2009.pdf

b. Quotes:

- "There is no rational end, no norm however correct, no program however exemplary, no social ideal however beautiful, and no legitimacy or legality that could justify men's killing one another" - C. Schmitt (pg. 21)
- **"Hitler knew well the extreme function of repetition: the biggest lie, often enough repeated, will be acted upon and accepted as truth."** - Author (pg. 201)

c. General Notes:

- Forward, by S. Bohm & C. Jones (pg. xiii)
 - "In the current historical situation one senses the equally pressing need for options against the impositions of the increasingly grotesque forms of global capitalism" (pg. xiii)
 - "This is not to say that the world we live in, like that of Marcuse, is one that is simply in crisis, but rather that, across the various spaces in which it is grasped in thought, it is not in crisis enough. This is the result of the impositions and extensions not only of the capitalist mode of production and the commodification of life, but of the incorporation of the very spaces in which these social processes might have been understood and transformed. Here we think with Marcuse of the place of culture and the diversion or incorporation of the critical impulse, but also the almost complete abdication of responsibility by those working in what are still nobly called universities" (pg. xiii)
 - "...**Marcuse's book is caught at the borderline between utopianism and despair**" (pg. xiii)
 - "On the one hand, it outlines concrete theoretical and practical proposals for overcoming the present, while, on the other hand, it is keenly aware that the present is marked by an almost complete subsumption in 'total administration'. This dialectic therefore eschews two of the most dominant trends in thought today: first, naive utopianism that imagines the easy escape from the present, as if the collapse of the capitalist empire is already at hand, and, second, the varieties of empiricism and fatalism that merely document the state of affairs and our failures to date" (pg. xiii-xiv)
 - "*Negations* is therefore not a negative book but a call to action, a thinking that involves an affirmation of thinking and of life and a hopefulness that knows also that hopefulness without negation – an awareness of what must be negated and the risks of that task – is naive. In this way, it is continuous with the project that, as Adorno stressed in *Negative Dialectics*, to stay positive, to affirm life, one must engage in a process of negating what is. Because only through this negating of what is can one find determinate possibilities of development, progress, freedom. Positive possibilities of a new life that escape the stultifying repetition of the present can only come through negation. Being simply 'positive' involves the danger of putting forward utopian futures which have no relation to the present, to the 'what is', to contemporary social relations. This is why Marx so vehemently criticised the utopian socialists of his time, as their utopian ideas for new towns and communities were not founded in an understanding of the realities of 'actually existing' capitalist relations" (pg. xiv-xv)
 - "We are all part of a capitalist culture that continuously tries to individualize us, to set us apart, to establish hierarchies that are able to judge, measure and categorize us. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that academic critique is today so individualised and is more intent on distinguishing itself from other criticism than on changing anything. But to overcome this state of affairs is also the point. Marcuse's Negations shows how this individualisation functions, how it is directly related to the commodification of life, and how it produces, what he calls with a directness rare today, a 'sick society'. **Negation means to, first, realize that we are sick, and, second, that there is a need to develop strategies beyond that sickness. To escape sickness is not to return to the previous state of good health, but is a joy in the possibility of living again.** Joy of negation then, and not for the purpose of frivolity or posturing, but because of the enclosure and of the forestalled real possibilities for freedom, that is, for meaningful and genuinely democratic social relations. Joy in knowing that another world is possible and that the immanent possibilities of the present both contain and constrain that very world. Joy in a negation that stands together with those who have struggled for the possibility of a future and who continue to do so today, in their various practical and intellectual experiments." (pg. xvi)
- Forward, by H. Marcuse (pg. xvii)
 - "if there was one matter about which the author of these essays and his friends were not uncertain, it was the understanding that **the fascist state was fascist society, and that totalitarian violence and totalitarian reason came from the structure of existing society**, which was in the act of overcoming its liberal past and incorporating its historical negation. This presented the critical theory of society with the task of identifying the tendencies that linked the liberal past with its totalitarian abolition." (pg. xvii)
 - "it was mind, reason, consciousness, 'pure' thought that in the traditional culture was supposed to constitute the autonomy of the subject, the essential freedom of man. Here was the sphere of negation, of contradiction to the established order, of protest, of dissociation, of criticism" (pg. xviii)
 - "The more 'materialistic' society became in the advanced industrial countries, i.e. the higher the standard of living rose for broad strata of the population, the clearer became the extent to which this progress stabilized misery and unhappiness. **Productivity bore destruction within it and turned technology from an instrument of liberation into one of new enslavement.** Faced with a society in which affluence is accompanied by intensified exploitation, militant materialism remains negative and revolutionary (even where exploitation becomes more comfortable and does not penetrate into consciousness). Its idea of happiness and of gratification can be realized only through political practice that has qualitatively new modes of human existence as its goal." (pg. xix-xx)
 - "the concern with philosophy expressed in these essays was already, in the thirties, a concern with the past: remembrance of something that at some point had lost its reality and had to be taken up again" (pg. xx)
 - "Of course, **all the wealth, the technology, and the productivity of this society cannot match the ideas of real freedom and of real justice which are at the center of socialist theory.**" (pg. xxi)
 - "This society has appropriated dimensions of consciousness and nature that formerly were relatively unspoiled." (pg. xxii)
 - "Behind all the inhuman aspects of automation as it is organized under capitalism, its real possibilities appear: the genesis of a technological world in which man can finally withdraw from, evacuate, and oversee the apparatus of his labor – in order to experiment freely with it. Irresponsible as it may seem, in view of existing poverty and existing need, to summon up the image of such freedom, it is just as irresponsible to conceal the extent to which existing poverty and existing need are perpetuated only by the interests that rule the status quo. **Despite all planning and organization, however, the fundamental tendencies of the system realize themselves against the will and the intentions of individuals – as blind forces even where they are scientifically mastered and calculated** and obey the requirements of the apparatus. The apparatus becomes in a literal sense the subject; this is practically the definition of an automaton. And to the extent to which the apparatus itself becomes the subject, it casts off man as a serving and working being and sets him free as a thinking, knowing, experimenting, and playing being. Freedom from the need for the intervention of human service and servitude – that is the law of technological rationality. Today the latter is enmeshed in the apparatus of domination, which perpetuates the necessity whose abolition it makes possible. To experiment and play with the apparatus is at present the monopoly of those who work for the preservation and expansion of the status quo. Perhaps this monopoly can be broken only by catastrophe." (pg. xxiii)

- society to the idea of a theoretical and practical, positive and negative critique.** This critique has two guidelines: first, the given situation of man as a rational organism, i.e. one that has the potentiality of freely determining and shaping his own existence, directed by the process of knowledge and with regard to his worldly happiness; second, the given level of development of the productive forces and the (corresponding or conflicting) relations of production as the criterion for those potentialities that can be realized at any given time in men's rational structuring of society. The rationalist theory is well aware of the limits of human knowledge and of rational social action, but it avoids fixing these limits too hurriedly and, above all, making capital out of them for the purpose of uncritically sanctioning established hierarchies." (pg. 9-10)
- "The irrationalist theory of society finds it unnecessary to deny radically the reality of critical reason: between binding reason to pre-given 'natural-organic' facts and enslaving it to the 'beast of prey within man', there is sufficiently wide latitude for all sorts of derivative reason. Decisive here is that irrational givens ('nature', 'blood and soil', 'folkhood', 'existential facts', 'totality', and so forth) are placed prior to the autonomy of reason as its limit in principle (not merely in fact), and reason is and remains causally, functionally, or organically dependent on them. Against all attempts to fight shy of this conclusion, it cannot be emphasized often enough that such functionalization of reason or of man as a rational organism annihilates the force and effectiveness of reason at its roots, for it **leads to a reinterpretation of the irrational pre-givens as normative ones, which place reason under the heteronomy of the irrational.** In the theory of contemporary society, playing up natural-organic facts against 'rootless' reason means justifying by irrational powers a society that can no longer be rationally justified and submerging in the hidden darkness of 'blood' or the 'soul' contradictions recognized by the light of conceptual knowledge. **This is intended to truncate comprehension and criticism.** "Reality does not admit of knowledge, only of acknowledgement": in this 'classical' formulation irrationalist theory arrives at the extreme antipode to all rational thought and at the same time reveals its deepest intentions. **Today the irrationalist theory of society is as essentially uncritical as the rationalist theory is critical; it is essentially anti-materialist,** for it must defame the worldly happiness of man that can be brought about only through a rational organization of society and replace it with other, less 'palpable' values. **What it offers as an alternative to materialism is a heroic pauperism: an ethical transfiguration of poverty, sacrifice, and service, and a 'folkish realism'** whose social meaning we shall come to later. Compared with heroic-folkish realism, liberalism is a rationalist theory. Its vital element is optimistic faith in the ultimate victory of reason, which will realize itself above all conflicts of interest and opinion in the harmony of the whole. In keeping with its economic views, liberalism links this victory of reason (and here begins the typical liberalist conception of rationalism) to the possibility of a free and open rivalry of divergent views and elements of knowledge, which is to result in rational truth and rightness" (pg. 10-11)
 - **"As the economic organization of society is built upon the free competition of private economic subjects, in other words, on the unity of opposites and the unification of the dissimilar, so the search for truth is founded on open self-expression, free dialogue, and convincing and being convinced through argument** – at root, that is, on contradicting and criticizing one's opponent. **All the tendencies from which the political demands of liberalism derive their theoretical validity** (such as freedom of speech and of the press, publicity, tolerance, parliamentary government) **are elements of a true rationalism"** (pg. 11)
 - "There is another source that furnishes liberalist society with a rationalist underpinning. The third fundamental right proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man is *sûreté*. **This security means very definitely a guarantee of freedom in economic conduct...**" (pg. 11)
 - "This has two primary corollaries: a maximum of legal security for all private contracts and a maximum of exact calculability of profit and loss, supply and demand." (pg. 11)
 - "The liberalist rationalization of economic life (as of social organization in general) is essentially private. It is tied to the rational practice of the individual economic subject or of a multiplicity of individual economic subjects. In the end, of course, the rationality of liberalist practice is supposed to demonstrate itself in the whole and characterize the whole, but this whole itself is outside the sphere of rationalization" (pg. 11)
 - "The structure and order of the whole are ultimately left to irrational forces: an accidental 'harmony', a 'natural balance'. The plausibility of liberalist rationalism thus ceases immediately when, with the intensification of social conflict and economic crises, general 'harmony' becomes increasingly improbable. **At this point liberalist theory must grasp at irrational justifications.** Rational critique gives up; it is all too readily prepared to acknowledge 'natural' privileges and favors. The idea of the charismatic, authoritarian leader is already preformed in the liberalist celebration of the gifted economic leader, the 'born' executive" (pg. 12)
 - "This rough sketch of liberalist social theory has shown how many elements of the totalitarian view of the state are already present in it." (pg. 12)
 - **"The priority and primacy of the whole over its 'members' (parts) is a basic thesis of heroic-folkish realism.** The whole is understood not only as a sum or abstract totality, but as the unity that unifies the parts, a unity which is the precondition for the fulfillment and completion of each part. **The demand for the realization of such a totality occupies the first place in the programmatic proclamations of the total-authoritarian state"** (pg. 13)
 - "We have seen that the exclusion of the whole from the process of rational action was a serious omission on the part of liberalist theory." (pg. 13)
 - "But released from its economic and social content, the concept of the whole has absolutely no concrete meaning in social theory." (pg. 14)
 - ◆ "Even the 'folk' becomes a real totality only by virtue of its economic and social unity, not vice versa" (pg. 14)
 - "Universalism must divert both consciousness and action from the only possible way to realize the 'whole' and from the only possible form of that whole into another, less dangerous direction: it substitutes the 'primal given' of the folk, of folkhood." (pg. 15)
 - "We shall not go into the various attempts that have been made to define the concept 'folk'. What is decisive is that it aims at a 'primal given' that, as a 'natural' one, is prior to the 'artificial' system of society" (pg. 15)
 - ◆ "As such, owing to its origins, it is largely withdrawn from the range of all human planning and decision. Hence all attempts are 'a priori' discredited that would overcome the present anarchically conflicting strivings and needs of individuals and raise them to a true totality by means of a planned transformation of the social relations of production. The path is cleared for 'heroic-folkish' organicism, which provides the basis necessary for totalitarian political theory to fulfill its social function" (pg. 15)
 - "'Nature' as celebrated by organicism, however, does not appear as a factor of production in the context of actual relations of production, nor as a condition of production, nor as the basis, itself historical, of human history. Instead it [e.g., Nature] **becomes a myth**, and as myth it hides the organicist devaluation and forcible displacement of historical and social processes. **Nature becomes the great antagonist of history"** (pg. 16)
 - **Meaning, 'Nature' (as Idea) serves (as) reason enough - but, is, in fact, not 'reason'; rather, merely the semblance (of) what seems reasonable (i.e., mimetic) and relatively 'ready-able' - to not think upon how human actions have created the world we live in. We submit such a process of thinking to myth, thereby allowing oneself to escape persecution. E. Cassirer, in Symbol, Myth, and Culture, writes "There is perhaps no older, no deeper, no more general mythical concept than the concept of fate"* (pg. 228)
 - "This de-historicization marks all aspects of organicist theory: the devaluation of time in favor of space, the elevation of the static over the dynamic and the conservative over the revolutionary, the rejection of all dialectic, the glorification of tradition for its own sake" (pg. 16)
 - **"Never has history been taken less seriously than now,** when it is primarily adjusted to the preservation and service of a national heritage, when revolutions are held to be 'background noise' or 'disturbances' of natural laws, and when the determination of human happiness and dignity is delivered over to natural forces of 'blood' and 'soil'. In this dehistoricization of the historical, naturalist theory gives itself away; it expresses an interest in stabilizing a particular form of the conditions of life, one that can no longer be justified in its present historical situation. If history were really taken seriously, it could all too easily remind men that this form is in crisis and that possibilities for changing it can be

- derived from the history of its origins. In short, it could remind men that the established social order is transitory, that "the hour of its birth ... is the hour of its death" (Hegel). It is ideologically perpetuated when it is claimed to be the 'natural order of life'" (pg. 16-17)
- "At the end of this path (of which we shall suggest only the most important stages) comes the point where **ideology's function of creating illusions turns into one of disillusionment: transfiguration and camouflage are replaced by open brutality.**" (pg. 18)
 - ◆ "The performance of duty, the sacrifice, and the devotion that 'heroic realism' requires of men are brought into the service of a social order that perpetuates the misery and unhappiness of individuals. Although these sacrifices are made at the 'brink of meaninglessness', they have nonetheless a concealed, very 'rational' purpose: factually and ideologically stabilizing the current system of producing and reproducing life. Heroic realism offends against the great ideas of duty, sacrifice, and devotion by programmatically incorporating into the apparatus of a system of domination what can only occur as the free gift of free men." (pg. 20-21)
 - "As we have seen, **the model of man projected by today's heroic realism is of one whose existence is fulfilled in unquestioning sacrifices and unconditional acts of devotion, whose ethic is poverty and all of whose worldly goods have been melted down into service and discipline.** This image stands in sharp opposition to all the ideals acquired by Western man in the last centuries." (pg. 21)
 - "And in the universal struggle against reason, justification by knowledge can no longer count as a justification" (pg. 21)
 - "'Existentialism' in its political form becomes the theory of the (negative) justification of what can no longer be justified." (pg. 21)
 - "**The meaning of philosophical existentialism lay in regaining the full concretion of the historical subject in opposition to the abstract 'logical' subject of rational idealism, i.e. eliminating the domination, unshaken from Descartes to Husserl, of the ego cogito.** Heidegger's position before his Sein und Zeit was philosophy's furthest advance in this direction" (pg. 22)
 - "Existentialism, too, sees in 'earthy and bloody forces' the real forces of history. Thus the existentialist currents, too, are nourished from the great naturalistic reservoir" (pg. 24)
 - ◆ "We saw that the existential as such is exempt from any rational standard or norm lying beyond it; it is itself the absolute norm and is inaccessible to any and all rational criticism and justification" (pg. 25)
 - "On this point political existentialism is more sensitive than its philosophical counterpart. It knows that even the 'earthy and bloody forces' of a folk become historical only in particular political forms, that is, if a real structure of domination, the state, has been erected over the folk. **Existentialism, too, needs an explicit political theory: the doctrine of the total state.**" (pg. 24)
 - "Essentially, **authoritarian leadership draws its political qualifications from two sources, which are themselves linked: an irrational, 'metaphysical' power, and a 'non-social' power.** The idea of 'justification' still disquiets the theory: "An authoritarian government needs a justification that goes beyond the personal". There is no material or rational justification. Thus the "justification must be metaphysical As a principle of state order, the distinction between leaders and led can be made only metaphysically". The political and social meaning of the concept 'metaphysical' gives itself away: "A government that governs only because it has a mandate from the folk is not an authoritarian government. Authority is possible only if it comes from transcendence...". The word 'transcendence' ought to be taken seriously here. The foundation of authority lies beyond all social facticity, so that it does not depend on it for validation. Above all, it surpasses the 'folk's' factual situation and power of comprehension: "Authority presupposes a status that is valid over against the folk because the folk does not confer it but acknowledges it". Acknowledgment is the foundation of authority: a truly 'existential' proof!" (pg. 26)
 - "**Real freedom for individual existence (and not merely in the liberalist sense) is possible only in a specifically structured polis, a 'rationally' organized society.** In consciously politicizing the concept of existence, and deprivatizing and deinternalizing (Ent-Innerlichung) the liberalist, idealist conception of man, the totalitarian view of the state represents progress – progress that leads beyond the basis of the totalitarian state, propelling the theory beyond the social order that it affirms. As long as it remains within the latter's bounds, the progress operates regressively: the process of politicizing and deprivatizing annihilates individual existence instead of truly raising it to 'universality'. This becomes clear in the antiliberalist concept of freedom" (pg. 27-28)
 - "Unless it is to annihilate human freedom rather than to fulfil it, **the political obligation of freedom can be only the free practice of the individual himself.** This practice begins with critique and ends with the free self-realization of the individual in a rationally organized society. This organization of society and this practice are the mortal enemies that political existentialism combats with all available means." (pg. 28)
 - "**Existentialism collapses the moment its political theory is realized.** The total-authoritarian state for which it longed gives the lie to all its truths. Existentialism accompanies its debacle with a self-abasement unique in the history of ideas, bringing its own history to end as a satyr play. In philosophy, existentialism begins as the antagonist in a great debate with Western rationalism and idealism, intending to save their conceptual content by injecting it into the historical concretion of individual existence. It ends by radically denying its own origin; the struggle against reason drives it blindly into the arms of the powers that be. In their service and with their protection, it turns traitor to the great philosophy that it formerly celebrated as the culmination of Western thought. The abyss between them is now unbridgeable" (pg. 28-29)
 - "**Existentialism, which at one time understood itself to be the heir of German Idealism, has given up the greatest intellectual heritage of German history.** It was not with Hegel's death but only now that the Fall of the Titans of German philosophy occurs. At that time, in the nineteenth century, its decisive achievements were preserved in a new form in scientific social theory and the critique of political economy. Today the fate of the labor movement, in which the heritage of this philosophy was preserved, is clouded with uncertainty" (pg. 29-30)
 - Chapter 2 - The Concept of Essence (pg. 31)
 - "For so much of men's real struggles and desires went into the metaphysical quest for an ultimate unity, truth, and universality of Being that they could not have failed to find expression in the derived forms of the philosophical tradition" (pg. 31)
 - "Under the name of 'essence' this Being is made into the object of 'authentic', certain, and secure knowledge. The way in which modern philosophy has understood and established knowledge of essence contrasts with that of ancient and medieval philosophy." (pg. 31)
 - "It is no longer the spontaneity of the concept but the receptivity of intuition that serves as the organon of the doctrine of essence. **Cognition culminates in recognition, where it remains fixated**" (pg. 32)
 - "...Husserl's philosophy thus still belongs to the liberalist period. The material eidetics (Scheler) that came in Husserl's train, however, represents the transition to a new stage: the preparation of thought for the ideology of authoritarian forms of domination. The intuition of essence is misused to establish orders of value in which the relations of hierarchy and subordination required by the established order are derived from the 'essence' of man, of nationality, and of race. **From Descartes to modern eidetics, the concept of essence has followed a course leading from autonomy to heteronomy, from the proclamation of the free, rational individual to his surrender to the powers of the authoritarian state.**" (pg. 32)
 - "The current form of the doctrine of essence no longer preserves the comprehension that led to the separation of essence and appearance; neither does the abstract cancellation of this separation demanded by positivism. A theory that wants to eradicate from science the concept of essence succumbs to helpless relativism, thus promoting the very powers whose reactionary thought it wants to combat. Positivism cannot provide an effective critique of the idealist doctrine of essence. Doing so devolves upon the materialist dialectic. Before this task is attempted, we shall analyze some typical forms of the idealist doctrine of essence" (pg. 32)
 - "In **Plato's** theory of Ideas, where the concept of essence was first clearly formulated, it was an outcome of the quest for the unity and universality of

- Being in view of the multiplicity and changeability of beings. That things, even though each of them is 'individual', are nevertheless similar and dissimilar, like and unlike; that in the endless multiplicity of their attributes they are comprehended as one and the same; that quite diverse phenomena accord in being considered good, beautiful, just, unjust, and so forth; in short, that the world of beings is divided into species and genera, subsumed under the highest categories, and known by means of universal concepts is the philosophical substratum of the problem of essence" (pg. 32-33)
- "For **Thomas Aquinas** the essence, as *essentia* of existence, is that according to, through, and in which existence is what it is. The *essentia* is, in other words, the inner structure of existence, in which it operates as the principle of form for each kind of being" (pg. 33-34)
 - "With **Kant** the characteristics of essence – such as unity, universality, permanence – reappear in the context of pure theoretical reason, where they are incorporated partly in the pure concepts of the understanding or in their transcendental apperception, partly in the transcendental Ideas of reason" (pg. 38)
 - "Phenomenology is therewith in principle a descriptive philosophy: it always aims only at describing what is as it is and as it presents itself, not, for instance, at showing what could and should be" (pg. 43)
 - "In this dimension, speaking of essence no longer means setting reality against its potentiality and what exists against what could be; essence has a purely descriptive and epistemological character" (pg. 43-44)
 - "Phenomenology's concept of essence is so far removed from any critical significance that it regards both the essential and the inessential, the object of phantasy as well as that of perception, as 'facts'. The epistemological antipositivism of this doctrine ill conceals its positivistic orientation" (pg. 44)
 - "Every attempt to ground philosophy in objectivity, in the sphere of material reality, without attacking the real presuppositions of its conceptual character, i.e. without integrating into the theory a practice aimed at transformation, necessarily surrenders its rationally critical character and becomes heteronomous. This fate befell the material doctrine of essence; it led, just as with positivism, to the subjection of theory to the 'given' powers and hierarchies" (pg. 45)
 - "The sacrifice of the idea of critical reason paved the way to resignation for the doctrine of essence, to its gradual transition to a new ideology. Bourgeois philosophy lost the Archimedean point where it had anchored the freedom of the knowing individual, and without it, it has no basis from which the weapon of critique can be employed against the claims of specific facts and hierarchies to be 'essential'" (pg. 45)
 - "...the autonomy of freedom is replaced by receptive heteronomy." (pg. 46)
 - "In the epoch of monopoly capitalism, reason is replaced by the acquiescent acknowledgment of 'essential' givens, in whose verification reason initially plays only a derivative role, and subsequently none at all." (pg. 46)
 - "The positivist opposition to the 'metaphysics' of the doctrine of essence conceived itself primarily as an epistemological critique: our experience of reality (reality by no means being identified with the immediately given) does not at all justify the assumption of two ontologically different 'worlds', an assumption presupposed by the opposition of thing and appearance, essence and fact. With this contention, positivism takes a decisive step beyond epistemological empiricism. For with its concept of fact, the facticity of an object of knowledge establishes not only its 'reality' but simultaneously its cognitive equi-valence to every other reality. With respect to knowledge, all facts are as such equi-valent. The world of facts is, so to speak, one-dimensional. The real is 'absolutely (schlechthin) real' and as such precludes any metaphysical or critical transcendence toward essence" (pg. 47)
 - "Cognition, freed from the tension between facts and essence, becomes recognition." (pg. 47)
 - "When all facts are indiscriminately held to be essential, and when each fact is indiscriminately held to be an essence, philosophy's attitude toward reality is fundamentally identical." (pg. 47)
 - "Under these conditions a theory for which reality is 'always essence' can only be one of resignation. As with phenomenological eidetics, the positivist annulment of the opposition of essence and fact is not a new beginning, but an end" (pg. 48)
 - "Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves toward a different potentiality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appearance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical structure of the social process of life. The essence of man and of things appears within that structure; what men and things could genuinely be appears in 'bad', 'perverted' form. At the same time, however, appears the possibility of negating this perversion and realizing in history that which could be. This antagonistic character of the historical process as it is today turns the opposition of essence and appearance into a dialectical relationship and this relationship into an object of the dialectic. Materialist theory takes up the concept of essence where philosophy last treated it as a dialectical concept – in Hegel's Logic." (pg. 49)
 - "For **Hegel** appearance and essence are two modes of being which stand in reciprocal relation to one another, so that the existence of appearance presupposes the suppression of merely self-subsistent essence. Essence is essence only through appearing, that is, through emerging from its mere self-subsistence: 'Essence must appear'. And appearance, as the appearance of what is in itself, becomes "what the thing in itself is, or its truth". "By this token essence is neither in back of nor beyond appearance; rather, existence is appearance because it is essence that exists." Hegel conceives of essence as a process in which 'mediated being' is posited through the overcoming of unmediated being; essence has a history. And the critical theme of the theory of essence is reactivated in the meaning of this history, in this movement from unmediated 'Being' through 'essence' to mediated 'existence'. "When, further, it is said that all things have an essence, what is being expressed is that they are not in reality what they show themselves to be", "that their immediate existence does not correspond to what they are in themselves". The movement of essence has the task of doing away with this bad immediacy and positing the sphere of beings (das Seiende) as that which it is in itself: 'Now the process of reality is itself of this sort. Reality is not simply something which is immediately, but rather, as essential Being, it is the overcoming of its own immediacy and therefore mediates itself with itself'. Essence is conceived as something which 'has become', as a 'result' that itself must reappear as a result and that enters into relation with the dynamic categories of the inessential, illusion, and appearance. In this way, it is conceived as part of a process which takes place between unmediated Being, its overcoming and preservation in essence (as its being-in-itself) and the realization of this essence. But with Hegel the process remains ontological; it is the Being of beings which undergoes it and is its subject. It thereby proves itself to be Logos, 'reason'. The movement through which unmediated Being is 'recollected' to essence as to its being-in-itself, 'reflection', in which immediacy is overcome and posited again as mediated existence, is a determination of Being itself, of Being as essence. "Essence as such is one with its reflection and not distinguished from the latter's own movement." It is not man who recollects essence, who grasps the world of beings which confronts him, overcomes its bad immediacy and posits it anew through the knowledge of essence; rather, for Hegel all this occurs within rational Being itself. Man participates in this process only as the subject of cognition, insofar as he himself is rational Being. Hegel's conception of essence already contains all the elements of a dynamic historical theory of essence, but in a dimension where they cannot be effective. Essence is for Hegel a movement, but a movement in which there is no longer any actual change, a movement which takes place within itself. "Essence is the absolute unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself; the process of its determination thus remains within this unity and is neither a becoming nor a transition to something else"; it is "the movement of becoming and of transition which remains within itself". Hegel transposes the tension between what could be and what exists, between being-in-itself (essence) and appearance, into the very structure of Being; as such it is always prior to all states of fact. Hegel's theory of essence remains transcendental" (pg. 49-50)

- **"The tension between potentiality and actuality, between what men and things could be and what they are in fact, is one of the dynamic focal points of this theory of society.** It sees therein not a transcendental structure of Being and an immutable ontological difference but a historical relationship which can be transformed in this life by real men; the incongruity of potentiality and actuality incites knowledge to become part of the practice of transformation" (pg. 50-51)
 - "In place of a static epistemological relationship of essence to fact emerges a critical and dynamic relationship of essence to appearance as parts of a historical process." (pg. 52)
- "What man can be in a given historical situation is determinable with regard to the following factors: the measure of control of natural and social productive forces, the level of the organization of labor, the development of needs in relation to possibilities for their fulfillment (especially the relation of what is necessary for the reproduction of life to the 'free' needs for gratification and happiness, for the 'good and the beautiful'), the availability, as material to be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life. This definition of essence already implies the whole theory of history that deduces the totality of the conditions of life from the mode of social organization and that at the same time provides the methodological and conceptual tools making possible knowledge of the historical tendencies effective at a particular time. On the basis of this theory the essence of man is understood in connection with those tendencies which have as their goal a new form of social life as the 'Idea' of that which practice must realize. Considered this way, **the image of man represents not only what can already be made of man today, what 'in itself' can already be today, but also** – and this is the polemical demand theory raises by means of this concept of essence – **the real fulfillment of everything that man desires to be when he understands himself in terms of his potentialities.**" (pg. 53)
 - "In making this demand of the essence of man, theory points the way from the bad current state of humanity to a mankind that disposes of the goods available to it in such a way that they are distributed in accordance with the true needs of the community. Here men would themselves take on the planning and shaping of the social process of life and not leave it to the arbitrariness of competition and the blind necessity of reified economic relations. The power of the conditions of labor over life, along with the separation of the immediate producers from the means of labor, would be abolished. Instead of life being placed in the service of labor, labor would become a means of life. Instead of degrading cultural values to the rank of privilege and object of 'leisure', men would really make them part of the common existence." (pg. 53)
- **"The materialist concept of essence is a historical concept.** Essence is conceivable only as the essence of a particular 'appearance', whose factual form is viewed with regard to what it is in itself and what it could be (but is not in fact). This relation, however, originates in history and changes in history" (pg. 54)
 - "All historical struggles for a better organization of the impoverished conditions of existence, as well as all of suffering mankind's religious and ethical ideal conceptions of a more just order of things, are preserved in the dialectical concept of the essence of man, where they have become elements of the historical practice linked to dialectical theory." (pg. 55)
- "The essence that the theory attempts to conceptualize appeared first in the form of man's potentiality within a particular historical situation, in conflict with his immediate existence" (pg. 59)
- "The conceptual scheme of materialist theory in its present form exhibits a dialectical dichotomy grounded in the structure of its object. It derives from the antagonistic character of the social life process as the identity of the processes of production on the one hand and the realization of capital on the other. From this basis **the antagonism permeates all areas of life.**" (pg. 61)
 - "All materialist concepts contain an accusation and an imperative." (pg. 63)
- Chapter 3 - The Affirmative Character of Culture (pg. 65)
 - "One theme continually recurs in the reasons given for the relegation of the highest form of knowledge and of pleasure to pure, purposeless theory: **the world of necessity, of everyday provision for life, is inconstant, insecure, unfree – not merely in fact, but in essence.** Disposal over material goods is never entirely the work of human industry and wisdom, for it is subject to the rule of contingency. The individual who places his highest goal, happiness, in these goods makes himself the slave of men and things. He surrenders his freedom. Wealth and well-being do not come or persist due to his autonomous decision but rather through the changeable fortune of opaque circumstances. Man thus subjects his existence to a purpose situated outside him. Of itself, such an external purpose can vitiate and enslave men only if the material conditions of life are poorly ordered, that is, if their reproduction is regulated through the anarchy of opposing social interests. In this order the preservation of the common existence is incompatible with individual happiness and freedom. Insofar as philosophy is concerned with man's happiness – and the theory of classical antiquity held it to be the highest good – it cannot find it in the established material organization of life. That is why it must transcend this order's facticity." (pg. 66)
- Chapter 4 - Philosophy and Critical Theory (pg. 99)
 - "From the beginning the critical theory of society was constantly involved in philosophical as well as social issues and controversies. At the time of its origin, in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, philosophy was the most advanced form of consciousness, and by comparison real conditions in Germany were backward. Criticism of the established order there began as a critique of that consciousness, because otherwise it would have confronted its object at an earlier and less advanced historical stage than that which had already attained reality in countries outside Germany. Once critical theory had recognized the responsibility of economic conditions for the totality of the established world and comprehended the social framework in which reality was organized, philosophy became superfluous as an independent scientific discipline dealing with the structure of reality. Furthermore, problems bearing on the potentialities of man and of reason could now be approached from the standpoint of economics" (pg. 99)
 - "In the conviction of its founders the critical theory of society is essentially linked with materialism" (pg. 99)
 - "The theory of society is an economic, not a philosophical, system. There are two basic elements linking materialism to correct social theory: concern with human happiness, and the conviction that it can be attained only through a transformation of the material conditions of existence. The actual course of the transformation and the fundamental measures to be taken in order to arrive at a rational organization of society are prescribed by analysis of economic and political conditions in the given historical situation. The subsequent construction of the new society cannot be the object of theory, for it is to occur as the free creation of the liberated individuals. When reason has been realized as the rational organization of mankind, philosophy is left without an object. For **philosophy, to the extent that it has been, up to the present, more than an occupation or a discipline within the given division of labor, has drawn its life from reason's not yet being reality.**" (pg. 100)
 - "Reason is the fundamental category of philosophical thought, the only one by means of which it has bound itself to human destiny. Philosophy wanted to discover the ultimate and most general grounds of Being. Under the name of reason it conceived the idea of an authentic Being in which all significant antitheses (of subject and object, essence and appearance, thought and being) were reconciled. Connected with this idea was the conviction that what exists is not immediately and already rational but must rather be brought to reason. Reason represents the highest potentiality of man and of existence; the two belong together. For when reason is accorded the status of substance, this means that at its highest level, as authentic reality, the world no longer stands opposed to the rational thought of men as mere material objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit). Rather, it is now comprehended by thought and defined as a concept (Begriff). That is, the external, antithetical character of material objectivity is overcome in a process through which the identity of subject and object is established as the rational, conceptual structure that is common to both. In its structure the world is considered accessible to reason, dependent on it, and dominated by it. **In this form philosophy is idealism; it subsumes being under thought.** But through this first thesis that made philosophy into rationalism and idealism it became critical philosophy as well. As the given world was bound up with rational thought and, indeed, ontologically dependent on it, all that contradicted reason or was not rational was posited as something that had to be overcome. Reason was established as a critical tribunal. In the philosophy of the bourgeois era reason took on the form of rational

- subjectivity. Man, the individual, was to examine and judge everything given by means of the power of his knowledge. Thus the concept of reason contains the concept of freedom as well. For such examination and judgment would be meaningless if man were not free to act in accordance with his insight and to bring what confronts him into accordance with reason" (pg. 100-101)
- **"...idealist rationalism [is] a bourgeois philosophy"** (pg. 103)
 - "Idealism tries to keep at least thought in a state of purity. It plays the peculiar double role of opposing both the true materialism of critical social theory and the false materialism of bourgeois practice. In idealism the individual protests the world by making both himself and the world free and rational in the realm of thought. This philosophy is in an essential sense individualistic" (pg. 104)
 - "The materialist protest and materialist critique originated in the struggle of oppressed groups for better living conditions and remain permanently associated with the actual process of this struggle. Western philosophy had established reason as authentic reality. In the bourgeois epoch the reality of reason became the task that the free individual was to fulfill. The subject was the locus of reason and the source of the process by which objectivity was to become rational. The material conditions of life, however, allotted freedom to reason only in pure thought and pure will. But a social situation has come about in which the realization of reason no longer needs to be restricted to pure thought and will. If reason means shaping life according to men's free decision on the basis of their knowledge, then the demand for reason henceforth means the creation of a social organization in which individuals can collectively regulate their lives in accordance with their needs. With the realization of reason in such a society, philosophy would disappear. It was the task of social theory to demonstrate this possibility and lay the foundation for a transformation of the economic structure. By so doing, it could provide theoretical leadership for those strata which, by virtue of their historical situation, were to bring about the change. **The interest of philosophy, concern with man, had found its new form in the interest of critical social theory. There is no philosophy alongside and outside this theory. For the philosophical construction of reason is replaced by the creation of a rational society.** The philosophical ideals of a better world and of true Being are incorporated into the practical aim of struggling mankind, where they take on a human form" (pg. 104-105)
 - **"freedom here means a real potentiality, a social relationship on whose realization human destiny depends."** (pg. 105)
 - "The transformation of a given status is not, of course, the business of philosophy. The philosopher can only participate in social struggles insofar as he is not a professional philosopher. This 'division of labor', too, results from the modern separation of the mental from the material means of production, and philosophy cannot overcome it. The abstract character of philosophical work in the past and present is rooted in the social conditions of existence. Adhering to the abstractness of philosophy is more appropriate to circumstances and closer to truth than is the pseudo-philosophical concreteness that condescends to social struggles. **What is true in philosophical concepts was arrived at by abstracting from the concrete status of man and is true only in such abstraction.** Reason, mind, morality, knowledge, and happiness are not only categories of bourgeois philosophy, but concerns of mankind. As such they must be preserved, if not derived anew" (pg. 108)
 - "Nor were specific philosophical contents 'resolved' into social facts. To the extent that **philosophy is more than ideology**, every such attempt must come to nought. When critical theory comes to terms with philosophy, it is interested in the truth content of philosophical concepts and problems. It presupposes that they really contain truth. The enterprise of the sociology of knowledge, to the contrary, is occupied only with the untruths, not the truths of previous philosophy. To be sure, even the highest philosophical categories are connected with social facts, even if only with the most general fact that the struggle of man with nature has not been undertaken by mankind as a free subject but instead has taken place only in class society. This fact comes to expression in many 'ontological differences' established by philosophy" (pg. 109)
 - **"But in its historical forms philosophy also contains insights into human and objective conditions whose truth points beyond previous society and thus cannot be completely reduced to it.** Here belong not only the contents dealt with under such concepts as reason, mind, freedom, morality, universality, and essence, but also important achievements of epistemology, psychology, and logic. Their truth content, which surmounts their social conditioning, presupposes not an eternal consciousness that transcendently constitutes the individual consciousness of historical subjects but only those particular historical subjects whose consciousness expresses itself in critical theory. It is only with and for this consciousness that the 'surpassing' content becomes visible in its real truth. The truth that it recognizes in philosophy is not reducible to existing social conditions. This would be the case only in a form of existence where consciousness is no longer separated from being, enabling the rationality of thought to proceed from the rationality of social existence. Until then truth that is more than the truth of what is can be attained and intended only in opposition to established social relations. To this negative condition, at least, it is subject" (pg. 109-110)
 - "If he pursues the idea of man, he must think in opposition to facticity. Wishing to conceive this idea in its philosophical purity and universality, he must abstract from the present state of affairs. **This abstractness, this radical withdrawal from the given, at least clears a path along which the individual in bourgeois society can seek the truth and adhere to what is known.** Beside concreteness and facticity, the thinking subject also leaves its misery 'outside'. But it cannot escape from itself, for it has incorporated the monadic isolation of the bourgeois individual into its premises. The subject thinks within a horizon of untruth that bars the door to real emancipation" (pg. 111)
 - ◆ "The process of knowledge is never terminated, because in every act of cognition the individual must once again re-enact the 'production of the world' and the categorical organization of experience. However, the process never gets any further because the restriction of 'productive' cognition to the transcendental sphere makes any new form of the world impossible. The constitution of the world occurs behind the backs of the individuals; yet it is their work." (pg. 111)
 - **"Critical theory's interest in the liberation of mankind binds it to certain ancient truths. It is at one with philosophy in maintaining that man can be more than a manipulable subject in the production process of class society."** (pg. 113)
 - "Here, however, abstractness results not from avoiding the status quo, but from orientation toward the future status of man. It cannot be supplanted by another, correct theory of the established order (as idealist abstractness was replaced by the critique of political economy). It cannot be succeeded by a new theory, but only by rational reality itself. **The abyss between rational and present reality cannot be bridged by conceptual thought. In order to retain what is not yet present as a goal in the present, phantasy is required.** The essential connection of phantasy with philosophy is evident from the function attributed to it by philosophers, especially Aristotle and Kant, under the title of 'imagination'. Owing to its unique capacity to 'intuit' an object though the latter be not present and to create something new out of given material of cognition, **imagination denotes a considerable degree of independence from the given, of freedom amid a world of unfreedom.** In surpassing what is present, it can anticipate the future." (pg. 113)
 - "True, in phantasy one can imagine anything. But critical theory does not envision an endless horizon of possibilities." (pg. 114)
 - ◆ "In a situation where such a future is a real possibility, phantasy is an important instrument in the task of continually holding the goal up to view. **Phantasy does not relate to the other cognitive faculties as illusion to truth** (which in fact, when it plumes itself on being the only truth, can perceive the truth of the future only as illusion). **Without phantasy, all philosophical knowledge remains in the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future,** which is the only link between philosophy and the real history of mankind." (pg. 114)
 - "Critical theory is, last but not least, critical of itself and of the social forces that make up its own basis." (pg. 115)
 - "Critical theory must concern itself to a hitherto unknown extent with the past – precisely insofar as it is concerned with the future" (pg. 116)
 - Chapter 5 - Hedonism (pg. 119)
 - **"Hedonism is the opposite pole to the philosophy of reason.** In abstract fashion, both movements of thought have preserved potentialities of existing society that point to a real human society. The philosophy of reason has emphasized the development of the productive forces, the free rational

- shaping of the conditions of life, the domination of nature, and the critical autonomy of the associated individuals. Hedonism has stressed the comprehensive unfolding and fulfillment of individual wants and needs, emancipation from an inhuman labor process, and liberation of the world for the purposes of enjoyment. In society up to the present, the two doctrines have been incompatible, as are the principles that they represent. The idea of reason aims at universality, at a society in which the antagonistic interests of 'empirical' individuals are canceled. To this community, however, the real fulfillment of individuals and their happiness remains alien and external; they must be sacrificed. **There is no harmony between the general and the particular interest, between reason and happiness.** If the individual believes that both interests are in accord, he becomes the victim of a necessary and salutary illusion; reason outwits individuals. The true interest (of universality) reifies itself in opposition to the individuals and becomes a power that overwhelms them" (pg. 124-125)
- "Hedonism wants to preserve the development and gratification of the individual as a goal within an anarchic and impoverished reality. But the protest against the reified community and against the meaningless sacrifices which are made to it leads only deeper into isolation and opposition between individuals as long as the historical forces that could transform the established society into a true community have not matured and are not comprehended. **For hedonism, happiness remains something exclusively subjective.** The particular interest of the individual, just as it is, is affirmed as the true interest and is justified against every and all community. **This is the limit of hedonism: its attachment to the individualism of competition.** Its concept of happiness can be derived only by abstracting from all universality and community. Abstract happiness corresponds to the abstract freedom of the monadic individual. The concrete objectivity of happiness is a concept for which hedonism finds no evidence." (pg. 125)
 - **"The apologetic aspect of hedonism** is located at a deeper level. It is to be found in hedonism's abstract conception of the subjective side of happiness, in its inability to distinguish between true and false wants and interests and between true and false enjoyment. It accepts the wants and interests of individuals as simply given and as valuable in themselves. Yet these wants and interests themselves, and not merely their gratification, already contain the stunted growth, the repression, and the untruth with which men grow up in class society. The affirmation of the one already contains the affirmation of the other. The inability of hedonism to apply the category of truth to happiness, its fundamental relativism, is not a logical or epistemological fault of a philosophical system. It can be neither corrected within the system nor eliminated by a more comprehensive and better philosophical system. It originates in the form of social relations to which hedonism is linked, and all attempts to avoid it through immanent differentiation lead to new contradictions." (pg. 126)
 - **"The moralization of pleasure is called for by the existence of antagonistic society."** (pg. 133)
 - "Critical theory¹⁸ comes to the question of the truth and universality of happiness in the elucidation of the concepts with which it seeks to determine the rational form of society" (pg. 136)
 - "Enjoyment is an attitude or mode of conduct toward things and human beings. The former, unless they have been made generally available by nature or by social regulation, are commodities accessible to corresponding purchasing power. For the great majority of humanity, only the very cheapest portion of these commodities is available. They become objects of enjoyment as commodities, and their origin is preserved within them – even enjoyment has a class character. The cheap is not as good as the dear. Precisely insofar as they lie outside the labor process, relations between men are essentially relations between members of the same class. For the majority, one's partner in pleasure will also be one's partner in the poverty of the same class. These conditions of life are a paltry showplace for happiness. The continual pressure under which the great masses must be kept for the reproduction of this society has only been augmented by the monopolistic accumulation of wealth. Any growth of enjoyment would endanger necessary discipline and make difficult the punctual and reliable coordination of the masses who keep the apparatus of the whole in operation. The economic regulation of enjoyment is supplemented by the police and the administration of justice. Pleasure wants essentially its own augmentation and refinement. The unfolding of the personality must not be merely spiritual. Industrial society has differentiated and intensified the objective world in such a manner that only an extremely differentiated and intensified sensuality can respond adequately to it. Modern technology contains all the means necessary to extract from things and bodies their mobility, beauty, and softness in order to bring them closer and make them available. Both the wants corresponding to these potentialities and the sensual organs through which they can be assimilated have been developed. What man can perceive, feel, and do in the midst of advanced civilization corresponds to the newly opened-up wealth of the world. But only those groups with the greatest purchasing power can take advantage of the expanded capacities and their gratification. The development of sensuality is only one part of the development of the productive forces: the need to fetter them is rooted in the antagonistic social system within which this development has taken place. There are many ways in which the ruled strata can be educated to diversion and substitute gratification. Here sports and a wide variety of permitted popular entertainment fulfill their historical function. In authoritarian states sadistic terror against enemies of the regime has found unforeseen modes of organized discharge. At the movies the common man can regularly participate in the glamour of the world of the stars and yet be aware at the same time that it is only a film and that there, too, there is splendor, bitterness, trouble, guilt, atonement, and the triumph of the good. The labor process, in which the laborer's organs atrophy and are coarsened, guarantees that the sensuousness of the lower strata does not develop beyond the technically necessary minimum. What is allowed beyond this as immediate enjoyment is circumscribed by the penal code" (pg. 137-138)
 - "Pleasure in the abasement of another as well as self-abasement under a stronger will, pleasure in the manifold surrogates for sexuality, in meaningless sacrifices, in the heroism of war are false pleasures because the drives and needs that fulfill themselves in them make men less free, blinder, and more wretched than they have to be. They are the drives and needs of individuals who were raised in an antagonistic society" (pg. 142)
 - "To the extent to which they do not completely disappear in a new form of social organization, modes of their gratification are conceivable in which the most extreme potentialities of men can really unfold happiness. This liberation of potentialities is a matter of social practice. What men, with their developed sensuous and psychic organs and the wealth created by their work, can undertake to attain the highest measure of happiness rests with this practice. Understood in this way, happiness can no longer or in any way be merely subjective: it enters the realm of men's communal thought and action." (pg. 142)
 - "Only today, at the highest stage of development of the established order, when the objective forces making for a higher order of humanity have become mature, and only in connection with the theory and practice linked to such a transformation, may the critique of the totality of the established order also take as its object the happiness that this order provides. **It appears that individuals raised to be integrated into the antagonistic labor process cannot be judges of their own happiness.** They have been prevented from knowing their true interest. Thus it is possible for them to designate their condition as happy and, without external compulsion, embrace the system that oppresses them. The results of modern plebiscites prove that men separated from possible truth can be brought to vote against themselves. As long as individuals see their interest only as getting along within the given order, such plebiscites pose no problems for the authoritarian apparatus. Terror merely supplements the delusions of the governed. **Appeal to interest is untrue**" (pg. 143)
 - "Their responsibility will be infinitely greater, because they will no longer have the false pleasure of masochistic security in the strong protection of a heteronomous power. The internal, real union of duty and happiness (and not a union effected in the world beyond), which idealist ethics had doubted, is possible only in freedom. This was Kant's intention when he founded the concept of duty on the autonomy of the person. Through its limitation to the freedom of the pure will, autonomy limits itself in favor of a social order that it could only admit in an abstract

form" (pg. 145)

- **"The truth to which the liberated individual relates in happiness is both general and particular.** The subject is no longer isolated in its interest against others. His life can be happy beyond the contingency of the moment, because his conditions of existence are no longer determined by a labor process which creates wealth only through the perpetuation of poverty and privation. Instead they are regulated through the rational self-administration of the whole in which the subject participates actively. **The individual can relate to others as equals and to the world as his world, no longer alienated from him. Mutual understanding will no longer be permeated by unhappiness, since insight and passion will no longer come into conflict with a reified form of human relationship.**" (pg. 145)
 - ◆ "General happiness presupposes knowledge of the true interest: that the social life-process be administered in a manner which brings into harmony the freedom of individuals and the preservation of the whole on the basis of given objective historical and natural conditions. With the development of social antagonisms the connection of happiness with knowledge was obscured. The abstract reason of isolated individuals is certainly powerless over a happiness abandoned to contingency" (pg. 145-146)
 - "It is true, of course, that men intend not happiness but, in each case, specific ends whose fulfillment then brings happiness. In the specific goals which are aimed at in solitary struggle for a rational society, happiness is no longer merely an attendant contingency. It is built into the very structure of the new order of the conditions of existence that have been demanded. **Happiness ceases to be a mere subjective state of feeling when general concern for the potentialities of individuals is effective at the level of the liberated needs and wants of the subjects.**" (pg. 146-147)
- "Freedom of knowledge is a part of real freedom, which can only exist together with common decision and action on the basis of what is known to be true. The essential role of truth for the happiness of individuals makes the characterization of happiness as pleasure and enjoyment appear insufficient. When knowledge of truth is no longer linked to knowledge of guilt, poverty, and injustice, it is no longer forced to remain external to a happiness ceded to immediate, sensual relationships. Even the most personal human relations can be opened to happiness in a really guiltless knowledge. Perhaps they would thereby become, in fact, that free community in life of which idealist morality had expected the highest unfolding of individuality. Knowledge will no longer disturb pleasure. Perhaps it can even become pleasure, which the ancient idea of nous had dared to see as the highest determination of knowledge. The bogey of the unchained voluptuary who would abandon himself only to his sensual wants is rooted in the separation of intellectual from material productive forces and the separation of the labor process from the process of consumption. Overcoming this separation belongs to the preconditions of freedom. The development of material wants must go together with the development of psychic and mental wants. The organization of technology, science, and art changes with their changed utilization and changed content. **When they are no longer under the compulsion of a system of production based on the unhappiness of the majority, and of the pressures of rationalization, internalization, and sublimation, then mind and spirit can only mean an augmentation of happiness.** Hedonism is both abolished and preserved in critical theory and practice. If freedom prevails in the spiritual and mental side of life, i.e. in culture, and if culture is no longer subject to the compulsion of internalization, then it becomes meaningless to restrict happiness to sensual pleasure." (pg. 148)
- Chapter 6 - Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber (pg. 151)
 - **"In the unfolding of capitalist rationality, irrationality becomes reason:** reason as frantic development of productivity, conquest of nature, enlargement of the mass of goods (and their accessibility for broad strata of the population); irrational because higher productivity, domination of nature, and social wealth become destructive forces. This destruction is not only figurative, as in the betrayal of so-called higher cultural values, but literal: the struggle for existence intensifies both within national states and internationally, and pent-up aggression is discharged in the legitimation of medieval cruelty (torture) and in the scientifically organized destruction of men." (pg. 155-156)
- Chapter 7 - Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown (pg. 171)
 - "Psychoanalysis in its most extreme and most advanced concepts guides Brown's interpretation of the history of men and of the human condition." (pg. 171)
- Chapter 8 - Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Societies (pg. 187)
 - "I propose to consider here the strains and stresses in **the so-called 'affluent society'**, a phrase which has (rightly or wrongly) been coined to describe contemporary American society. Its main characteristics are: (1) an abundant industrial and technical capacity which is to a great extent spent in the production and distribution of luxury goods, gadgets, waste, planned obsolescence, military or semimilitary equipment – in short, in what economists and sociologists used to call 'unproductive' goods and services; (2) a rising standard of living, which also extends to previously underprivileged parts of the population; (3) a high degree of concentration of economic and political power, combined with a high degree of organization and government intervention in the economy; (4) scientific and pseudoscientific investigation, control, and manipulation of private and group behavior, both at work and at leisure (including the behavior of the psyche, the soul, the unconscious, and the subconscious) for commercial and political purposes. All these tendencies are interrelated: they make up the syndrome which expresses the normal functioning of the 'affluent society'." (pg. 187)
 - **"As a tentative definition of 'sick society' we can say that a society is sick when its basic institutions and relations, its structure, are such that they do not permit the use of the available material and intellectual resources for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs.** The larger the discrepancy between the potential and the actual human conditions, the greater the social need for what I term 'surplus-repression', that is, repression necessitated not by the growth and preservation of civilization but by the vested interest in maintaining an established society. Such surplus-repression introduces (over and above, or rather underneath, the social conflicts) new strains and stresses in the individuals" (pg. 189)
 - "I suggest that **the strains derive from the basic contradiction between the capabilities of this society, which could produce essentially new forms of freedom amounting to a subversion of the established institutions on the one hand, and the repressive use of these capabilities on the other.** The contradiction explodes – and is at the same time 'resolved', 'contained' – in the ubiquitous aggression prevalent in this society. Its most conspicuous (but by no means isolated) manifestation is the military mobilization and its effect on the mental behavior of the individuals, but within the context of the basic contradiction, aggressiveness is fed by many sources. The following seem to be foremost:" (pg. 194)
 - "(1) The dehumanization of the process of production and consumption. Technical progress is identical with the increasing elimination of personal initiative, inclination, taste, and need from the provision of goods and services. This tendency is liberating if the available resources and techniques are used for freeing the individual from labor and recreation which are required for the reproduction of the established institutions but are parasitic, wasteful, and dehumanizing in terms of the existing technical and intellectual capabilities. The same tendency often gratifies hostility. (2) The conditions of crowding, noise, and overtness characteristic of mass society. As René Dubos has said, the need for "quiet, privacy, independence, initiative, and some open space" are not "frills or luxuries but constitute real biological necessities". Their lack injures the instinctual structure itself. Freud has emphasized the 'asocial' character of Eros – the mass society achieves an 'over-socialization' to which the individual reacts 'with all sorts of frustrations, repressions, aggressions, and fears which soon develop into genuine neuroses'" (pg. 194-195)

d. Further Readings:

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